RED RIVER DEFENSE COMPLEX



DCN: 2833

OUTLINE FOR BRAC COMMISSION BRIEF
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT
16 JUNE 2005

I. DEVIATION FROM CRITERIA AND POLICY

A. Strategy for Maintenance IJCSG was to "minimize sites"

B. Deviated from DOD 4151.18H *Depot Maintenance Capacity and Utilization Measurement Handbook* on capacity for single shift (1-8-5)

C. "Created" 2.6M DLH at ANAD and LEAD to accept FY04 workload by using 1.5 shifts; eliminates surge capacity at gaining installations.

D. DA analysis on Depot Maintenance shows no significant excess among five depots for FY2003.

E. JCSG and DA ignored "unique capabilities" of RRAD in M1 Abrams Roadwheel, Missile Recertification, and Bradley Transmission.

II. FLAWED INSTRUCTIONS & GUIDANCE

A. Decisions created new Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) without regard for current Army CITEs.

B. No basis for justification of 30% overhead structure savings.

C. Unrealistic COBRA calculation of 75% personnel relocation

D. Ignored RRAD environmental cost ($67M) for closure cleanup

E. No serious consideration for gaining workload

F. DLH transferred without analysis of throughput capacity; FY05 workload is 4.0M DLH at RRAD and 19M DLH for Army increasing to 25M in FY06.

G. DA "unconvinced" of ability of other depots to assume RRAD workload at current levels.

III. MILITARY VALUE

A. Insignificant rating difference between LEAD and RRAD (one position; 8/100 of point).

B. RRAD higher rated in Logistics, Cost, Training, and Power Projection; LEAD in Well-Being and Future.

C. No joint rating for highly rated and co-located DLA Distribution Facility (DDRT)

D. Ratings do not reflect all depot commodities and especially where highly rated

E. Does not reflect current military value of depot for critically needed items (HMMWV, Bradley transmission, roadwheel and track).

Section I **Tab A**

For the depot function, the weights of the four criteria were nearly equal. Criterion 3 was weighted the highest, because the Ship Overhaul and Repair sub-group valued the ability to meet long-term adaptability, mobilization, and contingency requirements. Criteria 1, 2, and 3 were each weighted slightly higher than Criterion 4, as mission-effectiveness is paramount. Criterion 1 reflected the current capabilities, which are likely to remain valued in the foreseeable future. Criterion 2 on facilities was equally weighed with the ability to meet needs because Criteria 1 and 2 together represent the in-place features of the shipyards.

Within the intermediate function, Criterion 1 was most heavily weighted to reflect the belief that IMA's are Fleet-following activities, without purpose when Fleet units are not collocated with the IMA. By being close to Fleet units, IMA's have the ability to provide a quick turn-around and short response time to Fleet emergent and routine maintenance needs. Criteria 1 and 2 together represent the in-place features of the IMA. Criterion 3 was next most important because it reflects the ability to meet future requirements as new platforms join the Navy inventory. Additionally, it provides the capability to meet contingency needs. Although Criterion 4 is an important factor for maintenance, the need to meet readiness requirements is the driving force for maintenance activities.

c. Scenario Development

Maintenance

After looking at numerous potential strategies for developing scenarios, the Maintenance sub-group developed a strategy to minimize sites by: 1) using the commodity level Total or Maximum Capacity at 1.5 shifts or Maximum Capacity at 1.0 shift; 2) maximizing military value at the commodity level. Capacity and military value data was run through the approved Optimization Tool utilizing a "Depot X" for limited amounts of workload that could not be accommodated under existing capacity, or classification. The output of the Optimization Tool was reviewed by the sub-group to determine the impacts and appropriateness of potential workload shifts. Workloads that had been placed in "Depot X" were either moved to other locations, with the expectation of building additional capacity, or classified as a showstopper to a closure or, realignment. The group used the reported capacity for a single shift and added a second shift using half of the single shift capacity for determining where to relocate the workload.

III. Analytical Approach/Analysis

a. Capacity Analysis

The disparate nature of the functions being analyzed by the IJCSG does not lend itself to a "one size fits all" analytic approach. The throughput of a manufacturing entity is viewed and measured very differently than that of a maintenance facility, and ship repair offers yet another set of unique functions. There are some overlaps but, in order to conduct meaningful industrial capacity analyses, ammunition and armaments, maintenance, and ship repair were best initially analyzed as discrete functions.

The three sub-groups worked together to develop definitions in order to avoid seams and overlap during the analysis process. For the most part, the BRAC 95 definition of terms developed by the Maintenance Joint Cross Service Group was used as a baseline and is attached. These definitions were further adapted, where noted, to meet the requirements of the individual sub-groups.

With one exception, the following common definition for maximum capacity was adopted for use by the IJCSG.

The maximum workload that could be performed assuming:

(a) No additional major Military Construction to that already funded through the FY 2004 Appropriations Act

(b) Capacity measured on a 40-hour workweek baseline

(c) Skilled workforce is available

(d) Support equipment/workstations comes with transferred workload

(e) Existing work continues to be preformed

(f) Under utilized facilities/space can only be counted once for an optimal work mix

Other	

The physical capacity metric was derived from *DoD Depot Maintenance Capacity and Utilization Measurement Handbook*, DoDD 4151.18H. That handbook measures capacity in terms such as the total capacity index, and the required capacity index. The maximum capacity construct adopted by the working group is the extent to which operations, by commodity group, could be expanded for a maintenance activity based on the current and future planned workload mixes assuming:

(a) No additional major Military Construction to that already funded through the FY 2004 Appropriations Act

(b) Capacity measured on a 40-hour workweek baseline

(c) Skilled workforce is available

(d) Support equipment/workstations comes with transferred workload

(e) Existing work continues to be performed

(f) Under utilized facilities/space can only be counted once for an optimal work mix.

For each maintenance activity, the workload metric considered the total workload being accomplished, the amount of workload needed to preserve a surge capability (i.e., the ability to preserve wartime capability requirements), and workload directed by Foreign Military Sales and State Department agreements. The capacity and workload metrics are summarized in the following table.

Capacity Metrics - Direct Labor Hours	▪ Total Capacity Index ▪ Required Capacity Index ▪ Maximum Capacity
Workload Metrics – Direct Labor Hours	▪ Total ▪ Core ▪ Directed ▪ Last Source ▪ Etc.

Combat Field Support/Intermediate-Level Maintenance

To ensure critical deployable combat field and intermediate-level maintenance capabilities were maintained, only combat field support/intermediate maintenance

activities that contained non-deployable maintenance personnel and non-deployable equipment that resided in a fixed infrastructure were considered for analysis.

Physical capacity was based on the actual facilities available to perform maintenance work for each of the various commodity groups. Workload was the amount of maintenance and repair work being accomplished by these non-deployable organizations. That included all work being provided for other activities not assigned to these organizations. Since those organizations have manpower consisting of military, civilian, and contractors, total manpower was considered. To ensure timely support to the deployable forces, the locations of critical maintenance and repair support capacity was also ascertained.

Depot Capacity Analysis Approach

Four pertinent questions relating to capacity were asked in the capacity data call. The respondents were requested to provide capacity data expressed in thousands of direct labor hours (DLHs) for work performed and to tie those DLHs to commodity groups. The references used to answer the capacity questions were the *DoD 4151.18H Depot Maintenance Capacity and Utilization Measurement Handbook* and Handbook supplemental guidance of October 4, 2001. The DoD core methodology dated November 10, 2003 was to be utilized to capture Service Core requirements.

Total Capacity (Current Capacity)

Maximum Capacity (Maximum Potential Capacity)

Service Core Requirement by Installation (Includes Surge)

Total Workload (Current Usage)

To respond to those questions, several calculations were required; a brief explanation is provided below.

Total Capacity Index (Current Capacity). Current Capacity was interpreted to be the Total Capacity Index. This index indicates the amount of capacity, expressed in DLH, that a facility can effectively employ, annually, on a single shift, 40-hour work week basis while producing the product mix that the facility is designed to accommodate.

Maximum Capacity. Maximum Capacity is defined as maximum workload that could be performed assuming:

(a) No additional major Military Construction in addition to that already funded through the FY 2004 Appropriations Act

(b) Capacity measured on a 40 hour work week baseline

(c) Skilled workforce is available

(d) Support equipment/workstations transferred with workload

(e) Existing work continues to be performed

(f) Underutilized facilities/space can only be counted once for an optimal work mix.

Workload (Current Usage). Workload includes core and non-core workload from all sources, i.e., interservicing, other non-DoD agency work, last source, directed, and FMS workload as a measure of the capacity being used. Workload is reported in DLHs expressed in thousands of hours.

Capacity Calculations. While capacity data was collected for four years (FY 2003-2005 and 2009), based on ISG guidance, the analysis used only FY 2003-2005. The calculations were based on an average of FY 2003-2005.

The range for the potential excess capacity was determined by subtracting the higher number between Total Workload and Service Core from the Total Capacity and the Maximum Capacity reported.

There was one minor deviation from the previously approved Capacity Analysis Plan. In order to determine potential excess capacity, the maintenance sub-group used Total Workload or Service Core by installation. Both of those are components of the Required Capacity Index referred to in the capacity report. The use of those components rather than the Index presents a more accurate reflection of what could reasonably be considered in determining potential excess capacity for this reporting requirement.

Combat Field Support/Intermediate-Level Maintenance Function Capacity Analysis Approach

The analysis evaluated only non-deployable maintenance personnel and non-deployable equipment that resided in a fixed infrastructure. The physical capacity was based on the actual facilities available to perform maintenance work for the various

Section I Tab C1

USA-0036R SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION

Recommendation Supporting Information

17-Apr-05

Close Red River Army Depot

Competing Recommendations and Other Information:

This recommendation incorporates Industrial Scenarios 0111 (munitions center) and 127B that realigns the maintenance functions. It also incorporates the Red River elements of S&S-0043R and 0051 which privatize supply, storage, and distribution of tires, packaged POL, and compressed gasses and closes the DLA distribution center and transfers the mission to the Oklahoma City Distribution Center.

Force Structure Capabilities:

This recommendation ensures that the Department will retain necessary capabilities to support the force structure plan. The closure of Red River shuts down 7,475,000 square feet of maintenance, storage and administrative space. The totality of the recommendations for Materiel and Logistics assures sufficient capacity by refacilitizing Anniston and Letterkenny Army Depots to accommodate 2.6M additional direct labor maintenance hours and by building new facilities at the Oklahoma City Distribution Center.

MVA Results:

The closure of Red River Army Depot involves the relocation or disestablishment of several different functions and as such, the analysis of both joint service groups and a military department. The munitions (Tab A) and depot maintenance (Tab B) functions were analyzed by the Industrial Joint Cross Service Group, the supply, storage, and distribution functions (Tabs C and D) by the Supply and Storage Joint Cross Service Group. Finally, the Army analyzed its overall military value to it. (Tab E).

Capacity Analysis Results:

This recommendation supports consolidation of workload into the Army's Centers for Industrial and Technical Excellence. This recommendation incorporates a surge capability and provides the necessary capacity by adding 2.6M additional Direct Labor Hours to Letterkenny and Anniston Army Depots. Detailed Capacity Information is at Tabs F thru J.

Tab A – Military Value Details for Munitions Maintenance Functions

Tab B - Military Value Details for Depot Maintenance Functions

Tab C - Military Value Details for supply, storage and distribution functions for tires, packaged petroleum, oil and lubricants, and compressed gases.

Tab D - Military Value Details for storage and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depots.

