

Hawthorne Army Depot Hawthorne, Nevada

Base Realignment and Closure Commission



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Briefing Topics

- Overview..... 3
- Military Value..... 4
- BRAC Data Corrections..... 7
- FY06 Reset Ammunition Movement..... 23
- Military Training..... 30
- Tenants Impact on Military Readiness..... 34
- Tri-Service..... 59
- Additional Benefits..... 61



Overview

Hawthorne Army Depot (HWAD) provides inside storage capacity in excess of 7,680,000 gross square feet and has proven to be an excellent and established deployment network that can support all DOD readiness scenarios. HWAD is a multi-functional depot that provides unsurpassed conventional demilitarization and resource recovery of munitions assets. The depot is providing support to joint military training, munitions testing, aircraft target ranges sustainability, range scrap processing support for BRAC and previous Formally Used Defense Sites (FUDS), and consolidation of Defense Logistics Agency stockpiles.



Quantitative Military Value

- HWAD has a high storage quantitative military value score (2 of 23 assessed)
- HWAD has a high demilitarization quantitative military value score (1 of 13 assessed)
- HWAD ranked 31 out of 97 installations evaluated
- The Industrial Joint Cross Service group used military "judgment" to recommend closure of HWAD
- HWAD's underutilized storage capacity could be used to store most overseas retrograde.
- PEO Ammo estimates all existing organic depots to be 100% of storage capacity by FY08

Candidate Recommendation #IND-0108

Supporting Information

Known or Potential Conflicts: None

Capacity Analysis: Attached. Closure of Hawthorne eliminates 16,510 STONS of Demilitarization capacity and **4,993.8 KSF** of storage capacity. **(5,650KSF Net)** ✓

Military Value Analysis: This recommendation relocates storage functions from Hawthorne Army Depot which has a quantitative military value score of 0.578853 (2nd of 23) to Tooele Army Depot which has a quantitative military value score of 0.328174 (5th of 23). The recommendation also relocates demil from Hawthorne Army Depot which has a quantitative military value score of 0.818122 (1st of 13) to Tooele Army Depot which has a higher quantitative military value score than Tooele, "it is the **military judgment of the Industrial Joint Cross Service group that Tooele is the preferred location**" for storage of munitions. As far as out-loading of the Services stocks, the readiness work at Tooele far exceeds that of Hawthorne. Tooele is used to store immediate response or primary sustainment stocks. "Accessibility and ease of out-loading are major factors in determining this response category." Hawthorne is used to store secondary sustainment or tier 2 level stocks. Accessibility is the greatest hindrance to Hawthorne ability to support immediate go-to-war readiness.

BRAC Plan Calls For Shipment of over 51,000 stons Per year for 3 years, plus Receive retrograde.

5 of 64

BRAC Military Value Rating

IND-0047 & 53 Scenarios: Close Hawthorne. Retain Crane, Iowa, Lake City, McAlester, Milan, Pine Bluff, Redford, Blue Grass, and Tooele.

	Installation Comparison Using BRAC 03 Data	MPV	Future MPV	All Storage Capacity (data from BRAC)	Excess Storage Capacity
Tier I	McAlester	27	18	10.64 MI Sq. Ft.	4.12 MI Sq. Ft.
Tier II	Hawthorne*	31	12	9.73 MI Sq. Ft.	4.19 MI Sq. Ft.
Tier I	Crane	32	27	8.02 MI Sq. Ft.	2.30 MI Sq. Ft.
Tier I	Tooele	42	41	5.24 MI Sq. Ft.	1.97 MI Sq. Ft.
Tier I	Blue Grass	45	80	6.02 MI Sq. Ft.	1.20 MI Sq. Ft.
Plant	Milan	59	55	3.26 MI Sq. Ft.	2.43 MI Sq. Ft.
Chem	Pine Bluff	64	64	4.19 MI Sq. Ft.	.40 MI Sq. Ft.
Plant	Lake City	69	46	1.09 MI Sq. Ft.	0 MI Sq. Ft.
Plant	Iowa	70	45	1.15 MI Sq. Ft.	.65 MI Sq. Ft.
Plant	Radford	80	52	.9 MI Sq. Ft.	.30 MI Sq. Ft.

*Lower number equals higher military value

6 of 64

BRAC Data Corrections

- **Outloading Capability**
- **Railroad Capability**
- **Ammunition Demilitarization**
- **Ammunition Renovation**
- **Closing Costs vs. Current Operating Costs**
- **Estimated cost to process demil assets at HWAD is \$150,731 million leaving 20K tons with no capabilities. This is unfunded liability.**
- **Number of personnel employed at HWAD**
- **Impact on local economy**

7 of 64

Outloading Capability

BRAC says that HWAD cannot off-load & receive munitions because of isolation and infrastructure problems.

This is incorrect. HWAD shipped more than any other depot during Desert Storm.

BRAC Plan Calls For Shipment of over 51,000 stons Per year for 3 years, plus Receive demilitarization retrograde stocks.



Out-loading at the Loading Dock



Out-loading at the Container Pad

8 of 64

Outloading Capability

- HWAD has three state-of-the-art container loading/offloading pads
- HWAD has six loading/offloading docks with multiple rails and truck access
- HWAD has 1,130 magazines accessible by both rail and truck (two railcars or trucks at each magazine)
- HWAD has 1,298 magazines accessible by truck
- Container Repair Facilities
- Rail Interchange Yard with a capacity of 271 railcars
- 45,392 tons received and 40,346 tons shipped each year - averaged over last 19 years
- Truck Inspection Lot capability of 150 trucks and is a safe-haven for commercial vehicles




9 of 64


HWAD Railroad/Road Capabilities

- HWAD has 213 miles of in-house rail serving the magazine areas
- HWAD Army owned rail line is connected to a major east-west rail line by a 54 mile spur to Wabuska, NV. This rail was upgraded in 1997 at a cost of \$23M and included rebuilding of three trestles and installation of 133 pound continuous welded rail.
- HWAD's surge capacity 30 days into a mobilization would be 329 containers per day for outloading (unconstrained)
- HWAD has 600 miles of internal roadway network
- HWAD can support training ammunition shipments to Fallon Naval Air Station and Nellis Air Force Base within 1 day
- HWAD is the closest to all West Coast Ports and travel times by truck can be seen on the next chart



10 of 64

Truck Travel Time From HWAD to Ports/Customers



Location	Travel Time
Keyport/AP Hadlock	14 hrs.
Pt. Laredo	14 hrs.
Umatilla	10 hrs.
Mountain Home AFB	8 hrs.
Fall AFB	9 hrs.
NAS Fallon	1 hr.
Tooele	8.5 hrs.
Nellis AFB	5 hrs.
Yucca Mtn.	5 hrs.
Fl. Irwin	6 hrs.
Twentynine Palms	7 hrs.
Fallbrook/Camp Pendleton	8 hrs.
Chino Valley	4 hrs.
Seal Beach	10 hrs.
Nike Meadows	2 hrs.
Concord	6 hrs.
San Francisco	7 hrs.

11 of 64

Transportation Modes

- The Federal and state highway systems serving HWAD are major highways connecting I-5, I-40, and I-80. The road network is in excellent condition and capable of handling thousands of ammo laden trucks per day.
- HWAD is located 60 miles south of NAS Fallon which can provide C17 aircraft out loading capabilities and is one of the largest air fields in the Navy Command.
- HWAD is located one mile from the Mineral County Industrial Airport which has a 6,000 ft runway with a 200 ft runoff. This runway can support large cargo aircraft.
- HWAD is the only major ammunition distribution point capable of supporting west coast ports within hours.

12 of 64



Hawthorne Army Depot

Workload History

13 of 64



Hawthorne Workload

Year	Renovation (Tons)	Demil (Tons)	Shipping	Receiving	
FY90	BRAC Question 519 & 520 Demil & Renovation: Current usage is defined as the average monthly output from that portion of the current capacity that is actually in use as of the end of 4 th Quarter FY03. On the 30 th of Sep 2003, we had no Demil or Renovation activity on that day. Our average became 0 vs. 544 tons of Demil and 0 tons vs. 292 on Renovation		37263	55406	
FY91			98093	112913	
FY92			53900	139600	
FY93			34189	70936	Tier II
FY94	5674	19145	31113	51662	
FY95	311	20768	40367	45394	
FY96	2087	11925	45792	38189	
FY97	4056	13186	51243	30045	
FY98	5745	9680	51600	27386	
FY99	1847	9789	52730	13267	
5th Qtr 99	4105	2490			
CY00	1500	4577	22051	6319	S-Y IDHQ
CY01	6210	4278	32373	9752	
CY02	2548	8065	17445	3482	
CY03	3510	6535	15050	41406	Demil
CY04	3183	6918	16342	21459	
CY05*	1413	3492	12940	13614	
*As of 30 Jun					
TOTALS	42172	118421	599571	667168	

14 of 64



Hawthorne Army Depot

Demilitarization

15 of 64

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- ## Western Area Demil Processes
- (Resource Recovery & Recycling & Disposal)
- **Ammo Preparation**
 - Breakdown/Pull Apart Equipment
 - Explosive Sawing
 - Waterjet Cutting
 - Defuzing Equipment
 - Remote Capabilities
 - **Explosive Removal**
 - Melt out
 - Steam out
 - Hot Water Washout
 - High Pressure Washout
 - Press Out
 - **Decontamination**
 - Flashing Furnace
 - Hot Gas Decontamination
 - Plasma Ordnance Destruction System
 - Rotary Furnace (Aug 06)
 - Bulk Energetic Demilitarization System (Feb 08)
 - **Support**
 - State Certified Analytical Laboratory
 - Water Treatment Facility
 - Munitions Mutilation Facility
- 16 of 64



Past and Present Demilitarization Projects and Benefits

- Depth Bombs
- Depth Charges
- MK25 Undersea Mines
- Russian Mines
- 3" thru 8" Projectiles
- 90mm/105mm/106mm Ctgs
- Bullpups Warheads
- M687 Projectiles
- Torpedo Warheads
- Harm Warheads
- 750# Bombs
- HAWK Rocket Motors
- 5" Rockets
- 81mm and 4.2" Mortars
- MK115 Continuous Rod Bombs
- 8" & 155 ICM Projectiles

In the past 12 years, HWAD has R3'd 120,848 tons.

17 of 64



Recovered Value of Explosives/Metals

- Explosives/metals recovered from demilitarization operations at HWAD for the past 12 years:
 - Explosives 24,650,000 pounds @ \$1.596 per pound = \$39,341,400. This figure represents a cost avoidance of buying new explosives.
 - Mixed Metals 91,400,000 pounds with an estimated value of \$7,000,000

18 of 64

Hawthorne Army Depot

Renovation



Renovation Last Year

- 
105 MM C445
 77,693 Ea
 Completed Mar 2004
- 
105 MM C445
 136,500.
 Aug 2004 – Oct 2005
- 
TNT
 70,969 boxes representing 3,548,000 lbs were inspected and repacked as required in support of bomb loading at McAlester Army Ammo Plant.
- 
Ammunition Containers
 18,075 (M2A1 & M548) containers were renovated in support of LAP operations at other installations.
- 
Milvans
 Repaired and shipped 236 milvans to support Tooele K-180 mine shipment to Iraq.



20 of 64

PAST RENOVATION ITEMS

- 105MM Projectiles
- 60MM HE
- 60MM WP
- 81MM HE
- 81MM III
- Hand Grenades
- 155MM HEAT
- 155MM III
- 155MM Copperhead
- FMU139 Bomb Fuzes
- Imbiber Beads
- 40MM Ctgs
- 30MM Ctgs
- Rocket Launchers
- Projectile Fuzes
- Fin Assemblies
- 120MM Ctg
- Linear Charges

21 of 64

Employment and Economic Impact

BRAC Position:
 "Potential reduction of 326 jobs over period 2006-2011. Less than .1% of economic area employment" (measured against Reno-Sparks, Nevada).

	HWAD Certified-Data (2003)	BRAC Data	Actual: (2005)
Military Personnel	1	74	1
Government Civilian Personnel	45	45	50
Contractor Personnel	463	80	531
Totals	509	199	582
Employment Displacement	42%	0.1%	49%

Reno/Sparks
Is
135 miles
away

Unemployment percentages do not reflect total impact and loss of jobs that will occur in the Town of Hawthorne.

22 of 64

Ammunition Reset Plan

- FY06 Plan
- 24,400 Tons from Korea
- 14,400 Tons from SWA
- 7,200 Tons from Europe
- Reset will require over 522,000 square feet of storage space
- All reset ammunition could be stored at HWAD
- PEO Ammo estimates all existing organic depots to be 100% of storage capacity by FY 08

23 of 64

Wholesale Depot Occupancy Profile by Fiscal Year by PEO Ammo Organization

8 million sq' available in all 8 of the Army Depots
 4 million sq' of the space is located at HWAD

24 of 64

IJCSG Capacity and Usage




Includes Outside Storage

IJCSG - Munitions / Armaments Capacity Report

Function	Site	Current Capacity	Current Usage	Maximum Capacity	Capacity Required to Support	Capacity Available to Support/Excess Capacity
MUNITIONS STORAGE						
Chemical Depot	ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	3,298.4	2,293.9	3,298.4	0	1,004.5
Chemical Depot	BLUE GRASS ARMY DEPOT	6,021.0	4,817.4	6,021.0	0	1,203.6
Chemical Depot	CRANE ARMY AMMUNITION ACTIVITY	6,020.9	5,721.2	6,020.9	0	2,299.7
Chemical Depot	DEWICK CREAM DEPOT	369.0	296.4	369.0	0	72.6
Chemical Depot	HAWTHORNE ARMY DEPOT	9,738.0	5,603.0	9,738.0	0	4,135.0
Chemical Depot	MOLESTON AWP	405.8	80.6	405.8	0	325.2
Chemical Depot	IOWA AWP	1,148.8	563.4	1,148.8	0	585.4
Chemical Depot	KANSAS ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT	1,238.5	895.9	1,238.5	0	342.6
Chemical Depot	LANE CITY AWP	1,084.0	1,084.0	1,084.0	0	0.0
Chemical Depot	LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	3,613.4	2,472.2	3,613.4	0	1,141.2
Chemical Depot	LOME STAR AWP	1,000.0	804.2	1,000.0	0	195.8
Chemical Depot	LOUISIANA AWP	350.0	270.4	350.0	0	79.6
Chemical Depot	MCALISTER AWP	10,637.1	6,522.0	10,637.1	0	4,115.1
Chemical Depot	MILAN AWP	3,298.1	829.9	3,298.1	0	2,468.2
Chemical Depot	MISSISSIPPI AWP	105.4	0.0	105.4	0	105.4
Chemical Depot	NEWPORT COCONO DEPOT	112.0	11.0	112.0	0	101.0
Chemical Depot	PINE BLUFF ARMOBIL	4,182.0	3,794.4	4,182.0	0	387.6
Chemical Depot	PURDUE CREAM DEPOT	1,475.0	161.6	1,475.0	0	1,313.4
Chemical Depot	RADFORD AWP	821.2	841.0	821.2	0	279.6
Chemical Depot	RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	2,747.6	1,732.9	2,747.6	0	1,014.7
Chemical Depot	SIERRA ARMY DEPOT	5,642.5	1,019.0	5,642.5	0	4,623.5
Chemical Depot	TOOLEE ARMY DEPOT	5,238.9	3,365.9	5,238.9	0	1,873.0
Chemical Depot	UNAKELA CREAM DEPOT	2,427.7	706.1	2,427.7	0	1,721.6

