

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-8
700 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0700
HSA-JCSG-D-05-409

DAPR-ZB

17 June 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR OSD BRAC CLEARINGHOUSE

SUBJECT: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker 0293 – Subject: BRAC Commissioners' Principi and Newton Base Visit to Fort Eustis, VA

1. Reference: E-mail, RSS dd, WSO BRAC Clearinghouse, Saturday, June 11, 2005, 3:01 PM, subject as above.
2. Issue/Question: By reference, BRAC Commission requested the following information:
 - a. As currently presented, the movement of the Transportation School to Ft Lee includes the full annual student load of 990. Yet Ft Lee does not have the capability to support watercraft, cargo specialist, or rail training, nor is such additional capability included in the proposal based on capital investment funding proposed. The Commission must assume, therefore, that such training will continue to be accomplished on-site at Ft Eustis. Request the Army confirm that approximately 30% of the load or approximately 300 trainee load of the 990 total load will remain resident at Ft Eustis. If so, was the additional cost included in course, and proposed location of training for the 990 training load identified in the permanent party at Ft Eustis please provide COBRA runs that reflect their retention at Ft Eustis.
 - b. A Joint Basing initiative assigns installation management for Ft Eustis and Ft Story to the Air Force and Navy, respectively. Cost savings are extremely high as a percentage of the actual authorizations – reaching over 58% savings in civilian authorizations at Ft Eustis. The cost savings imply an understanding of the mechanics of the Joint Basing yet the installations are unable to explain to the Commission the responsibilities and processes that will be in place under Joint Basing. Savings of that magnitude cannot, therefore, be validated. Please provide how the proposed relationship will work and the justification for the significant savings associated with this consolidation.
 - c. The Commission understands that HQ TRADOC might be housed at Ft Story. The data available to the Commission shows only \$5,254,280 in construction funding identified in the DOD alternative and is predicated on the headquarters at Ft Eustis in Newport News, VA, not Ft Story. Request confirmation that HQ TRADOC will be located on Ft Eustis and not Ft Story. If the intention is now to locate the headquarters at Ft Story, please provide a COBRA run reflecting the changed location.
3. Response:
 - a. Per Education and Training (E&T) JCSG: It was not the Army's intent to leave any part of the Transportation Center and School at Fort Eustis. A data call was sent to Fort Eustis to try to determine the magnitude of the water training – their response indicated it was 16.1 % of their output. In conjunction with TRADOC

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HQs, we determined a solution (for what if any water training must be left behind at Fort Eustis) could be determined during implementation and would not materially alter the payoff of the recommendation.

There are possible solutions to the water training issue that could still allow the move of all Transportation School students to Fort Lee and yet still conduct part of their training at Fort Eustis. For instance, the actual training that must be conducted on the water could be consolidated and students sent on a training exercise or TDY to Fort Eustis. Another possible solution, since the travel time from Ft Lee to Ft Eustis is less than one hour, would be to transport students back and forth from Fort Lee and Eustis on the same day without a loss of significant training time. The best solution should be determined by TRADOC HQ during implementation.

Cargo and rail training can and should be conducted at Fort Lee. Data call responses from Fort Eustis indicated the only unique construction required to handle the Transportation School was the construction of the Land Ship Training Facility and the Air Load Training Facility at an estimated cost of \$33,225,000. This additional cost was included the COBRA run for the CSS Center.

b. OSD is presently developing policy for executing these recommendations. OSD's Installation Capabilities Council (ICC) is working with Military Departments (MILDEPs) to develop a detailed functions list consistent with the intent of the BRAC recommendation. The intent of this BRAC recommendation is to include for consideration all base operations support (BOS) functions and the operations and maintenance (O&M) portion of sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM). Medical and Military Personnel services were the only BOS functions excluded from this recommendation because those functions were reviewed separately. However, the recommendation language also gives OSD flexibility to grant exceptions in implementation across the joint bases due to uniqueness in the delivery of base support services.

For both Ft. Eustis and Ft. Story, the elimination of positions for cost estimating purposes represents potential savings based on the size of consolidated workforces, not just the work force at one installation. In the case of Ft Eustis and Langley Air Force Base, 217 position reductions were associated with this merger. This represents 7% reduction of the total Eustis/Langley installation management workforce. The reductions associated with the Ft Story and Navy Region Mid-Atlantic region are 21, which represents less than 3% of the combined workforce.

Personnel reduction entries into COBRA may not reflect the actual reductions taken during execution of the recommendations. As mentioned in the COBRA footnotes, actual reductions may come from either service; and, the actual distribution of reductions between military and civilian may vary from the numbers entered into COBRA.

The savings for the joint basing recommendation were calculated using COBRA. We developed methodology for projecting reductions associated with the consolidation of installations. A detailed explanation of the methodology is provided at Attachment 1. As part of the Scenario Data Call process, these projections were forwarded to the services for their review and inputs. Based on service responses,

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
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projected reductions were validated or modified. To assure minimum risk to supported operations, the lowest number of reductions calculated by either the Service or the Joint Cross Service Group was used. Attachment 2 provides a detailed explanation of the reconciliation process used to determine the final personnel reductions used for the COBRA calculations. Attachment 3 explains the COBRA entries to screens 4, 5 and 6.

c. Response to the Commission question, above, regarding HQ TRADOC relocation to Ft. Eustis or Ft. Story is at Attachment 4.

4. Coordination: Col Jim Briggs, USAF, E&T JCSG, June 15, 2005.

4 Encl
As Stated



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Method for Determining Installation Management (IM) Personnel Requirements:

1. Assumptions:

- a. Economy of scale is achievable in all scenarios.
- b. Consolidation of installation workloads will not exceed a single organization capability to control (one exception).
- c. No personnel reductions are predicted based on BPR, additional outsourcing, etc.
- d. Efficiency level of a receiving installation would remain at current level or improve based on economy of scale, but would not be reduced to a level requiring additional resources.

2. General.

a. The calculations for predicting IM personnel requirements use an economy of scale model based on average ratios for comparable installations from the same service. The first ratio established for these calculations is square footage (from Capacity Data Call (CDC) Questions #445 or Military Value (MV) question #1979) of all facilities (measured in Sq Ft) compared to the number of personnel reported in CDC Question #330 authorized in the Public Works staff. This ratio forms the basis for predicting public works personnel requirements. Next is a set of two ratios which compare supported population (installation workforce and family members less IM workforce) and supported workforce (less IM workforce)(both from CDC Question #4096) to the number of personnel reported in the capacity data question (CDC Question #330) authorized to the installation management staff less public works staff. For Air Force and Army models (Navy when possible), the Information Management staff has been added from capacity data question CDC Question #316. Military personnel staff were not included because data available from capacity question CDC Question #478 was not delineated enough to separate the IM portion of personnel performing this function.

b. The ratios described above were derived by grouping within each service installations having square footage and or supported personnel/workforce within a narrowly defined range. In most cases increments of 5 million square feet or 5000 supported personnel/workforce were used as the break points. Examination of the resulting ratios clearly demonstrated a standard economy of scale curve with greater efficiency being achieved by larger installations. These ratios established the basis for scenario analysis to determine IM personnel requirements based on consolidation of the organizations supporting the installations identified. To the extent possible, all installations reporting data were included in the sample data used for establishing the above ratios. Where data was not available or data appeared to be inconsistent the installation was dropped.

c. Each set of scenarios was put through a series of calculations. The first calculation is specific to the Public Works function. The square footage of the installations is combined and then divided by the appropriate service ratio for the

combined square footage. The result provides the new requirement for public works personnel. This result is then compared to the total strength of the existing public works staffs. The difference is the reduction feasible strictly based on the economy of scale model. The second calculation is based on the supported population of the installation. The supported populations of the installations are combined and then the appropriate ratio applied to compare to the IM staff. This calculation is done with the Public Works staff included then excluded. The same process is repeated for the supported workforces. A final set of calculations is done for each of the above by adjusting for the military strength of the IM staffs when Air Force installations are included in the analysis. The strength of the IM military staff was adjusted downward by 25% to account for the Air Force mobility requirement resident in Air Force military personnel performing BASOPS functions.

d. The results were compiled into summary calculations which developed two or more solutions based on the specifics of the installations. The first is a result using the calculations done without adjustment for the military personnel. This was derived by adding the result from the Public Works calculation to each of the calculations done on supported population and supported workforce. This provided two solutions which were then compared. In theory, the reductions calculated from each method should be the same if resources were applied to the IM workforce in a strict formulaic process. There are several cases where this theory held true. As a technique of adjusting for the difference in these results, an even split method was used to come up with the final percent reduction to apply. The same process was then repeated using the results achieved by adjusting for the military. In general, when using the results after adjusting for the military, the method using the separate calculations for Public Works and adding to the results from the calculations for supported personnel and workforce done without Public Works achieved the best results. The conclusion from examining all results is that square footage is the best and most appropriate factor for determining Public Works staffing requirements.

e. In most cases, application of the economy of scale model required appropriate adjustments to reflect specific situations concerning the installations. Where appropriate, the average ratios were adjusted by using the specific ratio applicable to the proposed gaining installation. The reasons for adjustment were dependant on the efficiency of the installation compared to the service average. The logic guiding these adjustments was predicated on the following:

(1) If an installation had a very high efficiency ratio such that additional resources (above the combined total) would be required when applying the service average, an adjustment was applied to recognize the efficiency of that installation but at a lesser rate than already being achieved. This adjustment avoids overstating the projected staff requirements.

(2) If an installation was currently at an efficiency ratio lower than the service average, an adjustment was applied to ensure that calculated requirements primarily reflected economy of scale reductions versus reductions that would be imposed by assuming the installation would achieve greater efficiency than currently exists from

business process or other changes. This adjustment was intended to ensure that predicted reductions in staffing requirements would not be overstated.

(3) If a receiver installation was currently at an efficiency ratio lower than the losing installation to the point that an increase in personnel would be predicted using the appropriate service average, an adjustment using both services averages was applied. This adjustment was applied using the service average for the consolidated square footage and/or population against the specific installation data to predict requirements when consolidated. This adjustment had the effect of maintaining constant resources at existing service levels adjusted for economy of scale.

(4) Where appropriate and applicable, a final adjustment was applied to compensate for distance between the main cantonment areas of the respective installations. In cases where these areas were seamless or less than 5 miles, no adjustment was applied. In cases where the distance exceeded 5 miles but was less than 20 or the installations did not share a boundary, a 20 percent adjustment was applied to the predicated reductions. The basis for the 20 percent is to reflect the portion of the workforce that is facility dependant which requires supported population to go to the source of support. In general, the distances used for applying this reduction reflects little opportunity to close or reduce redundant facilities with this much separation without significantly degrading standards of support currently provided.

In all cases, the resulting recommended solutions will reflect using the most conservative approach and logic. Specific rationale for each scenario is provided for each set of results.