Section I Tab C2

ASA(I&E) directed that TABS present the briefing used in the last Tank to the SRG at the next session. Dr. College agreed, and noted that the SRG is now moving into the phase of integrating the JCSG candidate recommendations with the Army's recommendations using an installation centric approach so that we avoid duplicative costs and savings. Later, we expect that OSD will want us to combine some of the recommendation where it makes sense.

Dr. College then noted that the Supply & Storage JCSG requested Army help in working a candidate recommendation for a Virtual Inventory Control Point. TABS is working on costs analysis now, but it does not appear that the benefits justify the costs.

RRAD discussion

Dr. College then discussed Red River, noting that the FY03 data used in Industrial JCSG's analysis does not reflect current workload or future requirements. He noted that the Industrial JCSG still believes excess capacity exists in depot level maintenance across the Army and that Red River can and should be closed. The Marine facility at Barstow is also considered excess to requirements. [redacted]!! (see next page)

IJCSG - "believes excess capacity exists in DM across Army"

Dr. College then discussed integration of Candidate Recommendations, noting that the focus is on determining accurate costs/savings at each installation by eliminating overlap to get the numbers right. The next step is to determine how to report to the Commission. OSD will take the lead in integration and packaging for the Presidential Commission.

BG Weber then briefed new Education and Training JCSG Candidate Recommendations, beginning with the recommendation to realign all the Services War Colleges to Ft McNair.

ASA(I&E) noted there was solid pushback from all Services and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and asked why E&T is pursuing this recommendation.

Dep, G8 noted that Lincoln Hall, at Ft McNair appeared to be an attractive option for classroom space. However, he noted there were questions of quality of life for the Colonels and their families to move to the DC area for 10 months, as well as a concern of a lack of diversity in thinking if all Services were taught together. An additional issue is the movement of the activity inside the NCR, which may run contrary to the SecDef's intent on relocating activities into the NCR.

No other E&T candidate recommendations generated issues for the SRG.

Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA

Red River Army Depot

- S&S should inform OSD of decision to move SDP to OKC
- Anniston (24) and Letterkenny (39) have higher MV than Red River (40)
- Industrial JCSG determined that remaining capacity sufficient if Red River closed
- The model does not support the reality of mission requirements, nor accurately reflect Red River's military value in this instance — MIL VALUE
- The current base of work differs significantly now from the 03 data, (4 million DLH vice 2.1 million DLH)
- Organic Depot capacity for all 5 Army Depots has increased from 11M DLHs in FY02 to projected 25MDLHs in FY06 — Need all 5 for FY06 workload
- IJCSG is working supplemental data call that will address combat vehicle shortfalls that proposes putting 2.2m DLHs at Anniston and .4m DLHs at Letterkenny — "created" capacity to justify movement.

15 Mar 05
BRAC SRG #34 (CONTD)

On Reserve Component recommendations, Dr. College noted that legal review indicated that BRAC cannot submit Candidate Recommendations that don't include a military installation (State-owned ARNG sites are not military installations by BRAC definition). Therefore, RC candidate recommendations that include only state-owned ARNG facilities must be dropped. Also, the Navy withdrew participation in some of the candidate recommendations resulting in the situation described above. 23 of the RC recommendations fell into this category, and the SRG approved deleting these recommendations from the Army's submission.

Dr. College also noted that TABS is pushing forward with four RC Candidate Recommendations, despite lack of Navy support. These recommendations involve federal property and are considered installations for BRAC purposes. A/USA noted that, unless the Navy is able to demonstrate savings by relocating elsewhere, they may be required to go with the AFRC concept.

Dr. College proceeded to address special topic areas beginning with Technical JSCG Candidate Recommendation 0035A. Mr. Simmons, Army representative to the Technical JCSG, presented an update to Technical JCSG Candidate Recommendation 0035A that consolidated CECOM's Development and Acquisition activities at Aberdeen Proving Ground vice Ft. Belvoir. The SRG supported this modification.

VCSA asked whether this move supports what the Army is doing for Force Spirals. Mr. Simmons took the question for response. PA&E noted that every installation will have a productivity drop during BRAC execution. A/USA indicated that he believed that it is possible to manage the execution in a way that minimizes the impact on productivity and associated risk, and that we must not let that problem undo our BRAC work.

On Natick, the closure candidate recommendation will be submitted by the Army in support of both Technical and Supply and Storage JCSG's recommendations to move activities out of the installation.

On Red River, Dr. College noted that the IEC approved relocation of the functions with the condition that 2.6 M DLH of capacity be added to the other Army depots. The SRG approved submitting an Army candidate recommendation to close Red River given the collection of JCSG recommendations that move activities out of Red River.

On Rock Island, Dr. College noted that the situation is not as clear as with Red River. TABS has prepared a candidate recommendation on Rock Island, but there are too many issues pending for submission at this time.

Red River Army Depot

- OSD and the IJCSG have agreed to relocating the depot functions from Red River but the following conditions must be met:
  - The IJCSG must submit a CR that creates 2.6M DLHs capacity at other depots
  - IJCSG must describe to Secretary of the Army the allocation of the 2.6M DLHs across Letterkenny, Tobyhanna, Anniston and Albany

not IAW DOD Handbook!

22 Mar 05
BRAC SRG #35 (CONTD)

On the movement of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) to Ft Belvoir vice EPG, Dr. College noted that he is working with OSD to refine this candidate recommendation. He recommended that we not be specific about locating activities on the EPG in this or any recommendation, so that the Army could retain flexibility in the BRAC-related moves affecting Ft. Belvoir while preserving our options regarding the EPG. The SRG approved this approach.

On Red River, Dr. College reported the IEC decision to close Red River, and build additional capacity at Anniston Army Depot and Letterkenny Army Depot.

On S&S 35, Dr. College noted that TABS is working with the Supply and Storage JCSG to refine the candidate recommendation.

Dr. College also provided a modularity update, noting that the latest actions moved a UEx HQs from Ft Hood to Ft Carson.

A/USA expressed concern about presenting these recommendations to properly reflect the Army's transformation requirements since the costs are significant.

Dr. College also noted that a SUA/MEB is currently slated to go to Ft Knox. In response to Mr. Wynne's memo on Ft Knox, Dr College noted that the Army had made full use of Ft Knox's capacity, and had no intentions of closing it.

On Rock Island, also a subject of the Wynne Memo, Dr. College noted that TABS is awaiting action by the Industrial JCSG to see if closing Rock Island is feasible. Unless IJCSG moves activities away from Rock Island, the Army will not close it.

On closing Ft Monmouth, the Army is on track to make that recommendation.

On Sierra Army Depot, the Army is not contemplating closure.

On Soldier Systems Center (Natick), Dr. College noted that it was on track to be recommended for closure.

On Ft Huachuca, OSD asked why there was no action to close it. Dr. College noted that TABS responded that there were a number of activities best suited to perform their missions at Ft Huachuca and that the JCSGs had not relocated sufficient activities from there to make a closure action possible.

Dr College briefed that the Navy is contemplating closing Naval Weapons Station Crane. Crane Army Ammunition Activity occupies 80% of NWS Crane. The Army cannot vacate, as it is a strategic platform for production and storage. Army will watch this action closely and work with Navy as appropriate.

Sheet Metal Welding	

Maintenance

In response to the eighteen Combat Field Support/Intermediate questions in the capacity data call, the Maintenance subgroup received data from 181 activities

- Army - 53
- Navy - 48
- Marines - 1
- Air Force - 79

Eleven Depot questions resulted in responses from 44 activities

- Army - 16
- Navy – 19 (includes nine detachments with 20, or more personnel
- Marines - 2
- Air Force - 6
- Defense Logistics Agency -1

Depot Maintenance Function

Capacity Analysis Approach:

The Maintenance subgroup used the approach below to report Current Capacity, Maximum Capacity, and Current Usage. The Maintenance subgroups used the same approach to determine Excess Throughput Capacity as discussed in the Summary of Analysis of this report. Scenario development must take into account industrial factors required for maintenance of workstations as well as unscheduled demands.

Four pertinent questions relating to capacity were asked in the capacity data call. The respondents were requested to provide capacity data expressed in thousands of DLHs for work performed and to tie those DLHs to commodity groups. The references used to

answer the capacity questions were the DoD 4151.18H Depot Maintenance Capacity and Utilization Measurement Handbook and Handbook supplemental guidance of 4 October 2001. The DoD core methodology dated November 10, 2003 was utilized to capture Service Core requirements.

Question 501 - Total Capacity (Current Capacity)
Question 503 - Maximum Capacity (Maximum potential capacity)
Question 504 – Service Core Requirement by Installation (Includes Surge)
Question 506 - Total Workload (Current Usage)

To respond to these questions several calculations were required and a brief explanation is provided below.

Total Capacity Index (Current Capacity). Current Capacity is interpreted as being the Total Capacity Index. This index indicates the amount of capacity, expressed in DLH, that a facility can effectively employ, annually, on a single shift, 40-hour work week basis while producing the product mix that the facility is designed to accommodate.

Maximum Capacity. Maximum Capacity is defined as maximum workload that could be performed assuming:

(a) No additional major Military Construction in addition to that already funded through the FY 2004 Appropriations Act
(b) Capacity measured on a 40 hour workweek baseline
(c) Skilled workforce is available
(d) Support equipment/workstations transferred with workload
(e) Existing work continues to be performed
(f) Underutilized facilities/space can only be counted once for an optimal work mix.

Workload (Current Usage). Workload includes core and non-core workload from all sources, i.e., interservicing, other non-DoD agency work, last source, directed and FMS

workload as a measure of the capacity being used. Workload is reported in DLHs, as expressed in thousands of hours

Surge Requirement. The surge requirement is based on the ability to go from peacetime to wartime operations. The peacetime operations are based on a 40-hour workweek while the wartime operations are based on a 60-hour workweek (no additional augmentation: facilities, equipment, and personnel). The surge requirement is the delta between peacetime and wartime capability requirements

Capacity Calculations.

While capacity data was collected for four years (FY 03-05 and 09), based on ISG guidance, the analysis used only FY 2003-05. The calculations are based on an average of FY 2003-05.

The range for the potential excess capacity was determined by subtracting the higher number between Total Workload and Service Core from the Total Capacity and the Maximum Capacity reported.

There is one minor deviation from the Capacity Analysis Plan. In order to determine potential excess capacity the maintenance subgroup is now using Total Workload or Service Core by installation. Both of these are components of the Required Capacity Index referred to in the capacity report. The use of these components rather than the Index presents a more accurate reflection of what can be reasonably considered in determining potential excess capacity for this reporting requirement.

Forty installations are short a total of 1,427 KSF in CDC facilities, leaving the Army with a shortage of CDC facilities. Most of the installations with shortages in CDCs have a large number of soldiers. This unsatisfied requirement assumes that families, who would use the facilities if available, are obtaining services from either the local economy or other families on the installation.

Nursery and Child Care Facility			
Installations	**Excess /Shortage**	**Assets**	**Summary**
Ft Wainwright	24	67	✓ Army assets total 1,770 KSF
Ft Belvoir	12	68	✓ 9 installations show an excess of 62 KSF; 40 installations are short a total of 1,427 KSF
Pine Bluff Arsenal	8	14	
Ft Richardson	5	31	✓ Army requirement is 3,135 KSF
USAG Selfridge	5	18	✓ Army shortage is 1,365 KSF
Ft Lewis	-90	66	
Ft Stewart	-103	47	
Ft Campbell	-139	53	
Ft Bragg	-150	93	
Ft Hood	-254	67	

Table 58. Child Development Centers

Surge: Provision of child development centers need not be able to adjust in response to probable threats or to changes in force structure. This constitutes a requirement for surge capability in the military judgment of the BRAC SRG, the deliberative body charged with the assessment.