*Capacity is measured in bbl Report Date: Thursday, April 21, 2005 Database Date: April 18, 2005

25 of 64





COBRA DATA IMPACT ON SAVINGS

	COBRA	ACTUAL
➤ MILITARY PAYROLL (Army of One)		
Yearly Savings	\$ 6,183,000	\$ 95,000
➤ SUSTAINMENT (Maintain Life of Buildings)		
Yearly Savings	\$ 30,420,932	\$ 6,800,000
➤ BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT		
Yearly Savings	\$ 0	\$ 5,095,000
➤ RECAPITALIZATION (Modernization of Facilities)		
Yearly Savings (Historical)		\$ 4,316,000 or
Yearly Savings (Formula)	\$34,912,754	\$ 11,986,712
➤ Total 20 Year Savings (Vol. 8)	\$777,700,000 vs. \$86,320,000 or \$239,734,240	

COBRA DATA VS. ACTUAL DATA		
HAWTHORNE PERSONNEL	199 (74 Military)	553 (1 Military)
TOOELE PERSONNEL	1,083 (557 Military)	749 (2 Military)
HAWTHORNE SQ. FOOTAGE	9,578,000	7,680,000 storage
TOOELE SQ. FOOTAGE	9,415,000	2,483,000 storage
HAWTHORNE YEARLY OPERATING COSTS + PAYROLL		\$41,400,761
TOOELE YEARLY OPERATING COSTS + PAYROLL		\$66,800,000

29 of 64

Hawthorne Army Depot

Military Training

- 
- ## Training Mission
- Training Mission Approved Oct 04
 - High Altitude Desert Terrain Environment
 - Joint Training Environment
 - Navy Special Warfare
 - Marine Force RECON
 - Marine Corps Battalions
 - Army National Guard
 - Army Reserve
 - 71,287 acres available similar to terrain in Afghanistan and Iraq
- 31 of 64

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- ## Existing Training Opportunities
- High Altitude Mountain Training – 49,566 acres (Mount Grant)
 - High Angle Sniper Range (Formal USMC School) and Desert Live Fire Convoy Training – 18,703 acres (Old Bomb)
 - Walker Lake Training Area (49 square miles)
 - Desert Convoy Operations - Unlimited
 - C130/Helicopter/Parachute Training at Hawthorne Aviation Facility – 6,000 ft runway (777 acres)
 - Demo & Explosive Breaching – 3,183 acres (New Bomb)
 - POW Compound- 4.3 acres (103-30 Compound)
 - Industrial Combat Training Facilities – 161 acres (101 Compound)
 - Over 1,500 military personnel trained in Jan – Apr 05
- 32 of 64

36 of 64



- AMC
- ARDEC
- MARCOSYS/COM

Major Customers

- Average of 8,000 man-hours performing tests each year
- Average of 258 test days each year
- Average of 30 test events each year

Test Range Usage Data

- Range can be quickly reconfigured to accommodate testing and training
- Reporting of results
- Computerized data collection equipment allows for same day analysis and test if warranted
- Range is government (MCPD) controlled and operated. This allows quick changes to schedule priority, and the flexibility to change test criteria during test if warranted

Flexibility/Priority

Lance Corporal Carter Test Range

NSWC Crane Division
Detachment Fallbrook



Marine Corps Programs Division

35 of 64

- Fully instrumented state-of-art range including data collection equipment, radar tracking systems, environmental condition chambers, and video analysis cameras
- Supports DT, LUT, LAT, ACTD, In-Service, and OT testing of weapon systems ranging from small arms through mortars, rockets, and artillery
- 50,000 sq. ft. of administrative and range support facilities
- weather (available 360 days/year)
- clear, fully environmentally compliant, and not impeded by adverse
- 18,703 acre Test Range that is not encumbered by encroachment, is FAA cleared, fully environmentally compliant, and not impeded by adverse

Capabilities

- Relieved/removed the need to perform emergency LFT&E of ordnance and weapon systems at heavily committed Marine Corps Training facilities
- Supports multi-service testing with a dedicated, responsive, rapid turn-around capability
- Established under joint agreement in 1989 between the U. S. Army and Marine Corps

History

Lance Corporal Carter Test Range

NSWC Crane Division
Detachment Fallbrook



Marine Corps Programs Division

34 of 64

Tenant/Customer Impact


Hawthorne Army Depot

Tenants/Customers

- Marine Corps Program Office
- Naval Undersea Warfare Center
- U.S. Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center
- U.S. Navy - Fallon Naval Air Station
- U.S. Navy Special Warfare Group 2
- High Desert Special Operations Training Center



33 of 64



Proposed Training Area Expansion



Marine Corps Programs Division

NSWC Crane Division Detachment Fallbrook

Lance Corporal Carter Test Range

- **Value Added to Warfighter**
 - West Coast location within reasonable driving distance of major Marine Corps and Navy Headquarters at Camp Pendleton (I MEF) and San Diego
 - Rapid response to safety and reliability concerns with both fielded and developmental weapon systems
 - Interaction of operating forces during testing is an approved and encouraged method used during assessment and evaluation of ordnance/weapon systems to help ensure testing fully meets ("reality check") needs of warfighter
 - Ability for LFT&E to include the Active Duty operator, improves the test item assessment while concurrently training the operator
 - Independent assessments in near battlefield conditions contribute to War on Terrorism and Homeland Defense capabilities
- **COBRA Model Costs**
 - Did not include the cost of closing the Lance Corporal Carter Test Range
 - Did not include the cost of moving full-up Test Range operations to a new location.

37 of 64

Mines, DEMIL, Ordnance and Battery Reclamation

Division Code 3343 – Hawthorne, NV

Mr. Scott Wills
Mr. John Nester
Mr. Robert Jusko

38 of 64

Mines, DEMIL, Ordnance and Battery Reclamation Division

Major Functions:

- Mines and Mine Systems (PMS495)
 - DEJOT level repair facility for 29 yrs
 - Unique Mines Knowledge and Expertise
 - Mechanical Assemblies
 - Ordnance Experience
- Battery Management (PMS495, PMS 404)
 - Storage, Testing, Shelf-life extension
 - End-of-Life cycle Management
 - Reclamation and Recycling
 - Best-Cost Disposal
- Material management (PMS495, PMS 404)
 - 1,500 annual Receipts
 - 650 annual issue documents
 - Material Deep Storage
- Material Reclamation (PMS495, PMS 404)
 - Distribution, Best-Source Disposal, Recycling
 - Batteries and Mines

Facilities & Equipment Examples:

- 400,000 Square Feet of Storage Space
 - Secure, Controlled Access, Acid Atmosphere Storage
- Two Explosive operations facilities
- Battery Reclamation Facility (BRF)
- Refrigerated/Frigid material Storage
- Renewable Energy Resource (Solar Power System)
- Building 104-3 Certified High Explosives Magnetic test site

Man Power

- (10) Government
 - (7) Overight
 - (3) Mechanics
- (6) Technical Services Support Contractors
- (6) Logistics Support Contractors

Product Examples:

- BRF Reclaimed over 885K Troy ounces of silver of program silver (Targets and Mines) to date at a combined cost savings to the programs of over 2.2 Million (PMS 404)
- BRF Recycled over 15K Mercury and Mercury Cadmium batteries at a cost avoidance to the programs of over 1.5 Million (PMS 495)
- Fleet return SLQQ-48 Pyro Cable Inerting and screening for refurbishment (PMS 404)
- SLQQ-48 Shipping container manufacturing (PMS 304)
- MK32 Arming Device inerting (PMS495)
- All In-Service and Exercise Mines Depot Support (PMS495)
- MK 141 Battery Magnetic testing (PMS495)
- Since FY01 to date the Site has Demil (ed) over 200K items and cleared over 1K outstanding Demil documents (PMS495)

39 of 64

MCMWTC TRAINING USAGE OF HAWTHORNE ARMY DEPOT

LtCol Joseph Dennison, Commanding Officer
LtCol Robb Etnyre, Executive Officer

40 of 64

10



Why Hawthorne?

- **Land Manager Status**
 - MWTC is on Forest Service lands
 - HWAD is DOD-owned
- **Live Fire Capability**
 - HWAD provides exponentially greater opportunities for:
 - ✓ Demolitions training
 - ✓ Live fire infantry assault training
 - ✓ Overhead/indirect fire support training

41 of 64



Why Hawthorne?

- **Climatic/seasonal/environmental variations**
 - MWTC is sub-alpine, HWAD is high desert
 - Snow cover heavy at MWTC, minimal at HWAD
 - HWAD closely resembles key Afghan operational areas
 - Synergy: Dispersion of sub-units between MWTC and HWAD duplicates logistical and command and control challenges of operating in Afghanistan

42 of 64



Current Training Activities

- **Mountain Scout Sniper Course**
 - 8 classes per year
 - 2 weeks per class
 - 20 students per class
 - Joint training: SF, Rangers, SEALs, Allied Special Forces

43 of 64



Current Training Activities

- **Unit Pre-Afghanistan Deployment Training**
 - Current and future USMC battalions deploying to Afghanistan scheduled to train at HWAD
 - 2000+ Marines already trained
 - 1st Battalion, 3d Marines scheduled for September 05
 - I Marine Expeditionary Force Afghan Army Combat Advisor Team scheduled for October 05

44 of 64




Projected USMC Investment in HWAD/MCMWTC Partnership

- **Range Scheduling Integration**
 - Range Facility Management Support System HWAD Fire Desk
- **Afghan Village**
 - Modular, semi-permanent small urban training facility
- **LCpl Carter Test Range Upgrades**
 - High angle sniper firing range targetry
 - Classroom and hygiene facilities

45 of 64




Conclusion

“Hawthorne Army Depot directly supports the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center’s mission with critical and unique capabilities. Loss of access to HWAD’s training areas will significantly reduce MWTC’s ability to train Marine and other US Forces for combat in Afghanistan, as well as other mountain/cold weather potential contingency areas worldwide.”

46 of 64




NRSW/HAWTHORNE RANGE RESIDUE PROCESSING PROGRAM

RANGE SUSTAINMENT

Mr. Larry Jones
Mr. Mark Glass

47 of 64




NRSW RANGE RESIDUE MANAGEMENT

- **PROBLEM:**
Scrap Processors and Dealers Have Failed To Provide the Proper Environment To Recycle Range Residue Scrap
- **SOLUTION:**
Establish Standardized Region Program
+Employing Centralized Processing/Recycling/ Demilitarizing Center
*On Site Management
*Cost Savings / 20% to 25% Less Than Commercial Contractor
- **NRSW Has Over 20 Million Pounds Of Legacy Ordnance and Target Range Scrap On Its Operational Training Ranges**
- **Approximately 6 Million Pounds Of Ordnance Is Dropped Annually On NRSW Training Ranges**

48 of 64

RANGE RESIDUE PROCESSING PROGRAM

➤ PURPOSE

- Ensuring All Range Residue Scrap Is Released To Recycling Markets Is Demilitarized In Accordance With DOD Standards
- Is Free Of Hazards To Human Health and Safety and Does Not Resemble Military Munitions
- Provides Sound Stewardship Of Natural and Man-Made Resources By Encompassing and Achieving a Safe Recycling Strategy With The "Best Value" For The Recyclables On The Market As Well As Ensuring That All Range Residue Scrap Is Properly Disposed Of According To Applicable Environmental Statutes
- Improving Range Residue Scrap-Processing Techniques To Meet The Special Demands Of Handling And Demilitarizing Range Residue Scrap

A COST-EFFECTIVE LIABILITY-REDUCING SOLUTION

49 of 64

AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

IMAP:
Other Operations Support:

- Ranges
- EOD Detachments (Weapons)

- NAS FALLON
- 4 AIR-TO-GROUND RANGES
- NAF EL CENTRO
- 4 AIR-TO-GROUND RANGES
- SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND
- -13 RANGES
- +AIR-TO-GROUND/SHIP-TO-GROUND (SPAWAR)
- +MISSILE IMPACT AREA
- +SMALL ARMS (SPECWAR)
- NAWA CHINA LAKE / SNB
- -RDT&E
- -AIR-TO-GROUND
- SNB
- -AIR-TO-GROUND

85% OF ALL NAVY ORDNANCE DROPPED IN TRAINING

50 of 64

HAWTHORNE FEATURES / BENEFITS

- Over 230 Square Miles Of Real Estate
- State Of The Art Shipping/Receiving Facilities (Container Repair Facilities, Container Loading Pads, ETC.)
- Ability To Use Existing Western Area Demilitarization Facility (WADF) Processes Which Are Environmentally Friendly
- Rail / Highway Access


Hawthorne – The Solution for NRSW Range Residue Scrap

51 of 64

RANGE RESIDUE PROCESSING PROGRAM STATUS

- Memorandum of Agreement between NRSW and Hawthorne Army Depot
 - Signed 10 Feb 2005
 - Roles and Responsibilities
- 8 April 05 / First Shipments Of Range Residue Scrap To Hawthorne
 - News Media Day
- 9 May 05 / Transporting Range Residue Scrap Daily From FRTC
- Estimate 5K Tons Of Range Residue Scrap Will Be Transported and Processed By 30 Dec 05
 - \$341.00 per ton
- To Date Approximately 1.2 Million Pounds of Range Residue Scrap Transported To Hawthorne

52 of 64



Navy Special Operations Group 2

LCDR Mike Strenk
CWO2 Kevin Calloway


53 of 64



Naval Special Warfare

- **Active duty NSW force ~6,000**
 - Includes support personnel
 - A little more than 1 percent of total Navy manpower
- **A Navy Warfare Community with ~2,900 Active Duty Operators**
 - 2,320 officer/enlisted SEALs (SEa, Air, Land)
 - 573 enlisted SWCCs (Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewman)
- **Reserve NSW force ~1,100 personnel**
 - 340 SEAL/SWCCs
 - 775 Support Tech
- **Maritime Component of Special Operations Command (SOCOM)/ Special Operations Branch of U.S. Navy**

54 of 64




Naval Special Warfare Hawthorne Army Depot

- Provides Naval Special Warfare Realistic Training Area to continue the Global War on Terrorism
 - Provides Desert Training at Altitude/Climate and Conditions and Terrain associated with Afghanistan
 - HMWVV Mobility Training and Convoy Training Long range day and night
 - High Angle/Long Distance shooting ranges
 - Mortar and shooting ranges
 - Close Proximity to NAS Fallon
 - Low cost/ 6-8 training cycles a year

56 of 64



HDSOC, LLC

Mr. Jerry Bailey

57 of 64



HDSOC, LLC

- Private limited liability company (LLC), 12 full-time employees, upwards 30 temporary employees will augment every month.
- Terrain and climate mirrors that of the current operational areas.
- Utilizes HWAD facilities and lands to train:
 - Department of Defense military units (USMC, USN)
 - USG Agencies – Border Patrol, US Department of State
 - Other private security companies fulfilling USG contracts in high threat regions in the world.
- Beginning 1 Aug 05, 70 - 110 personnel per month are projected to rotate through HDSOC'S training programs, completely reliant on the services of Hawthorne and Mineral County.
- Continued long term access to HWAD is critical to HDSOC'S success.

