

FINAL COORDINATION DRAFT

Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support



**Department of Defense
Washington, D.C.**

Current as of: 4 January 2005

Table of Contents



Table of Contents

Executive Summary	1
Protect the United States from Attack through an Active, Layered Defense.....	1
Organizing Construct—Lead, Support, and Enable	2
Key Objectives of the Strategy	2
Capability Themes for Homeland Defense and Civil Support	3
Projected Implications of the Strategy	4
I. Context	5
Key Definitions.....	5
Standing Guidance from National and Defense Strategies	5
Security Environment.....	7
Organizing for Homeland Defense and Civil Support	7
Assumptions.....	9
II. Active, Layered Defense.....	10
III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives.....	13
Lead.....	15
Support	17
Enable	18
IV. Core Capabilities.....	19
Capabilities for Achieving Maximum Awareness of Threats	19
Capabilities for Intercepting and Defeating Threats at a Safe Distance.....	23
Capabilities for Providing Mission Assurance	26
Capabilities for CBRNE Consequence Management.....	30
Enhancing US and International Capabilities for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security	31
V. Implications of the Strategy.....	34
Force Structure	34
Technology.....	36
Funding	38
Managing Homeland Defense and Civil Support Risk.....	39
Conclusion	40

Executive Summary



Executive Summary

"The world changed on September 11, 2001. We learned that a threat that gathers on the other side of the earth can strike our own cities and kill our own citizens. It's an important lesson; one we can never forget. Oceans no longer protect America from the dangers of this world. We're protected by daily vigilance at home. And we will be protected by resolute and decisive action against threats abroad."

President George W. Bush

September 17, 2002

Protecting the United States homeland from attack is the highest priority of the Department of Defense (DoD). On September 11, 2001, the world changed dramatically. For the first time since Pearl Harbor, we experienced catastrophic, direct attacks against our territory. This time, however, the foe was not another nation but terrorists seeking to undermine America's political will and destroy our way of life. As a result, the United States has become a nation at war, a war whose length and scope may be unprecedented.

We now confront an enemy who will attempt to engage us not only far from US shores, but also at home. Terrorists will seek to employ asymmetric means to penetrate our defenses and exploit the openness of our society to their advantage. By attacking our citizens, our economic institutions, our physical infrastructure, and our social fabric, they seek to destroy American democracy. We dare not underestimate the devastation that terrorists seek to bring to Americans at home.

To defeat 21st century threats, we must think and act innovatively. Our adversaries consider US territory an integral part of a global theater of combat. We must therefore have a strategy that applies to the domestic context the key principles that have shaped

the successful transformation of US power projection and joint expeditionary warfare.

Protect the United States from Attack through an Active, Layered Defense

This Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support focuses on achieving the Defense Department's paramount goal: securing the United States from direct attack. The strategy is rooted in the following:

- Respect for America's constitutional principles;
- Adherence to Presidential and Secretary of Defense guidance;
- Recognition of terrorist and state-based threats to the United States; and
- Commitment to continue transformation of US military capabilities.

Protecting the United States in the ten-year timeframe covered by this Strategy requires a strategic concept for an active, layered defense. **This active, layered defense is global, seamlessly integrating US capabilities in the forward regions of the world, the global commons of space and cyberspace, in the geographic approaches to**

Executive Summary

US territory, and within the United States. It is a defense in depth. To be effective, it requires superior intelligence collection and analysis, calculated deterrence of enemies, a layered system of mutually supporting defensive measures that are neither passive nor ad hoc, and the capability to mass and focus sufficient warfighting assets to defeat any attack.

This active, layered defense employs tactical defenses in a strategic offense. It maximizes threat awareness and seizes the initiative from those who would harm us. In so doing, it intends to defeat potential challengers before they threaten the United States at home.

Organizing Construct—Lead, Support, and Enable

Although the active, layered defense extends across the globe, this Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support focuses primarily on DoD's activities in the homeland and the approaches to US territory. In those geographic layers, the Department undertakes a range of activities to protect the United States from attack. These generally divide into the following categories:

- **Lead:** At the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense executes military missions that prevent, deter, defend, and defeat attacks upon the United States, our population, and our defense critical infrastructure.
- **Support:** At the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense provides support to civil authorities. This support is part of a comprehensive

national response to prevent and protect against terrorist incidents or recover from an attack or disaster. DoD provides support to a lead federal agency when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

- **Enable:** The Department of Defense actively seeks to improve the homeland defense and homeland security contributions of our domestic and international partners and, in turn, to improve DoD capabilities by sharing expertise and relevant technology, as appropriate, across military and civilian boundaries.

Key Objectives of the Strategy

Within the lead, support, and enable framework for homeland defense and civil support, the Department is focused on the following paramount objectives, listed in order of priority:

- **Achieve maximum awareness of potential threats.** Together with the Intelligence Community and civil authorities, DoD works to obtain and promptly exploit all actionable information needed to protect the United States. Timely and actionable intelligence, together with early warning, is the most critical enabler to protecting the United States at a safe distance.
- **Intercept and defeat threats at a safe distance.** The Department of Defense will defend the United States in our air and maritime approaches. When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, we also defeat direct threats within US airspace and on US territory. In both cases, the

Executive Summary

Department of Defense acts in accordance with applicable laws.

- **Provide mission assurance.** The Department of Defense performs assigned duties even under attack or after disruption. We protect our forces, installations, and information; ensure crisis management, continuity of operations (COOP), and continuity of government (COG); and ensure the security of defense critical infrastructure.
- **Support civil authorities in recovering from domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) mass casualty attacks.** The Department of Defense will be prepared to provide forces and capabilities in support of domestic CBRNE consequence management, with an emphasis on preparing for multiple, simultaneous mass casualty incidents. US military forces must be trained, equipped, and ready to provide timely assistance to civil authorities in times of domestic CBRNE catastrophes, programming specifically for this capability as necessary.
- **Improve national and international capabilities for homeland defense and homeland security.** The Department of Defense is learning from the experiences of domestic and international partners and sharing expertise with federal, state, local, and tribal authorities, the private sector, and US allies and friends abroad. By sharing expertise, we improve the ability of the Department

of Defense to carry out an active, layered defense.

Capability Themes for Homeland Defense and Civil Support

Several important themes underlie the objectives and capabilities established by this Strategy:

- **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capabilities.** The Department of Defense requires current and actionable intelligence defining potential threats to US territory. DoD must also ensure that it can identify and track suspect traffic in the air and maritime approaches and conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to examine wide areas of the maritime and air domains to discover potential threats before they reach the United States.
- **Information-Sharing.** Together with domestic and international partners, DoD will integrate information collected from a wide range of sources. The events of September 11, 2001 highlighted the need to share information across federal agencies and, increasingly, with state, local, and tribal authorities, the private sector, and international partners.
- **Joint Operational Capabilities for Homeland Defense.** DoD will continue to transform US military forces to execute homeland defense and civil support missions in the air and maritime approaches, within US airspace, and on US territory.

Executive Summary

- **Interagency and Intergovernmental Coordination.** The Department of Defense and our domestic and international partners will continue to coordinate closely in the execution of homeland defense and civil support missions.

When fully realized, this Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support will transform and improve DoD capabilities in each of these areas.

Projected Implications of the Strategy

In developing this Strategy, the Department took into account its likely force structure, resource, and technology implications in order to ensure the appropriate alignment of scarce Department resources with the priorities set forth in the National Defense Strategy. As DoD components implement the strategic tenets outlined in this document, a more precise accounting of the forces, technological advances, and financial resources it requires will be needed.

Because DoD's forces and resources are finite, the Strategy recognizes the need to manage

risk within the homeland defense and civil support mission areas. It does so by allocating DoD forces and resources in accordance with the Strategy's prioritized objectives, focusing resources on fulfilling its lead responsibilities for homeland defense. As a second priority, we will ensure the Department's ability to support civil authorities in recovering from multiple, catastrophic mass casualty CBRNE incidents within the United States.

The Department of Defense will expeditiously implement the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. Fundamentally, this will require the Department to integrate strategy, planning, and operational capabilities for homeland defense and civil support more fully into DoD processes. **Even as the Department of Defense implements this Strategy, it will continue to adapt to changes in the strategic environment, incorporate lessons learned from operational experience, and capitalize on emerging technology and operational concepts.**



I. Context

“For most of the twentieth century, the world was divided by a great struggle over ideas: destructive totalitarian visions or freedom and equality. That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class, nation, and race which promised utopia have been defeated and discredited. America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends.”

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

September 2002

The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support embodies the core principles articulated in the US Constitution, the Nation’s laws, and in Presidential and Secretary of Defense guidance. It also responds to the challenges posed by the security environment over the next decade.

Key Definitions

Homeland security, as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, is “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” The Department of Homeland Security is the lead federal agency for homeland security. In addition, its responsibilities extend beyond terrorism to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a wide range of major domestic disasters and other emergencies.

Homeland defense is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against direct threats and aggression. The Department of Defense is responsible for homeland defense.

Defense support of civil authorities, often referred to as civil support, is DoD support provided during and in the aftermath of domestic emergencies—such as terrorist attacks or major disasters—and for designated law enforcement and other activities. When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, DoD provides support of civil authorities by employing the Nation’s federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor personnel, and DoD agency and component assets.

Standing Guidance from National and Defense Strategies

The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support integrates the objectives and guidance expressed in the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the National Defense Strategy to guide Department of Defense operations to protect the US homeland.

- The National Security Strategy (2001) expands the scope of US foreign and security policy to encompass forward-reaching preventive activities,

I. Context

- including pre-emption, against hostile states and terrorist groups.
- The National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) guides the national effort to secure the US homeland against terrorist attacks. It provides a framework for action at all levels of government that play a role in homeland security.
 - The National Defense Strategy (2004) identifies as its top priority the dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat of direct threats to the United States. The Strategy's implementation hinges on

an active, layered defense that is designed to defeat the most dangerous challenges early and at a safe distance, before they are allowed to mature. It directs military leadership to properly shape, size, and globally posture to 1) defend the US homeland; 2) operate in and from four forward regions; 3) swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping military campaigns while preserving the president's option to call for a decisive result in a single operation; and 4) conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies.




