

Ventura County, California
Community Report to the
BRAC Commission
Relevant to Naval Base Ventura County

July 14, 2005

I. Introduction

The Department of Defense (DoD) significantly deviated from Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law and from their own internal departmental guidance in performing their analysis and in making certain realignment recommendations that affect Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) and two of its primary tenant commands: Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Pt. Mugu (NAWC WD), and Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD).

The deviations in the DoD analysis processes deal with the following Selection Criteria:

- Military Value (Criteria #1 & #2)
- Costs and Savings (Criteria #5)
- Receiving Community Infrastructure (Criteria #7)

Additionally, deviations from Department guidance to enhance Jointness and Transformation as well as specific areas of poor execution of basic data analysis and management have been identified.

Several of DoD's realignment recommendations, including those affecting NAWC WD Sea Range, Targets, Range Support Aircraft and Weapons functions, and NSWC PHD Weapons and C⁴ISR functions, deviate from BRAC law and DoD guidance as well as demonstrate poor DoD data analysis and management. Therefore, the discussions of these functions and the imperative to reject/modify the respective DoD recommendations are provided in two different sections of this paper.

This position paper will clearly identify and discuss DoD's deviations, and will provide recommendations to the BRAC Commission on changes that should be made prior to the Commission's forwarding its report to the President.

DoD's realignment recommendations which apply to NBVC were all originated, staffed, and reported by the Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG). These recommendations, along with their respective impacts on the Ventura County community, are provided below:

Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center

DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.”

DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.”

Economic Impact on Communities: “Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 5,012 jobs (2,250 direct jobs and 2,762 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.”

Consolidate Maritime C⁴ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Base Ventura County, CA, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA, and Naval Station Newport, RI, by relocating Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, and consolidating with the Space Warfare Center to create the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.”

Economic Impact on Communities: “Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 286 jobs (127 direct jobs and 159 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.”

Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.”

Economic Impact on Communities: “Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,075 jobs (479 direct jobs and 596 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area economic area.”

The total maximum potential impact to Ventura County would be a reduction of 6,373 jobs (2,856 direct and 3,517 indirect), with 6,087 of these jobs slated to move to China Lake.

II. Deviation from Selection Criteria

A. Military Value Criteria

The Department of Defense (DoD) significantly deviated from Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law by not adequately considering Military Value criteria. A discussion of these deviations is provided below.

1. Final Selection Criteria Number 1:

“The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.”

Military Value Criteria Number 1 means that no BRAC recommendations should be forwarded that would degrade the operational readiness of our joint warfighters. In recommending that the Pt. Mugu Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence be realigned to China Lake, the TJCSG significantly deviated from BRAC law. A discussion of these deviations is provided below.

a. Electronic Warfare

The Electronic Warfare (EW) Center of Excellence (COE) at Point Mugu includes the Electronic Combat Simulation and Evaluation Laboratory (ECSEL), the EA-6B laboratory, the EA-18G laboratory, the Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Planning and Exploitation System (TERPES) laboratory, the Threat Simulation group, and the Electronic Warfare Software Support Activity (EWSSA). These EW labs provide a wide range of synergistic support to Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and FMS tactical airborne electronic attack (AEA), threat simulation, and electronic threat intelligence customers.

Pt. Mugu has been the Navy's EW COE for over 50 years. The 368 civilian and 11 military personnel located at Pt. Mugu possess over 4,500 collective years of specialized EW experience, with an average of over 15 years per person of EA-6B, AEA, and threat analysis engineering experience.

The Pt. Mugu EA-6B Weapons System Support Laboratory provides real-time operational support to the warfighter. This capability is maintained 24/7/365. When a crisis occurs in the world, the lab responds to the urgent needs of the warfighter. Examples of recent support include pushing reprogrammed user data files to all deployed EA-6B squadrons on 9/11/2001, and providing 100% responses to over 31,900 data requests in the June 2003 to June 2004 timeframe.

Based on its resident EW expertise, including its extensive EA-6B experience, Pt. Mugu was chosen by the Navy program manager as the optimum site for

the EA-18G Software Support Activity laboratory. This laboratory is currently in development. When complete, Pt. Mugu EW specialists, working in a coordinated technical environment with the F/A-18 mission systems software specialists at China Lake, will develop the EA-18G EW systems.

The TERPES was developed, tested, and is maintained at Pt. Mugu. It depends on the utilization of electronic support measures instrumentation in the EA-6B to capture the electronic signals from a threat. These signals are processed by the TERPES to present the electronic order of battle of enemy forces. The TERPES lab provides operational support to Marine Corps combat operations on a 24 hour a day basis in order to capture, analyze, and distribute signals information to deployed operational forces.

The Threat Simulation group at Pt. Mugu uses electronic intelligence as well as research into foreign electronic capabilities to develop systems that stimulate U.S. weapons and sensors in the same manner as the threat. The systems developed in this program have proven invaluable in past conflicts when the enemy employed weapons and sensors that were not countered by our embedded countermeasures in tactical aircraft (TACAIR). These Threat Simulators can be rapidly deployed to our operating forces, and have been used tactically in hostile environments.