58 of 64



Hawthorne Army Depot

Tri-Service Activities

59 of 64



HWAD Tri-Service Activities

- United States Navy Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) Detachment Hawthorne (tenant)
- United States Marine Corps Programs Office ammunition testing (tenant)
- United States Navy SEAL training
- United States Marine Corps training
- Army Special Forces training
- Puget Sound Naval Shipyard Bulge Plate Explosive Testing/Loading of explosives charges
- United States Navy Range Scrap Processing
- Corps of Engineers FUDS and BRAC Sites Range Scrap Processing
- DLA Elementary Mercury Storage
- HWAD is the test bed for the next generation of robotic security systems

60 of 64



Hawthorne Army Depot

Additional Benefits

61 of 64



Additional Benefits

- HWAD is the only Army site with real possibilities for development of Geothermal Energy
 - Seismic evaluation completed
 - Potential 15 to 20 MW power generation plant
 - Uninterrupted power supply in national emergencies to support shipping/receiving
- HWAD's Isolation ensures
 - No encroachment at all
 - Arid desert climate - ideal for storage of munitions or other equipment
 - Environmental friendly permitting
 - Security benefits
 - Continued opportunities for training the war fighter and operation of test range
 - Public safety
- Buildable acreage
 - Magazines
 - Demil Facilities
 - Training Ranges
 - Future Defense Needs
 - Homeland Security Storage Activity

62 of 64



Conclusion

- Hawthorne's mission is to Receive, Store and Issue/Ship, Renovate and Demil conventional ammunition thereby dispelling the "non-deployment" assertion.
- Born out of a disaster in 1926. Hawthorne has served the Warfighter for 75 years. The mission essential nature of the depot remains and can grow. The strategic location of the depot and the unique functions available testify to the military value of the depot.

63 of 64




Mission & Training To Support The Joint Warfighter




64 of 64

**U S ARMY JOINT MUNITIONS
COMMAND MUNITIONS
FACILITIES ASSESSMENT TEAM**

**HAWTHORNE ARMY DEPOT
ASSESSMENT REPORT**

17 – 21 APRIL 2005 ON-SITE VISIT

12 MAY 2005

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents	02
Introduction	05
Executive Summary	07
I. Inventory	22
A. Count Five	22
B. Two Dimensional (2-D) Bar Code Applications	23
C. Inventory Adjustments	23
D. Inventory Reconciliation	24
E. Physical Inventory - Category III and IV	24
F. Critical Storage Capacity	26
G. Regulations, Standard Operating Procedure(s), (SOPs) and Desk Procedure(s)	27
H. Investigations and Report of Surveys	27
I. Physical Inventory - Category I and II	28
J. Local Account (11) Management	30
K. Sealed/Unsealed Sites	31
L. Quality Control	32
II. Document Control	34
A. Key Control Process	34
B. Supply Discrepancy Report (SDR) Controls	34
C. Management Control Number (MCN) Processing	35
D. Ammunition Transfer Record (ATR) Controls	36
E. Magazine Document Control (MDC) Controls	37
F. Concealed Discrepancy Processing	38
G. Receipt Posting	38
H. Receipt Control Number (RCN) Process	39
I. Receipt Reversal	40
J. Materiel Release Order (MRO) Processing and Control	40
K. Maintenance and Demilitarization Planning and Management	41
L. Storage Planning and Management	42
III. Physical Security	44
A. Serious Incident Report (SIR) Processing	44
B. Security Plan	44
C. Investigations and Report Processing	44
D. Intrusion Detection System (IDS)	45
E. Entry and Exit Control	46
F. Maintenance Operations	46
IV. Quality Assurance and Surveillance	47
A. Return Materiel Operations	47

TABLE OF CONTENTS

B.	Condition Code K (CC-K)	47
C.	Suspension and Restriction Verification	48
D.	Transportation and Conveyance Inspection	49
E.	Storage Magazines Inspection	49
V.	Transportation	51
A.	Shipping Process, Procedures, and Documentation	51
B.	Receiving Process, Procedures, and Documentation	51
C.	Tracking (Inbound and Outbound)	52
D.	Carrier Performance Program (CPP)	52
E.	Secure Holding	53
F.	Equitable Distribution of Movement Workload	54
G.	Container Control Management	54
H.	Transportation Facility Guide (TFG)	55
I.	SOP(s) and Desk Procedures	55
VI.	Explosive Safety	57
A.	Responsibility Assignment and Organizational Staffing	57
B.	Regulations Availability and Currency	58
C.	Explosive Licenses	58
D.	Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) Finding(s)	59
E.	Site Plans/Installation Master Plan	59
F.	Demolition and Demilitarization Operations	60
G.	Material Handling Operations	61
VII.	International Standards Organization (ISO) 9001:2000	62
A.	Applicability	62
VIII.	Administration	63
A.	Staffing and Manpower	63
B.	Training	63
IX.	Special Interest Items	66
A.	Automation	66
B.	Air Force MRO Denials	67
C.	Propellant Stability Program	67
X.	Management Control	69
A.	Assessment	69

**Appendix A - Key Hawthorne Army Depot and Day and Zimmerman
Hawthorne Corporation Personnel Contacted** 71

Appendix B - Assessment Team Members 72

INTRODUCTION

The US Army Joint Munitions Command (JMC) munitions facilities assessment team performed a Supply Depot Operations (SDO) on-site compliance review at Hawthorne Army Depot (HWAD) during the period 18 - 21 Apr 05. Specifically, a thirteen (13) person team visited HWAD and reviewed its inventory and accountability (receipt, storage, and issue), document control, physical security, quality assurance and surveillance, transportation, explosive safety, maintenance, and demilitarization, munitions functions for compliance with governing SDO regulations and Command guidance and policies. Headquarters, US Army Field Support Command (HQ, AFSC), Headquarters, US Army Joint Munitions Command (HQ JMC), US Army Defense Ammunition Center (DAC), and Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD), logistics Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) participated in the assessment.

Assessment standards:

- Assigned staff collectively has the knowledge and skills to properly perform the assessment.
- Exercise due professional care: Use sound judgment in establishing the assessment's scope, methodology, tests, and procedures.
- Properly plan assessment's work.
- Gather, review, and analyze, the best available relevant, sufficient, and competent, documentary, physical, and testimonial, information to determine if the sites properly follow policies, procedures, and regulations, governing the JMC SDO mission and functions.

Assessment approach: Use Command checklists, Army Regulation (AR) 11-2, 01 Aug 94, Army Programs - Management Control, and DAC review guides, to assess the functional areas compliance with governing SDO guidance.

In-brief: 18 Apr 05 briefed HWAD Commander, HWAD Civilian Executive Assistance (CEA), Day and Zimmerman Hawthorne Corporation (DZHC) Plant Manager and key HWAD and DZHC functional personnel, on the assessment's objectives.

Out-brief: 21 Apr 05 discussed the draft assessment results with the HWAD Commander, HWAD CEA, DZHC Plant Manager, and key HWAD and DZHC functional personnel, and provided them with the installation's Wellness Report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. We evaluated the following functional areas during the review and assigned them a Green, Amber, or Red rating.

- Green rating: Controls are established and working as intended. The process is in full compliance with governing SDO regulations, Command guidance, or both.

- Amber rating: Controls are established; but not working as intended. The process is in partial compliance with governing SDO regulations, Command guidance, or both.

- Red rating: Controls are not established or personnel are not following established controls. The process is in non-compliance with governing SDO regulations, Command guidance, or both.

2. During the 18 - 21 Apr 05 on-site visit, the Assessment Team reviewed six (6) mission areas and 53 individual processes within these areas. We found the following conditions at HWAD: (I) controls established and working as intended and (II) controls established; but not working as intended. Based upon this report's established rating criteria, HWAD receives an overall Green report rating.

3. The assessment team prepared 54 daily worksheets and assigned 48 Green ratings, five (5) Amber ratings, and zero (0) Red ratings, to the 53 individual processes reviewed. *Note: Two (2) daily worksheets pertained to the same mission area individual process and we rolled them into one (1) process rating. HWAD can accomplish continuous process improvements through implementing and executing the 80 recommendations identified in this section. In addition, HWAD resolving the reported Amber ratings and bringing them into full compliance with the governing SDO regulations should achieve process improvements. The Assessment Team's recommendations are as follows. We are establishing target dates of completion for the applicable HQ, AFSC, HQ, JMC, and HWAD/DZHC, organizations.

a. Inventory overall report rating: **Green**. HWAD received eleven (11) Green, one (1) Amber, and zero (0) Red, individual process ratings from the Assessment Team SMEs. The Green rating recommendations are for additional inventory process improvements. To move the one (1) Amber report rating to a Green report rating, HWAD needs to

properly attach the two dimensional bar codes to the pallets.

1. Count Five Program:

- Recommendation(s): None.

2. Two-Dimensional (2-D) Bar Coding:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD immediately corrects the deficiencies identified in the Discussion section.

- HWAD consistently comply with Headquarters, US Army Operations Support Command memorandum, 11 Oct 02, subject: Application of Two-Dimensional (2-D) Bar Code Labels to Ammunition Stockpile, as bar codes will become extremely important in depot operations and ensure that bar code labels are properly attached to all assets stored in the magazine.

3. Inventory Adjustments:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD immediately reconciles the Korean assets to properly support the country agreement requiring strict stored assets monitoring and tracking.

- HQ JMC, SFSJM-CTA, follow-ups on the reconciliation within 30 days from this review.

4. Inventory Reconciliation:

- Recommendation(s): None.

5. Physical Inventory - Category (CAT) III and IV:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD immediately corrects the noted deficiencies at buildings 002006, 005018, 008013, 081007, 112013, 11610A, and 11614A.

- HWAD must ensure all stored assets properly have their 2-D bar code label(s) and MDC(s) attached.

6. Critical Storage Capacity:

- Recommendation(s):

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, supports HWAD by inducting more serviceable and training stocks.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, use the HWAD available space to provide relief to the near capacity Crane Army Ammunition Activity (CAAA) and McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (MCAAP) storage activities.

7. Regulations, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and Desk Procedures:

- Recommendation(s): HWAD continues to keep their Internal Operating Procedures (IOPs) current and updated to reflect current processes.

8. Investigations and Reports of Survey:

- Recommendation(s): None.

9. Physical Inventory - CAT I and II:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD considers re-warehousing buildings with small lots into one building.

- HWAD places the MDCs on each pallet in the building and change markings on boxes with Lot #DUW80K0001-002 with correct quantity.

- HWAD properly attaches all bar code labels to assets utilizing twist-wire or zip ties to prevent lost.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process in the next Command assessment.

10. Local Account (11) Management:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD updates their valid accounts with proper account Points of Contact (POCs) and viable address.

- HWAD appoints an Accountable Property Book Officer (ACTPO), in accordance with AR 735-5, 28 Feb 05, Property Accountability - Policies and Procedures for Property Accountability, chapter 2, section III, paragraph 2-10, for the 11 accounts and provides a copy to the HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, ACTPO.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process in the next Command assessment.

11. Sealed and Unsealed Sites:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues to monitor the building dropping problem and check all sealed buildings through Standard Depot System (SDS) screen 9323 before accepting into the physical program.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, clearly defines performing the sealed site inventory process in the forthcoming US Army Materiel Command Regulation (AMC-R) 740-27 revision.

12. Inventory Quality Control:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues to execute its Quality Control (QC) program in their usual thorough and efficient manner.

- HWAD Surveillance immediately starts using DA Form 4508 instead of their local Form 389.

b. Recordkeeping and Document Control overall report rating: **Green**. HWAD received 11 Green, one (1) Amber, and zero (0) Red, individual process ratings from the Assessment Team SMEs. The Green rating recommendations are for additional document control process improvements. To move the one (1) Amber report rating to a Green report rating, HWAD must properly display and position its multiple lots' Magazine Data Cards (MDCs).

1. Key Control Process:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues with existing procedures and ensures all personnel received updated training/guidance for the current manual key control program.

- HWAD considers the feasibility of installing the HQ, JMC automated key control program.

2. Supply Discrepancy Report (SDR) Controls:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD establishes an IOP for processing SDRs.

- HWAD establishes a log that tracks all incoming and outgoing SDRs.

- HWAD and DZHC pursue converting the manual SDR log to an automated SDR log.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, follow-up within 30 days of receipt of the final assessment report to ensure HWAD fully complies with SFSJM-CTA memorandum, 03 Mar 05, Headquarters, US Army Joint Munitions Command (JMC) Policy for Munitions Supply Discrepancy Reports (SDRs).

3. Management Control Number (MCN) Processing:

- Recommendation(s): HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, provides fully coordinated and properly vetted instructions to the installation regarding the administration of MCNs and MCN Inventories (MCNIs), and the complete instruction for viable data migration.

4. Ammunition Transfer Record (ATR) Controls:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues its efficient and accurate ATR processing. The HWAD organizations submitting ATRs should be instructed on the importance of timely submission of paperwork.

- HWAD Surveillance uses the DA Form 4508 to record ammunition moves in accordance with (IAW) AMC-R 740-25, 01 May 00, Storage and Supply Activities - Ammunition Stock Location System, and submits it to Inventory in a timely manner.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process during the next Command assessment.

5. Magazine Data Card (MDC) Controls:

- Recommendation(s): HWAD immediately complies with the AMC-R 740-25 requirement to place each individual MDC with its corresponding lot.

6. Concealed Discrepancy Reporting:

- Recommendation(s): HWAD provides notification of concealed discrepancies to HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, on a quarterly basis.

7. Receipt Posting:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues stressing the importance of accurate and timely receipt postings.

- HWAD develops a follow-up process for a tenant such as the Marine Corps, since their documentation tardiness counts against HWAD.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process during the next Command assessment.

8. Receipt Control Number (RCN) Process:

- Recommendation(s): HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process during the next Command assessment.

9. Receipt Reversal:

- Recommendation(s): HWAD works with HQ, JMC to help bring other installations up to standard.

10. Materiel Release Order (MRO) Processing and Controls:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD immediately reconcile the open ZAXs and ZAX listing to ensure there are no shipping documents on the ZAX listing for materiel already shipped.

- HWAD continues to maintain current OPTEMPO for upkeep expediting the obligation of new MROs, the immediate input of phone-out MROs and the attention to use of ZMR/ZMXs.

- HWAD continues maintaining current oversight of the use of ZMR/ZMXs.

- HWAD promptly administers cancellations to the custodial record and informs shipping location supervisors of the cancelled requirement so that return to storage location can be accomplished.

- HWAD schedules one-on-one training with the site coordinator to use the Munitions Transportation Management System - Field Module (MTMS-FM) transportation system that is already in place at Hawthorne.

11. Maintenance and Demilitarization Planning and Management:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues to pay great attention to the details for ensuring safe and efficient operations.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process during the next Command assessment.

12. Storage Planning and Management:

- Recommendation(s):

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, make greater use of unused HWAD storage space, which should decrease the cost per ton.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process during the next Command assessment.

c. Physical Security overall report rating: **Green**. HWAD received six (6) Green, zero (0) Amber, and zero (0) Red, individual process ratings from the Assessment Team SME. The Green rating recommendations are for additional investigations and reports process improvements and continuing interim measures to protect their CAT I and II materiel until the Department of the Army responds to the HWAD waiver.

1. Serious Incident Report (SIR) Processing:

- Recommendation(s): None.

2. Security Plan:

- Recommendation(s): None.

3. Investigations and Report Processing:

- Recommendation(s): To make a good investigations and reports process even better, DZHC should consider adding the use of the following two (2) forms to the reporting system when they apply:

- DA Form 3056, Report of Missing/Recovered Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives. This will give closure to SIRs filed in cases of stolen or unaccounted for AA&E. Both this form and the SIR are filed with the Office of the Provost Marshal General.