Figure 1: Strategic Underpinnings of the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support

I. Context

In addition to these overarching strategies, the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support is informed by, and complements, other key strategic and planning documents. These include standing National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directives, the National Military Strategy, the DoD Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept, and *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* (Office of the Director for Force Transformation).

Security Environment

The defining characteristic of the security environment over the next ten years is the certainty of substantial diverse and asymmetric challenges to the United States, our allies, and interests. At the same time, we are faced with great *uncertainty* regarding the specific character, timing, and sources of potential attacks. This Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support addresses the full range of challenges to the US homeland over the next decade.

Nation-state military threats to the United States will persist throughout the next decade. Rogue nations, for example, pose immediate and continuing challenges to the United States and our allies, friends, and interests. In addition, we must prepare for the potential emergence of regional peer competitors.

The United States will also face a range of asymmetric, transnational threats. Of greatest concern is the availability of weapons of mass destruction, heretofore the exclusive domain of nation-states, to terrorist groups. **In the next ten years, these terrorist groups, poised to attack the United States and actively seeking to inflict mass casualties or disrupt**

US military operations, represent the most immediate challenge to the nation's security.

Transnational terrorist groups view the world as an integrated, global battlespace in which to exploit perceived US vulnerabilities, wherever they may be. This battlespace includes the US homeland. Terrorists seek to attack the United States and its centers of gravity at home and abroad and will use asymmetric means to achieve their ends, such as simultaneous, mass casualty attacks. On September 11, 2001, terrorists demonstrated both the intent and capability to conduct complex, geographically dispersed attacks against the United States and our allies. It is foreseeable that adversaries will also develop or otherwise obtain chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives (CBRNE) capabilities, with the intent of causing mass panic or catastrophic loss of life. Although America's allies and interests abroad will be the most likely targets of terrorism in the coming decade, we must also anticipate enemy attacks aimed at Americans at home.

Organizing for Homeland Defense and Civil Support

In light of the importance of homeland defense and DoD's contributions to homeland security, the Secretary of Defense, with the support of Congress, has improved the Department's organization and oversight structure for homeland defense and civil support.

- **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.** As stated in the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense provides overall supervision

I. Context

of DoD's homeland defense activities. The establishment of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense responded to the need for improved policy guidance to DoD Components on homeland defense and civil support issues.

- **US Northern Command**, headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Established in 2002, US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is responsible for planning, organizing, and executing all aspects of homeland defense and performing civil support missions within the continental United States, Alaska, and territorial waters. It also coordinates security cooperation with Canada and Mexico. In addition to the land masses of the United States, Canada, and Mexico, US Northern Command's area of responsibility includes the coastal approaches, the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands.
- **US Pacific Command**, headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii. US Pacific Command (USPACOM) has homeland defense and civil support responsibilities for Hawaii and US territories, possessions, and freely associated states in the Pacific.
- **North American Aerospace Defense Command**, headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The bi-national North American Aerospace Command (NORAD) is responsible for protecting the North American airspace over the United States and Canada. Aerospace warning and control are the cornerstones of the NORAD mission.

In addition to these organizations, all other regional and functional combatant commands, the Military Departments, and DoD elements contribute to the protection of the US homeland from attack.

- Other regional combatant commanders can promote international cooperation on homeland defense through exercises and military-to-military contact programs. Together with the functional combatant commanders, these regional commanders can also intercept and defeat adversaries intent on attacking US territory. Of particular note, US Strategic Command is responsible for early warning of and defense against missile attack and long-range conventional attacks. It is further charged with deterring and defending against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conducting information operations as well as computer network operations.
- The Military Departments organize, train, and equip US military forces across operational domains. The Military Departments provide the bulk of the DoD capabilities likely to be requested for civil support.
- Other DoD Components contribute to homeland defense through intelligence collection, analysis, and prioritization; capability assessments; and oversight of relevant policy, acquisition, logistics, personnel, readiness, and financial matters.

The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support will guide all DoD Components across the full range of

I. Context

homeland defense and civil support activities.

Assumptions

This Strategy makes the following key assumptions:

- The United States will continue to face traditional military challenges emanating from hostile nation-states. Nation-state adversaries will incorporate asymmetric threats into their broader strategies of competition and confrontation with the United States.
- Terrorists will seek and likely gain surreptitious entry into the United States to conduct mass casualty attacks against Americans on US soil.
 - Terrorists will leverage vulnerabilities to create new methods of attack.
 - Terrorists and/or rogue states will attempt multiple, simultaneous mass casualty CBRNE attacks against the US homeland.
 - Terrorists will try to shape and degrade American political will in order to diminish American resistance to terrorist ideologies and agendas.
- Allies and friends will cooperate with the United States in mutually beneficial security cooperation arrangements.
- US Northern Command, the North American Aerospace Command, and US Pacific Command will continue to develop mature homeland defense capabilities in the air, land, and maritime domains, with appropriate support provided by other combatant commands.
- The Department of Homeland Security and other federal, state, local, and tribal authorities will continue to improve their prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities throughout the decade.
- The Department of Defense will promote the integration and sharing of applicable DoD capabilities, equipment, and technologies with federal, state, local, and tribal authorities and the private sector.
- In the event of major catastrophes, the President or the Secretary of Defense will direct DoD to provide substantial support to civil authorities. DoD's responses will be planned, practiced, and carefully integrated into the national response.
- The likelihood of US military operations overseas will be high throughout the next ten years.

II. Active, Layered Defense



II. Active, Layered Defense

“The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.”

President George W. Bush

June 1, 2002

As set forth in the National Defense Strategy (2004), the Department of Defense is transforming its approach to homeland defense just as it is transforming national defense capabilities overall. **Guiding homeland defense planning is the concept of an active, layered defense, predicated on seizing the initiative from adversaries.**

“Our most important contribution to the security of the US homeland is our capacity to disrupt and defeat threats early and at a safe distance, as far from the US and its partners as possible. Our ability to identify and defeat threats abroad—before they can strike—while making critical contributions to the direct defense of our territory and population is the sine qua non of our nation’s security.”

The National Defense Strategy

The case for an active, layered defense is clear. The United States has multiple points of vulnerability that adversaries seek to exploit. Significantly, these vulnerabilities exist in America’s key centers of gravity. Commerce relies on the flow of goods and people across the nation’s borders, through our seaports and airports, and on our streets and highways. The US free market economy requires trust in the uninterrupted electronic movement of financial data and funds through cyberspace. The symbols of American heritage—monuments and public

buildings—are a source of national pride and are open to all. Vast and potentially vulnerable natural resources provide power to our homes and food for our tables.

To safeguard the American way of life and to secure our freedom we cannot depend on passive or reactive defenses. A strictly defensive strategy is easily subject to enemy reconnaissance and inevitable defeat. By contrast, an active, layered defense relies on early warning of an emerging threat in order to quickly deploy and execute a decisive response.

The United States must keep potential adversaries off balance by both an effective defense of US territory and, when necessary, by projecting power across the globe. **We must seize the initiative from adversaries and apply all aspects of national power to prevent, intercept, and disrupt attacks against us and our allies and friends. In short, the United States must act in ways that an enemy cannot predict, circumvent, or overcome.** Multiple barriers to attack must be deployed across the globe—in the forward regions, the approaches to the United States, in the US homeland, and in the global commons—to create an unpredictable web of land, maritime, and air assets that are arrayed to aggressively detect, deter, and defeat hostile action.

II. Active, Layered Defense




Figure 2: Active, Layered Defense Concept

The Forward Regions. The forward regions are foreign land areas, sovereign airspace, and sovereign waters outside the US homeland. The Department of Defense is a key contributor to the President's integrated national security effort abroad. To respond quickly to rising threats, the United States requires timely and actionable intelligence. Improved human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, improved analysis of terrorist threats and targets, and improved technical collection against potential CBRN weapons are all critical in this regard. In addition, the United States must counter and delegitimize the ideological support for terrorist groups, disrupt their flow of funding, and create an environment that curtails recruitment. US military forces must be trained, ready, and postured to intercept potential enemies, eliminate enemy sanctuaries, and maintain

regional stability, in conjunction with allies and friendly states.

The Approaches. The waters and airspace geographically contiguous to the United States are critical homeland defense battle-spaces. In these approaches, US Northern Command, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and US Pacific Command, supported by the Intelligence Community, the US Coast Guard, and other combatant commands, have the opportunity to detect, deter, and, if necessary, defeat threats en route—before they reach the United States. **This requires maximum awareness of threats in the air and maritime avenues of approach as well as the interception capabilities necessary to maintain US freedom of action, secure the rights and obligations of the United States, and protect the nation at a safe distance.**

II. Active, Layered Defense

The American Homeland. The US homeland includes the United States, its territories and possessions, and the Commonwealths and Compact States of the Pacific. It also includes the surrounding territorial seas. Among its responsibilities within US territory, DoD focuses on the following areas:

- DoD is responsible for defeating direct attacks against the United States, when so directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. NORAD is the cornerstone of our homeland air defense capability. Our air defense success rests on an integrated system for air surveillance and defense against air threats at all altitudes. DoD also maintains land forces capable of responding rapidly, when so directed, to threats against DoD personnel, defense critical infrastructure, or other domestic targets. Finally, DoD supports the US Coast Guard in the exercise of its maritime authorities under domestic and international law.
- DoD supports civilian law enforcement and counterterrorism authorities consistent with US law. This includes providing expertise, intelligence, equipment, and training facilities to domestic law enforcement when so directed. It can also include the use of US military forces to support civilian law enforcement in responding to civil disturbances, as provided in US law.
- DoD provides critical CBRNE consequence management capabilities in support of civil authorities. With few exceptions, DoD's consequence management capabilities are designed for the wartime protection of the Department's personnel and facilities. Nevertheless, civil authorities are

likely to call upon these capabilities if a domestic CBRNE catastrophe occurs in the ten-year time frame of this strategy. **DoD must therefore equip and train forces, as necessary, for domestic CBRNE consequence management.**

The Global Commons. The global commons consist of space and cyberspace. America's ability to defend the global commons and operate effectively from them is critical to the conduct of all US military missions, from the forward regions to the homeland. This is particularly true given our reliance on net-centric capabilities. **An active, layered defense requires a trustworthy information system, impervious to disabling digital attacks.** Computer network defense must ensure that networks can self-diagnose problems and build immunity to future attacks. At the same time, networks must remain operational and consistently available for the execution of US military missions.

