

DCN: 10981



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT
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JUN 17 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS), AND CHAIRMAN
INFRASTRUCTURE STEERING GROUP

Subj: BRAC 2005 PRINCIPLES AND IMPERATIVES

Ref: (a) USD (AT&L) memo of 10 June 04

Per reference (a), the Department of the Navy forwards enclosure (1), the draft Navy and Marine Corps Imperatives. As requested, they are provided as read aheads for our discussion at the 25 June 2004 Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) meeting. The Imperatives are offered in their current draft state to continue our discussion among the members of the ISG. Additionally, we are forwarding enclosure (2) containing line in/line out suggested revisions to the draft Principles provided by reference (a). The rationale is provided for each change and includes both substantive and editorial suggestions. The last page of enclosure (2) is the smooth version of the Principles with our suggestions.

I look forward to our discussion on 25 June.

HT Johnson
H. T. JOHNSON

Enclosures:
As stated

Draft Naval Imperatives by Principle

Recruit and Train:

- *For major CSG / ESG level exercises, ranges / OPAREAs with air, sea and over the shore maneuver space must be as close as feasible, preferably within 3 underway days, while individual operational ships and aircraft will need unimpeded access to ranges and operating areas within 6 underway hours for ships, 12 underway hours for submarines, and 1 un-refueled sortie for aircraft.*
- *Fleet Replacement and Operational Squadrons should be located within one un-refueled sortie to DoD-controlled airspace, ranges, targets, low-level routes, outlying fields and over-water training airspace with access to aircraft carrier support.*
- *Pilot training and maintenance training for the Joint Strike Fighter must be co-located at the initial Integrated Training Center (ITC) selected within the BRAC 2005 process, and should be as joint as possible.*
- *Undergraduate flight training will be located separately from operational squadrons and major metropolitan airports and air traffic areas, and have access to DoD-controlled airspace over open water and land with access to aircraft carrier support.*
- *Navy initial skills training will be located with accessions training to minimize student moves or with skills progression training to allow cross-utilization of instructors, facilities and equipment, and support future training and efficiency improvements .*
- *Fleet concentration areas will provide Navy skills progression training and functional skills training relevant to homeported platforms whenever possible.*
- *Navy requires a center for Naval strategic thought and Joint and Coalition maritime security policy innovation.*
- *Navy requires access to relevant educational programs which include specific focus on those areas which are uniquely maritime. Military student admission requirements must complement military personnel management practices.*
- *Geographically position infrastructure and all elements of the MAGTF to enhance training, maintenance and deployment of Marine Forces as MAGTFs. This necessitates retaining/acquiring sufficient sea access, air space, air-to-ground*

training ranges and maneuver areas, for training and deployment purposes; preserving necessary rail access, explosives safety arcs, and staging areas; and avoiding the potential for single points of failure.

- *Preserve training infrastructure to support future weapons platforms, advances in technology, and developments in doctrine and tactics for live fire and combined arms training.*
- *Maintain ownership/scheduling authority for training ranges/maneuver areas deemed essential for meeting MAGTF, unit and individual training standard requirements.*
- *Services retain entry-level training and maintain ownership of accredited educational institutions to develop its officer and enlisted personnel. Retain associated doctrinal concepts and wargaming/simulation experimentation.*

Quality of Life:

- *Align Naval Medicine's Military Treatment Facilities with Navy and Marine Corps force concentration for maximum efficiency and effectiveness, and to maximize operational medical support to the Fleet and Marine Corps.*
- *Maintain sufficient medical capacity (manning, logistics, training and facilities) integral to the MAGTF as well as reach back infrastructure to ensure the continuum of care for the operating forces and additional organic capacity for the supporting establishment and Service member families.*
- *Maintain sufficient capacity to provide operational-non-operational (sea-shore) rotation.*

Organize:

- *The Navy Reserve will become fully integrated with Active forces, located to leverage pooled equipment and training facilities. Reserve presence priority is 1) Active duty Commands, 2) Joint Reserve Facilities, 3) Naval Reserve Activity.*
- *Navy will maintain active or reserve presence in every state.*
- *Where practicable, organizations in leased space should be moved into available space on DoD installations, exclusive of recruiting activities.*