- DA Form 4833, Commander's Report of Discipline or Administrative Action. This will show in the file the final outcome of an investigation when a perpetrator is identified and judicial or administrative action is taken.

4. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Requirement:

- Recommendation(s): HWAD continues with existing compensatory measures and await approval action from the Department of the Army.

5. Entry and Exit Control:

- Recommendation(s): None.

6. Maintenance Operations:

- Recommendation(s): None.

d. Quality Assurance and Surveillance overall report rating: **Amber**. HWAD received two (2) Green, three (3) Amber, and zero (0) Red, individual process ratings from the Assessment Team SMEs. The Green rating recommendations are for additional suspension and restriction verification process improvements. To move the three (3) Amber report ratings to Green report ratings, HWAD must address its

Condition Code K (CC-K) inspection backlog, properly complete DD Form 626, and implement and execute its proposed magazine inspections "get-well" plan.

1. Return Material Operations:

- Recommendation(s): None.

2. Condition Code K:

- Recommendation(s): SFSJM-QAS evaluate the CC-K backlog at the storage activities and determine its effect(s) on war-fighter stocks asset posture. For HWAD, if the backlog's effect is negative, elevate the need for contract modification and additional funding to AMSFS-CC.

3. Verification of Suspension and Restriction:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD reviews the suspension tag program for accuracy and completeness.

- When stocks can not be found in storage, immediately notify Inventory and follow-up until stocks are found or adjustment made.

4. Transportation and Conveyance Inspection:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD Quality Assurance Specialist (Ammunition Surveillance) (QASAS) immediately instructs DZHC to complete required the required DD Form 626 blocks.

- When monitoring this process, the HWAD QASAS places more emphasis on the inbound shipments' required DD Form 626 blocks.

5. Storage Magazines Inspection:

- Recommendation(s): HWAD executes its proposed get well-plan identified in the Discussion section.

e. Transportation overall report rating: **Green**. HWAD received ten (10) Green, zero (0) Amber, and zero (0) Red, individual process ratings from the Assessment Team SMEs.

The Green rating recommendations are for additional process improvements.

1. Shipping Process, Procedures, and Documentation:

- Recommendation(s): None.

2. Receiving Process, Procedures, and Documentation:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues reviewing all the IOPs and making updates as needed/required.

- HWAD revises the Incoming Shipments IOP and forwards the revision to HQ, AFSC, AMSFS-ST, care of Mr. Dave Tipp and Mr. Melvin Outen.

3. Tracking (Inbound and Outbound):

- Recommendation(s): None.

4. Carrier Performance Program:

- Recommendation(s): HQ, AFSC, AMSFS-ST, pursues a quicker and simpler process for issuing Letters of Warning (LOWs). IAW the Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR) Department of Defense (DOD) 4500.9 (4500.9-R), November 2004, Part II - Cargo Movement, chapter 207, LOWs and non-use notification currently must be sent via registered mail to carriers. Replies/responses from carriers are also sent via U.S. Postal Service. A possible solution may be to allow LOWs be sent via electronic mail (email). Also, allow carriers to respond via email. Non-use notification would remain via registered mail.

5. Secure Holding:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD updates the 19 Mar 03 IOP to reflect name change of Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) to Surface Distribution and Deployment Command (SDDC). In addition, add a statement on the 48 hour rule for compliance with the 19 Apr 03 MTMC/SDDC memo.

- HWAD forwards a copy of the updated IOP to HQ, AFSC, AMSFS-ST, care of Mr. Dave Tipp and Mr. Melvin Outen.

6. Equitable Distribution of Movement Workload:

- Recommendation(s): None.

7. Container Control Management:

- Recommendation(s): HQ, AFSC, AMSFS-ST, provides the JMC storage activities with Command Container Management Policy that provides clear container management requirements guidance within 120 days of final report release.

8. Transportation Facility Guide (TFG):

- Recommendation(s): HWAD continues with current operation. Global Freight Management (GFM) is being updated as required and within required guidelines. If any problems with Electronic Transportation Acquisition (ETA)/TFG program arise, identify "exact" program/software problems and forward to HQ, AFSC, AMSFS-ST, care of Mr. David Tipp and Mr. Melvin Outen.

9. Standard Operating Procedures and Desk Procedures:

- Recommendation(s): None.

f. Explosive Safety overall report rating: **Green**. HWAD received (8) Green, zero (0) Amber, and zero (0) Red, individual process ratings from the Assessment Team SME. The Green rating recommendations are for additional process improvements.

1. Responsibility Assignment and Organizational Staffing:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD and DZHC continue to execute the safety program in accordance with established regulatory guidance.

- The DZHC Safety Program document is shared with other organizations as an example that presents a comprehensive compilation of safety requirements.

- Both HWAD and DZHC continue to execute and enforce an effective safety program.

2. Regulations Availability and Currency:

- Recommendation(s): None.

3. Explosive Licenses:

- Recommendation(s): HWAD consider pursuing the acquisition of DOD sponsored free software (ESS) that will provide an automated means of maintaining the explosive license program as well as installation master maps with explosive safety quantity distance arcs. The DAC US Army Technical Center for Explosive Safety (USATCES) will provide information for the acquisition of the program.

4. Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) Finding(s):

- Recommendation(s): HWAD contacts HQ, AFSC, AMSFS-SF, to obtain status of these submissions.

5. Site Plans and Installation Master Plan:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD Safety and DZHC continue to work together to provide accurate and effective site plan submissions.

- HWAD considers pursuing the acquisition of DOD sponsored free software (ESS) that will provide an automated means of maintaining the explosive license program as well as installation master maps with explosive safety quantity distance arcs. The DAC USATCES will provide information for the acquisition of the program.

6. Demolition and Demilitarization Operations:

- Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues to execute the demilitarization process in accordance with the procedures established for these operations.

- HWAD maintains the excellent coordination and cooperation of all organizations required to execute the operations safely and efficiently.

7. Material Handling Operations:

- Recommendation(s): DZHC continues to execute the material handling operations safely and in accordance with regulatory guidance.

g. International Standards Organization (ISO) 9001:2000: We did not rate ISO 9001:2000 as Green, Amber, or Red. Instead, we examined its applicability at HWAD. Given Major Army Command (MACOM) and Major Subordinate Command (MSC) support and resources, it would be appropriate for the HWAD Administrative Contracting Office (ACO) staff to pursue ISO certification. DZHC has been ISO 9001:2000 certified since July 2001 and has a very effective and successful Quality Management System (QMS) in place.

1. Applicability:

- Recommendation(s): DZHC has established an excellent, comprehensive QMS that could be used as an example for other installations in establishing an ISO certifiable QMS.

h. Staffing/Manpower:

1. Quality Assurance and Surveillance:

- Recommendation(s): None. Career Program 20 Manager is addressing this concern as Higher Headquarters directed.

i. Training:

1. Transportation:

- Recommendation(s): HWAD ensure both government and contractor employees, that are hazard material (HAZMAT) certified, are appointed in writing (appointment orders). Government employees should be appointed by the Commander. HWAD should make an internal decision as to who signs/appoints DZHC employees. Either the Commander or a DZHC representative is acceptable. Copy must be provided

to the HWAD Transportation Officer (TO). Upon completion of appointment orders, the HWAD TO sends an email to HQ, AFSC, AMSFS-ST, care of Mr. Dave Tipp and Mr. Melvin Outen, stating this action is completed. AMSFS-ST does not need copies of appointment orders/letters.

3. Explosive Safety:

- Recommendation(s):

- DZHC continues to emphasize and execute an effective explosive safety-training program.

- AMSFS-HR considers adopting the "PC Compliance-Training Management Software (v.3.0)" command-wide to forecast, schedule, and record, personnel training.

j. Special Interest Items:

1. Automation:

- Recommendation(s): None.

2. MRO Denials:

- Recommendation(s): HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, requests the Air Force (AF) Liaison Office located at Rock Island Arsenal assistance in training Hill Air Force Base (AFB) item managers on the proper procedure for requisitioning Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) controlled stock.

3. Propellant Stability Program:

- Recommendation(s): None.

k. Management Control:

1. Assessment:

- Recommendation(s):

- The HWAD Management Control Program POC:

- Maintains a copy of the assessment report in the Management Control Program files to document the assessment was performed in Fiscal Year (FY) 05 and its results.

- Updates the existing "MANAGEMENT CONTROL EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED WITHIN (HAWTHORNE ARMY DEPOT) IN FISCAL YEAR 2005" enclosure and forward a copy to the BGAD Management Control Administrator (MCA) for forwarding to the HQ, AFSC MCA. List this assessment as P - Process Review.

- Receives a schedule of audits, inspections, and other reviews, performed and completed at HWAD during the FY. Any audits, inspections, and other reviews, completed during the FY and before the HQ, AFSC management control suspense should appear in enclosure 2, MANAGEMENT CONTROL EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED WITHIN (HAWTHORNE ARMY DEPOT) IN FISCAL YEAR XX. For those audits, inspections, and other reviews completed after the HQ, AFSC management control suspense, they should go into enclosure 2 for the following FY.

- The applicable HWAD managers evaluate the audit, inspection, or other reviews, results and determine if key controls are in place and working as intended. After this evaluation, provide written documentation regarding their evaluation to the HWAD Commander and HWAD Management Control Program POC.

I - INVENTORY

A. COUNT FIVE PROGRAM: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: The HWAD Commander completed the FY 05 first and second quarter count five requirement in December 2004 and 15 Mar 05 respectively. HWAD memorandum, 01 Jan 05, published the FY 05 annual count five inspection dates and has the Commander's signature. Our review of the program's 01 Jan 05 internal operating procedure and count five results are a clear indication that regulatory controls are in place and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: We reviewed the HWAD Count Five program files and determined HWAD implements the program in accordance with AMC-R 740-27, 16 Jun 99, Storage and Supply Activities - Ammunition Inventory and Accountability, paragraph 1-4.j. The HWAD quarterly count five consist of a random sample of one (1) magazine with 100 percent of its items inventoried. Planographs are annotated with any corrections or changes and signed by the HWAD Commander/participants. The FY 05, 04, and 03, count five documentation is on file IAW AMC-R 740-27.

3. Recommendation(s): None.

B. TWO-DIMENSIONAL (2-D) BARCODE APPLICATION: Status: Amber.

1. Conclusion: HWAD does not always properly attach the 2-D barcodes to the pallets. As a result, HQ, JMC policy controls are established and not working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: The assessment Team selected 36 buildings within the HWAD complex to be used as a sample of the total population of 2600 ammunition storage facilities. Our sample results indicate that overall 2-D barcodes are being attached to stock in storage per Headquarters, US Army Operations Support Command memorandum, 11 Oct 02, subject: Application of Two-Dimensional (2-D) Bar Code Labels to Ammunition Stockpile with limited consistency.

- 008013: Bar code labels were stowed at the front of a grid with or near the MDCs in a plastic bag.

- 005108: Bar code labels are missing at grid ADEF.

- 002006: Bar code labels are missing at grids ACAF, and their quantities are wrong at grids DFAD and ABHK.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD immediately corrects the deficiencies identified in the Discussion section.

- HWAD consistently comply with Headquarters, US Army Operations Support Command memorandum, 11 Oct 02, subject: Application of Two-Dimensional (2-D) Bar Code Labels to Ammunition Stockpile, as bar codes will become extremely important in depot operations and ensure that bar code labels are properly attached to all assets stored in the magazine.

C. INVENTORY ADJUSTMENTS: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD's gain and loss causative research contains the proper supporting documentation. As result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: We reviewed the HWAD causative research process. AR 735-5, chapter 12, and AR 740-26, 12 Mar 03, Physical Inventory Control, chapter 2, require adequate explanation narratives, sufficient supporting documentation, and documented supervisory approval, to support the causative research conclusion(s). Our review of 10 folders and the adjustment logs disclosed each package's causative research is properly completed. Packages contain all required data: 3Q/4A, Stockpile Inventory List Comparator (SILC) discrepancy reports, MDC copies, SDS screens, ATR copies, and DD Form 1348s copies if necessary. All supply clerks have been extensively trained on causative/reconciliation process.

HWAD recently receipted WSAR-K assets marked for demilitarization. Receipt discrepancies have surfaced and must be reconciled immediately. Receipt adjustments must be correctly posted to align the Korean asset posture.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD immediately reconciles the Korean assets to properly support the country agreement requiring strict stored assets monitoring and tracking.

- HQ JMC, SFSJM-CTA, follow-ups on the reconciliation within 30 days from this review.

D. INVENTORY RECONCILIATION: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD is performing its inventory reconciliation IAW all applicable regulatory requirements. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: None. See C. Inventory Adjustments and H. Investigations/Reports of Survey narratives.

3. Recommendation(s): None.

E. PHYSICAL INVENTORY - CAT III and IV: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD is doing a very good job planning, performing, and documenting, CAT III and IV ammunition physical inventories IAW AMC-R 740-27. Our review disclosed HWAD accomplished complete inventories in FY 03 and FY 04. Processes and controls are well established and consistently applied at HWAD.

2. Discussion: The Assessment Team selected a sampling of 26 CAT III and IV buildings located at HWAD to represent the total population of 2600 storage sites to test the physical inventory controls. These buildings were divided among two teams. Sites inspected are as follows: PLOT04, 002006, 005018, 008013, 012009, 036004, 050022, 059001, 072003, 081007, 100095, 105031, 111014, 112013, 11301C, 11335C, 11363A, 114035, 115029, 11550E, 11607A, 11610A, 11614A, 11639C, 11643A, and 67RX01.

Following is a summary of observations:

- PLOT04: No discrepancies.
- 002006: At grids ACAF, stock was missing bar codes. Bar codes are wrong at grids ABHK and DFAD. Very clean building and good storage practices.
- 005018: At grid ADEF, stock was missing bar codes. Very clean building and good storage practices.
- 008013: Bar code labels were stowed at the front of a grid with or near the MDCs in a plastic bag.

- 012009: No discrepancies.
- 036004: No discrepancies.
- 050022: No discrepancies.
- 059001: Several light boxes are not banded to pallets.
- 072003: MDC has a quantity of 116,935. The 2-D bar code, planograph, and actual count agree and have a quantity of 116,930. HWAD corrected MDC on the spot.
- 081007: Empty site. It needs cleaning as there is considerable dunnage and steel banding.
- 100095: No discrepancies.
- 105031: No discrepancies.
- 111014: No discrepancies.
- 112013: Mixed condition codes were observed stowed on the same pallet.
- 11301C: No discrepancies.
- 11335C: This building has some dunnage and empty pallets.
- 11363A: No discrepancies.
- 114035: No discrepancies.
- 115029: No discrepancies.
- 11550E: No discrepancies.
- 11607A: No discrepancies.
- 11610A: Grid FGLL stock found at grid FGDD. 2-D bar codes are wrong at grids KMNN and KMOO.
- 11614A: Two (2) light containers of the same lot were on the same pallet.
- 11639C: No discrepancies.

- 11643A: No discrepancies.
- 67RX01: No discrepancies.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD immediately corrects the noted deficiencies at buildings 002006, 005018, 008013, 081007, 112013, 11610A, and 11614A.

- HWAD must ensure all stored assets properly have their 2-D bar code label(s) and MDC(s) attached.

