BRAC 2005
Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group

Meeting Minutes of August 19, 2003

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security & Information Operations) chaired this meeting. The list of attendees is attached.

The Chair opened the second meeting of the Intelligence JCSG with introductions, reminding all of the importance of the task ahead and expecting everyone in attendance today (and in the future) to be empowered to speak for their agency. She reiterated the policy that only designated Primary and Alternates are allowed to attend these deliberative sessions; no substitutes will be permitted. Lastly, it was her intent to keep these meetings and work product at the lowest classification level possible. However, if some issues required higher classification, special arrangements will be made to accommodate these discussions, minutes and work product.

The Chair then turned the meeting over to [redacted] who reviewed with the group a number of administrative items that dealt with how the group would operate, correspondence and communication procedures, where the work would be conducted and how to control and use work materials. The Chair stated all participants will be heard, but the BRAC process has a defined set of deliverables and dates to be met, therefore decisions will be made and the group will move on to the next discussion item. She next asked how the group should approach the task, by function or process, and opined that it would be best to focus on what made sense for the 21st century, to look at higher echelons vice embedded intelligence at the tactical level which would be better evaluated by the Military Services. All recommendations, including business process reengineering suggestions need to be tied to facility closure and realignment recommendations. Everyone agreed with this approach.

Moving to the next agenda item, [redacted] asked for the groups thoughts on the recommended functions/subordinate functions for analysis (attached) that were consolidated from individual agency and Service submissions (attached). [redacted] pointed out this list of functions is how the intelligence community traditionally views its functions.

The group reviewed and discussed each proposed function and subordinate function(s). The following is a summary of decisions using the proposed functions handout as a guide:

- Collection and Processing should be expanded to include Tasking and Control and all should form the basis for one intelligence subgroup: Tasking, Collection, Control

and Processing. The subfunctions to the above four functions that are listed on the handout would remain the same. Everyone agreed that satellite launching facilities should also be evaluated in this subgroup. This effort should be coordinated with the USAF BRAC effort. It was further suggested that a representative from the Joint Staff (J-2) should be invited again to participate in this subgroup. The Chair took this for action.

- Analysis and Production should form a second subgroup. The sub-functions listed (in black) would remain as stated; however, the Theater sub-function does not include functions that are embedded in a Service operating unit.
- Dissemination, as depicted, would become the third subgroup.
- Personnel Management, Financial Management, and the proliferation of intelligence fusion centers would need to be addressed in some manner.
- Education and Training and Research and Development (moved from the Excluded functions list) will become subgroups.
- The following is the disposition of the recommended Excluded functions:
  - Embedded Service/Mission Specific Intelligence – Excluded because it is tactical intelligence normally embedded at the unit level.
- Notional Metrics would be reworked by [redacted] to capture as many metrics as possible understanding at this time this is a "notional" list.

The Chair stated the next step(s) were to get a written report drafted by the end of the week which will be sent out for comment. The final report was due to the ISG on 22 August 2003. She reminded the members that Transformational Options were due at the same time and that only NSA (attached) had submitted options.

The Chair closed the meeting stating that a written Capacity Analysis Report was due to the ISG on 3 October 2003 and a Capacity Brief would be presented by the Chair to the ISG on 10 October 2003.

Approved: _____
Carol A. Haave
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Security & Information Operations)
Chair, Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group

Attachments:

1. List of Attendees

2. Agenda
3. Recommended Functions/Subordinate Functions for Analysis
4. USMC comments on Recommended Functions for Analysis
5. Army comments on Recommended Functions for Analysis
6. NRO Functional Input
7. NSA Transformational Options for BRAC 2005

[redacted]

DCN: 11301

Intelligence JCSG Meeting
August 19, 2003

Attendees

Members/Primary:

- Ms. Carol Haave, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security and Information Operations), Chair
- Mr. Kenneth Dumm, Associate Director for Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters USAF

Alternates:

- Ms. Jean Bennett, Army G2

[redacted]

Others:

[redacted]

- [redacted]
- Ms. Karyn L. Vice, NSA/NCRDEF

[redacted]

- Mr. Tom Ferguson, NIMA/067

[redacted]

- Mr. Peter Potochney, OSD BRAC
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

[redacted]

DCN: 11301

[redacted]

