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
BRAC COMMISSION – 2005

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OVERSEAS BASING COMMISSION



COMMISSION ON REVIEW OF OVERSEAS MILITARY FACILITY
STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES



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Hon. Al Cornella, Chairman
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VADM Anthony Less, USN (Ret)
BG Keith Martin, PA ARNG (Ret)
LTG H.G. (Pete) Taylor, USA (Ret)
Dr. James A. Thomson

May 9, 2005

To the President of the United States:

The Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, also known as the Overseas Basing Commission, hereby transmits a May 2005 report to the President and the U.S. Congress. A final report due not later than August 15, 2005, is required by the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. 108-132, Sec. 128, as amended, Pub. L. 108-324, Sec. 127.

In response to the concerns and wishes of certain Members of Congress, the Overseas Basing Commission is issuing this report for review and use by the Congress, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission, and others. It is our hope that this review and the discussion it invokes will add to and strengthen a national awareness and understanding of the strategic importance that the United States' military presence in the world has to our national security.

We sincerely thank you for your continuing support as well as that of your staffs. The Commission is at your disposal should you desire further information and may be reached at the above address or via the e-mail by contacting our Executive Director, patricia.walker@obc.gov. The undersigned Commissioners are in full accord with the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the May 2005 Report. The final report will be provided not later than August 15, 2005.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Al Cornella
Chairman

Lewis E. Curtis, III
Vice Chairman

Anthony A. Less
Commissioner

Keith Martin
Commissioner

H.G. (Pete) Taylor
Commissioner

Dr. James A. Thomson
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
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Commissioner



Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

The United States enters the new millennium as the foremost political, economic, and military entity in the world. Seldom has history seen such a dominant, unilateral power astride the international scene. Nonetheless, after what has proved to be only a brief interlude of relatively unchallenged security in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, we find ourselves in the midst of a global war on terror, armed conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, and challenged by an international environment of potentially intense confrontation and hostility. Clearly we have rivals who resent our international preeminence. Just as clearly, others will emerge in the future.

SECURITY POSTURE

We have shifted our own security posture accordingly to counter the threat. We have undertaken a transformation of strategy that is far-reaching in its implications on our ability to defend ourselves at home and to pursue our interests in the world. We have formulated new doctrines, organized new unit structures, developed new weapons, communications, intelligence, logistics, and command and control systems, and sought new allies and altered basing locations at home and abroad. We are adopting new techniques and procedures, shifting our forces around the globe, and otherwise launching a myriad of innovations.

Amidst this avalanche of change the Overseas Basing Commission was asked to assess the applicability and feasibility of the proposed global basing structure for U.S. forces. At the same time we were asked to look beyond just the single matter of overseas basing and to consider any other issues that impact on it and the overall security of the United States. We offer our findings on both matters.

The Commission was impressed by the many initiatives being taken by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the individual services, and the Combatant Commanders to adapt to a changing world. We were also struck by the enormity of the entire effort. The overseas basing structure as envisioned by the Secretary of Defense holds great potential for protecting and securing the nation, its interests and its allies in the post-9-11 world.

The Commission fully understands the need for change and endorses much of what is planned and already in progress. The movement of a heavy brigade out of Korea and the shifting of forces remaining there south of the Han River, for example, make eminently good sense. The expansion of cooperative security locations (CSL) and

forward operating sites (FOS)¹ in key strategic locations around the globe adds to operational flexibility, preserves a presence abroad, and serves to strengthen alliance relationships. The transformation of military forces in the individual services into expeditionary capable units furthers our posture as a capabilities-based force. These and many of the other initiatives are positive developments which if done in full coordination with each other under a synchronized plan and within affordable costs hold great promise for the future.

On the other hand, the Commission expresses reservations on a number of rebasing initiatives. For example, while we can see the wisdom of returning to the United States the majority of Army heavy forces from Central Europe, we believe one heavy brigade should be kept in place for a variety of reasons that include demonstration of our commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), our resolve in Kosovo and elsewhere in the Balkans, and to hedge against future uncertainties regarding planned rotational units in Eastern Europe.

The Commission suggests that U.S. presence in Europe remains crucial to future global stability. Nor are we sure that current discussions on relocating U.S. forces on Okinawa adequately address strategic concerns for U.S. security interests in East Asia. The Commission offers its views on these and other specific issues in the body of the Report.

As the Commission did its work it found grounds for both praise and caution in regard to the Department of Defense (DOD) Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS). It notes that IGPBS itself was based largely on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001.² That review was essentially completed prior to the attack on the U.S. of September 11, 2001. Much additional change has transpired since that event. The 2005 QDR is now underway. Most likely it will generate more change.

The Report that follows will detail in its several parts the geopolitical considerations, operational impacts, mobility concerns, quality of life implications, and cost burdens

1 According to DOD, Forward Operating Sites (FOS) will be expandable "warm facilities" maintained with a limited U.S. military support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment. FOSs will support rotational rather than permanently stationed forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional training. Examples include: the Sembawang port facility in Singapore and Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) will be facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence. Instead they will be maintained with periodic service, contractor, or host-nation support. CSLs will provide contingency access and be a focal point for security cooperation activities. A current example of a CSL is in Dakar, Senegal, where the Air Force has negotiated contingency landing, logistics, and fuel contracting arrangements, and which served as a staging area for the 2003 peace support operation in Liberia.

2 DOD Report to Congress, *Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture*, September 2004.

Preface

On May 9, 2005, the Commission on the Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (“the “Overseas Basing Commission”) made public its May 2005, report to the President and Members of Congress.

In this report, the Commission identified its major concerns and presented its conclusions and recommendations with respect to future overseas basing issues.

Following publication of the report, the Department of Defense advised the Commission of its concerns that certain information in the report might have a deleterious impact on the Department's activities. In response, the Commission edited those passages to remove any such information. In so doing, the Commission determined that the changes in the report had no affect on the conclusions and recommendations of the report.

The Commission continues to gather and assess information in preparation for its final report. Several of the appendices are in the process of being updated and will be incorporated into the August 15, 2005 final report to the President and Congress.



affected by the amount of change underway. It is the combination of the concerns raised in each of these areas, however, which leads the Commission to its major finding that the timing and synchronization of the global rebasing initiatives must be rethought.

GEOPOLITICAL POSTURE

The U.S. overseas basing structure must serve both in the near term and for decades to come. The global network of U.S. bases becomes the skeleton upon which the flesh and muscle of operational capability will be molded. The bases themselves and the agreements that govern them become both a reflection of and contributor to our alliance relationships around the world.

From a geopolitical perspective, implementation of each step of the process — the withdrawal of units to the Continental United States (CONUS), the signing of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), access agreements and so on — creates a new global posture. It is critical that the steps be taken in such a way that at any point in the process U.S. security is stronger, not weaker. Yet the withdrawals are front-loaded and compensatory additions sometimes come only later.

Moreover, the bases we select now cannot be oriented to dealing only with current threats. They must have the capacity to deal with threats that will emerge in decades to come, and that consideration necessitates a more finite discussion of what the long-term threats might be. Even in a capabilities-based posture, we must have some recognition of the range of threats we are likely to face, both near and long term. At the same time, we must consider the values of those with whom we are prepared to ally.

We diminish our presence in long-standing relationships with some concern that once departed our ability to maintain influence is correspondingly reduced. We join into new bilateral and multilateral relationships with some trepidation that if both our national values and mutual interests do not converge a happy marriage will not result. The Commission notes that our base structure is not merely a derivative of strategy; it is a driver in its own right. It must, therefore, be fully integrated with every other facet of strategy before it can be properly affixed. It is the opinion of the Commission that a full dialogue by all necessary parties on the impact on U.S. security of the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy has not taken place.

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Our military forces must be able to meet the force projection demands placed on them under existing strategies and plans. Their training and equipment must be adequate to

the task, access to key locations assured, and units and bases protected to the degree commensurate with the risks we ask our service men and women to undertake. It is not clear that all of these concerns have been addressed.

Moreover, to launch major realignments of bases and unit configurations at a time we are in the midst of two major conflicts (Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom) takes us to the edge of our capabilities. Many of our active and reserve forces need to reset in light of the strain these operations have put on their equipment and support systems. The intercontinental (in some cases) and intra-theater movement of operational units will impact force readiness for a period of time. Simultaneous transformation of unit types and subsequent demands incurred by rotational cycles will further stretch capabilities.

All of these impacts must be taken into account if we are to maintain both our capability and flexibility throughout. The Commission finds no imperative for doing all of this in the short span of time now planned (2006 - 2011), and believes that if we continue at the current pace we are liable to handicap operational capability and run the risk of creating new vulnerabilities.

MOBILITY

A central objective of a rebasing strategy is to ensure availability of requisite combat power at the point of need. As we return forces from overseas, shift them within and between combatant commands, and transform them into more readily deployable units we seek an outcome of enhanced mobility.

The Commission is concerned, however, that adequate strategic sealift, airlift, and prepositioned equipment and stocks do not exist and that current intra-theater airlift is over-stressed. Aside from the lift capability, the Commission is also concerned that the air and seaports, inter-nodal connectivities and other mobility enabling systems are not adequate to meet potential contingencies. Moreover, the Commission notes that budgetary plans for mobility assets are inadequate to meet projected lift demand.

QUALITY OF LIFE

The nation relies on an armed force of committed volunteers. Throughout our history, they have served nobly in peace and war under sometimes rigorous conditions and with varying degrees of risk. They have never failed us. The Commission notes all that has been done to secure their well-being and to look after their needs under the current conditions of war and transformation. It is concerned, however, that unless some reordering of priorities takes place we are in danger of straining active and reserve forces and their families beyond the degree they should be asked to accept.

As we reposition tens of thousands of family members to localities that may not have been given adequate time or budget to prepare for their proper reception, and as we subject service members to repeated rotations abroad for extended periods of time (even in eras of unbroken peace), we may find ourselves unable to acquire the requisite numbers of recruits and reenlistments to maintain a viable volunteer force.

The Commission believes that in the short run planners must take a “last day — first day”³ approach to the movement of units and families from one location to another. Furthermore, the Commission suggests close monitoring of attitudes toward military service in times of frequent and extended separations from home and family. Most importantly, the Commission recommends that quality of life considerations be a priority in the global realignment process.

COSTS

The Department of Defense estimates the implementation of IGPBS to be between \$9 billion and \$12 billion⁴ with only about \$4 billion currently budgeted from fiscal years 2006 through 2011.⁵ These costs may be understated. An independent analysis conducted for the Overseas Basing Commission put the tab at closer to \$20 billion.⁶

In some cases we will be moving into prime locations where available space and facilities are scarce and for which we will pay top dollar (Okinawa and Singapore are two; there are several others). In other instances, we will be moving into key strategic positions within or on the periphery of what is described in the Report (and elsewhere) as the “arc of instability” where accommodations are sparse and the surrounding region depressed, but where nonetheless we could be asked to spend considerable amounts in return for our access.

3 “Last day” refers to maintaining the support infrastructure for personnel at locations until the last day they are in place. “First day” refers to having the support infrastructure in place on the first day troops arrive at their new location.

4 The \$9 billion to \$12 billion estimate includes base closure costs, the transportation costs to move people and equipment, any new facility costs at receiving locations, and the costs to establish FOSs and CSLs.

5 Of the \$4 billion, about \$3 billion has been allocated to a Base Realignment and Closure account that has been established to pay for IGPBS actions related to BRAC, such as the cost connected with the movement of troops from overseas to U.S. installations. It does not include the Korean Land Partnership Plan or Efficient Basing Grafenwoehr, as these projects were already funded. In addition, the projected funding estimate does not include host nation support dollars. Host nation support funding would defray some of the projected costs.

6 The \$20 billion estimate includes recurring life cycle costs, non-recurring overseas and domestic (for returning forces) estimated new facility costs. It also includes costs related to U.S. funding to implement the Land Partnership Plan for Korea rebasing.

Additionally, the costs associated with rebasing forces within CONUS have not been fully analyzed. Over and above overseas relocation costs will be bills for service transformation, purchase of strategic and intra-theater lift, resetting of units and their equipment sets in the active and reserve forces, replacement and expansion of stocks, new weapons and systems purchases, and continued force modernization. The sum total is enormous.

Moreover, many of the costs are unprogrammed and will be drawn from individual service operating budgets planned for other uses. We are in danger of robbing from operations and maintenance accounts to meet even minimal levels of construction and quality of life concerns. The Commission gives a strong caution that global restructuring and transformation ambitions may be bigger than our wallet.

TIMING AND SYNCHRONIZATION

The Commission fully understands the need for transformation and lauds the insight and vision behind the many different initiatives going forward. At the same time it expresses a concern that the timing of several of the actions may be misguided and that the overall synchronization of the many separate undertakings is lacking. It is difficult to understand, for example, why we would withdraw all of our heavy forces from Europe to replace them with a Stryker brigade before we have successfully developed an organic tank killing weapon system able to compete on the move with enemy armor.

Further, the Commission questions why we would move tens of thousands of service members and their families to locations in the United States before we have programmed the budgetary outlays to accommodate their arrival and before local communities are able to prepare services for population expansion. Nor can we understand why we must shift so rapidly to an expeditionary posture when we have neither achieved the technological breakthroughs nor put budgetary programs in place to produce the necessary fast sealift to get displaced forces into action in accordance with existing strategies and plans.

These and other examples gave repeated indication that in far too many instances we are putting the cart before the horse. It is our observation that the detailed synchronization required of so massive a realignment is lacking. The Commission strongly recommends that the pace of events be slowed and reordered.

A BROADER PERSPECTIVE

The Commission began its work focused on the details of rebasing abroad. It soon became clear, however, that the overseas basing structure could not be viewed in

isolation from all the other transformation activities and their cumulative effect on the security of the United States.

The information we gathered, visits we made, and hearings we held impressed upon us a number of things, among which were the commitment of our service members and their military and civilian leaders, the need for change, and the dedication of the Combatant Commanders, individual services, and the Department of Defense to a more secure America. The Commission's investigation and analysis, however, brought it to a number of other conclusions as well.

We found that the quest for greater security would benefit from the addition of the following three critical elements.

First, the nation would prosper from a more inclusive national discussion on how best to arrange for the greater security of the United States. The Commission notes that the last great transformation of America's security posture in the world — the post-World War II era that led up to and followed the 1947 National Security Act — was driven by a process that brought together the best minds the country had to offer, the energies of a collection of federal agencies and organizations, and the deliberations of a focused and bipartisan legislature.

The current transformation which has been ongoing since the end of the Cold War — massive in scope and in expected outcomes — has not had the benefit of such a wide spectrum of views. It has been too much the purview of a single agency — the Department of Defense. The Commission recommends a larger involvement by all of the relevant organs of government informed by wide reflection from the best minds in public and private life.

Second, the many events already undertaken and further changes that most likely will be generated by the 2005 QDR require an overall architectural design. The Commission repeatedly discovered disconnects between one event and another. While individual efforts and separate commands were impressive in the scope and thoroughness, they often appeared to be inadequately linked to one another. No single entity revealed itself as master of the entire plan. The Commission strongly suggests that the entire effort of transformation be tied together in one overarching design, and that a specific body be assigned responsibilities to both guide and monitor its implementation.

Third, the Congress of the United States must provide active oversight to the process. Cost and budgetary inconsistencies alone indicate that the Congress needs to exercise

its full authority in ensuring that plans and programs are adequate to the task. This view is reinforced by the disconnection between the overseas basing plan and the base realignment and closure process.

The two are inherently related, yet the Congress is divorced from direct oversight from either, the latter by design and the former by a lack of information available to the Legislature on the effects of the entire process. The Commission recommends that the Congress exercise its oversight responsibilities fully and vigorously. It is time to adapt our security systems to meet emerging threats, and to do so by continuing a shift to a capabilities-based posture that will allow us to answer the range of challenges we face. But we cannot do so without an overarching plan.

