

Subject: "On DoD Installation" metric rationale.

The DoD's military value models are based on a decision analysis technique known as multi-attribute value theory. Using this approach the DoD Military Value Scoring Plan format was established such that each of the four Military Value Selection Criteria contain Attributes with supporting Metrics. Specifically, the DFAS Military Value Scoring Plan was developed and vetted through a structured and stringent approval process. The process included the HSA JCSG leadership, each of the Military Departments, the DoD Infrastructure Steering Group, and the DoD Infrastructure Executive Counsel. As such, the DFAS Military Value Scoring Plan and model includes the combined subject matter expertise and military judgment of the DoD. It was through the vetting process and specifically with input from DoD leadership that determined the weights for each Criterion, Attribute and Metric.

The following is intended to provide a summary of the thought process that resulted in the use of the DFAS Military Value Scoring Plan Metric "On a DoD Installation."

1. Early in the BRAC 2005, September/October 2003 timeframe, research indicated that DFAS could operate from any location that met the following minimum requirements:

- a. A secure facility environment.
- b. Adequate communications capability.
- c. An available area workforce

2. In addressing the issue of a secure facility's environment within the DFAS Military Value Scoring Plan it was determined to be a Criterion 1 issue. Criterion 1 was given the highest weight of 40%, because it included metric's associated with the above three minimum requirements which were identified as Attributes under Criterion 1 and weighted as follows.

- a. Attribute 1: Secure Facilities/Survivability – 20%
- b. Attribute 2: Workforce – 15%
- c. Attribute 3: Network Services – 5%

3. Attribute 1 was given the highest weight because it was determined, relative to Attribute 2, a secure facility is essential in ensuring that DFAS work can be accomplished under any circumstances. This also recognizes the importance of providing a secure work environment for DFAS employees. Furthermore, in terms of supporting current and future mission capabilities, the Department has control over the property it owns and this is not case with non-DoD owned facilities.

4. It was determined that two metrics were necessary to support the comparison between locations associated with the intent of Attribute 1 because:

- a. DFAS operational locations could vary in type, i.e. on a DoD installation, leased from a Federal Agency such as GSA, leased from the private sector, leased back from a

Enclosure

Local Redevelopment Agency (LRA) who either hold a deed to the property or will receive a deed from the DoD sometime in the future,

b. DoD Anti-Terrorist and Force Protection Standards were evolving

5. The two metrics developed to support Attribute 1 are as follows:

a. On a DoD-Owned Installation – For each location, identify if the site is on a DoD-owned installation with a controlled perimeter. Amplification(s) are as follows:

i. UFC 4-010-01, Controlled perimeter = For the purpose of these standards, a physical boundary at which vehicle access is controlled at the perimeter of an installation, an area within an installation, or other area with restricted access. A physical boundary will be considered as a sufficient means to channel vehicles to the access control points. At a minimum, access control at a controlled perimeter requires the demonstrated capability to search for and detect explosives. Where the controlled perimeter includes a shoreline and there is no defined perimeter beyond the shoreline, the boundary will be at the mean high water mark. Access control = For the purposes of these standards, any combination of barriers, gates, electronic security equipment, and/or guards that can deny entry to unauthorized personnel or vehicles.

ii. For the purpose of this question, a DoD-owned Installation is one which is recorded on a service's real property records.

b. Terrorist Threat Assessment Rating. For each location, identify the terrorist threat assessment rating based on threat assessment intelligence and DSHARPP analysis for (a) personnel attacks, (b) conventional explosive attack, (c) arson, (d) hostage situation, (e) weapons of mass destruction, (f) theft, and (g) other. The amplification can be provided if required.

6. The Metric "On a DoD Installation" was given the highest weight 15% with the Metric "Terrorist Threat Assessment Rating" given 5%, because a facility on an actively protected DoD installation is expected to provide the safest environment to accomplish the DFAS mission.

7. Further, Metric "Terrorist Threat Assessment Rating" is weighted less than the Metric "On a DoD Installation" because it was determined that differentiating between on or off a DoD installation may be the first and the most important step in defining a site's survivability, but that Metric "Terrorist Threat Assessment Rating" supports the delineation of the threat assessment of each DFAS facility.

8. In conclusion the above two Metric weights, like all weights in the DFAS Military Value Scoring Plan, are by their nature subjective. However, they were developed using subject matter expertise, military judgment, and vetted through a structured and stringent approval process such that they reflect the DoD's expert opinion.



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REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DAPR-ZB

22 July 2005

**MEMORANDUM FOR BRAC COMMISSION STAFF**

**Subject: DFAS Questions Raised on 14 July 2005**

1. Reference HSA JCSG memorandum dated 20 July 2005, responding to questions rose during 14 July 2005.

2. Responses to the following questions are now available and are provided below:

a. Use of Optimization Model.

Response:

HSA JCSG Analyst has scheduled a meeting with the BRAC Commission Staffers at 1:00 p.m., Monday, 25 July 2005.

b. Preference for being on a DISN point of presence (POP) versus accessing (through an access circuit) a DISN POP.