The EWSSA provides direct new system software builds for U.S. jamming and receiving systems. When new enemy threat systems are introduced, the EWSSA is responsible for developing the new software for existing fleet receiving and jamming systems to counter this threat. This effort entails a highly trained engineering staff to analyze the threat, to develop techniques to defeat the threat system, and to incorporate the new capability into the jamming system software. The EWSSA provides direct support to a wide variety of Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army platforms and EW receiver and jammer systems.

The TJCSG deviated from the Military Value criteria by recommending that the Pt. Mugu Electronic Warfare capability be realigned to China Lake. This recommendation was made in spite of the following facts:

- Pt. Mugu is the current EW Center of Excellence. The intellectual center of mass is at Pt. Mugu. Pt. Mugu employs approximately 400 Electronic Warfare personnel, while China Lake employs only about 30 personnel in the same EW disciplines.
- Execution of the proposed EW realignment would cause significant disruption to the warfighting capabilities of our deployed forces. By forcing the tear-down, transition, and reconstruction of the EW labs, services currently provided 24/7 would be interrupted for months, if not years. Combined with the loss of intellectual capital described below, the down-time would severely impact the nation's ability to counter enemy

weapons and electronic warfare systems. As a result, our warfighters would be placed in harm's way.

- The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) recognizes the value of the existing EW COE to the warfighter, and the difficulty in reconstituting this capability at another location, and, as a result, has recommended establishment of a Joint EW COE at Pt. Mugu. NAVAIRSYSCOM leadership, service EW program managers, and the operational EA-6B wing commander are all opposed to this proposed realignment.
- Realignment of EW to China Lake would result in a significant loss in expert personnel and intellectual capital. This intellectual capital has evolved over decades at Point Mugu, and cannot be moved without disruption to mission effectiveness. The time period required to train an Electronics Engineer to become a functional EW systems engineer is estimated to be 7-10 years.
- As opposed to the DoD justification contained in their recommendations to the Commission, there is no redundant infrastructure between Pt. Mugu and China Lake. Movement of EW to China Lake would not make more efficient use of the Electronic Combat Range. The ECSEL and other Pt. Mugu indoor range facilities provide the preferred methodology for testing, at significantly lower cost and greater fidelity. If the Pt. Mugu EW labs were relocated to China Lake, they would not result in increased use of the Electronic Combat Range.

b. Surface Ship Combat Systems

The DoD proposed realignment of 432 positions from NBVC Port Hueneme to China Lake contains a fundamental flaw that may have a significant negative impact on the active duty ships of the US fleet. The flaw is that many of the functions and positions (297) associated with the ship's combat system side of the interface with expendable ordnance (Weapons and Armaments) were included in the realignment to China Lake. This will result in potentially serious breakdowns in the interface controls for combat systems aboard our ships going in harms way and can result in inoperable combat systems. To prevent this from happening would require NBVC Port Hueneme to redevelop and duplicate the functions and positions locally at a significant cost. This is a clear deviation from the BRAC Criteria #1.

The proposed realignments decrease Military Value. They would negatively impact warfighter capabilities, they would unnecessarily cost the taxpayers millions of dollars, and they would not result in any increased synergy with China Lake. Due to the fact that the TJCSG significantly deviated from the defined selection criteria, the DOD recommendation to realign the Electronic Warfare from Pt. Mugu to China Lake, as well as portions of the Weapons and

Armaments from Port Hueneme that are really part of the ships combat system to China Lake, should be rejected.

2. Final Selection Criteria Number 2:

“The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.”

In his September 3, 2004, Memorandum to DoD leadership, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz provided further guidance on “BRAC 2005 Military Value Principles.” His guidance included direction that the Military Departments and the Joint Cross-Service Groups should use a number of principles when applying military judgment in their deliberative processes. These principles included:

“The Department needs research, development, acquisition, test, and evaluation capabilities that efficiently and effectively place superior technology in the hands of the warfighter to meet current and future threats and facilitate knowledge-enabled and net-centric warfare.”

The combination of Military Value Criteria Number 2 and Mr. Wolfowitz’s implementing guidance should have sent a very clear message to the JCSG’s. That message was that in order to enhance military value, no BRAC recommendations should be forwarded that would degrade the efficiency or effectiveness of DoD’s test and training ranges or their supporting functions.

In recommending that Sea Range, Targets, and Range Support Aircraft be realigned from Pt. Mugu to China Lake, the TJCSG significantly deviated from BRAC law and from the above DoD implementing guidance. A discussion of those deviations is provided below.

a. Sea Range

The Pt. Mugu Sea Range, encompassing 36,000 square miles of controlled airspace is DoD’s largest and most heavily instrumented sea range. The Sea Range is a National Range and is designated as a Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB). The Sea Range operates range instrumentation located on coastal mountains and on off-shore islands, including the Navy-owned San Nicolas Island, located 60 miles from the coastline. The Range is expandable, and supports open-ocean and littoral testing of tactical, strategic and missile defense weapons, weapons systems and aircraft systems; Fleet training and joint experimentation. The Pt. Mugu Sea Range provides services to a large number of test and training customers. For example, its FY-04 customer base was 33% Air Force, 26% Navy, 19% Missile Defense Agency,

9% Other DoD, 8% Foreign Military Sales, 3% Commercial, and 2% NASA. The Sea Range is one of four open-air ranges operated under a single NAVAIRSYSCOM Ranges Department.