The Commission believes that change is necessary, but guided change that considers the entirety of the security components of the United States, not just those related to the Department of Defense. The Commission found that the overseas basing structure cannot be viewed in isolation from a myriad of other security-related considerations. Its feasibility and effectiveness can only be evaluated in context with all other aspects of national security mentioned elsewhere in this Report. We believe that at some time too much activity in too short a time threatens to change transformation into turbulence. We have concluded that we are doing too much too fast and a reordering of the steps is necessary. We call, therefore, for a process of deliberation and review to accompany the zeal and aggressiveness to act.

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Main Discussion

INTRODUCTION

The Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States — more commonly known as The Overseas Basing Commission — was established in 2003 by Public Law 108-132, as amended by 108-324.¹ The Commission was created to evaluate the current and proposed overseas basing structure of U.S. military forces; to assess the number (and, by implication, type) of forces to be based outside the United States, the current state (and availability to our forces) of military facilities and training areas and ranges abroad; the amounts received in direct and indirect payments from allies in support of those facilities; whether the existing and planned structures were adequate to future needs, the feasibility and advisability of proposed changes; and to assess any other issue related to the planned basing structure. The Commission, active since May 2004, was tasked to provide a report of its findings and conclusions not later than August of 2005.

The foundation document for global reposturing is the 2004 Department of Defense Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS).² The Commission, therefore, began its investigation with a review and analysis of the underlying assumptions and resulting conclusions of that document. The IGPBS calls for a significant realignment of the U.S. global posture — withdrawals to the United States of some forces that until now were stationed overseas, closure of some overseas facilities, enhanced access to yet others we already occupy, and the creation of new facilities where in some cases we will maintain a permanent or semi-permanent presence.

A shift of this magnitude affects significantly the overall strategic posture of the United States — political relations with allies and friends, deterrence of aggression against U.S. interests, conduct of military operations, shaping of the international environment in ways favorable to the United States, and so on. Thus, any assessment of basing cannot be separated from its related parts (e.g., domestic as well as overseas basing, alliance relationships, mobility lift capabilities, access to energy sources, etc.) nor from broader considerations of security strategy (e.g., the likely nature of current and emerging threats, economic impacts, political and policy implications, and so on).

¹ See Appendix A.

² The unclassified version of the strategy can be found in the DOD Report to Congress, *Strengthening U.S. Global Posture* (September 2004).

Accordingly, we determined that fulfillment of our duties demanded more than a mere critique of the proposed overseas basing posture. Mindful of the emphasis in the directive of PL 108-132 to consider "...any other issue related to military facilities overseas..." the Commission elected to cast its review in the context of overseas basing as it relates to the totality of U.S. security strategy.

Throughout the course of our investigations we were continually impressed by the professionalism, dedication, and thoughtfulness of all those at every level who are forging the elements of U.S. security. We compliment the patriotism and commitment of those who work these issues every day and who are willing to sacrifice their own well-being to that end.

We are struck most of all by the unstinting commitment of our young soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who perform their duties so selflessly in the midst of war and conflict. The Departments of Defense and State, as well as other federal, state, and local agencies, have much to be proud of in the way that their people and their organizations have worked to improve the overall safety and security of our citizens. We are well served by all their endeavors to provide a better and safer future for all of us.

In the course of our work, we reviewed many facts and listened to many views. It was always our objective to find within the imperatives for change an appreciation of the lines between inherent (for either traditional or parochial reasons) resistance and justifiable reservation for moving forward at the pace and to the extent contemplated.

Simultaneously, we sought to understand how change in one area impacted change in others, and how the transformation of the many parts of our security apparatus impacted on the whole. At no point in our investigation did we conclude that the overall intention to move toward a higher level of security in an altered global environment was unwise or unsound. As will become obvious in the Report that follows, the concerns expressed by the Commission are related to specific aspects of the conversion, and how they add to or detract from the overall outcome.

The underpinning of the proposed global basing posture is the transformation from a threats-based force to a capabilities-based force. Our Cold War basing structure, designed to deal with the preeminent threat of an expansionist Communist ideology, has been overtaken by events. The effort to expand U.S. global access therefore, is strategically sound. For that reason, with a few important exceptions, the Commission applauds the Administration's efforts to secure new bases and access in its global repositioning plan.

The threats we face have changed and broadened along several dimensions. They have shifted geographically, so that threats that are emanating from the “arc of instability” — an arc stretching from West Africa, across Southwest, South, and Southeast Asia and across the Pacific into the Andes — have become paramount. Yet, our traditional national security interests in Europe and East Asia remain key, as do our allies there. The threats to our interests have shifted from conventional to asymmetric ones, especially terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We no longer have the convenience of focusing on one dominant threat and assuming that if we are postured to meet that threat, we can handle any lesser threats that might simultaneously emerge. A capabilities-based focus, therefore, seems appropriate, although (as we shall discuss later in the Report) we must still consider the range and likelihood of various threats that might present themselves.

To that end, the Commission focused on the process of change to determine the level of input from Combatant Commanders and the degree to which that input was entered into the overall plan. We had assumed at the outset that there was an overriding architecture for global restructuring, and our early concern was that individual needs would not be adequately represented in the final outcome.

The Commission concluded that the Combatant Commanders had every opportunity to provide their insights and state their needs, and did so quite clearly and thoroughly. In fact, the Commission perceived that the vast majority of the detailed planning for IGPBS was being done by the Combatant Commanders and by the individual services.

At the same time, however, we became increasingly concerned that the sum total of transformation initiatives was not coordinated within an overarching plan, that many adaptations were being undertaken “in-stride” as opposed to being in concert with phased, deliberate timing. The many independent yet related activities were disconnected from each other to the degree that the central objective of an enhanced security posture for the United States was at risk.

We have heard argued, and can agree in part, that synergies are created by undertaking multiple tasks at one time. Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Army modularization, joint force transformation, the Mobility Capabilities Study, domestic base realignment and closure (referred to by the acronym BRAC), and many other initiatives are laudable in and of themselves, and put together properly can result in major improvements in strategic security. But their depth and breadth are so vast when taken together that there is a danger — voiced in the words of one senior military leader — of too many balls in the air at once.

In considering IGPBS, the Commission tried to come to terms with a number of fundamental questions, included in which were the following:

- What are the geopolitical ramifications? How does the loss of sizeable forward presence impact deterrence, war fighting, security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations?
- Can we address traditional and emerging threats?
- Will we be able to successfully negotiate Status of Forces Agreements, access rights, and other key agreements with our allies?
- Do we possess the strategic and intra-theater lift necessary to make such a posture work?
- What are the implementation costs of IGPBS? Will we be able to afford these changes in the time required under current budget constraints?
- What is the impact on personnel and families, and what is the corresponding impact on maintaining and retaining the total force?
- Is there adequate synchronization with other events currently taking place, events that include the war on terror, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere, the Mobility Capability Study, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and Department of Defense base closure and realignment?

Our exploration of each of these questions led to the findings and recommendations that follow. As the answers developed (and in turn led to yet other questions) a pattern of six major areas of concern developed: geopolitical considerations, operational requirements, mobility, quality of life, costs, and timing and synchronization. Each is discussed in turn below.

I. GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The military basing structure of the United States is part and parcel of its national security strategy. Where we place our forces, how we stage them for commitment in the pursuit of national interests, where we position sets of equipment and supplies to sustain them and how and with whom we ally and train are more than a reflection of current policy options. It is strategy itself, not the totality of it, but a significant part. The basing posture of the United States, particularly its overseas basing, is the

skeleton of national security upon which flesh and muscle will be molded to enable us to protect our national interests and the interests of our allies, not just today, but for decades to come.

America's current basing system is an outgrowth of its emergence as a global power in the first half of the 20th century. Its rudimentary overseas basing structure at that time originated with America's entry into world affairs commensurate with the Spanish-American War and expanded dramatically in the 1940s with the watershed strategic decision to ally with the free nations of the world to resist the global expansion of fascism.

By the end of World War II, America's domestic and international base structure eclipsed anything the world had ever seen, far surpassing in scale and scope the impressive historical antecedents of the Roman, Mongol, Ottoman, and British empires. More striking, all of the latter had been built over decades and centuries. The U.S. basing structure had been built in five years.

By 1947, it was clear that this very same basing system would be called upon to implement a decades-long policy of containment. Through the many permutations of the Cold War, our basing posture — with appropriate adaptations to meet the particular threats that emerged — more than sufficed to match our strategic resolve. In the end, the threat of communist expansion was defeated, only to be replaced yet again by a variety of threats to our national interests. Beginning in the late 1970s our basing structure was augmented by increasing our access to facilities in Southwest Asia, the Persian Gulf, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. This overlay on the post-World War II basing structure served us well in the first Gulf War.

With the end of the Cold War and throughout the 1990s we began to adjust accordingly. Our overseas basing structure and especially our military presence was cut back substantially. The U.S. Army removed a corps headquarters, two divisions, two armored cavalry regiments, and their assigned supporting units from Europe. In the end over 270,000 personnel were cut from the Army structure worldwide. The Air Force removed more than six wings and closed seven air bases in Europe with an overall service reduction of over 160,000 personnel. Only a small fraction of the numbers we once permanently located in Europe remains today. Our armed forces are similarly reduced. We have already substantially modified our Cold War posture.

Now, some fourteen years after the successful liberation of Kuwait and sixteen years after the tearing down of the Berlin wall and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the United States faces a variety of strategic challenges that necessitate a further

revamping of our basing posture. Simultaneously, we find ourselves embarked on a number of strategic initiatives that run the gamut from a global war on terror, a counter-insurgency and nation building campaign in Iraq, containment of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — nuclear and otherwise — into the hands of irresponsible nations and non-state actors, a transformation of the means and conduct of warfare, a realignment of traditional alliance and diplomatic relationships, a restructuring of our major combat units, and considerations of emerging challenges to our primacy in the world.

The Commission acknowledges the complexity of taking on the breadth of these strategic issues, and it offers both its admiration and congratulations for the energy, foresight, and commitment with which all of this has been done. As a nation, we have not ducked the hard issues nor failed to recognize the need for transformation and reorientation. Already we have undertaken enormous change in the movement of forces around the globe, the transformation of our armed forces and their supporting structures, our technological developments in air, sea, land, and space capabilities, and in the employment of forces across the entire spectrum of our active and reserve components. All in all, the totality of effort has been commendable.

At the same time, however, the Commission must emphasize that considerations of rebasing cannot be seen as an aside from these major strategic deliberations. It cannot be merely a consequence of domestic political tradeoffs. Nor can it be the fallout of diplomatic compromise, the appeasement of an ally here, a quid pro quo for a bilateral arrangement there. The entire basing structure of the United States, both domestic and international, must be an integrated whole and must relate directly to the national security strategy of the United States.

Admittedly, real world tradeoffs must come into play. It is the nature of both our own political system and the international order that they do. But they must not be seen as an aside of strategy, pawns to be used to serve some other purpose. Our base structure is not merely a derivative of strategy; it is a driver in its own right. It must, therefore, be fully integrated with every other facet of strategy before it can be properly affixed. It is our opinion that the enormity of this point, and the discussion that it demands, has not been taken into account to the degree that it merits. Let us elaborate.

THE THREAT

None of us can predict the future. That, however, is enough to remind us that any base structuring cannot be designed to deal only with the threats of today. The base structure developed in the short span of World War II survived over fifty years with some adaptation over time to the Cold War, Korean War, Viet Nam War, repeated challenges in the Middle East and from revolution and the illegal drug trade in our

own hemisphere. The base structure we develop in the near future must enable us to meet the threats that will emerge over the next quarter century and beyond.

Since we cannot know the precise threats that will pertain, our strategy — to include our basing strategy — must allow for a degree of uncertainty and hedge against that uncertainty. We can define (and have done so) with some degree of specificity our national interests. We have established long term relationships with other nations and regional and international bodies with whom we have committed ourselves to certain principles, mutual interests, and obligations. We can devise a force structure and basing posture to meet those commitments only in so much as we allow for enough flexibility to meet changing conditions.

But we must consider more than changing conditions. We must also take into account emerging threats. In ten years, the face of terror may take on a whole new look of menace, or may have receded to the sort of danger many Americans perceived before September 11, 2001. In the same amount of time, or perhaps less, major objectives may have been met in Iraq, only to see them challenged in neighboring countries or in contiguous regions.

Much of today's focus is on threats that could emerge from an arc that stretches from West Africa across Southwest, South, and Southeast Asia, the Pacific and into the Andes. Within this broad arc lie the poorest countries of the world, left behind by globalization and bereft of its economic benefits. It is an area that contains more than its fair share of ethnic strife, religious and ideological fanaticism, failed government and — above all — antipathy and hatred toward the West in general and the United States in particular. Its very poverty and instability drive some of its denizens toward the selection of asymmetric ways to threaten the West, not in the manner posed by the Cold War or even of the first Gulf War, but more in the form of terror, insurgency, or access to weapons of mass destruction.

But looking beyond today, we cannot rule out sometime in the next quarter of a century the emergence of a more traditional great power competitor, possibly in our zones of interest in Europe and East Asia. If that occurs a force posture and base structure optimized for predominantly asymmetric threats emanating from the arc of instability may not be able to stay ahead of and ultimately contend with a global rival bent on direct confrontation with the United States.

The threat may take many postures, not just military. Our access to energy sources remains an imperative, as does open trade, access to the routes of commerce, and unfettered international exchange. Economic and cyber warfare is a distinct

possibility. Human rights violations, natural disaster, epidemics, and the breakdown of national and international order are all plausible contingencies that may require the United States to act across the range of its capabilities. In virtually every case, our base structure will be an essential part of those capabilities.

It is not enough to contend that a capabilities-based posture can meet all challenges. Some degree of consensus on what the threats will be and which ones we prepare to counter must exist. Just as a defense that tries to be strong everywhere runs the risk of being strong nowhere, a one-size-meets-every-threat mentality risks complacency and increases the likelihood that we will be inadequately prepared for the threats of greatest concern that eventually emerge.

The consideration of threats is not a matter for the Department of Defense to consider alone. It is a matter for the interagency process to take up collectively. In some cases, it is a matter for our alliance partners (more on that below) to consider in dialogue with us. In every case, it is a matter for the oversight of the bill payer, the U.S. Congress. The Commission is concerned that the dialogue on what the range of future threats over the mid and long term might be, and how to best prepare to meet them, has not occurred.

We note, for example, that beyond early inroads to establishing a network of CSLs in Africa, we have done little to counter the expansion of potentially hostile competitors there, or considered to what degree we might wish to do so. Accordingly, without such considerations, it is imprudent to conclude that without a larger discussion the base structure currently being considered hedges against the threats that could emerge in the mid and long term.

ALLIES, PARTNERS AND FRIENDS

Our global basing posture presupposes and determines at one and the same time a network of political relationships between the United States and its allies, partners, and friends. Where we put our forces, our unit sets, our supplies, our fueling points and our training facilities implies a bilateral relationship that is mutually supportive and focused on common interests.

Strong political relations between the United States and respective host countries accepting our bases, presence, and staging operations hinge on shared, if not identical, national interests. They make possible and are buttressed by military-to-military contacts and legal arrangements regarding stationed forces and access to facilities. If our political ties are strong, our ability to use facilities when we need them will be better assured and if our military-to-military relations are healthy and our operating arrangements robust, the efficacy of the bases for our mutual purposes are enhanced.

For example, our relationship with the United Kingdom for almost one hundred years has been predicated on a closeness of political traditions, shared interests, and long standing mutual respect. Its proximity yet separateness from the European mainland have been of major strategic significance through two world wars and a long running Cold War. But more significant than geographic convenience has been the political partnership of democracy, freedom, and other shared values. Our history since the wars in the late 18th and early 19th centuries has been one of friendship and mutual support.