An active defense also requires the ability to detect and defeat threats from space. This includes the need for capable defenses against ballistic missiles. Ground facilities that support US space systems are potential targets of attacks and the Department will protect them.

III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives



III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives

"We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our military's highest priority is to defend the United States . . . The threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces."

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

September 2002

The employment of an active, layered defense across the globe is fundamental to homeland defense. The National Defense Strategy emphasizes the Department of Defense's role in the forward regions and the global commons and how that role is critical to the defense of US territory. **This Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support therefore focuses particular attention on the US homeland and its approaches.** In these geographic layers, the Department's activities to protect the United States generally fall into one of the following categories:

- **Lead:** DoD leads military missions to deter, prevent, and defeat attacks on the United States, its population, and its defense critical infrastructure. This includes defending the maritime and air approaches to the United States and protecting US airspace, territorial seas, and territory from attacks. The Department is also responsible for protecting DoD personnel located in US territory.
- **Support:** At the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Department provides defense support of civil authorities in order to prevent terrorist incidents or manage the consequences of an attack or a disaster. Civil authorities are most likely to request DoD support where we have unique capabilities to

contribute or when civilian responders are overwhelmed. DoD's contributions to the comprehensive national response effort can be critical, particularly in the near-term, as the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies strengthen their preparedness and response capabilities.

- **Enable:** Efforts to share capabilities and expertise with domestic agencies and international partners reinforce the Department's lead and support activities. At home, the Department works to improve civilian capabilities for homeland security by lending expertise and sharing relevant technology. For example, DoD is assisting the Department of Homeland Security in its efforts to develop intelligence analytical capabilities. We are also sharing training and simulation technologies, as well as unmanned aerial vehicle technologies for civilian surveillance along the Nation's borders. Abroad, the Department's security cooperation initiatives improve collective capabilities for homeland defense missions through exercises, information-sharing agreements, and formal defense agreements, such as NORAD.

III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives

To fulfill the key strategic goal of protecting the United States from attack, the Department of Defense will focus on achieving five key objectives directly related to the lead, support, and enable framework. In order of priority, these objectives are:

1. Achieve maximum awareness of potential threats (Lead);
2. Intercept and defeat threats at a safe distance from the United States, and US territories and possessions (Lead);
3. Provide mission assurance (Lead);
4. Ensure DoD's ability to support civil authorities in domestic CBRNE consequence management (Support); and

5. Improve domestic and international partner capabilities for homeland defense and homeland security (Enable).

These objectives are described in detail below. The defense capabilities required to fulfill them are discussed in detail in Section IV of the Strategy.

ACTIVITIES	OBJECTIVES	CORE CAPABILITIES
LEAD	Achieve Maximum Awareness of Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain agile and capable defense intelligence architecture • Analyze and understand potential threats • Detect, identify, and track emerging threats in all operational domains • Ensure shared situational awareness within DoD and with domestic and foreign partners
	Intercept and Defeat Threats at a Safe Distance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intercept and defeat national security threats in the maritime and air approaches and within US territory
	Provide Mission Assurance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepare DoD installations for direct threats, especially CBRNE attacks • Ensure DoD crisis management and continuity preparedness • Prepare and protect defense critical infrastructure • Ensure preparedness of the Defense Industrial Base • Prepare to protect designated national critical infrastructure
SUPPORT	Support Consequence Management for CBRNE Mass Casualty Attacks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manage consequences of CBRNE mass casualty attacks
ENABLE	Improve Relevant National and International Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective interagency planning and interoperability • Capable federal, state, and local partners and effective domestic relationships • Capable international partners and effective defense-to-defense relationships

Figure 3: DoD Objectives and Core Capabilities for Protecting the United States from Attack

III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives

Lead

Objective 1: Achieve maximum awareness of threats

To defend the nation in the 21st century, the Department requires sufficient forewarning and immediate situational awareness of potential attacks. No longer is it sufficient to track the movement of hostile military aircraft and warships. In the 21st century threat environment, transnational terrorists and rogue states may employ a wide range of civilian vessels and aircraft as weapons, engage in cyber attacks, or target civilian infrastructure to achieve devastating effects.

To protect the United States in this environment, the Department of Defense, in cooperation with domestic and international partners, will seek to achieve maximum awareness of threats. By so doing, the United States increases the time available for an effective operational response. **Threat awareness includes the ability to obtain comprehensive, accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence and information; exploiting relevant information; and making it available to the warfighters, policy makers, and interagency and international partners responsible for identifying and responding to threats.**

An active, layered defense requires information to flow freely regardless of operational boundaries. Relevant information may originate in one or several of the operational domains—land, maritime, air, cyberspace, or space. It may originate from an array of domestic and foreign sources. To achieve maximum awareness of threats, information will be posted to DoD's Global Information Grid, integrating operational domains and facilitating information sharing

across traditional military-civilian boundaries. Using fused and shared threat awareness, our domestic and international partners and we can determine the most appropriate means to deter, intercept, or defeat threats and act accordingly.

Objective 2: Intercept and defeat threats at a safe distance

During the Cold War, the United States focused on preventing Soviet submarines, ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers from attacking the American homeland. Although concerns about traditional conventional and nuclear threats to the US homeland remain, we recognize that in the next ten years, adversaries will present a host of new challenges. They may attempt to use commercial vessels to transport terrorists or weapons to the United States. They may attempt to intrude on US airspace with low-altitude aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. They may attempt to convert maritime vessels, aircraft, and other modes of transportation into weapons. Through these and other means, our enemies will constantly employ asymmetric means to challenge the security of the United States.

In the maritime approaches, DoD is working with the Department of Homeland Security to integrate US maritime defense and to optimize the mutually supporting capabilities of the US Navy and the US Coast Guard. **As the Chief of Naval Operations has stated, "forward deployed naval forces will network with other assets of the Navy and the Coast Guard, as well as the intelligence agencies to identify, track and intercept threats long before they threaten this nation."** This will require a level of situational awareness in the maritime domain similar to that in the air approaches. The goal, as the

III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives

CNO explains, is to **“extend the security of the United States far seaward, taking advantage of the time and space purchased by forward deployed assets to protect the U.S. from impending threats.”**

In the air domain, DoD has primary responsibility for defending US airspace and protecting the United States from ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and other aerospace attacks. For North America, this defense is carried out in partnership with Canada, through NORAD. In addition, the Department of Defense relies heavily on the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration) for early identification of air threats. As in the maritime environment, cooperation and operational coordination with our interagency partners, as well as our neighbors and other allies, is critical to protecting the United States from air threats.

Within US territory, we face the challenge of intercepting and defeating enemies determined to cause fear, death, and economic disruption. Although we must not dismiss traditional foreign military threats, in the period covered by this strategy, domestic employment of the US military in a homeland defense role will likely come in response to transnational terrorist, rogue state, or other threats that exceed the capabilities of domestic counterterrorism and law enforcement authorities.

Therefore, the Department must approach the interception and defeat of threats to US territory from a joint, interagency, and, ultimately, intergovernmental perspective. DoD must not conduct operations in separate and distinct land, maritime, and air operational domains. Over the coming

decade, the Department will continue to develop joint concepts of operations, working with critical interagency and international partners as appropriate.

Objective 3: Provide mission assurance

The Department cannot fulfill any of the Strategy’s key objectives without having the core capabilities in place to assure mission success. **Mission assurance, the certainty that DoD components can perform assigned tasks or duties in accordance with the intended purpose or plan, is therefore itself a key objective.** The Department of Defense’s framework for mission assurance includes a range of programs and efforts aimed at securing DoD warfighting capabilities even when under attack or after disruption. These include force protection measures, installation preparedness, continuity of operations, and defense critical infrastructure protection.

Force Protection and Installation

Preparedness. An attack on DoD military and civilian personnel or the facilities where they work could directly affect the Department’s ability to project power overseas or carry out vital homeland defense functions. Of particular concern is the threat to DoD personnel posed by domestic CBRNE attacks. To achieve an appropriate level of personnel protection on domestic bases and installations, the Department will develop and implement a comprehensive preparedness plan for CBRNE attacks. This plan will leverage capabilities and programs throughout the Department (e.g. Critical Infrastructure Protection, Antiterrorism/Force Protection, Project Guardian) including required intelligence support. In accordance with DoD responsibilities in the National Biodefense Policy, the Department is

III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives

especially attentive to the unique challenges posed by biological agents.

Crisis Management and Continuity of Operations. During an emergency, the Nation's leaders, including DoD decision-makers, must be able to carry out vital government functions. **The Department must provide the President and Secretary of Defense with survivable and enduring national command and control of DoD assets and US military forces.** DoD also plays an important supporting role in ensuring Continuity of Government and Enduring Constitutional Government in times of crisis. In the Cold War era, DoD continuity efforts focused on survival of senior leadership to prosecute war in the aftermath of a massive nuclear attack. Today, DoD's crisis management efforts are broader, responsive to the full range of potential threats to the nation. Meeting the Department's crisis management objectives requires ready DoD transportation assets, capable and survivable remote operation sites, and advanced communications capabilities throughout the DoD continuity architecture. DoD will continue to explore innovative concepts in communications and netcentric operations to improve national-level crisis management.

