

DOD
QDR
presentation
BRAC

**Base Realignment and Closure
Commission**



**May 4th, 2005
9:30 AM Hearing**

Mr. Skinner

Base Realignment and Closure Commission

Hearing of the Commission

9:30 am

May 4, 2005

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Joint Staff, Pentagon

Structure, Resource & Assessment

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Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy ✓

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**Statement
of
Chairman Anthony J. Principi**

**Hearing
of the
2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission**

May 4, 2005

Washington, D.C.

Good Morning,

And welcome to the second day of hearings of the 2005 BRAC Commission. Today's hearing, like yesterday's two hearings, will help provide the Commission with the foundation we need to provide an independent assessment of the DoD's 2005 base realignment and closure proposal when it is released in less than two weeks.

I also want to express the Commission's appreciation to the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs for making their hearing room available for yesterday's and today's hearing.

Yesterday morning, we were briefed on the statute guiding our decisions and the criteria we must apply in evaluating the Defense Department proposal, the issues we are likely to face in the months to come as well as the lessons learned from prior BRACs. In the afternoon, we were briefed by representatives of the intelligence community on the threats to our national security we can anticipate over the two decades to come.

The Department of Defense is called upon to develop and field the forces needed to deter or defeat those threats. In turn, it must maintain the bases needed to support those forces; without diverting scarce resources to the maintenance of bases which are not needed.

The future force structure of our armed forces is, therefore, a driving force in determining the base structure our nation will need to support in the decades to come.

This Commission must, therefore, have a good understanding of that force structure if we are to meet our obligations to the Congress, to the President, to the men and women who embody our armed forces, and to the American people.

Today, we will hear from Mr. Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Defense Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Vice Admiral Martin Chanik, Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessments on the Joint Staff. They will speak to the anticipated force structure of our armed forces, their anticipated global posture and strategy of our armed forces and to the Secretary's guidance for conducting the Quadrennial Defense Review, now underway.

As you might expect, this information can be very sensitive and while we begin in open session I anticipate that we will move to closed session at an early point in this hearing to protect classified information. I expect our witnesses will signal when our questioning is moving into the classified area so that we can go to a closed session.

Mr. Henry, please proceed.



**TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR
VICE ADMIRAL EVAN MARTIN CHANIK, JR.
U.S. NAVY**

27 MAY 1951 Born in Newport, Rhode Island
30 JUN 1969 Midshipman, U.S. Naval Academy
06 JUN 1973 Ensign
06 JUN 1975 Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 JUL 1977 Lieutenant
01 JUN 1982 Lieutenant Commander
01 SEP 1988 Commander
01 OCT 1993 Captain
09 MAR 2000 Designated Rear Admiral (lower half) while
 serving in billets commensurate with that grade
01 JUL 2000 Rear Admiral (lower half)
19 SEP 2002 Designated Rear Admiral while serving in billets
 commensurate with that grade
01 SEP 2003 Rear Admiral
18 MAR 2005 Vice Admiral, Service continuous to date



<u>ASSIGNMENTS AND DUTIES</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL (DUINS)	JUN 1973	AUG 1973
Training Squadron ONE, NAS Saufley Field, Pensacola, FL (DUINS)	AUG 1973	SEP 1973
Training Squadron TWO THREE, NAS Kingsville, TX (DUINS)	SEP 1973	SEP 1974
Commander, Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Ready Replacement Pilot)	SEP 1974	AUG 1975
Commander, Fighter Squadron ONE (Division Officer)	AUG 1975	FEB 1978
Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN Training Officer)	MAR 1978	OCT 1980
Commander, Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Replacement Pilot)	OCT 1980	MAY 1981
Commander, Fighter Squadron TWO FOUR (Operations Officer)	MAY 1981	OCT 1984
Commanding Officer, Air Test and Evaluation Squadron FOUR (Quality Assurance Officer)	OCT 1984	JUL 1985
Commander, Airborne Early Warning Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet/Navy Fighter Weapons School/ 4477 th U.S. Air Force Test and Evaluation Squadron (Evaluation Officer)	AUG 1985	MAR 1988

**TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR
VICE ADMIRAL EVAN MARTIN CHANIK, JR.
U.S. NAVY**

<u>ASSIGNMENTS AND DUTIES (CONT'D)</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Commander, Fighter Squadron ONE ZERO ONE (Replacement Pilot)	MAR 1988	SEP 1988
XO, Fighter Squadron EIGHT FOUR	SEP 1988	MAR 1990
CO, Fighter Squadron EIGHT FOUR	MAR 1990	JUL 1991
Naval Nuclear Power School, Orlando, FL (DUINS)	SEP 1991	OCT 1991
Commander, Naval Nuclear Power Unit, Charleston, SC (DUINS)	MAY 1992	OCT 1992
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)/ Commander, Fighter Wing ONE (TEM DU)	NOV 1992	OCT 1993
XO, USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70)	OCT 1993	AUG 1995
CO, USS CAMDEN (AOE 2)	OCT 1995	JUN 1997
CO, USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65)	SEP 1997	JUL 2000
Office of the CNO (Director, Aviation Plans and Requirements Branch) (N780)	JUL 2000	APR 2002
Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force, Southwest Asia, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (TEM DU)	MAY 2002	AUG 2002
Commander, Carrier Group THREE	APR 2002	AUG 2004
Office of the CNO (Director, Programming Division) (N80)	AUG 2004	MAR 2005
Joint Staff (Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment) (J-8)	MAR 2005	TO DATE

MEDALS AND AWARDS

Legion of Merit	Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
Bronze Star Medal	Navy "E" Ribbon with three "E's"
Meritorious Service Medal with two Gold Stars	National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Air Medal (fourth strike/flight award)	Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with Combat "V" and two Gold Stars	Vietnam Service Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal	Southwest Asia Service Medal with three Bronze Stars
Joint Meritorious Unit Award with Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster	Kuwait Liberation Medal (Saudi Arabia)
Navy Unit Commendation	Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kuwait)
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award	Expert Pistol Shot Medal

TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR
VICE ADMIRAL EVAN MARTIN CHANIK, JR.
U.S. NAVY

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

BS (Operations Analysis), U.S. Naval Academy, 1973
MA (Business Administration), 1987
Designated Naval Aviator, 1974
Designated Joint Specialty Officer, 1989

PERSONAL DATA

Wife: Kathleen M. Foster, La Crescenta, California
Children: None.

SUMMARY OF JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Rank</u>
4477 th U.S. Air Force Test and Evaluation Squadron	AUG 85 - MAR 88	LCDR
Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force, Southwest Asia, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	MAY 02 - AUG 02	RDML
Joint Staff (Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment) (J-8)	MAR 05 - TO DATE	VADM

INTENSE COMBAT

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Fighter Squadron EIGHT FOUR	JAN 91	CDR

STATEMENT OF

VADM E. M. CHANIK

DIRECTOR FOR FORCE STRUCTURE

RESOURCES AND ASSESSMENT, J-8

THE JOINT STAFF

BEFORE THE

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION

MAY 4, 2005

Thanks you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission for the opportunity to testify today about the BRAC Force Structure Plan. As you are aware, the Secretary will present his BRAC recommendations to you not later than 16 May. The recommendations are the result of intense analysis performed by the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups that began over two years ago. Per the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, these recommendations will be based on the BRAC 2005 Final Selection Criteria, certified data, and the Force Structure Plan.

The BRAC statute required the Secretary to submit to Congress a force structure plan for the Armed Forces. The legislation directed that the plan be based on an assessment of the probable threats to US national security during the 20-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005, the probable end-strength levels and major force units needed to meet the threats, and the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during that period.

Upon completion, the Secretary submitted the Force Structure Plan to Congress in March 2004, along with his certification for the need for BRAC. The statute also provided the Secretary the opportunity to submit a revised plan. This revision was submitted to Congress on March 15, 2005.

How the Force Structure Plan was used

Recommendations to the BRAC Commission were developed by the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups based on the Selection Criteria, certified data, and the Force Structure Plan. To facilitate their efforts, the completed Force Structure Plan was provided to the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups for inclusion into their analysis. Utilizing the Force Structure Plan in their analysis, the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups ensured that post-BRAC infrastructure would be sufficient to support current and future force structure and requirements to surge.

What the Plan Provides

The plan begins with a discussion of the Department's capabilities-based approach for matching strategy-to-force structure. While the Department is shifting to a capabilities-based, vice threat-based approach, assessment of probable threats is prudent and included, as directed by legislation. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps force structure tables, probable end-strength levels and anticipated funding levels complete the document and represent the capabilities the Department estimates are required to meet the probable threats, including the capability to surge.