Shortages exist in this functional area, thus providing no government-owned surge capability. Private sector capacity is available to augment government-owned capacity, including leases, contracts, and like services.

Because these capabilities are not difficult to reconstitute, Army BRAC recommendations did not purposefully avoid reducing the quantity of assets available to the Army.

Garrison commanders should anticipate and support an increase of in-home providers to offset surge requirements, keeping care affordable with the same quality. Currently there are no agreements with off-post centers that can give comparable care at low cost.

Implications: Given the increasing number of married soldiers and dual-soldier families, providing CDC services on military installations is an increasingly vital quality of life measure. In light of the highlighted shortages, CDCs could be a significant source of required MILCON to support BRAC actions.

2.4.6. Joint Logistics

2.4.6.1. Depot Maintenance

For Depot Maintenance, TABS used the measurements for workload and capacity index expressed in direct labor hours (DLH) for fiscal year 2003 by depot level commodity

groups[19] at maintenance depots. The workload is the total organic workload, funded, being performed and reported by each installation from all funded sources. The reported capacity index for the depot commodity groups applicable to depot maintenance work at each maintenance installation used the formula in Chapter 3 of the DOD Depot Maintenance Capacity and Utilization Measurement Handbook. Subtracting the workload from the capacity index at each installation, depot maintenance capacity shows 20 percent excess across the Army, but there is a 8 percent shortage at Red River Army Depot.

Depot Maintenance			
Installations	**Assets**	**Excess/Shortage**	**Summary**
Anniston AD	3,962	739	✓ 13,392 direct labor hours
Corpus Christi	3,957	697	✓ 20 % excess exists across the Army; 8 % shortage exists at Red River Army Depot
Tobyhanna AD	3,687	706	
Red River AD	1,849	-158	
Letterkenny AD	1,575	213	
Others (11)	1,670	1,118	
Total	13,392	3,308	

Table 59. Depot Maintenance

Surge: The Army's goal for its five principal depots (Anniston Army Depot, Tobyhanna Army Depot, Corpus Christi Army Depot, Letterkenny Army Depot, and Red River Army Depot) is a workload of 85 percent capacity based on one shift, eight hours per day, and five days per week. The remaining 15 percent is available to meet surge requirements.

In the opinion of the BRAC SRG, surge capacity is required due to the importance of depot maintenance, but the Industrial JCSG will determine actual requirements.

Implications: Larger depots may have the capacity to absorb the workload of smaller depots as well as other DOD depot-type activities. Consolidation may improve the efficiency and effectives of our depots in support of the warfighter.

2.4.6.2. Armaments Production

The Army has four Manufacturing Centers: Lima Army Tank Plant, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Watervliet Arsenal, and Rock Island Arsenal. Each manufacturing center has a unique capability that must be maintained. While the capability needs to be maintained, this does not imply that the installation itself needs to be retained.

- Lima – Only DOD organic combat vehicle manufacturing facility.
- Pine Bluff Arsenal – Only DOD organic facility for Chem/Bio production and rebuild. Sole supplier for producing white phosphorous
- Watervliet Arsenal – Unique capability for the manufacture of light arms and heavy arms, thick-/thin-walled mortar, and cannon tubes.[20]
- Rock Island Arsenal – USMC howitzers mounts. Unique Foundry capability.

[19] DOD 4151.18H, DOD Depot Maintenance Capacity and Utilization Measurement Handbook, Jan 24, 1997 and Handbook Supplemental guidance, Oct 4, 2001.
[20] Industrial Analysis Center, DCMA, *Army Transformation of the Industrial Base Study*, April 2003.

Section I **Tab E**

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Attribute	
Force Deployment	Brigade Capacity
Materiel Deployment	Environmental Elasticity
Accessibility	Urban Sprawl
Connectivity	Crime Index
Test Range Capacity	Employment Opportunities
Inter-service/Partnership	

Table 8. Attributes Without Constraints in MVP

Once the first feasible portfolio was found, the Army determined the resulting capacity, the percent of the requirement met, and the excess capacity present within the portfolio.

3.3 Unique Capabilities

The Army did not include "unique capability" within MVI, but added these capabilities in its MVP determination as constraints if the Army had a requirement for the capability. To see if a unique capability was in fact a "binding" constraint, the Army ran the model first without the requirement to keep a particular installation. If the portfolio did not include the installation with the unique capability within the portfolio, the Army added a special constraint with a requirement to keep the unique installation.

The following table lists those installations with unique capabilities that required a special constraint to be kept within the Army portfolio; without the constraint they could not have been included.

Installation	Unique Capability
Holston	Sole permit holder to produce energetics
Radford	Sole permit holder to produce TNT
Lake City	Major producer of small arms ammunition
Pine Bluff	Sole permit holder to produce white phosphorous. Also, chemical defense equipment provider
Watervliet	8 unique manufacturing capabilities
Sunny Point	Sole east-coast, deep-water port capable of handling munitions
Fort Myer	Houses Arlington Cemetery and the Old Guard
Fort Detrick	Medical Research Mission
Tripler	Sole Medical Center in Pacific
Walter Reed	Medical Research & Congressional Medical Mission

Table 9. Unique Capabilities

These unique capabilities were identified by the the TABS Group subject matter experts in coordination with the JCSGs. Sunny Point and Arlington were known unique geographical capabilities; Fort Detrick, Fort Tripler, and Walter Reed Army Medical Center had unique medical facilities.

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

OCT 24

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND, 5001 EISENHOWER AVENUE, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22333-0001

SUBJECT: Designation of Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE)

Based on authority of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 2474, I designate the following depot maintenance activities as CITEs:

a. Anniston Army Depot for combat vehicles (except Bradley), artillery, and small caliber weapons.

b. Corpus Christi Army Depot for rotary wing aircraft (less Avionics).

c. Letterkenny Army Depot for air defense and tactical missile ground support equipment (less missile guidance and control).

d. Red River Army Depot for tactical wheeled vehicles, the Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE), Bradley Fighting Vehicle series, Multiple Launch Rocket System chassis, Patriot Missile recertifications, and for rubber products necessary for sustainment and support to the United States and Allied forces and agencies.

e. Tobyhanna Army Depot for communications and electronics, avionics, and missile guidance and control.

I authorize and encourage each CITE to enter into public-private cooperative arrangements referred to in the statute as "public-private partnerships" to perform work related to the depot maintenance core competencies of the particular CITE. Depot operations will comply with all applicable law, to include Title 10 U.S.C. Section 2208

and Title 22 U.S.C. Section 2770. Further, depots will make their respective capabilities available to all interested contractors to avoid even the perception of exclusive teaming arrangements.

Section 2474(b)(3) requires a report to Congress evaluating the need for loan guarantee authority, similar to our loan guarantee program under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 4555, to facilitate the establishment of public-private partnerships and the achievement of the objectives set forth in Section 2474. Accordingly, the Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command will take the lead in preparing and submitting this report to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology NLT 30 days upon receipt of this letter.

Additionally, the Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command will notify the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, by written correspondence, of all current public-private arrangements NLT 30 days upon receipt of this letter.

Thomas E. White

Thomas E. White

Section II Tab A2

Fires Center at Fort Sill, OK; and consolidating the Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation Centers and Schools to create a Combat Service Support Center at Fort Lee, VA. The Army pursued these actions to enhance training coordination, doctrine development, training effectiveness, and efficiency. These consolidations improve on the Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) model, approved as part of BRAC 95 and currently in place at Fort Leonard Wood, which consolidated the Military Police, Engineer, and Chemical Centers and Schools. The United States Military Academy Preparatory School is realigned with the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY. This action consolidates all academy-related training from two locations (Fort Monmouth and West Point) to one location (West Point). Drill Sergeants Training is realigned from three locations (Fort Benning, GA; Fort Jackson, SC; and Fort Leonard Wood, MO) to one location (Fort Jackson). The Aviation Logistics School is realigned with the Aviation Center and School at Fort Rucker, AL. The Prime Power School is realigned with MANSCEN at Fort Lee. The Air Force and Army Transportation Management Schools are realigned at Fort Lee to create a Joint Center of Excellence. Air Force Culinary training is realigned with the Army's training at Fort Lee, and both the Air Force's and Navy's religious training is realigned at Fort Jackson creating Joint Centers of Excellence. These consolidations foster consistency, standardization and training proficiency, while reducing the total number of Military Occupational Skills (MOS) training locations. They also support Army Transformation by collocating institutional training, and other units in large numbers on single installations to promote force stabilization. In addition, they improve training capabilities while eliminating excess capacity at institutional training installations, enhancing Military Value by providing the same or better level of training at reduced costs.

Realign or close installations to integrate critical munitions production and storage, manufacturing, Depot level maintenance, and materiel management capabilities to enhance Joint productivity and efficiency and reduce cost. The Army recommends closing four Army Ammunition Plants, three Chemical Depots, and two Army Depots (one maintenance and one munitions storage) to reduce cost-of-ownership and increase efficiency. The Army recommends realigning workload among nine other Depots and Arsenals and five Army Ammunition Plants. These realignments will enhance four Army Depots as Joint Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence for specific commodities, Army Arsenals into three Joint Manufacturing and Technology Centers, one Joint Logistics Expeditionary Center, and munitions production and storage installations into five Joint Munitions Centers of Excellence. These transformations will enhance Military Value eliminate single function and inefficient facilities and allow the Army Organic Industrial Base to partner with the civilian defense industry, using capacity from both the government and private industry, achieving the most favorable and economical efficiencies for all of DOD.

Realign DOD RDAT&E organizations into Joint Centers of Excellence that enhance mission accomplishment at reduced cost. The Army recommendations achieve a major transformation by collocating and integrating major RDAT&E elements currently scattered at many sites by assembling Human Systems, Information Systems, Sensors, Electronics, and Chemical-Biological RDA at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. The collocation of Communications-Electronics Research Development and Engineering Center, Night Vision Lab, Communications Electronics Command, Army Test and

7.7 Materiel and Logistics

The Army developed recommendations through the leadership of the Supply and Storage and Industrial JCSGs to close four Army Ammunition Plants, three Chemical Depots, and two Army Depots (one maintenance and one munitions storage) to reduce cost-of-ownership and increase efficiency. The Army recommends realigning workload among nine other Depots and Arsenals and five Army Ammunition Plants. These realignments will enhance four Army Depots as Joint Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence for specific commodities, Army Arsenals into three Joint Manufacturing and Technology Centers, one Joint Logistics Expeditionary Center, and munitions production and storage installations into five Joint Munitions Centers of Excellence. These transformations will enhance Military Value eliminate single function and inefficient facilities and allow the Army Organic Industrial Base to partner with the civilian defense industry, using capacity from both the government and private industry, achieving the most favorable and economical efficiencies for all of DOD.

7.8 RDAT&E

The Army coordinated with the Technical JCSG to develop recommendations that achieve a major transformation by collocating and integrating major RDAT&E elements currently scattered at many sites by assembling Human Systems, Information Systems, Sensors, Electronics, and Chemical-Biological RDA at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. The collocation of Communications-Electronics Research Development and Engineering Center, Night Vision Lab, Communications Electronics Command, Army Test and Evaluation Command, several PEOs and PMs, Biological-Medical, and Chemical-Biological RDA at Aberdeen Proving Ground creates a powerful Center for Soldier-Focused Systems that permit integration and coordination at every step from R and D through T, A, & E. Other recommendations create similar Joint facilities at Detroit Arsenal, MI (Ground Vehicles), Redstone Arsenal, AL (Aviation), and Picatinny Arsenal, NJ (Guns and Ammunitions) to reduce cost and enhance effectiveness. The recommendations permit the closure of Fort Monmouth, NJ.