3. Ft. Bragg/Pope AFB:

a. Based on both quantitative and qualitative military value analysis, the team's recommendation is to realign installation management responsibilities from Pope AFB to Ft. Bragg with the Army assuming executive agency responsibilities. Based on this recommendation, the calculations used were taken from the tables establishing ratios for Army installations.

b. The first calculations for public works staff requirements were based on the Army average ratio for installations over 20 million square feet. In this case, Ft. Bragg has a higher efficiency than the Army overall, but not so significantly higher to justify making an adjustment to compensate for the difference. Without adjusting for military personnel, the calculations projected a reduction of 95 personnel from the total 754 public works staff. When adjusted for Air Force military personnel, the projection was a reduction of 62. The latter was the result used in the final calculations.

c. The calculations using supported population and supported workforce did require adjustment to compensate for an exceptionally high efficiency ratio for Ft. Bragg. For Army installations with a supported population of over 40K personnel, the Army average was one installation management staff person required for every 36.3 supported personnel. The Ft. Bragg average was 90.2. The difference for supported workforce for

installations over 30K was 27.7 for the Army average and 42.5 for Ft. Bragg. Although no single factor explains why Ft. Bragg is so significantly higher than the Army averages, two key mission areas (maintenance and supply functions) as determined by the capacity analysis provide a major part of the explanation. The Army average as a percent of the IM staff was 9% for each of these functions. In the case of Ft. Bragg, both of these functions were staffed at very low personnel levels and were both at 3.5% each of the total IM staff. When considering that all other installations in the comparable size groupings support operational forces with heavy densities of major end items (tanks, personnel carriers, aviation) while Ft. Bragg supports exclusively light forces with a low density of heavy equipment, it logically follows that Ft. Bragg will have a higher efficiency ratio for both the maintenance and supply functions and therefore higher overall average. Since nothing in this scenario will change the basic mission requirements for Ft. Bragg, it is essential to compensate for Ft. Bragg's current efficiency to avoid overstating the IM staffing requirements based on use of the Army average.

d. Adjustments of 10, 20, and 50 percent were made to compensate for the Ft. Bragg efficiency levels. A 50 percent adjustment used in conjunction with the military adjustment for Pope AFB resulted in a prediction of personnel reductions of 437 or 12.6 percent. An examination of all results concludes that an adjustment between 25 and 50 percent is appropriate and supportable with negligible risk to support of Army or Air Force operational capabilities. This would result in a prediction of personnel reductions between 86 (2.5%) and 437 (12.6%) personnel.

4. Ft. Lewis/McChord AFB:

a. Based on quantitative and qualitative military value analysis, the team recommendation is to realign installation management responsibilities from McChord AFB to Ft. Lewis with the Army assuming executive agency responsibility. Based on this recommendation, the calculations used were taken from the tables establishing ratios for Army installations.

b. The first calculations for public works staff requirements were based on the Army average for installations over 20 million sq ft. The Ft. Lewis ratio while contributing to the 15-20 million sq ft category had a ratio slightly higher than the Army ratio therefore no adjustments were necessary other than for Air Force military personnel. Based on current staffing, the economy of scale model predicts a potential for substantial reductions. The result without adjustment for military personnel gave a projected reduction of 238 personnel from the total of 788 public works personnel while the result with an adjustment for military personnel projected a reduction of 207. The latter was the result used in final calculations.

c. The calculations using supported population and supported workforce required adjustment to compensate for an Army efficiency ratio which projected personnel reductions at a level sufficiently high to create concern for risk to operational capabilities of supported forces. In order to mitigate this concern, an adjustment was applied using the rule established in paragraph 2.e. (2). Using the Ft. Lewis ratio in accordance with

this rule, the predicted reduction changed from 1490 personnel (34%) using the Army average with no adjustments to 1141 (26.2%) with adjustments for military. An additional note of interest for this scenario, the difference between the percentage reductions for supported population and supported work force were negligible resulting in no requirement to adjust.

d. Although Ft. Lewis and McChord share a boundary, there is a distance of approximately eight miles between the cantonment areas. Based on this distance, it is recommended that an adjustment be applied as described in paragraph 1.e. (3). Using a 20% adjustment resulted in a predicted reduction of 912 personnel or 21%.

5. Pearl Harbor/Hickam AFB:

a. Based on quantitative and qualitative military value analysis, the team recommendation is to realign installation management responsibilities from Hickam AFB to Pearl Harbor Naval Station with the Navy assuming executive agency responsibilities. Based on this recommendation, the calculations used were taken from the tables establishing ratios for Navy installations.

b. With respect to Navy installations in general and Pearl Harbor specifically, the Navy's regional structure for installation management requires a modified approach to development and application of efficiency ratios. While a number of bases in the Navy's inventory have robust dedicated staffing, all bases to some extent rely on personnel employed at central work centers responsible for multiple bases. Where possible and in particular Norfolk and Hawaii regions the ratios were adjusted to reflect a reasonable apportionment of personnel employed in the work centers. In the case of Pearl Harbor, which comprises the major workload for the supporting work centers, adjustments down of 25% and 50% were calculated. The solutions achieved using a reduction of 25% produce results that best track with estimates for the proportion of workload attributed to Pearl Harbor for these work centers. Therefore, the recommended solutions are based on reducing the work center personnel by 25%.

c. For calculations to determine public works staffing requirements, solutions were developed using the Navy average for bases over 15 million sq ft. However, solutions were also developed using Pearl Harbor averages since these were lower than the Navy average. Therefore, the adjustment described in paragraph 2 e (2) was used to avoid overstating predicted personnel reduction. The solution ranging from use of the Navy average with no adjustments for military to using the Pearl Harbor average with adjustment for military and 25% adjustment for the public works center were 708 personnel to 251 out of a total of 1781 personnel doing public works functions. The recommended solutions use the lowest reduction.

d. The calculations using supported population and supported workforce were developed using the same sequence and process done for public works. Solutions were developed using the Navy average ratios for supported populations 25K to 50K personnel

and supported workforce 20K to 40K personnel. Solutions were also developed based on the Pearl Harbor ratios with and without adjustment for military personnel. The solutions for both supported populations and supported workforce were close enough to be considered insignificant and require no adjustment. In each case the most conservative solution is recommended.

e. The solution for the Pearl Harbor/Hickam AFB consolidation ranged from a predicted reduction of 563 personnel at 8.5% to a low of 280 personnel at 4.2%. In this scenario no adjustment for distances was applied based on proximity of the cantonment areas. The range of solutions is considered achievable with negligible risk to operational capabilities of supported forces.

6. McGuire AFB/Ft. Dix/Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst:

a. Based on quantitative and qualitative military value analysis, the team recommendation is to realign installation management responsibilities from Ft. Dix and Lakehurst to McGuire AFB with the Air Force assuming executive agency responsibilities. Based on this recommendation, the calculations used were taken from the tables establishing ratios for Air Force installations.

b. The first calculations for public works staff requirements were based on the Air Force average for installations over 9 million square feet. Because the McGuire ratio reflected greater efficiency than the Air Force average, it was also used in developing projected reductions. Based on reported public works staffing both ratios even when adjusted for military personnel projected a requirement to add between 68 and 418 personnel. The projection adding 68 was based on the McGuire average adjusted for military and would be the preferred solution without any further adjustment. Because these calculations predicted additional resourcing required for public works, additional calculations were completed using Army and Navy ratios for installations between 15-20 million square feet and over 15 million square feet respectively for the Army and Navy square footage only. The rationale for this adjustment is based on the assumption that current efficiencies for the square footage of Dix and Lakehurst can be supported at current efficiencies. This adjustment projected a reduction of 101 public works positions. Results using McGuire ratios and combined results were used in summary calculations.

c. The calculations using supported population and supported workforce were based on the Air Force average for installations between 20-25K and over 15K respectively. Although the projected reductions in staff requirements were substantial, they appear to be an accurate reflection of potential based on economy of scale. McGuire was almost exactly on the Air Force average for installations between 10-15K supported population and 5-10K supported workforce and therefore should project at the Air Force average based on the expanded requirements generated by consolidation. The Air Force averages used were still lower than the existing Ft. Dix or Lakehurst averages indicating that these installations overall would at minimum maintain and most likely realize resourcing levels slightly above current levels.

d. The solutions developed for the McGuire/Dix/Lakehurst consolidation ranged from a predicted reduction of 655 personnel at 19.4% to 426 personnel at 12.6%. The projections on the lowest end are considered achievable with negligible risk to support of operational forces.

7. Elmendorf AFB/Ft. Richardson:

a. Based on quantitative and qualitative military value analysis, the team recommendation is to realign installation management responsibilities from Ft. Richardson to Elmendorf AFB with the Air Force assuming executive agency responsibilities. Based on this recommendation, the calculations used were taken from the tables establishing ratios for Air Force installations.

b. The first calculations for public works staff requirements were based on the Air Force average for installations over 9 million square feet. In this case, the Elmendorf ratio which was a contributor to the overall Air Force ratio for installations over 9 million square feet, was extremely close to the Air Force average eliminating the need to use an adjustment based on the Elmendorf ratio. Based on reported public works staffing, the results with and without adjustment for military personnel ranged from a reduction of 1 to an addition of 30. The projection adding 30 was based on the Air Force average adjusted for military and would be the preferred solution without any further adjustment. Because these calculations predicted additional resourcing required for public works, additional calculations were completed using the Army ratio for installations with 10-15 million square feet for the Army square footage. The rationale for this adjustment is based on the assumption that current efficiencies for the square footage of Richardson can be supported at current efficiencies. This adjustment projected a reduction of 94 public works positions when adjusting for military. Although this last result appears reasonable, results using only the Air Force ratio were used in summary calculations since this represented the most conservative approach.

c. The calculations using supported population and supported workforce were based on the Air Force average for installations over 25K and over 15K respectively. These calculations produced a wide range between projections for supported workforce which were significant and supported population which indicated resource addition when adjusted for military. Based on the difference, an even split adjustment was made to balance the disparity. Since the shift was in the direction of supported population thereby strengthening the position of supported workforce resourcing this adjustment improves support to operational forces while compensating for the support to the overall population. Unique to this situation is the fact that the Air Force ratios for the largest sized installations is slightly less efficient than those for Elmendorf which makes these calculations more conservative than strictly applying Elmendorf efficiencies.

d. The solutions developed for the Elmendorf/Richardson consolidation ranged from a predicted reduction of 378 personnel at 10.3 % to 224 personnel at 6%. The

projections are considered achievable with negligible risk to support of operational forces.