F. CRITICAL STORAGE CAPABILITY: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: Hawthorne has good control of explosive space management. HWAD provides storage utilization feeder data to JMC and internally uses the feeder data to measure space allocation or usage. When queried, the storage space manager provided the excluded storage space and available empty buildings for munitions storage. A "master plan" and license record serves as the template for where materiel should be re-located upon re-warehousing or receipt. The explosive compatibility and magazine content listing is used on a recurring basis to ensure HWAD maintains cleared and safe munitions storage. HWAD is at 56 percent capacity. Hawthorne possesses excellent structures and a workforce capable of serving a critical storage shortfall of overloaded depots. All consideration should be given to Hawthorne to locate more training or war-fighter munitions within the complex.

2. Discussion: Our interview with space management personnel indicates a good working process is in effect to rapidly assign incoming receipts, replace shipped space into reuse, and provide storage feeder data to JMC. Grid changes and management is exceptional. HWAD has 680 magazines currently empty and could immediately intake storage of conventional munitions. The storage planner would appreciate any advance shipment notification, Report of Shipment (REPSHIP), to HWAD as it greatly enhances the planners' job. First, the storage planner checks for like National Stock Numbers (NSNs)/Lot #s. If this does not work, the planner looks at like NSN or Department of Defense Identification Codes (DODICs). Next, if that approach does not work, the storage planner checks for like materiel. The storage planner has made great progress in

getting the truck drivers to provide 24 hours advance notice for incoming shipments.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, supports HWAD by inducting more serviceable and training stocks.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, use the HWAD available space to provide relief to the near capacity Crane Army Ammunition Activity (CAAA) and McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (MCAAP) storage activities.

G. REGULATIONS, SOPs, and DESK PROCEDURES: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has policies in place for the majority of their inventory functions. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: Policies, desk procedures, and SOPs, are in place for the following: Site Inventory, In-float, found on post, Scheduling, 2-D Bar Coding, Quality Control, Key Control, Time Standards, ATR, Demilitarization, Receipts, Denials, Cancellations, 11 Accounts, Transportation Discrepancy Reports, and SDRs. All IOPs are well prepared and updated. Last update was 27 Feb 04.

3. Recommendation(s): HWAD continues to keep their IOPs current and updated to reflect current processes. Very good HWAD program.

H. INVESTIGATIONS AND REPORTS OF SURVEY: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD properly processes Inventory Adjustment Report (IAR) investigations. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: HWAD had seven (7) investigations initiated in FY 04 and three (3) in FY 05 with 80 percent of their inventory completed. There is one (1) open investigation and the DA Form 444 requires the Commander's approval. The rest are waiting for HQ, JMC approval. We reviewed completed and in-process IAR investigations. For completed investigations, our review disclosed HWAD met all

causative research investigation requirements. In addition, the HWAD files are complete and in outstanding order.

3. Recommendation(s): None. Excellent Job! Continue with existing procedures and ensure all personnel received updated training/guidance for Automatic Identification Technology (AIT).

I. PHYSICAL INVENTORY - CAT I and II: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD does a good job in maintaining accountability in risk category I and II sites. The regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: The Assessment Team selected a sampling of ten (10) CAT I and II buildings located at HWAD to represent the total population of 2600 storage sites to test the physical inventory controls. We divided the ten (10) buildings among three (3) teams. When the floor to record inventory was completed, we found no major quantity discrepancies in these sites.

We verified HWAD sent a memorandum to HQ, JMC notifying SFSJM-CTA of the CAT I semi-annual inventories completion for FY 04. HWAD completed its FY 05 semi-annual CAT I inventory and its annual CAT II inventory. The Certification letter is forthcoming to HQ, JMC.

Results for the ten (10) CAT I and II buildings are as follows:

CATEGORY I:

- 13006: Good: Assets in building reflect ownership to B5A, 11K, FG5, and NCB accounts. All barcode labels and magazine data cards were filled out properly and matched assets in storage location. All serial numbered assets stored in magazine matched planograph. Building has an active Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Last inventory of building conducted 13 Apr 05.

- 13009: Good: Assets in building reflect ownership to 115 account. All bar code labels and magazine data cards were filled out properly and matched assets in storage location. All serial numbered assets stored in

magazine matched planograph. Building has an active IDS. Last inventory of building conducted 13 Apr 05.

CATEGORY II:

- 13004: Good: Assets in building reflect ownership to B5A account. All bar code labels and magazine data cards were filled out properly and matched assets in storage location. Building has an active IDS. CAT I Buildings 13006 and 13009 and CAT II Buildings 13001, 13002, 13003, 13007, 13008, and 13010, are using the test program Mobile Detection Assessment Response System (MDARS) to monitor magazine activity. Last inventory of buildings conducted 04 Oct 04 and 13 Apr 05.

- 14018: Good: Assets in building reflect ownership to MHQ and B14 accounts. Barcode labels attached and magazine data cards filled out properly. Building has an active IDS. Last inventory of building conducted 05 Oct 04.

- 16008: Good: Assets in building reflect ownership to B5A, FG5, 11Y, and B14, account. It was noted that this magazine had many loose pallets with assets not banded to pallet. Planograph and bar code for Lot #DUW80K0001-002 reflected quantity of 81, however, stored assets reflected 20 lbs one (1) Roll. Inventory personnel stated catalog change submitted by JMC to change quantity to nine (9) each. Bar code labels attached, and magazine data cards matched assets correctly. Building has an active IDS. Last inventory of building conducted 11 Oct 04.

- 21010: Good: Anti-Tank Mines. Assets in building reflect ownership to B14 account. Barcode labels attached and magazine data cards filled out properly. Building has an active IDS. Last inventory of building conducted 05 Oct 04.

- 23008: Good: Anti-Tank Mines. Assets in building reflect ownership to B5A account. Barcode labels attached and magazine data cards filled out properly. Building has an active IDS. Last inventory of building conducted 11 Oct 04. Building had four (4) small lots stored in entire building.

- 23018: Good: Anti-Tank Mines. Assets in building reflect ownership to B5A account. Bar code labels attached

and magazine data cards filled out properly. Building has an active IDS. Last inventory of building conducted 11 Oct 04. Building had four (4) small lots stored in entire building.

- 27009: Good: Assets in building reflect ownership to B5A account. Bar code labels attached and magazine data cards filled out properly. Last inventory of building conducted 11 Oct 04. Building had only two (2) small lots stored in entire building.

- 29018: Good: Assets in building reflect ownership to B14, 11D, and NCB accounts. Bar code labels attached and magazine data cards filled out properly. Last inventory of building conducted 05 Oct 04. Building had three (3) small lots stored in entire building.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD considers re-warehousing buildings with small lots into one building.

- HWAD places the MDCs on each pallet in the building and change markings on boxes with Lot #DUW80K0001-002 with correct quantity.

- HWAD properly attaches all bar code labels to assets utilizing twist-wire or zip ties to prevent lost.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process in the next Command assessment.

J. LOCAL ACCOUNT (11) MANAGEMENT: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: Hawthorne has adequate control of 11 account assets. HWAD has 24 11 accounts are on hand. Storage planner segregates the stocks from other owners and maintains record of facility use. The 11D account is used for Local Depot Property production, maintenance and donor storage. 11D account receipts are verified by the Storage Planner for proper input into the account. The 11D Account appears to be managed; but should validate the assets on a frequent basis and be purged of all unneeded assets and routinely recorded as reviewed with the Inventory chief.

2. Discussion: The 11 accounts are in good order. Addresses and Points of Contacts (POCs) should be updated

on all accounts, and an annual reconciliation should be noted by the 11 Account ammunition manager.

11 accounts reviewed are 11A, 11B, 11D, 11E, 11F, 11T, 11Y, and 11Z.

There was not a current letter on file designating an ACTPO for the 11D account.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD updates their valid accounts with proper account Points of Contact (POCs) and viable address.

- HWAD appoints an ACTPO, in accordance with AR 735-5, chapter 2, section III, paragraph 2-10, for the 11 accounts and provides a copy to the HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, ACTPO.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process in the next Command assessment.

K. SEALED AND USEALED SITES: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD performs the five (5) percent sealed site sealed sites regulatory requirement. In addition, the current HWAD sealed site process is effective and efficient and complies with AMC-R 740-27. As a result, regulatory controls are in place and are working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: AMC-R 740-27, chapter 5, paragraph 3.h., requires HWAD to inventory five (5) percent of their sealed structures and report the results to HQ, JMC. HWAD has consistently exceeded the five (5) percent sampling. No findings of materiel were found. However, HWAD found a problem with the key control program in SDS as it was dropping buildings. Approximately 20 percent of the sites showed no movement while checking the scheduling sheet would indicate movement had happened. HWAD has a very good tracking program and does maintain a record of their sealed sites inventoried. HWAD does a tremendous job in keeping as many magazines sealed as possible. As of this on-site visit, out of 75,000 grids HWAD has 40,000 grids sealed. This is aspects attributes to HWAD going through their inventory in such a timely matter.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues to monitor the building dropping problem and check all sealed buildings through SDS screen 9323 before accepting into the physical program.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, clearly defines performing the sealed site inventory process in the forthcoming AMC-R 740-27 revision.

L. INVENTORY QUALITY CONTROL: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD performs its ammunition quality control program as AMC-R 740-27 requires. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: HWAD performs quality control checks in accordance with AMC-R 740-27, chapter 4. Specifically, HWAD performs receipts, DA Form 4508 Ammunition Transfer Records, shipment/issues, physical inventory counts, access control program, document control, and cataloging. The program is thoroughly documented, done on a monthly basis, and reported to HQ, JMC on a monthly basis. In addition, HWAD is retaining the files for two (2) years plus the current inventory year. However, during review of the monthly QC reports, it was discovered that Surveillance is not using the DA Form 4508 IAW AMC-R 740-25 when they move materiel for inspection. Surveillance uses a local form, Form 389, which appears to be simply a planning document. Additionally, the time lag from when the movement occurred to when the paperwork was submitted can be as long as three (3) weeks.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues to execute its QC program in their usual thorough and efficient manner. This program is a valuable tool for upper management to assess its accountability procedures.

- Surveillance immediately starts using DA Form 4508 instead of the local Form 389. In our opinion, Form 389 is not designed to provide adequate information on ammunition moves. In addition, Form 389 is not submitted to Inventory until after materiel movement into and out of the Surveillance workshop has been accomplished. As a

result, HWAD loses accountability during the time ammunition is moved out of storage until paperwork submission to Inventory.

II - DOCUMENT CONTROL

A. KEY CONTROL PROCESS: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD is currently not using the automated key control program, but does have an active key control program. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: Our review disclosed HWAD has a good key control program. The key and lock custodians are well trained and efficient. HWAD uses a manual key control program. Review included physical observation of the process. The manual key control process is working as intended. We observed the signing in and out of keys to several depot personnel.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues with existing procedures and ensures all personnel received updated training/guidance for the current manual key control program.

- HWAD considers the feasibility of installing the HQ, JMC automated key control program.

B. SUPPLY DISCREPANCY REPORT (SDR) CONTROLS: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: The ACO Surveillance Chief is responsible for oversight of the SDR program at HWAD. The Surveillance Chief is a member of the Commander's staff. HWAD Surveillance does not maintain a system to track all incoming and outgoing SDRs. DZHC prepares outgoing and respond to incoming SDRs as Surveillance directs. DZHC submits all reports to the ACO and Surveillance for final processing. DZHC maintains a manual log that tracks issued and received SDRs. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: Through interview and documentation review, we determined DZHC team maintains a manual log that tracks HWAD issued and received SDRs. The manual log contains entries from Calendar Year (CY) 2003 to the present. We selected CY 04 and 05 SDRs for review.

- FY 04 has eight (8) entries. HWAD issued six (6) SDR and received two (2). Supporting documentation was readily available for review. All SDRs were submitted to the ACO and properly closed.

- FY 05 has nine (9) entries. HWAD issued eight (8) SDRs and received one (1). Supporting documentation was readily available for our review. All SDRs were submitted to the ACO and properly closed.

SFSJM-CTA memorandum, 03 Mar 05, Headquarters, US Army Joint Munitions Command (JMC) Policy requires incoming SDR replies be forwarded to HQ, JMC 48 hours of preparation. The HQ, JMC 48 hours submission requirement is dated 03 Mar 05. None of the FY 05 SDRs have a date of 03 Mar 05 or later. HWAD does not have internal operating procedures in place for processing and tracking SDRs.

Per interviews with the government and contractor personnel, DZHC does not receive all incoming SDRs. HWAD respond directly on SDRs that are determined to be invalid or instances of condition code discrepancies. Development of an automated SDR tracking log reviewable by both HWAD and HZDC personnel will improve program effectiveness.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD establishes an IOP for processing SDRs.
- HWAD establishes a log that tracks all incoming and outgoing SDRs.
- HWAD and DZHC pursue converting the manual SDR log to an automated SDR log.
- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, follow-up within 30 days of receipt of the final assessment report to ensure HWAD fully complies with SFSJM-CTA memorandum, 03 Mar 05, Headquarters, US Army Joint Munitions Command (JMC) Policy for Munitions Supply Discrepancy Reports (SDRs).

C. MANAGEMENT CONTROL NUMBER (MCN) PROCESSING: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD requires immediate clarification to de-conflict the data cleansing process and new direction for MCN assignment and the existing AR 708-1, 21 Jul 00,

Logistics - Management Data and Cataloging of Supplies and Equipment mandates.

2. Discussion: Interview and observation of the MCN controls in place at HWAD indicated that MCN assignment is being processed and a log maintained containing pertinent data on non standard items. HWAD is monitoring the data cleansing progression and has 132 remaining, for purpose of successful migration to the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) platform. Discussion with the data cleanser reveals that a process definition for MCN assignment from the DAC staff poses the potential of misidentification or delay in non standard assignment. Our review disclosed the data cleansing list and the MCNI lists are not aligned. This finding is not a negative to Hawthorne, as they are operating as instructed. The finding is an US Army Field Support Command (AFSC) responsibility to de-conflict and provide properly vetted instructions to the installations which will preclude any potential rework in the MCN and MCNI reconciliation.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, provides fully coordinated and properly vetted instructions to the installation regarding the administration of MCNs and MCNIs, and the complete instruction for viable data migration.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, follow-ups within 30 days of receipt of the final assessment report.

D. AMMUNITION TRANSFER RECORD (ATR) CONTROLS: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has excellent control of both the preparation and processing of ATRs. Interview with processing personnel reveals that a thorough understanding exists regarding the responsibilities they have in the administration of SDS changes via ATRs. Processors of transactions are cognizant of the goals established that provide for timely processing and thorough validation of the transaction processed to SDS.

However, Surveillance uses local Form 389 to record ammunition moves. The form is not submitted until the movement to and from Surveillance has been done. This practice can lead to potential loss of material visibility.

One (1) document we inspected indicated a three (3) week time lag between the material's movement and submission to Inventory for processing. See Section II - Inventory, L. Inventory Quality Control.

2. Discussion: Our interview with lead managers of the area operations leads the team to conclude the ATRs function as designed, are monitored for accuracy, and provide for an auditable trail of all activities surrounding the reclassification, movement, lot changing, re-identification, and demilitarization of munitions assets. We checked six (6) documents for accuracy and timeliness of processing with no discrepancies noted. HWAD should be commended for their actions leading to a full expertise in this discipline. Registry control is good and currently mitigates the risk to the inventory when not returning an ATR within the required 24 hour timeframe. We found HWAD consistently processes ATRs within 24 hours of receipt. Any delays in processing were the results of outside influences. The daily follow-ups performed by the ATR clerks are ingeniously incorporated into the QC program.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues its efficient and accurate ATR processing. The HWAD organizations submitting ATRs should be instructed on the importance of timely submission of paperwork.