The TJCSG deviated from the Military Value criteria by recommending that the Pt. Mugu Sea Range be realigned to China Lake as part of the Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center. This recommendation was made in spite of the following facts:

- Over 10 years of internal reorganizations and restructuring have eliminated all duplicative capabilities and management layers between the Pt. Mugu and China Lake ranges
- Movement of Sea Range jobs from Pt. Mugu to China Lake would result in significant loss in intellectual capital
- The Sea Range provides support to a large number of non-Weapons and Armaments customers
- Operation of the Sea Range is inextricably linked to the geography
- No synergy would be gained by realigning the Sea Range to China Lake
- Significant unnecessary non-recurring and recurring costs would be incurred by both the Range and its customers
- The efficiency and effectiveness of the Sea Range would be decreased, and
- Safety risk to both participating and non-participating personnel would be increased by moving control of developmental and operational weapons testing to a location more than 150 miles away from the test venue.

From senior DoD officials involved in both Technical and Education & Training JCSG's, we learned that, since Open Air Ranges and their supporting functions were under the purview of the E&T JCSG, the TJCSG should not have made realignment recommendations regarding the Pt. Mugu Sea Range. TJCSG personnel exceeded their authority by recommending that Sea Range and associated Targets and Range Support Aircraft personnel be realigned to China Lake.

The proposed realignment decreases Military Value. It would not result in any increased synergy with China Lake W&A programs, but it would negatively impact cost, safety and operational efficiency of Sea Range operations. Due to the fact that the TJCSG significantly deviated from the defined selection criteria and exceeded its authority in making OAR recommendations, the DoD

recommendation to realign the Sea Range from Pt. Mugu to China Lake should be rejected.

b. Targets

Pt. Mugu has served for over sixty years as the Navy's premier aerial and seaborne targets engineering, operations and logistics site. It is the only site that operates all of the Navy's air and surface launched target systems and is the only Center of Excellence for target systems within the Navy. The Pt. Mugu target capability originated as, and remains a natural and necessary extension of the Sea Range.

Aerial targets, maintained, operated and refurbished at Pt. Mugu, are comprised of subscale subsonic targets and full-scale missile targets capable of remote operation by an air or ground-based controller. The seaborne targets, maintained, operated and refurbished at Port Hueneme, consist of a full array of small high speed attack boats, full-sized remotely operated ships and sea-going target launch platforms.

The TJCSG deviated from the Military Value criteria by recommending that Pt. Mugu's targets personnel be realigned to China Lake as part of the Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center. This recommendation was made in spite of the fact that an average of 92% of aerial target operations are conducted at the Pt. Mugu Sea Range, while an average of only 8% are conducted at China Lake. 100% of seaborne target operations are conducted at the Sea Range. Moving all target operations from the Sea Range to China Lake and then transporting the people and equipment back to Point Mugu on a daily basis to conduct operations on the Sea Range would result in significant increases in operating and maintenance costs.

The proposed realignment decreases Military Value. It would not result in any increased synergy with any China Lake W&A program, but it would negatively impact Sea Range operations. By degrading the efficiency and effectiveness of Sea Range operations and imposing unnecessary non-recurring and recurring costs, this recommendation significantly deviates from the defined selection criteria. The DoD recommendation to realign the targets organization from Pt. Mugu to China Lake should be rejected.

c. Range Support Aircraft

Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Three Zero (VX-30), a NAVAIRSYSCOM command based at NAS Pt. Mugu, operates P-3, C-130 and F/A-18 aircraft in support of both T&E and Fleet training activities. The P-3 and C-130 aircraft, known as Range Support Aircraft (RSA), perform an average of 86% of their sorties on the Pt. Mugu Sea Range, 13% of their sorties off-range (primarily in support of world-wide MDA and NASA operations) and only 1% of their sorties on the China Lake land range. The VX-30 aircrew, Sea Range and

targets personnel, flying in the RSA, perform range surveillance, clearance, telemetry, flight termination, optics, targets launch and logistics support functions for the Sea Range.

The TJCSG deviated from the Military Value criteria by recommending that VX-30 be realigned to China Lake as part of the Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center. This recommendation was made in spite of the fact that VX-30 does not test weapons and armaments, but does support a wide variety of non-weapons customers on the Sea Range. The TJCSG also made this recommendation in spite of the significant additional costs that would have to borne, by both BRAC appropriations and Sea Range customers, as a result. The non-recurring costs to build a new hangar and ramp space at China Lake are estimated at over \$25M. The recurring costs of operations would increase by approximately \$6.8M per year in order to pay for the additional flight time to/from China Lake and the costs of the required maintenance detachments from China Lake. Other unknown costs would accrue as a result of decreased on-station time, higher total flight time, decreased aircraft fatigue life, more frequent depot-level repairs, and loss of Sea Range operational efficiency due to the RSA being based over 150 miles away from the Sea Range.

