



18 Jul 05

Dear Commissioner Principi,

Mr. Chairman, subsequent to my testimony at the BRAC Hearing today, I sensed that I had not succinctly addressed your final question/comment with respect to getting the numbers understood and correct. I offer the facts as I know them below:

1. The cost of required MilCon to duplicate MCRD San Diego's facilities at Parris Island is \$366M. I recognize this is larger than the 1995 estimate (\$168M in 95 dollars), however, this is due to increased training infrastructure that has been added since 1995 and exists today, as well as the requirement to build all buildings at PI to both earthquake and hurricane standards. In the years 2000-2004 the San Diego Depot graduated 16473, 16344, 15856, 16648, and 15366 Marines respectively, which represents roughly 50% of our annual graduates. The infrastructure to do that would have to be duplicated at Parris Island. It should also be noted that significant challenges to MilCon are present at Parris Island that will require extensive Environmental Impact Studies to address wetlands, historic sites and lead collection.
2. Our detailed analysis of personnel reflects the closing of San Diego would yield a maximum of 107 billets for personnel savings. The savings that existed in 1995 from recouping 1100 personnel have already been harvested in the intervening years. If your staff has developed a different number we are unaware of it or of its derivation.
3. There will be additional costs if San Diego were to close, including: 1) \$50M penalty for termination of utilities, 2) \$9.4M for transportation of recruits from the Western region to Parris Island and back to Camp Pendleton for School of Infantry training.

From a cost perspective the alternative to close San Diego does not yield any savings and breaks a system that functions very well today. If your staff has developed different numbers, we would welcome the opportunity to see them and jointly review our data and assumptions.

Operationally the Marine Corps must retain the flexibility and capability to surge as we have done historically in Korea (74K-205K), Vietnam (190K-310K), in the late 80s (188K-220K) and currently as mandated by the Congress. Our capability to the Nation is combined arms and ground combat and that is a very people intensive operation. As we are increasing end strength today in support of the GWOT, should another contingency or mobilization occur we would again see the need for this immediate flexibility to surge.

Mr. Commissioner, we are today a Nation at war and the Marines are heavily committed. As discussed today, our end strength is growing as mandated by the Congress, while that of the Navy and Air Force is going down as they develop high technology, less people intensive weapons systems and reduce platforms respectively. The Marine Corps is a people intensive, crisis oriented force in readiness for the Nation, that must have the capacity to rapidly surge as we have done in the past. We can ill afford to break a recruiting and recruit training process that has served this Nation so well. I strongly urge you to sustain the two USMC Recruit Depots as submitted by the Department of Defense.

Very Respectfully,

W.L. Nyland
General USMC
Assistant Commandant



18 Jul 05

Dear Commissioner Bilbray,

Sir, subsequent to my testimony at the BRAC Hearing today, I sensed that I had not succinctly addressed the Chairman's final question/comment with respect to getting the numbers understood and correct. I offer the facts as I know them below:

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Very Respectfully,

W.L. Nyland
General USMC
Assistant Commandant



18 Jul 05

Dear Commissioner Coyle,

Sir, subsequent to my testimony at the BRAC Hearing today, I sensed that I had not succinctly addressed the Chairman's final question/comment with respect to getting the numbers understood and correct. I offer the facts as I know them below:

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Very Respectfully,

W.L. Nyland
General USMC
Assistant Commandant



18 Jul 05

Dear Commissioner Gehman,

Sir, subsequent to my testimony at the BRAC Hearing today, I sensed that I had not succinctly addressed the Chairman's final question/comment with respect to getting the numbers understood and correct. I offer the facts as I know them below:

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Very Respectfully,

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W.L. Nyland
General USMC
Assistant Commandant



18 Jul 05

Dear Commissioner Hansen,

Sir, subsequent to my testimony at the BRAC Hearing today, I sensed that I had not succinctly addressed the Chairman's final question/comment with respect to getting the numbers understood and correct. I offer the facts as I know them below:

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Very Respectfully,

W.L. Nyland
General USMC
Assistant Commandant



18 Jul 05

Dear Commissioner Hill,

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Very Respectfully,

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W.L. Nyland
General USMC
Assistant Commandant



18 Jul 05

Dear Commissioner Newton,

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Very Respectfully,

W.L. Nyland
General USMC
Assistant Commandant



18 Jul 05

Dear Commissioner Skinner,

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Very Respectfully,

W.L. Nyland
General USMC
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18 Jul 05

Dear Commissioner Turner,

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