Surge

As surge requirements can arise for any number of reasons, including contingency mobilizations or extended changes in force levels, it was a key consideration throughout the BRAC process. To account for surge, the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups analyzed this requirement throughout the process. During the capacity analysis phase, the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups identified potential excess capacity over known requirements that allowed them to assess what capacity was available for surge. During the military value analysis phase, DoD infrastructure was evaluated using the Final Selection Criteria. The Final Selection Criteria included eight criteria, the first four of which were focused on military value and the last four were considerations of other factors. In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department was to give priority consideration to military value, as highlighted in the first four criteria. Significantly, two of those four military value selection criteria address the surge requirement. Criterion One addresses “the current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense.” Criterion Three addresses “the ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements.” Lastly, surge was considered during the scenario analysis phase. As the Department analyzed alternative scenarios, the

20-year Force Structure Plan requirements were applied against all alternatives prior to reaching a final recommendation.


Homeland Defense

An important mission considered within BRAC was homeland defense. Final Selection Criterion Two required the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups to consider, in their military value analysis, “the availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace...and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions.” Additionally, all Service and Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations were reviewed by all the Combatant Commands, providing NORTHCOM and PACOM an opportunity to comment on their homeland defense requirements.

Conclusion

In closing, the BRAC Force Structure Plan is a cornerstone document used as an input for conducting analysis and upon which the Secretary’s recommendations will be based. It was thoroughly coordinated throughout the Department and meets all the BRAC statutory requirements.

I thank you for this opportunity and look forward to working with the Commission during the next phase of BRAC 2005.




What is a QDR?

- The QDR's principal purpose is to balance strategy with resources
 - Develops strategic planning guidance for the Defense Department
 - Lays out an agenda for developing needed capabilities and shaping the future force
- Takes a 20-year outlook
- Submitted to Congress with President's FY07 budget




Periods of Fundamental Change

	1930s	1950s	1980s	2000+
Challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How to prepare for war with Japan? • How to prepare for a conflict in Europe? • How to develop new military technologies during the Depression /defense budget constraints? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How to fight in the time, place, and manner of our choosing in the atomic age? • How to leverage new nuclear "genie"? • How to employ "trip wires"? • How to reposture globally for the Cold War? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How to roll-back Communist expansion in the 3rd world? • How to impose costs on USSR in terms of technology? • How to restore the military balance on the Central European Front? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ☐ <i>How do we build partnerships to defeat terrorist extremism?</i> ☐ <i>How do we defend the homeland in-depth?</i> ☐ <i>How do we shape the choices of countries arriving at strategic crossroads?</i> ☐ <i>How do we prevent the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile state or non-state actors?</i>
Responses	<p><u>New Concepts of Warfare</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Amphibious warfare • Carrier aviation • Combined arms / mechanized warfare • Strategic bombing 	<p><u>"New Look" Strategy</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Doctrine of massive retaliation • Nuclear Triad (USAF, USN) • Pentomic Army • Nuclear-capable tactical aircraft (USAF, USN) • NRO 	<p><u>Reagan Doctrine</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Competitive strategies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SDI • Maritime Strategy, horizontal escalation • Stealth / precision / technology • AirLand Battle • SOF capabilities 	<p><u>Transformation</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ☐ <i>Capabilities Mix</i> ☐ <i>Joint Capability Enablers</i> ☐ <i>Roles, Missions & Organizations</i> ☐ <i>Business Practices</i> ☐ <i>Human Capital Strategy</i> ☐ <i>Authorities</i>



Four Focus Areas

1. Build partnerships to defeat terrorist extremism
2. Defend the homeland in-depth
3. Shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads
4. Prevent the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile state or non-state actors



These 4 areas provide focus for new capabilities development

QDR Assumptions

- United States, allies and partners will be tested by major unforeseen, national security contingencies over the next decade
- QDR will be conducted in context of a Nation at war
 - *Global War on Terror has first priority*
 - *Strategic victory in Iraq and Afghanistan is part of the Global War on Terror*
- External & internal pressures on resources will impact DoD transformation
 - *Rising USG non-discretionary costs will increase pressure on DoD's top-line*
 - *DoD fact-of-life costs continue to grow (e.g., health programs, fuel)*
- Transformation is a work in progress
 - *Major initiatives now underway will continue (e.g., global posture changes, rebalancing the force, force modularization, capabilities-based planning)*
 - *There are other initiatives that need to be addressed (senior leadership input)*



QDR Issues

Capability Mix

Overarching:

How should DoD apportion resources & risk?