The proposed realignment decreases Military Value. If VX-30 were realigned from Pt. Mugu to China Lake, the quality of support to the Sea Range would be significantly degraded while increasing the cost to the taxpayer by several millions of dollars per year. By degrading the efficiency and effectiveness of Sea Range operations and imposing unnecessary non-recurring and recurring costs, this recommendation significantly deviates from the defined selection criteria. The DoD recommendation to realign VX-30 from Pt. Mugu to China Lake should be rejected.

B. Other Criteria

DoD significantly deviated from Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law by not adequately considering other mandated Selection Criteria. A discussion of these deviations to Criteria #5 (Costs and Savings) and Criteria #7 (Receiving community infrastructure) is provided below.

1. Final Selection Criteria Number 5:

“The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.”

The TJCSG did not perform a proper analysis of the costs and savings associated with their recommended realignments. Specifically, extremely poor analyses were performed on the TECH 18 (Weapons and Armaments) and TECH 54 (Electronic

Warfare) scenarios. A detailed discussion and a summary of more accurate costs and savings are provided below.

a. Basic TECH 18 Scenario as Submitted in the DoD Recommendations to the BRAC Commission

This scenario realigns all W&A RDAT&E billets from NBVC (and other locations) primarily to China Lake. It fails to include the costs of moving the Range and Targets Functions (facilities and equipment) to China Lake and does not include the additional recurring costs of conducting Range and Target Operations from China Lake vice NBVC. It also assumes an across-the-board (military, civilian, and contractor) reduction in required billets of 15%.

Summary Results:

Payback Year	2015 (7 years)
NPV in 2025 (\$K)	-433,404 (negative number = savings, positive = loss)
1-Time Cost (\$K)	358,142

b. Basic TECH 18 Scenario Modified to Include Anticipated Actual Costs

The true cost of TECH 18 must include the anticipated actual costs of moving the Range and Target functions from NBVC to China Lake. Additionally, due to over 12 years of consolidation of technical, administrative, and management functions across the single NAWC WD organization, the assumed 15% savings would not occur. The July 2005 GAO report found fault with this 15% savings number used by the TJCSG and stated that a 5.5% savings would be more accurate. Due to the complete lack of redundancy in technical, administrative and management personnel between the NAWC Pt. Mugu and China Lake sites, a more accurate estimate would be zero savings. Using the data taken from the certified responses of NBVC and China Lake to Scenario Data Call DON-0162, January 11, 2005, and making the above two changes to the TECH 18, COBRA analysis results in dramatic changes to the bottom line numbers.

Payback Year	100+ Years
NPV in 2025 (\$K)	249,094 (loss)
1-Time Cost (\$K)	440,497

c. Basic TECH 18 Scenario Modified to Exclude Sea Range, Targets and VX-30 Personnel and Facilities

As discussed in paragraph II.A.2 above, Sea Range, Targets and VX-30 Range Support Aircraft should not be moved to China Lake. By running the COBRA model without the associated MILCON and moving expenses associated with the Sea Range, Targets and VX-30, and eliminating the 15% savings, as discussed above, yields the following bottom line numbers:

Payback Year	2037 (29 Years)
NPV in 2025 (\$K)	77,811 (loss)
1-Time Cost (\$K)	269,727

In summary, the TJCSG can not have it both ways. It should have either included the range and targets costs and incurred a 20 year NPV of +\$249,094,000 or left the Range, Targets and VX-30 activities at Pt. Mugu (the most sensible solution) and incurred a 20 year NPV of +\$77,811,000.

d. Basic TECH 54 Scenario as Submitted in the DoD Recommendations to the BRAC Commission

This scenario relocates the entire Pt. Mugu Electronic Warfare (EW) Center of Excellence from NBVC to China Lake.

Payback Year	2021 (12 Years)
NPV in 2025 (\$K)	-16,888 (savings)
1-Time Cost (\$K)	72,699

e. Basic TECH 54 Scenario with Unjustified Personnel Savings Removed

The Basic Scenario shows 11 military, 368 civilian, and 100 contractor positions being realigned from NBVC to China Lake with no reductions. However, the Receiving Activity (China Lake) claimed a Miscellaneous Recurring Savings of \$3,010,000 per year. The data call footnote states:

“Identifies savings attributed to a calculated payroll savings for reduced Technical and Admin personnel. Justification is an un-itemized value. Details in Source file 1.”