- *Ensure effective/proven IT support can be achieved within the BRAC implementation window on any joint cross-service initiative.*
- *Maintain sufficient capacity to support surge, mobilization, continuity of operations and conduct core roles and missions (sea-based operations, combined arms, etc.).*

Equip:

- *DON as a minimum will maintain a corporate science and technology capability, consisting of intellectual capital and facilities, to explore new and emerging technologies for naval warfare across the air, land, and maritime operating environment.*
- *DON will preserve the minimum required non-renewable infrastructure (i.e. air, land, sea, and space ranges and frequency spectrum) sufficient to ensure the successful RDTE&A, life-cycle support of emerging and existing technologies and capabilities for maritime operating environments and individual, team, and unit training.*

Supply, Service, and Maintain:

- *DON requires a depot maintenance industrial complex that delivers best value cradle-to-grave results in cost-efficiency (total unit cost), responsiveness (schedule compliance and flexibility), and quality (compliance with specifications).*
- *DON requires ship maintenance capabilities close to the fleet to minimize family disruption to:*
 - *Dry dock CVNs and submarines on both coasts and in the central Pacific.*
 - *Refuel/de-fuel/inactivate nuclear-powered ships.*
 - *Dispose of inactivated nuclear-powered ship reactor compartments.*
- *DON must retain capability to engineer, produce, maintain, and handle ordnance and energetic materials designed specifically for the maritime environment.*
- *Navy must maintain minimum capability to represent Navy requirements (all classes of supply), integrate logistics support for Naval forces, and acquire appropriate support for Navy unique material.*
- *Preserve inherent Service capabilities where concepts of operations differ from other Services (e.g. MALS support to the FRSSs, deployable intermediate maintenance support for MPS equipment, Navy IMAs, reach back support for sea-based logistics, etc).*

- *Retain organic maintenance, supply and distribution capability to support sea-basing concepts.*

Deploy & Employ (Operational):

In order to optimize existing and unique capabilities which should be dispersed to preclude a single major debilitating attack within the global war on terror:

- *Fleet basing must be dispersed and support the Fleet Response Plan on both coasts.*
- *CVN capability: 2 East Coast ports, 2 West Coast ports, and 2 forward-based in the Pacific.*
- *SSBN basing: 1 East Coast port, 1 West Coast port.*
- *MPA and rotary wing must take advantage of coastal basing opportunities to capitalize on training and operational synergies.*
- *OLF capability to permit unrestricted fleet operations, including flight training, if home base does not allow.*
- *CLF capability: 1 East Coast and 1 West Coast base that minimize explosive safety risks and eliminate waiver requirements.*
- *Support an expeditionary culture through basing decisions that improve the traits of speed, flexibility and adaptability of Naval expeditionary forces for sea-basing.*

Intelligence:

- *Maintain sufficient organic ISR/analytic capability to meet Naval warfighting and acquisition requirements while effectively leveraging Joint and National intelligence capabilities.*

Proposed BRAC Principles **[with substantive and editorial changes]**

Recruit and Train: The Department must attract, develop, and retain a highly skilled and educated total force (active, reserve, and civilian, ~~and contractor personnel~~) that ~~must have~~ has access to effective, diverse, and sustainable training areas~~space~~ in order ~~throughout a diversity of climate and terrain~~ to ensure current and future readiness, ~~and to~~ support advances in technology, and to respond to anticipated developments in joint and service doctrine and tactics.

Rationale: While we do consider contractor personnel part of our current workforce, we do not recruit and train contractor personnel or expressly provide infrastructure support for them. Inclusion of the word “effective” before “training space” introduces the idea of well-designed training space, suited for the purposes intended. Revised wording state what total force needs (rather than stating that the need is an imperative), eliminates unnecessary wording regarding “climate and terrain” (covered in selection criteria, captured by “diverse”), and describes more clearly why training areas (rather than “space”) is necessary.