Critical Infrastructure Protection. The Department of Defense has the responsibility for assuring it has access to *defense critical infrastructure*. This is defined as DoD and non-DoD cyber and physical assets and associated infrastructure essential to project and support military forces worldwide.

In some scenarios, assurance of non-DoD infrastructures might involve protection activities, in close coordination with other federal, state, local, tribal, or private sector partners. This could include elements of the Defense Industrial Base, which provides

defense-related products and services that are essential to mobilize, deploy, and sustain military operations. It could also include selected civil and commercial infrastructures that provide the power, communications, transportation, and other utilities that military forces and DoD support organizations rely on to meet their operational needs.

In addition, the President or the Secretary of Defense might direct US military forces to protect non-DoD assets of national significance. The President has designated fourteen categories of non-defense Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. Although these facilities and assets are not required for the support of DoD missions, they are so vital to the nation that their incapacitation, exploitation, or destruction could have a debilitating effect on the security and economic well-being of the United States.

Support

Objective 4: Support consequence management for CBRNE mass-casualty attacks

The Department has traditionally supported civil authorities in a wide variety of domestic contingencies, usually natural disasters. DoD typically does so using military forces and DoD capabilities designed for use in expeditionary warfighting missions. That support continues today. For example, unique national intelligence capabilities that are located within the Defense intelligence community are frequently called upon to support other US government agencies. Although these traditional types of defense support of civil authorities are likely to continue, they are not likely to impede DoD's ability to execute other missions specified in the National Defense Strategy.

III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives

At the high end of the threat spectrum, however, the 21st century environment has fundamentally altered the terms under which Department of Defense assets and capabilities might be called upon for support. **The potential for multiple, simultaneous, CBRNE attacks on US territory is real.** It is therefore particularly imperative that the Department of Defense be prepared to support civilian responders in responding to such mass casualty events.

Support to domestic authorities for consequence management is a core element of active, layered defense. The Department of Defense maintains considerable CBRNE recovery expertise and equipment. When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, DoD will employ these capabilities to assist the Secretary of Homeland Security, the principal federal official for domestic incident management, or other domestic authorities. **DoD must be prepared to support its interagency partners in responding to a range of CBRNE incidents, including multiple, simultaneous mass casualty attacks within the United States.**

Enable

Objective 5: Improve national and international capabilities for homeland defense and homeland security

Enabling better national capabilities for homeland security missions is an important complement to DoD's lead and support activities. The broad range of threats posed by terrorists and other transnational actors has expanded our traditional concept of national security. In the past, the Department of Defense could largely fulfill its responsibility for protecting the nation

by integrating its activities with the Department of State and the Intelligence Community. Today, the expertise and corresponding responsibility for managing security challenges is much more widely shared among federal departments and agencies. State, local, and tribal authorities, the private sector, and our allies and friends abroad are also critical contributors to US national security.

In such an environment, DoD must unify its efforts with those of its key interagency partners and international friends and allies to ensure the nation's security. Sharing technology, capabilities, and expertise strengthens the nation's ability to respond to hostile threats and domestic emergencies. Likewise, cooperative homeland defense education and training initiatives will foster a common understanding of shared threats and how best to address them. In turn, DoD can readily leverage the expertise of other federal, state, local, and tribal authorities and international partners to improve its own capabilities for counterterrorism, maritime interception, and other missions critical to an active, layered defense.

IV. Core Capabilities



IV. Core Capabilities

"Some believe that, with the U.S. in the midst of a dangerous war on terrorism, now is not the time to transform our armed forces. I believe that quite the opposite is true. Now is precisely the time to make changes. The impetus and the urgency added by the events of September 11th powerfully make the case for action."

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

January 31, 2002

The Department of Defense will provide the homeland defense and civil support capabilities necessary to support implementation of the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the National Defense Strategy. Over the next ten years, DoD will protect the United States from attack by focusing on the core capabilities necessary to achieve each of the key objectives detailed in Section III.

Capabilities for Achieving Maximum Awareness of Threats

Core Capability: Capable and agile defense intelligence architecture

Protecting the United States against the full range of 21st century threats requires the US Intelligence Community to restore its human intelligence capabilities, reprioritize intelligence collection to emphasize probable homeland defense threats, and invest in new intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) sensor capabilities. In the Cold War, we knew both the nature of the threat to our country and the source of that threat. Today, intelligence and warning must extend beyond conventional military and strategic nuclear threats to cover a wide range of other state-

and non-state challenges that may manifest themselves overseas or at home.

The Intelligence Community is adjusting to this changing strategic landscape to meet the nation's homeland security needs. The establishment of a National Intelligence Director, the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC), the Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, and the DoD's Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) exemplify this shift. Executive Orders for strengthened management of the Intelligence Community also ensure a more collaborative, comprehensive approach to intelligence support for national security. While these changes are taking place, the Department of Defense is reorienting its intelligence capabilities in line with the full range of homeland defense priorities. Specifically, the Department will:

- Focus on integrated collection management of foreign and military information and its application to homeland defense and homeland security;
- Better utilize national intelligence assets and capabilities to increase early warning and support prevention, interception, and

IV. Core Capabilities

disruption of potential threats overseas or in the approaches to the United States;

- Collect homeland defense threat information from relevant private and public sector sources, consistent with US constitutional authorities and privacy law;
- Identify capability needs for CBRNE sensors to meet homeland defense requirements; and
- Develop automated tools to improve data analysis and management, in order to systematically track large amounts of data, and to detect, fuse, and analyze aberrant patterns of activity, consistent with US privacy protections.

Core Capability: Collect, analyze, and understand potential threats

Improving our understanding of America's foreign enemies—in advance of an attack—is at the heart of DoD's efforts to achieve maximum awareness of potential threats. In accordance with the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2002), we are strengthening DoD's knowledge of foreign terrorist networks and the inner workings of their operations.

Improved human intelligence, particularly in the forward regions of the world, is the single most important factor in understanding terrorist organizations. The Department of Defense is currently undertaking a focused review of DoD human intelligence capabilities, including reforms to improve HUMINT career development, policies, practices, and organizations. It is critical that DoD HUMINT operators have relevant linguistic skills and cultural

understanding as well as the technical skills needed to provide high quality, insightful information to the analysts within the Intelligence Community.

In addition, we will **develop a cadre of specialized terrorism intelligence analysts within the Defense intelligence community** and deploy a number of these analysts to interagency centers for homeland defense and counterterrorism analysis and operations. The Department will continue to maintain significant counterterrorism collection and analytical capability to support military activities overseas and in the approaches to the United States.

National agencies within the Department, such as the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, will continue to provide their unique capabilities in support of the national homeland security mission in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. The Department will also maintain an analytical capability to identify threats to defense critical infrastructure.

Core Capability: Detection, identification, and tracking of emerging threats in all operational domains

We face challenges in our ability to detect, identify, and track objects in all operational environments, but especially the air and maritime domains. Every day, thousands of US and foreign vessels and aircraft approach and depart American ports and airports and those of our closest neighbors. The sheer volume of cargo and diversity of passengers in these operational domains challenges US capabilities.

To detect and track anticipated air and maritime threats effectively, the United States must have capabilities to cue, surveil,

IV. Core Capabilities

identify, engage, and assess potential threats in real time. Detection and tracking capabilities must be all-weather, around-the-clock, and effective against moving targets. The United States must also have the ability to detect CBRNE threats emanating from any operating environment. **This requires a comprehensive, all-domain CBRNE detection architecture, from collection to analysis.**

The maritime picture is multi-jurisdictional, with various US agencies responsible for tracking vessels from their departure at foreign ports to their arrival in the United States. Recognizing the potential vulnerability this situation creates, DoD is working closely with interagency partners, especially the Department of Homeland Security, to establish a unified concept for maritime domain awareness (MDA)— the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.

Based on the emerging MDA concept, the Department of Defense will work with interagency partners to develop a comprehensive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability to detect threats as far forward of the US homeland as possible, ideally before threat vessels depart foreign ports. **DoD will ensure persistent wide-area surveillance and reconnaissance of the US maritime approaches, layered and periodically varied in such a manner that an adversary cannot predict or evade observation.** Surveillance will also be long-range in all dimensions of the maritime domain. The nation will benefit from the Department of Homeland Security's work to institute worldwide cargo and crew reliability mechanisms. DoD, in concert with the

Department of Homeland Security, will receive and share data from improved identification systems for small commercial and other vessels, just as it has done for maritime vessels of over 300 gross tons that are on international voyages.

Achieving threat awareness in the air operational domain presents similar challenges. Throughout the Cold War, the Department of Defense focused on maintaining awareness of external threats that entered US airspace from overseas. The attacks on September 11, 2001, however, originated in US airspace and highlighted weaknesses in domestic radar coverage and interagency air defense coordination. Adversaries might maintain low altitude flight profiles, employ stealth and other defense countermeasures, or engage in deception to challenge US air defenses. Though substantial, the requirements for domestic air defense are achievable.

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, DoD has coordinated with interagency partners to significantly improve the air defense of the United States. DoD has worked with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to integrate domestic radar coverage and has conducted Operation Noble Eagle air patrols to protect designated US cities and critical assets. We have placed particular emphasis on implementing a robust air defense capability for the National Capital Region, using both air and ground air defense forces. DoD has also worked closely with interagency partners to exchange a wide range of information regarding potential threats.

The Department of Defense will continue to work with domestic and international partners to develop a persistent, wide-area

IV. Core Capabilities

surveillance and reconnaissance capability for the airspace within US borders, as well as over the nation's land and maritime approaches. This capability requires the development of advanced technology sensors to detect and track low altitude air vehicles across a wide geographic area. DoD is investigating various technologies that could provide an over-the-horizon engagement capability to detect enemy threats in the approaches or over US territory, leading to their defeat. The United States and our allies must also integrate sensor and intelligence data to identify hostile air vehicles by observing their performance characteristics, suspicious activities, or other attributes. These capabilities in the air domain will provide timely threat detection, extending the depth of air defenses and the time for response, thereby providing multiple engagement opportunities to defeat identified threats.