A review of the source file, and the documentation preceding that source file, revealed that this \$3M/year number was an un-itemized value with no justification. The results of the COBRA model run without this unjustified recurring savings are shown below:

Payback Year	2040 (31 Years)
NPV in 2025 (\$K)	24,961 (loss)
1-Time Cost (\$K)	72,699

- f. In summary, both the Weapons and Armaments (TECH 18) and the Electronic Warfare (TECH 54) scenarios recommended by the TJCSG will result in high one-time costs and unacceptable long-term costs to the taxpayer. By not considering these costs in its analysis, DoD significantly deviated from BRAC law.

2. Final Selection Criteria Number 7:

“The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.”

The TJCSG significantly deviated from this Selection Criteria by accepting the Bakersfield Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as being an accurate representation of Ridgecrest’s ability to support the potential realignment of personnel.

Bakersfield, located approximately 115 miles west of China Lake, is over two hours away, with almost nothing in between the two cities except mountains and desert. The only city of any size within 60 miles of Ridgecrest is California City, 35 miles away with a population of 8,400.

The relocation of nearly over 6,300 positions to Ridgecrest (population approximately 25,000) from all activities would represent a total influx of about 22,000 people (at a 3.5 to 1 ratio) in the 2007-2008 timeframe. This would require essentially doubling the size of the city of Ridgecrest in the next two years.

The June 16, 2005, Multiple Listing Service for available homes showed 12 houses for sale in the city of Ridgecrest. The MSA data shows 22,912 vacant housing units, but the majority of those are in Bakersfield, 115 miles from China Lake. Housing for an additional 22,000 people could ultimately be constructed in the Ridgecrest area, but it is not likely that this could be accomplished by 2008.

Doubling of the size of Ridgecrest by developing an additional 21 square miles of real estate, also raises serious environmental concerns. This large influx of people would definitely affect the delicate environmental balance found in the Mojave Desert, including the habitat of the Mojave Ground Squirrel, the Desert Tortoise, and the Kangaroo Rat.

The statistics for medical providers are misleading. The Bakersfield MSA shows 1,231 beds, and 937 physicians, but the Ridgecrest Regional hospital only has 80

beds and 65 physicians. When Ridgecrest residents are faced with any significant medical challenges, they invariably leave town to find solutions. This problem would only be exacerbated by the addition of another 22,000 residents.

The city of Ridgecrest could expand its utility services, including power, water, sewage, and refuse, but it is doubtful that it could obtain the funding and establish the infrastructure in time for the 2007-2008 influx.

The availability of schools is another serious issue to be considered. With the known extended timeframes associated with passing school bond initiatives, the known state education funding problems, and the normal lengths of time required to design, obtain approvals for, and build new schools, it is unlikely that adequate educational facilities could be available by 2007-2008.

The TJCSG scenario data callers asked if Ridgecrest could accommodate a number of separate realignment actions. Taken in pieces, perhaps they could be done. But taken in total, especially with the short timeframe in which to accomplish all actions, it is unlikely that Ridgecrest could accommodate the recommended realignments.

DoD deviated from the Selection Criteria guidance by not adequately assessing the total impact of all realignment actions on the city of Ridgecrest and by accepting the Bakersfield MSA as being representative of Ridgecrest.

III. Deviation from Departmental Guidance to Enhance Jointness and Transformation

The TJCSG significantly deviated from Departmental Guidance to Enhance Jointness and Transformation. A discussion of these deviations is provided below.

In a November 15, 2002, memorandum to his DoD leadership, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld provided the following guidance:

“A primary objective of BRAC 2005, in addition to realigning our base structure to meet our post-Cold War force structure, is to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity...I am confident we can produce BRAC recommendations that will advance transformation, combat effectiveness, and the efficient use of the taxpayer’s money.”

In his September 8, 2004, memorandum for DoD leadership, including the Chairmen of the Joint Cross Service Groups, Under Secretary of Defense Michael Wynne recommended several “Transformational Options” for approval, including:

“Establish regional Cross-Service and Cross-Functional ranges that will support Service collective, interoperability and joint training as well as test and evaluation of weapons systems.”

In spite of Mr. Rumsfeld's and Mr. Wynne's guidance, it appears that very few DoD recommendations actually enhance jointness and transformation. Most of the recommendations, including those directly affecting NBVC, are service-centric vice joint. This lack of jointness and transformation has been noted by others, also.

In his April 6, 2005, weekly update to SECDEF, Under Secretary Wynne stated that the Navy's approach "can limit BRAC's transformational potential." He further noted that the Navy "worked closely with joint cross-service groups, but leaned toward service-centric rather than joint solutions."

During Dr. Ronald Sega's testimony before the BRAC Commission on May 19, 2005, Commissioner Coyle noted:

"But from what I can see, you recommended very little in the way of cross servicing or jointness that would bring services together in a technical way. And my question is: Why didn't you?"

Dr. Sega's response included:

"It is our hope that in these areas that are largely co-locating, consolidating at the service level will evolve to more of a joint character."

In its July 2005 "Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignment," the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that:

"Some proposed actions represent some progress in emphasizing transformation and jointness, but progress in these efforts varied without clear agreement on transformational options to be considered, and many recommendations tended to foster jointness by consolidating functions within rather than across military services."