Base Realignment and Closure 2005

Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group

19 August 2003

1300 – 1315	Administrative Remarks	Carol Haave
1315 – 1415	Review of Functions Outline	All
1415 – 1430	Closing Remarks/Next Deliverable	[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

INTELLIGENCE JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

Recommended Functions/Subordinate Functions for Analysis

- **Collection (Basic sources of intelligence collection)**
  IMINT
  SIGINT
  HUMINT
  MASINT (NIMA recommends deletion)

- **Processing (Associated basic intelligence collection processing functions)**
  IMINT
  SIGINT
  HUMINT
  MASINT (NIMA recommends deletion)

- **Analysis (Basic types of intelligence analysis)** (A/N/AF/NIMA recommend combine Analysis and Production)
  Basic
  Current (NIMA recommends I&W be addressed under Current)
  Indications and Warning
  Scientific and Technical
  Predictive
  Strategic Issues (NIMA recommends add)
  Counter Terrorism (NIMA recommends add)

- **Production (Basic division of intelligence production)**
  National
  Theater (Navy recommends change to DoD)
  Service (Navy recommends add)

  (NIMA recommends replace above with :
  Operational
  National Policy and Security
  Homeland Security)

- **Dissemination (Basic categories of intelligence dissemination)**
  Time Sensitive
  Not Time Sensitive
  (NIMA recommends deletion of the above two sub-functions. No substitute language was provided)

[redacted]

[redacted]

- **Special Activities (Additional intelligence functions)**
  Counterintelligence (Navy recommends deletion)
  Intelligence Support to **Information Operations** (Army, Navy, and Air Force recommend deletion)

  Homeland Security/Homeland Defense (Navy recommends add)

  (NIMA recommends the following adds:
  Precision Engagement
  Targeting
  Safety of Navigation
  Support to the DCI Center
  President's Daily Brief)

Excluded functions

- **Personnel Management (Subset of above functions)**
- **Financial Management (Subset of above functions)**
- **Education, Training,** Ranges, **and Exercises**, to include M&S **(Subset of above functions or addressed by Education and Training JCSG)** (Air Force rewording) (Navy recommends add to Functions)
- **Research and Development (Performed largely by the private sector)** (Air Force recommends add to Functions above)
- **Installation Specific Security Programs (Subset of above functions)**
- **Information Technology Acquisition Management (Subset of above functions)**
- Embedded Service/Mission Specific Intelligence (Unit intelligence and mission intelligence are unique applications and best treated along with their support missions.) (Air Force recommends add)

Notional Metrics

- Mission, priority, and customer (Air Force recommends add)
- **Efficient and effective business process**, to include evolving DoD transformation related joint architectures (Air Force recommends rewording) (NIMA recommends separation of efficient and effective)
- **Unique facilities/equipment** (NIMA recommends delete)
- **System or program requirements that dictate a specific geographic location**
- **Security requirements**
- **Dispersal requirements** (NIMA recommends delete)
- **COOP/COG redundancy requirements**
- Time sensitive/Not time sensitive (Air Force recommends add)
- Customer satisfaction (NIMA recommends add)
- National policy and security (NIMA recommends add)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Organization



[redacted]

DCN: 11301

[redacted]

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS,
INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO
1000
IOC/BRAC
15 Aug 03

From: USMC Action Officer for Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group
To: Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence; [redacted]

Subj: USMC comments on Recommended Functions for Analysis by the Intelligence JCSG

1. Before the JCSG can settle on what function to analyze, the JCSG must address two questions on the scope of the analysis.

a. First, is the primary goal of the JCSG to transform the intelligence function, or to maximize efficiency by reconfiguring the current infrastructure? As the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence is still developing the transformation plan, we believe the JCSG should focus on reconfiguring the infrastructure to maximize efficiency. It is appropriate to adapt the infrastructure to the new transformational policy where that can be done, but developing a new transformational policy is not our primary goal.

b. The second scope question is how deep should the JCSG go into the DoD intelligence. The bulk of Marine Corps Intelligence (almost 70% from a manpower perspective) is embedded in the operating forces -- providing support to tactical and operational-level commanders. The intelligence capabilities and supporting infrastructure for this support are part and parcel of the Marine Corps' operational activities and cannot be analyzed outside of a study of those operational units themselves. If the service BRAC determines that a particular base should be closed and its tenant operational unit (e.g. a division) should be moved, than naturally, its embedded intelligence unit would have to relocate and/or be realigned. Therefore, we believe the JCSG should begin its analysis at the echelon above Corps intelligence architecture, focusing on Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Centers, RSOCs, JRICs, service intelligence centers, and combat support agency/DoD field activities with an intelligence mission. There should be special emphasis on NFIP-funded activities such as DIA, NSA, NIMA, NRO.