8. Naval District Washington/Bolling AFB

a. Based on quantitative and qualitative military value analysis, the team's recommendation is to realign installation management responsibilities from Bolling AFB to the Naval District of Washington with the Navy assuming executive agency responsibilities. Based on this recommendation, the factors used were taken from the tables establishing ratios for Navy installations with adjustments described in c below.

b. The first calculations for public works staff requirements were based on Navy average ratios for installations over 15 million square feet. In this case, the NDW ratio was higher than the Navy average to the point that calculations with both ratios were done to compare the difference. Using the overall average resulted in modest reductions of 43 not adjusted for military and 22 adjusted for military. The calculations using the NDW ratio resulted in higher reductions of 273 and 252 respectively. In keeping with the approach of using the most conservative method, the smaller reductions were used in the summary calculations.

c. Unlike the public works, NDW ratios for supported personnel and supported workforce are considerably lower than the Navy average. However, it is critical to note that the range from lowest to highest in this range represented limited bases ranging from a one to four difference in the basis (supported population and workforce) with NDW being the lowest. Consequently, the high end (Norfolk) skewed this average upward beyond a realistic average to apply for this scenario. Based on this, it was necessary to apply an adjustment. Several methods were considered and calculated. Because NDW was at the bottom of the range (50K plus for supported population and 40K+ for supported workforce) it was not appropriate to default to the NDW average as the sole basis for a solution necessitating an adjustment upward of the NDW ratio. Using correlation between NDW and Norfolk which represent the low and high end, a 25% adjustment to the NDW ratio was used to reach the recommended predicted reduction.

d. Using the various methods, solutions ranged from a high of 18.5% with no adjustment for military or the Navy average to a low of 2.5% using both an adjustment for military and the 25% adjustment for NDW described in c above. This range represented a projected personnel reduction of 852 at the 18.5% rate to 120 at the 2.6% rate.

9. Charleston AFB/Naval Weapons Station Charleston:

a. Based on quantitative and qualitative military value analysis, the team's recommendation is to realign installation management responsibilities from Naval Weapons Station Charleston to Charleston AFB with the Air Force assuming executive agency responsibilities. Based on this recommendation, the factors used were taken from

the tables establishing ratios for Air Force installations with adjustments described in paragraphs b and c below. In the case of this scenario, the quantitative results from the military value analysis were extremely close resulting in greater reliance on the qualitative analysis for arriving at the recommendation. The following notes address the considerations used in completing the qualitative analysis.

(1). General: The military value model which provides the quantitative tool for designating the most appropriate Installation (Service) to assume Executive Agency responsibilities resulted in a virtual tie. Weapons Station Charleston received a value of 0.185 compared to 0.184 for Charleston AFB. Therefore, qualitative military judgment is critical to the final recommendation for designation of executive agency.

(2). Core Mission: The core mission of Charleston AFB is operationally focused by providing a host installation for air mobility forces. Weapons Station Charleston provides a host installation for multiple activities and multiple services which have primary missions of training and industrial type activities. The military value model established higher weights for support of operational forces. As expected, Charleston AFB scored higher on this metric. However, later discussion details why the delta was smaller than expected and therefore advantaged the Weapons Station.

(3). Supported Population: The Weapons Station data reflected a supported population of 15K plus compared to 10K plus for the AFB. The military value model was weighted in favor of the installations supporting larger populations as indicated in the scope and assumptions of the model. In most cases, installations supporting large operational missions attained higher scores since they are typically larger than other types of installations such as the Weapons Station. This case provides an exception. The critical part of this comparison is that a large portion (6.5K plus) of the Weapons Station population is training (students) and industrial (civilians/contractors) which entails significantly less support and consequently less resources per supported person and therefore not a completely accurate reflection of capabilities which is the key factor being measured by this metric.

(4). Efficiency: Ratios comparing installation workforce to square footage and supported population were heavily weighted and favored the installations achieving the highest ratios. As noted in the above discussion, the impact of the composition of the supported population at the Weapons Station was reflected in higher efficiency ratios for the Weapons Station.

(5). Operational Activities: As explained in the discussion regarding core mission, the metric for operational forces carried higher weighting than administrative, training and RDTE. Although the AFB received the highest score for this metric, it must be noted that the Weapons Station reflected an operational strength of 1162 of which more than 50% was composed of an Army Material Command responsible for supply, maintenance and storage of the Army's pre-positioned afloat equipment. This activity was considered operational based on deployment requirements for contractor personnel to meet pre-positioned ships at ports of debarkation. Although the rationale for considering

these personnel as operational is supportable, it is subjective and could easily be argued that these personnel could have been included in the RDTE category. Had the later been the case, Charleston AFB would have achieved the higher Military Value score.

(6). summary: The military value model for Installation Management was designed and approved to generate higher scores for larger and operationally focused installations. This case was a rare exception where bases with dissimilar missions resulted in military value scores which did not reflect a clear recommendation regarding which installation would be the best choice to assume the responsibilities under consolidation. However, the above considerations which examine qualitative aspects of the metrics and factors used in the Military Value model, strongly suggest that Charleston AFB be designated as the gaining installation.

b. The first calculations for public works staff requirements were based on Air Force average ratios for installations having 5-9 million square feet. In this case, the Charleston AFB ratio contributed to the average for Air Force bases having less than 5 million square feet. The Charleston ratio was slightly higher than the overall average for this group indicating that the Air Force average for installations in the 5-9 million square foot range should be used without adjustment. However, using this ratio as the sole basis for calculating predicted public works staff reductions resulted in an estimated requirement that would exceed significantly the combined totals of the consolidated public works staffs. Since this result was inconsistent with the assumptions that a larger staff should not be required to execute the same workload already supported, an adjustment was appropriate. For this scenario, the adjustment applied was to calculate using both the Air Force ratio for the 5-9 million square foot categories and the Navy ratio for the 5-10 million square foot category applied to the actual square footage for each base as described in 2.e. (3) The requirement for each was summed and subtracted from the consolidated public works total to get a predicted reduction. This adjustment reflects a modified economy of scale approach using existing resourcing levels both services. This resulted in a very modest projected reduction of 28 without adjustment for military personnel and 27 with an adjustment for military personnel.

c. The calculations using supported population and workforce were based on the Air Force average for installations over 25K and 15K respectively. Weapon Station Charleston similar to other naval installations is supported out of consolidated work centers which necessitates appropriate adjustments. For purpose of this scenario, calculations were completed with all works center personnel included and then with all removed in order to determine the range. In this scenario with all personnel from the work centers removed, the predicted reductions using both supported population and supported workforce were still substantial. In keeping with a conservative approach, no intermediate adjustments were used for the work centers since removal assured predictable reductions. Calculations were also completed with and without adjustment for military.

d. As a final adjustment, a 20% factor was applied to compensate for the distance between the bases. In this case, the distance is less than 10 miles. The solutions developed

for the Charleston scenario ranged from a predicated reduction of 873 personnel at 22.3% to a low of 362 at 9.2%. The projections on the lowest end of this range are considered achievable with negligible risk to support of operational forces.

10. Ft. Myer/Henderson Hall:

a. Based on quantitative and qualitative military value analysis, the team's recommendation is to realign installation management responsibilities from Headquarters Battalion HQMC Henderson Hall to Ft. Myer with the Army assuming overall responsibility. Based on this recommendation, the ratios used were taken from the tables established for Army installations.

b. The first calculations for public works staff were initially calculated using the Army ratio for installations under 8 million square feet and then using the Ft. Myer ratio. In this case, Ft. Myer has a significantly better efficiency ratio than the Army average for comparable size installations. This fact combined with a very small square footage and no reported public works personnel for Henderson Hall generates a predicted requirement that would more than double the existing public works staff. Although there were no public works personnel reported by Henderson Hall, it is understood that this function is provided through the Navy public works center and therefore does require public works support. Based on this fact, the calculation using the Ft. Myer average which predicted a modest increase of public works staff personnel was chosen. While there could be potential for some reduction in the Navy public works center based on the Henderson Hall workload reduction, the small square footage involved and the difficulty of allocating man years directly to Henderson Hall made this effort unfeasible for the very small reduction that could be predicted.

c. The calculations using supported population and supported workforce used ratios for Army installations from 20-30K and 5-10K respectively. When calculating for projected staff requirements including public works personnel, the Ft. Myer ratio was also used as a comparison. However, when calculating without public works staffing, the Army averages and Ft. Myer averages were very close which eliminated any need to make adjustments. Final calculations resulted in a predicted reduction of 75 based on supported population and 153 based on supported workforce.

d. The final solutions for this scenario ranged from a high of 104 reductions representing 12.9% to a low of 65 reductions at 8.1%. This range of predicted personnel reductions are considered achievable with negligible risk to supported missions.

11. Hampton Roads North: Langley AFB/Ft. Eustis/Ft. Monroe:

a. Based on quantitative and qualitative military value analysis, the team recommendation is to realign installation management responsibilities from Ft. Eustis and Ft. Monroe to Langley AFB with the Air Force assuming overall responsibility. Based on this recommendation, the calculations used were taken from the table establishing ratios

for Air Force installations with adjustments as described in the paragraphs below. The initial calculations were completed using data for only Langley AFB and Ft. Eustis. Ft. Monroe was excluded based on an expectation that the Army will pursue closure of Ft. Monroe as part of BRAC 2005. Additional calculations including Ft. Monroe are pending.

b. The first calculations for public works staff requirements were based on the Air Force average ratios for installations over 9 million square feet. In the case of Langley which contributed to the Air Force average for installations with 5-9 million square feet, the average when adjusting for military was slightly higher than the Air Force average and could therefore adjust to the larger square footage at or above the average for installations over 9 million square feet. Based on this fact, no adjustment for the Langley average was required. However, the results of using only the Air Force average generated predicted public works staff requirements above the current consolidated total. Given this result, it was necessary to apply the adjustment described in 2

.e. (3) which based economy of scale predicted changes on the service average for the respective square footage. Using the combination of Air Force and Army averages resulted in predicted reductions of 79 personnel with adjustments for the military to 104 without adjustments for the military.

c. The calculations using supported population and supported workforce required similarly adjustments to those for public works staff. Results using only the Air Force average for installation over 25K supported population and 15K supported workforce projected personnel requirements above the current consolidated totals both with and without adjustment for military personnel. Based on these results, adjustments using combined Air Force and Army results derived from the specific installations were used for final calculations. For supported population an adjustment was also made using the process described in 2.e.(1) for Langley which had an efficiency ratio significantly higher than the Air Force average for Air Force installations over 25K. The combined results for supported population when used for predicting personnel reductions ranged from a high of 414 without adjustment of military personnel to a low of 244 without adjustment for military personnel.

d. As a final adjustment, a 20% factor was applied to compensate for the distance between the bases. The solutions developed for the Hampton North scenario excluding Ft. Monroe range from a predicted reduction of 455 personnel at 14.4% to a low end of 228 personnel at 7.2%. The projections on the lowest end of this range are considered achievable with negligible risk to support of operational forces.