For more than fifty years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a steadfast bastion against overt aggression that would threaten its member states, buffering both Europe and North America from what was a serious threat of war and subjugation. NATO stood firm in the face of what was often dire threat — from the Berlin blockade through intermittent brinksmanship in the '50s, '60s '70s, and '80s to the Balkan Wars of the '90s. Now expanded, NATO remains as important as ever to our international alliance posture.

U.S. presence in Europe remains crucial to future global stability. The legitimacy of that presence lies directly with our ties to NATO. Full participation in NATO allows us to maintain a leadership position in European affairs, as well as in contiguous regions. We cannot hope for much influence without presence — the degree of influence often correlates to the level of permanent presence that we maintain forward. The argument that rotational units will suffice for such influence may have merit, but it runs against the perception our allies will hold that the presence is not permanent and that it may not be continued over time if political will is lost, budgets become overstretched, or rotational units are diverted elsewhere.

Moreover, the ability to influence international events from our base in NATO expands well beyond Europe proper. Africa, for example, has become of increasing strategic importance to the United States. Other nations have begun major initiatives to expand their influence in key locations on the Continent. The United States must be a central player in Africa, for reasons of both stability and security. We are already present at a few strategic locations (e.g., Djibouti), but for years to come our ability to project power (and, therefore, influence) is dependent on our presence in Europe. The same realities exist for Eastern Europe, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and other regions east and south of Central Europe.

The same conditions apply in Asia. We stood with our allies in Korea during the hard years of 1950 to 1953. We have stayed the course ever since. Japan, once our foe, has extended the hand of friendship in helping to keep the peace in northeast Asia. Our allies in the Pacific basin have contributed and shared in political and military risks.

They have made economic contributions as well. The same observations apply in the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America. Our traditional allies have been a mainstay in the largely stable world that has prevailed since the end of World War II. Our alliances have been of mutual benefit.

A major advantage of continued reliance on traditional allies is predictability. We have worked with them for many years and both they and we have come to understand where our interests come together and where they diverge. Together we have established a track record that increases our assurance we will be able to make use of our facilities when the need arises.

To address the threats and contingencies we could face in the future, we should join with new friends and allies to both enhance our presence overseas and our political relationships. We need to be mindful at the same time that any resulting bilateral arrangements will lack the long history of mutual support we have already established with others. We are forging relationships now with new democracies in which long-term regime stability is not assured. Still others remain in the grip of autocratic regimes which could be (and in some cases have been) toppled overnight.

We would do well to consider their motives for some of the emerging arrangements (e.g., narrow financial opportunity versus long term national interests) and to keep in mind that U.S. popularity abroad has waned and will fluctuate further in the years ahead. All of these considerations should be taken into account as we evaluate our confidence to access new bases in the years ahead and to weigh that against what we surrender when we pull out of long-standing, more traditional, locations.

None of these considerations argues against change. Indeed, the Commission is convinced that an altered base structure is imperative in an altered world and a new strategic environment. What the Commission does voice a concern about, however, is the seemingly one-dimensional decision being reached as to what bases should be abandoned and what bases established.

A base structure is more than a military consideration. It is a political arrangement of the first order that has bilateral, international, cultural, and economic consequences. In that regard, the Commission has found no evidence of a wide scale discussion among all affected entities (e.g., Departments of State, Energy, Justice, etc.) as to the wisdom of specific overseas basing choices, or of the network of choices in its totality. Status of Forces Agreement issues, access rights, Article 98³ considerations, acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, terms of lease, levels of bilateral political and economic support, training and exercise arrangements, and other major concerns appear

incomplete even as we are proceeding with basing plans. Even if considered in their individual parts, there seems to be no integration of analysis. This is a cause of major concern.

INTEGRATION AND TIMING OF STRATEGIC CONSTRUCTS

The Commission acknowledges and respects the extent of recent innovations in national security affairs. It is uncertain, however, whether the myriad of strategic developments has been adequately integrated. We believe various strategic initiatives can either be reinforcing of one another, or — if we are not careful — at cross-purposes.

Transformation efforts must be related to net assessments of intelligence. Massive up front costs must be related to budgetary cycles. Force projection requirements must be correlated with mobility factors, which are in turn related to developments in energy sources, strategic lift platforms, and technological breakthroughs. Base locations will be impacted by all of these, and in some cases will themselves serve as catalysts for change in the others.

It is not clear whether there exists an ordered logic to the unfolding of all of the strategic level matters currently being decided, and how they relate to base structures. Take only one area — intelligence. Base structures have a relationship to the development of intelligence capability. Some are expressly for that purpose, providing access points into critical areas. Yet others are being situated with an eye to the use of special operating forces, themselves an integral part of the intelligence capabilities of the nation. Still others allow for the development of bilateral and multilateral intelligence sharing, and the joint and combined training and operations that will stem from that.

Simultaneously, our nation is undergoing a massive intelligence restructuring, beginning at the top and reverberating through every level and every sector of intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination, and operations. The interrelationships of how intelligence capacity is to be enhanced, who is to do what part of it, and how all of that can be reinforced by base locations would be a worthy up front discussion. If that has occurred in any meaningful sense, it is not apparent to the Commission.

³ Article 98 of the International Criminal Court Rome Statute, “Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender” protects U.S. citizens from the ICC. This is also codified in U.S. law under the American Service Members Protection Act.

Writ large, this leaves us with a concern about full appreciation of the cascading set of priorities that fall out of so many strategic initiatives. There must be some order of importance delineated between the various levels of decision-making, be they grand strategic, strategic, operational, organizational, or tactical. If there is not, we cannot be reassured that the right goals and objectives will be set with appropriate degrees of importance and with the right set of metrics to gauge progress toward their accomplishments.

With each step of the process — the withdrawal of a unit to CONUS, the opening of a new facility, the signing of a SOFA agreement, and so on — we create a global structuring posture incrementally different from that which had existed prior. At no point in the process can we afford to leave ourselves vulnerable and at the end of the day it is critically important that the aggregation of all of those steps result in a global posture stronger than what we have today.

The Commission is not convinced that the current IGPBS plan provided to Congress will accomplish this. The timing of the decreases in our overseas basing capabilities is front-loaded. The enhancements are planned for later implementation and — in many cases — are contingent on uncertain developments. For example, they depend on future political relations, satisfactorily negotiated agreements, future force modernizations (and modularizations), technological developments, and so on.

The Commission believes strongly that the sequencing of the implementation of IGPBS should be reordered so that (at a minimum) our earliest steps do not detract from but augment our capabilities. One clear example of this is the necessity to not reduce our ground presence in Europe until we have negotiated appropriate arrangements with Eastern European nations and are assured that we will be able to deploy the right mix of forces there.

II. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

While we stressed in the preceding discussion the strategic centrality of our global base structure, we recognize fully that the ultimate measure of the utility of overseas basing lies in its ability to allow our forces to operate in a manner commensurate with national command decisions to protect the security interests of the United States.

Power projection, force protection, alliance obligations, deterrence, access and anti-access considerations, sustainability, timeliness of response, agility to shift from one phase of operations to another and to do so both intra-theater and inter-theater in sequential, simultaneous, and/or overlapping campaigns are all considerations that the Commission has reviewed. These are our observations.

POWER PROJECTION

The demands being placed on U.S. forces are many and varied, and promise to be even more so over the foreseeable future. A current military posture that allows for defense of the homeland, operations in four separate forward regions, the swift defeat of adversaries in two overlapping military campaigns, and the achievement of a decisive and enduring outcome in at least one of the latter (the so named "1-4-2-1 strategy") places a high demand on force capabilities.⁴

Flexibility of options and response packages, reliability of allies, dependability on access to bases and their collocated resources, and speed of action are all critical parameters. The Commission has considered them in each of the four geographic regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Middle East) delineated by the current plans.

Our overarching view is that we are near the edge in terms of capabilities to meet stated requirements and timelines. The first concern is the number and type of forces to be left deployed overseas — they are thinly spread and do not leave much margin for error. Nor are they in their final configurations.

Stryker brigades, for example, are in an interim state, still evolving into some final, yet to be determined, form. Most heavy ground forces are being removed from the mix. We may need one more carrier strike force based abroad. Passive and active defenses may be inadequate. If the Balkans blow up again, U.S. forces based in Europe may be stretched beyond their capacity to respond there while still maintaining their current rotation cycle into CENTCOM. In many parts of the world, fixed wing landing fields are sparse and our access to those that are available may be denied or otherwise contested.

Although much of our power projection capability lies in the mobilization base, we have in recent years put that under great strain. Its capacity to generate adequate forces in time to reinforce a thin slice of ready forces based abroad may become problematic should there be no relief on already existing demands. Training cycles, the recruitment base, retention considerations, and other key factors are integral to our ability to field appropriate sized forces capable of projecting the necessary power where needed on a continuous and widespread basis.

⁴ The "1-4-2-1 strategy," as discussed in the March 2005 National Defense Strategy of the United States, is defined as: 1 - Defend the U.S. Homeland; 4 - Operate in and from four forward regions to assure allies and friends, dissuade competitors, and deter and counter aggression and coercion; 2 - Swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping military campaigns while preserving for the President the option to call for a more decisive and enduring result in a single operation; and 1 - Conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies.

Placement must also be considered a component of power projection. Clearly there are linkages between areas of interest and proximity of U.S. forces. For example, what we put in place in Singapore has consequence for Diego Garcia, which in turn impacts on our capabilities in CENTCOM; our presence in Okinawa is related to our commitments to Japan, Korea, the Taiwan Straits, and other locations in East Asia. Indeed, our very presence abroad signals the commitment of national interest. But placement is more than a matter of geographic accessibility. As mentioned before in this Report, it is an indicator of alliance relationships and to certain degrees the capacity for those relationships to be mutually supportive.

Some matters that would benefit from further discussion are the ability of various national and international agencies to reinforce or otherwise assist intelligence gathering operations, the establishment of traditional patterns of combined operations over time (e.g., frequent and routine use of basing rights, the establishment of standard operating procedures, Status of Forces Agreements, and other bilateral and multilateral arrangements), and the development of initiatives in parts of the world that may be crucial to future contingencies (e.g., South Asia, Latin America, Africa south of the Sahel, others). At the same time, we should reconsider existing treaties to determine if they still offer to all parties the advantages originally realized (e.g., Iceland).⁵

FORCE PROTECTION

The United States has always been prepared to place its forces where its national interests and the interest of its allies dictate. With the support of our allies, we held fast in West Europe for decades despite a massive build up of conventional (and nuclear) forces by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. We entered a war on the cusp of being defeated in Korea, and then stayed in place with a sizeable contingent of ground forces in the five decades that followed, notwithstanding an unending shrillness from a bellicose society directly across the demilitarized zone.

We fought our longest war in South Viet Nam, against what some historians describe as the most militarized society of modern times. On three occasions in the recent past we have entered into conflict in the Middle East, first to liberate Kuwait, second to remove an extremist terrorist regime in Afghanistan, then to topple a dictator in Iraq.

⁵ The 1951 bilateral defense treaty between the United States and Iceland allowed for U.S. basing in exchange for the United States providing for the defense of Iceland. Iceland has historically not had armed forces and the advent of the Cold War coupled with the strategic location of the island increased her vulnerability at that time. As a result of changes to the post Cold-War security environment, the U.S. should review with Iceland the continuing need for and amount of U.S. Navy and Air Force presence.

Each time we have done so fully cognizant of the risks involved for deployed troops, and with adequate considerations of force protection. Never have these forces (nor any others) been seen merely as a 'trip-wire' to ignite a larger strategic response. It is our nature to fight to protect our forces, and to send them into harm's way only if we believe we have given them every opportunity not only for their survival but for their success as well.

The Commission found that this tradition continues under the overseas basing structure being planned. In the main, fewer troops (and fewer families that accompany those troops) mean less of a force protection requirement overall. At the same time, it means less of a mutually reinforcing capability from U.S. forces stationed abroad. Rotational units from the United States fill some of that capacity, as do contingency packages that can reinforce quickly from the CONUS base.

Many of the requirements for protection of U.S. forces, their bases, preposition unit sets, supply and fuel stocks, and training areas will have to be met from local arrangements. Again, it is clear that we must look for reliability and dependability in the places where we have decided to position ourselves. This will call for continual evaluation over time. Our nation has no intention of leaving any of our forces or their support bases at risk.

The Commission notes that some of our locations may lack adequate hardening (specifically in regard to protection of air assets, both fixed and rotary wing) and that theater missile defense coverage of some critical installations may be thin, particularly in the Pacific region. In some locales, our facilities are in immediate proximity to civilian infrastructure. Urban expansion threatens to encroach even further. We must remain mindful of an unceasing need for force protection at each state of the overseas basing restructuring.

TRAINING AND EXERCISES, AND FACILITIES

Training and exercises are an imperative of operational capability. The United States does not commit untrained forces to action. Indeed, having learned the lessons of past wars, the American military holds high the importance of winning the first battle.

While our training areas at home are well developed, our training areas abroad are in various stages of development. Some, such as the training complexes located in and around Grafenwoehr, Germany, are excellent. Others, such as the proposed extended training concept focused in and around Australia and adjacent waters, show promise.

Some of the ranges within the Udairi Range Complex in Kuwait provide a superb training venue for deployed units sent to the region. The entire Rodriguez training area and ranges located near the Demilitarized Zone in Korea are being upgraded, expanded, and protected from future encroachment. Eastern Europe offers opportunities, although some bilateral arrangements are yet to be completed. Yet others, such as the current sites being discussed in Africa, may be less than adequate even for present needs.

Our military doctrine emphasizes joint and combined operations. We believe the optimization of specific service (and ally) capabilities, when brought together in a smoothly integrated campaign, offers a whole greater than the sum of its parts. We also believe that we must train as we will fight. That means the entire joint force, reserves as well as active, both U.S. and allies, must train realistically and as an integrated whole.

The Commission is concerned that not enough attention has been given to training in the development of the overseas basing plan. Not only is infrastructure sparse in some regions, capabilities for integrated training across services and with allies are sketchy. As we have pointed out elsewhere in this Report, our global basing plan is more than a contemporary adjustment to meet the challenges and threats of today.

More than that, we are establishing operational conditions for decades to come. In that regard, we believe that there is room for further innovation in deciding with whom we train, how we train with them, and where we train. While we have pointed out we should not move away from collocation with traditional allies without careful considerations of benefit and gain, so too, do we recommend that we consider the establishment of some combined training possibilities with potential future allies who may prove critical in helping us to meet emerging threats. Until all such considerations in regard to training and exercises are joined, the Commission is reluctant to endorse the entire proposed overseas basing structure as being conducive to improved operational capabilities.

Facilities must also be adequate to mission requirements placed on them. We are returning approximately 30% of our entire overseas site inventory (by number of sites) to host nations, most of this in Germany and Korea. This will leave 23 sites in Korea, with further consolidation to 10, and a total of 88 in Europe. The Commission finds that the condition of the facilities in the overseas basing posture is less than adequate.

ROTATIONAL BASE

Force projection over time is a product of the sustainability of the rotation base. It is one thing to surge for a single campaign, another to keep expeditionary forces at the ready along with their supporting elements year in and year out, with a high probability of frequent deployments for decades on end.

This challenge is compounded when we are structured with a heavily stretched force that even in times of sustained peace will spend frequent tours of duty abroad away from their home base. Elsewhere in this report (see Appendix N, Quality of Life), we comment on the overseas basing structure's impact on the propensity to sustain a volunteer force in the active and reserve components. We are left with the question of whether rotational demands over time will leave us with a ready force for all contingencies in a 1-4-2-1 posture, or any other posture that is likely to succeed it.

We have already mentioned the need for joint and combined training. That remains an imperative. But we must also consider the effects of the entire cycle of preparedness necessary for units as they protect and sustain the base structure, train up for and execute extended deployments abroad, return to home base and fall back on equipment (and mission requirements there), and, in the meantime, get committed frequently (as we can presume) to real world missions. Not only do such commitments tend to be exhausting to the active force, they run the risk of collapsing the National Guard and Reserves or at the very least of straining them to the point of undercutting capabilities.