2. We recommend changes to the proposed functions for analysis.

a. There are two obvious ways to organize the functions, by discipline or according to the intelligence cycle. Neither is ideal. Organizing by discipline ignores the obvious commonalities across disciplines; using the intelligence cycle will lead to inefficiencies and duplicative effort as the various disciplines are analyzed more than once.

b. The Marine Corps recommends a hybrid approach by nominating the following functional areas for analysis:

[redacted]

[redacted]

(1) IMINT.

(2) SIGINT.

(3) MASINT.

(4) Production (encompassing Analysis and Dissemination).

c. We believe that the unique requirements of IMINT, SIGINT and MASINT require those disciplines be looked at in an end-to-end analysis, from collection through dissemination. Dividing these disciplines across functional areas would be inefficient and, more importantly, may result in missing opportunities for improvement. Analysis and Production are inextricably linked, and generally performed in the same Center or Facility. For this reason they should be analyzed together. Dissemination could be grouped with Analysis and Production, but the need for in depth analysis of our critical intelligence networks may require a separate functional area be established.

d. The Marine Corps recommends that HUMINT, Counterintelligence, and Special Activities be excluded as these functions have very limited associated facilities and infrastructure. However, we recommend that the members of the JCSG have knowledge of their service and agency intelligence special activities since the Intelligence JSCG will likely be asked by other JCSGs to comment on closing or realignment of facilities that could have an unknown or unintended impact on a special program.

3. POC for this submission is [redacted] DSN [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent:
To:
Cc:

Subject: [redacted]

Classification: [redacted]

The Army DCS, G-2 has reviewed the "Recommended Functions/Subordinate Functions for Analysis" proposal discussed at the 7 Aug Intelligence JCSG and provide the following comments:

1) Recommend the Analysis and Production functions be consolidated and organizationally formed into one element (Sub-Panel). Recognizing that each of the basic intelligence functions overlap, we feel this is one area that is difficult to separate and could result in considerable duplication.

2) Recommend under the "Special Activities" functions, Information Operations be changed to Intelligence Support to Information Operations. Though the intelligence community is a major contributor to the IO effort, it must be recognized that IO is an operations function. The scope of the review for the JCSG should be limited to the intelligence activity in support of IO.

We look forward to participating in the working sessions of the Intelligence JCSG and want to be a major player. We must ensure the intelligence communities efforts are focused on the new defense strategy and support the warfighters.

thanks

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: [redacted]

Subj: Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group Analytical Framework

1. [redacted] After review and some discussion on the outline you provided I wanted to forward the following comments. As I le[redacted] know when she called to reschedule the meeting from 15 to 19 Au[redacted] be (am) out of town. My designated alternate for the remainder of the BRAC process will be Ms. Claudia Clark, Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence (703.614.0281/0283). She is aware of the 19 August meeting and is trying to clear a hole in her schedule to attend. She has [redacted] numbe[redacted] has hers.

2. Comments on the draft analytical framework. I don't have any major objections or improvements to recommend. It seems to be a reasonable way to break down the problem. In the category of minor comments I offer the following:

   - Education and Training: Recommend considering including this as a functional category rather than leaving it to the E&T JCSG. From an infrastructure perspective it seems we do have facilities/locations the size of which do warrant review from our group. In a relative sense, probably more square footage is devoted to training than many other functional/sub-functional areas (HUMINT for example) and looking at training could reveal some opportunities for transformation of some intelligence business(es). Also, for some E&T facilities may play a role in other areas such as COOP relocation, surge for crisis response, etc.
   - Analysis and Production: For simplicity, I think you might be able to combine analysis and production into a single group. This will probably be the largest and most important, but using another approach would artificially separate the two functions that most often take placed together.
   - Service/DoD/National: Within the A&P Functional category, it might make sense to categorize or register facilities as Service, DoD and national and thereby highlight some potential duplication, potential synergies by co-location, or non-productive redundancies.
   - Homeland Security and Defense: Somewhere we should probably look at mission and customer sets, and in doing so, look at which facilities/commands/etc. support new/emerging areas. These might provide opportunities to transform since they may have been addresses initially (in the last year to two years) in an ad hoc, do-it-today manner. If they stand the test of time and make the transition from emerging to enduring challenges/mission areas (like HLS/HLD) a realigned

infrastructure to support them might make sense and expose some BRAC opportunities.