12. San Antonio: Lackland AFB/Randolph AFB/Ft. Sam Houston:

a. Based on quantitative and qualitative military value analysis, the team recommendation is to realign installation management from Ft. Sam Houston and Randolph AFB to Lackland AFB with the Air Force assuming overall responsibility. Based on this recommendation, the factors used were taken from the tables establishing

ratios for Air Force installations with adjustments as described in the paragraphs below. Initially calculations were done for only Lackland and Ft. Sam Houston in order to determine a baseline prediction that would be consistent with all other scenarios. The range of predicted personnel reductions using only Ft. Sam Houston and Lackland was 4-7% of the combined installation management workforce. The results including Randolph AFB described below were consistent with this prediction as noted in the summary.

b. The first calculations for public works staff requirements were based on Air Force average ratios for installations over 9 million square feet. Because the consolidated square footage of the three installations is significantly larger than 9 million, the factor used failed to reflect any supportable economy of scale realistic at this high end of the range. As expected, the calculations predicted a requirement to add personnel resources rather than reduce. Based on this result, an adjustment described in 2.e. (3), using service ratios for the total square footage was applied separately to each installation. Using the combination of these results generated predictions for personnel reductions ranging from 251 without adjustment for military personnel to 295 with adjustment for military personnel.

c. The calculations using supported population and supported workforce required the same adjustments as that described for public works. As with the square footage range, the combined supported population and supported workforce significantly exceeded the range above 25K and 15 such that economy of scale would not be reflected as a result of applying the service average factor. The initial results using the Air Force average was, as expected, a staffing requirement projecting additional resource requirements. As noted, adjustments using combined service calculations described in 2.e. (3) were applied to develop the final calculations. For both supported population and supported workforce additional adjustments for installation specific efficiencies were applied as described in 2.e. (1). The combined results for predicted personnel reductions based on supported population ranged from a high of 168 to a low of 90 and a high of 562 to a low of 449 when using supported workforce.

d. As a final adjustment, a 30% adjustment was made for geographic distances based on a 20 mile separation between Lackland and Randolph AFB. The final solutions developed ranged from a predicted reduction of 307 personnel at 4.6% on the low end to 657 at 9.9% on the high end. The projections on the lowest end of this range are considered achievable with negligible risks to supported mission activities.

13. Hampton Roads South: Navy Mid-Atlantic Region/Ft. Story:

a. The Hampton Roads South scenario is unique when compared to other scenarios. Because Ft. Story is a sub-installation of Ft. Eustis, separate data was not submitted to reflect specific staffing. Since Ft. Story specific data was not provided, a quantitative military value analysis was not possible. However, based on qualitative military value analysis it is the team recommendation to realign installation management responsibilities from Ft. Eustis/Ft. Story to Navy Region Mid-Atlantic with the Navy assuming executive agency responsibilities. Based on this recommendation, the

calculations used were taken from the tables establishing ratios for the Navy installations with adjustments as described.

b. Unlike other scenarios which relied on capacity data for current IM staffing levels and military value data for supported population and supported workforce, it was necessary to estimate the Ft. Story applicable data based on Ft. Eustis data provided through these data calls. The basis for this estimate was the Ft. Eustis briefing data provided to TABS in early 2004. There was a very high consistency between the briefing data and certified data which established a high degree of confidence in this approach. Based on briefing data, percentages of workforce and family members allocated to Ft. Story were computed and then applied to the Ft. Eustis IM staff certified data to determine the Ft. Story number. The calculations resulted in a determination of 140 total IM staff of which 29 were computed as public works.

c. Because the disparity between the Mid Atlantic region aggregated data and Ft. Story is so significant, it was determined that a modified approach for doing calculations was appropriate in this case. In order to establish consistency with other scenarios, one naval installation was selected as the entity to consolidate with Ft. Story rather than the region aggregated. In this case, Naval Amphibious Station Little Creek was chosen based on geographical proximity and share characteristics of supported operation. This selection in no way presumes a management structure that would be implemented, the sole purpose was to establish a more appropriate comparison for determining staff requirements.

d. With respect to Navy installations in general and Norfolk specifically, the Navy's regional structure for installation management requires a modified approach to development and application of efficiency ratios. While a number of bases in the Navy's inventory have robust dedicated staffing, all bases to some extent rely on personnel employed at central work centers responsible for multiple bases. Where possible and in particular Norfolk and Hawaii regions the ratios were adjusted to reflect a reasonable apportionment of personnel employed in the work centers. In the case of Little Creek, which comprises a small portion of workload for the supporting public works center, public works personnel were allocated on a reported square footage basis of the total region.

e. The first calculations to determine public works staffing requirements were developed using the Navy average for bases less than 5 million square feet. Two calculations were made for this scenario. The first was a straight average ratio based on all sample data for bases with fewer than 5 million square feet and the second was with an adjusted ratio which utilized a 20% adjustment for public works center personnel not captured in the sample data. Both results appeared reliable with the first projection a reduction of 63 positions and the second a reduction of 26 positions. The lower figure of 26 was used in the final recommendation to ensure reductions would not be overstated. However, the entire range of projections appears achievable with negligible risk.

f. Several approaches were used for the calculations based on supported population and supported workforce. Although the combined total for Little Creek and Ft. Story were considerably lower, it is more realistic in this case to use ratios applicable to the Norfolk region since those would be more reflective of implementation under Mid Atlantic region. Initially calculations were done using the ratios for installations over 50K supported personnel and 40K supported workforce. However, it is critical to note that the range from lowest to highest in this range represented limited bases ranging from a one to four difference in the basis (supported population and workforce) with Norfolk being by far the highest. Consequently, Norfolk skewed this average upward beyond a realistic average to apply for this scenario. Calculations were also done using the Norfolk (Mid Atlantic) ratios in order to determine the range of projections. The results were ranges slightly exceeding 200 in both cases. Based on this, it was necessary to apply an adjustment. Several methods were considered and calculated. Because Norfolk was at the top of the range (50K plus for supported population and 40K+ for supported workforce) it was not appropriate to default to the Navy average as the sole basis for a solution necessitating an adjustment upward of the Navy ratio. Using correlation between the Navy average and Norfolk, a 50% adjustment to the Navy ratio was used to reach the recommended predicted reduction. The result of this adjustment was a projected reduction of 32 using supported population and 36 using supported workforce. The lower was used in the recommended solution.

g. As a final adjustment, a 20% factor was applied to compensate for the distance between the bases. The solutions developed for the Hampton South scenario range from a predicted reduction of 64 personnel at 11.7% to a low end of 46 personnel at 8.4%. The projections throughout this range are considered achievable with negligible risk to support of operational forces. The lowest was used in the recommended reduction.

14. Andrews AFB/Naval Air Facility Washington:

a. The Andrews AFB/Naval Air Facility scenario is unique when compared to other scenarios. Because the Naval Air Facility is one of many installations composing the Naval District Washington, separate data was not submitted to reflect specific staffing. Since NAF specific data was not provided, a quantitative military value analysis was not possible. However, based on qualitative military value analysis it is the team recommendation to realign installation management responsibilities from Naval Air Facility (Naval District Washington) to Andrews AFB with the Air Force assuming overall responsibility. Based on this recommendation, the calculations used were taken from the tables establishing ratios for the Air Force installations with adjustments as described. Although the total range of certified data needed was not available to separate NAF from NDW for military value purposes, the data required for the following calculations was available and extracted from the NDW certified data.

b. The first calculations for public works staff requirements were based on Air Force average ratios for installations over 9 million square feet. Calculations were done with and without adjustment for military personnel. The results ranged from a projected

reduction of 57 personnel without adjustment and 36 personnel with adjustment for personnel. The lowest result was used in the recommended solution.

c. Unlike all other scenarios, calculations were not computed for supported population since no method was available to allocate family members of Navy personnel to NAF. Therefore, calculations were limited to using the supported workforce. Because the Andrews ratio which was included in the 5-10K Air Force data was well below the Air Force average, it was necessary to apply an adjustment as described in d. (2) with an additional adjustment for the small additional workforce from NAF. This adjustment prevented the projections from being overstated while capturing the effects of economy of scale. This resulted in a range of projections from 89 on the high end to a requirement to add 6 on the low end. Although the low end was used in the recommended calculations, the entire range of projections appears achievable with negligible risk to support of mission.

d. The final solutions for this scenario ranged from a high of 89 reductions representing 2.5% to a low of 25 reductions at .8%. This entire range of predicted personnel reductions are considered achievable with negligible risk to supported missions. The most conservative solution was used for the recommendation.

15. Ft. Monmouth/Weapons Station Earle Colt:

a. Based on quantitative and qualitative military value analysis, the team recommendation is to realign installation management responsibilities from Naval Weapons Station Earle Colt to Ft. Monmouth with the Army assuming overall responsibility. Based on this recommendation, the calculations used were taken from the tables establishing ratios for Army installations.

b. The calculations for public works staff were calculated using the Army ratio for installations under 8 million square feet. This calculation resulted in a projected reduction of 51 public works positions representing 12% of the reported consolidated public works staffing. This was used in the final recommendation without further adjustment.

c. The calculations for supported population and supported workforce initially used the Army averages for installations 10K and under and 10-15K respectively. Since these averages were well above the Ft. Monmouth average and the change to installation size just slightly moved the total strength into the next larger category, the results as expected were projections for significant reductions. Based on this, an adjustment as described in 2 e. (2) was applied to avoid overstating projected reductions. With this adjustment, the range of projected reductions went from a high of 605 to a low of 137. The low was used in the final recommendation. The low end of the range is considered achievable with negligible risk to supported operations.

d. The final solutions for this scenario ranged from a high of 605 reductions representing 33.2% to a low of 182 reductions at 7.2%. The low end of this range of

predicted personnel reductions are considered achievable with negligible risk to supported missions. The most conservative solution was used for the recommendation.

16. Dobbins ARB/NAS Atlanta:

a. Based on qualitative military value analysis, the team's recommendation is to realign installation management responsibilities from Naval Air Station Atlanta to Dobbins ARB with the Air Force assuming overall responsibility. Based on this recommendation, the factors used were taken from the tables establishing ratios for Air Force installations with adjustments described in paragraphs b and c below.

b. The calculations for public works staff were calculated using the Air Force ratio for installations under 5 million square feet. This calculation resulted in a projected gain of 110 public works positions. Because this is an Air Reserve Base with civilian staffing rather than the typical base with significant military, it is expected that Dobbins would be considerably more efficient than size would indicate. As an adjustment, the Dobbins ratio was applied as described in 2 e. (1). With this adjustment a gain of 8 was projected. The later result was used in one of the two solutions developed. Because NAS reported PW staffing does not reflect support from a public works center, it is recognized that reduced workload could eliminate manpower requirements at the supporting center.

c. The calculations for supported workforce used ratios for installations under 5K. Because Dobbins did not provide family member data, calculations using supported population were not used in the final summaries. A projection was developed for supported population but not considered reliable enough to use in the recommended solution. In this scenario, supported workforce staffing requirements were developed using the ratio with public works included and with public works excluded. The result with public works excluded was a projection of 187 reductions and with public works included a projection of 51 reductions. In this case, the calculations including public works were used in the recommended projection.

d. The final solutions for this scenario ranged from a high of 179 reductions representing 16.7% to a low of 51 reductions at 4.8%. The full range of predicted personnel reductions are considered achievable with negligible risk to supported missions. The most conservative solution was used for the recommendation.