7.9 Local Government and Community Requests

The Army received three requests from local governments and communities to close an installation on the BRAC 2005 study list. In accordance with BRAC law, Section 2914(b)(2), which requires the Secretary of Defense to consider such notices, the Army considered these requests, incorporated them into the decision process, and came to the following conclusions:

- Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant – This installation was removed from the Army BRAC 2005 study list when special legislation authorized the transfer of 14,995 acres and nearly 500 buildings to the State of Louisiana. The State will use 1,200 acres of the property for commercial and industrial economic use. The Army retains the right to conduct training on 13,500 acres of the property, which will be managed by the Louisiana Army National Guard.
- Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant – The Army evaluated the capacity and Military Value of Mississippi AAP and determined that it could be closed in the effort to consolidate munitions manufacturing sites. The Army's recommendation

Section II Tab B

ARMY RECOMMENDATION – FINAL

Close Red River Army Depot

17-Apr-05

Recommendation:

Close Red River Army Depot, TX. Relocate the storage and demilitarization functions of the Munitions Center to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK. Relocate the munitions maintenance functions of the Munitions Center to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK, and Blue Grass Army Depot, KY. Relocate the depot maintenance of Armament and Structural Components, Combat Vehicles, Depot Fleet/Field Support, Engines and Transmissions, Fabrication and Manufacturing, Fire Control Systems and Components, and Other to Anniston Army Depot, AL. Relocate the depot maintenance of Powertrain Components, and Starters/Generators to Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA. Relocate the depot maintenance of Construction Equipment to Anniston Army Depot, AL, and Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA. Relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Vehicles to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA and Letterkenny Depot, PA. Relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Missiles to Letterkenny Army Depot, PA. Disestablish and privatize the supply, storage, and distribution functions for tires, packaged Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants, and compressed gases. Relocate the storage and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot to the Defense Distribution Depot, Oklahoma City, OK.

Justification:

This recommendation supports the strategy of minimizing the number of industrial base sites performing depot maintenance for ground and missile systems. The receiving depots have greater maintenance capability, higher facility utilization and greater opportunities for interservice workloading. This recommendation reinforces Anniston's and Letterkenny's roles as Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence for Combat Vehicles (Anniston) and Missile Systems (Letterkenny). This recommendation decreases the cost of depot maintenance operations by consolidation and elimination of 30% of duplicate overhead structures required to operate multiple depot maintenance activities. This recommendation also increases opportunities for interservice workloading by transferring maintenance workload to the Marine Corps.

This recommendation relocates storage, demilitarization, and munitions maintenance functions to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, and thereby reduces redundancy and removes excess from Red River Munitions Center. This recommendation allows DoD to create centers of excellence, generate efficiencies, and create deployment networks servicing all Services.

This recommendation relocates the storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City at Tinker Air Force Base.

TOTAL COBRA PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 1/10
Data As Of 05/20/2005 11:36:04 AM, Report Created 05/20/2005 11:59:33 AM

Department : Army
Scenario File : J:\RECOMMENDATION DEVELOPMENT\REVIEW FINAL\Completed\Sent to OSD\USA-0036R Close Red River\Criterion 5-COBRA\Close Red River Version #2.CBR
Option Pkg Name: Red River Version #2 (15 Feb)
Std Fctrs File : D:\Army COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

	Rate	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	1,588	0	431	0	0	2,019
Early Retirement*	8.10%	0	128	0	35	0	0	163
Regular Retirement*	1.67%	0	27	0	7	0	0	34
Civilian Turnover*	9.16%	0	145	0	39	0	0	184
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	95	0	26	0	0	121
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	1,193	0	324	0	0	1,517
Civilian Positions Available		0	395	0	107	0	0	502
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	402	251	196	0	0	849
Early Retirement	8.10%	0	33	20	16	0	0	69
Regular Retirement	1.67%	0	7	4	2	0	0	13
Civilian Turnover	9.16%	0	37	23	17	0	0	77
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	24	15	12	0	0	51
Priority Placement#	39.97%	0	161	100	78	0	0	339
Civilians Available to Move		0	140	89	71	0	0	300
Civilians Moving		0	140	0	29	0	0	169
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	89	42	0	0	131
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	1,588	0	431	0	0	2,019
Civilians Moving		0	1,333	0	353	0	0	1,686
New Civilians Hired		0	255	0	78	0	0	333
Other Civilian Additions		270	120	9	0	0	0	399
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIREMENTS		0	161	20	51	0	0	232
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	119	104	80	0	0	303
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	161	100	78	0	0	339
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		270	375	9	78	0	0	732

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

\# Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPP placements involving a PCS is 50.70%

Force Base and causes a significant amount of new construction. The installation has an 81-acre historic district with seven contributing resources, and there is one historic property not in a historic district. Tinker Air Force Base has jurisdictional wetlands on 0.15% of the land, which do not currently restrict operations. Additional operations may impact wetlands, which may lead to operational restrictions. No adverse impact to any other environmental resource area is expected. No adverse impact to any other environmental resource is expected.

No resource impacts are expected at McAlester Army Depot, Blue Grass Army Depot, or Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Albany.

This recommendation will require spending approximately $3,494,000 for environmental compliance costs. These costs were included in the payback calculation. Red River reports $49.1 million in environmental restoration costs. Because the Department has a legal obligation to perform environmental restoration regardless of whether an installation is closed, realigned, or remains open, these costs were not included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities.

**** End of Report ****

Integration Results – Red River

Before Integration			
CR#	CR Title	1-time Cost ($K)	NPV
USA-0036v2	Close Red River	$446,907	($730,225)
IND-0111v2	Realign Red River Munitions Ctr	$113,642	($68,256)
IND-0127B	Realign Red River (Maintenance)	$194,097	($124,193)
S&S-0043	Privitize Tires	$2,090	($66,492)
S&S-0044	Privitize Packaged POL	$0	($37)
S&S-0045	Privitize Compressed Gases	$206	($2,847)
S&S-0051	4 regional Strategic Distribution Platforms	$107,126	($439,159)
	Total	$864,068	($1,431,209)

After Integration			
USA-0036v3	Close Red River	$539,010	($456,183)
	Total	$539,010	($456,183)

- Closes Red River
- Eliminates 2 CRs

SRG #40 26 April 2005

Section II **Tab F**

WASHINGTON PULSE

Military Scientists Don't Take Names in Vain

In the world of military hardware projects, the right name—and acronym—can make a huge difference when seeking political and financial support on Capitol Hill. A case in point is an underwater surveillance system developed by the Office of Naval Research. The project initially was named "Persistent Undersea Surveillance." But once ONR officials realized the acronym was PUS, they concluded the name had to be changed. "I didn't think I could get the Hill to fund 'PUS,'" says Rear Adm. Jay M. Cohen, chief of naval research. The fix was simple. "We added 'littoral' and we went from 'PUS' to 'PLUS' ... And who's going to argue with 'PLUS?'"

Air Force Touts Role in Hunting Insurgents

The Air Force is finding new ways to target insurgents in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Walter E. "Buck" Buchanan III, commander of the air component of the U.S. Central Command, told a seminar on Capitol Hill. Aircraft equipped with advanced sensors are being used to track suspected enemies and pass their location to U.S. forces on the ground, he said. For instance, aerial reconnaissance helped located an Iraqi whose house was full of brand-new copper stolen from the country's government and industrial facilities.

Coast Guard Aircraft Unfit for Duty? ...

The safety record of the Coast Guard's aircraft fleet is nothing short of alarming, according to senior officials. Aging helicopters are the primary culprits. Although several programs already are under way to upgrade and replace outdated aircraft, the fleet is displaying troubling evidence of poor health, notes Vice Adm. Terry M. Cross, vice commandant of the Coast Guard. In 2003, the fleet recorded 63 potential engine failures per 100,000 hours of flight. Last year, they jumped to 329 out of 100,000 hours. By comparison, the Federal Aviation Administration standard is 1 per 100,000.

... Revised Wish List Raises Eyebrows

The Coast Guard, meanwhile, recently submitted to Congress a much anticipated revised requirements document for its multibillion-dollar Deepwater program. Under Deepwater, the Coast Guard will spend between $19 billion to $24 billion during the next two decades to replace its aging aircraft and ships. The program started in 1999. After 9/11, however, the Coast Guard's expanded missions prompted a lengthy review of the hardware requirements. Of note in the revised plan is a dramatic change in the aircraft mix. The original idea was to buy six C-130J transports and 35 C-235 maritime patrol aircraft. The new blueprint calls for 22 C-130s and 20 C-235s. The updated procurement plan also eliminates the Bell/Agusta AB139 helicopter from the program.

Busy Depots Safe From BRAC

Army depots are working beyond capacity and show no signs of slowing down, says Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey. With these industrial facilities operating 24/7 to keep up with equipment repair workloads, the Army is not in a position to close any of them, even as a round of base closures looms, he asserts. This year, the service's eight depots and arsenals will generate 19 million direct labor hours. Next year, the number is going up to 25 million direct labor hours. "We have surge capacity within that, and we pay very close attention to having that capability," says Harvey. The Base Realignment and Closure Commission will have to take that into account. "We are going to maintain the capability to be able to surge—in the 25 million to 30 million range."

"The Navy really did show a sense of humor by putting a **policy guy**, me, in charge of war-fighting requirements."

Vice Adm. Joseph A. Sestak Jr., deputy chief of naval operations for warfare requirements and programs, musing on the difficulties of planning a shipbuilding strategy for the U.S. Navy.

"... We were waiting for the starship **Enterprise** to arrive."

Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, Army chief of staff, putting in plain words the reasoning behind the service's decision to restructure the Future Combat Systems program. The Army, he said, needed to ensure that the advanced technologies in FCS provided "continuity from where we are today to the future."

"I want people to **smoke the pipe**, stare at the ceiling and say, **'what if?'**"

Thomas Yost, team leader for unmanned aerial vehicle programs at the U.S. Army's Research, Development and Engineering Command, whimsically recommending regular smoke breaks to help industry come up with innovative UAV concepts.

"Marines can be **'retentive'** about controlling the air space."

Lt. Gen. Jan Huly, deputy Marine Corps commandant for plans, programs and operations, describing the coordination challenges Marines face in Iraq while operating unmanned aircraft in air space that must be shared with the other services. Marines in Iraq operate more than 100 UAVs.

Section II Tab G

Red River

SRG #32
1 March 2005

- Anniston (24) and Letterkenny (39) have higher MV than Red River (40)
- Industrial JCSG determined that remaining capacity sufficient if Red River closed - Army is not yet convinced — IJCSG - close Army - not yet
- The model used does not support the reality of mission requirements, nor accurately reflect Red River's military value in this instance — not reflect mission
- The current base of work differs significantly now from the 03 data, (4 million DLH vice 2.1 million DLH) and that this base is more representative of the workload that we can expect in the foreseeable future — 4M DLH vs. 2.1M DLH for future
- Estimate based on assumption of 50% surge capacity requirement; Red River surpassed the FY 03 surge requirement in its routine operations in FY 05 and continues to increase its mission load -- in support of what is considered a "small" war
- If the base remains at 4 Million DLH, or continues to grow, does this recommendation still make sense?

Section III **Tab A**

2.4 Installation Value

MVI is the ranking of Army installations from 1 to 97 in terms of value and their ability to support current and future Army requirements. The Army ranked installations in two contexts: one is an overall ranking, and the second is the relative ranking within a capability (see Annex 1 for capability rankings). Both rankings provided a means to evaluate the installation across the different Military Value criteria.