Focus Area #1: *What capabilities are needed to build partnerships to defeat extremism?*

Focus Area #2: *What capabilities are needed to defend the homeland in-depth?*

Focus Area #3: *What capabilities are needed to shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads?*

Focus Areas #4: *What capabilities are needed to prevent the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile state or non-state actors?*

Roles, Missions & Organizations

What changes to roles, missions, organizations and responsibilities in DoD are needed to meet 21st century challenges?

What recommendations should DoD make to better integrate and otherwise improve interagency operations across the U.S. Government?

What institutional changes are needed to address the 4 focus areas?

Manning & Balancing the Force

What type of people and skill sets are required to address the 4 focus areas?

What is the appropriate Human Capital Strategy for the 21st century to attract, retain, and develop the right type of people and skill sets?

What is the appropriate Active-Reserve Component mix to address the 4 focus areas of the 21st century?

Business Practices & Processes

How do we improve consumability of data across Components to support Capabilities-Based Planning?

How should the Department control costs / address the growing cost of business?

Reform its budgeting, contracting, auditing, and acquisition processes to better support wartime operations?

Joint Enablers


How should DoD improve key capability enablers to address the 4 focus areas?

Global Defense Posture & BRAC


How should DoD update its global defense posture to strengthen the operational capabilities of the joint warfighter?

Authorities

What changes are needed to address 21st century challenges? (Title 10, etc.)




Linking Strategy to Global Defense Posture and BRAC



Department-wide
Planning Guidance

Cold War (1985)




- Legacy from the end of 20th century wars

- Forces were located and equipped to fight where they were based.




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Post-Cold War (1995-2002)




• US no longer assumes we know where our forces will have to operate —and no longer assumes they will fight where they are based.




Global Defense Posture – Key Themes

- Develop flexibility to contend with uncertainty
- Focus within and across regions
- Expand allied roles, build new partnerships
- Focus on capabilities, not numbers
- Develop rapidly deployable capabilities



Global Defense Posture – Key Elements



Activities

- Military Presence
- Global Sourcing
- Surge

Relationships


- Alliance Transformation
- Legal Arrangements
- Command Structures

Facilities

- Cooperative Security Locations
- Forward Operating Sites
- Main Operating Bases
- Pre-positioned Equipment
- CONUS Reach-back



Global Defense Posture Changes



National Defense Strategy Quadrennial Defense Review Global Defense Posture



Briefing for the Base Realignment and Closure Commission


4 May 2005

***Ryan Henry
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy***

Agenda

BRAC's Relationship to:

- National Defense Strategy
- Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
- Global Defense Posture



DoD Strategic Planning

- **Since 9/11 we have updated our strategic thinking**
 - We have incorporated lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other operations.
 - BRAC's application of "best military value" plays a key role in leveraging lessons learned.
- **The National Defense Strategy, QDR Terms of Reference, and Global Defense Posture:**
 - *Acknowledge the limits of intelligence (in all senses of the term) and position us to handle strategic uncertainty;*
 - *Recognize the value of early measures to resolve problems before they become crises and crises before they become wars; and*
 - *Emphasize the criticality of building partnership capacity to address national security concerns.*



National Defense Strategy

□ Key ideas:

- Strategic uncertainty
- Value of early action (preventive measures)
- Increasing partnership capacity
- Active, layered defense (National Mil Strategy)

Defense “Ends”:

- Secure U.S. from direct attack
- Secure strategic access and retain freedom of action
- Strengthen alliances and partnerships
- Establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order

Defense “Ways”:

- Assure allies and friends
- Dissuade potential adversaries
- Deter aggression and counter coercion
- Defeat adversaries

GWOT strategy:


- Protect the homeland
- Disrupt and attack terrorist networks
- Counter ideological support for terrorism

□ Transformation:

- Changing the way we think about challenges and opportunities
 - *Continual reexamination of assumptions; willingness to adapt to new circumstances and to abandon preconceptions that don't comport with unfolding events*
- Adapting the defense establishment to post 9-11 perspective
- Refocusing capabilities to meet 21st-century challenges, not just those we are already most prepared to meet
- Integrated defense risk framework -- Operational, Future Challenges, Force Management, Institutional



Security Challenges



Capabilities-based planning should apportion risk across challenges



Christopher "Ryan" Henry

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Ryan Henry was appointed by President Bush, confirmed by the Senate, and has served as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy since February 2003. He is an advisor to the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Under Secretary of Defense on policy, strategy, transformation, force structure, global posture, and on the execution of deliberate and contingency plans by combatant commanders in support of the national objectives. Additionally, he provides strategy and resource guidance to senior Department officials and represents the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in a variety of fora.