17. COMNAVMARIANAS/Andersen AFB:

a. Based on quantitative and qualitative military value analysis, the team recommendation is to realign installation management responsibilities from Andersen AFB to COMNAVMARIANAS with the Navy assuming responsibilities. Based on this recommendation, the calculations used were taken from the tables establishing ratios for Navy installations.

b. For calculations to determine public works staffing requirements, solutions were developed using the Navy average for bases over 15 million sq ft. However,

solutions were also developed using Navy averages for bases 10-15 million square feet since these averages were more efficient than the over 15 million square average and reflect the size of COMNAVMARIANAS footprint. The solutions ranging from use of the Navy average over 15 million square feet with no adjustments for military to using the average for 10-15 million square feet with adjustment for military were an additional 137 required to 144 reductions. Although this entire range of projections is considered feasible, the recommended solution was to use the Navy average for bases over 15 million square feet which provides the most conservative result reflecting a requirement for additional public works personnel.

c. The calculations using supported population and supported workforce were developed using the same approach but in this case applying the adjustment described in 2 e(2) under projected savings above. Solutions were developed using the Navy average ratios for supported populations 15K to 20K personnel and supported workforce 10K to 15K personnel. Solutions were also developed based on the Guam ratios with and without adjustment for military personnel. The solutions for both supported populations and supported workforce were close but required a small adjustment. In each case the most conservative solution is recommended.

d. The solution for the COMNAVMARIANAS and Andersen AFB consolidation ranged from a predicted reduction of 226 personnel at 9.5% (Baseline: Andersen 1299, COMNAVMARIANAS 1038, total 2337) to a low of 95 personnel reductions at 4.1%. In this scenario no adjustment for distance was applied based on proximity of the cantonment areas. The range of solutions is considered achievable with negligible risk to operational capabilities of supported forces.

Subject: Scenario Data Call Reconciliation for Installation Management: HSA-0009, 0010, 0011, 0012, 0013, 0014, 0015, 0016, 0017, 0032, 0033, 0034, 0075, 0119, 0127

1. References:

a. IM Discussion Paper titled "Method for Determining Installation Management (IM) Personnel Requirements"

b. HSA JCSG MFR, control number HSA-JCSG-GC-IM-0007, subject: Negotiated Recommendations; dated 18 November 2004

c. HSA JCSG MFR, control number HSA-JCSG-GC-IM-0010, subject: COBRA Data Reconciliation Ft. Myer/Henderson Hall; dated 19 April 2005

d. HSA JCSG MFR, control number HSA-JCSG-GC-IM-0011, subject: Scenario Data Call Reconciliation HSA-0034; dated 27 April 2005

e. HSA JCSG MFR, control number HSA-JCSG-GC-IM-0012, subject: Scenario Data Call Reconciliation HSA-0012; dated 27 April 2005

f. Scenario Data Call responses from all services for above scenarios.

2. Overview: The following discussion provides details for each HSA JCSG Installation Management scenario regarding the actions and adjustments made resulting from the service responses to the scenario data calls (SDC). The resulting adjustments were used as the basis for Cobra input for each scenario that was approved as a candidate recommendation. The scenario data calls transmitted to the services proposed personnel reductions that could be anticipated through implementation of the scenario. The above reference describes in narrative form the process for determining the recommended proposed reduction. Reference b describes negotiations with service representatives prior to release of the scenario data calls. The scenario data calls requested concurrence or adjustment to the proposed personnel reductions as appropriate. In general, the approach for reviewing service responses was to consider only the data pertaining to the respective service and matching that data to the service data provided from the other service. Exceptions to this approach are noted in subsequent discussion. Where necessary to clarify the intent of the service response, email follow up was used and referenced in the following discussions. When service negotiations and responses did not result in clear coherent responses, military judgment was applied to make appropriate adjustments consistent with the agreements noted in reference b. The resulting personnel reduction entered into Cobra was subsequently reviewed and approved through the ISG process as part of the Candidate Recommendation. The tables included in this document reflect the initial COBRA input for screen six with most scenarios reflecting initial reductions in FY06. Final COBRA input has been changed to reflect implementation beginning in FY07 as a result of the OSD allocation process which was the basis for this modification.

3. General: The proposed personnel reductions by agreement with the services were reflected in screen six of the scenario data calls. The reduction was transmitted by showing eliminations of personnel at the installation designated for realignment (transferring IM responsibilities) and additions at the installation assuming responsibilities for installation management as described in the scenario justifications. The difference between the eliminations and additions was the proposed reduction. The basis for screen six entries was the baseline installation management workforce reported in capacity data as described in the above reference. It is important to understand that using this convention of eliminations and additions was intended to help make the intent of the scenario as clear as possible and also to serve as a means for validating the general accuracy of the baselines reported through the capacity data call. The final input into Cobra reflected only the reduction of personnel since eliminating the workforce at one installation and adding to the other would result in generation of costs that would not be incurred in actual implementation. As a final general note; by service agreement the proposed reductions were spread between both the military and civilian workforce consistent with the baseline distribution of the reported workforce. Although the screen six entries were not assumed to reflect real transfers of military personnel, the Air Force responses for scenarios where the Air Force transferred responsibility dropped military personnel to emphasize their intent that military personnel would not transfer service. For purposes of reconciling these responses, military judgment was applied inferring that the Air Force baselines of military personnel were accurate unless specific notes indicating otherwise were included in the scenario data call responses. Those scenarios where baseline changes to the military IM workforce were warranted are indicated in the following discussions.

4. Ft. Bragg/Pope AFB: HSA-0009 **(SCENARIO DELETED)**

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 86 personnel. This represents approximately 2.5% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of 3468 personnel reported in the capacity data call. The base line for each installation was 1728 for Ft. Bragg and 1740 for Pope AFB. The reduction of 86 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by elimination of 1482 military and civilians after removing 258 contractor personnel from Pope AFB and the addition of 1396 personnel to Ft. Bragg with the difference being the 86 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Army Response: The Army response had no change to the screen six data for Ft. Bragg indicating concurrence that the reduction of 86 personnel from the consolidated workforces would be feasible if this scenario is implemented. As the service assuming responsibility for installation management functions, this concurrence takes precedence.

c. Air Force Response: As indicated in the general notes, the Air Force response changed the military personnel numbers entered for Pope AFB in screen six of the SDC to zero. This response presumed concurrence with the military personnel numbers with the exception noted below regarding airfield operations. The civilian numbers were adjusted to reflect an elimination of 20 less personnel than were included in screen six of

the SDC for Pope AFB. Included in notes on screen six, the Air Force response indicated that 98 personnel performing airfield operations should be removed from the eligible population based on the opinion that airfield operations should not be consolidated. Ten of these personnel were civilians and are part of the 20 fewer civilians noted above. Including the 98 from the airfield and 10 additional civilians, the total adjustment for Pope AFB recommended by the Air Force was 108. With respect to the Airfield, it is the opinion of the IM team that many airfield functions are BASOPS in nature and can readily be consolidated. The Capacity Data Call specifically targeted these functions. However, it is possible that personnel doing mission operations were included in the capacity data and therefore accepting this adjustment was appropriate. OSD implementation guidance will make final determinations regarding the extent of consolidation for airfield operations.

d. Summary: Although the Army concurred with the proposed reduction, the adjustment to the Pope AFB workforce baseline dictated that a minor adjustment to the reduction of 86 would be appropriate. Accepting the adjustment of 108 personnel reduced the Pope AFB baseline workforce from 1740 to 1632 and the consolidated workforce from 3468 to 3360. There were a couple of options for calculating an adjustment however, since the baseline change was small and would not be expected to result in a significant change when recalculated using the same method which resulted in the 86 recommendation, it was determined that using the 2.5% reduction applied to the adjusted baseline would be appropriate. Applying the 2.5% factor to the adjusted baseline of 3360 resulted in a new recommended reduction of 84 if the scenario is implemented. This was the number of reductions used in the Cobra model for this candidate recommendation. As a cross check on the above rationale, a calculation was completed using the new baseline and the same method done to obtain 86. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name
POPE

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-1	-2	-1
Enlisted Positions	-17	-33	-16
Civilian Positions	-4	-7	-3

5. Ft. Lewis/McChord AFB: HSA-0010

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 434 personnel. This represents 10% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of 4345 personnel reported in the capacity data call. The base line for each installation was 2300 for Ft. Lewis and 2045 for McChord AFB. The reduction of 434 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by elimination of 1705 military and civilians after removing 340 contractor personnel from McChord AFB and the addition of 1271 personnel to Ft. Lewis with the difference being the 434 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Army Response: The Army response had no change to the screen six data for Ft. Lewis indicating concurrence that the reduction of 434 personnel from the consolidated workforces would be feasible if this scenario is implemented. As the service assuming responsibility for installation management functions, this concurrence takes precedence.

c. Air Force Response: As indicated in the general notes, the Air Force response changed the military personnel numbers entered for McChord AFB in screen six of the SDC to zero. Based on military judgment this response presumed concurrence with the original baseline military personnel numbers with the exception noted below regarding airfield operations. The civilian numbers were adjusted to reflect an elimination of 41 less personnel than were included in screen six of the SDC for McChord AFB. Included in notes on screen six, the Air Force response indicated that 113 personnel performing airfield operations should be removed from the eligible population based on the opinion that airfield operations should not be consolidated. Thirty of these personnel were civilians and are part of the 41 fewer civilians noted above. Including the 113 from the airfield and 11 additional civilians, the total adjustment for McChord AFB recommended by the Air Force was 124. With respect to the airfield, it is the opinion of the IM team that many airfield functions are BASOPS in nature and can readily be consolidated. The Capacity Data Call specifically targeted these functions. However, it is possible that personnel doing mission operations were included in the capacity data and therefore accepting this adjustment was appropriate. OSD implementation guidance will make final determinations regarding the extent of consolidation for airfield operations.

d. Summary: Although the Army concurred with the proposed reduction, the adjustment to the McChord workforce baseline made an adjustment to the reduction of 434 appropriate. Accepting the adjustment of 124 personnel reduced the McChord baseline workforce from 2045 to 1921 and the consolidated workforce from 4345 to 4221. In this scenario, recalculation was not required because the HSA JCSG member approved and service concurred (reference b) limit of 10% maximum reduction of the consolidated workforce would still apply. The original range of feasible reductions for this scenario was 912 ((21%) to 1490 (34%) and it was easily determined that recalculating using the new baseline would not lower the range of feasible reductions enough to go under 10%. Applying the 10% factor to the adjusted baseline of 4221 resulted in a new recommended reduction of 422 if the scenario is implemented. Air Force concurrence with this adjustment provided by Maj Ed Oshiba by email on 15 December 2004 (attached). This was the number of reductions used in the Cobra model

for this candidate recommendation. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name
MCCHORD

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-5	-10	-5
Enlisted Positions	-72	-143	-71
Civilian Positions	-29	-58	-29