The rankings for each installation for the overall perspective follow in Table 6. For more detail on the rankings for each individual MV capability, see Annex 1.

Installation	Rank	Overall Score				Installation	Rank	Overall Score
Ft Bliss	1	6.25	Redstone Arsenal	30	2.99	Milan AAP	59	1.92
Ft Lewis	2	5.76	Hawthorne AD	31	2.97	Mississippi AAP	60	1.91
Ft Hood	3	5.70	Crane AD	32	2.92	West Point	61	1.88
Ft Stewart / Hunter AAF	4	5.48	Ft Eustis	33	2.91	Ft Leavenworth	62	1.85
Ft Bragg	5	5.37	Ft Gordon	34	2.80	Newport Chem Depot	63	1.85
Yuma PG	6	5.31	Ft Leonard Wood	35	2.79	Pine Buff Arsenal	64	1.84
Ft Carson	7	5.26	Ft Lee	36	2.79	Ft Mc Nair	65	1.83
Dugway PG	8	5.25	Tobyhanna AD	37	2.79	Ft Myer	66	1.81
Ft Benning	9	5.24	Ft Belvoir	38	2.70	Kansas AAP	67	1.80
White Sands MR	10	5.16	Letterkenny AD	39	2.69	Ft Monroe	68	1.79
Ft Wainwright	11	5.09	Red River AD	40	2.61	Lake City AAP	69	1.78
Ft Knox	12	4.91	Sierra AD	41	2.49	Iowa AAP	70	1.78
Ft Riley	13	4.89	Tooele AD	42	2.48	Lone Star AAP	71	1.73
Ft Campbell	14	4.81	Ft Sam Houston	43	2.42	Adelphi Labs	72	1.71
Ft Drum	15	4.71	Deseret Chem Plant	44	2.36	Ft Hamilton	73	1.69
Ft Polk	16	4.67	Bluegrass AD	45	2.34	Detroit Arsenal	74	1.63
Ft Irwin	17	4.56	Walter Reed AMC	46	2.33	Carlisle	75	1.62
Aberdeen PG	18	4.18	Picatinny Arsenal	47	2.33	Lima Tank Plant	76	1.60
Ft Sill	19	4.03	Watervliet Arsenal	48	2.25	Corpus Christi ADA	77	1.59
Schofield Barracks	20	3.95	Ft Meade	49	2.25	Scranton AAP	78	1.55
Ft Huachuca	21	3.86	Ft Monmouth	49	2.25	USAG Selfridge	79	1.51
Ft AP Hill	22	3.68	Ft McPherson	51	2.22	Radford AAP	80	1.51
Ft Dix	23	3.47	Ft Gillem	52	2.20	Ft Shafter	81	1.48
Ft Mc Coy	24	3.21	Rock Island Arsenal	53	2.14	Ft Buchanan	82	1.47
Anniston AD	25	3.19	MOT Sunny Point	54	2.09	Holston AAP	83	1.44
Ft Jackson	26	3.14	Pueblo Chem Depot	55	2.03	Presidio Of Monterey	84	1.35
McAlester AAP	27	3.10	Ft Detrick	56	1.98	Umatilla Chem Depot	85	1.31
Ft Rucker	28	3.07	Soldier Support Center	57	1.96	Tripler AAP	87	1.26
Ft Richardson	29	3.00	Charles Kelley	58	1.93	Riverbank AAP	89	1.18
			Lease - HQ, ATEC	86	1.27	Lease - Hoffman complex	92	1.11
			Lease - Rosslyn Complex	88	1.20	Lease - ARPERCEN	94	1.06
			Lease - Bailey's Crossroads	90	1.16	Lease - PEO STRICOM	95	1.01
			Lease - Army Research	91	1.15	Lease - Army JAG Agency	96	0.94
			Lease - Crystal City Complex	92	1.11	Lease - Army JAG School	97	0.91

Table 6. Installation Ranking (MVI)

ANNEX 1. CAPABILITY RESULTS

This annex contains the rank and score by capability of each Army installation studied during BRAC 2005.

Installation	Rank	Overall Score	Rank	Training Score	Rank	Future Score	Rank	PP Score	Rank	Logisitics Score	Rank	Cost Score	Rank	WB Score
Ft Bliss	1	6.25	3	8.71	7	6.07	13	6.21	7	2.65	21	6.32	41	4.26
Ft Lewis	2	5.76	8	6.56	9	5.87	1	8.29	14	1.87	16	6.57	59	3.28
Ft Hood	3	5.70	10	6.19	1	7.67	5	7.04	16	1.83	38	5.74	50	3.71
Ft Stewart / Hunter AAF	4	5.48	13	5.84	2	6.95	3	7.78	17	1.83	41	5.65	89	2.27
Ft Bragg	5	5.37	9	6.30	10	5.84	2	7.81	25	1.25	35	5.81	77	2.64
Yuma PG	6	5.31	2	9.36	8	5.90	67	1.92	5	2.90	69	4.66	95	1.57
Ft Carson	7	5.26	6	7.10	20	4.35	7	7.00	19	1.80	66	4.82	51	3.62
Dugway PG	8	5.25	5	8.12	10	5.84	64	1.98	4	2.93	18	6.55	56	3.32
Ft Benning	9	5.24	7	6.57	25	4.03	4	7.50	27	1.18	34	5.84	20	5.11
White Sands MR	10	5.16	4	8.39	15	5.23	48	2.43	3	3.26	39	5.72	92	1.89
Ft Wainwright	11	5.09	1	9.71	17	4.69	57	2.14	6	2.78	97	2.50	76	2.64
Ft Knox	12	4.91	14	5.77	23	4.21	12	6.44	12	1.92	14	6.67	52	3.59
Ft Riley	13	4.89	16	5.49	3	6.43	8	6.71	30	1.15	68	4.72	82	2.40
Ft Campbell	14	4.81	17	5.10	4	6.14	6	7.03	28	1.18	59	5.08	84	2.37
Ft Drum	15	4.71	12	6.05	5	6.13	26	4.68	31	1.15	71	4.57	53	3.47
Ft Polk	16	4.67	15	5.76	6	6.11	21	5.16	31	1.15	54	5.22	87	2.28
Ft Irwin	17	4.56	11	6.18	24	4.18	38	3.76	8	2.60	83	4.00	8	5.69
Aberdeen PG	18	4.18	25	3.06	16	4.92	19	5.22	13	1.90	2	7.79	33	4.75
Ft Sill	19	4.03	18	5.03	57	2.26	9	6.62	29	1.17	53	5.30	78	2.49
Schofield Barracks	20	3.95	19	4.88	33	3.82	18	5.26	18	1.82	96	2.96	66	2.97
Ft Huachuca	21	3.86	20	4.34	19	4.54	39	3.60	38	0.99	30	5.96	42	4.22
Ft AP Hill	22	3.68	21	4.06	14	5.34	45	2.83	33	1.13	49	5.40	57	3.32
Ft Dix	23	3.47	29	2.12	34	3.74	16	5.81	64	0.16	23	6.31	4	6.08
Ft Mc Coy	24	3.21	23	3.53	35	3.65	34	3.96	41	0.72	78	4.28	68	2.95
Anniston AD	25	3.19	35	1.04	61	2.01	11	6.46	2	3.42	7	7.05	94	1.68
Ft Jackson	26	3.14	24	3.16	31	3.86	40	3.51	65	0.15	32	5.88	58	3.31
McAlester AAP	27	3.10	37	0.95	18	4.64	20	5.18	21	1.63	26	6.22	85	2.34
Ft Rucker	28	3.07	22	3.63	50	2.53	47	2.73	39	0.94	13	6.71	64	3.02
Ft Richardson	29	3.00	27	2.75	29	3.91	33	3.99	62	0.18	73	4.48	54	3.46
Redstone Arsenal	30	2.99	30	2.00	40	3.20	42	3.15	42	0.71	1	8.47	44	4.09
Hawthorne AD	31	2.97	26	2.87	12	5.56	61	1.99	35	1.11	86	3.65	83	2.39
Crane AD	32	2.92	32	1.22	27	3.97	30	4.39	9	2.38	63	4.98	86	2.31
Ft Eustis	33	2.91	43	0.77	49	2.57	10	6.55	58	0.23	27	6.17	17	5.17
Ft Gordon	34	2.80	28	2.62	30	3.88	77	1.77	54	0.33	42	5.64	26	5.01
Ft Leonard Wood	35	2.79	31	1.60	13	5.44	76	1.78	26	1.19	70	4.61	34	4.70
Ft Lee	36	2.79	49	0.59	39	3.21	14	6.08	67	0.15	37	5.74	37	4.57
Tobyhanna AD	37	2.79	69	0.36	81	1.06	32	4.38	1	4.24	6	7.29	39	4.39
Ft Belvoir	38	2.70	46	0.67	32	3.82	37	3.93	44	0.63	5	7.41	47	3.76
Letterkenny AD	39	2.69	42	0.78	36	3.63	28	4.51	34	1.13	52	5.34	48	3.75
Red River AD	40	2.61	39	0.88	60	2.02	15	5.81	24	1.31	50	5.38	73	2.67
Sierra AD	41	2.49	34	1.07	26	4.00	27	4.57	47	0.55	94	3.37	80	2.44
Tooele AD	42	2.48	40	0.87	41	3.19	31	4.38	45	0.62	46	5.54	70	2.81
Ft Sam Houston	43	2.42	33	1.21	65	1.84	44	2.97	57	0.24	3	7.78	14	5.31
Deseret Chem Plant	44	2.36	41	0.80	28	3.96	46	2.82	63	0.16	57	5.10	30	4.84
Bluegrass AD	45	2.34	53	0.43	80	1.09	17	5.54	43	0.68	56	5.12	12	5.35

DDRT

OUTLINE FOR BRAC COMMISSION BRIEF
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT –RED RIVER, TEXAS
16 JUNE 2005

I. SELECTED AS STRATEGIC DISTRIBUTION PLATFORM (SDP)

A. DDRT ranked number one for placement as SDP in Central Region.
B. Slated for closure only following Red River's potential closure

II. OKLAHOMA CITY DISTRIBUTION DEPOT

A. Requires $43M MILCON for covered storage buildings.
B. Fails to equal building space available at DD-Red River

III. RECOMMENDATION

A. BRAC Commission statement declaring DDRT as the SDP in Central Region

FINDINGS

Reference: Supply and Storage Joint Cross Service Group (S&S JCSG) Review of Draft Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Imperatives – July 8, 2004

1. Recruit and Train: The Military Departments and Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to support the Army's Leader Development and Assessment Course and Leader's Training Course. Question: Does this refer just to military training schools or does it include the civilian leadership in Bldg. 468?

2. Organize: The Military Departments and the JCSG will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to support surge, mobilization, continuity of operations, evacuations for natural disasters, or conduct core roles and missions (e.g., sea-based operations, combined arms, etc.). Comment: The closure of the Red River Defense Complex will severely impact the surge capability for any type of military conflict. Example: The CCP operation at DDRT, grenades at LSAAP, and the armor kits program at RRAD.