Core Capability: Shared situational awareness within DoD and with domestic and foreign partners

Shared situational awareness is defined as a common perception of the environment and its implications. All domestic and foreign partners within the homeland defense mission space require situational awareness for three reasons: to identify threats as early and as distant from US borders as possible; to provide ample time for an optimal course of action; and to allow for a flexible operational response. From the March 2003 Homeland Security Information Sharing Memorandum of Agreement, to the aggressive and unprecedented information sharing underway at the NCTC, the US Government continues to make great strides in overcoming obstacles to shared situational awareness.

During the Cold War, the Department of Defense sought shared situational awareness with the Department of State, the Intelligence Community, and allied nations in order to deter and defeat threats posed by the Soviet Union and other nations. At the same time, the American law enforcement community worked with its international counterparts to thwart international drug cartels and a growing number of worldwide crime syndicates.

Today, transnational terrorists have blurred the traditional distinction between national security and international law enforcement. Together with a significant proliferation in the number and type of potential foreign threats, **this expanded national security challenge necessitates an unprecedented degree of shared situational awareness among federal agencies, with state, local, tribal, and private entities, and between the United States and its key foreign partners.**

As a first step, the Department of Defense must provide seamless connectivity and timely, accurate, and trusted information to all DoD Components—any time, any place—in order to achieve maximum awareness of potential attacks against the United States. The Department will therefore ensure that DoD's information infrastructure provides an integrated, interoperable worldwide network of information technology products and management services. This will allow users across DoD to process information and move it to warfighters, policymakers, and support personnel on demand. Network connectivity must be flexible enough to support global operations while allowing for local requirements and innovation. **It must also create a real-time link among sensors, decision makers, and warfighters to**

IV. Core Capabilities

facilitate the rapid engagement of enemy targets.

Beyond building an integrated information infrastructure, DoD must also populate that network with accurate, timely, and actionable data. Today, information relevant to protecting the United States is widely dispersed. The Department, in concert with the intelligence and law enforcement communities and foreign partners, will build on the great strides already made to diminish existing cultural, technological, and bureaucratic obstacles to information sharing. The Intelligence Community and Department of Defense will drive improved information sharing within a "need to share" context. The resulting information exchange, commonly referred to as "horizontal integration of intelligence," will provide analysts across the US government and partner nations with timely and accurate all-source information, vastly improving the creation of a coherent and fully integrated threat picture. Such an expansion in information sharing requires appropriate safeguards to ensure that DoD intelligence components rigorously apply laws that protect Americans' civil liberties and privacy.

Capabilities for Intercepting and Defeating Threats at a Safe Distance

Core Capability: Interception and defeat of national security threats in the maritime and air approaches and within US territory

Maritime Operational Domain. The United States must be prepared for the foreseeable threat of transnational terrorists, detected on the high seas and armed with weapons of

mass destruction. Accordingly, we will fully integrate our surface, subsurface, air, and surveillance assets, focus them forward, and extend the Nation's maritime defensive perimeter further out to sea in order to deter and defeat maritime threats at a safe distance from the US coast.

Enhancing our ability to intercept enemies in the maritime domain requires a seamless system of overlapping defenses—both adaptable and flexible—to frustrate enemy observation and avoid predictability. This begins in the forward regions with improved surveillance capability, increased HUMINT collection, and enhanced international partnerships through programs like the Container Security Initiative and Proliferation Security Initiative. To maximize maritime domain awareness, successive layers of surveillance must be fully coordinated with the operational activity of our forward deployed forces.

DoD has established standing orders for conducting maritime homeland defense and maritime interception operations. Given this guidance, geographic combatant commanders will include interception exercises in their theater security cooperation plans and conduct such exercises on a periodic basis. The US Navy and US Coast Guard will conduct routine and frequent maritime interception exercises to ensure a high state of training and readiness.

To intercept and defeat transnational threats, the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security must have a predetermined process for ensuring rapid, effective US Coast Guard support to the US Navy and vice versa. Although DoD has the lead role in defending the United States from direct maritime attack, we recognize the US

IV. Core Capabilities

Coast Guard's lead responsibility for maritime law enforcement and homeland security. We will continue to support the US Coast Guard in fulfilling its homeland security responsibilities. Together with the US Coast Guard, we must build upon the security in our ports and littorals, expanding maritime defense capabilities further seaward in support of national security. **This includes strengthening the 96-hour notice of US arrival requirement by including a "consent to board" provision as a prerequisite for entry into a US port.**

The United States must have a concept of operations for the maritime defense of the homeland. Such a concept may require the routine assignment of naval forces to US Northern Command. DoD will also consider the use of US Naval Reserve forces to undertake unique roles in maritime homeland defense. In addition, the US Navy should assess the integrated benefit of forces currently available in support of Operation Noble Eagle, available coastal patrol craft, and the utility of the Navy's littoral combat ship to execute the maritime homeland defense missions.

Air Operational Domain. The Department of Defense will defeat air threats to the United States, such as ballistic and cruise missiles and attacking military aircraft. DoD must also be prepared to intercept non-traditional air threats, even when the intent to harm the United States is more uncertain, as initially occurred on September 11, 2001. These threats could include commercial or chartered aircraft, general aviation, ultralight airplanes, unmanned aerial vehicles, radio controlled aircraft, or even balloons. Early detection and successful interception of these types of potential threats requires very close cooperation with DoD's interagency partners.

Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense, through Operation Noble Eagle, has conducted air patrols to protect major US population centers, critical infrastructure, and other sites. Working with our interagency partners, DoD will continue these patrols to intercept air threats to the US homeland as long as required by the projected threat.

The Department of Defense will continue to improve the air-to-air and ground-to-air capabilities and associated forces necessary to intercept and defeat all domestic air threats. For air patrol missions, DoD will use more capable aircraft as they are fielded and explore the potential for employing unmanned combat air vehicles. DoD is also upgrading ground-based air defense assets with improved detection and targeting capabilities.

The Department of Defense will devote significant attention to defending US territory against cruise missile attacks. Defense against cruise missiles poses unique challenges, given that their low altitude and small size make them more difficult to identify and track than traditional air threats. The Department of Defense is developing integrated capabilities to defend against cruise missiles, as well as other types of unmanned aerial vehicles. As an interim step, DoD is developing a deployable air and cruise missile defense capability to protect designated areas. This will integrate Service tactical air defense assets, the NORAD air defense system, interagency information sources, and advanced technology sensors. **Future air and cruise missile defense assets will be fully interoperable, increase the size of the defended area, and engage threats at increased range.**

IV. Core Capabilities

DoD will also continue to work with interagency partners to develop a common air surveillance picture that will enhance our ability to identify and, ultimately, defeat enemy targets. Improved sensors are also required to detect and track potential air threats within the United States. The current radars maintained by the Federal Aviation Administration to track air traffic within the United States are aging, with high maintenance costs, poor reliability, and reduced capability to track emerging threats. **The nation will need to develop advanced, follow-on sensors to the current generation of radars in order to improve tracking and identification of low-altitude threats.**

Land Operational Domain. The Department of Defense will be prepared to deter and defeat direct, land-based attacks against the United States. We must work closely and cooperatively with our neighbors, establish seamless relationships and organizational structures with interagency partners, and be prepared to respond with military forces on our own soil quickly, responsively, and in a manner that is well coordinated with civilian law enforcement agencies.

Historically, the United States relied almost exclusively on forward deployed forces to confront and defeat nation-state adversaries overseas. Although military power projection remains crucial, transnational terrorism has significantly reduced the effectiveness of this singular approach. Now and in the future, we must be prepared in every part of the globe—most especially the US homeland—to deter, prevent, and defeat terrorist or other asymmetric threats.

The majority of infrastructure in the United States is privately owned. Consequently, private owners provide the first line of

defense for most of the nation's assets. Should that defense prove insufficient, or public welfare is threatened, local, state, and, if necessary, federal authorities will assist in intercepting and defeating threats on US territory. By law and national policy, DoD's role on US soil is relatively circumscribed. The following three-tiered approach provides the parameters under which the military would likely operate:

Tier 1: Local and federal law enforcement.

When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, DoD will provide appropriate defense assets in support of domestic law enforcement authority, normally in support of a lead federal agency such as the FBI. Under these circumstances, military forces and assets will remain under the command and control of a DoD authority.

Tier 2: National Guard forces not on active duty. When directed by the Governor or appropriate state authority, National Guard forces and assets can respond quickly to intercept and defeat terrorist threats within US territory.

Operating in either State Active Duty or Title 32 status, National Guard forces can provide support to civilian law enforcement authorities in two key areas. First, National Guard counternarcotics efforts can enhance the effectiveness of counterterrorism initiatives through information-sharing, logistics support, and combined operations. Second, by virtue of their status under state law and Title 32 of US Code, National Guard forces provide civilian authorities with a flexible option under the Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA) construct.

IV. Core Capabilities

Newly expanded authorities under Title 32 of US Code—and the National Guard’s on-going transformation into a truly 21st century force—will provide Governors and state authorities with flexible, responsive, multi-capable units to deter and defeat localized terrorist attacks. For example, National Guard reaction forces—scalable in terms of size and mix of skills—can provide security for critical infrastructure, support civilian law enforcement agencies in responding to terrorist acts, and offer their neighbors immediate assurance of safety and security.

Tier 3: US military forces responding to Presidential direction. If circumstances warrant, the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct military forces and assets to intercept and defeat threats on US territory. **When conducting land defense missions on US territory, DoD does so as a core, warfighting mission, fulfilling the Commander in Chief’s Constitutional obligation to defend the nation.** To fulfill this responsibility, DoD will ensure the availability of appropriately sized, trained, equipped, and ready quick reaction forces (QRFs) and rapid reaction forces (RRFs).