Consider recent operational requirements and their impact on force projection relative to the rotation base. While adequate combat power was generated for the initial phases of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (and in the global war on terror in general), additional forces were eventually required to meet the needs of local law and order requirements, emergency response, border security, training of host country military and police forces, protecting lines of communications, and so on.

Future planning must take account of all of these considerations germane to the successive phases of any single campaign, as well as consider the likelihood of more than one simultaneous campaign. In light of these demands, the Commission recommends a full review of the impact the planned base structure will have on the rotational base and its concomitant ability to project the requisite forces.

III. MOBILITY

The Commission has given special consideration to our ability to move requisite forces to the point of need. Mobility is the key to meeting our worldwide mission contingencies as defined in current strategies. Without it, we lack the credibility on which deterrence and dissuasion is based. Without it, our operational capabilities are undermined. Without it, the very underpinnings of our strategic posture become unbalanced. If we are not able to get to the region (or regions) of interest in time, and with the requisite combat power to prevail, we are rendered inconsequential to our stated objectives.

The essential question before us is whether we can meet the requirements we have set for ourselves. Put another way, can the global basing structure (both foreign and domestic), when considered in line with prepositioned stocks and available lift, fulfill the demands of a 1-4-2-1 military strategy. And, can we move in line with a timetable that suggests we be able to defeat the efforts of any potential enemy within 10 days after the beginning of a conflict, defeat that enemy fully within the next 30 days, and be prepared to engage a second potential enemy 30 days after that.⁶ For the following reasons, the Commission is doubtful we have the ability to meet these mobility demands as stated.

STRATEGIC LIFT

While our operational forces will increase their combat capabilities as they continue to restructure into an expeditionary posture, attendant enhancements of air transport, sea lift, rail capacities, and port infrastructure to rapidly move them have not kept pace. Although the Defense Department has undertaken a mobility capabilities study to assess the requirements to meet the demands of an expeditionary force based largely in CONUS (that assessment is to be completed by the summer of this year) it is our observation that elements of our existing strategic lift are already stressed to capacity. The Commission cannot see how moving the majority of U.S. forces back to the United States will make the task of deploying them into contested regions any easier.

While some of the burden is expected to be offset by the ongoing organization and fielding of six (five active and one National Guard) Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, the Army will remain in the near to mid term a predominantly heavy force. The movement of any sizeable Army force into the fight, therefore, will necessitate a combination of sea and air lift of mammoth proportions. Marine and air expeditionary forces are likewise dependent upon air and sea lift. Current sea lift assets are capable of providing the lift, but outside the timelines required.

⁶ The 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap defines 10-30-30 as a swiftness goal for strategic responsiveness of the Joint Force as a whole within the 1-4-2-1 framework. A Congressional Budget Office Study, *Options for Restructuring the Army*, May 2005, describes the swiftness goals.

The number of fast sea ships is limited and other vessels (large, medium speed roll-on/roll-off, break bulk bottoms) require significantly longer transit times. Purchase of additional C-17s (beyond a total of 180) and tankers would help, but we would still be hard pressed, given sorties required and turn-around times, to meet force projection demands in contested areas.

The argument can be (and has been) made that greater mobility accrues to a domestically based force. This is true, however, only in part. The facility of movement (such as decision timelines, political ease of decision, rail and road surge reprioritization, and proximity of supplemental resources) may be enhanced by being in the United States, but time-distance factors may be exacerbated. Both weight and volume demands on existing strategic air capacity will be taxing.

Sea lift can be surged, but movement times across large expanses of ocean, and subsequently over land, will be relatively slow. Loading and unloading of equipment, troop movements, relocation of ammunition and fuel, and sustaining flows of materiel and supplies will be difficult to accomplish within the timelines allowed under current strategic requirements. As discussed below in this Report, prepositioned stocks offset some of these demands, but not sufficiently and not without constraints of their own.

A recent RAND study concluded that a Stryker configured force of a thousand vehicles or more would have difficulty in moving inter-theater in time frames as short as four days. Assuming mobility enhancements, best achievable times (depending on where they were to go and from where they originated) were determined to be nine to twenty-one days. In this particular study, the chief constraint was reception capability, not lift.

The significance of the shortfall is less with the timelines than it is in the quantities and composition of forces considered. We can have no guarantee our opponents will configure themselves in force packages that are convenient to only what we can muster in short order at the point of conflict. It is the movement of sufficient forces in the time allowed that is the true indicator of capability.

By every measure, the planned basing structure places a greater demand on strategic lift. Clearly, there are work-arounds: purchasing more air lift, technological advances providing for faster sea lift, duplicating unit sets and prepositioning them abroad. The Mobility Capabilities Study may determine there are others as well. But the Commission finds that under current demands of a 1-4-2-1 strategy and the commensurate timelines to move from one contested area to another, strategic lift is not sufficient to the task.

INTRA-THEATER LIFT

While intra-theater mobility appears to be less of a concern than strategic lift, it remains problematic. Global repositioning decisions have been driven by shifting areas of concern. We have sought to place forces abroad (and at sea) where they are in closer proximity (even if in reduced numbers) and with sufficient combat power to influence developments in regions of interest. Concomitant with changes in domestic basing, our objective has been to create a more flexible force capable of meeting whatever contingencies arise.

But we cannot be certain where or when those contingencies will present themselves, or how they will unfold. In essence, we are hedging against those uncertainties by locating in relative proximity to where we can expect to be challenged. Nonetheless, we can expect that in most cases units in place abroad (and prepositioned sets of equipment and stocks as well) will have to move elsewhere in theater. How fast they can do that is the challenge.

Our C-130 fleet remains the workhorse of intra-theater air mobility. It is an aging fleet in need of extensive upgrade. Most of its airframes are located in the Air National Guard. Some commanders have identified a need to procure more C-130Js, yet additional purchases have come into question.⁷

Moreover, we can assume that in some cases, intra-theater mobility will require sea lift as well. The good news is that we are developing high speed vessels for use in theaters where forces may have to move across water expanses (such as the Pacific or Indian Oceans, or the Mediterranean and the Black Seas). Unlike current sea lift, they have the potential to move heavy equipment and crews at very high speed in acceptable sea states to meet deployment timelines. However, the costs and schedule of these programs are unknown. Until we see intra-theater mobility platforms coming on line, our ability to move within regions is not without constraint.

Intra-theater mobility is more than a question of platforms. Our capability to shift forces is contingent on host nation allies allowing them to move from their sovereign territory to be committed elsewhere. This could prove highly problematic if by doing so their national interests were put at risk. Already we are hearing strong voices being raised in Korea and Japan that American forces shifted from bases there into action elsewhere in the region would be a violation of existing bilateral arrangements and destabilizing to regional politics, and might not be allowed. Echoes of those concerns are being heard elsewhere as well, and may well get louder as the years pass.

⁷ The 2006 President's Budget Request terminated the C-130J multi-year production contract. However, in May 2005, DOD reversed itself and requested continuation of the contract. The DOD Appropriations Act for FY2006 restored funding to the program.

Eastern European nations dependent on imported oil, for example, may one day feel constrained from allowing American forces or equipment on their soil to move against the interests of their sources of supply. It would be a nightmare scenario to see overseas based forces frozen in place for political reasons, unable to redeploy to where they are needed at the critical moment. As pointed out earlier in this Report, we need to ensure our rebasing strategy is closely coordinated with U.S. alliance strategies.

PREPOSITIONING

It is far easier to move people than it is to move equipment. Even when we are fully postured as an expeditionary force across all services, speed of entry, appropriate force packaging, flexibility, and sufficient levels of combat power are best assured by having in place the right mix of equipment and supplies our forces can fall in on quickly and reliably. Where we put prepositioned unit sets, ammunition stocks and other supporting items, what they are comprised of, and how they are defended, maintained, and continually updated are all central to our operational capability.

Such decisions cannot be taken in isolation. They must be fully integrated with considerations of threats, bilateral arrangements, and budgetary consequences. There are, for example, clear tradeoffs between prepositioned stocks and strategic lift. Either one is expensive, but investments in the former ensure capability in place within a single theater, while investments in the latter buy more flexibility between theaters. Selection of one over the other must be commensurate with the assessment of emerging threats. Clearly, the best approach is an inventory of prepositioned stocks and inter and intra theater lift capabilities that allow ready access to areas of instability.

The Commission is convinced that prepositioning is an imperative, with some unit sets and combat power capabilities to be placed on land and others at sea. While each component has a fundamental military objective in common — quick response by U.S. forces to areas of the world where access may be inherently difficult by virtue of geographic remoteness and lack of diplomatic accommodations, or otherwise contested by hostile forces, or a combination of all of the above — they complement each other in key ways. Therefore, tight integration of service concepts, doctrines, and plans is a first step in ensuring sea-based and land-based arrangements enhance rapidity of movement, generation of sufficient combat power, and its sustainability over time.

It is uncertain what the composition and amounts of that prepositioning must be. Understanding fully the investment costs entailed, the Commission recommends we hedge against uncertainty. We cannot rely on bare minimums. Nor can we tolerate uncertainties of access to the stocks that we put in place. Recent operations around the

world have pointed out the fragility of the current base of stocks and supplies. Planners need to consider depth, flexibility, and alternatives against the constantly shifting geopolitical landscape.

Ammunition stocks, for example, have been drawn down in recent months. We may have taken these too close to the edge given our 1-4-2-1 military strategy. Fuel stocks are, at the moment, less of a concern, but in an evolving world where oil is in increasing demand we need to carefully consider future requirements. Unit sets themselves are expensive, particularly considering the evolving nature of the Army's Stryker brigades. Reserve forces are reporting excessive wear on unit equipment, particularly wheeled and tracked vehicles.

Given the centrality of prepositioned stocks to the operational capability of U.S. forces, their high costs, and their anticipated heavy use over time, the Commission recommends periodic review by the U.S. Congress. Furthermore, it recommends that such decisions cannot be made apart from assessments of likely threats, trade-offs on budgetary investment priorities, and prognosis of future alliance partnerships.

IV. QUALITY OF LIFE

The Commission elevates quality of life issues as a key concern of the global positioning strategy. We do so because the more we visited the combatant commands, the more expert testimony and reports we heard and reviewed, and the more we considered the issues, the clearer it became that this becomes an area of central importance.

We cannot overstress our findings that for both structural reasons (i.e., the feasibility of transitioning to an expeditionary force while maintaining central policies and values our nation has adopted in relation to military service) and moral reasons (our obligation to care for the service men and women we are likely to put in harm's way and the families they leave behind) quality of life is a central consideration not only for the Department of Defense, but for the Congress of the United States as well.

The United States, after decades of relying on a conscripted force beginning in 1940, moved to an all volunteer service in 1973. In the years that followed, we structured the active and reserve forces of the nation into an integrated whole so that any commitment to conflict abroad would be a total commitment of the nation.

We have held high these principles of volunteer service and a mutually reinforcing force of active and reserve components. These principles have in turn at first altered and then made permanent expectations among those who serve, and the families that serve alongside of them. The results have been a more mature and a more professional

force. It has also led to a more married force and one more integrated into American society as a whole. Expectations are high among those presently serving and those considering enlisting that these conditions will not change.

Yet, unless we consider with care all of the ramifications of a transformation, and the pace at which we do it, we run the risk of violating these expectations. The large scale return of forces from overseas has already had major impact on family support structures. Current conditions of service for the National Guard and Reserves have exceeded expectations held only a few years ago of only an occasional activation away from home for any length of time.

Base closings at home along with the return of yet additional masses of service members and dependents from overseas will have major impact on local communities and the quality of life that can be expected. Movements abroad from established bases into new locations, or into locations already in use that will be put under pressure by increases in populations, will impact on living conditions. Expeditionary service with frequent deployments even in times of peace will have yet another set of impacts on family structures and the nature of the volunteer active and reserve force.

The Commission is struck by the duality of considerations that must take place at every level. These are matters not just for the federal government to consider, but local governments as well. They are matters that affect not just the active force, but also the reserves. It is not just an issue of relocation, but one of rotation of forces abroad in repeated cycles of deployment and training. It is overseas basing and domestic base realignments and closures. With each of these there are sets of concerns that must be addressed, and addressed in time to meet budgetary cycles (see Costs, page 26).

The Commission has found scant evidence that adequate analyses has been done across the entire spectrum of quality of life issues and recommends that this issue be made a priority.

FAMILY CONSIDERATIONS

The Commission recommends that planners take a last day — first day approach to the movements of troops and families from one location to another. Quality of life should not deteriorate in existing locations as presence is stood down and departure is anticipated. Support systems, schools, medical facilities and other needs must be provided for until the last day. Simultaneously, receiving facilities must have in place equal quality of life arrangements as the first newcomers arrive. We see these as imperative whether the movement is abroad from one locale to another or from overseas to the United States, or from one base in CONUS to yet another as a result of base realignment and closures.

In some cases, the conditions of support will change, but must be thought out and budgeted for, whether the budgeting is the obligation of the federal government or local communities. Take schools as an example. The Department of Defense Dependent School (DODDS) system that has served so well for more than five decades abroad is likely to undergo severe contraction. It will be important to hold local overseas school systems together even as presence is drawn down. Teachers who have served for some time in one community will have to make decisions as whether they wish to relocate elsewhere abroad, or return to the United States.

More of a concern, schools in the United States will need to gear up for the influx of large numbers of children returning from overseas and plans for the transitioning of students in both sending and receiving schools must be in place. That will entail local government decisions pertaining to bonding for construction of more classrooms, the hiring of more teachers, and contractual services for education related support. Such events require advance planning and will be the outcomes of public review and political decisions.

Medical facilities and systems will also need to be worked out. Historically, Army basing in the United States has been in economically depressed areas that are not prepared to deal with sudden surges in local population and their demands on medical facilities. Simultaneous with transition to a DOD medical system (as opposed to an individual service system), we will need to ensure that adequate medical support is in place prior to the displacement of large numbers of service people and their dependents.

Housing is also a major issue. Some of this will be on post, much of it off post. There is a danger that some of the intra-theater transfers contemplated abroad may over stress housing requirements. There is even a greater risk at home that overseas basing drawdowns, as well as domestic base closures and realignments, we will move large numbers of service people into locales lacking in adequate housing units, or at least housing of the proper quality and proximity to base. Here is yet another area where overseas basing considerations cannot be separated from domestic realignments.

FORCE ISSUES

The same need for a last day — first day approach applies to those serving in the ranks as well. While soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are used to the hardships that come with military life, we cannot expect them routinely to accept harsh conditions of service. If we move to new bases abroad, or fall in on already existing bases in greater numbers, and if we redeploy tens of thousands to bases back in the United States, we need to ensure that up to standard barracks, proper support facilities (i.e., fitness centers, dining facilities, motor pools, chapels, etc.) and other appropriate accommodations are in place.

It is the view of the Commission that within the CONUS temporary, relocatable barracks for example, are not acceptable. We demand much of our young service men and women. We owe it to them to provide a decent place to live and work when they are at home station and in extended rotations abroad.

Perhaps of greater concern than redeployments in the near term is the impact of an expeditionary force over the long term. Conditions of service and expectations are changing, especially for the Army (the last of the services to fully transition to an expeditionary force) and the reserve components as well. The conflicts of the war on terror, Afghanistan, and Iraq have already had an impact on force rotations.

Many of our forces are back in action or (about to be) after only a brief respite at home. Operating tempos are likely to remain unabated for some time to come. Expectations are changing, and with those changed expectations we are beginning to see their impact on force recruitment and retention.

RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION

Although the Department of Defense has developed over the past several decades robust and flexible (and expensive) recruiting and retention programs, we may be beginning to see strains on the system that could jeopardize sustaining the force. Both external parameters (such as the military/civilian pay gap, unemployment, and economic indicators) and internal incentives (enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, family separation allowances and/or imminent danger pay) influence recruitment and retention rates, as do end strength objectives. We are not without options for expanding or contracting the force. Who we get and who we retain is determined by motives for service and expectations realized (or not) once on board.