6. Pearl Harbor/Hickam AFB: HSA-0016

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 280 personnel. This represents approximately 4.2% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of approximately 6634 personnel reported in the capacity data call. The base line for each installation was 4405 for Pearl Harbor and 2229 for Hickam AFB. The reduction of 280 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by elimination of 1725 military and civilians after removing 504 contractor personnel from Hickam AFB and the addition of 1445 personnel to Pearl Harbor with the difference being the 280 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Navy Response: The Navy response had no change to the screen six data for Pearl Harbor indicating concurrence that the reduction of 280 personnel from the consolidated workforces would be feasible if this scenario is implemented. This was confirmed in the Navy response to question 47 of the SDC which indicated this reduction could be accomplished. For purpose of clarification, the SDC response from the Navy used the first version of an SDC which reflected only civilian reductions distributed to both installations. This version of the SDC had been replaced per the guidance contained in the cover memorandum and paragraph 3 above. Since the Navy response used this first version, military judgment was applied with the conclusion that concurrence with the recommended per the first version constituted concurrence with the revised version which distributed reductions between military and civilian and took all eliminations at just the losing installation. As the service assuming responsibility for installation management functions, this concurrence takes precedence.

c. Air Force Response: As indicated in the general notes, the Air Force response changed the military personnel numbers entered for Hickam AFB in screen six of the SDC to zero. Based on military judgment this response presumed concurrence with the original baseline military personnel numbers. The civilian numbers were adjusted to reflect an elimination of 19 less personnel than were included in screen six of the SDC

for Hickam AFB. This recommended adjustment is considered very minor and represents only a minor discrepancy between the original data call reports and the service validation done in conjunction with the SDC.

d. Summary: Although the Navy concurred with the proposed reduction, the minor adjustment to the Hickam civilian workforce baseline made a minor adjustment to the reduction of 280 appropriate. Accepting the adjustment of 19 personnel reduced the Hickam baseline workforce from 2229 to 2210 and the consolidated workforce from 6634 to 6615. Based on military judgment and agreement noted in reference b, recalculation was not warranted because the adjusted baseline represents a statistically insignificant change which would not result in any significant change to the recommended percent reduction. Applying the 4.2% factor to the adjusted baseline of 6615 resulted in a new recommended reduction of 277 if the scenario is implemented. This was the number of reductions used in the Cobra model for this candidate recommendation. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name
Hickam AFB

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-3	-6	-3
Enlisted Positions	-41	-82	-42
Civilian Positions	-25	-50	-25

7. McGuire AFB/Ft. Dix/Lakehurst: HSA-0011

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 319 personnel. This represents approximately 9.4% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of 3378 personnel reported in the capacity data call. The base line for each installation was 2234 for McGuire AFB, 652 for Ft. Dix and 492 for Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst. The reduction of 319 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by a total of 1088 eliminations which included elimination of 595 military and civilians after removing 35 contractor personnel from Ft. Dix, by elimination of 493 military and civilians after removing 41 contractor personnel from Lakehurst and the addition of 769 personnel to McGuire AFB with the difference being the 319 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

a. Army Response: The Army response had no change to the screen six data for Ft. Dix indicating concurrence that the baseline for Ft. Dix was valid and that the reduction of 319 personnel from the consolidated workforces would be feasible if this scenario is implemented.

b. Navy Response: The Navy response did change the screen six data for Lakehurst by changing the elimination of civilians from 333 to 297 for a reduction of 36. This recommended adjustment is considered minor and represents only a small discrepancy between the original data call reports and the service validation done in conjunction with the SDC.

c. Air Force Response: The initial response from the Air Force was inconsistent with the numbers transmitted in the SDC which required email follow up to get clarification and revised screen six numbers. For clarification purposes, the initial response showed an addition to McGuire AFB of 954 which was 185 greater than the 769 additions transmitted in the SDC. When taking into account the Navy baseline adjustment of 36, this would have left a reduction of only 98 personnel which is considered well below a feasible reduction and the agreed SDC starting point identified in reference b. A clarification and review was requested from the Air Force POC who determined that his review had incorrectly adjusted the additions required for McGuire. After further review, the Air Force provided a revision (email from Maj Ed Oshiba 14 Dec, attached) which reflected an addition of 790 personnel which was 21 additions above the original SDC number of 769. This adjustment was considered reasonable and as the service assuming responsibility would take precedence as the necessary staffing level for implementing this scenario.

d. Summary: For this scenario, the new baseline for Ft. Dix and Lakehurst military and civilian personnel was reduced from 1088 to 1052 as a result of the 36 civilian personnel adjustment for Lakehurst. The McGuire baseline for military and civilian additions was raised from 769 to 790 reflecting an increase of 21 or stated another way, reducing the total number of reductions considered feasible by the Air Force. Taking the difference between 1052 and 790 resulted in the new reduction which changed from the recommended number of 319 to 262. This was the number of reductions used in the Cobra model for this candidate recommendation. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name

DIX

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-1	-2	-1
Enlisted Positions	-1	-2	0
Civilian Positions	-21	-40	-21

Base Name

NAVAIRENGSTA
LKHRST

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-2	-4	-2
Enlisted Positions	-31	-62	-31
Civilian Positions	-11	-20	-10

8. Elmendorf AFB/Ft. Richardson: HSA-0015

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 224 personnel. This represents approximately 6% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of 3673 personnel reported in the capacity data call. The base line for each installation was 2761 for Elmendorf and 912 for Ft. Richardson. The reduction of 224 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by elimination of 773 military and civilians after removing 143 contractor personnel from Ft. Richardson and the addition of 549 personnel to Elmendorf with the difference being the 224 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Army Response: The Army response had no change to the screen six data for Ft. Richardson indicating concurrence that the reduction of 224 personnel from the consolidated workforces would be feasible if this scenario is implemented.

c. Air Force Response: The Air Force response concurred with the 6% reduction but modified the additions based on a workforce without contractor personnel included in the baseline. Although the Air Force rationale for this adjustment is understood it is not consistent with the method and calculations used to come up with the recommended reductions. The Air Force concern is based on the fact that COBRA can't eliminate contractors. While it is feasible that some contractor personnel would be reduced if the scenario is implemented, for cost estimation purposes it is essential to reflect total potential reductions. Based on military judgment, the basis for the Air Force adjustment was not accepted and the original SDC numbers were used.

d. Summary: Based on the Air Force concurrence with the percent reduction applied (reference b) and the negotiated start point, military judgment determined that no change to the recommended reduction of 224 was required. This was the number of reductions used in the Cobra model for this candidate recommendation. The adjustment made in the Air Force response with respect to contractor personnel was not considered an appropriate basis for changing the recommended reduction for the reasons stated in c above. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name

RICHARDSON

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-2	-3	-1
Enlisted Positions	-20	-39	-19
Civilian Positions	-35	-70	-35

9. Naval District Washington/Bolling AFB: HSA-0013

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 120 personnel. This represents approximately 2.6% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of approximately 4606 personnel reported in the capacity data call. The base line for each installation was 3384 for Naval District Washington and 1222 for Bolling AFB. The reduction of 120 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by elimination of 1060 military and civilians after removing 162 contractor personnel from Bolling AFB and the addition of 940 personnel to Naval District Washington with the difference being the 120 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Air Force Response: As indicated in the general notes, the Air Force response changed the military personnel numbers entered for Bolling AFB in screen six of the SDC to zero. Based on military judgment this response presumed concurrence with the original baseline military personnel numbers. The civilian numbers were adjusted to reflect an elimination of 17 less personnel than were included in screen six of the SDC for Bolling AFB. This recommended adjustment is considered very minor and represents only a minor discrepancy between the original data call reports and the service validation done in conjunction with the SDC.

c. Navy Response: The Navy response had no change to the screen six data for Naval District Washington indicating concurrence that the reduction of 120 personnel from the consolidated workforces would be feasible if this scenario is implemented. This was confirmed in the Navy response to question 47 of the SDC which indicated this reduction could be accomplished. As the service assuming responsibility for installation management functions, this concurrence takes precedence.

d. Summary: Although the Navy concurred with the proposed reduction, the adjustment to the Bolling workforce baseline made a minor adjustment to the reduction of 120 appropriate. Accepting the adjustment of 17 personnel reduced the Bolling baseline workforce from 1222 to 1205 and the consolidated workforce from 4606 to 4589. Based on military judgment and agreement noted in reference b, recalculation was not warranted because the adjusted baseline represents a statistically insignificant change which would not result in any significant change to the recommended percent reduction. Applying the 2.6% factor to the adjusted baseline of 4589 resulted in a new

recommended reduction of 119 if the scenario is implemented. This was the number of reductions used in the Cobra model for this candidate recommendation. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name
Bolling AFB

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-2	-3	-1
Enlisted Positions	-15	-29	-14
Civilian Positions	-14	-27	-14

10. Charleston AFB/Naval Weapons Station Charleston: HSA-0032

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 362 personnel. This represents approximately 9.2% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of 3914 personnel reported in the capacity data call. The base line for each installation was 1383 for Naval Weapons Station Charleston and 2531 for Charleston AFB. The reduction of 362 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by elimination of 929 military and civilians after removing 454 contractor personnel from Weapons Station Charleston and the addition of 567 personnel to Charleston AFB with the difference being the 362 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Navy Response: The Navy response did change the screen six data for Weapons Station Charleston by changing the elimination of enlisted from 233 to 207 for a reduction of 26. This recommended adjustment is considered minor and represents only a small discrepancy between the original data call reports and the service validation done in conjunction with the SDC. As a note of clarification, the Navy response showed reductions at Charleston AFB. Similar to the response for HSA-0016, the portion of the first SDC version was used in this response which is why these AFB reductions are reflected. However, unlike the HSA-0016 Navy response, in this case the format used in the second version of the SDC was to reflect the NAVWPNSTA data. As noted in paragraph 2 above, only the NAVWPNSTA portion of the Navy response was used in reaching the final COBRA input.

c. Air Force Response: The initial response from the Air Force was inconsistent with the numbers transmitted in the SDC which required email follow up to get clarification and revised screen six numbers. For clarification purposes, the initial response showed an addition to Charleston AFB of 845 which was 278 greater than the 769 additions transmitted in the SDC. When taking into account the Navy baseline

adjustment of 26, this would have left a reduction of only 58 personnel which is considered well below a feasible reduction that would have negligible risk. A clarification and review was requested from the Air Force POC who determined that his review had incorrectly adjusted the additions required for McGuire. After further review, the Air Force provided a revision (email from Maj Ed Oshiba, 14 December 2004, attached) which reflected an addition of 639 personnel which was 72 additions above the original SDC number of 567. This adjustment was considered reasonable and as the service assuming responsibility would take precedence as the necessary staffing level for implementing this scenario.

d. Summary: For this scenario, the new baseline for Weapons Station Charleston military and civilian personnel was reduced from 929 to 903 as a result of the 26 enlisted personnel adjustment for Weapons Station Charleston. The Charleston AFB baseline for military and civilian additions was raised from 567 to 639 reflecting an increase of 72 or stated another way, reducing the total number of reductions considered feasible by the Air Force. Taking the difference between 903 and 639 resulted in the new reduction which changed from the recommended number of 362 to 264. This was the number of reductions used in the Cobra model for this candidate recommendation. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name
WPNSTA CHARLESTON