Capabilities for Providing Mission Assurance

Core Capability: Enhanced preparedness of DoD installations for direct threats, especially CBRNE attacks

Improving DoD’s capabilities for mitigating and, if necessary, operating in a CBRNE-contaminated environment will require progress in detecting and identifying threats

(sense), providing early warning (shape), protecting forces and installations (shield), and ensuring the ability to operate in a contaminated environment (sustain). DoD’s Joint Chemical and Biological Defense Program is focused on developing and fielding technologies to mitigate, and if necessary, allow forces to operate in CBRNE contaminated environments.

Sense. DoD currently has a range of capabilities to detect, identify, and quantify airborne, waterborne, and other hazards. Needed improvements include advanced standoff and point detection capabilities for chemical and biological threats. DoD is also working to develop and field standoff detection capabilities for explosives. Advances in standoff detection capability will enhance the Department’s ability to detect nuclear devices as well as weapons using explosives to disperse chemical, biological, and radioactive materials. Finally, the Department is improving medical surveillance capabilities both on installations and within surrounding communities to provide early detection and identification of CBRNE events in the workforce.

Shape: DoD characterizes CBRNE attacks by assimilating information drawn from sensors and elsewhere to inform commanders of impending or approaching threats. The Department is continuing to improve on early CBRNE threat characterization by developing an integrated concept of operations for sensing, reporting, and warning of CBRNE attacks, ensuring compatibility with national-level CBRNE sensor architectures currently in operation, such

IV. Core Capabilities

as BIOWATCH, and those under development.

Shield: The Department will continue to provide force protection in advance of a potential CBRNE attack, whether overseas or at domestic installations. Already, 750,000 US military personnel have been vaccinated against anthrax; 650,000 are vaccinated against smallpox. The Department is now focusing on the development of vaccines and other capabilities that can address new and emerging biological and chemical threats. This includes significant research on technologies for improved chemical and biological agent detection and personal and collective protection equipment. DoD is also preparing to field capabilities that protect US forces from chemical agents that can be absorbed through the skin.

Lastly, the Department is deepening and expanding collaboration on biodefense research with the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services. This includes significant new investments by these civilian agencies and the creation of a new research consortium. The construction of a National Interagency Biodefense Campus, collocated with the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), will significantly facilitate civil-military cooperation in this area. A revitalized and recapitalized USAMRIID, along with major Department of Homeland Security and Department of Health and Human Services investments, will provide DoD and the nation with added research capacity, additional biopharmaceutical development, increased testing and evaluation of potential biodefense medical

products, and large surge lab capacity for bioterrorism incident response.

Sustain: DoD must be able to sustain operations during and after a CBRNE attack in the United States. Medical therapeutics that allow DoD personnel to continue mission-essential tasks in a CBRNE environment are of highest priority. DoD will also expand pilot programs for CBRNE installation preparedness to protect DoD personnel and facilities in the event of an attack. In addition to providing enhanced CBRNE defense capabilities at 200 critical installations in the United States and abroad, DoD will improve preparedness and protection of all installations through updated doctrine and guidance. The Department will examine an aggressive expansion of this installation preparedness program to increase both the level of protection and the number of DoD installations it covers.

Core Capability: Crisis management and DoD continuity preparedness

The Department's crisis management and continuity of operations programs are central to mission assurance. DoD must provide capabilities necessary to support senior leadership decision-making and military command and control and to perform essential DoD functions to support national-level crisis managers. DoD is working to enhance its information management and communications capabilities to support senior leadership in crises. It is also improving the survivability and flexibility of military command and control capabilities.

A significant element of mission assurance is **continuity of operations**—maintaining the ability to carry out DoD mission essential

IV. Core Capabilities

functions in the event of a national emergency or terrorist attack. Fulfilling this objective in the current security environment necessitates new and innovative approaches. Some of these approaches include policies for personnel dispersion, leveraging advances in information technology to improve crisis coordination, and improving relocation facilities. The Department recently conducted a zero-based assessment of DoD continuity capabilities. The results of this assessment detail numerous capability improvements that the Department can pursue in order to ensure the continuity of DoD operations in times of crisis. It also provides recommendations that will transform DoD's approach to continuity operations from a Cold War-oriented operational concept to one better suited to address the current and evolving terrorist threat. The recommendations include the use of new and emerging technologies and the development of more flexible relocation options.

Core Capability: Preparedness and protection of defense critical infrastructure

Because resources are constrained, uniform protection of all defense critical infrastructure is not possible. **The Department must prioritize the protection of assets based on their criticality to executing the National Defense Strategy and seek to minimize the vulnerability of critical assets in accordance with integrated risk management approach.** To this end the Department will devise a strategy to:

- Identify infrastructure critical to the accomplishment of DoD missions, based on a warfighter mission area analysis.

- Assess the potential effect of a loss or degradation of critical infrastructure on DoD operations to determine specific vulnerabilities, especially from terrorist attack.
- Manage the risk of loss, degradation, or disruption of critical assets through remediation or mitigation efforts, such as changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures; minimizing single points of service; and creating appropriate redundancies, where feasible.
- Protect infrastructure at the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense where the nature of the threat exceeds the capabilities of an asset owner and civilian law enforcement are insufficient.
- Enable real-time incident management operations by integrating current and emerging threat monitoring and reporting with existing critical infrastructure network data and analysis through the Mission Assurance Support Center within the Defense Program Office for Mission Assurance.

The Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and other DoD components are now implementing the Protective Risk Management Strategy through modifications to their programs and budgets.

Core Capability: Preparedness of the Defense Industrial Base

The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (2003) notes that, **without the important contributions of the private sector, DoD cannot effectively execute core defense missions.** Private industry

IV. Core Capabilities

manufactures and provides the majority of the equipment, materials, services, and weapons for the US armed forces. Ensuring that military forces are properly equipped is critical to maintaining DoD power projection and homeland defense capabilities. In that regard, the President recently designated DoD as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). **In this role, DoD is responsible for national infrastructure protection activities for critical defense industries as set forth in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7.**

To assure that mission critical supplies and services are available, DoD contracts are being modified to ensure that appropriate protective measures are in place at key facilities and appropriate information is shared with the DoD to assess the security of the DIB. In addition, the Defense Logistics Agency and other DoD contracting activities are revising the contract process to ensure that civilian defense contractors are able to operate for the duration of a national emergency. **Defense contractors must be able to maintain adequate response times, ensure supply and labor availability, and provide direct logistic support in times of crisis.** Contracts will also require DoD program managers to be accountable for ensuring the protection of supporting infrastructure, including key suppliers. DoD base and installation commanders, and those who contract for non-DoD infrastructure services and assets, will monitor assurance activities through compliance with contract language that clearly identifies reliable service availability, priority of restoration, and asset protection.

Core Capability: Preparedness to protect designated national critical infrastructure

The Department has historically focused on preventing unauthorized personnel from gaining access to DoD installations and protecting those installations from traditional military attacks. **In the post-September 11, 2001 era, DoD is expanding the traditional concept of critical asset protection to include protection from acts of transnational terrorism.** Countering terrorist reconnaissance activity is central to the successful defense of critical infrastructure.

As outlined in the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (2003), DoD bears responsibility for protecting its own assets, infrastructure, and personnel. At the Department's request, domestic law enforcement may assist with protection functions at DoD facilities.

For non-DoD infrastructure, to include private and public assets that are critical to the execution of the defense strategy, DoD's protection role is more limited. The initial responsibility for protection of non-DoD infrastructure rests with asset owners. Civilian law enforcement authorities augment and reinforce the efforts of asset owners, creating a second tier of protection.

Should protection requirements exceed the capabilities of asset owners and civilian law enforcement, state authorities provide an additional layer of defense. In addition to a governor's authority to employ National Guard forces in a state active duty status, recent changes to Title 32 of US Code will provide an additional, expeditious means to mobilize National Guard forces under the

IV. Core Capabilities

control of the governor using federal funding to defeat a foreign terrorist threat.

To achieve critical infrastructure protection in the most serious situations, the Department of Defense maintains trained and ready combat forces for homeland defense missions.

Capabilities for CBRNE Consequence Management

Core Capability: Consequence management assistance for domestic CBRNE mass casualty attacks

Acknowledging the challenges presented by the current security environment, the Department of Defense must be able to conduct most major combat operations in a CBRNE environment. US military forces organize, train, and equip to operate in contaminated environments, as well as manage the consequences of CBRNE incidents, on a level unmatched by any other single domestic agency or international partner. **If directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense must be prepared to use these capabilities to assist interagency partners in the aftermath of domestic CBRNE mass casualty attacks.** DoD's CBRNE capabilities include specialized agent detection and identification systems as well as casualty extraction and mass decontamination abilities. DoD can also provide significant support to domestic consequence management by providing emergency medical support, such as equipment, mobile hospitals, medical personnel, engineering support, and mortuary services.

Not all domestic CBRNE incidents will necessitate a federal response; many

scenarios may be well within the capabilities of state and local responders.

Those incidents that do require a US government response will be coordinated by a lead federal agency. In most catastrophic scenarios, DoD may be called upon to provide support to the Department of Homeland Security or another lead federal agency. **The Department will work closely with interagency partners—through the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System—to ensure proficiency and interoperability in responding to multiple CBRNE incidents.**

The Department will ensure that its dedicated CBRNE civil support assets are sized, trained, equipped, and ready for the domestic consequence management mission. This will include planning for the potential augmentation of existing National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams (CSTs) with other National Guard capabilities and forces that are task-organized for this mission.

DoD will also identify, train, and equip an additional, discrete number of military forces for the potential requirements associated with multiple, simultaneous CBRNE attacks within the United States. These forces will be dual-mission in nature—these warfighters and support elements will not be dedicated to the civil support role but they will nevertheless be ready to perform domestic consequence management missions when required.