In 2003 and 2004 the Army National Guard achieved 87% and 88% of their recruiting goal, respectively. They missed retention goals by only 1% in both those years (and by 2% in 2001 and 2002). However, the Department of Defense stop-loss policy is holding down departures. The fact is that no longer do Guardsmen and their families expect only an occasional activation and deployment.

Over the course of a twenty year career, expectations are that several deployments will occur, and that transition to an expeditionary force will bring yet more deployments for extended periods, even when not called upon to serve in times of conflict. The 2004 Reserve Forces Policy Board has commented on the impact of changing expectations for reserve forces.

We are seeing the same changes of expectation in the active force, and the accompanying effects on recruitment. This has impacted more on some sectors than others. Simultaneously, the Army is expanding its force structure by some 30,000 and we have yet to gauge the results of higher recruiting and reenlistment objectives being set.

All of this is occurring before complete transition to an expeditionary force. Quality of Life support systems may go a long way to compensate for frequent and extended deployments away from home base. But in a married force, which is the predominant nature of our current structure, we would do well to remember that separation from family and loved ones itself is likely to extract a severe hardship on those involved.

This is not to argue against an expeditionary force but rather to highlight the importance of holding firm on providing the best quality of life we can to our serving forces and their dependent families. For each component of the services, active and reserve, the impacts will be different, for they are a result of prior expectations.

A Guardsman who joined up in 1990 expecting a once in a career extended deployment abroad may now be calculating that he or she can expect to be away every fourth or fifth year. Similarly, an active duty soldier who joined three years ago and since has been married and has children may be forecasting, in an expeditionary force, seven extended deployments over a twenty year career. These are changing expectations and they are likely to have impact over time.

The Commission places high value on a voluntary force and on the principle that when we commit the nation to combat or otherwise put our forces at risk, we do so in a way that our society is completely committed as one nation and one force. We are not sure the full extent of the overseas basing posture, the domestic base realignments and closure, and the full transformation to an expeditionary force has been more widely reviewed and that the Congress has had sufficient occasion to consider all of their ramifications.

Quality of life is an important consideration in all of this, and we recommend the Congress increase its oversight of these matters as they relate to the global posture review, its timing, and the impact on service members and their families.

V. COSTS

The Commission recognizes that the costs associated with the new global posture are enormous, even if details are not yet clear. An overseas basing shift is itself a reflection of strategic transformation that entails a number of budgetary redirections that will begin to impact immediately and will continue to do so for the better part of the next

decade, and perhaps beyond. Much more is involved than investments in new forward operating sites, cooperative security locations, and prepositioned combat, combat support, and combat service support sets of equipment and stocks.

Quality of life investments discussed in the preceding section of this Report, the possible need for enhanced pay scales and recruitment and reenlistment incentives, operating tempo costs, training related expenses, and bilateral and international partnership compensations, and costs associated with overseas base closures and the concomitant infrastructure requirements on CONUS bases are also financial considerations that must be taken into account. So too are investments in new weapon systems, lift capabilities, doctrinal concepts, and integrated systems (e.g., intelligence, education, communications, space-based, etc.) made necessary by global realignment.

Not all of the considered shifts in strategic priority entail additional outlays. There very well may be savings accrued from residual values of returned property, lower transportation costs for the movement and displacement of families, cash off-sets and other burden-sharing compensations from host nations, and significant savings from changed priorities in weapons systems purchased to meet altered expectations of emerging threats. Domestic base closings may also add to savings.

Each of these decisions, however, is of major political and strategic consequence, and their precise outcomes are hard to predict. Certainly none of them should be taken in isolation from one another (a point we have stressed elsewhere in this Report). We are left, therefore, with a wide range of uncertainty as to both the magnitude and timing of budgetary outlays as noted below.

OVERSEAS BASING

Improvements to main operating bases, forward operating sites (essentially expandable facilities maintained with a limited U.S. military presence) and cooperative security locations (facilities with little or no permanent U.S. military support presence) require land and sea facility investments, operating budgets, and contractual services. Add to these the investments requirements for unit sets of equipment and supporting stocks, their protection (from environmental as well as security threats), maintenance, and upkeep. Add again similar expenditures for procuring, securing, maintaining, and exercising CSLs and other bases abroad (i.e., working with locals, entering into and using facilities, etc.) and using training areas. The sum promises to be appreciable.

Prepositioned unit sets are themselves expensive. But their composition will surely change over time, as we have not yet transformed into end state formations. Indeed, transformation itself is more a process than a fixed state. Purchases of equipment and unit sets are likely to reoccur on a cyclic basis, perhaps rapidly on occasion as new technologies and doctrines evolve. Changes in unit types, therefore, will bring with them associated changes in cost outlays as facilities and training areas are in turn modified to accommodate them. Conceivably, lift requirements (and associated expenses) will change as well.

We can expect in some of the areas we are looking to shift forces with little local financial assistance in site and facility preparation. Current negotiations with a number of countries are promising. But considering the depressed nature of some of their economies, we cannot expect much help in paying upfront costs.

In other locales where additional basing and access rights would be important for an expeditionary force posture conditions are crowded and available space for additional concrete sparse. As a result, costs could be steep. Many of the host nation costs that the United States will ultimately negotiate have to be incorporated in programmatic analyses.

These considerations lead us to observe the absolute necessity to consider both strategic and operational requirements in tandem with budgetary investments. Consider the need to shift an additional aircraft carrier and attendant forces to the Pacific, a move that the Commission recommends. A likely location for its basing would be Hawaii, where real estate, property values, and cost of living expenses are all high.

An expeditionary force hedging against the range of threats that could present itself to PACOM may demand the additional carrier strike group to deter such threats, or, should they emerge anyway, to provide the flexibility and speed of reaction. But the economic consequences for basing in Hawaii would be significant, even as it entails major political and economic impact in its wake back in CONUS. The calculations of such expenses — and the political will to bear them — can only come with strong Congressional oversight and the wider public discussion that follows.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

Without question global rebasing costs must be considered in tandem with costs associated with the 2005 base realignment and closure process (BRAC). Both have significant costs associated with them, funds that are intrinsically in competition with one another.

Moreover, where we are based in the United States is related to how we are postured in the world, and that relationship itself could affect budgetary outlays. If, for example, we wish to place troop units, fleets, and air assets optimally poised for commitment to PACOM, we would do so in terms of time schedules for deployment, configuration of units, and distances to likely objective areas. Conceivably, bases in Alaska become relatively more attractive for ground based units that could take advantage of great circle routes.

Similarly, maritime forces stationed in Hawaii would offer strong strategic options and operational capabilities for the Pacific. But these locations incorporate sizeable investments if we expand our presence in them. What we might place in available Alaskan military bases, for example, would most likely be different in size and composition from what we had there for the duration of the Cold War.

The cost impacts on the federal budget and local economies could be significant. Many other parameters come into play of course, but we use these examples to illustrate the relationship between overseas basing and domestic base realignment decisions. The huge investments of budgetary outlays entailed by both sets of decisions (domestic and overseas) have not, as far as we can see, been fully connected and programmed. The Commission recommends that we do so.

RETURN OF FORCES FROM ABROAD

Related to the preceding is consideration of costs incurred and (potential) savings realized by any forces returning from overseas. Relocation to the CONUS base will require investments in family housing (either construction or leasing), additional barracks, fitness centers, child development centers, schools, chapels, medical facilities, motor pools, training facility upgrades, and many other infrastructure improvements. These will entail significant costs and depending upon when troops (and their dependents) redeploy will have major impact on current budget cycles. How money will be redirected within existing appropriations is unclear.

The Commission is concerned such redirections of money in the near term will have as yet unanticipated impacts on other military requirements. On the other hand, not to invest in the areas listed above would have severe impact on military readiness and quality of life considerations as well. Either way the outcomes, if not coordinated and planned, threaten to be chaotic.

Nor can we rest assured that cost savings will help defray near term expenses. While cost burden sharing and cash compensations have been suggested as one source of offsets to relocation costs (GAO Report on DOD Master Plan), it is unknown to what

extent these savings will materialize. Residual values for returned property from host nations vary by Status of Forces agreements and other bilateral arrangements. Returns may be less than expected.

In EUCOM, for example, nine countries have contributed \$175 million for returned property. Economically depressed markets coupled with reduced defense spending by some of the host nations and closures of their own military bases have lowered the overall value pegged to returned property.

At the same time, the U.S. has incurred costs for environmental remediation of some of the returned property and lands. EUCOM, for example, estimates \$90 million in remediation costs. The bottom line is the Commission foresees heavy expenses up front with little compensation as a result of returning forces from abroad. More importantly, the Commission expresses its concern that expenses have not been adequately planned for in the DOD budgetary cycle.

STRATEGIC LIFT

We have pointed out in the section of this Report on mobility about the need for strategic lift. Suffice to say here that the Mobility Capabilities Study currently being done by DOD will identify additional costs to enter into the budgetary equation. Some of these will, no doubt, be earmarked for prepositioned unit sets and associated stocks. But some of these costs will most likely be related to strategic air and sea lift themselves.

Existing fleets need upgrades. New platforms may be required. Intra-theater transportation lift requirements will have to be part of the calculation, whether this is done by U.S. military carriers or contracted platforms. Again, the operational requirement will be to get the requisite forces to the point of need — to the strategic objective — in required timeframes. This, in the end, will surely entail significant investments in adequate lift capacity, another sizeable amount to be added to the total budgetary picture.

In sum, the Commission is struck by the enormity of the total costs being undertaken as we shift to an expeditionary force. While the overseas basing costs are but one part of the entire DOD transformation, they are indelibly intertwined with all other costs that will have to be taken into account. Despite our best efforts, the Commission has not been able to affix with any precision either the separate or totaled budgetary outlays that will be entailed.

We have observed, however, that the range of uncertainty remains great, the parts are in danger of being calculated irrespective of one another, and that the timing of budgetary planning cycles may not have been synchronized. All of these taken together point to the need for Congressional oversight of the integrated whole.

VI. TIMING AND SYNCHRONIZATION

The Commission is concerned that the totality of events regarding the security of the United States currently unfolding is more than we can financially and operational handle in a short span of years. Nor are we convinced that adequate strategic analysis has been given to their sequencing and synchronization. By itself, overseas basing relocations present an impressive challenge, all of which are planned within the budgetary cycle (Program Objective Memorandum (POM)) years of 2006 to 2011.

Among the major relocations forecast are the consolidation of forces in Korea (the Land Partnership Plan), the potential shifting of forces from Okinawa, movement of NAVEUR headquarters (and supporting elements) from London to Naples, the relocation of two Army heavy divisions from Germany to CONUS, the graduated displacement of one brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division from Korea to Iraq to the United States, the stationing of an additional aircraft carrier in the Pacific, the consolidation of Special Operating Forces and the expansion of the 173rd Airborne Brigade at separate locations in Europe, and a myriad of other major and minor adjustments in U.S. forces around the world and at home.

Many of the steps in the global repositioning process are being taken without waiting for other developments. Yet others will be done in the near future. This is especially true for the relocation of forces to CONUS. The Commission believes that the chief obstacles to these moves are the preparation of bases to receive these forces. This depends on the BRAC process.

BRAC IMPLEMENTATION

The BRAC process begins considering the Department of Defense's recommendations in the middle of May of 2005 and by September of the same year will present conclusions to the President (who must accept or reject them in their entirety) and, if accepted by the President he will forward them shortly thereafter to the Congress. Until then, forces returning from overseas cannot know where they will go.

Yet the divisions in Europe are to begin their movements in the third quarter of 2007; the brigade in Korea has already begun its move and will close on the United States in the fall of 2005. Since BRAC decisions will only be affirmed in the first quarter of fiscal year 2006 and budget actions will not be completed until later in that same fiscal

year, there is little time for necessary funding to reach installations that will require new or expanded facilities and training areas to accommodate either the new modularized brigades or the returning brigades (that will in turn begin their conversion to modularized design upon their arrival back in CONUS).

Many other steps in the repositioning process depend on more than BRAC alone. They depend on decisions and actions by other nations, and the transformation and modularization of the Army, to name a few. But it is not merely a question of relocating U.S. forces and bases. The entire process will be undertaken at a time during which we will continue to fight the global war on terror and consolidate and rebuild in Iraq and Afghanistan. As if that were not enough, we are proceeding simultaneously with the following major initiatives.

ACTIONS BY OTHER NATIONS

Most of the repositioning of forces abroad, as well as the increase in access rights and training capabilities, depend upon reaching agreements with other nations and implementing them. SOFA and access right agreements will need to be negotiated, signed, and — in some cases — approved by parliaments. Understandings will have to be reached regarding host nation support, U.S. reciprocal payments (as applicable) and schedules and operating procedures for regular use of new facilities.

Accomplishing all of this is contingent on the state of political relations between the United States and the intended host nation, as well as the international political environment. For the most part, the arrangements required are not yet in hand. It would indeed be a testimony to U.S. diplomatic abilities if we were able to achieve all that is envisioned by IGPBS.

ARMY TRANSFORMATION AND MODULARIZATION

The Army is in the process of restructuring all of its brigades into modular units of action. Each brigade will become more self sufficient, with organic (i.e., structurally part of the brigade) units that will enable independent operations separate from traditional command and control ties to division and corps structures. The latter, however, will retain units of their own which can be attached or otherwise placed in support of the modular brigades.

Simultaneously, the Army will expand from 33 to 48 brigades in the active force, and from 24 to 34 in the reserves. These changes will take place from 2005 to 2009, and according to current forecasts will cost the Army Total Obligation Authority (TOA) in excess of \$37 billion. The additional brigades being formed (as well as those returning from overseas) will compete for existing space, training facilities, barracks, housing and schooling (and so on) at the bases remaining after the BRAC process is completed.

RESETTING THE FORCE

The strain of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to the need to replace and rebuild equipment belonging to both active and reserve forces. Moreover, in many instances stocks that were stored in Army preposition sites for contingency use have been drawn and consumed, necessitating their replacement. Costs for resetting just for the Army are estimated (conservatively) at \$13 billion.

The Marine Corps will have a proportional bill as it replenishes Maritime Preposition Ships (MPS) ships that have been drawn down to support ongoing operations. Global rebasing envisions additional prepositioned stocks with forward operating sites. The movement of heavy forces back to CONUS presupposes that Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks will be included in select overseas preposition sites, necessitating significant budgetary outlays.

CONTINUING OPERATIONS

Although we cannot predict with any degree of certainty how long operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will last, we can expect they will continue to put heavy demands on the force (albeit, hopefully, at a reduced scale) for several years. Already rotational plans for the various services envision some service members returning for a fourth (and in some cases a fifth) tour of duty.

Simultaneously, we expect to remain committed to NATO efforts in the Balkans. We can also expect to continue, in compliance with the Egyptian-Arab peace accords of 1978, rotating a battalion task force into the Sinai. To compensate for the withdrawal of an Army brigade from Korea, and in light of the tensions that remain in Northeast Asia, we can plan on high operational tempos that will include rotation of modularized units into the region.

In addition to unit presence and rotations mentioned above, we must include plans to expand joint and combined training opportunities. Already we are looking at developing opportunities in Eastern Europe, the Black Sea, North Africa, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. The necessary expansions in strategic and intra-theater lift have been discussed elsewhere in this Report (see Mobility). Add to all of these needed adjustments in theater missile air defense, communications, intelligence, and unmanned strike and reconnaissance capabilities. Their sum totals comprise an impressive list of activities and associated costs.

In light of all of this, the Commission is skeptical about DOD's ability to justify, accomplish, or afford the planned timeframes. Budget demands alone appear to be excessive, particularly when juxtaposed to all other policy initiatives that will entail major budgetary impact (both within and separate from security concerns).