3. Supply, Service, and Maintain:

   a. The Military Departments and the JCSG will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that creates a single point of failure in logistics operations. Additional comments reinforce the importance of ensuring flexibility in developing logistics support concepts and supporting infrastructure that are responsive and mitigate risk. Comment: Moving workload to a centralized installation, such as Anniston, Tobyhanna, or Letterkenny, will provide a greater window of opportunity for single point of failure as opposed to multiple installations.

   b. The Military Departments and the JCSG will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates logistics information management and oversight capabilities: Data standardization, Information Routing, or Supply chain efficiency information capture. Comment: Information routing is being accomplished thru DDRT at the present time for 19 DLA sites.

   c. The Military Departments and the JCSG will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates critical production capabilities that cannot be readily rebuilt or expanded during mobilization and reconstitution or commercially duplicated, as well as capabilities to replenish stockpiles. Comment: Military construction is contingent upon budgets and funding and can take up to 7 years to complete. Expansion, through construction, during mobilization is neither feasible nor cost effective.

4. Deploy and Employ (Operational):

   a. The Department needs secure installations that are optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense), that support power projection, repaid deployable capabilities, and expeditionary force needs for reach back capability, that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge, and that ensure strategic redundancy. This Imperative discusses the ability of the Army to simultaneously deploy forces from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf Coasts in support of operational plans.
      i. A surge percentage of 20% is being used to determine infrastructure requirements. With the above stated imperative of supporting conflicts from three (3) coasts, 20% is not a valid assumption.
      ii. With conflicts in two theaters of engagement, the Defense Complex is currently operating at greater than 20% surge capacity.
      iii. Note: In the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Report, Volume XI, p. 20, the 20% figure is stated as being validated by repeated usage in subsequent reports. There is no valid argument for this surge percentage.

   b. The Military Departments and the JCSG will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to respond to reach back requests from forward deployed forces and forces at overseas main operating bases engaged in or in support of combatant commander contingency operations.
      i. DDRT support to forward forces includes the shipment of approximately 25,000 air pallets and 2,500 seavans (containers) of material since July of 2003.
      ii. RRAD and LSAAP support includes the preparation of numerous items (armor kits, vehicle plating, grenades, etc.).

5. Force Structure: Army Plans to Implement and Fund Modular Forces, March 16, 2005.
   a. The Army proposes to reorganize its 10 active divisions, expanding from 33 brigades to 43 modular brigade combat teams. Reference Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) memorandum of July 13, 2004, that recommends temporary stationing of seven of the new brigades within a one day delivery range of DDRT.

   b. Required quantities of critical equipment, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, communications equipment, and trucks are not currently available in sufficient quantities. An increase in maintenance requirements will mean a corresponding increase in supply, storage, distribution support, and capacity requirements.

   c. Closure of maintenance depots that have the expertise to refurbish trucks and ship them to all parts of the world will provide additional impediments to this supply operation.

6. The OSD BRAC Database lists Red River Army Depot as being comprised of only one entity, Bowie County, for the military housing area. Additional counties to be considered should be Cass, Red River, Titus, Morris, Miller, and Little River. This restricted housing area reflects a gross inaccuracy in reporting medical facilities, housing availability, schools, employment, etc.

7. The Environmental Impact paragraph for RRAD includes the $49.1M for cleanup after the installation is cleared of material. However, the costs of closure omit this figure, stating that cleanup would be required whether the installation is open or closed. Until the possible contaminant causing materials are removed there is no need for cleanup. Example: Some vehicles that may have leaked oil or hydraulic fluids into the soil will not be moved until transfer of assets to another installation has begun. Cleanup costs will not be incurred until that time.

8. DDRT is ranked #1 for placement as the Strategic Distribution Platform (SDP) in the Central Region for the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) by the JCSG. DDRT was placed on the BRAC closure list when RRAD was added. Recommendation: Upon RRAD's removal from the BRAC list, DDRT should be re-designated as the Central Region SDP for DLA.

9. Placement of DDRT as the Central Region SDP would negate the need for military construction dollars (MILCON) at DDOO, a cost avoidance of $43M.

   a. MILCON at DDOO will include two new covered storage buildings (a total of 414,934 sq. ft.), to house the material transferring from DDRT. A 3,000 sq ft utility building is also planned. The proposed covered storage is approximately 2/3 the size of the Distribution Operations Center (DOC) at DDRT. DDOO has only 143,000 sq ft of covered storage space available (source: Storage Space Management Report, June 2004). Their available space, plus the new buildings, would not equal the space currently available inside the DOC.
   b. Material stored in other covered areas at DDRT equals approximately 1.5M square feet and has not been taken into consideration.
   c. Open storage for approximately 8,000 vehicles has not been addressed. Where these vehicles will be stored, and the additional equipment costs (overhead crane, tow vehicles, etc.) to move them, has not been identified.

RRMC

Briefing to BRAC Commission

Red River Munitions Center

16 June 2005

A. Insufficient storage at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant

B. Insufficient CAT I and II igloos

C. Only Chaparral Missile Facility

D. Instability of Spartan Rocket motors

E. RRMC personnel currently on McAlester's TDA

RRMC Tab A

Explanation and backup data for Bullet A

Table 61 – Ammunition Storage says that the Army has 48,315 KSF in assets. Their requirement is 29,120 KSF – leaving an excess of 19,195 KSF. However, when determining available assets, the Army included installations that are closing when they figured their assets. They will not have these assets if they close them and cannot be included as available assets. These include Hawthorne's 6,303 KSF, Red River's 1,801 KSF, Kansas's 939 KSF, and Lone Star's 902 KSF reducing the excess by 9,945 KSF. The actual available assets should be 38, 370 KSF. The goal of Joint Munitions Command (JMC) is to be at 85% capacity (page A-89). Anything above the goal should not be considered as excess capacity. 85% of 38,370 KSF is 32,614.5 KSF. The requirements are 29,120 leaving a total of 3,494.5 KSF. There is no evidence that this takes into consideration additional security requirements such as explosive compatibility and CAT I and CAT II storage. Another important consideration is where the retrograde that is currently in Iraq and Afghanistan will be stored when the war is over.

While the BRAC data shows that McAlester Army Ammunition Plant's (MCAAP) excess capacity is 4,115,100 SF, JMC has confirmed that excess capacity is currently 1,032,745 SF at MCAAP (putting them at 90% of their capacity) and 198,376 SF at Blue Grass Army Ammunition Plant (putting them at 97% of their capacity). Since the BRAC data was gathered, both of these locations have shown a significant increase in storage occupancy and both are now well over the optimum level set by JMC. It is our contention that neither MCAAP nor Blue Grass will be able to store all of ammunition items that are proposed to be sent to them. The Army plans to move the storage and maintenance from Red River Munitions Center (RRMC) and Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant (LSAAP) to McAlester AAP and Blue Grass AAP. This alone equates to a 2,557,400 SF additional storage requirement – more than either site could take if they were to store at 100%. The plan also moves the weapon/cluster bomb function and missile warhead production from Kansas AAP

to MCAAP which will require additional storage space. The plan also moves the demil function from RRMC, LSAAP, and Sierra AAP to MCAAP – which will require additional storage space until the items can be demilled. Since RRMC is already on MCAAP's TDA, by leaving RRMC open, we can provide additional storage capacity that MCAAP needs to facilitate the acceptance of the items proposed by BRAC for the closure of other munitions facilities.

Each manufacturing center is Joint in nature. TABS collected data on FY 03 direct labor hours (DLHs) from theses manufacturing centers and compared that data to the Total Capacity Index in order to determine the excess capacity. The Capacity Index was calculated in accordance with the DOD Depot Maintenance Capacity and Utilization Measurement Handbook, DOD 4151.18H. As shown in Table B-14, the manufacturing centers display about 69 percent excess capacity; none of the installations are in a deficit.

Armament Production			
Installations	Assets	Excess/Shortage	Summary
Pine Buff Arsenal	2,341	2,341	✓ 69 % excess capacity; none of the installations are in a deficit
Rock Island Arsenal	1759	1,117	
Lima Tank Plant	867	281	
Watervliet Arsenal	641	421	
Anniston AD	379	0	
Tooele AD	105	45	
Others (2)	26	1	
Total	6,119	4,206	

Table 60. Armament Production

Surge: The Army has excess armament production capacity and can meet surge requirements through additional funding for multiple shifts.

In the opinion of the BRAC SRG, surge capacity is required due to the importance of armament production, but the Industrial JCSG will determine actual requirements.

Implications: The excess means that the FY03 workload at these centers was assessed and judged to by less than maximum capacity. The potential exists to reshape these manufacturing centers around the core capability and divest of excess infrastructure.

2.4.6.3. Ammunition Storage

Most Army ammunition production facilities have limited storage and distribution for ammunition. The Army has 13 Army production facilities based on the Army Stationing Strategy dated 5 August 2003. The Army has seven munitions centers: Blue Grass Army Depot, Hawthorne Army Depot, Tooele Army Depot, and the four chemical demilitarization sites, which will close at the completion of the Chem Demil mission. It should be noted that there are three other munitions centers located as tenants at Anniston Army Depot, Letterkenny Army Depot, and Red River Army Depot. The Joint Munitions Command (JMC) considers Blue Grass Army Depot, Hawthorne Army Depot, Tooele Army Depot, and the three munitions centers located at depots as storage and distribution centers. Storage and distribution includes receipt, storage, issue, maintenance, surveillance, and demilitarization of munitions.

Not counting installation level ammunition storage facilities the Army has 20 installations with ammunition storage. Two of these installations have requirements equal to assets. The remaining 18 installations have assets, 47,373KSF, which exceed the requirement of 28,178 KSF, leaving an excess of 19,195 KSF.

Ammunition Storage			
Installations	Assets	Excess/Shortage	Summary
McAlester AAP	6,925	2,686	✓ Army assets total 48,315 KSF ✓ Army requirement is 29,120 KSF ✓ Army excess totals 19,195 KSF ✓ 2 installations have requirements equal to assets. ✓ The remaining 18 installations have assets of 47,313 KSF with requirements of 28,178 KSF
Hawthorne AD	6,303	2,591	
Crane AD	4,892	1,377	
Sierra AD	4,537	3,691	
Pine Buff Arsenal	3,970	268	
Bluegrass AD	3,966	793	
Tooele AD	3,250	1,273	
Letterkenny AD	2,343	939	
Milan AAP	2,169	1,579	
Anniston AD	1,990	587	
Red River AD	1,801	598	
Pueblo CD	1,475	1,314	
Others (8)	4,694	1,500	
Total	48,315	19,195	

Table 61. Ammunition Storage

Surge: The Army has excess ammunition storage capability above the installation. Some excess should be maintained to meet unexpected surge requirements.

In the opinion of the BRAC SRG, surge capacity is required due to the importance of ammunition storage, but the Industrial JCSG will determine actual requirements.

Implications: The JMC goal is to be filled at 85% capacity. End state is to structure a Joint distribution network that will enhance the strategic mobility/deployability of the Warfighter, reduce the sustainment footprint, and reduce the cost of logistics while maintaining warfighting capability and readiness. These goals imply the ability to consolidate and divest of excess infrastructure.

2.4.7. C4I/ Headquarters

2.4.7.1. General Administrative Space

General administrative buildings provide space for all administrative functions in Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) units not provided by other facilities. Courtrooms for maneuver units are included in this facility as well as the majority of space for the garrison staff and military school faculty. Space is provided at 162 square feet per authorized person. With permanent assets of 36,281 KSF and requirements of 34,588 KSF, the Army appears to have an excess of 1,693 KSF. The Army has fifty-one installations with excess admin space totaling 6,500 KSF and thirty-five other installations with shortages totaling 4,807 KSF. Much of the excess is at depot and industrial installations with little capability to support for maneuver units. In terms of shortage, Fort Bragg, a maneuver installation has 24 percent of the Army general admin space shortage. Most of the installations that could support additional maneuver-unit stationing are already deficient in general admin space and would require MILCON to support new missions.