Mr. Henry's professional career spans 24 years of military service, including work in government operations, leading-edge research and development, and policy analysis. He served as an aviation squadron commander, Congressional staffer, experimental test pilot, and technology/warfare architect. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1972 and from National Defense University in 1992. He also earned advanced degrees in Aeronautical Systems (University of West Florida, 1974), and Systems Management (University of Southern California, 1982).

Prior to appointment as Principal Deputy, Mr. Henry was Corporate Vice President for Technology and Business Development at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Before joining SAIC, Mr. Henry was a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, where he led the Information-based Warfare initiative and served as Director of the "Conflict in the Digital Age" Project. He also served as a Program Manager and Information Systems Architect for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

Mr. Henry co-authored The Information Revolution and International Security, has written for a variety of periodicals, and provided commentary to domestic and overseas broadcast news organizations.

Statement to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission

Ryan Henry
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

May 4, 2005

Mr. Chairman and members of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, I am pleased to appear before you today and grateful for the work you are doing for our nation.

Today I will discuss with you our National Defense Strategy, the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review, and our Global Defense Posture changes - all of which provide the strategic foundation for the Department's BRAC recommendations.

National Defense Strategy

Mr. Chairman, our National Defense Strategy outlines an active, layered approach to the defense of the nation and its interests. We seek to create conditions conducive to respect for the sovereignty of nations and a secure international order favorable to freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity.

Our National Defense Strategy identifies four strategic objectives:

- **Secure the United States from direct attack.** We make it our top priority to dissuade, deter, and defeat those who seek to harm the United States directly, especially extremist enemies with weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
- **Strengthen alliances and partnerships.** We will expand the community of nations that share principles and interests with us. This includes helping partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests;
- **Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.** We will promote the security, prosperity, and freedom of action of the United States and its partners by securing access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons; and
- **Establish favorable security conditions.** Working with others in the U.S. Government, we will create conditions for a favorable international system

by honoring our security commitments and working with other nations to bring about a common appreciation of threats; a broad, secure, and lasting peace; and the steps required to protect against these threats.

We accomplish these objectives through assuring, dissuading, deterring, and when necessary defeating adversaries:

- **assuring allies and friends** by demonstrating our resolve to fulfill our alliance and other defense commitments and help protect common interests;
- **dissuading potential adversaries** from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions, particularly by developing our own key military advantages;
- **detering aggression and countering coercion** by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the will to resolve conflicts decisively on favorable terms; and
- at the direction of the President, **defeating adversaries** at the time, place and in the manner of our choosing—setting the conditions for future security.

Mr. Chairman, four guidelines structure our strategic planning and decision-making:

- We will focus our military planning, posture, operations, and capabilities on the **active, forward, and layered defense** of our nation, our interests, and our partners;
- We will **continually transform** how we approach and confront challenges, conduct business, and work with others;
- We will use a **capabilities-based approach** to operationalize this strategy by setting priorities among competing capabilities to address mature and emerging challenges; and
- We will **manage risks** across the Department associated with resources and operations. We will consider the full range of such risks and manage clear tradeoffs.

Quadrennial Defense Review

Act to Revise Current Force Structure

Mr. Chairman, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will operationalize our new National Defense Strategy and shape the future force. The Department launched the formal review in March 2003, and the QDR Report will be submitted to Congress with the FY07 budget request.

The QDR will take a 20-year outlook. It will examine the capabilities that the Department and the nation need to contend with challenges in four focus areas:

- Building partnerships to hasten the demise of terrorist extremist networks;
- Defending the homeland in depth;
- Shaping the choices of key nations at strategic crossroads; and
- Preventing the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile state or non-state actors for when classic deterrence is ineffective.

A theme cutting across all of these focus areas – and a central element of the National Defense Strategy – is how we might help our allies and partners to develop their own capacities to confront security challenges that we have in common.