[redacted]

- Counterintelligence: To the greatest extent possible, CI should be included in the same functional categories (derived from the intelligence cycle) we are using for the rest of the JCSG, rather than breaking all of CI out as a Special Activity.
- Information Operations: Same with IO. Do we mean to look at IO facilities, or do we really mean intelligence support to IO? As a customer support area (if we mean intelligence support to IO) it should be any different than support to strike, support to humanitarian efforts/civil affairs, etc. Why not include in the other categories (collection, analysis, etc.).

[redacted]

INTELLIGENCE JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

Recommended Functions/Subordinate Functions for Analysis

Collection (Basic source of intelligence collection)

- IMINT
- SIGINT
- HUMINT
- MASINT

Note: Bounded to fixed collection sites and fixed infrastructure supporting non-fixed collection assets.
*Rationale: Systems are not the focus, facilities are.

Processing (Associated basic intelligence collection processing functions)

- IMINT
- SIGINT
- HUMINT
- MASINT

Analysis & Production (Basic types of intelligence analysis)

- Basic
- Current
- Indications and Warning
- Science and Technical
- Predictive

~~Production (Basic division of intelligence production)~~

- ~~National~~
- ~~Theater~~

*Rationale: Dividing line between analysis and production is fine and significance of distinction not clear, particularly as initiatives like digital production distribute production function.

Dissemination (Basic categories of intelligence dissemination)

- Time Sensitive
- Not Time Sensitive

Special Activities (Additional intelligence functions)

- Counterintelligence

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~- Information Operations~~
*Rationale: Should be Intelligence Support to IO, not IO. IO is not an intelligence function. (Intel support is subset of above functions)

Excluded Functions

- Personnel Management (Subset of above functions)
- Financial Management (Subset of above functions)
- Education, Training, Ranges and Exercises – Including M & S for these functions (Subset of above functions or addressed by Education and Training JCSG) *Rationale: Training and exercising integrated ISR packages drive range and M&S requirements
- Research & Development ~~(Performed largely by the private sector)~~ (IC should address within the Technical JCSG) *Rationale: There is a lot of Intel applicable R&D that does go on within the DoD and IC
- Installation Specific Security Programs (Subset of above functions)
- Information Technology Acquisition Management (Subset of above functions)
- Intelligence Support to Information Operations (Subset of above functions)
- Embedded Service/Mission Specific Intelligence -Non-ISR Units/Missions (Addressed in Service Studies) *Rationale: Focus of Cross-Service Groups is common functions. Unit intel and mission intel are unique applications and are best treated along with their supported missions.

Notional Metrics

- Mission, Priority, Customer *Rationale: Needed for "military" value
- Efficient and effective business process (Includes support of Evolving Joint Architectures) *Rationale: DoD Transformation of Force Modernization based on Architecture drive requirements
- Unique facilities/equipment
- System or program requirements that dictate a specific geographic location
- Security requirements
- Dispersal requirements
- COOP/COG redundancy requirements
- Time Sensitive/Not Time Sensitive *Rationale: This distinction can occur in any of the functions

[redacted]

[redacted]

Organization

Combine Analysis and Production SubGroups

[redacted]

NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
4600 SANDAMORE ROAD
BETHESDA, MARYLAND 20817-5007

V-196-03/SIIF

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SECURITY, INFORMATION OPERATIONS/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Subject: National Imagery and Mapping Agency's Representatives to the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group

1. Per your request, the following individuals will represent NIMA on the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group:
   a. Primary: Mr. Thomas A. Ferguson, Director, Office of Geospatial Intelligence Management at (301) 227-7089.
   b. Alternate: [redacted] Deputy Director, Strategic Transformation Office at [redacted].