Response:

(1) Defense Information System Agency (DISA) maintains about 1500 Defense Information System Network (DISN) Points of Presence (PoPs), engineered to maximize cost effectiveness and practicality. They re-evaluate their infrastructure regularly and make changes as required. Generally speaking PoPs have multiple customers. Customers not located on a DISN PoP access the PoP through a leased circuit. Access circuits could be quite expensive, costing \$10s of thousands per month to rent. Whereas those hooked directly into a PoP pay nothing or perhaps only a portion of the cost. For example, DLA pays for the PoP at DFAS Columbus; DFAS pays for the PoP at DFAS Cleveland since it is the only customer. Many DFAS sites not on a DISN PoP, pay monthly fees for an access circuit.

(2) The following are associated details with regard to DFAS and DISN PoP comments made by DISA:

i. Currently DFAS pays for a 24 Mbps subscription at Columbus. Starting in FY06, DFAS will be the host for Columbus.



DAPR-ZB

Subject: DFAS Questions Raised on 14 July 2005

- ii. Currently, DFAS pays for a 9Mbps subscription at Cleveland. Starting in FY06, DFAS will be the host for Cleveland. Note: Under the DoD recommendation DFAS-Cleveland is realigned and the contracted function, Retired Military and Annuitant Pay Services, remains in Cleveland.
  - iii. For DFAS sites not on a DISN Pop, DFAS currently pays a flat rate port fee based on subscription. Starting in FY06, DFAS will pay the leased cost for the access circuits.
  - iv. Since DFAS does not encrypt all traffic, security is an issue. DFAS only encrypts traffic from DFAS to DFAS and DFAS to DISA DECCs.
- c. Request potential reasons for the reported hiring days of 132.5 for DFAS-Kansas City.

Response:

The military value question was DoD #1903, HSA-FIN-HIRE DFAS Identify the Avg Hiring Time (500 Series) for External Hires. The response was prepared for each site for external recruit actions for 500 series occupations. Hiring time was determined based in the number of days from the Request for Personnel Action was initiated to the date the job offer was accepted.

For DFAS Kansas City, there were seven (7) recruit actions that met the criteria established in the question. The hiring time for four (4) of the seven (7) actions was well beyond normal expectations.

The hire time for two GS-510 Accountant entry level positions was well beyond normal expectations because the selectees were students who had not yet completed their education. In both cases the job offer was made 56 days after the Request for Personnel Action was initiated but the job offer acceptance was not recorded and the recruit action was not finalized until the students completed their education.

For another entry level GS-510 intern position management took 136 days to make their selection.

The hire time for one GS-540, Voucher Examiner positions was extended beyond normal expectations because of delays issuing the referral, management not making a timely selection and an unusual delay by the employee accepting the job offer.

DAPR-ZB

Subject: DFAS Questions Raised on 14 July 2005

For the remaining three actions, the hiring time was also above overall DFAS averages but causes were not identifiable so long after the fact.

- d. Review the "bottom-up" process for determining the Military Value Metrics.

Response:

The development of attributes and metrics that support each Military Selection Criterion, and their associated weights, were developed in an iterative fashion. This process required numerous meetings at the staff level, with HSA JCSG leadership, and with external parties to include the service and department level BRAC leadership. The development of the model occurred largely at the staff level; detailed minutes of these sessions are not available. However, specific guidance provided by the leadership was reflected in the minutes. Examples of this include the addition of a communications/information technology metric and balancing of weights.

- e. It appears that the current work stations at the DFAS Indianapolis facility will require complete reconfiguration to support additional personnel and workload. It also appears that more parking will be required for the additional DFAS personnel.

(1) Does GSA charge an additional fee (above the lease cost) to reconfigure office space and will GSA charge for additional parking space?

(2) Are these costs in the current COBRA run?

Response:

(1) The FM Team has contacted DFAS to obtain an answer concerning GSA lease charges.

(2) Costs associated with additional parking spaces and the reconfiguration of administrative space was not included in the COBRA run associated with the DoD DFAS recommendation.

3. Added issue/question:

DFAS Rome, NY Leaseback from AF. Background: Staffers indicate that DFAS facility in Rome NY is a leaseback from the AF and are indicating this site should have been identified, as a DoD owned installation.

Response:

DAPR-ZB

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(1) The DFAS response to Military Value Question #1918 asked "For each location, identify if the site is on a DoD-owned installation with a controlled perimeter (See Amplification)." DFAS Rome is on a DoD Owned Installation but does not have a controlled perimeter. We could not answer affirmative since DFAS Rome does not meet both requirements (i.e. be on a DoD Owned Installation AND have a controlled perimeter).

(2) Military Value Question #1918, On a DoD-Owned Installation – For each location, identify if the site is on a DoD-owned installation with a controlled perimeter. Amplification(s):

i. UFC 4-010-01, Controlled perimeter = For the purpose of these standards, a physical boundary at which vehicle access is controlled at the perimeter of an installation, an area within an installation, or other area with restricted access. A physical boundary will be considered as a sufficient means to channel vehicles to the access control points. At a minimum, access control at a controlled perimeter requires the demonstrated capability to search for and detect explosives. Where the controlled perimeter includes a shoreline and there is no defined perimeter beyond the shoreline, the boundary will be at the mean high water mark. Access control = For the purposes of these standards, any combination of barriers, gates, electronic security equipment, and/or guards that can deny entry to unauthorized personnel or vehicles.

ii. For the purpose of this question, a DoD-owned Installation is one which is recorded on a service's real property records.

4. Coordination: N/A

  
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