Munitions Storage

OrgName	Total Capacity	Maximum Capacity	Current Usage	Required Surge Capacity	Available Surge/Excess Capacity
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	1,990.0	1,990.0	1,403.5	0	586.5
BLUE GRASS ARMY DEPOT	3,965.9	3,965.9	3,173.3	0	792.6
CRANE ARMY AMMUNITION ACTIVITY	4,891.6	4,891.6	3,514.7	0	1,376.9
DESERET CHEMICAL DEPOT	717.0	717.0	547.0	0	170.0
HAWTHORNE ARMY DEPOT	6,303.0	6,303.0	3,712.0	0	2,591.0
HOLSTON AAP	202.9	202.9	45.3	0	157.6
IOWA AAP	1,142.6	1,142.6	503.4	0	639.3
KANSAS ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT	938.9	938.9	661.3	0	277.6
LAKE CITY AAP	941.6	941.6	941.6	0	0
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	2,343.1	2,343.1	1,403.7	0	939.4
LONE STAR AAP	901.9	901.9	721.6	0	180.4
LOUISIANA AAP	350.0	350.0	270.4	0	79.6
MCALESTER AAP	6,925.4	6,925.4	4,239.7	0	2,685.7
MILAN AAP	2,168.9	2,168.9	590.3	0	1,578.6
MISSISSIPPI AAP	105.4	105.4	0	0	105.4
NEWPORT CHEM DEPOT	11.6	11.6	11.6	0	0
PINE BLUFF ARSENAL	3,970.1	3,970.1	3,701.9	0	268.2
PUEBLO CHEM DEPOT	1,475.2	1,475.2	161.6	0	1,313.6
RADFORD AAP	460.6	460.6	320.8	0	139.8
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	1,800.7	1,800.7	1,202.6	0	598.1
SIERRA ARMY DEPOT	4,536.7	4,536.7	845.4	0	3,691.3
TOOELE ARMY DEPOT	3,250.1	3,250.1	1,977.0	0	1,273.1
UMATILLA CHEM DEPOT	0	0	0	0	0

- NAVSEA Infrastructure Analysis model
- DoD 5000.60 Defense Industrial Capabilities Assessments
- DoD 5000.60-H Assessing Defense Industrial Capabilities.

The Capacity Analysis Data Call contained a total of nine munitions and armaments questions. Responses were received from 238 activities:

- Air Force - 115
- Navy/ Marines - 62
- Army - 61.

The analysis evaluated munitions production, munitions maintenance, munitions storage/distribution, munitions demilitarization, and armaments production/manufacturing.

- Munitions Productions evaluated current capacity, current usage, and maximum capacity at the end item and component level by commodity in eaches and pounds.
- Munitions Maintenance evaluated current capacity, current usage, and maximum capacity by commodity in DLH (K).
- Munitions Demilitarization (Demil) evaluated current capacity by MIDAS Class in "eaches" and STONS by method of demil (ob/od, meltout, washout, incineration, and reclamation).
- Munitions Storage evaluated by storage type (earth covered, above ground, inert, etc.) the number structures, maximum net storage capacity (KSF), utilized net storage capacity (KSF), and the number of explosive safety waivers.
- Armaments Production/Manufacturing:
  - Evaluated armaments Total Capacity for FY 2003-2005 and 2009 in DLHs by commodity.
  - Evaluated armaments Maximum Capacity for FY 2003-2005 and 2009 in DLHs by commodity.
  - Evaluated armaments Required Capacity for FY 2003-2005 and 2009 in DLHs by commodity.
  - Evaluated armaments Workload Capacity for FY 2003-2005 and 2009 in DLHs by commodity.

EXCESS STORAGE CAPACITY UPDATE

MCALESTER AAP STORAGE CAPACITY (BRAC data)

TOTAL STORAGE CAPACITY	10,637,100 SF
TOTAL EXCESS CAPACITY	4, 115,100 SF
PERCENT CAPACITY NOT UTILIZED	38.7%

MCALESTER AAP STORAGE CAPACITY (JMC – 4/30/05)

TOTAL STORAGE CAPACITY	10,637,100 SF
TOTAL EXCESS CAPACITY	1,032,745 SF
PERCENT CAPACITY NOT UTILIZED	9.7%

BLUE GRASS AAP STORAGE CAPACITY (BRAC data)

TOTAL STORAGE CAPACITY	6,021,000 SF
TOTAL EXCESS CAPACITY	1,203,600 SF
PERCENT CAPACITY NOT UTILIZED	20%

BLUE GRASS AAP STORAGE CAPACITY (JMC – 4/30/05)

TOTAL STORAGE CAPACITY	6,021,000 SF
TOTAL EXCESS CAPACITY	198,376 SF
PERCENT CAPACITY NOT UTILIZED	3.3%

LETTERKENNY STORAGE CAPACITY (BRAC data)

TOTAL STORAGE CAPACITY	3,613,400 SF
TOTAL EXCESS CAPACITY	1,141,200 SF
PERCENT CAPACITY NOT UTILIZIED	31.6%

LETTERKENNY STORAGE CAPACITY (JMC 4/30/05)

TOTAL STORAGE CAPACITY	3,613,400 SF
TOTAL EXCESS CAPACITY	667,584 SF
PERCENT CAPACITY NOT UTILIZIED	18%

RED RIVER STORAGE CAPACITY (BRAC data)

TOTAL STORAGE CAPACITY	2,747,600 SF
TOTAL CURRENT USAGE	1,732,900 SF
TOTAL EXCESS CAPACITY	1,014,700 SF
PERCENT CAPACITY NOT UTILIZIED	36.9%

RED RIVER STORAGE CAPACITY (JMC 4/30/05)

TOTAL STORAGE CAPACITY	2,747,600 SF
TOTAL CURRENT USAGE	2,083,452 SF
TOTAL EXCESS CAPACITY	664,148 SF
PERCENT CAPACITY NOT UTILIZIED	24%

LONE STAR STORAGE CAPACITY (BRAC data)

TOTAL STORAGE CAPACITY	1,030,600 SF
TOTAL CURRENT USAGE	824,500 SF
TOTAL EXCESS CAPACITY	206,100 SF
PERCENT CAPACITY NOT UTILIZIED	20%

NO CURRENT DATA AVAILABLE ON LONE STAR

RRMC Tab B

Explanation and backup data for Bullet B

McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (MCAAP) has only three CAT I and 47 CAT II igloos. Red River Munitions Center currently has 107 CAT I and II igloos – of that 82% are currently occupied and would require an estimated 88 CAT I/II igloos at MCAAP. By leaving RRMC open, the need for these additional igloos at MCAAP will be eliminated. (NOTE: CAT I and CAT II igloos require IDS systems installed in each igloo as well as additional separate fencing, lighting, and dual locking systems.) The Army Plan does not call for any additional facilities to be built at MCAAP. Nor are there dollars allocated for upgrade of facilities to meet CAT I and II standards.

RRMC Tab C

Explanation and backup data for Bullet C

Red River Munitions Center has the only Chaparral Missile Facility in the United States. Our missile facility has 19,500 SF and is climate controlled with thirteen bays divided by twelve inch reinforced concrete walls. It contains over $30M worth of test equipment. It contains a 100,000 class laminar flow clean room. Our electronic integrated systems mechanics are well trained in missile maintenance. We are capable of complete overhaul of the Chaparral missile. AMCOM has made a ten-year commitment to FMS customers to provide support and maintenance of the Chaparral missile. Since we are the only organization with the facility, equipment, and expertise to provide this service, if the mission is moved, the facility will have to be duplicated, the equipment dismantled, moved and restructured and the expertise regained. Approximately cost to replicate the facility is in excess of $3M. It is uncertain whether the equipment will tolerate a move.

A study was conducted in 1991 and 1992 to move the Chaparral missile to Letterkenny Army Depot. Ultimately it was decided that it was not cost effective to move the missile program. Cost at that time (1992) to move the program (less facility cost) was $3,928,753. Using the Consumer Price Index Inflation index, current cost would approximately be $5,320,545.

RRMC Tab D

Explanation and backup data for Bullet D

We have Spartan Rocket Motors that cannot be demilled and cannot be moved. We have been actively pursuing this issue for many years with the only decision being that they cannot be moved and cannot be demilitarized. In fact, there are concerns about whether the motors are even stable enough to be tested. This issue has been included as a material weakness in our management control report and is presently being worked by ARDEC at Redstone.

Scrivner, Larry D Mr RRMC

From: Hignight, Harrell D Mr RRMC
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2005 7:52 AM
To: Scrivner, Larry D Mr RRMC
Subject: FW: Revised SPARTAN WBS

-----Original Message-----
From: Olszewski, William J Contractor/Quanti Tech [mailto:bill.olszewski@us.army.mil]
Sent: Monday, July 26, 2004 1:06 PM
To: williamson@anad.army.mil; crosbym@anad.army.mil; tyrone.nordquist@dac.army.mil; orest.hrycak@us.army.mil; Wright, Jeff S; larry.nortunen@dac.army.mil; LTC Kevin Jennings; Adams, Lisha G DCSS; mark-pomeroy@us.army.mil; Little, Rob R
Cc: dorothy.olson@DAC.army.mil; ldgibbs@pica.army.mil; Gozdur, Edward E DCSS; King, Tony R DCSS; dhookway@pica.army.mil; harrell.hignight@redriver-ex.army.mil; Caudill, Steve M (Contractor-ERC); Olszewski, William J Contractor/Quanti Tech
Subject: FW: Revised SPARTAN WBS

A meeting is scheduled for the Review of Site Specific Safety and Health Plan / SPARTAN SOP, 5 Aug 04 at 1100 -1200 hours central time in DCSS conference room 8425 . Please have your comments in by 3 Aug 04. All local Redstone regular participants are invited to attend.

Those joining by telephone, call 256-955-8627, DSN 645-8627 256-955-8627 or DSN 645-8627 and enter code 2410.

Attached is the Spartan Motor WBS as of 23 July 03.

Regards,

Bill Olszewski, Contractor/Quanti Tech

-----Original Message-----
From: Olszewski, William J Contractor/Quanti Tech
Sent: Monday, July 26, 2004 8:30 AM
To: 'williamson@anad.army.mil'; 'crosbym@anad.army.mil'; 'tyrone.nordquist@dac.army.mil'; 'orest.hrycak@us.army.mil'; Wright, Jeff S; 'larry.nortunen@dac.army.mil'; 'LTC Kevin Jennings'; Adams, Lisha G DCSS; 'mark-pomeroy@us.army.mil'; Little, Rob R
Cc: 'dorothy.olson@DAC.army.mil'; 'ldgibbs@pica.army.mil'; Gozdur, Edward E DCSS; King, Tony R DCSS; 'dhookway@pica.army.mil'; 'harrell.hignight@redriver-ex.army.mil'; Caudill, Steve M (Contractor-ERC)
Subject: FW: Revised SPARTAN WBS

Good Morning,

Base on a phone con from ADMC, concerning the scheduled review of the Site Specific Safety and Health Plan/ SPARTAN SOP the WBS has been revised to reflect slippage on the document review and signature loop. We are planning a conference call for the 5 Aug 04 at 1000 hrs central time.