In comments directly aimed at the TJCSG recommendations, GAO stated:

"Limited progress was made to foster greater jointness and transformation."

The TJCSG's deviations from Departmental guidance resulted in recommendations which adversely affect Naval Base Ventura County. These deviations are discussed below.

As discussed above, the Pt. Mugu Sea Range is a national range providing joint services to a large number of test and training customers. For example, its FY-04 customer base was 33% Air Force, 26% Navy, 19% Missile Defense Agency, and 9% Other DoD. In spite of Under Secretary Wynne's recommendation to establish cross-service ranges and a clear opportunity to expand the Sea Range's joint mission, the TJCSG recommended moving all Pt. Mugu Range, Targets and Range Support Aircraft personnel to China Lake as part of a service-centric Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center.

As described above, the EA-6B laboratory directly supports the joint airborne electronic attack missions of the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. This capability is an integral part of the larger EW Center of Excellence at Pt. Mugu. Instead of making recommendations that would enhance the value of the joint EA-6B laboratory at Pt. Mugu, the TJCSG recommended tearing it down and moving it to a service-centric Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics RDAT&E center at China Lake.

The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) laboratory at Pt. Mugu provides direct support to the AMRAAM joint program office. This is the only AMRAAM HIL in operation and supports both Air Force and Navy RDAT&E and Raytheon, the system contractor. Rather than enhancing the value of this joint laboratory, the TJCSG recommended tearing it down and moving it to China Lake as part of a service-centric Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center.

The Radar Reflectivity Laboratory (RRL) at Pt. Mugu is the only one of its kind in the world. The RRL provides monostatic and bistatic radar cross-section characterization services to a wide variety of joint customers, including Navy and Air Force aircraft programs, UAV and weapons programs, Navy ship and submarine programs, the Missile Defense Agency and DoD sponsored R&D programs. Rather than enhancing the value of this joint laboratory, the TJCSG recommended abandoning and moving the RRL to China Lake as part of a service-centric Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center.

Co-Location ≠ Transformation. While the TJCSG made many recommendations which resulted in co-location of similar functions, co-location is not transformational. In fact it is just the opposite. In the business world, the transformation is to more distributed organizations. In this regard, Naval Air Systems Command leadership exhibited great foresight in 1992 by establishing the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, with the two campuses at Pt. Mugu and China Lake. NAWC WD was established as, and remains an integrated command with a single management and financial structure. In the recent words of the first NAWC Commander, RADM George Strohsahl (ret):

“The technical work at Pt. Mugu since the creation of the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) and the introduction of a competency aligned organization within the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) has been totally integrated with related work at other NAWC locations. Management layering and duplicative work has been eliminated. If the work is relocated (realigned in BRAC parlance) little savings will accrue through elimination of jobs. The move will simply attempt to pick up the people and place them in different buildings some 150 miles away.”

RADM Strohsahl goes on to say:

“Modern internet, video teleconferences, and other communications capability seamlessly link these physically separated elements to form effective teams. The NAWC and the current NAVAIR management

concept were founded on this modern reality. It has worked well for them for over a decade. This proposed costly relocation is a giant step back in time without any tangible benefit. The BRAC recommendation in this instance is attempting to fix something that simply isn't broken."

He summarizes his feelings about the proposed realignment actions by saying:

"The BRAC commission must understand the terrible error that has been made and remove this realignment from the final BRAC list."

Practical examples of the transformational distributed connectivity referenced by RADM Strohsahl can be seen in both the EA-18G and AMRAAM laboratories at Pt. Mugu. The EA-18G airborne electronic attack systems ("EA-18G backseat"), being developed and tested at Pt. Mugu, are electronically linked to the EA-18G mission systems ("EA-18G frontseat") being developed and tested at China Lake. The AMRAAM systems being developed and tested at Pt. Mugu are electronically linked with the F/A-18 systems being developed and tested at China Lake. None of these labs have to be in the same room, or even on the same base to operate effectively. Both are examples of transformational ways of doing business. The DoD recommendations would result in a big transformational step backwards, while interrupting critical service to the warfighter, unnecessarily spending millions of tax dollars and disintegrating a skilled and motivated workforce.

The TJCSG significantly deviated from Department guidance to enhance jointness and transformation. Instead, it recommended two specific service-centric realignments (W&A and EW) that would significantly damage joint value and would set Weapons and EW transformation back 15 years. At the same time, these DoD recommendations would result in loss of valuable intellectual capital, would adversely affect our warfighters and would impose significant unnecessary expenses on the taxpayer.

IV. Poor Execution of Basic Data Analysis and Management Functions

The Technical Joint Cross Service Group did an extremely poor job of analyzing and managing the data which was submitted by both NAWC WD and NSWC PHD. The most egregious example of this poor execution was in the TJCSG handling of what has become known as the "Question 47" data. A description of the Question 47 issue is provided below.

