



DCN: 12073

**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
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**Executive Director:** Charles Battaglia

July 22, 2005

**TO:** [Clearinghouse@wso.whs.mil](mailto:Clearinghouse@wso.whs.mil)

**FROM:** BRAC Commission

**SUBJECT:** Tobyhanna and Letterkenny Army Depots.

Request Army and JCSG comments and responses to the below questions. Please ensure that Army and JCSG comments are coordinated and separately identified.

1. With the recommendation to move the DLA facility there is a cost of about \$14M in COBRA to move supplies from Red River to Tinker AFB. Is that just for the Class IX supplies? Is that all associated inventories? Where will all of the DLA Class VII stocks go?
2. The timeline for the DLA move is planned mostly for 2009 with MILCON dollars in COBRA in 2009. What is the planned timing and integration for this move? There are currently 4 million square feet of covered storage at Red River DDRT and it appears that the building to be built in Oklahoma will only be about 60% of that size. Where will all the assets go that are currently stored at RRAD?
3. The COBRA data erroneously lists the number of doors at the DDRT as 34 instead of the actual 52 doors. Does this have any impact to the planned COBRA MILCON at Tinker AFB? Does this impact military value?
4. Supply and Storage scenarios in August 2004 planned for four Strategic Distribution Platforms (SDP) - San Joaquin, Warner Robbins, Red River and Susquehanna. In February 2005 Scenario 48 disestablished the Red River location with the closure of Red River Army Depot. It was stated that 80% of the DDRT mission is not related to the Red River Army Depot, and the two remaining SDP of San Joaquin and Susquehanna are not collocated with any maintenance facility. Why did the S&S group decide to close the Red River DLA operations? Could it not have remained a viable operation even without the maintenance depot?
5. What is the genesis and intent of the recommendation to privatize tires, POL and compressed gasses? Does this impact just the storage, receipt, and issue of tires? Does it take into consideration the Red River DLA mission to kit tires for shipment to Theater? Will Tinker AFB assume the mission to kit and ship kitted tires, or is the intent for the Army to no longer ship kitted tires to the Theater?
6. The DDRT is actually the last step in the road wheel and track process with their application of the preservative and bundling missions as was directed by Defense Reform Initiative Directive (DRID) 1992, but there does not appear to be any cost in COBRA to recreate this mission at Anniston Army Depot. How will Anniston execute and finalize this portion of the rubber mission? Is this cost included with the MILCON for the rubber facility? Will the Supply and Storage DLA recommended moves impact the ability of the Anniston DLA facility to execute this mission? Does this conflict at all with DRID 1992 that pushed this mission to DLA?
7. Within the COBRA there is no discussion of the type of munitions storage that will need to be built at McAlester, i.e. Category 1 and 2 storage igloos for missiles. How is this mission integrated into the existing McAlester infrastructure?
8. Beginning in FY06 Stinger stockpile reliability workload is scheduled to begin at the Red River Munitions Center (RRMC). Where would this workload now be performed?
9. The projected FMS support for Hawk, Patriot, and Chaparral is approximately a 10-year workload. How was U.S. support to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) workload considered in the evaluation of workload? Does this mission transfer to one of the gaining installations?