Lastly, the Department will ensure that other elements of the Total Force—currently sized and shaped primarily for overseas missions—are identified, exercised, and ready to support CBRNE consequence management as necessary. This capability will provide added utility for overseas deployments or domestic missions. Within this Total Force context,

IV. Core Capabilities

DoD's effectiveness in responding to domestic CBRNE contingencies will be greatly improved through adjustments to Active and Reserve Component training, procedures that allow for faster mobilization of National Guard and Reserve Forces, and improved command relationships that make optimal use of the Reserve Component. This includes leveraging the National Guard's Joint Force Headquarters-State organizations.

Enhancing US and International Capabilities for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security

Core Capability: Interagency planning and interoperability

Recognizing the critical importance of interoperability, DoD will share training, planning, and other appropriate resources with interagency partners to standardize operational concepts, develop technology requirements, and coordinate budget planning for homeland missions. Interagency efforts must focus on closing any remaining seams in air, land, maritime, cyberspace and space operational domains and must enhance national preparedness and incident management efforts. Development of a coordinated training and exercise program is an essential step toward enhanced cooperation in executing homeland defense and civil support missions.

Active DoD participation in the interagency process improves planning and interoperability and will ensure that procedures for supporting civil authorities are consistent with the framework for domestic incident response outlined in the

National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System. DoD will work closely with interagency partners to identify how best to coordinate interagency civil support activities.

Core Capability: Capable federal, state, and local partners and effective domestic relationships

The Department of Defense has identified three tenets to enhance defense support of civil authorities:

- Augment civil capabilities with DoD expertise where necessary;
- Ensure the seamless operational integration of defense support capabilities with those of the civil sector;
- Assist in the civil sector's development, procurement, and sourcing of new technologies and equipment.

Within this civil support framework, the Department will actively seek to identify opportunities for cooperation with the civil sector. Several initiatives to enhance civilian capabilities are already underway. Examples include:

- DoD assistance to the Department of Homeland Security to develop CBRNE victim rescue capabilities, similar to those of the US Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force.
- Joint DoD and Department of Homeland Security research and development on, and civilian acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles for law enforcement and

IV. Core Capabilities

ground surveillance systems for border security.

- DoD efforts through the Interagency Counter Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) Task Force to help develop an attack prevention and recovery plan, provide technical advice and analysis to the Department of Homeland Security regarding MANPAD countermeasures, and operational assistance to stem the proliferation of MANPADS overseas.

In compliance with Section 1401 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2003, DoD will continue to engage in efforts to transfer competencies between DoD and the civil sector—through technology transfer as well as sharing DoD's "lessons learned" from applicable exercises and program management. **Such collaborative efforts can increase the overall effectiveness of national capabilities and potentially reduce other agencies' dependencies on limited DoD assets.**

To succeed, the Department will need a systematic approach to ensure close coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and other interagency, state, and local partners, specifically:

- Facilitating the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to identify and provide appropriate and applicable defense technologies to state and local first responders;
- Nurturing new collaborative research, development, experimentation, test and acquisition opportunities with the Department of Homeland Security, while avoiding duplication of effort in these areas; and

- Ensuring the smooth transition of appropriate missions, technologies, and capabilities to the civil sector.

Complementing these activities will be a long-term effort with our federal partners to identify specific, frequently requested DoD capabilities for possible transition to the civil sector.

Core Capability: Capable international partners and effective defense-to-defense relationships

Because it is the Department's first priority, homeland defense must be a central, carefully considered element of our defense-to-defense relationships with key allies and friends abroad. The United States fosters strong defense relationships worldwide for many reasons of national security interest. Two such reasons are to strengthen allied military contributions to collective security and to enhance US capabilities through exposure to partners' expertise. Thus, DoD has an active security cooperation program, directed through the Secretary of Defense's Security Cooperation Guidance, that encourages mutual improvements to support coalition operations and to ensure continued interoperability. Clearly, our homeland defense will be substantially strengthened through the cooperation and assistance of international allies. **We will therefore strengthen DoD's emphasis in the Security Cooperation Guidance on homeland defense and civil support issues, with particular focus on improved information sharing in defense-to-defense interactions.**

Our North American neighbors, Canada and Mexico, are particularly vital to the protection of the US homeland and the continent. The Department also places special emphasis on

IV. Core Capabilities

cooperative homeland defense efforts with friendly nations in the Pacific and the Caribbean and with our NATO allies.

The primary mechanism for US-Canadian cooperation on homeland defense is the North American Aerospace Defense Command. Dedicated to the defense of US and Canadian airspace, NORAD has evolved from a Cold War institution to an agile 21st century counterterrorism capability reflecting an integrated, flexible bi-national approach to air defense. Over the next decade, the Department of Defense, in conjunction with the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security and working with our Canadian partners, will further refine and build on the NORAD concept. This effort will identify mechanisms for sharing information across all operational domains—air, maritime, and land, with shared awareness of the North American maritime domain as the first priority.

Given the importance of Mexico to US homeland defense, US-Mexican counterterrorism cooperation is essential. The Department will work with the Department of Homeland Security and Mexico to anticipate and plan for crisis coordination and consequence management following a terrorist attack. Cooperation with Mexico on law enforcement and immigration issues is substantial, especially in counternarcotics and

border control operations. Defense-to-defense cooperation requires similar emphasis and must be pursued with due respect for the Mexican government's policy goals and legal constraints. Traditional security assistance tools are pivotal in further developing mutually beneficial defense capabilities and arrangements.

Just as US defense of the homeland begins well beyond our geographic boundaries, so too must our cooperative efforts to improve that defense. The expansion of information and intelligence sharing with foreign partners is critical to the success of this Strategy. Friendly and allied nations often possess significant information relating to counterterrorism, smuggling, and other US concerns. Incorporating this information into our base of knowledge could significantly improve US readiness both for homeland defense and civil support missions.

Beyond the information realm, some nations have significant expertise to share with the United States in counterterrorism and other mission areas related to homeland defense. The United States likewise has much to gain in increasing the homeland defense capabilities of friendly nations. The Department will therefore expand combined education, exercise, training, and experimentation initiatives related to homeland defense.

V. Implications of the Strategy



V. Implications of the Strategy

"The threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces."

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

September 2002

The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support requires adjustments in DoD forces and capabilities, resource allocation, and technology development. Given resource constraints, meeting the Strategy's homeland defense and civil support objectives will require accommodation of competing demands within the National Defense Strategy.

Force Structure

An understanding of the force structure implications of the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support is critical to the Department's ability to size and shape forces correctly for diverse military missions. **This strategy reflects a Total Force approach to homeland defense missions, incorporating the capabilities of Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve forces that will be trained and equipped primarily for warfighting missions in the forward regions and approaches.** Identified forces must also be prepared to conduct the full spectrum of domestic civil support missions when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense to do so. The types of forces employed for any given homeland defense mission will be situation-dependent. Additionally, the type, scope, and location of events, competing DoD missions, resident civilian capabilities, and

a host of other variables will affect requests for defense support of civil authorities. To execute this diverse range of missions effectively, DoD must ensure the Total Force, both reserve and active components, is:

- **Timely** in response and readily accessible. Homeland defense and civil support missions require a rapid response, often measured in hours, not days.
- **Trained and equipped** to achieve the highest degree of readiness in a broad array of mission sets.
- **Transformed** to meet the terrorist challenges of a post-Cold War security environment. Forces must be agile and interoperable, taking advantage of networked capabilities.
- Consistent with the objectives of this Strategy, and in preparation for the next Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department will undertake a thorough analysis of force requirements for homeland defense missions. This analysis will take into account the projected capabilities of civilian agencies where those capabilities may affect DoD's force requirements. **A preliminary assessment suggests modest changes in several major mission areas and the potential for more**

V. Implications of the Strategy

substantial adjustments to maritime defense forces.

Focused Reliance upon the Reserve Component

Homeland defense and civil support are Total Force responsibilities. However, the nation needs to focus particular attention on better utilizing the competencies of the National Guard and Reserve Component organizations. The National Guard is particularly well suited for civil support missions. It is forward deployed in 3,200 communities through the nation, readily accessible in State Active Duty and Title 32 status, routinely exercised with local law enforcement, first responders, and the remainder of the Total Force, and experienced in supporting neighboring communities in times of crisis. In addition, Reserve forces currently provide many of the key capabilities needed for homeland defense and civil support, including intelligence, military policing, medical expertise, and chemical decontamination. The most promising areas for employment of the National Guard and Reserve forces include the following missions:

- ***Air and Missile Defense***, including surveillance and manning of ground-based defense systems.
- ***Maritime Security***, including Naval Reserve augmentation of active component and Coast Guard capabilities engaged in intelligence and surveillance, critical infrastructure protection, port security, and maritime intercept operations. **Traditional Cold War missions for the Naval Reserve should be transformed to reflect the 21st century transnational terrorist**

threat, most especially the maritime transportation of weapons of mass destruction to the United States.

Therefore, DoD will evaluate the operational benefit of employing Naval Reserve maritime and aviation capabilities in support of emerging homeland defense missions.

- ***Land defense***, including missions requiring Quick Reaction Forces/Rapid Reaction Forces. **The National Guard Bureau has recommended that the Army use existing National Guard force structure to form modular Reaction Forces, an initiative that could provide additional capabilities to support land defense mission requirements.** Other Reserve forces, including the Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve, are also capable of serving in reaction force roles.
- ***CBRNE response***, including specific capabilities for detection, extraction, decontamination, and medical care. **The Army National Guard Chemical-Biological-Radiological-High Explosives Enhanced Force Packages (NGCERFPs) effort is a promising initiative well tailored to CBRNE response.** The NGCERFPs are task-organized, using existing National Guard force structure. **The effective employment of National Guard forces in state or Title 32 status could increase the availability of US military forces for overseas deployments.**

Chemical companies resident in the Army Reserve can provide

V. Implications of the Strategy

significant capabilities and are trained and equipped for CBRN assessment as well as extraction and decontamination of mass casualties. The Reserve Component can also offer significant assistance with security, engineering, transportation, communications and other general-purpose homeland defense requirements related to CBRNE response.