The investments in human capital, planning, programming and production of replacement equipment, and buildup of training areas and facility capacities appear to be over-reaching. So too do timelines for the resolution of diplomatic negotiations seem overly ambitious.

Nor can we find the security imperatives for doing this in the short time allotted. For example, we are hard pressed to discern what is driving the near term return of two heavy divisions from overseas, to understand why we would even do that without expanded strategic lift capacities in place, and to understand the logic that would initiate movement directly behind BRAC decisions that could not possibly allow for budgetary planning to accommodate returning forces and their families. Indeed, the Commission cannot understand how any of these matters could be considered in isolation from one another — why for example we would begin executing an overseas basing plan before we know what the domestic basing plan is likely to be.

While commendable and critical work has been done by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the Services, and the Combatant Commands, the timing and synchronization of the overseas basing plan needs further review. We foresee great disruption in the overall stability and capability of the force to meet even near term contingencies should we proceed as we currently plan.

If unforeseen threats arise in either the near term or the mid term, we could be caught in mid-stride unable to meet them. Failure to synchronize, coordinate, and properly pace could actually create new risks, vulnerabilities, and threats. Recent developments concerning Taiwan, North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, and Syria are reminders of the volatile times in which we live. And if we are fortunate enough to complete all of the planned events without seeing destabilizing threats arise, we are still vulnerable to whatever long-term threat may emerge that we have neither considered nor prepared ourselves for.

We strongly recommend, at the very least, full analysis with requisite Congressional oversight of the collateral effects — on operations, on budget, and on sustaining the force — if all of the realignments and transformations occur as now projected.

Conclusions and Recommendations

OVERVIEW

The military basing posture of the United States is a significant reflection of U.S. national security interests throughout the world. It will serve as a central component of our strategy for decades to come. The Commission fully understands the need for change and endorses most of the initiatives undertaken in the Department of Defense's Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy (IGPBS). These changes will improve our overall military posture and flexibility.

However, they comprise a totality that is larger than just the Department of Defense and therefore require a wider review by all affected parties on the appropriate role of U.S. presence overseas. The sequencing and pace of the proposed realignments could harm our ability to meet broader national security imperatives and could significantly impact both the military's ability to protect national interests and the quality of life of the servicemen and women affected by the realignment.

Thus, an interagency process should examine the plan as a whole (to include sequencing and pace). Additionally, IGPBS does not institutionalize a process to periodically refine and evolve the overseas basing structure. The Commission finds, therefore, that IGPBS would benefit from more inclusive oversight and direction across the Executive and Legislative branches of government.

CONCLUSIONS

The Commission finds that the IGPBS was conceived without the full benefit of wide-scale, senior-level deliberations among all relevant U.S. agencies impacted by the rebasing initiative. Our overseas basing posture is instrumental to defense requirements, but also involves relationships to diplomacy, intelligence, homeland security, energy, trade and commerce, law enforcement and alliances — not just for today, but for decades to come.

The Commission, therefore, concludes that IGPBS is not fully synchronized across ongoing operations and analytical efforts, and that no interagency entity is integrating implementation of the related national security activities. Moreover, the Commission finds no evidence of an overwhelming strategic or operational imperative that would explain why the overseas basing realignment needs to be accomplished on its current schedule without ensuring that essential pieces are in place.

Additionally, there are a number of geopolitical considerations, operational concerns, mobility requirements, recruiting and retention, quality of life issues, and costs that need to be addressed prior to the return of forces to the United States and before a realignment of overseas basing takes place. The Commission notes:

- Decisions have been made with regard to locations and force levels before the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and 2005 Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) have been completed.
- Actions are proceeding to reduce overseas presence on the territories of some of our traditional allies. But our plans to compensate and enhance our overseas posture by establishing enduring base locations, prepositioned stocks, training sites, and forces abroad on the territories of other friends and allies are proceeding without the necessary underlying diplomatic and legal arrangements in place. Accordingly, we cannot know, at this stage, whether these new locations will afford the same degree of flexibility and reliability that we have come to expect from our traditional allies.
- U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan is likely to drive rotational base issues for the next several years. Breakout of hostilities in additional regions (for example, the Balkans) will further stress the force. Withdrawing of all heavy forces from Europe will not ease that stress and may exacerbate it.
- Okinawa is the strategic linchpin to operational capabilities in East Asia. Diminishing our combat capability on the island would pose great risk to our national interests in the region.
- The simultaneous activities of service transformation, resetting the forces, rebuilding of prepositioned equipment sets, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Global War on Terrorism, IGPBS, and BRAC compete for funding within a limited budget. The current schedule of IGPBS moves will adversely impact the Services ability to adequately fund modernization and readiness.
- Strategic mobility is the key to our ability to respond to events worldwide. Plans for sea and airlift capabilities, as well as prepositioned equipment sets, must take into account the additional demands that IGPBS could place on an increasingly continental United States (CONUS)-based force. Surging forces from CONUS will be problematic if strategic and tactical lift capabilities and prepositioned stocks are not in place.

- Forces may be returned to CONUS without critical quality of life programs such as housing, healthcare, and schools in place. Quality of life programs are not the sole purview of the Department of Defense. Planning and funding by the receiving locality's school districts, medical facilities, and existing infrastructure appear not to be in line with anticipated arrival of significant numbers of service members and families from abroad.
- The impact on recruiting and retention by IGPBS rotational forces has not been adequately evaluated, nor have associated risks to sustaining the volunteer force been assessed.
- Not enough attention has been given to our ability to train and exercise the force in the formulation of the overseas basing plan. Infrastructure is sparse in some regions; capabilities for integrated training across services and with allies are sketchy.
- The U.S. Congress has yet to be fully informed on the complete extent and related impacts of the overseas base realignments. Further, Congress has not been adequately informed on the total costs of the plan.
- The overseas basing posture of the United States (IGPBS) and domestic base realignment and closure (BRAC) are inherently related. Although the Commission calls for an overarching review of the overseas basing posture, we believe that the BRAC process should move forward as scheduled.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The nation would benefit from a more inclusive discussion on how best to ensure the greater security of the United States. The fundamental political and policy dimensions of the plan must involve broader elements of national leadership.

The Commission, therefore, recommends the following:

- The detailed synchronization required by so massive a realignment of forces requires that the pace of events be slowed and reordered.
- The entire effort of overseas basing be integrated into one overarching design that is coordinated and synchronized with all ongoing initiatives. Furthermore, an interagency review process be put in place to periodically consider the impacts of the global force posture and to ensure that outcomes are consistent with overall national interests.

The review process might include the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, Homeland Security (especially Immigration and Customs and Border Patrol), Justice (especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation), Commerce, and Treasury, the U.S Trade Representative, and the National Intelligence Director (along with other relevant intelligence agencies), the Office of Management and Budget, and others.

- The Congress, including the Defense and Foreign Relations Committees, provide more rigorous oversight (to include hearings) of the global basing process given the scope and cost of the DOD rebasing plans, their impacts on the individual services, the men and women of our armed services and their families, and to the political and trade alliances of the United States. Particular attention should also be paid to the timing and synchronization and cost of all the related efforts.

Additionally, the Commission recommends the following:

- Marine Corps air assets assigned to Futenma Marine Corps Air Station on Okinawa should relocate to Kadena Air Base and/or Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station; all other Marine Corps assets should remain on Okinawa.
- In order to hedge against uncertainty in regard to near term threats, demonstrate a continued and enduring commitment to NATO, and allow for heavy force military to military contacts with our NATO allies, at least one of the heavy brigade combat teams scheduled for return to the United States should remain in Europe fully manned until: 1) the Balkans' support mission is lifted; 2) a ground-based offensive tank killing system is stationed in Europe; and 3) Operation Iraqi Freedom is mitigated. Additionally, a heavy brigade combat team equipment set should be prepositioned afloat within the region. These recommendations are in addition to the current DOD plan for a Stryker Brigade in Germany and the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vicenza, Italy.

Further, a brigade should be committed to support continuous rotational deployments to Eastern Europe and U.S. military-to-military presence in the new NATO countries.

- The U.S should review its treaty with Iceland, and update it to reflect the post-Cold War security environment.
- Greater depth is needed in Africa to secure long-term U.S. interests against potential competitors. The Horn of Africa initiative should be replicated in those locations elsewhere on the Continent, which may prove to be of increasing importance to future strategic concerns. To some extent, similar initiatives are needed in Latin America.

- DOD must ensure that all necessary infrastructure and quality of life programs (such as housing, medical, schools, etc.) be retained at overseas bases until the last day the service members and their families depart, and that the necessary infrastructure and quality of life programs be in place by the first day the first troops and families arrive from their overseas locations.

Appendix A

Legislative Requirements

PUBLIC LAW 108-132

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2004,
as amended by Public Law 108-324, Section 127

SECTION 128.¹

(a) COMMISSION ON REVIEW OF OVERSEAS MILITARY FACILITY STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES.—

- (1) There is established the Commission on the Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (in this section referred to as the “Commission”).

- (2) (A) The Commission shall be composed of eight members of whom-
 - (i) two shall be appointed by the Majority Leader of the Senate;
 - (ii) two shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate;
 - (iii) two shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
 - (iv) two shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.(B) Individuals appointed to the Commission shall have significant experience in the national security or foreign policy of the United States.
(C) Appointments of the members of the Commission shall be made not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

- (3) Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

¹ Public Law 108-132, Section 128, was enacted on November 22, 2003.

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- (4) Not later than 30 days after the date on which all members of the Commission have been appointed, the Commission shall hold its first meeting.
- (5) The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chairman.
- (6) A majority of the members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number of members may hold hearings.
- (7) The Commission shall select a Chairman and Vice Chairman from among its members.

(b) DUTIES.—

- (1) The Commission shall conduct a thorough study of matters relating to the military facility structure of the United States overseas.
- (2) In conducting the study, the Commission shall-
 - (A) assess the number of forces required to be forward based outside the United States;
 - (B) examine the current state of the military facilities and training ranges of the United States overseas for all permanent stations and deployed locations, including the condition of land and improvements at such facilities and ranges and the availability of additional land, if required, for such facilities and ranges;
 - (C) identify the amounts received by the United States, whether in direct payments, in-kind contributions, or otherwise, from foreign countries by reason of military facilities of the United States overseas;
 - (D) assess whether or not the current military basing and training range structure of the United States overseas is adequate to meet the current and future mission of the Department of Defense, including contingency, mobilization, and future force requirements;
 - (E) assess the feasibility and advisability of the closure or realignment of military facilities of the United States overseas, or of the establishment of new military facilities of the United States overseas; and

(F) consider or assess any other issue relating to military facilities of the United States overseas that the Commission considers appropriate.

(3) (A) Not later than August 15, 2005 ~~December 31, 2004~~,² the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a report which shall contain a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of the Commission, together with its recommendations for such legislation and administrative actions as it considers appropriate.

(B) In addition to the matters specified in subparagraph (A), the report shall also include a proposal by the Commission for an overseas basing strategy for the Department of Defense in order to meet the current and future mission of the Department.

(C) POWERS.—

- (1) The Commission may hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Commission considers advisable to carry out this section.
- (2) The Commission may secure directly from any Federal department or agency such information as the Commission considers necessary to carry out this section. Upon request of the Chairman of the Commission, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission.
- (3) Upon request of the Commission, the Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Commission, on a reimbursable basis, the administrative support necessary for the Commission to carry out its duties under this section.
- (4) The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.
- (5) The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property

² Public Law 108-324, Section 127, "Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005," amending Pub. L. 108-132, was enacted on October 13, 2004.

(d) PERSONNEL MATTERS.—

- (1) Each member of the Commission who is not an officer or employee of the Federal Government shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which such member is engaged in the performance of the duties of the Commission under this section. All members of the Commission who are officers or employees of the United States shall serve without compensation in addition to that received for their services as officers or employees of the United States.

- (2)
 - (A) Members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission under this section.

 - (B) Members and staff of the Commission may receive transportation on military aircraft to and from the United States, and overseas, for purposes of the performance of the duties of the Commission to the extent that such transportation will not interfere with the requirements of military operations.

- (3)
 - (A) The Chairman of the Commission may, without regard to the civil service laws and regulations, appoint and terminate an executive director and such other additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to perform its duties under this section. The employment of an executive director shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission.

 - (B) The Commission may employ a staff to assist the Commission in carrying out its duties. The total number of the staff of the Commission, including an executive director under subparagraph (A), may not exceed 12.

 - (C) The Chairman of the Commission may fix the compensation of the executive director and other personnel without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, relating to classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay for the executive director and other personnel may not exceed the rate payable for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.

- (4) Any employee of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, or the General Accounting Office may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.
- (5) The Chairman of the Commission may procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, at rates for individuals which do not exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.

(e) SECURITY.—

- (1) Members and staff of the Commission, and any experts and consultants to the Commission, shall possess security clearances appropriate for their duties with the Commission under this section.
- (2) The Secretary of Defense shall assume responsibility for the handling and disposition of any information relating to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission under this section.

(f) TERMINATION.—

The Commission shall terminate 45 days after the date on which the Commission submits its report under subsection (b).

(g) FUNDING.—

- (1) Of the amount appropriated by this Act, \$3,000,000 shall be available to the Commission to carry out this section.
- (2) The amount made available by paragraph (1) shall remain available, without fiscal year limitation, until September 2005. This Act may be cited as the "Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2004"

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Appendix B

Commissioner Biographies

ALTON W. CORNELLA, CHAIRMAN

The Honorable Alton ("Al") Cornella is a businessman from Rapid City, South Dakota, and was appointed to the Commission by former U.S. Senator Thomas Daschle (D-South Dakota).

Mr. Cornella served in the U.S. Navy, including service in Vietnam from 1966-67. He has also served on various local, state and federal boards and commissions dealing with military issues, environmental regulation and economic development. Mr. Cornella has been involved with the base closing process since 1991. In 1995, he served as a Commissioner on the United States Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC).

He presently serves on the Academic Advisory Board of the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology; the State of South Dakota Board of Military Affairs; the South Dakota State Chamber of Commerce Board of Directors, and is the development chairman of Crazy Horse Memorial Foundation. Since 2000, he has served as South Dakota State Chairman of Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR), an agency of the Department of Defense.

LEWIS E. CURTIS III, VICE-CHAIRMAN

MAJOR GENERAL, USAF (RET.)

General Lew Curtis was appointed to the Commission by U.S. Senator Bill Frist (R-Tennessee). He retired from the Air Force after 35 years in staff and command positions in the areas of aircraft maintenance, logistics management and acquisition.

He is a consultant providing services in business development, competitive assessments and strategic planning. He served six years as a member of the Texas Military Planning Commission.

ANTHONY (TONY) A. LESS, COMMISSIONER

VICE ADMIRAL, USN (RET.)

Vice Admiral Tony Less was appointed to the Commission by U.S. Senator Bill Frist (R-Tennessee). He retired from the U.S. Navy in 1994 after 35 years of service. Following his retirement, Admiral Less became the President of the Association of Naval Aviation, a non-profit organization and for seven years was the Vice-President for Government Programs with Kaman Aerospace for their Bloomfield, CT and Washington, DC offices.

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Vice Admiral Less is the Senior Vice President for Naval Sector Programs at Burdeshaw Associates, Ltd., a position he has held since 2003. Burdeshaw is an association of retired senior military officers, government civilians, and corporate executives whose experience assists clients in matching their technology and capabilities with U.S. and foreign military and other government requirements.

As a Naval officer, Vice Admiral Less was the Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and held several leadership positions such as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations) as well as Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East/Commander, Middle East Forces and Commander, Carrier Group One.

KEITH MARTIN, COMMISSIONER**BRIGADIER GENERAL, (PA) ARNG (RET.)**

General Keith Martin was appointed to the Commission by U.S. Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-California). He has enjoyed a 34-year career in military service as a commissioned officer in the Army, Army Reserve and National Guard. He saw combat duty in Southeast Asia with the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions.