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008	2009
Officer Positions	0	-3	-6	-2
Enlisted Positions	0	-18	-90	-44
Civilian Positions	0	-25	-51	-25

11. Ft. Myer/Henderson Hall: HSA-0014

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 65 personnel. This represents approximately 8.1% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of approximately 811 personnel reported in the capacity data call. The base line for each installation was 339 for Henderson Hall and 469 for Ft. Myer. The reduction of 65 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by elimination of 328 military and civilians after removing 11 contractor personnel from Henderson Hall and the addition of 263 personnel to Ft. Myer with the difference being the 65 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Navy Response: The Navy response made a significant change to the screen six SDC numbers for Henderson Hall. The basis for this change was a detailed review which

determined that of the 342 personnel reported in the Henderson Hall baseline, 139 were Exchange employees and therefore erroneously reported and 124 were staff in direct support of HQ Marine Corp and not full time installation management staff. The result was a change to the Henderson Hall baseline from 339 to 76.

c. Army Response: The Army response also had a significant change to the baseline required by Ft. Myer to assume responsibilities for Henderson Hall. The Army response reduced the additions from the 263 in the SDC to 112. This response in effect recommended that the reduction recommended could be increased by an additional 151 personnel from 65 to 216. As the service assuming responsibility for installation management functions, this concurrence takes precedence.

d. Summary: Based on the numerical responses, even with the Army response increasing the reduction, their stated requirement of 112 additions still exceeded the Henderson Hall number of 76 personnel available. Based on these responses, a meeting was convened to reconcile and determine if this scenario was still feasible to pursue. At an 11 January session with Navy/Marine and Army representatives (reference c) resolution was achieved which confirmed that 13 reductions would be achieved if this scenario were implemented. The key factors in reaching this consensus were a reassessment of the actual supported workforce at Henderson Hall and a review of what the Army staff requirement would be based on a revised workforce at Henderson Hall. In the original calculations, the Henderson Hall workforce was reported at 2222. In discussion with Marine Corps representatives, it was determined that this included HQ Marine Corp personnel not present on Henderson Hall. The actual workforce on Henderson Hall requiring installation management support was determined to be approximately 500 personnel. Based on this revision, the Army determined that 63 additional staff requirements were needed versus the 112 submitted in the response to the SDC. Based on these adjustments, it was agreed that the difference of 13 between 76 available installation management staff on Henderson Hall and the Army requirement for 63 additional staff would be the reduction used in Cobra. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name

CO HQBN HQMC

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-1		
Enlisted Positions	-3	-5	-2
Civilian Positions	-1	-1	

12. Langley AFB/Ft. Eustis/Ft. Monroe: HSA-0033

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 217 personnel. This represents approximately 7.2% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of 3157 personnel reported in the capacity data call. The base line for each installation was 2014 for Langley and 1143 for Ft. Eustis. The reduction of 217 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by elimination of 506 military and civilians after removing 140 personnel allocated to Ft. Story and 497 contractor personnel from Ft. Eustis and the addition of 289 personnel to Langley with the difference being the 217 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Army Response: The Army response had no change to the screen six data for Ft. Richardson indicating concurrence that the reduction of 217 personnel from the consolidated workforces would be feasible if this scenario is implemented.

c. Air Force Response: The initial response from the Air Force was inconsistent with the numbers transmitted in the SDC which required email follow up to get clarification and concurrence with the SDC recommendation. For clarification purposes, the initial response showed an addition to Langley AFB of 470 which was 181 greater than the 289 additions transmitted in the SDC. This change would have left a reduction of only 36 personnel which is considered well below a feasible reduction that would have negligible risk. Although the Air Force rationale for this adjustment is understood it is not consistent with the method and calculations used to come up with the recommended reductions. The Air Force concern is based on the fact that COBRA can't eliminate contractors. While it is feasible that some contractor personnel would be reduced if the scenario is implemented, for cost estimation purposes it is more accurate to reflect total potential reductions. A clarification and review was requested from the Air Force POC who determined that his review had incorrectly adjusted the additions required for Langley. After further review, the Air Force provided concurrence with the SDC recommended reductions (email Maj Ed Oshiba, dated 14 December 2004, attached)

d. Summary: Based on the Air Force concurrence with the percent reduction applied (reference b) and the negotiated start point, military judgment determined that no change to the recommended reduction of 217 was required. This was the number of reductions used in the Cobra model for this candidate recommendation. The adjustment made in the Air Force response with respect to contractor personnel was not considered an appropriate basis for changing the recommended reduction for the reasons stated in c above. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name
EUSTIS

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-2	-3	-2

Enlisted Positions	-11	-21	-11
Civilian Positions	-42	-83	-42

13. Lackland AFB/Ft. Sam Houston/Randolph AFB: HSA-0017

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 307 personnel. This represents approximately 4.6% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of 6644 personnel reported in the capacity data call. The base line for each installation was 3859 for Lackland AFB, 1197 for Ft. Sam Houston and 1588 for Randolph AFB. The reduction of 307 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by a total of 2128 eliminations which included elimination of 844 military and civilians after removing 353 contractor personnel from Ft. Sam Houston, by elimination of 1284 military and civilians after removing 303 contractor personnel from Randolph and the addition of 1821 personnel to Lackland AFB with the difference being the 307 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Army Response: The Army response had no change to the screen six data for Ft. Richardson indicating concurrence that the reduction of 307 personnel from the consolidated workforces would be feasible if this scenario is implemented.

c. Air Force Response: The initial response from the Air Force was inconsistent with the numbers transmitted in the SDC which required email follow up to get clarification and revised screen six numbers. The Air Force response did change the screen six data for Randolph by changing the elimination of military/civilian personnel from 1284 to 1096 for a reduction of 188. The Air Force response indicated that 188 personnel performing COMM/IT functions should be removed from the eligible population based on the opinion that these should not be consolidated. With respect to the COMM/IT function, it is the opinion of the IM team that many of these functions are BASOPS in nature and can readily be consolidated. The Capacity Data Call specifically targeted these functions. However, it is possible that personnel doing mission operations were included in the capacity data and therefore accepting this adjustment was appropriate. OSD implementation guidance will make final determinations regarding the extent of consolidation for COMM/IT operations. With respect to screen six revisions, the initial response showed an addition to Lackland AFB of 1851 which was 30 greater than the 1821 additions transmitted in the SDC. When taking into account the Air Force baseline adjustment of 188 at Randolph, this would have left a reduction of only 89 personnel which is considered well below a feasible reduction that would have negligible risk. A clarification and review was requested from the Air Force POC who determined that his review had incorrectly adjusted the additions required for Lackland. After further review, the Air Force provided a revision (email from Maj Ed Oshiba, 15 December 2004, attached) which reflected an addition of 1751 personnel which was 70 additions fewer than the original SDC number of 1821. This adjustment was considered reasonable in view of the baseline change at Randolph and as the service assuming responsibility would take precedence as the necessary staffing level for implementing this scenario.

Summary: For this scenario, the new baseline for Ft. Sam Houston and Randolph military and civilian personnel was reduced from 2128 to 1940 as a result of the 188 military/civilian personnel adjustment for Randolph. The Lackland baseline for military and civilian additions was lowered from 1821 to 1751 reflecting a reduction of 70 personnel. Taking the difference between 1940 and 1751 resulted in the new reduction which changed from the recommended number of 307 to 189. This was the number of reductions used in the Cobra model for this candidate recommendation. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name

SAM HOUSTON

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-1	-1	-1
Enlisted Positions	-6	-13	-6
Civilian Positions	-13	-27	-12

Base Name

Randolph AFB

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-1	-2	-1
Enlisted Positions	-9	-18	-9
Civilian Positions	-17	-35	-17

13. Hampton Roads South (COMNAVREG MIDLANTIC (Little Creek)/Ft. Story):
HSA-0034

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 46 personnel. This represents approximately 8.4% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of approximately 549 personnel reported in the capacity data call and computed as described in the reference. The base line for each installation was 409 for COMNAVREG MIDLANTIC (Little Creek) and 140 for Ft. Story. The reduction of 46 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by elimination of 71 military and civilians after removing 69 contractor personnel from Ft. Story and the addition of 25

personnel to COMNAVREGMIDLANTIC with the difference being the 46 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Army Response: Unique to this scenario, the Army response provided both the Ft. Story adjustment and the Navy adjustment for COMNAVREG MIDLANT based on Navy concurrence (reference d) that the Army response reflected their corroborated effort. The Army response raised the Ft. Story baseline by adding 6 military/civilian personnel to the eliminations recommended in the SDC raising the total from 71 to 77. This response also reflected an agreed increase to the additions for COMNAVREG from 25 to 56 for an increase of 21 personnel.

c. Navy Response: See comments above.

d. Summary: Based on the adjustments for both Ft. Story and COMNAVREG, the reduction of personnel for this scenario adjusted from 46 to 21. This adjustment was based on the difference between the new baseline for Ft. Story of 77 personnel reduced by the new staffing requirement for COMNAVREG of 56 military/civilians. This resulted in the new reduction of 21 which was used in the COBRA model. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name

EUSTIS

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions		-2	-1
Enlisted Positions	-4	-8	-3
Civilian Positions	-1	-2	

14. Andrews AFB/NAF Washington: HSA-0012

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 25 personnel. This represents approximately .8% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of approximately 3512 personnel reported in the capacity data call and computed as described in the reference. The base line for each installation was 3436 for Andrews AFB and 76 for Ft. NAF Washington. The reduction of 25 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by elimination of 76 military and civilians from NAF Washington and the addition of 51 personnel to Andrews AFB with the difference being the 25 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Navy Response: The Navy response did change the screen six data for NAF Washington by changing the elimination of military and civilians from 76 to 51 for a reduction of 25. This recommended adjustment is based on a number of personnel

supporting NAF but not dedicated to the NAF workforce. This adjustment was considered appropriate although potential does exist that the Navy could reduce some personnel in support of NAF and other Navy installations within the COMNAVDISTRICT area of responsibility.

c. Air Force Response: The initial Air Force input was inconsistent with the numbers transmitted in the SDC which required email follow up to get clarification and revised screen six numbers. The initial response showed an addition of 45 personnel to Andrews AFB which was 6 lower than the SDC recommendation. Although this input would have been readily acceptable if there was no adjustment to the NAF baseline, given the adjustment to the NAF numbers, this would have resulted in a reduction of only 6 personnel which represents the difference between the NAF adjusted baseline of 51 and the Andrews initial requirement of 45. A clarification and review was requested from the Air Force POC. Because of the extremely small baseline, recalculation using HSA methodology (reference b) would result in a very minor change. Based on these numbers, a recommendation was made to the Air Force POC (email to Maj Ed Oshiba 15 December 2004, attached, with 28 April concurrence) to adjust the recommended reduction proportionally to the reduced NAF baseline. Concurrence was provided (reference e).