10. How were the RRMC facilities in Weilerbach, Germany, Korea, Kuwait and Israel incorporated into the evaluation of the installation? If they were not considered, why not?
11. Does the recommendation assume demilitarization of assets in place? The depot reports that the demilitarization of all assets could not be completed within the BRAC implementation timeframe. Does some of this demilitarization workload move? Where?
12. How was Red River Army Depot given credit for the relationship between the Army Depot, Munitions Center, and Distribution Depot? Was this considered as one location, or three separate stand alone activities? If these relationships were not considered, why were they not considered? How was the Lear Siegler facility taken into consideration?
13. The standard factor in COBRA is that 75% of the personnel will relocate, however, the installation quotes that only 16% of previous personnel relocated with BRAC 1995. Was any consideration given to changing this standard factor for this recommendation based on previous Red River history? If not, why not?
14. It appears that other installations were given credit in military value for unique one-of-a-kind capabilities - Rock Island's foundry and Watervliet's gun tubes capabilities. How was the rubber facility uniqueness within the DoD incorporated into the Red River military value? If not, why was it not considered?
15. How was the upcoming Bradley partnership workload incorporated into the evaluation? If not, why was it not incorporated? What is the funded Bradley workload in dollars and quantities that is planned for Red River Army Depot for FY05-11? Past FY11?
16. There should have been more military value assigned to Red River in criteria 23 for having more partnerships. On what basis was the RRAD value determined for this criteria?
17. Within the Census Bureau database Red River is classified as being in an urban area which lowered the military value for this criteria, however, the installation claims this should be a rural area. How was the determination made that the area is urban?
18. Criteria #37 in the military value relates to brigade training space. For this element, all the maintenance depots forwarded a "0" input, yet there is a numerical answer for each installation. How was this value determined?
19. Criteria #6 relates to restricted airspace. What was the intended interpretation of this element? Was it airspace for training? Both Anniston and Letterkenny received credit for restricted airspace because they have airspace which cannot be flown into. How was airspace treated, scored and interpreted?
20. Red River did not get credit for the jointness which is there - they are the producer of M1 road wheels for all services. How was this factored in to the Red River value?
21. The recommendation builds 2.2 million direct labor hours of capacity at Anniston and .4 million direct labor hours of capacity at Letterkenny factored at a one shift operation, however, the scenario states that work is calculated at one and a half shifts. How does this recommendation eliminate excess capacity if it is being rebuilt at two separate locations?
22. How does this recommendation decrease the cost of depot maintenance operations by consolidation and elimination of 30 percent of duplicate overhead structures?
23. Why is there no MILCON at McAlester for the Patriot program Category 1 and 2 storage igloos, and for other munitions? If there is MILCON for the move to McAlester, please break out the dollars by project for each year in which they will be required.
24. Was any consideration given within the military value criteria to installations with Title 10 U.S. Code 2474 Center for Industrial Technical Excellence (CITE) designations? If not, why not?
25. Were any scenarios explored that migrated Army or other service workload to existing CITEs?
26. Per the latest approved position, how many DLH are planned for execution at RRAD in FY05 - FY11?

- 27. Per the latest approved version of the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy, for how many years is the HMMWV RECAP program currently planned? What is the quantity of vehicles required for each year of the program? How many of those required vehicles are funded for each year?
- 28. What are the annual requirements by type of track or road wheel for the rubber products facility? Please provide historical FY02/FY03 data as well as funding and requirements through the POM.
- 29. How many personnel are currently on board at the Red River Army Depot, Munitions Center and DDRT facilities? Please provide updated detailed certified data for each location: how many military officers, enlisted, permanent civilians, temps or terms, and contractor personnel. What is the number of personnel that will now be eligible for relocation or retraining benefits as part of the BRAC recommendation to close RRAD?
- 30. Per the latest approved position, what is the current planned Bradley workload to be executed at RRAD for FY05-11? Is all of this work funded?
- 31. Per the Clearing House Tasker 345 dated June 22, 2005 question and answer number 6, there is \$141,188.6K in MILCON at Anniston and \$17,591K in MILCON at Letterkenny that were erroneously included as one-time-costs. There are one-time-costs at both depots in 2007 and 2008, please break out the dollars by project for each year in which they will be required, and include the proposed square footage for each building.
- 32. With some degree of specificity, describe the degree of complexity and commonality of repair processes between the M1 and Bradley transmissions, answering the question of how easily the Bradley transmission can be integrated and incorporated into the M1 transmission line at Anniston Army Depot.
- 33. What is the current operating cost of RRAD? What is the current payroll?
- 34. How many Patriot rounds does the Munitions Center certify every year?
- 35. There has been reference to a \$49M building planned for construction at RRAD that will be a multi-system support center. What specifically will be the intended use of this building? When is it planned for construction?

Regards,

R. Gary Dinsick  
Army Team Leader