- HWAD Surveillance uses the DA Form 4508 to record ammunition moves IAW AMC-R 740-25, 01 May 00, Storage and Supply Activities - Ammunition Stock Location System, and submits it to Inventory in a timely manner.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process during the next Command assessment.

E. MAGAZINE DATA CARD (MDC) CONTROLS: Status: Amber.

1. Conclusion: HWAD prepares and maintains MDCs in accordance with the governing regulations. However, we noted instances where HWAD consolidated numerous MDCs in one (1) plastic document protector at the front of a grid of assets. AMC-R 740-25, Appendix A, paragraph 2, directs HWAD to locate the MDCs either on the top or the front of the ammunition stack as near an operating aisle as is

possible. As a result, controls are established; but not working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: Our inventory reviews disclosed that HWAD consolidates MDCs. Specifically, in grids where HWAD locates multiple lots all the MDCs are kept in one (1) package at the front of the grid. Regulatory guidance requires each individual MDC placed with its corresponding lot. MDC consolidation results in time consuming inventory operations that would otherwise be very expeditious and is a breeding ground for potential inventory errors. Other than this noted discrepancy, HWAD prepares and maintains the MDCs IAW AMC-R 740-25 and AMC-R 740-27.

3. Recommendation(s): HWAD immediately complies with the AMC-R 740-25 requirement to place each individual MDC with its corresponding lot.

F. CONCEALED DISCREPANCY PROCESSING: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has a very good concealed discrepancy program and is aggressively researching all submitted and noted discrepancies. Hawthorne uses the correct document number, starts with "W81YG8", when processing all concealed discrepancies and has a management code "F" assigned. As a result, controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: Hawthorne posted 40 concealed discrepancies within the last 12 months for FY 04; but has conducted causative research to post correct changes to SDS. HWAD inventory personnel were made aware of the new reporting procedures for concealed discrepancies and new policy letter due out from HQ JMC, SFSJM-CTA.

3. Recommendation(s): HWAD provides notification of concealed discrepancies to HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, on a case by case basis.

G. RECEIPT POSTING: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD performs receipt posting to SDS within the regulatory timeframes. The HWAD processes provide reliable posting. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: Our interviews, direct observation, and document reviews revealed that HWAD posts receipts to SDS in a timely manner. DZHC regularly reviews and revises their IOPs. The IOP, Inbound Receipts Truck Lot Procedures, was last updated on 27 Feb 04. DZHC uses an automated data base and ARTIS to track receipts by RCN, Transportation Control Number (TCN), or Government Bill of Lading (GBL).

We pulled 43 days of SDS receipts for review. HWAD routinely meets the six (6) and nine (9) day posting requirements. Two (2) late receipts were discovered and researched. HWAD posted one, RCN 08214TA1, 15 days after receipt due to the Marine Corps not returning the Receipt Inspection document until 15 days later. HWAD had apparently posted a second receipt, RCN 03409STR3, 69 days after receipt based on the printout we received for review. Research showed that HWAD originally posted it the same day; but an error was discovered; a serial number was required from Tooele Directorate of Information Management (DOIM), by Inventory. The reversal is still in process.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues stressing the importance of accurate and timely receipt postings.

- HWAD develops a follow-up process for a tenant such as the Marine Corps, since their documentation tardiness counts against HWAD.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process during the next Command assessment.

H. RECEIPT CONTROL NUMBER (RCN) PROCESS: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: Hawthorne immediately assigns a RCN to all materiel upon the conveyance's arrival. HWAD uses the RCN to properly document the receipt into the SDS custodial file and does so within one (1) day of arrival by recording receipt at the truck lot. As a result, controls are established and working at HWAD as intended.

2. Discussion: Using an automated local database, ARTIS, HWAD establishes and tracks the RCNs from conveyance inspection. Receipts are posted to record reflecting the receiving site as the storage location. The RCN number

represents the Julian date, the arrival hour, and trailer, DROM, or Military Van (MILVAN) number. HWAD fully reviews the receipt process, validates the posting, monitors the final storage, and properly posts the associated grid(s) to the planograph. HWAD has superb tracing and follow-through processes for receipt processing and RCN assignment.

3. Recommendation(s): HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process during the next Command assessment.

I. RECEIPT REVERSALS: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD processes receipt reversals IAW regulatory guidance and with outstanding attention to detail and timeliness. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: We evaluated 45 days, 1,118 records, of receipt processing. Of those, 82 receipts, seven (7) percent, were reversed and reposted. All examples reviewed indicate that the HWAD receiving team processes their receipt document reversals well within regulatory guidance. The overall receipt review process ensures that HWAD corrects inconsistencies and errors within one (1) to three (3) days. Document receipt reversals reviewed were necessitated by corrections to condition codes, lot numbers, and receipt document number erroneous input. No quantity errors were found in the sample reviewed.

3. Recommendation(s): HWAD works with HQ, JMC to help bring other installations up to standard.

J. MATERIEL RELEASE ORDER (MRO) PROCESSING AND CONTROLS: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: Hawthorne has an excellent method in place to control the shipping processes. HWAD processes MROs for shipment of conventional ammunition for MILVAN shipping, truck, rail, and special account, requirements. HWAD has met all FY 05 Required Delivery Dates (RDDs) and exhibits an expedited shipment processing method. The shipping operation's technicians are experts in their designated duties. In talking with the Chief, the office very much wants MTMS-FM training. To date, they have received very little training; but have all the equipment in place to operate. We sampled open ZAXs and found

shipping documents still on the ZAXs listing that have been shipped.

2. Discussion: Obligations, lot changes, ZAXs, and MRO closeouts are administered to the SDS record immediately. ZAX suspense listings are used to verify shipments and report overall MRO posture for HWAD. SDS transactions and has a staff of three (3) persons assigned to the multi-task function. SOPs and desk procedures are available.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD immediately reconcile the open ZAXs and ZAX listing to ensure there are no shipping documents on the ZAX listing for materiel already shipped.

- HWAD continues to maintain current OPTEMPO for upkeep expediting the obligation of new MROs, the immediate input of phone-out MROs and the attention to use of ZMR/ZMXs.

- HWAD continues maintaining current oversight of the use of ZMR/ZMXs.

- HWAD promptly administers cancellations to the custodial record and informs shipping location supervisors of the cancelled requirement so that return to storage location can be accomplished.

- HWAD schedules one-on-one training with the site coordinator to use the MTMS-FM transportation system that is already in place at Hawthorne.

K. MAINTENANCE AND DEMILITARIZATION PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD is to be commended for their efficient document processing. They have an excellent system of IOPs for their maintenance and demilitarization programs. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: The Munitions Operations Directorate will canvass the stockpile to determine sequencing of lots before each job. They will meet with all appropriate offices (Facilities, Safety, Storage, Transportation, etc.)

to plan what is required to complete each demilitarization or maintenance job as part of the set up process. Work requests are then given to Facilities Maintenance to configure the lines, if necessary. For any job that has been out of production for 15 days or more, each worker involved must read and sign all SOPs. New jobs begin with an inert walk-through, followed by a live walk-through and a Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) before full production begins. Each shift reports production on the shift reports with any problems noted on reports when planned quantities are not met. Billing takes place when jobs are complete. For example, for the 8" ICM Demilitarization program, billing will take place only when grenades and expulsion charges are destroyed.

ATRs serve as records of disposal. The ATRs are processed in a timely manner. Three (3) documents were inspected and no discrepancies were noted. Personnel interviewed were very cognizant of the proper procedures for processing ATRs.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues to pay great attention to the details for ensuring safe and efficient operations.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process during the next Command assessment.

L. STORAGE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has outstanding control of explosive space management, explosive compatibility, and all aspects of efficient use of available storage space. The DZHC Storage Planner has years of experience which is evident in the outstanding overall operation. Databases, SDS and ARTIS, are used to plan and track the storage and movement of all assets in and out of HWAD. HWAD is 56 percent full, with nearly 25 percent of its buildings empty. HQ, JMC should make more use of this space where HWAD is not facing the same problems as other overused depots.

2. Discussion: We conducted an interview with the DZHC Storage Planner. The interview indicated that there is a strong working process in effect to plan for storage of known receipts and rapidly assign storage locations for

unexpected receipts, track and post storage plan changes, and utilization reporting. The storage management plan was last updated 18 Nov 03, and includes regulations and procedures for storage including density factors, capacities, and compatibilities. The recent 1.2 criteria changes did not have a major effect since many igloos were full due to capacity rather than explosive weight.

Decisions on storage locations for incoming assets are made based on lot, NSN, condition code, like material, and intended future disposition. For example, HWAD stores assets destined for maintenance or demilitarization in the North Area to minimize future transportation costs. Grids are assigned by the munitions handling crews. Crew leaders conduct training to ensure this is done properly. Re-warehousing requirements are reviewed at least quarterly for buildings 50 percent full or less.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, make greater use of unused HWAD storage space, which should decrease the cost per ton.

- HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, review this process during the next Command assessment.

III - PHYSICAL SECURITY

A. SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT PROCESSING: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: The HWAD SIR process is working as intended. The responsible sections report Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) shortages or overages to the Depot Protection Division. They initiate an investigation and prepare the SIR when necessary. Security and the reporting section work together to resolve the discrepancies. When appropriate, these reports are coordinated with affected law enforcement agencies.

2. Discussion: There have been three (3) SIRs reported at HWAD since January 2003. Only one (1) of these involved ammunition/explosives. Specifically, eight (8) two pound blocks of M118 Demolition Munitions were not accounted for. The investigation was referred to the Mineral County Sheriff, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and US Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID). CID's final report indicates that investigation by the FBI concludes the munitions were stolen by persons unknown and by means unknown. No logical suspects were identified and neither the FBI nor CID is actively pursuing further investigation.

3. Recommendation(s): None.

B. SECURITY PLAN: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: The HWAD Physical Security Plan is complete and in the correct format. As a result, controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: There are no provisions or omissions apparent in the Physical Security Plan that makes it easy for unauthorized entry and exit, pilferage, or sabotage. The Plan is well organized and mission oriented. Good job!

3. Recommendation(s): None.

C. INVESTIGATIONS AND REPORT PROCESSING: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has a process for reporting, investigating, documenting, and filing, alleged offenses. The personnel involved in this process are knowledgeable

and capable. As a result, controls are established and working as intended.

2. Discussion: Reports are received by the Guard Operations Center or Security Manager. An offense report is initiated. If required, a SIR is filed. When the investigation is complete, it is filed or sent for prosecution/administrative action. Since HWAD is a concurrent jurisdiction installation, the Depot Protection Division reports offenses to the Mineral County Sheriff or state and federal law enforcement agencies when appropriate.

3. Recommendation(s): To make a good investigations and reports process even better, HWAD and DZHC should consider adding the use of the following two (2) forms to the reporting system when they apply:

- DA Form 3056, Report of Missing/Recovered Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives. This will give closure to SIRs filed in cases of stolen or unaccounted for AA&E. Both this form and the SIR are filed with the Office of the Provost Marshal General.

- DA Form 4833, Commander's Report of Discipline or Administrative Action. This will show in the file the final outcome of an investigation when a perpetrator is identified and judicial or administrative action is taken.

D. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (IDS): Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: The IDS used to protect the sensitive CAT I and II munitions at HWAD is not operable. However, they have instituted compensatory measures and requested a waiver to the regulatory requirements as required. The Department of the Army (DA) has not yet responded to their request.

2. Discussion: HWAD is in the process of installing a new ICIIDS intrusion detection system. A necessary part of this installation process is the dismantling of the existing IDS. HWAD recognizes the requirement for IDS and has taken reasonable compensatory measures to protect the stored CAT I and II materiel in the interim. Their waiver request is at DA awaiting action. It was recommended for approval at HQ, AMC and HQ, AFSC. There are no further logical steps for HWAD to undertake at this time.

3. Recommendation(s): HWAD continues with existing compensatory measures and await approval action from DA.

E. ENTRY AND EXIT CONTROL: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: The guards assigned at the entry/exit to the AA&E storage area are knowledgeable of their control duties and are proficient in executing them. As a result, controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: During inspection at the AA&E storage area gate, the guards performed their duties controlling entry and exit in a professional and effective manner. Their efforts are commendable. Good Job!

3. Recommendation(s): None.

F. MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: Security procedures in effect for demilitarization and demolition processes are adequate and in keeping with current policy. As a result, controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: At the New Bomb Disposal Area, about 25 miles south of HWAD on Route 359, there were no operations in progress at the time of inspection. However, the procedures established for protection of the materiel and personnel appear functional and appropriate. The area was relatively clear of demolition residue with no evidence of explosive materiel apparent. There was minor shrapnel residue; but such was considered insignificant and within toleration limits.

At the Western Area Demilitarization Facility, we reviewed the 750 pound bomb demilitarization process. The bombs are taken to a workshop where they are cut into sections. Then the explosive materiel is removed from the sections. Explosive materiel residue taken from the bombs is removed from the workshop, boxed, and stored in the magazines. The explosive materiel then becomes DZHC property and used for donor material in other demilitarization operations.

3. Recommendation(s): None.

IV - QUALITY ASSURANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

A. RETURNED MATERIEL OPERATIONS: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has adequate controls in place and follows procedures. As a result, controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: SOP DZHC-0000-L-002, 5 April 05, Logistics Services, Revision 1, is an adequate SOP. We observed a receipt process at a Less Than Truck Load (LTL) building DZHC operates. The QASAS performed all the necessary checks which included suspension/restriction status, annotation of DD Form 1348-1, verification of materiel markings with documentation accompanying the materiel, and Damage-In-Transit (DIT) inspection.

We selected a nine (9) document sample for review. Our review indicated that all DD Form 1348s had been annotated with the date of receipt/inspection, name of inspector, condition code, and that DIT inspection was done. The sample's Depot Surveillance Record (DSR) cards were consistent with information contained on the DD Form 1348s and SDS data input.

3. Recommendation(s): None.

B. CONDITION CODE K: Status: Amber.

1. Conclusion: The current contract does not require DZHC to manage the CC-K program. As a result, controls are established; but not working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: Under the previous contract, HQ, AFSC required DZHC to formally monitor the CC-K stocks. DZHC ensured that no lot remained in CC-K over 45 days in accordance with AR 725-50, 15 Nov 95, Requisition, Receipt and Issue System, paragraph 5-44.c(2)(a). The current fixed price contract does not contain the regulatory requirement for DZHC to monitor the CC-K stocks. As a stop-gap measure, the HWAD Ammunition Surveillance Division has included the CC-K stocks in their own funded inspection program.

3. Recommendation(s): SFSJM-QAS evaluate the CC-K backlog at the storage activities and determine its effect(s) on war-fighter stocks asset posture. For HWAD,

if the backlog's effect is negative, elevate the need for contract modification and additional funding to AMSFS-CC.

C. VERIFICATION OF SUSPENSION AND RESTRICTION: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has effective suspension/restriction procedures in place for all the Services' suspensions/restrictions. However, we did note HWAD does not always affix suspension tags to low priority stocks in a timely manner. Overall, controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: HWAD maintains a database of all suspension/restriction actions by all Services. The database is effectively used to identify when suspension notices are not received in sequence as well as routine checks during cyclic inspections or shipment operations.