- **Critical Infrastructure Protection**, including the performance of comprehensive assessments at critical infrastructure sites and utilization of Reserve Component forces for quick reaction requirements and local security at key defense and non-defense critical infrastructure sites, when directed.

Technology

Implementation of the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support may require several new technological investments. Three areas of particular interest for further exploration are advanced information and communications technology, new generations of sensors, and non-lethal capabilities.

Advanced Information and Communications Technology

Technological and organizational improvements for homeland security and homeland defense will benefit from focused investment in advanced information technology especially to prevent, intercept, and respond to terrorist activity. Whether the objective is improved maritime domain awareness and operations, interception of

weapons of mass destruction, response to chemical or biological attacks, or continuity of operations and government, improvement in information technology is a critical enabler to addressing current capability shortfalls. Advanced modeling and simulation techniques for threat identification, pattern analysis, risk assessment, dependency analysis, and cost/benefit calculus are critical for addressing issues of data sharing, security, and interoperability. Without these tools, the return on investments in other areas, such as improved sensors, detectors, command and control, and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and analysis, will be incomplete and insufficient.

Equally pivotal are potential advances in communications technologies, particularly those supporting ground-mobile and airborne communications. DoD must also work to reduce the size and power requirements of mobile communications systems. It must also invest in technologies that shield them against electromagnetic effects.

Sensors

New generations of sensors and sensor platforms will enhance threat awareness in the air, maritime, and land domains by helping to close current gaps over much of the maritime domain and in domestic airspace, particularly at low altitudes. Shared sensor technology will also play an important role in enabling improved border surveillance by civilian agencies.

The placement of sensors on high altitude platforms, including new generations of unmanned aerial vehicles, satellites, and aerostats, will allow sustained surveillance

V. Implications of the Strategy

of wide areas of the earth's surface. These sensors will also enhance defenses against low-flying cruise missiles. Some new ground sensors will have an over the horizon capability with applications for homeland defense and homeland security missions.

New sensor technologies are also required for maritime defense, including the non-acoustic detection of underwater vehicles, objects, and swimmers. New sensor capabilities will be needed for a wide range of other tasks, such as remote detection of concealed CBRNE weapons aboard ships and for mapping the location and extent of contamination should adversaries use these weapons. Finally, **DoD must fully integrate its sensors as well as others on which it relies with information networks in order to coordinate their use and rapidly distribute information to operational and policy users.**

Non-Lethal Capabilities

The transnational terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, made it clear that the US homeland is now part of the enemy battle space. Therefore, we may be required to defeat attacks in close proximity to major civilian population centers. Non-lethal capabilities hold some promise as an effective alternative to deadly force. The Department will therefore examine the potential operational employment of non-lethal weapons for homeland defense missions, particularly those where civilian loss of life can be effectively minimized.

Non-lethal technologies with potential application to homeland defense missions include:

- **Counter-personnel technology**, used to deny entry into a particular area, temporarily incapacitate individuals or groups, and clear facilities, structures, and areas.
- **Counter-material technology**, to disable, neutralize, or deny an area to vehicles, vessels, and aircraft, or disable particular items of equipment.
- **Counter-capability technology**, to disable or neutralize facilities, systems, and CBRNE.

The Department will expand basic research into the physiological effects of non-lethal weapons. The Department should also identify opportunities to share appropriate non-lethal capabilities with domestic law enforcement agencies, consistent with applicable law.

Rapid Prototyping of Emerging Capabilities

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) are a key DoD vehicle for rapidly fielding promising technologies. The objectives of an ACTD are to conduct meaningful demonstrations of the capability, develop and test concepts of operations to optimize military effectiveness, and, if warranted, prepare to transition the capability into acquisition without loss of momentum. Currently, there are over 25 ACTDs with relevance to homeland defense and homeland security such as the Homeland Security/Homeland Defense Command and Control Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. The Department will ensure that requirements for homeland defense and civil support are properly addressed in the ACTD process in

V. Implications of the Strategy

the decade ahead. The Department will continue working with the Department of Homeland Security and other domestic and international partners to encourage their participation in ACTDs as appropriate.

DoD will also continue to leverage innovative capabilities arising from private sector initiatives, many of which are fostered through the interagency Technical Support Working Group (TSWG).

Funding

With many important programs competing for finite resources, proper funding and budget oversight for homeland defense and CBRNE consequence management missions is vital. Currently, the Department accounts for homeland defense activities through a variety of widely dispersed programs and funding lines. Funding for homeland defense is not accounted for consistently; it can be found in every Military Department and combatant command and numerous initiatives under the purview of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Funding Implications

In developing planning and programming guidance to implement the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, DoD must thoroughly assess the fiscal implications of attaining and sustaining requisite core capabilities. Determining the relative costs and benefits of each of the following areas merit immediate attention:

- **Expanding communications infrastructure** and enhancing DoD's ability to share vital information while protecting the integrity of the Global Information Grid;

- **Improving intelligence assets** to enhance overall threat awareness throughout all domains;
- Developing and procuring **advanced technologies** to maximize awareness of potential threats;
- Ensuring the necessary capabilities, types, and number of transformational forces needed to effectively conduct an active, layered **maritime defense** against transnational threats, including CBRNE attacks;
- Implementing DoD's **Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection** responsibilities;
- Furthering investments in **non-lethal weapons** research and capabilities;
- Providing support for DoD **continuity of operations** in the event of a national emergency or catastrophe; and
- Implementing **National Guard Bureau transformation** initiatives, such as NGCERFPs, as appropriate.

In the course of implementing this strategy, the Department must not take on responsibilities and costs for homeland security missions better addressed by other federal, state, local, or tribal authorities. This will require close coordination and continuing cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security and other interagency partners, including finding efficiencies in the research, development, testing, acquisition, and deployment of capabilities that span multiple agencies.

V. Implications of the Strategy

Managing Homeland Defense and Civil Support Risk

The Department must employ a risk management strategy that appropriately acknowledges the importance of an active, layered homeland defense. **An active, layered defense integrates homeland defense and forward operations conceptually and operationally.** Therefore, the Department will assess homeland defense and civil support mission risks and resources in the context of all of the requirements outlined in the National Defense Strategy.

The Strategy places a premium on the Department's primary responsibility for protecting the homeland from attack. A second priority is to meet DoD's most challenging civil support mission—CBRNE consequence management. Specifically, the Strategy's risk management approach is as follows:

Lead. The Department's key lead objectives are to achieve maximum awareness of threats, intercept and defeat threats at a safe distance, and provide mission assurance.

DoD must not accept undue risk in its active defense of the US homeland from direct air, land, or maritime threats. The capability and readiness of US forces to intercept and defeat these threats must be assured. Further, because the most critical element of successfully defeating threats to the homeland is shared situational awareness, the Department will focus

special attention in this area. DoD accepts some operational risk in providing mission assurance.

Support. Transnational terrorists have a demonstrated intent to acquire weapons of mass destruction and exploit US vulnerabilities in order to employ such weapons against potential domestic targets. Accordingly, the Department will reduce risk by improving its consequence management capabilities for responding to multiple, simultaneous CBRNE mass casualty attacks in the United States. **DoD will maintain a ready, capable, and agile command and control structure, along with competently trained forces, to assist civilian authorities with catastrophic incident response. However, with the exception of a dedicated command and control element (currently the Joint Task Force-Civil Support), DoD will continue to rely on dual-capable forces for consequence management and other defense support of civil authorities.** The Department minimizes the risk that dual-capable forces may be assigned to other high priority missions by deconflicting overseas and domestic force requirements wherever possible.

Enable. Enabling domestic and international partner capabilities is an important priority for the Department. **The Department aims to decrease long-term risk by improving the capabilities of our interagency and international partners.** DoD accepts some risk in achieving the "Enable" objective in order to address other, more immediate, "Lead" and "Support" objectives.

VI. Conclusion



VI. Conclusion

"The battle is now joined on many fronts. We will not waver; we will not tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail. Peace and freedom will prevail."

President George W. Bush

October 7, 2001

The United States faces ruthless enemies who seek to break our will and exploit America's fundamental freedoms. Our adversaries are eager to employ violence against Americans at home. In this environment, the Department of Defense's paramount goal will continue to be the defense of the US homeland from direct attack.

A new kind of enemy requires a new concept for defending the homeland. **The terrorist enemy now considers the US homeland a preeminent part of the global theater of combat, and so must we.** We cannot depend on passive or reactive defenses but must seize the initiative from adversaries.

The active, layered defense articulated in this Strategy seamlessly integrates US capabilities in the forward regions of the world, the global commons of space and cyberspace, the geographic approaches to the US territory, and within the United States. Whether in a leading, supporting, or enabling role, the Department of Defense, guided by this Strategy and consistent with US law, will work with an intense focus to protect the US homeland and the American people.

When fully realized, this Strategy will transform the Department's homeland defense and civil support capabilities. The nation will have effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

capabilities for homeland defense; and information will be widely shared with relevant decision-makers. The Department will have well-trained and responsive forces for homeland defense missions that will use improved technology and operational concepts to eliminate potential seams between the maritime, air, and land domains. Additionally, **the Department will achieve unity of effort with our interagency and international partners in the execution of homeland defense and civil support missions.**

In implementing the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, the Department will carefully consider the potential implications for force structure, technology, and funding. More fundamentally, the Department must change its conceptual and cultural approach to homeland defense. The Department can no longer think in terms of the "home" game and the "away" game. There is only one game.

The effectiveness of any strategy is ultimately in the hands of those charged with its implementation. The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support is a call for fundamental transformation in military capabilities in order to counter the 21st century threat. Defending the US homeland—our people, property, and freedom—is a fundamental duty. Failure is not an option.