2. NIMA's point of contact for this request is [redacted] Facilities Program Division at [redacted].

[redacted]

[redacted]

DCN: 11301

NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
4600 SANGAMORE ROAD
BETHESDA, MARYLAND 20816-5003

U-101-03/SIIP

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SECURITY AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS/COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: BRAC 2005 Intelligence Joint Cross Service Group (I-JCSG) Recommended Functions/Subordinate Functions for Analysis

1. At the I-JCSG meeting of 7 August 2003, you requested comments on the functions and subordinate functions proposed for analysis by the I-JCSG. NIMA's comments are enclosed.

2. Point of contact for these comments is [redacted] Deputy Director, Strategic Transformation Office at [redacted].

[redacted]

Enclosure a/s

DCN: 11301

[redacted]

NIMA Comments on
Recommended Functions/Subordinate Functions for Analysis
by the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group

Overall Comments

1. The definitions of the Functions/Subordinate Functions for Analysis are not clear and should be better defined. They also seem to end before conflict operations. For example does the Notional Metric "Security" include physical security (with Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP), computer security, information security, and other dimensions of this overarching issue, or is exclusively one facet of the issue? We recommend the functions be better defined to facilitate the analysis.

Recommended Functions/Subordinate Functions for Analysis:

Collection

1. We recommend that MASINT be deleted as a collection function. The decision to disestablish the MASINT Office has faded MASINT as a distinct discipline.

Processing

1. We recommend that MASINT be deleted as stated above.

Analysis

1. We believe there are inherent problems in separating analysis and production as we move toward integrated processes, and their collocation is important to the timely performance. Therefore, we recommend that these functions be merged.
2. We see the need to include "Strategic issues" in this function to include supplemental topics as treaty monitoring, deeply buried and hardened targets and border monitoring.
3. We recommend that "Counter Terrorism" be added as a function of intelligence analysis.
4. We understand Basic to be geospatial foundation data, order of battle, and adversary doctrine understanding. We see Indications and Warnings as a subcategory of Current. Current would also include high current interest, force disposition, etc.

Production

1. We understand this function is intended represent a customer perspective. We recommend that the subordinate functions of "Operational," "National Policy and Security," and "Homeland Security" rather than those proposed. We believe that National and Theater are not sufficiently comprehensive and do not extend from the policy-maker to the tactical operator.

[redacted]

DCN: 11301

[redacted]

Dissemination:

1. Time sensitivity is a characteristic function of analysis and production, especially with the move toward a net-centric environment. Therefore, we recommend that this subordinate function be eliminated.

Excluded Functions:

1. No additions or deletions are recommended.

Special Activities

1. We recommend adding "Precision Engagement," "Targeting," "Safety of Navigation," "Support to the DCI Center," and the "President's Daily Brief" as subordinate functions under Special Activities. These subordinate functions are embedded parts of the mission of the defense agencies and should therefore be part of the analytical framework.

Notional Metrics:

1. "National policy and security" should be added to the proposed metrics. Core missions of the defense agencies include national policy and security. These missions include support to Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. These missions are embedded in daily operations, and are an operational responsibility to the National Foreign Intelligence Program. Any study involving intelligence functions of the defense agencies must incorporate the national values of these functions as an integral part of such analysis.
2. We recommend that separate "efficient" and "effective" business practices be analyzed. We believe that each, as a metric, is worth asking separately, and sequentially. We believe these metrics should embody time and cost, workforce productivity, facilitating interaction and coordination, the ability to recruit and maintain a skilled workforce, and transition impacts.
3. We recommend that "Unique facilities/equipment" be deleted as a subordinate function. It is not clear why this is necessary as a metric.
4. We also recommend that "Dispersal requirements" be deleted as a subordinate function. The intent of this metric is not clear and it seems to be adequately covered in the COOP/COG redundancy requirements metric.
5. We recommend that "Customer satisfaction" be added as a proposed metric.

[redacted]

DCN: 11301

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

Office of the Deputy Director

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SECURITY AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group for BRAC 2005 Functional Input

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is pleased to name [redacted] primary and alternate representatives respectively for the Intelligence Joint-Cross Service Group. Attached is background information you may need for your records.