Both sites of Naval Base Ventura County responded to scenario data call TECH 2. TECH 2 was translated into TECH 18, which was used by the TJCSG in its analysis. The TJCSG analyzed TECH 18 without any input from the Point Mugu or Port Hueneme sites.

The COBRA data indicates that the TJCSG analysis used incorrect numbers. Apparently, the TJCSG made the same mistake across the board for all TECH 18 losing activities. This error is particularly significant for Naval Base Ventura County since it is by far the largest contributor to the TECH 18 scenario. The most significant results are that costs

associated with this action were grossly understated, and that the savings associated with this action are extremely overstated

When TECH 2 was issued, guidance included:

“Report FTEs, equipment and facilities that are within this scenario category (W&A) but are an inextricable part of a specific effort performed by your activity that is not Weapons; however, identify and explain in #USN0047 those areas of conflict.”

NBVC personnel argued that it would not be appropriate to include NAWC Sea Range, Targets and NSWC Weapons Systems Integration personnel in this data call response. In particular, the Sea Range personnel spread their work across all Defense Technical Areas, including Air Platforms and Space Systems. Additionally, these personnel do not work on weapons and armaments; they work on range and target systems. In prior scenarios this inseparable work was not included in the personnel and equipment movement, dynamic costing or military construction requirements as they were never intended to be moved by either the gaining or losing activities.

Regarding the NSWC Weapons Integration positions, these personnel are associated with the shipboard combat systems interface, not the expendable weapons and armaments such as missiles. The systems of surface combatants are designed as an integral system including fire-control, launcher and any weapons container interface to allow the system to control and adapt functions going to and from the various weapons that must work with the Combat System. This is necessary to consider and make systems adjustments at the ship/container/launcher side of the interface to the weapon, allowing the many different ship combat systems to work with the various weapons. This type of work is not funded by the Program Executive Offices for Weapons and/or Armaments. It is funded by the ship systems program offices. Some of these programs are highly classified and require a STILO capability to support them. However, the STILO functions and positions were included in the proposed realignment. A total lack of understanding of the way shipboard combat systems are engineered and funded is evident in the realignment recommendations of the TJCSG (Tech 18) for NSWC PHD. This is also true for the TJCSG (Tech 9) realignment recommendations for C4ISR functions and positions from NSWC PHD to Point Loma. Many of the positions covered by the realignment are Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and/or switchboard related. Neither of these program areas are C4ISR functions. In the case of CEC, it relates to target recognition and processing within and between the combat system/s. All of the interface programming and data processing is combat system unique and must be done as a part of the overall combat system design. Likewise, switchboards are devices that provide the inter-connections and routing of various subsystems in the combat system and must be managed and documented by the combat system engineers; not the C4ISR personnel. In all of the above areas, NSWC PHD would have to recreate the positions and capabilities in order to perform its combat systems engineering and integration mission. This would result in added cost with no savings.

After much discussion between Navy principals, NAWC WD and NSWC PHD were directed to include the higher numbers of personnel, but to describe these “inextricable” personnel in Question 47. The NAWC WD Question 47 wording submitted was:

“The following areas would require a reduction in the number of personnel, equipment, and facilities to be relocated to the receiving site: (1) F-14 weapons system support has been terminated, a reduction of 132 civilians and 24 contractors; (2) An error of 33 civilians performing EW support; (3) personnel, mission equipment, and facilities performing outdoor air range operations. These are an integrated, fixed base capability that must remain at the Point Mugu site to continue sea range operations, net reduction of 505 civilians, 153 contractors, 2,667 tons of mission equipment, and 1,022.4 KSFT of facility space; (4) Retaining the 3 anechoic chambers whose primary customer is the targets range complex, a net reduction of 14 civilians, 3 contractors, 90 tons of support equipment, and 44.2 KSF; (5) Keeping logistical support for targets with the targets hardware, a net reduction of 24 civilians,; and (6) Not moving the general and administrative support that currently services both China Lake and Point Mugu, a net reduction of 143 civilians and 22 contractors.”

This statement was inclusive of mission equipment and facilities performing outdoor air range operations include both range and target operations.

In the SECDEF recommendation coming from TECH 18 the impact on the community is shown as a total of 2,250 direct jobs. It is clear none of the question 47 reductions were applied in the recommendation.

The impact of ignoring the question 47 reduction in TECH 18 is significant. None of the cost of the mission equipment nor the operational considerations to make a mission capable range were included, yet all of the personnel would be moved to China Lake. Neither the losing nor receiving sites included dynamic or facility costs to relocate the functions identified in question 47. Since the analysis used the full personnel movements while ignoring the accompanying costs, the return on investment calculation is incorrect.

A similar problem occurred with the NSWC Port Hueneme in TECH 2A. Mission critical inextricable functions, with personnel counts, were included in the certified question 47 response, but were excluded from the TECH 18 analysis. The certified data indicated a total of approximately 432 direct jobs in the movement tables, but indicated only 134 were movable due to the inextricable functions being performed at the Hueneme site. Subsequently, the recommendations stemming from TECH 18 included all the personnel in the move without regard to the input from the site experts. Likewise, of the 127 positions to be moved to Point Loma as C4ISR related, 96 of them are clearly inextricable to the continued performance of the mission at NSWC PHD and are not part of C4ISR .