During our review, we noted that suspension tags had been prepared for stocks; but the stocks could not be found in storage and the tags had been brought back to the office. Two (2) of the lots were suspended in 2003. A check of one of the lots (1320-D245, lot BK-7-MCA-69, CC-H, Location 11362E, Grid JMPP) indicated that it is still shown on records as in storage. Although Inventory may have been notified that the items were not found in storage, no "paper-trail" exists to indicate that Inventory was notified or that Inventory took any action.

The suspension tags have not consistently been placed in storage because of higher priority activities and deployments. When applied to stocks, suspension tags are placed with the stocks during magazine inspections or during special trips to the sites for the sole purpose of applying the tags.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD reviews the suspension tag program for accuracy and completeness.

- When stocks can not be found in storage, immediately notify Inventory and follow-up until stocks are found or adjustment made.

D. TRANSPORTATION AND CONVEYANCE INSPECTION: Status: Amber

1. Conclusion: We selected and reviewed five (5) outbound shipments. Our review determined all their applicable documentation was adequate. We selected and reviewed five (5) inbound shipments. Our review determined their documentation was deficient because required DD Form 626 blocks were not completed. As a result, controls are established; but not working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: The HZHC Quality Assurance (QA) inspector signed the DD Form 626 in the Destination block; but did so without filling out any of the required inspection blocks. HWAD SOP HW-000-R-305, 16 Nov 00, Shipping and Receiving Inspection, Revision 3, requires that QASAS monitor 15 percent of all aspects of the contractor's process.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD QASAS immediately instruct DZHC to complete required the required DD Form 626 blocks.

- When monitoring this process, the HWAD QASAS places more emphasis on the inbound shipments' required DD Form 626 blocks.

E. STORAGE MAGAZINES INSPECTIONS: Status: Amber.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has a well-written magazine inspection SOP HW-0000-T-314, 06 Nov 02, Magazine, Building Sites Containing Ammunition or Explosive in Storage, Revision 3, Change 3, that is under revision and a well-maintained database documenting magazine inspections. However, HWAD has not performed magazine inspections since July/August 2004. At that time, HWAD inspected over 400 magazines. As of 20 Apr 05, 1,353 magazines are overdue for their biennial inspections. Regulatory controls are established; but not working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: Supply Bulletin (SB) 742-1, 17 Jan 05, Ammunition Surveillance Procedures, Chapter 10, requires magazine inspections be performed annually. However, HWAD in accordance with SB 742-1, chapter 10, paragraph 10-2.c. and IOP QA-001, 15 Jun 04, Magazine Inspection, has extended the annual requirement to 24 months. HWAD

extended the annual requirement due to the absence of a pattern of magazine facility or materiel deficiencies.

HWAD magazine inspections are not current because of higher priority workload and personnel shortages. HWAD plans to resume magazine inspections when two (2) annuitants and four (4) interns start work in May 2005.

Nine (9) storage sites were inspected and we found no discrepancies during our visits.

- Triple Arch Magazines: 116-72A, 116-39C, 116-43A, 115-50E, and 113-63A.

- Outdoor Storage Area: PLOT4

- Earth Covered Magazines: 114-15, 115-44, and 111-87.

3. Recommendation(s): HWAD executes proposed get well-plan identified in the Discussion section.

V - TRANSPORTATION

A. SHIPPING PROCESS, PROCEDURES, AND DOCUMENTATION:

Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has a good shipping process. Formal procedures, IOPs, and documentation are complete. As a result, controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: We discussed the overall shipping process with HWAD transportation personnel and reviewed 25 outbound records/files. Our review disclosed procedures are in place and working as intended. DZHC shipping files/packets have all required material per previous US General Accounting Office (GAO) audit. Additional detailed information and forms are included, i.e. Transportation Priorities 1 - 3 and CAT I and II material notification form for each shipping packet. They have a check sheet attached to the front page of each packet listing required documentation. This is used for internal control and completion of files.

3. Recommendation(s): None.

B. RECEIVING PROCESS, PROCEDURES, AND DOCUMENTATION:

Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has written procedures, IOPs, for incoming shipments. During our review, we found two (2) inadequate procedures.

- The incoming truck receipt traffic technician was not aware of the need to inform the traffic management office when shipments were received without advance REPSHIPS. Eight (8) of 15 files, 53 percent, did not have REPSHIPS. The traffic management office issues a Transportation Deficiency Report when required. This was a deficiency GAO noted.

- DD Form 626 is not always completely filled out. Specifically, the DD Form 626s are being signed, but do not indicate checks/inspections were conducted.

For this process, overall controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: We discussed the REPSHIP deficiency with the HWAD Transportation Officer, HWAD Traffic Technician (at truck lot), and DZHC Traffic Manager. The inbound procedure is being updated. This update will include the REPSHIP requirement and process notification in the revised IOP.

DD Form 626 is a QA function. SFSJM-QAS addresses this in their assessment. See Section IV - Quality Assurance and Surveillance, D. Transportation and Conveyance Inspection.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues reviewing all IOPs and making updates as needed/required.

- HWAD revises the Incoming Shipments IOP and forwards the revision to HQ, AFSC, AMSFS-ST, care of Mr. Dave Tipp and Mr. Melvin Outen.

C. TRACKING (INBOUND AND OUTBOUND): Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD currently tracks all inbound and outbound shipments to final destination. As result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: HWAD tracks and monitors (traces when appropriate) all movements of munitions and sensitive materials into the depot and to the final destination for outbound shipments. As a result, HWAD fully complies with the DTR DOD 4500.9-R, November 2004, Part II - Cargo Movement, chapter 202. HWAD receives daily reports (via fax) from the Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTTS) on all shipments for both incoming and outbound movement. Procedures are in place for tracking outbound shipments and are currently being used as intended. If/when a shipment "appears" that the RDD is questionable, HWAD take proactive action by contacting the carrier to ensure on time delivery.

3. Recommendation(s): None.

D. CARRIER PERFORMANCE PROGRAM: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has an excellent Carrier Performance Program (CPP). As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: We interviewed the HWAD TO and discussed the process/procedures in place and viewed records/files. Our review disclosed HWAD applies the CPP criteria in accordance with the DTR DOD 4500.9-R, November 2004, Part II - Cargo Movement, chapter 207. HAWD maintains records of violations by individual carriers. Both inbound and outbound discrepancies by carriers are being funneled to one central location/person for appropriate action. Monthly reports for all LOWs are being sent via email to the HQ, AFSC transportation office, AMSFS-ST, each month in a timely manner.

3. Recommendation(s): HQ, AFSC, AMSFS-ST, pursues a quicker and simpler process for issuing LOWs. IAW DTR DOD 4500.9-R, Chapter 207, LOWs and non-use notification currently must be sent via registered mail to carriers. Replies/responses from carriers are also sent via U.S. Postal Service. A possible solution may be to allow LOWs be sent via email. Also, allow carriers to respond via email. Non-use notification would remain via registered mail.

E. SECURE HOLDING: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has a secure holding policy and complies with the DTR DOD 4500.9-R requirements. As a result controls are in place and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: The secure hold area information is properly noted in the TFG. We reviewed the current procedures and DZHC IOP dated 19 Mar 03. Specific procedures for managing and controlling access into and out of the secure holding/safe haven areas are clearly written for both duty and non-duty hours. The log for non-duty entry includes date, time, driver, carrier/company, tractor name, trailer number, copy of Commercial Bill of Lading (CBL), DODIC, seal numbers, explosive type, and the driver must sign the form/log. HWAD conducts daily Secure Holding inspections/inventories. The Guard Operations Center (GOC) faxes daily inventory reports to the government TO and DZHC traffic office. The TO takes appropriate action when required. The IOP is over two (2) years old, but is still

applicable and accurate, except MTMC has changed their name to SDDC. The IOP does not state "a shipment must not be held in secure holding greater than 48 hours without prior approval of the shipping activity" per MTMC/SDDC memorandum dated 19 Apr 03.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD updates the 19 Mar 03 IOP to reflect name change of MTMC to SDDC. In addition, add a statement on the 48 hour rule for compliance with the 19 Apr 03 MTMC/SDDC memo.

- HWAD forwards a copy of the updated IOP to HQ, AFSC, AMSFS-ST, care of Mr. Dave Tipp and Mr. Melvin Outen.

F. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MOVEMENT WORKLOAD: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD properly performs equitable distribution of transportation/movement workload. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: We discussed equitable carrier distribution procedures with the HWAD TO. The TO provided carrier distribution spreadsheet and backup data. Additionally, we reviewed carrier distribution data report for December 2004 - March 2005. JMC data measured both cost/dollars by percentage and by weight/tons for each carrier. HWAD is in compliance with the GFM guidance. Hawthorne transportation maintains files/documentation and includes as an attachment, the ETA/GFM routing screen to show reasons for non-selection of equal rated/listed carriers. In most cases, reason was to ensure fair and equal distribute of transportation workload to all ammunition approved carriers.

3. Recommendation(s): None.

G. CONTAINER CONTROL MANAGEMENT: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: The HWAD Container Management Program is excellent. As a result, local controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: We interviewed the Container Program

Manager and reviewed the program files. Our review disclosed the files contain the most recent regulatory requirements. The one (1) area HWAD needs to concentrate on is the Container Control Officer (CCO) appointment letter. HWAD verified their container upload list is completed and forwarded IAW the DOD Directive and provided to the Headquarters, Department of Army Container Manager via the US Army Field Support Command (AFSC) inventory database and Army Intermodal Distribution Platform Management Office. Hawthorne updates the AFSC inventory database monthly as required. Currently, on-hand Hawthorne has 615 leased Textainer containers under prefixes PRSU, MLCU, TGHU and TEXU. Arrangements have been made with the HQ, AFSC Container Manager to get the list of these containers and provide it to Textainer for their removal of all; but 200 containers. The HWAD CCO requested keeping at least 200 leased containers on-hand for future movements.

3. Recommendation(s): AMSFS-ST provides the JMC storage activities with Command Container Management Policy that provides clear container management requirements guidance within 120 days of final report release.

H. TRANSPORTATION FACILITY GUIDE (TFG): Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: During our assessment, we reviewed the HWAD TFG screens/listings in ETA. The TFG is current as of 31 Jan 05. As a result, regulatory controls are in place and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: We discussed the TFG update procedures and process using ETA. HWAD has indicated using ETA/TFG system/software is slow. Other JMC TOs have expressed similar concerns/problems with TFG program/software.

3. Recommendation(s): HWAD continues with current operation. GFM is being updated as required and within required guidelines. If any problems with ETA/TFG program arise, identify "exact" program/software problems and forward to HQ, AFSC, AMSFS-ST, care of Mr. David Tipp and Mr. Melvin Outen.

**I. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES AND DESK PROCEDURES:
Status: Green.**

1. Conclusion: DZHC has written IOPs for each functional area reviewed. As a result, local controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: We reviewed transportation outbound procedures, receiving, met/missed RDDs, export (water, air, Foreign Military Sales), container management, and secure hold area. Our review disclosed DZHC has very good written procedures. These procedures are readily accessible to all personnel.

3. Recommendation(s): None.

VI - EXPLOSIVE SAFETY

A. RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGNMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL STAFFING:

Status: Green.

1. Conclusion:

a. The ACO Safety Officer at HWAD, responsible for the oversight of the explosive safety program at HWAD, is a member of the Commander's Staff with unencumbered access to the Commander in accordance with regulatory guidance. Safety responsibilities throughout the installation are identified in the HWAD Regulation (HWADR) 385-10, 31 Oct 00, Safety Program Management. The DZHC Safety Manager has unencumbered access to the DZHC General Manager. Safety responsibilities throughout the organization are identified in the DZHC Safety Program. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD and DZHC.

b. The HWAD and DZHC Safety Offices are fully staffed with current manning requirements. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion:

a. Both organizations operate within the regulatory guidance or are aligned with the spirit of the regulations with respect to the unencumbered access of the Safety Managers to the senior member of their respective organizations. HWADR 385-10 clearly identifies safety related responsibilities throughout the organization. This regulation is currently under review with changes forthcoming. The DZHC Safety Program is a comprehensive controlled document providing detailed requirements for explosive safety concerns.

b. The HWAD ACO Safety Office is staffed with a manager responsible for oversight of the installation explosive safety arena. This office provides oversight of the many and varied explosive operations being executed at HWAD (by DZHC, US Marine Corps, and US Navy). The DZHC Safety office is fully staffed as required by current work requirements. They have also instituted a program that requires Quality Assurance Specialists to focus daily efforts with respect to explosive safety duties.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD and DZHC continue to execute the safety program in accordance with established regulatory guidance.

- The DZHC Safety Program document is shared with other organizations as an example that presents a comprehensive compilation of safety requirements.

- Both HWAD and DZHC continue to execute and enforce an effective safety program.

B. REGULATIONS AVAILABILITY AND CURRENCY: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD Safety, responsible for oversight of the explosive safety program at HWAD, has access to (either hardcopy at their workstation or online) the required current regulations. DZHC has a current copy of DOD 4145.26, September 1997, Standard Contractors Safety Manual for Ammunition and Explosives (DOD 4145.26M) available. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: Both HWAD and DZHC Safety personnel exhibit strong in-depth regulatory requirements knowledge. Their on-hand resources are extensive and supplemented by publications available on-line. Note: As required by the fixed-cost contract, DZHC must follow regulatory guidance in effect at the time of contract award.

3. Recommendation(s): None.

C. EXPLOSIVE LICENSES: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: The HWAD Ammunition Storage Plan contains required explosive licensing information. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: The HWAD Ammunition Storage Plan is a very comprehensive document that provides the "backbone" of the licensing program. The document is current and being reviewed on an annual basis. HWAD Safety maintains this document. As indicated in the regulatory controls, an explosive license is a required and permanent document listing Hazard Division limits for all Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) approved ammunition

and explosive approved sites. The HWAD Ammunition Storage Plan currently lists all storage sites, operating buildings, and loading docks, to include information required by Department of the Army Pamphlet 385-64 (DA PAM 385-64), 15 Dec 1999, Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards.

3. Recommendation(s): HWAD consider pursuing the acquisition of DOD sponsored free software (ESS) that will provide an automated means of maintaining the explosive license program as well as installation master maps with explosive safety quantity distance arcs. The DAC US Army Technical Center for Explosive Safety (USATCES) will provide information for the acquisition of the program.

**D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPLOSIVE SAFETY BOARD (DDESB)
FINDINGS: Status: Green.**

1. Conclusion: HWAD provided responses to the two (2) findings surfaced during the 2004 DDESB survey. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: Findings identified during the 2004 DDESB Survey were responded to by initiating and executing two (2) separate Safety Site Plan Submissions. These submissions have been forwarded as required by regulatory guidance.

3. Recommendation(s): HWAD contacts HQ, AFSC, AMSFS-SF, to obtain status of these submissions.

**E. SITE PLANS AND INSTALLATION MASTER PLAN: Status:
Green.**

1. Conclusion: The HWAD Safety Office provided evidence of compliance with the explosive safety site plan submission process and presence of an Installation Master Map with explosive safety quantity distance arcs. As a result, the regulatory controls are established and working as intended.