In February 2003, he was appointed Director of Homeland Security for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by Governor Edward Rendell. For 30 years prior to that, he was a television news reporter and anchor in Pennsylvania, Florida and New York.

H.G. (PETE) TAYLOR, COMMISSIONER**LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA (RET.)**

General Pete Taylor was appointed to the Commission by U.S. Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-California). He retired from the U.S. Army in 1993 as the Commanding General, III Corps and Ft. Hood after more than 33 years of active service which included staff and command positions at every level from platoon through corps.

Upon retirement from the Army, he became Vice-Chairman of the Board of the Heights State Bank, Harker Heights, Texas, where he served until 2002. He has also provided consulting services in leadership, training and management to defense-oriented corporations.

General Taylor has been active in community affairs, including scouting, Rotary, United Way and as a member of the Killeen Independent School Board of Trustees. He served four years as a member of the Texas Strategic Military Planning Commission and is chairman of the Heart of Texas Defense Alliance, a three-county central Texas defense advocacy group. Additionally, he was one of the founders, and is a current board member, of the Military Child Education Coalition, a national, non-profit organization that advocates for military children. He was born in Tennessee, and is a graduate of Middle Tennessee University. He also holds a Master's degree from Kansas State University.

JAMES A. THOMSON, PH.D, COMMISSIONER

Dr. James A. Thomson was appointed to the Commission by former U.S. Senator Thomas Daschle (D-South Dakota). Since August 1989, he has served as President and Chief Executive Officer of the RAND Corporation, a non-profit, non-partisan institution that seeks to improve public policy through research and analysis. He joined RAND in 1981, and has served there as director of the research program in national security, foreign policy, defense policy and arms control.

From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Thomson was a member of the National Security Council staff, where he was primarily responsible for defense and arms control matters related to Europe. From 1974 to 1977, he was an analyst in the office of the Secretary of Defense.

He holds degrees from the University of New Hampshire and Purdue University and has been awarded honorary doctorate degrees by Purdue and Pepperdine Universities.

PATRICIA J. WALKER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Ms. Patricia Walker is the Executive Director of the Overseas Basing Commission. She is responsible for the policy, guidance, and direction of the Commission staff and provides the Commissioners counsel on appropriate actions for their consideration and deliberation. She also concurrently holds the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Materiel and Facilities).

She co-authored a report entitled, *Putting Quality at the Top of the Agenda*. She was a contract negotiator for all overseas military fuel requirements in the Defense Fuel Supply Center and established the first Foreign Military Sales program in Central America. An acquisition professional she served on the Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council; she then transitioned to the military installations arena as the Deputy Director to the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Environmental Security.

She was also Assistant Director for Analysis and Investment for the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Industrial Affairs and Installations; Co-Chair of the Privatization and Outsourcing Integrated Policy Team; and participated on the DOD Quality of Life Task Force. In 1988 and 1991, Ms. Walker served on the Secretary of Defense senior staff responsible for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) analyses and recommendations.

OVERSEAS BASING COMMISSION

Commission Staff

Patricia Walker	Executive Director
Clifton Aldrich	Regional Director
Christina Duffy	Regional Director
James Hanna	Regional Director
Jim McDonough	Report Writer
Rumu Sarkar	General Counsel
Wade Nelson	Public Affairs
SGM Gwendolyn Adams	Staff
Maj Mark Arredondo	Staff
CDR Edmundo Bellini	Staff
COL John Dolac	Staff
CDR John Floyd	Staff
Liz Gabor	Staff
LCDR Scott Herzog	Staff
Col Betty Ludtke	Staff
Maj Brian Maves	Staff
Michael Naylor	Staff
Joan Sigler	Staff
Marilyn Wasleski	Staff

Appendix C

Acknowledgments

MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

- The Honorable Diane Feinstein, United States Senate;
- The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison, United States Senate;
- The Honorable John T. Walsh, United States House of Representatives;
- The Honorable Chet Edwards, United States House of Representatives;
- Staff of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees;
- Staff of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.

FORMER MILITARY AND NATIONAL POLICY EXPERTS

- Mr. Atsushi Ando, First Secretary Political Section, Embassy Japan;
- Mr. Thomas Barnett, United States Naval War College;
- Mr. Michael Clark, Representative for the City of Kaiserslautern;
- Mr. Marcus Corbin, Center for Defense Information;
- Danut Culetu, Prefect, Prefectura Judetului Constanta, Romania;
- Colonel Greg Gardner, United States Army (Ret);
- General Ron Griffith, United States Army (Ret), Executive Vice President, MPRI;
- The Honorable John Hamre, Ph.D., President & CEO, Center for Strategic & International Studies;
- General George Harmeyer, United States Army (Ret);

OVERSEAS BASING COMMISSION

- General Charles Horner, United States Air Force (Ret);
- Ambassador Robert Hunter, Rand Corporation;
- Governor Keiichi Inamine, Okinawa, Japan;
- Dr. Mary Keller, Military Child Education Coalition;
- General William F. Kernan, United States Army (Ret), Senior Vice President, MPRI;
- Honorable Lawrence Korb, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress;
- Major General Sergiu Medar, Chief of Military Intelligence, Romanian Armed Forces;
- General Montgomery Meigs, United States Army (Ret);
- Mr. Michael Noonan, Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute;
- Mr. Michael O'Hanlon, Brookings Institution;
- Admiral Donald Pilling, United States Navy (Ret), President & CEO, Logistics Management Institute;
- Florian Pinta, Major General, Romanian Armed Forces;
- Ms. Joyce Wessel-Raezer, Director of Government Relations, National Military Family Association;
- General Charles (Tony) Robertson, Jr., United States Air Force (Ret);
- Mr. Jack Spencer, Heritage Foundation;
- General Gordon Sullivan, United States Army (Ret), President & CEO, Association of the United States Army (AUSA);
- Shigeru Suzuki, Ph.D., First Secretary (Defense Technology Cooperation) Political Section, Japanese Embassy, Washington, D.C.;
- Dr. Loren Thomson, Chief Operating Officer, Lexington Institute;

- General John Tilleli, United States Army (Ret), President & COO, Cypress International;
- General Carl Vuono, United States Army (Ret), President, MPRI;
- General Michael Williams, United States Marine Corps (Ret);
- Dr. Dov Zakheim, Vice President, Booz-Allen-Hamilton.

FEDERAL ENTITIES

- Combatant Commanders and their staffs from:
 - Pacific Command, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, United States Navy;
 - Vice Admiral Gary Roughhead, Deputy Commander, Pacific Command;
 - Colonel Steve McCain, Chief, Legislative Affairs, Pacific Command;
 - Lieutenant General John Brown, USARPAC;
 - Lieutenant General Waskow, USFJ;
 - Colonel John Kelly, USARPAC COS;
 - Major General Perkins, USARJ;
 - Major General Eikenberry, PACOM J-5;
 - European Command, General James L. Jones, United States Marine Corps;
 - General Charles Wald, Deputy Commander EUCOM;
 - Major General Joseph Stein, ACOS J3 OPS, SACEUR;
 - Rear Admiral Bill Goodwin, ECJ5;
 - Major General Scott Gration, ECJ5;

OVERSEAS BASING COMMISSION

- Colonel P.S. Penn, Special Assistant for Legislative Affairs, SACEUR;
- Central Command, General John Abazaid, United States Army;
- Special Forces Command, General Bryan D. Brown, United States Army;
- Southern Command, General Bantz Craddock, United States Army;
- United States Transportation Command, General John W. Handy, United States Air Force;
- Ambassador Howard Baker, United States Ambassador to Japan;
- General B.B. Bell, United States Army, Commander U.S. Army Europe;
- Dr. Ronald Rasch, Deputy Political Advisor, USAREUR;
 - Mr. Bill Chesarek, Chief, Force Management, USAREUR;
 - Colonel Mark Bellini, Deputy Commander, 21st Theater Support Command;
 - Colonel Mike Gunn, Chief of Staff, 21st Theater Support Command;
 - Lieutenant Colonel Mitch Wilson, Commanding Officer, Field Support Battalion Livorno;
 - Lieutenant General Blackman, United States Marine Corps, Commanding General III MEF;
- Major General Douglas Burnett, Air National Guard, The Adjutant General, State of Florida;
- Mr. Ray Dubois, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment);
- Mr. Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense, (Policy);
- Mr. Daniel H. Else, Congressional Research Service;
- Dr. J. Michael Gilmore, Congressional Budget Office;

- Mr. Phil Grone, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment);
- Mr. Carl Gettinger, Chief, Political-Military Unit, U.S. Embassy, Japan;
- Mr. Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy to the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy);
- Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, United States Army Reserve, Chief, United States Army Reserve;
- General Paul V. Hester, United States Air Force, Pacific Air Forces;
 - Lieutenant General Gene Renuart, Deputy Commander, Pacific Air Forces;
 - Major General Denny Larsen, 13th Air Force;
- Mr. Andy Hoehn, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Strategy);
- Dr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Congressional Budget Office;
- Mr. J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director, Congressional Budget Office;
- Mr. Jay Janke, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations & Environment);
- Rear Admiral Artie Johnson, United States Navy, Commander, Naval Forces, Marianas;
- General Leon LaPorte, United States Army, Commander, United States Forces, Korea;
 - Lieutenant General Campbell, 8th Army;
 - Lieutenant General Trexler, 7th Air Force;
 - Colonel Daniel Wilson, Assistant Chief of Staff, Engineer, USFK;
 - George Filbeck, Deputy G3 Training, 8th Army;
 - Woody Woodfill, Director, Training Support Activity, Korea;

OVERSEAS BASING COMMISSION

- Colonel Steven Eldridge, Deputy J2, USFK;
- Ambassador Frank Lavin, United States Ambassador to Singapore;
- Mr. Richard Lawless, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) for International Security Affairs- Asia Pacific, Department of Defense;
- Lieutenant General Arthur Lichte, Vice Commander, USAFE;
- Ambassador Rose Likins, Acting Assistant Secretary, Political-Military Affairs, Department of State;
- Dr. Frances Lussier, Congressional Budget Office;
- Dr. Markowitz, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluations;
- Mr. Michael W. Michalak, Minister, American Embassy, Tokyo;
- Mr. Mark Minton, DCM, American Embassy, Seoul;
- Mr. Get Moy, Director of Installation Requirements and Management, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (I&E);
- Admiral Michael Mullen, United States Navy, Commander, United States Naval Forces Europe;
- Rear Admiral Stan Bozin, Commander, Naval Region Europe;
- Rear Admiral Noel Preston, Director, Navy Europe Programs, Resources, and Support;
- Rear Admiral Van Mauney, Director, Navy Europe Plans and Operations;
- Captain Ken Bitar, Executive Officer, NAS Sigonella;
- Captain Orem, Commanding Officer, NAS Rota;

- Mr. Barry Pavel, Principal Director for Strategy, Office of the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy;
- Mr. Terry Pudas, Deputy Director, Force Transformation, Department of Defense;
- Rear Admiral Kevin Quinn, United States Navy, COMLOGRUWESTPAC;
- Mr. Tom Reich, American Consulate General, Naha, Okinawa, Department of State;
- Mr. Evans J.R. Revere, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs;
- Mr. Bill Roege, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Programs Analysis & Evaluation);
- Commander Ronald T. Schall, Naval Attaché, American Embassy Bucharest;
- Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz, Director, United States Army National Guard;
- Mr. William Stanton, Deputy Chief of Mission Australia, Department of State;
- Ms. Patricia Stigliani, Deputy Principal Office r, American Consulate General Okinawa;
- Vice Admiral Robert F. Willard, United States Navy, Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-8);
- Randall Yin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government Accountability Office

STUDY SUPPORT

- Logistics Management Institute.

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 - PACOM

OVERSEAS BASING COMMISSION

- Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Batule
- Lieutenant Neely Marcus
- Major Tony Millican
- Captain Allison Shobe
- EUCOM
 - Captain Darrel Choat
 - Captain Mark Samuels
- CENTCOM
 - Colonel Eunice (USAF) US CENTAF Construction Management Office, Al Udeid, Qatar
 - Major General Helland (USMC), Commander JFT-Horn of Africa
 - Colonel William Holmes (USA) USCENTCOM J4 representative
 - Brigadier General James Hunt, Commander 455 A E W, Bagram AB, Afghanistan
 - Colonel Keltz (USAF), Commander, 386 AEW Ali Al Salem, Kuwait
 - Colonel Lowery (USAF), Commander, 416 AEG, Karshi-Khanabad, UZ
 - Vice Admiral David Nichols, COMUSNAVCENT, Bahrain
 - Lieutenant Colonel Pencina (USA) Commander, 111 ASG, Karshi-Khanabad, UZ
 - Lieutenant Colonel Randy Powell (USA), CJ& Director, CJTF-76, Afghanistan

- Major General Norman Seip, Dep Commander, Combined Forces Air Component Command, USCENTCOM, Al Udeid, Qatar
- Captain Jay Smith (USN), Commanding Officer, Naval Support Activity Bahrain
- Major General Speer (USA), Dep Commanding General, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), Arifjan, Kuwait
- Colonel Mark Tillman (USA), Dep Plans Chief, USCENTCOM

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Appendix D

Study Methodology

INTRODUCTION

This appendix provides a detailed description of the methods, tools, and techniques used by the Commission to evaluate the overseas basing structure.

OVERVIEW

The Commission views overseas basing as a system within a larger network of interrelated systems designed to meet the capabilities required of the war fighter as well as the needs of the United States government. We investigated how the network of bases interacts and how the assigned personnel, materiel, and equipment support National Security Goals in each region. We used this perspective to guide the analysis in assessing how well the overseas basing structure supports national security and the DOD mission.


ANALYTICAL APPROACH

The Commission used existing data literature review, consultation with subject matter experts through hearings and interviews, field visits and direct data gathering with the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) in their area of responsibility (AOR). The Commission conducted a comprehensive review of all applicable documents related to national, defense, and military strategies and policies. Critical to this review was the conduct of hearings with DOD and non DOD experts in the field ranging from geopolitical and military affairs, to family and soldier advocacy groups. Visits to the COCOM AORs were essential to the gathering of first hand knowledge and rationale related to plans for facility closure, realignments, and upgrades and force structure adjustments.

The foundation for our analysis was a thorough investigation of the national security, defense, and military strategies and the DOD operational and war fighting capabilities needed to meet projected mission requirements. In conducting the analysis, we developed a baseline of both current and future overseas basing postures that we used to gauge changes in overseas-based capabilities. Based on this model, we then assessed the impact the proposed future overseas basing posture had on U.S. national security—as compared to the current posture—from the strategic/geopolitical and the operational/war fighting perspectives. We also conducted a facility and training area review to determine the adequacy of basing to support the future overseas posture, as well as the cost implications of implementing the new posture. These assessments

resulted in a number of issues for the Commission to consider on the ability of the force to respond to national military security requirements and the impact on the forces executing the assigned mission. These issues drove Commissioner consultations and deliberations and resulted in the Conclusions and Recommendations contained in the final report.

Figure D-1 portrays our analytical approach to conduct these assessments.



Strategic Review

The initial step in our analysis was to conduct a thorough review of U.S. national security strategy, national defense strategy, national military strategy, and challenges of the security environment to gain understanding of key drivers for the U.S. military overseas basing strategy and posture.

The Commission interviewed key officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the COCOMs, U.S. Transportation Command, and the State Department to understand the current application and use of the U.S. defense strategy and guidance, as detailed in:

- U.S. National Military Strategy;
- Defense Planning and OSD Transformation Planning Guidance;
- Emerging Joint Operational Concepts;
- OSD Basing Policy; and,
- Strategies of the COCOMs.


These interviews were designed to identify the current and future capabilities needed to operate in a security environment characterized by traditional, irregular, disruptive, or catastrophic challenges. These challenges range from the classical state actors, to terrorism and insurgency, to the employment of weapons of mass destruction.