d. Summary: For this scenario, the Air Force concurrence with the recommended proportional adjustment to the SDC recommended reduction was used to establish the new reduction for COBRA. The NAF baseline change from 76 to 51 represents a 33% reduction. Applying the same percent to the SDC recommended reduction of 25 resulted in a new recommended reduction of 18. This was the number of reductions used for the COBRA model. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name

NAF WASH DC

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	0	-1	0
Enlisted Positions	-2	-4	-2
Civilian Positions	-2	-5	-2

15. Ft. Monmouth/Weapons Station Earle Colt: HSA-0075 (SCENARIO DELETED)

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 132 personnel. This represents approximately 7.2% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of 1822 personnel reported in the capacity data call. The base

line for each installation was 1310 for Ft. Monmouth and 512 for Earle Colt. The reduction of 132 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by elimination of 424 military and civilians after removing 88 contractor personnel from Weapons Station Earle Colt and the addition of 292 personnel to Ft. Monmouth with the difference being the 132 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Navy Response: The Navy response made a significant change to the screen six SDC numbers for Earle Colt. The basis for this change was a detailed review which determined that 108 personnel reported in the Earle Colt baseline were mission personnel supporting Atlantic Ordnance Command and therefore erroneously reported. This adjustment was considered valid since the munitions mission performed by this activity is not within the installation management level scope of functions. This resulted in an adjustment to the baseline from 512 to 406.

c. Army Response: The Army response also had a significant change to the baseline required by Ft. Monmouth to assume responsibilities for Earle Colt. The Army response reduced the additions from the 292 in the SDC to 242. This response in effect recommended that the reduction recommended could be increased by an additional 50 personnel from 132 to 182 when not taking into consideration the baseline change for Earle Colt. As the service assuming responsibility for installation management functions, this adjustment to the staffing requirement needed for Ft. Monmouth to assume responsibility takes precedence.

d. Summary: For this scenario, the baseline for Weapons Station Earle Colt was changed from 512 to 406. After removing contractors, the new baseline for military and civilians was 318. Based on the Army adjusted staffing requirement from 292 to 242, the resulting reduction became the difference between 318 and 242 which resulted in a new reduction of 75. This was the number used in the COBRA model. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name

WPNSTA EARLE

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-1	-1	-1
Enlisted Positions	-11	-23	-11
Civilian Positions	-7	-12	-8

16. Dobbins ARB/Naval Air Station Atlanta: HSA-0119 (**SCENARIO DELETED**)

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 51 personnel. This represents approximately 4.8% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of 1072 personnel reported in the capacity data call. The base line for each installation was 710 for Dobbins ARB and 362 for NAS Atlanta. The reduction of 51 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by elimination of 327 military and civilians after removing 35 contractor personnel from NAS Atlanta and the addition of 276 personnel to Dobbins ARB with the difference being the 51 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Navy Response: The Navy response made a significant change to the screen six SDC numbers for NAS Atlanta. The basis for this change was a detailed review which determined that 92 personnel reported in the NAS Atlanta baseline were mission personnel and therefore erroneously reported. Although the specific mission functions were not detailed in the response, this adjustment was accepted as valid. This resulted in an adjustment to the baseline from 362 to 270.

c. Air Force Response: The initial response from the Air Force was inconsistent with the numbers transmitted in the SDC which required email follow up to get clarification and revision to the SDC recommendation. For clarification purposes, the initial response showed an addition to Dobbins ARB of 311 which was 35 greater than the 276 additions transmitted in the SDC. This change would have left a reduction of only 15 personnel (not considering the Navy baseline change) which is considered well below a feasible reduction that would have negligible risk. Although the Air Force rationale for this adjustment is understood it is not consistent with the method and calculations used to come up with the recommended reductions. The Air Force concern is based on the fact that COBRA can't eliminate contractors. While it is feasible that some contractor personnel would be reduced if the scenario is implemented, for cost estimation purposes it is more accurate to reflect total potential reductions. A review was requested from the Air Force POC who determined that his review had incorrectly adjusted the additions required for Dobbins ARB. After further review, the Air Force concurred with a revision which reflected an addition of 190 personnel which was 86 additions fewer than the original SDC number of 276. This adjustment was considered reasonable in view of the baseline change at NAS Atlanta and as the service assuming responsibility would take precedence as the necessary staffing level for implementing this scenario.

d. Summary: For this scenario, the new baseline for NAS Atlanta military and civilian personnel was reduced from 327 to 235 as a result of the military/civilian personnel adjustment for NAS Atlanta. The Dobbins ARB baseline for military and civilian additions was lowered from 279 to 190 reflecting a decrease of 86 staff requirements based on recalculating the percent reduction using the new baseline. Taking the difference between 235 and 190 resulted in the new reduction which changed from the recommended number of 51 to 45. This was the number of reductions used in the Cobra model for this candidate recommendation. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name
NAS ATLANTA

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-1	-2	
Enlisted Positions	-6	-11	-5
Civilian Positions	-5	-10	-5

17. COMNAVMARIANAS/Andersen AFB: HSA-0127

a. General: The recommended personnel reduction for this scenario was 95 personnel. This represents approximately 4.1% of the total consolidated installation management workforce of 2337 personnel reported in the capacity data call. The base line for each installation was 1038 for COMNAVMARIANAS and 1299 for Andersen AFB. The reduction of 95 personnel was reflected in the scenario data call by elimination of 1027 military and civilians after removing 272 contractor personnel from Andersen AFB and the addition of 932 personnel to COMNAVMARIANAS with the difference being the 95 personnel recommended for reduction as a result of implementation.

b. Air Force Response: The initial response from the Air Force had no change to the screen six data for Andersen AFB indicating concurrence that the reduction of 95 personnel from the consolidated workforces would be feasible if this scenario is implemented. The Air Force response did question the screen six data for Andersen by noting that the elimination of military/civilian personnel totaled 1027 which was 175 more personnel than reported in CDC#330. This difference is accounted for by the COMM/IT personnel reported in CDC#316 for Andersen AFB which were identified as included in the SDC screen one description of the scenario. With respect to the COMM/IT function, it is the opinion of the IM team that these functions are BASOPS in nature and can readily be consolidated therefore no adjustment is required or appropriate. Although an adjustment for COMM/IT was made to other scenarios, the response in this case unlike other scenarios did not change numbers in screen six. OSD implementation guidance will make final determinations regarding the extent of consolidation for COMM/IT operations.

c. Navy Response: The Navy response provided narrative concurrence with the screen six numbers confirmed by the response to question 47 of the SDC indicating that the reduction of 95 personnel from the consolidated workforces would be feasible if this scenario is implemented. As the service assuming responsibility for installation management functions, this concurrence takes precedence.

d. Summary: Based on the Navy concurrence with the percent reduction applied no change to the recommended reduction of 95 was required. This was the number of

reductions used in the Cobra model for this candidate recommendation. The screen six table for entry into Cobra is shown below.

Base Name
Andersen AFB

Scenario Changes by Year (+Additions/-Eliminations)

	2006	2007	2008
Officer Positions	-1	-3	-1
Enlisted Positions	-15	-30	-14
	-8	-15	-8

Screen 4:

COBRA static data was used for all DOD Installations. No other data was entered.

Screen 5 explanations:

Military Department (MILDEP) approaches for inclusion of implementation costs and savings for Installation Management consolidation within COBRA vary significantly. While one service assumes a MILCON and associated AT/FP cost requirement, another service does not. Similar assumptions pertain to training, IT requirements and contract cancellations. The objectives of the HSA JCSG are to provide a framework for COBRA analysis that ensures comparable cost information across services and to maintain an equal and fair treatment for all services.

Savings associated with footprint reductions and additional support personnel reductions (medical, etc.) were not included because of difficulty in establishing consistent criteria for calculating.

Savings associated with military manpower reductions was not included. Identifying manpower reductions as miscellaneous recurring savings is not the appropriate method for COBRA cost estimates. These savings have been identified as manpower eliminations in screen six of COBRA for cost estimating purposes.

One time costs of \$370K were identified by Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station in the summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts, HSA scenario HSA-0011 (criteria 8). These costs are included. A \$100K of recurring costs also identified in this assessment has also been included since this cost is a new continuing recurring cost.

Screen 6 explanations:

The entries for screen 6 reflect the total projected reduction of all BASOPS personnel associated with this scenario. For the sake of simplicity, and with Services' concurrence, COBRA inputs/reductions were only applied to the installation being realigned. The allocation between military and civilian personnel is based on the percentage distribution of the losing installation workforce as reported in the Capacity Data Call. This distribution is only for purposes of developing a cost estimate. Actual reductions resulting from implementation may come from the existing workforce at both installations with the actual mix between military and civilian reductions reflecting staffing requirements based on service determinations.

The projected reduction was based on a series of calculations which determined a potential range of reductions that would be feasible dependent on amount of risk considered acceptable. This reduction represents the lowest end of the calculated range and is considered to have negligible risk. The projections were transmitted by scenario data call and reviewed by the services involved. Per agreement with the services, the respective services agreed to negotiate and concur or modify the recommended reductions. Final personnel reductions were the results of these negotiated efforts, the HSA methodology, military judgment and the allocation process conducted by the services. Service agreement to conduct negotiations is reflected in memorandum for record, HSA-JCSG, subject: Service Review of Joint Basing Scenario Data Calls; dated 19 April 2005, control number HSA-JCSG-D-05-322. The COBRA input for the Henderson Hall realignment is also captured in memorandum for record HSA-JCSG , subject: COBRA Data Reconciliation for Ft. Myer/Henderson Hall; dated 19 April 2005, control number, HSA-JCSG-GC-IM-009. For all other realignments, explanation of adjustments from the scenario data call screen six entries is captured in HSA JCSG discussion paper, subject: Scenario Data Call Reconciliation for Installation Management which explains HSA-JCSG methodology detailing the reconciliation process and is located as an enclosure to the reference memorandum subject: Service Review of Joint Basing Scenario Data Calls.



BRAC 2005 - Query Response Manager



Response to E0365

Question:

The Commission understands that HQ TRADOC might be housed at Ft Story. The data available to the Commission shows only \$5,254,280 in construction funding identified in the DOD alternative and is predicated on the headquarters at Ft Eustis in Newport News, VA, not Ft Story. Request confirmation that HQ TRADOC will be located on Ft Eustis and not Ft Story. If the intention is now to locate the headquarters at Ft Story, please provide a COBRA run reflecting the changed location.

Answer:

The Army recommendation does not distinguish Ft. Story as separate from Ft. Eustis. Ft. Story is a sub-post of Ft. Eustis, and the two were treated as a single installation during Army BRAC analysis. Army military value and capacity analyses addressed a Ft. Eustis that includes the facilities and capabilities of Ft. Story. The Army ACSIM and Ft. Eustis installation planners will evaluate the best use of existing facilities and construction sites at both locations when implementing the BRAC recommendation to move TRADOC HQs.

References:**Approved By:****Date:** 14-Jun-05