2. Discussion:

The HWAD Safety Office executes a very effective site plan safety submission process. DZHC provides input to the process. There is evidence of a strong, close working

relationship between the organizations. No new construction or modification to existing buildings occurs without discussion among interested parties and obtaining final concurrence of the Depot Commander. Of special note, HWAD Safety has forwarded submissions for all existing facilities requiring DDESB approval.

The HWAD Safety Office maintains an Installation Master Plan (map), titled "HWAD Strategic Plan 2000-2010". Also, a series of maps displaying explosive safety quantity distance arcs is present in the safety office.

HWAD has no exemptions or waivers in effect at this time.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD Safety and DZHC continue to work together to provide accurate and effective site plan submissions.

- HWAD considers pursuing the acquisition of DOD sponsored free software (ESS) that will provide an automated means of maintaining the explosive license program as well as installation master maps with explosive safety quantity distance arcs. DAC USATCES will provide information for the acquisition of the program.

F. DEMOLITION AND DEMILITARIZATION OPERATIONS: Status:
Green.

1. Conclusion: The DZHC demolition and demilitarization processes observed comply with the approved standard operating procedures. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion:

The Plasma Ordnance Disposal System (PODS) operation is still in a pre-operational phase. No energetic material is being processed at this time. Evidence was provided indicating compliance with conditions set forth in the safety site plan submission.

The M483A1 Disassembly and C445 Renovation operations are good examples of safe and efficient operations.

3. Recommendation(s):

- HWAD continues to execute the demilitarization process in accordance with the procedures established for these operations.

- HWAD maintains the excellent coordination and cooperation of all organizations required to execute the operations safely and efficiently.

G. MATERIAL HANDLING OPERATIONS: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: DZHC personnel execute material handling in accordance with the required current regulations. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: Material handling operations were observed at Buildings 108-20 and 103-16. Forklifts were serviceable, with current inspections, and operated appropriately. Slings and chain hoists were serviceable, with current inspections, and operated appropriately. Operators are properly trained and licensed with records available at the Human Resources Training Coordinator's office.

3. Recommendation(s): DZHC continues to execute the material handling operations safely and in accordance with regulatory guidance.

VII - INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ORGANIZATION (ISO) 9001:2000:
Status: No rating.

A. APPLICABILITY:

1. Conclusion: Pursuit of ISO certification is appropriate for the HWAD ACO given MACOM/MSC support and sufficient resources.

2. Discussion: The HWAD ACO does not have an established QMS. This is a requirement for an organization desiring ISO certification. Resources, funding and personnel, preclude HWAD from actively seeking ISO certification. The HWAD Office of the Commander is fully cognizant of the benefits of an organization being certified to the ISO Standard.

DZHC does have an established QMS and was certified to ISO 9001:2000 on 13 Jul 01. Evidence was provided indicating the organization is working within the QMS. The QMS is tested regularly as required by ISO. Documentation supporting the QMS includes Quality Management Policies, SOPs, and IOPs.

3. Recommendation(s): DZHC has established an excellent, comprehensive QMS that could be used as an example for other installations in establishing an ISO certifiable QMS.

VIII - ADMINISTRATION

A. STAFFING AND MANPOWER:

IV - Quality Assurance and Surveillance: Status: No rating.

1. Conclusion: Currently critical mission areas are being adequately supported, but only through using QASAS interns to fill these positions during their on-the-job training.

2. Discussion:

Four (4) new interns report for work in May 2005 and will not be on the HWAD Table of Distribution and Allowance unlike the three (3) departing interns who were. The three (3) departing interns are being transferred as they become journeymen QASAS. Two (2) new annuitants will report for work in May 2005.

One (1) QASAS is currently deployed.

For all HWAD journeymen QASAS currently assigned, one (1) has been at HWAD for more than four (4) months and will leave in May 2005.

In June 2005, two (2) QASAS supervisors will be certified in HAZMAT transportation.

Inexperience and high turnover of personnel result in inadequate training of interns.

Some QASAS administrative functions have been tasked to the office secretary.

3. Recommendation(s): None. Career Program 20 Manager is addressing this concern as Higher Headquarters directed.

B. TRAINING:

V - Transportation: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD transportation employees are being properly trained and certified. Records are maintained. Training plans for each DZHC employee by job

description are laid out very clearly and precisely. HWAD has a very good overall training plan in place, with one exception. HAZMAT certifiers do not have "appointment orders" outlining scope of authority from the activity, Commander or his representative. As a result, regulatory controls are in place and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: We discussed training requirements with the DZHC Training Officer and HWAD TO. The DZHC Training Officer demonstrated the DZHC program and made all queries sought. We reviewed the transportation employee training program.

SPECIAL NOTE: The DZHC Traffic Manager requested JMC assistance for additional AIT training to include key control, security, and MTMS-FM software. AMSFS-ST has been contacted and is willing to work with HWAD and provide them with MTMS-FM training. SFSJM-CTA will discuss further as a "special interest item".

3. Recommendation(s): HWAD ensure both government and contractor employees, that are HAZMAT certified, are appointed in writing (appointment orders). Government employees should be appointed by the Commander. HWAD should make an internal decision as to who signs/appoints DZHC employees. Either the Commander or a DZHC representative is acceptable. Copy must be provided to the HWAD TO. Upon completion of appointment orders, the HWAD TO sends an email to HQ, AFSC, AMSFS-ST, care of Mr. Dave Tipp and Mr. Melvin Outen, stating this action is completed. AMSFS-ST does not need copies of appointment orders/letters.

VI - Explosives Safety: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: DZHC has developed and maintains a comprehensive and extensive training program in accordance with regulatory guidance. As a result, controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: DZHC executes its explosive training IAW the DZHC Master Training Plan and Safety Program. The DZHC Safety Manager provides general and job related training during new employee orientation. Employees must pass a written test at the conclusion of the explosive safety portion. HAZMAT training is conducted after completion of new employee training. Employees report to

their assigned supervisor to receive job specific, standard operating procedure training. The Human resources Division Training Coordinator keeps detailed records for all training. Our records review indicates that explosive safety training is a high priority in personnel development.

3. Recommendation(s):

- DZHC continues to emphasize and execute an effective explosive safety-training program.

- AMSFS-HR considers adopting the "PC Compliance-Training Management Software (v.3.0)" command-wide to forecast, schedule, and record, personnel training.

IX - SPECIAL INTEREST ITEMS

A. AUTOMATION: Status: Not Rated.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has implemented several automation initiatives. In addition, HWAD would like to expand their MTMS-FM knowledge and use. HWAD has a manual key control process; but expressed interest in the HQ, JMC automated key control process.

2. Discussion:

SILC: HWAD has embraced SILC and is reaping the benefits of greater efficiencies in their inventory program. Inventory is doing an excellent job; but feels the storage, receipt, and shipping, crews could use more training on scanner use to reproduce needed bar codes without manual data entry. The SILC help desk is more than willing to assist HWAD. This should help in the bar codes continued accuracy.

MTMS-FM: HWAD has purchased all the MTMS-FM equipment to use the system. At this time HWAD is currently printing MROs using the AIT server; but needs training on the functionality of the screens and use between departments. They are able to write tags using the Smart Chain Client Tools (previously TAV tools), but have not been trained on MTMS-FM software. Hawthorne is currently creating Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMDs) using the Command's web site. HWAD is eagerly waiting on training so they can use the entire system.

Product Manager Joint-Automatic Identification Technology (PM-J-AIT): HWAD is awaiting the PM-J-AIT team Site Survey before proceeding with training. Hawthorne wants to ensure correct functioning and communication exists. The team was recently in HWAD the week of 27 - 29 Mar 05. POC during the site survey came from the Information Technology department.

Mobile Detection Assessment and Response System (MDARS) - Exterior System: HWAD is the MDARS prototype for a joint Army - Navy development effort to provide automated intrusion detection and inventory assessment capability for use in DOD warehouses and storage sites. The MDARS' objective is to provide an autonomous platform utilizing robotics technology with the following capabilities:

surveillance of assets and facility grounds, intruder detection, barrier assessment using sensors for door lock detection, and inventory control assistance.

Key Control Program (Check-It-Out): At this time, this automated program has not been initiated at HWAD, but they are open to its installation and the available HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, training.

3. Recommendation(s): None.

B. MRO DENIALS: Status: Not Rated.

1. Conclusion: On two (2) separate instances, Hill AFB item managers by-passed the HQ, JMC process for requisitioning SMCA materiel and created in-line denials. The unauthorized MRO generated a 16 percent denial rate in March 2004 and a 27 percent denial rate in February 2005 for HWAD. This resulted in a poor MRO performance at HWAD.

2. Discussion: The AF item managers loaded requisitions without HQ, JMC knowledge or authorization and the MROs automatically denied in-line with a management code 7 - no requesting stock number. The denials are reflected on the US Army Materiel Command Depot Report of Supply Performance (304 Report) for March and April 2004 and February and March 2005. The erroneous denial data reflected in the 304 Report is not correctable and elevates the HWAD denial rate well above the HQ, AMC one (1) percent denial goal. These AF item manager requisition generated errors must be corrected to avoid future denial at HWAD.

3. Recommendation(s): HQ, JMC, SFSJM-CTA, requests the AF Liaison Office located at Rock Island Arsenal assistance in training Hill AFB item managers on the proper procedure for requisitioning SMCA controlled stock.

C. PROPELLANT STABILITY PROGRAM: Status: Green.

1. Conclusion: HWAD has properly established a Propellant Stability Program. As a result, regulatory controls are established and working as intended at HWAD.

2. Discussion: Our review determined HWAD has a local procedure, IOP QA-004, 16 Jun 04, Propellant Management Policy, and database with current stability values that form the foundation for their Propellant Stability

Program's implementation and execution. We selected ten (10) lots for review. Each lot reviewed has the current percent stability and test date recorded on the DSR Card and the local database. As a result, HWAD complies with SB 742-1 and DAC Guide, December 2003, Ammunition Logistics - Propellant Management Policy.

3. Recommendation(s): None.

X - MANAGEMENT CONTROL

A. ASSESSMENT:

1. Conclusion: As previously stated, we found two (2) instances at HWAD. (I) Controls are established and working as intended. (II) Controls are established and not working as intended. It is HWAD management's responsibility to periodically test key management controls and verify they are in place and working as intended so they eliminate or reduce the procedure, process, or system, associated high, medium, or low, risk(s). This constitutes the Army management control policy, specifically - risk management.

2. Discussion: Risk management is a Management Control Program and process component and managerial responsibility. During the assessment we reviewed the HWAD FY 05 Assurance Statement on Management Control forwarded to HQ, AFSC. Our intent was to confirm through supporting documentation that in FY 05 HWAD tested the functional areas we assessed and verified key controls are in place and working as intended. We were unable to accomplish this effort because a documented audit trail did not exist to show the tests HWAD conducted and their results. Retaining supporting documentation to verify performing key management controls testing and verification is something we need to address to the HQ, AFSC Management Control Administrator and ensure is present in the FY 06 Management Control Program guidance. Supporting documentation provides an independent reviewer such as our Assessment Team with reasonable assurance key management controls are in place and operating as intended before the review begins.

In accordance with AR 11-2, chapter 2, paragraph 2-6, the absence or ineffectiveness of management controls constitutes a management control weakness that requires correction. In addition, the organization must evaluate the management control weakness for materiality. As a result, HWAD must review this assessment's instances where controls are not working as intended and (1) determine if any are material and (2) correct them. Correction applies to the instance even if it is not considered a material weakness. *Note: Resource deficiencies in themselves are not considered management control weaknesses.

3. Recommendation(s): The HWAD Management Control Program POC:

- Maintains a copy of the assessment report in the Management Control Program files to document the assessment was performed in FY 05 and its results.

- Updates the existing "MANAGEMENT CONTROL EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED WITHIN (HAWTHORNE ARMY DEPOT) IN FISCAL YEAR 2005" enclosure and forward a copy to the BGAD MCA for forwarding to the HQ, AFSC MCA. List this assessment as P - Process Review.

- Receives a schedule of audits, inspections, and other reviews, performed and completed at HWAD during the FY. Any audits, inspections, and other reviews, completed during the FY and before the HQ, AFSC management control suspense should appear in enclosure 2, MANAGEMENT CONTROL EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED WITHIN (HAWTHORNE ARMY DEPOT) IN FISCAL YEAR XX. For those audits, inspections, and other reviews completed after the HQ, AFSC management control suspense, they should go into enclosure 2 for the following FY.

- The applicable HWAD managers evaluate the audit, inspection, or other reviews, results and determine if key controls are in place and working as intended. After this evaluation, provide written documentation regarding their evaluation to the HWAD Commander and HWAD Management Control Program POC.

APPENDIX A - HWAD AND DZHC KEY PERSONNEL CONTACTED

NAME	ORGANIZATION	DSN 830
LTC Johnny Summers	Commander	7001
Mr. Florentino Cardenas	CEA	7002
Mr. Ray Montoya	Inv/Accountability	7502
Ms. Clezie Brantley	DZHC Inv/Accountability	7205
Ms. Teresa McNally	DZHC Inv/Accountability	7447
Ms. Rita Vaden	DZHC Inv/Accountability	7765
Ms. Debbie Sitton-Baker	DZHC Inv/Accountability	7275
Ms. Gloralyn Rath	DZHC Inv/Accountability	7023
Ms. Gina Buum	DZHC Inv/Accountability	7970
Mr. Lotus Rubert	DZHC Inv/Accountability	7463
Ms. Rita Barnhurst	DZHC Inv/Accountability	7987
Mr. Tom Lyle	Physical Security	7012
Mr. Joe Carlos	DZHC Physical Security	7601
Ms. Sue Teters	DZHC Physical Security	7555
Mr. Ed Simkins	Quality Assurance	7407
Mr. Jon Allie	Quality Assurance	7834
Ms. Renee Holt	Quality Assurance	7400
Mr. Kent Wofford	Quality Assurance	7835
Ms. LeAnne Cornell	DZHC Quality Assurance	7041
Mr. Steve Wheeler	DZHC Quality Assurance	7043
Mr. Steve Clark	Transportation	7118
Ms. Donna Kovacs	DZHC Transportation	7415
Ms. Nora Selby	DZHC Transportation	7306
Mr. Gene Dillard	DZHC Transportation	7850
Mr. Dave Dillingham	Safety	7020
*Mr. Jim Holt	DZHC Safety	7930
Mr. Wayne Larson	DZHC Safety	7842
Ms. Donna Roberts	Management Controls	7341

*Retired 28 Apr 05.

APPENDIX B - ASSESSMENT TEAM MEMBERS

NAME	ORGANIZATION	DSN 793
Mr. Rickey Peer	JMC Inv/Acct	2307
Ms. Mazie Angus	JMC Inv/Acct	3596
Mr. Marvin Elmore	JMC Inv/Acct	6644
Mr. Mark Lile	JMC Inv/Acct	0132
Mr. Howard Hill	JMC Inv/Acct (BGAD)	DSN 745-6547
Mr. Sebastian Curtis	AFSC Internal Review	2497
Mr. James Moore	AFSC Force Protection	1530
Mr. Quinn Williams	JMC QASAS	6617
Mr. Bill Akins	JMC QASAS	7552
Mr. Dave Tipp	AFSC Transportation	6243
Mr. Rick Gates	AFSC Transportation	4873
Mr. Dan Linehan, Jr.	DAC	DSN 956-8867
Mr. Jay Lundberg	JMC Facilities Mgmt	2318

HAWTHORNE ARMY AMMUNITION DEPOT