In preparation for the 19 August 2003 meeting, the NRO offers the following generic functional areas for consideration in the planning and analysis phase of this effort.

a. Presence of NRO collection management/mission management systems

b. Presence of NRO calibration and test systems

c. Presence of NRO spacecraft command and control systems

d. Presence of NRO data processing, analysis, and reporting systems

e. Presence of NRO training facility, systems

f. Presence of NRO data storage facility or systems

g. Presence of NRO system development

h. Presence of an NRO downlink facility

i. Presence of an NRO launch facility

j. Presence of an NRO communications point of presence

k. Presence of an NRO Space Control Segment

l. Presence of Alternate Space Control Segments

m. Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN)

n. Space Surveillance Network (SSN)

[redacted]

DCN: 11301

[redacted]

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

20 June 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, & LOGISTICS

SUBJECT: Transformational Options for BRAC 2005

In response to your memorandum dated 23 May 2003, subject as above, the National Security Agency/Central Security Service evaluated a number of force realignment approaches. The evaluation team analyzed the impact of changes to signals intelligence and information assurance forces in regard to improving warfighting capability and efficiency. The attached option presents a means to achieve progress toward better integration of intelligence systems, improvements in joint operations, and greater efficiency in deploying signals intelligence capabilities in a rapidly changing security environment.

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the BRAC analytic framework. I look forward to supporting the Department's progress toward a more effective and efficient force, enabled by an infrastructure that meets the needs of the force and provides a quality environment for our people.

Michael V. Hayden

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy to Mr. Haase for BRAC meeting tomorrow
Chris

Encl:
a/s

Copy Furnished:
Director of Central Intelligence
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

[redacted]

[redacted]

Realignment of Signals Intelligence Exploitation & Production Centers

[redacted] Combatant Commanders require Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) as a key component of a multi-source intelligence picture. The joint Regional Security Operations Centers (RSOCs) and service airborne Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) systems represent two of the primary SIGINT assets that meet the Combatant Commander's varied intelligence needs. Under the current force alignment, the RSOCs and remoting-capable airborne ISR assets are not located together; the two asset types maintain completely independent exploitation & production centers, maintenance support, and management staff, even when remoting technologies would enable consolidation of such resources. By consolidating the ground systems and staff for the airborne ISR resources with the RSOCs, the Department of Defense can improve the intelligence support to the warfighter while achieving notable efficiencies in infrastructure and personnel resources. These changes will advance the Department toward the goals of achieving information superiority and providing integrated, globally available, and persistent reconnaissance capabilities, as directed in the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and Joint Vision 2020.

Improving Operational Support to Warfighting

[redacted] Enabling decision superiority through timely intelligence relies on more than advanced reconnaissance technology. Skilled people are the secret ingredient. The collected data can only be transformed into meaningful intelligence when people with world-class linguistic and analytic skills have access to the reconnaissance systems. Accurate forecasts of sensor deployments to different geographic regions are required if each ISR system must maintain an independent analysis and production center. Such forecasting has proven difficult. Furthermore, the current force alignment dilutes mission-critical skills between several geographic locations, creates potential operational discontinuities as intelligence support requirements change, and results in greater overall manpower needs and infrastructure costs. Consolidating ISR ground system operations for the U-2 and RC-12 platforms with the RSOCs not only mitigates these drawbacks of the current posture but also gains new capabilities in providing global, persistent surveillance.

[redacted] The maintenance of separate ISR ground systems, with dedicated linguists and analysts, requires precise forecasting of future deployment possibilities, so the correct linguist resource mix will be available when the unit is deployed in support of a Combatant Commander. When the linguist need forecast is inaccurate, mitigation strategies involving relay of the remoting capabilities must be employed, nullifying the perceived benefit in dedicated linguist resources. Forecasting the right sensor-to-people mix proved difficult enough under previous defense strategies, facing known, fixed adversaries. Today's National Security Strategy calls for even greater flexibility, as we "cop[e] with the challenge of following a far more complex and elusive set of targets."

