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MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

SUBJECT: DON comments on the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Report

We have conducted a detailed review of the draft Technical Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Report, and provide the following recommendations to make the written report a more complete product:

Major Concerns:

1. As discussed at the ISG meeting, we need to develop a process for establishing consistency of terminology and Military Value attributes/metrics/weights/scores assignment across the Technical JCSG and like areas of other JCSGs. This will become particularly important during the scenario phase as inter-JCSG negotiations become necessary and during review by higher level and external organizations.

Examples: Although the terminology is different, there is good correlation between the weights and scores assigned to the "people" and "synergy" attributes of both the Technical and Industrial JCSGs, which may well be reviewing elements of the same activities. However, Education and Training ranges and Test and Evaluation ranges have very different analytical constructs, which may create difficulties if we try to analyze the potential for use of one type of range by the other function. A single set of questions with a common analytical construct would be preferable to allow comparability and use by both the Technical and E&T JCSGs.

2. Essential elements of the report need to be completed. These include 10 of 26 questions, certain weights and scores, and the "future war fighting concepts group" assessment upon which certain weights and scores are based.

3. We need to ensure there is rationale to support all aspects of the scoring plan, including assignment of attributes, metrics, weights and scoring. Many different function/capability combinations have similar criteria and attribute weights, and many similar capability/attribute combinations have widely different scoring, with no explanation in the body of the report. To the extent possible, we should strive to have these reports be complete, stand-alone documents that contain the reasons for selecting attributes and metrics and assigning weights and scores, supported by official records of deliberation.

Example from the scoring plan waterfall charts: Air, Land, Sea, Space Capability – Research function – Criteria 1 – Attribute 5 (Synergy) – Metric 3 (Proximity) is scored

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as 40%. In the Weapons and Armaments Capability Area, the same combination of Function/Criteria/Attribute/Metric is scored as 20%. There is great similarity within the elements of these two capability/function/criteria/attribute/metric sets, but no explanation of the difference in scores.

4. The Technical JCSG should conduct sensitivity analyses using notional data to determine the viability of the weights, scoring and formulas in the Military Value Report. It is unclear whether their scoring plan values those attributes they consider important. Sensitivity analyses should point out where skewed and unintended results might occur.

Specific Recommendations:

1. In paragraph 1.2, strike the phrase “the Joint Staff and Marine Corps chose not to be active participants in the CIT.” We understand this to be factually incorrect, as both organizations are now represented at CIT meetings.

2. Map “Future Warfighting Concepts” to validated plans/guidance. The current list of future technologies/capabilities is not sufficiently justified by other official studies and plans.

3. Ensure workload metrics are used that are meaningful to BRAC deliberations. In questions where “Total Funding Executed” is requested, “In House Funding Executed”, “Out-of-House (Other Government Activity) Funding Executed”, and “Contractor Funding Executed” should also be requested, so analysis can provide a complete picture of an activity’s/organization’s military value. (Note: Final questions numbers and terminology were not available at the time of these comments).

4. Ensure metrics to measure and compare program accomplishment are complete. In questions measuring program accomplishment (ACAT programs, ACTDs, ATD’s, UNS, and Rapid Response projects), the measurement is limited to numbers of programs. Because program scope can vary widely, another factor, such as cost or FTEs expended, should be used as an additional, discriminating measure.

5. Reconsider assigned weights for Selection Criteria #4 as a whole. This Selection Criteria appears not to have been well understood, and thus results in less consideration than the other 3 criteria (para 2.2.d). There are technical areas under consideration in which the cost of operations and the manpower implications could be significant factors.

6. Delete the question requesting funding plans for “high value warfighting capabilities/technology.” The detail level required to map future year funding plans to these technologies is not available in all Military Departments in auditable form.

7. Delete the questions under the heading of “bounding parameter.” This has been the subject of much discussion related to the scoring and weighting of physical

structures and equipment, with no agreement reached. This metric contains greater risk for skewing an analysis than any other, even if consensus is reached on weighting and scoring.

8. Data gathering and analysis should be planned for the lowest level that will be significant for BRAC actions across all Military Departments. Presently, the data gathering and analysis construct goes no lower than the function/capability level. Plans should be adjusted based upon an understanding of the distribution of functions/sub-functions and capabilities across the Military Departments to allow discrimination between the many "technical facilities." In some cases, functional/capability level is sufficient; in others, sub-function or lower is required. A symmetrical construct will not allow the analysis required.

Example: The "Research/Weapons" function/capability area has several significant sub-areas that need to be visible and analyzed separately to allow BRAC decisions, i.e., Aviation Weapons Systems, Undersea Weapons Systems, Sea Surface Weapons Systems, and Land Weapons Systems.

My office stands ready to further clarify these issues and assist in implementation of the recommendations as necessary.



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