Since the DoD recommendations were published on May 13th, both the Navy personnel at NBVC and personnel outside the base, including elected officials, have been trying to find out what the TJCSG did with the Question 47 inputs. Answers have included:

From the Lead of the W&A subgroup of the TJCSG:

“I don’t know.”

From the GAO inquiry:

“A Navy official said that most Navy activities asked to exclude large numbers of personnel from consideration in recommendations and the technical group was consistent in disregarding these exclusions.”

(In a telephone conversation with the GAO personnel who researched this subject, we were told that their DoD point of contact told them that the TJCSG analysts did not understand the Question 47 exclusions, so they ignored them.)

In a response to Congressman Gallegly’s question on why the TJCSG ignored the Question 47 exclusions, Mr. Alan R. Shaffer, Executive Director of the TJCSG, responded:

“Naval Base Ventura County information was reviewed but not included in the final analysis due to expert military judgment.”

A summary of the timeline of what we think happened is provided below:

- (1) NBVC personnel who prepared the data call responses identified the inconsistencies and confusion that would result if they were to arbitrarily lump all personnel into “W&A” or “C⁴ISR” categories.
- (2) NBVC personnel were directed to include all of the W&A and C⁴ISR personnel, but were told to identify areas of conflict for those personnel considered to be an inextricable part of their activity’s mission in their Question 47 inputs.
- (3) NBVC operated in good faith by identifying all positions in each category, and also specifically identified those positions considered inextricable in their Question 47 responses.
- (4) TJCSG personnel did not understand the Question 47 exclusions, did not ask NBVC personnel for clarification and ignored the data.
- (5) DoD rolled up all of the realignment numbers, including those from the TJCSG, and published a recommendation to realign 2,250 NBVC personnel, when the correct number, subtracting the Question 47 exclusions, should have been 803.

Bottom line position: Improperly realigning the 1,447 inextricable NBVC personnel, with the resulting loss of intellectual capital, adverse effects on the warfighter, and

unnecessary expense to the taxpayer, due to TJCSG staff incompetence/inattention to detail is an egregious error which should be corrected by the Commission.

V. Conclusions

The Technical Joint Cross Service Group significantly deviated from BRAC law, specifically in not complying with the defined Selection Criteria. These deviations resulted in faulty realignment recommendations regarding Electronic Warfare; Range, Targets and Range Support Aircraft; Weapons and Armaments; and C⁴ISR functions at NBVC.

The Technical Joint Cross Service Group significantly deviated from internal DoD guidance to enhance Jointness and Transformation. These deviations resulted in faulty realignment recommendations regarding Electronic Warfare and Weapons and Armaments functions at NBVC.

The Technical Joint Cross Service Group did a very poor job of basic data analysis and management. These errors resulted in faulty realignment recommendations regarding Range and Targets, Weapons and Armaments, and C⁴ISR functions at NBVC.

The bottom line is that the Technical Joint Cross Service Group did an extremely poor job of judging military value, considering Jointness and Transformation and analyzing and managing the data. A majority of their realignment recommendations simply do not make sense. Most of the affected positions are synergistic neither with the Weapons and Armaments and Electronics Warfare work at China Lake, nor with the C⁴ISR work at Pt. Loma. These jobs are integral to the existing NAWC WD Sea Range and EW Center of Excellence and to the NSWC PHD shipboard combat systems integration mission. Realigning these positions to China Lake and Point Loma would result in significant losses of intellectual capital, would adversely affect our warfighting capabilities and would waste hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayers' money.

VI. Recommendations

Detailed recommendations for changes to be made to the DoD recommendations are provided below:

Modify the DoD Recommendation: "Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA."

Reduce the number of Range, Targets, Anechoic Chamber, Logistics and G&A positions to be realigned from Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu by the number defined as being inextricable to the command's core mission. Specifically, reduce the number of positions to be realigned by 851 civilian and 202 contractor positions.

Reject the recommendation to move the VX-30 test squadron from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. Retain the Test Squadron Range Support Aircraft base of operations at Pt. Mugu.

Specifically, reduce the number of positions to be realigned by 32 civilian and 214 military positions.

Modify the DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.”

Reduce the number of Weapons and Armament positions to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to the command’s core mission. Specifically, reduce the number of positions to be realigned by 291 civilian and 6 military positions.

Modify the DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Base Ventura County, CA, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA, and Naval Station Newport, RI, by relocating Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, and consolidating with the Space Warfare Center to create the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.”

Specifically reduce the number of C⁴ISR jobs to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to the command’s core mission. Reduce the number of positions to be realigned by 96 civilian and 1 military positions.

Reject the DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.”

Retain Electronic Warfare RDAT&E functions at Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Pt. Mugu.