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]O) Consolidating these resources will also concentrate linguistic and analytic talent. Language proficiency is highly perishable; constant operational exposure is critical if the linguist is to remain ready. The combination of language expertise with knowledge of adversary military capabilities and intelligence analysis techniques is also crucial to success. The requirement to duplicate this skill combination at several locations potentially dilutes the effectiveness of the assets when they must be used in support of military operations. The impact on effectiveness is particularly notable when a unit does not execute peacetime intelligence operations. Similar to the maneuver warfare maxim to "never hold artillery in reserve," intelligence assets lose their effectiveness when "held in reserve" during peacetime. Combining the familiarity with the Combatant Commander's requirements gained through peacetime support with the constant exercising of perishable skills results in greater effectiveness across the spectrum of military operations.

[redacted]This transformation to a truly joint operation enables far greater flexibility in supporting the redeployment of ISR sensors into areas not previously considered critical to U.S. security and reduces the potential of operational discontinuities. By co-locating the exploitation and production assets from the onset, the force gains agility in responding to rapidly changing needs, since equipment cross-training can be accomplished prior to a contingency situation. If the combination of an Air Force reconnaissance system with Army linguists is the best solution for a given operation, the consolidated assets could meet this need without the potential cross-training delays and logistical issues inherent in today's force alignment. Furthermore, the current alignment may result in a shift of focus from the RSOCs to the deployed ISR systems in meeting the Combatant Commander's key intelligence requirements as the scope of military operations in a theater changes from a deterrence posture to combat. This requires careful orchestration between the SIGINT assets and may result in some loss in effectiveness. Realignment mitigates this risk.

[redacted]eyond addressing shortfalls in the current posture, the Department will gain new capabilities in persistent surveillance through this realignment. Linguists and analysts will no longer be constrained by the operational rhythm of the aircraft. Rather, the same team can access multiple sensors, both tactical and national, delivering continuous coverage of the Combatant Commander's critical requirements and achieving "load smoothing" across different aircraft-based sensors as flight schedules dictate. The paradigm change positions the force to better integrate emerging capabilities, such as UAVs, without the need to duplicate staff and infrastructure. The change also enables support to multiple Combatant Commanders without unnecessary redeployments and the division of talented linguists between two or more production centers. Finally, intelligence support will not be constrained by the need for ground system redeployment or technology-based mitigating approaches in short notice scenarios. The production team would be able to execute support immediately through the broad portfolio of RSOC sensors, adding the ISR systems to the range of available collection once the aircraft arrives in theater.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Maximizing Infrastructure Efficiency

[redacted] Realigning these assets also produces infrastructure and manpower efficiencies. There would be no need to maintain separate base facilities for each of the current organizations. Depending on the scope of the realignment, the change might reduce the number of locations from nine to three, realigning six CONUS-based and three OCONUS-based organizations to three CONUS locations. In addition to the general base facilities, such as barracks, dining facilities, and community support services, the realignment would also produce savings in asset-unique support facilities, such as language training centers that meet continuing professional development needs. Such realignment would require facilities expansion at the three consolidated locations.

[redacted] The change may also result in manpower savings, particularly in the areas of command and support staff, maintenance, communications, information technology support, and administration. Some savings in the operational career fields may also be accrued, since efficiencies will be gained through mission load smoothing. Forecasting and staffing the requisite linguist and analysts at the consolidated facility would be more efficient and may result in an overall staffing decrease.

[redacted] While realignments of the intelligence assets would enable infrastructure reductions, total base closure may also depend on relocation of reconnaissance squadrons, airfield support, and other unrelated resident organizations, depending on the specific situation. This proposal does not address the issues associated with change to the aircraft base of operations and support forces; however, co-location of aircraft operational forces with the ISR ground system is not required to achieve operational success. In fact, this premise can be a constraint factor in providing timely intelligence support when a system must be physically redeployed to a new theater on short notice.

[redacted] The proposed realignment will advance progress toward several key strategic goals. The National Security Strategy directs the government to achieve greater integration of intelligence capabilities. More specifically, SIGINT forces will be better postured to achieve the Quadrennial Defense Review's operational goal of denying enemy sanctuary through persistent surveillance and leveraging technology and innovative concepts to develop an interoperable, joint C4ISR architecture. Enabled by today's remoting technologies and encouraged by newly emerging capabilities, realignment of these forces is an achievable goal that will produce significant benefits to warfighting support and efficiency improvements. It will serve as a first step toward a truly joint and integrated intelligence force: a critical requirement for achieving decision superiority in the battlefields of tomorrow.

[redacted]