See Dr.Little note below:

r
Bill Olszewski
256-842-8140

-----Original Message-----
From: Gozdur, Edward E DCSS
Sent: Friday, July 23, 2004 1:18 PM
To: Little, Rob R; Olszewski, William J Contractor/Quanti Tech; 'mary.s.crosby@us.army.mil'; McDonald, Michael J; Caudill, Steve M (Contractor-ERC)
Cc: King, Tony R DCSS; Adams, Lisha G DCSS
Subject: RE: Revised SPARTAN WBS

Dr Little
I agree we need to continue to shoot for the original schedule for execution of the program. I think we are in good shape with the documentation. Thanks for you and your teams efforts.
Ed

Ed Gozdur
Phone (256) 313-1645
Cell (256) 714-0137

-----Original Message-----
From: Little, Rob R
Sent: Friday, July 23, 2004 12:25 PM
To: Olszewski, William J Contractor/Quanti Tech; 'mary.s.crosby@us.army.mil'; McDonald, Michael J; Caudill, Steve M (Contractor-ERC)
Cc: King, Tony R DCSS; Gozdur, Edward E DCSS
Subject: Revised SPARTAN WBS

Bill,
In accordance with e-mail traffic from ADMC, concerning their schedule, we have revised the WBS to reflect slippage on the document review and signature loop; but hold fast to plans for implementation of equipment siting the week of 16 AUG 04. These efforts are not necessarily mutually inclusive; and should be able to be worked concurrently. Look for an appropriate date for a telecom the week of the 3rd. At some point after equipment siting but before actual work, we can support a management level meeting at ADMC; at the close of which, we could take all interested parties out to the Command Center for equipment demonstration. We should allow Ms. Adams, and LTC Jennings to express their availability and interest, as well as ADMC. I think there is still some slack in the schedule if we get in a bind.

Robert R. Little, Ph.D.
Propulsion and Structures Directorate
AMSRD-AMR-PS-S, Bldg 7156
U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command
Redstone Arsenal, Ala. 35898
phone: (256) 876-6205

-----Original Message-----
From: Olszewski, William J Contractor/Quanti Tech
Sent: Friday, July 23, 2004 9:28 AM
To: Little, Rob R
Subject: FW: Site Specific Safety and Health Plan/ SPARTAN SOP
Importance: High

Fyi.....

Scrivner, Larry D Mr RRMC

From: Hignight, Harrell D Mr RRMC
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2005 8:01 AM
To: Scrivner, Larry D Mr RRMC
Subject: FW: SPARTAN Request for RRMC

-----Original Message-----
From: Little, Rob R [mailto:robert.r.little@us.army.mil]
Sent: Thursday, September 16, 2004 7:22 AM
To: Gozdur, Edward E DCSS; King, Tony R DCSS
Cc: Adams, Lisha G DCSS; 'Brown, William L - RRMC'; 'harrell.hignight@us.army.mil'; 'windell.mitchell@redriver-ex.army.mil'; Caudill, Steve M (Contractor-ERC); 'jim.schooler@us.army.mil'
Subject: SPARTAN Request for RRMC

Mr. Gozdur, Sir,

Attached below is the contact information I received for RRMC personnel, and request that the Preliminary Findings of our SPARTAN work at ADMC be transmitted to them for review. Based upon these findings, we contend that the potential for the presence of toxic phosphine gas in RRMC igloos is not credible, and request that local surveillance personnel be given access to the storage locations for SPARTAN motors at RRMC. In order to support Tier 1 Safety and Condition Assessment planning at RRMC, the following information would be most useful:

1) A listing of motor S/Ns stored at RRMC, and in which Magazine they are stored. Any other explosive items stored with these?
2) Global maps of the interior of each magazine, to locate relative physical position of each container to one another and distances to fixed structure surfaces. This can best be accomplished by using the largest cross-sectional dimension of the container at its separation point (UPPER-LOWER)
3) Description of the magazine interior size, to include geometry, height along walls, and in the center of the ceiling
4) If possible, provide a collection of digital photographs of the interior of each magazine, from several prospective view points, so that

I also suggest, that if necessary, our team could visit RRMC Management to discuss findings and begin dialog for planning purposes.

RRMC contact information:

+ Harrell Hignight, Director
  DSN: 829-2437
  COM: 903-334-2437
  FAX: 829-4324
  Address: Red River Munitions Center, ATTN: SJMMC-MC, 100 Main Drive, Texarkana, TX 75507-5000
  E-mail: harrell.hignight@us.army.mil

+ Jim Schooler, Safety Manager (RRAD)
  DSN: 829-2371
  COM: 903-334-2371
  FAX: 829-4346
  Address: Red River Army Depot, ATTN: AMSTA-RR-OS, 100 Main Drive, Texarkana, TX 75507-5000
  E-mail: jim.schooler@us.army.mil

Robert R. Little, Ph.D.
Propulsion and Structures Directorate

AMSRD-AMR-PS-S, Bldg 7156
U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command
Redstone Arsenal, Ala. 35898
phone: (256) 876-6205

RRMC Tab E

Explanation and backup data for Bullet E

The report shows that no positions from Red River Munitions Center (RRMC) will transfer to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (MCAAP) or BlueGrass. However, RRMC employees are on the MCAAP TDA. MCAAP does not show a loss of employees.

Department : Army
Scenario File : J:\PROPOSAL DEVELOPMENT\MATERIEL & LOGISTICS\Mr. James Folk\Cobra Runs\Close Red River\Close Red River Version #2.CBR
Option Pkg Name: Red River Version #2 (15 Feb)
Std Fctrs File : D:\Army COBRA 6.09\BRAC2005.SFF

FOOTNOTES FOR SCREEN ONE
==========
Close Red River Army Depot, TX. Relocate the storage and demilitarization functions of the Munitions Center to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK. Relocate the munitions maintenance functions of the Munitions Center to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK, and Blue Grass Army Depot, KY. Relocate the depot maintenance of Armament and Structural Components, Combat Vehicles, Depot Fleet/Field Support, Engines and Transmissions, Fabrication and Manufacturing, Fire Control Systems and Components, and Other to Anniston Army Depot, AL. Relocate the depot maintenance of Powertrain Components, and Starters/Generators to Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA. Relocate the depot maintenance of Construction Equipment to Anniston Army Depot, AL, and Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA. Relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Vehicles to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA and Letterkenny Depot, PA. Relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Missiles to Letterkenny Army Depot, PA. Disestablish and privatize the supply, storage, and distribution functions for tires, packaged Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants, and compressed gases. Relocate the storage and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot to the Defense Distribution Depot, Oklahoma City, OK.

FOOTNOTES FOR SCREEN THREE
==========
To Basex. 56 positions.

USAED 12
FORSCOM 1
TMDE 11
DRMO 24
DLA DAPS 3
DFAS 5

From Ind 00127B

65 positions and the support equipment transfer from RRAD to TYAD.
338 positions and support equip. transfer to LEAD.
975 positions & spt. equip. transfer to Anniston

From Ind. #0111

No positions from the RR Munitions Center will transfer to McAlester or Bluegrass. It is anticipated that the missions can be accomodated with existing workforce.

From S&S #51: 431 positions will be transferred to the Oklahoma City Distribution Center. The remainder will be eliminated.

FOOTNOTES FOR SCREEN FIVE
==========
All costs on screen 5 reflect the cumulative effect of CRs at the gaining installations (Anniston, Tobyhanna, and Letterkenny). The CR SSEI report may show differing costs of environmental impacts for the gaining installations since those SSEIs are based soley on the closure actions that affect the gaining locations. The costs shown on screen 5 are this CR's portion of the cumulative impact of all CRs affecting gaining locations.

Anniston allocation costs for environmental FY07 $904K and IT FY08 $123K
Tobyhanna allocation costs for environmental FY07 $179 and IT FY07 $10K
Letterkenny allocation costs for environmental FY 07 $921K and IT FY07 $680K

Tobyhanna:
Non-milcon env cost at Tobyhanna AD is $1.050M for EIS and EBS.
One-time IT cost is $21.7K

COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v6.09) - Page 13
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INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: RED RIVER, TX (48733)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	-3	-1	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	-5	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	262	-402	-251	-81	0	0
Off Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prog FH Privatization:	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Name: MCALESTER, OK (40549)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Prog nonBRAC Change:	-64	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prog FH Privatization:	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Name: Tinker AFB, OK (WWYK)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	9	0	0	0
Off Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prog FH Privatization:	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Name: CO MCLB ALBANY, GA (M67004)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	14	0	-12	0	0
Off Prog nonBRAC Change:	-13	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Prog nonBRAC Change:	-65	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Prog nonBRAC Change:	-163	-244	0	0	0	0
Stu Prog nonBRAC Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prog FH Privatization:	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

COBRA PERSONNEL/SF/SUSTAINMENT/RECAP/BOS DELTAS REPORT (COBRA v6.09)
Data As Of 04/16/2005 11:30:21 AM, Report Created 04/17/2005 9:45:57 AM

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Personnel

Base	Start*	Finish*	Change	%Change
TOBYHANNA	3,149	3,215	66	2%
BASE X (ARMY)	6,348	6,404	56	1%
LETTERKENNY	1,476	1,820	344	23%
ANNISTON	3,533	4,512	979	28%
RED RIVER	2,500	0	-2,500	-100%
MCALESTER	1,314	1,314	0	0%
BLUE GRASS	862	862	0	0%
Tinker AFB	21,797	22,237	440	2%
CO MCLB ALBANY	2,370	2,526	156	7%
TOTAL	43,349	42,890	-459	-1%

Square Footage

Base	Start	Finish	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
TOBYHANNA	4,518,000	4,518,000	0	0%	0
BASE X (ARMY)	6,388,460	6,388,460	0	0%	0
LETTERKENNY	5,754,000	5,754,000	0	0%	0
ANNISTON	8,948,000	8,948,000	0	0%	0
RED RIVER	7,475,000	0	-7,475,000	-100%	2,990
MCALESTER	9,677,000	9,677,000	0	0%	0
BLUE GRASS	3,799,000	3,799,000	0	0%	0
Tinker AFB	10,117,000	10,538,084	421,084	4%	957
CO MCLB ALBANY	6,853,407	6,853,407	0	0%	0
TOTAL	63,529,867	56,475,951	-7,053,916	-11%	15,368

Base Operations Support (2005$)

Base	Start*	Finish*	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
TOBYHANNA	30,275,614	30,423,837	148,223	0%	2,246
BASE X (ARMY)	22,654,632	22,730,691	76,059	0%	1,358
LETTERKENNY	22,461,240	23,115,598	654,359	3%	1,902
ANNISTON	28,732,697	30,761,497	2,028,800	7%	2,072
RED RIVER	26,480,590	0	-26,480,590	-100%	10,592
MCALESTER	23,613,891	23,613,891	0	0%	0
BLUE GRASS	10,175,610	10,175,610	0	0%	0
Tinker AFB	85,416,000	86,929,675	1,513,675	2%	3,440
CO MCLB ALBANY	17,382,493	17,814,701	432,207	2%	2,770
TOTAL	267,192,767	245,565,500	-21,627,267	-8%	47,118

COBRA SUSTAINMENT/RECAP/BOS/HOUSING CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v6.09) - Page 2
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RED RIVER, TX (48733)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Jobs Gained-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Mil	0	0	8	1	0	0	9
NET CHANGE-Mil	0	0	-8	-1	0	0	-9
Jobs Gained-Civ	262	0	0	0	0	0	262
Jobs Lost-Civ	0	1,990	251	512	0	0	2,753
NET CHANGE-Civ	262	-1,990	-251	-512	0	0	-2,491
Jobs Gained-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

MCALESTER, OK (40549)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Jobs Gained-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Gained-Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Gained-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

BLUE GRASS, KY (21081)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Jobs Gained-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Gained-Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Gained-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Tinker AFB, OK (WWYK)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Jobs Gained-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Gained-Civ	0	0	9	431	0	0	440
Jobs Lost-Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Civ	0	0	9	431	0	0	440
Jobs Gained-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0