Strategic Assessments

The Commission developed evaluation criteria to compare and measure how effectively the current and future overseas basing postures support current and future national security and military strategies and military operations. In developing the criteria for our assessments, we used a modified version of the Quadrennial Defense Review framework for assessing risks of various defense initiatives. Our framework, presented in Figure D-2, below, examines the global overseas basing posture from the risk areas of strategic-geopolitical, warfighting and operational, implementing enablers, force management, and institutional/resource demands. Also shown in Figure D-2 are the key issues and focus areas of the Commission in conducting the study.

Figure D-2

Commission Perspective (QDR Risk Areas)



Strategic-Geopolitical Assessment

In conducting the strategic-geopolitical assessments, we analyzed the impact of the basing postures using established theories of deterrence, international politics, alliance relations, and sources of conflict as well as analyses of current dynamics and future developments in the global security environment.

Strategic and Geopolitical Evaluation Criteria

The strategic and geopolitical criteria used in the analysis included the following. Each was selected based on the priority given the goal in U.S. national security strategy and its importance in light of current and emerging challenges in the global security environment.

- Defend homeland against terrorism;
- Prevent weapons of mass destruction use;
- Dissuade-deter adversaries;
- Assure allies;

- Expand coalitions and coalition capabilities;
- Maintain peace and security in critical regions;
- Defend “the commons”-access to markets/energy sources;
- Enhance U.S. leadership;
- Promote individual rights and,
- Broaden/expand options and access;

Operational Assessment

In conducting assessments, we compared the future overseas posture with current overseas basing and continental U.S. basing of the same capabilities relative to strategic-geopolitical and war fighting-operational criteria or benchmarks. For various types of capabilities, we investigated whether or not the kinds of capabilities need to be forward based as part of the overall defense structure.

For specific capability changes of the future overseas basing posture, we investigated how the specific capability impacts the U.S. national security strategy and national military strategy goals relative to: (1) current based capabilities and (2) continental U.S. basing of the capabilities. For example, we assessed the impact of basing a Stryker battalion in the western Pacific region with the current posture (which currently does not have Strykers deployed forward) and to continental U.S.-basing of the Stryker unit.

The Commission used adjectival ratings to identify the benefits and risks (positive and negatives impacts): “no change,” “marginal change,” “modest change,” “significant change.” This kind of assessment is appropriate given the imprecise nature of many metrics and key data elements and the fact that DOD is still conducting detailed operational availability assessments of the future basing posture. From this analysis, the Commission drew conclusions as to how effectively the basing structure supports DOD’s requirements.

Operational and War Fighting Evaluation Criteria

The operational and war fighting criteria used in the analysis include the following. Each was selected based on the priority given the mission in U.S. defense and military strategy and a combination of the risk and likelihood of such operations

- Find and kill/capture terrorists overseas in the Global War on Terror;
- Neutralize enemy WMD;
- Swiftly defeat enemy attacks against allies/other interests;
- Decisively defeat enemy centers of power;
- Defend interests in a strategic war with a near-peer competitor;
- Overcome anti-access efforts;
- Humanitarian interventions (peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief);
- Counter-proliferation; and,
- Non-combatant evacuation operations.

Force Structure

The next step involved identifying and defining the current and future military force structure planned to provide the capabilities identified in the strategic review discussed above. The Commission was not provided this force structure by DOD. Consequently, to conduct the analysis, the Commission defined current and future baseline models using the base structure report with specific combat elements of significant size (i.e. the primary combat capabilities stationed within each area of responsibility) ascribed to each site based primarily on the DOD Report to Congress, *Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture* (September 2004). Additional information was obtained from other sources, chiefly the Mobility Capabilities Study 2005 terms of reference, the 2004 DOD Report to Congress on Base Realignment and Closure, and briefings provided to the Commission during their visits to each COCOM.

Scenarios and Vignette Modeling

The Commission did not conduct a comprehensive operational assessment of the full range of DOD scenarios and capabilities.¹ Such a multi-year effort was not required to adequately assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the DOD future overseas basing posture.

Using the results of the DOD interviews and document review, the Commission designed a series of representative scenarios to test the current and future basing structures on how effectively they support the national security and military strategy and operational requirements. These “vignette” scenarios were designed to specifically address the legislative requirements and issues raised during Commission testimony. The issues included strategic and tactical lift, operational flexibility and reach, the timing and movement of forces, the positioning of sealift and prepositioning assets, and the ability of the future posture to project power across multiple areas of responsibility.

The scenarios covered four basic areas: anti-terrorist operations, brigade rapid deployment, major combat, and peacetime operations.

For interested parties, the Commission utilized brigade-size forces as our unit of analysis.² The scenarios included:

- Deployments in support of a major theater of war in Central Asia — conducted to investigate South Asia responsiveness;
- Deployment of Forces to East Asian Littorals — conducted to investigate East Asian Littorals responsiveness;
- Deployment of Stryker brigade combat team from Grafenwoehr, Germany to Nigeria, Africa — conducted to investigate West African responsiveness;
- Deployment of Stryker brigade combat teams within PACOM to South Korea — conducted to investigate Northeast Asia responsiveness;

¹ DOD is currently conducting the Operational Assessment '05, which uses the new overseas basing concepts and new planning scenarios (not previously used in previous Operational assessments). Their process involves a DOD-wide force capabilities assessment across the complete range of planning scenarios with multiple iterations conducted to optimize meeting mission objectives.

² Our units of analysis included: brigades, marine expeditionary units/brigades, air expeditionary wings, and carrier strike groups.

- Deployment of Task Force from EUCOM to Sudan, Africa — conducted to investigate Sub-Saharan Africa responsiveness;
- Strike Capability within COCOMs — conducted to investigate overseas basing impacts on COCOM strike capabilities;
- Peacetime Rotational Training — conducted to investigate rotational training's impact on presence;
- Strategic Mobility for Overseas Basing — conducted to investigate strategic mobility complementing overseas basing; and,
- Increased Forward Global War on Terror in COCOMs — conducted to investigate overseas basing posture supporting the global war on terror.

Facilities Review:

We developed a baseline model for the current overseas base posture. We initially used the DOD FY2004 Base Structure Report and the FY2003 Installations' Readiness Report to assess the current facilities and range basing structure. We identified capabilities, existing locations and conditions, and force structure capacities. We coded each installation or base as a main operating base, forward operating site, or cooperative security location.

We then developed the baseline for modeling the future overseas basing posture. To do this, we used DOD's concept of future basing strategies as defined in DOD's "Report to Congress: Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture," various briefings and documents we received from DOD, and from discussions with OSD and the COCOMs. We identified base locations, combatant unit locations, rotational unit locations, and transportation and logistics hubs. Because of the on going changes in DOD assessment of overseas bases and the changing nature and uncertainty of the final facility laydown a modeling effort was not possible.

COST IMPACTS METHODOLOGY

To determine the cost of implementing the Department of Defense's (DOD) Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, we interviewed knowledgeable DOD and Army officials and reviewed pertinent documents from these officials. We interviewed and/or obtained documents from officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Supply Chain Integration, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Army, War Plans Division,

and U.S. Army, G3 Training. Specifically, we reviewed DOD's Overseas Master Plan Submission for 2006, a briefing on U.S. Forces in Korea provided to the Commission, Service's submission on prepositioned stocks, and a U.S. Government Accountability Report titled Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans (GAO-04-609, Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004).

In addition, we estimated the present value of the total incremental cost to implement the facilities and ranges portion of the strategy. To do this, we estimated the initial (construction, renovation, and alteration) and operating costs, at each overseas base, of achieving the realignment of the overseas basing structure. This allowed us to investigate impacts by the types of bases and by regional areas of responsibility. We used data collected from the Future Years Defense Plan, interviews, and other source documents.

Since DOD was not able to provide a laydown of a facility by facility renovation or new construction requirement there was significant uncertainty associated with estimating the costs of building new or renovating existing bases. Single numbers ("point estimates") for either individual base locations or regions mask this underlying variability inherent in estimates of this type. These individual-location and region-wide cost estimates are sensitive to factors such as the type of base, location, amount of existing infrastructure that can be effectively used for the future mission, host nation support to be received and others. In addition, actual costs at any given location have risks of being different from estimated costs for reasons such as wrong assumptions, cost changes in the region, and others.

Therefore, we employed a stochastic cost modeling approach to these cost estimates to properly account for the inherent risks and sensitivities that provided a range of cost estimates for each region, as well as an "expected" (most likely) cost.

The approach involved:

- Classifying each potential location by type of base;
- Developing cost estimates for the best case, most likely case, and worst case scenarios for each location;
- Performing a Monte Carlo (probability-based) simulation on the costs of locations in each region; and,

- Performing a sensitivity analysis of the results for significant cost drivers in each region.

The results provided a range of costs, as well as a “most likely” cost for each region, and statistical confidence intervals for the “most likely” costs. The results also provided the probabilities associated with achieving any given level of total cost for a region.

Issue Identification

Each of these review and assessments led to the identification of issues which were subsequently presented to the Commissioners for consideration for inclusion in the Commission’s Conclusions and Recommendations

Appendix E

Public Hearings and Visits

Public Hearings and Visits

Listed below are the various public hearings, visits, interviews and meetings conducted during the course of the Commission's review.

PUBLIC HEARINGS:

July 14, 2004:

- Frances Lussier, Ph.D., National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office;
- Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Congressional Budget Office;
- J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director, Congressional Budget Office.

September 2, 2004:

- George Harmeyer, Major General, U.S. Army (Retired);
- Mary M. Keller, Military Child Education Coalition;
- Honorable Lawrence Korb, Center for American Progress;
- Michael E. O'Hanlon, Brookings Institute;
- Donald Pilling, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired);
- Joyce Wessel Raezer, The National Military Family Association;
- Jack Spencer, Heritage Foundation;
- Mike Williams, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired).

OVERSEAS BASING COMMISSION

November 9, 2004:

- Thomas P.M. Barnett, U.S. Naval War College;
- Marcus Corbin, Center for Defense Information;
- John J. Hamre, President, Center for Strategic and International Studies;
- Honorable Robert E. Hunter, RAND Corporation;
- Charles A. Horner, General, U.S. Air Force (Retired);
- Montgomery S. Meigs, General, U.S. Army (Retired);
- Michael P. Noonan, Foreign Policy Research Institute;
- Charles "Tony" Robertson, Jr., General, U.S. Air Force (Retired).

March 1, 2005:

- Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
- Ambassador Rose M. Likins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs;
- Vice Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. Navy, Director of Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J8), Joint Chiefs of Staff.

VISITS:

U.S. Central Command: September 28, 2004 (HQ, MacDill AFB); 13-21 April, 2005 (to facilities in AOR);

- Afghanistan
- Bahrain
- Djibouti
- Kuwait

- Uzbekistan
- Qatar
- United Arab Emirates
- U.S. European Command: August 15-20, 2004 (to facilities in AOR and HQ, Vahingen, GE); January 8-13, 2005; 6-13 April, 2005 (to facilities in AOR and HQ, Vahingen, GE);
 - Bulgaria
 - Germany
 - Italy
 - Romania
 - Spain
 - Turkey
- U.S. Pacific Command: November 10-22, 2004; February 12-21, 2005 (to facilities in AOR and HQ, Pearl Harbor, HI):
 - Australia
 - Guam
 - Hawaii
 - Japan (including Okinawa)
 - Korea
 - Singapore

OVERSEAS BASING COMMISSION

- U.S. Southern Command: September 28, 2004 (At SOCOM HQ, MacDill AFB)
- U.S. Special Operations Command: September 28, 2004 (HQ, MacDill AFB);
- U.S. Transportation Command: October 27, 2004, and January 4, 2005 (HQ, Scott AFB).

INTERVIEWS & MEETINGS:

- Meeting with Mr. Jay Janke and COL Bradshaw, ODUSD (I&E) concerning IRR on 27 October 2004.
- Meeting with Captain Sweetzer, USN, Joint staff, J8, plus several informal follow-up meetings on Operational Availability studies and Defense Planning Scenarios on 28 October, 2004.
- Meeting with Service range/training area personnel on 4 November 2004.
- State Department regional briefing by Mr. Revere on 10 November 2004.
- Meeting with OSD Office of Force Transformation on IGPBS and its relationship to US DOD Transformation on 15 November 2004.
- Meeting with Service facility representatives on 17 November 2004.
- Meeting with Army Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (OACSIM) regarding Real Property Planning and Analysis System (RPLANS) on 22 November 2004.
- Meeting with GAO concerning overseas basing on 23 November 2004.
- Meeting with Mr. James Townsend, OSD ISP regarding IGPBS implementation on 23 November 2004.
- Meeting with ODUSD (I&E) regarding prepositioning on 7 December 2004.
- Meeting with Army Staff representatives (G3, G4, G8) regarding IGPBS Implementation on 8 December 2004.

- Meeting with Mr. Don Stevens, RAND, regarding Air Force Basing Study on 8 December 2005.
- Meeting with Army G3/5/7 (Pol/Mil Europe) regarding future basing in Europe on 10 December 2004.
- Meeting OSD PAE regarding IGPBS costs on 14 December 2004.
- Meeting with Army PAE regarding IGPBS costs on 15 December 2004.
- Meeting with Army G4 & G1 Plans personnel concerning IGPBS on 16 December 2004.
- Meeting with Colonel John Brown Army G4 Staff, Chief of Force Projection Planning, on Army prepositioning and force projection capabilities on 16 December 2004.
- Meeting with Eric Coulter and David Markowitz of OSD PA&E concerning Operational Risk Assessments and Operational Availability Studies on 20 December 2004.
- Meeting with Colonel Patrick Kelly, OSD Policy, Resources and Plans on DOD Planning Scenarios on 20 December 2004.
- Meeting with OSD on overseas base closures on 11 January 2005.
- Meeting with Air Force Staff regarding Planning and Programming for IGPBS on 12 January 2005.
- Meeting with Air Force personnel on IGPBS on 16 January 2005.
- In addition meetings were held with knowledgeable officials to obtain information on Quality of Life, Recruiting and Retention, Facilities and Ranges as well as regional issues.



OVERSEAS BASING COMMISSION

Major Conclusions and Recommendations

The Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (Overseas Basing Commission) submits its May 2005 Report that advises the President and the U.S. Congress on the U.S. overseas military basing posture, and makes the following recommendations.

- The military basing posture of the United States is a significant reflection of U.S. national security interests throughout the world. It will serve as a central component of our strategy for decades to come. The totality of this posture is larger than just the Department of Defense and therefore requires a wider review by all affected parties. The review process might include the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, Homeland Security (Immigrations and Customs), Justice (FBI), Commerce, and Treasury, the U.S. Trade Representatives, the National Intelligence Director (and relevant agencies), the Office of Management and Budget and other.
- Congress should provide more rigorous oversight (including hearings) of the global basing process given the scope and impact of DOD rebasing plans. Particular attention should be paid to the timing and synchronization and cost of all the related efforts.
- The detailed synchronization required by so massive a realignment of forces requires that the pace of events be slowed and re-ordered.
- DOD must ensure all necessary infrastructure and quality of life programs be retained at overseas bases until the last day service members and their families depart, and that necessary infrastructure and quality of life programs be in place in the U.S. by the first days troops and families arrive from overseas.
- Marine Corps assets assigned to Futenma Marine Air Corps Station on Okinawa should re-locate to Kadena Air Base and/or Iwakuni Marine Air Corps Station; all other Marine Corps assets should remain on Okinawa.
- Within the European Theatre, one of the heavy brigade combat teams scheduled for return to the U.S. should remain in Europe. A heavy brigade combat team equipment set should be prepositioned afloat within the region, and a brigade should be committed to support continuous rotational deployments.
- Additional U.S. attention is needed to encourage healthy relationships in many areas of Africa and Latin America as they may be key to future strategic interest.
- The U.S. should review its treaty with Iceland, and update it to reflect a post-Cold War security environment.

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