Quality of Life: The Department must provide a quality of life, to include quality of work place, that supports recruitment, learning and training, and enhances retention.

Rationale: Ties “quality of life” to “recruit and train,” and encompasses idea of quality of life including quality of service/workplace.

Organize: The Department needs force structure ~~sized, composed, and~~ located to match the demands of the National Military Strategy as reflected by the force’s size and composition, effectively and efficiently supported by properly aligned headquarters and other DoD organizations: that take advantage of opportunities for joint basing.

Rationale: Ties force structure size and composition appropriately to strategy, rather than implying that BRAC determines force structure size and composition. Moves “joint basing” thought from “deploy and employ” to “organize,” which describes where/how force structure should be placed, rather than how it should be used. Eliminates words relating to combined basing, which implies basing with multi-national forces (not part of the domestic BRAC process). “Joint basing” is a more appropriate focus for installations in the United States.

Equip: The Department needs research, development, acquisition, test, and evaluation capabilities that are sized appropriately to efficiently and economically support efforts to place superior technology ~~designed to meet current and future threats~~ in the hands of the warfighter to meet current and future threats and ~~that facilitates~~ knowledge-enabled and net-centric warfare.

Rationale: Puts focus on how RDT&E activities must be shaped, rather than on its ultimate goal of superior technology, which is not measurable in BRAC.

Supply, Service, and Maintain: The Department needs access to logistical and industrial infrastructure capabilities optimally integrated into a skilled and cost efficient national industrial base that provides ~~robust~~, agile, and responsive global support to operational forces.

Rationale: Places focus on industrial base inside the United States, rather than extending scope to extra-territorial industrial assets we may rely on when deployed. “Robust” implies “having a lot of it,” rather than having sufficient. If the support is agile and responsive, it is sufficient to do what is necessary, without regard to numbers or size. More clearly describes what industrial base should do, rather than how it should do it.

Deploy & Employ (Operational): The Department needs: ~~taking advantage of opportunities for joint and combined basing, secure~~ installations that are secure, optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense), that support power projection, rapid deployable capabilities, and expeditionary forces needs that rely on ~~for reach-back capability operations, that sustain and ensure strategic redundancy and~~ the capability to mobilize and surge, and that ensure strategic redundancy.

Rationale: Moves joint basing idea to “organize” as more appropriate fit, cleans up wording so it flows better and is more clear.

Intelligence: The Department needs intelligence capabilities to support the National Military Strategy by delivering predictive analysis, warning of impending crises, providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving horizontal integration of networks and databases.

Proposed BRAC Principles [with substantive and editorial changes]

Recruit and Train: The Department must attract, develop, and retain a highly skilled and educated total force (active, reserve, and civilian) that has access to effective, diverse, and sustainable training areas in order to ensure current and future readiness, to support advances in technology, and to respond to anticipated developments in joint and service doctrine and tactics.

Quality of Life: The Department must provide a quality of life, to include quality of work place, that supports recruitment, learning and training, and enhances retention.

Organize: The Department needs force structure located to match the demands of the National Military Strategy as reflected by the force's size and composition, effectively and efficiently supported by properly aligned headquarters and other DoD organizations that take advantage of opportunities for joint basing.

Equip: The Department needs research, development, acquisition, test, and evaluation capabilities that are sized appropriately to efficiently and economically support efforts to place superior technology in the hands of the warfighter to meet current and future threats and facilitate knowledge-enabled and net-centric warfare.

Supply, Service, and Maintain: The Department needs access to logistical and industrial infrastructure capabilities optimally integrated into a skilled and cost efficient national industrial base that provides agile and responsive global support to operational forces.

Deploy & Employ (Operational): The Department needs secure installations that are optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense), that support power projection, rapid deployable capabilities, and expeditionary force needs for reach-back capability, that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge, and that ensure strategic redundancy.

Intelligence: The Department needs intelligence capabilities to support the National Military Strategy by delivering predictive analysis, warning of impending crises, providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving horizontal integration of networks and databases.