Mr. Chairman, rather than looking solely at weapons systems and force structure, the QDR will look at all aspects of the Department of Defense through the lens of the four focus areas, employing six separate, but complimentary lines of approach:

- The needed mix of warfighting capabilities;
- Joint enablers, such as logistics, space, and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance;
- Roles, missions, and organizations for the next two decades;
- Manning and balancing the force for a 21st -century “human capital strategy”;

- Business practices and processes, such as financial dealings, fiscal planning, corporate governance, supply chain management, and strategic planning; and
- Requisite DOD authorities in areas such as Title 5, Title 10, and Title 32, and internal directives needed for a transformed department.

The 2005 QDR differs significantly from past QDRs in that it recognizes that the United States is a nation at war. It will build upon lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that we live in an environment of uncertainty—we cannot adequately predict when, where, or how we might need to next use our forces.

To avoid “stovepiping” of issues and resource priorities, the Department’s senior leaders are the driving force managing all aspects of the QDR. This QDR also will be inclusive: in addition to close consultations with Congress, we will solicit ideas from other government agencies, defense industry, and our international partners to benefit from their strategic thinking.

Finally, during this QDR, the force sizing construct will be treated as an output, not an input to the process. Past QDRs spent much time discussing the proper “size” of the force. This time we will first determine the right mix of capabilities that we need to face our uncertain future, and then we will address any necessary force construct changes that may be needed.

Global Defense Posture Strategy

Mr. Chairman, the Administration’s efforts to strengthen America’s global defense posture will result in the most profound re-ordering of U.S. military forces overseas since the Cold War.

We are redefining our military’s forward presence by strengthening our ability to meet our security commitments in the midst of a dynamic and uncertain geopolitical landscape. Transforming our global defense posture is an important part of our broader effort to transform the Department to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

Similar to the National Defense Strategy and the ongoing QDR, we conducted our global defense posture review thoroughly and deliberately. We collaborated with our interagency partners – particularly the State Department – early in the process. We made an intensive effort to consult with our allies and partners to incorporate their views, with trips to 20 capitals, ambassadorial discussions, and 20 Hill visits for briefings and testimony. The results were

gratifying: within 24 hours of President Bush's speech last August announcing his intention to move forward with our global posture plans, officials of key allies and partners made strong statements of support for our strategy and our proposals. Because we had kept our Russian and Chinese counterparts apprised of our proposed changes, there was no negative reaction from these countries. This helped assure our European and Asian allies.

Mr. Chairman, we also have regularly briefed Members of Congress and their personal and committee staffs throughout our review, with over 40 such briefings to date. We provided a detailed Report to Congress in the fall of 2004. We also have worked closely with the Overseas Basing Commission in its efforts to provide Congress with its assessment of our global presence, basing, and infrastructure needs.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate some of the strategic principles of the global posture changes; summarize some of the most prominent changes; and address the BRAC process in more detail.

First, let me clarify what we have aimed to achieve:

- We are not aiming at retrenchment, curtailing U.S. commitments, isolationism or unilateralism. Instead, we want to strengthen our ability to fulfill our international commitments;
- We want to ensure our future alliances are capable, affordable, sustainable, and relevant;
- We are not narrowly focused on numbers of troops overseas; instead we are focusing on the effective capabilities of our forces and those of our allies;
- We are not talking about fighting in place, but about our ability to rapidly get to the fight; and
- We are not only talking about basing, we are talking about relationships and activities and the ability to move forces when and where they are needed.

Some historical context may be useful. The September 11th attacks clarified our understanding of the key security issues that we will face in the 21st-century. These include:

- the nexus among terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

- ungoverned areas within states, which can serve as both a breeding ground and a sanctuary for terrorists; and
- the adoption of asymmetric approaches – including irregular warfare – that adversaries could use to counter U.S. conventional military superiority.

Mr. Chairman, just as we have updated our National Defense Strategy and worked to transform our alliances to meet these security challenges, we also recognized the importance of transforming our global posture. Much of our in-place posture still reflects a Cold War structure – forward stationed forces configured to fight near where they were based.

Now, nearly 15 years after the end of the Cold War, we know that the premises underlying our posture have changed fundamentally: we no longer expect our forces to fight in place; our forces need to be able to rapidly project power into theaters that may be far from where they are based.

Global Defense Posture Themes

Mr. Chairman, five key strategy themes guide our Global Defense Posture changes:

First is the need to improve flexibility to contend with uncertainty. Much of our existing overseas posture was established during the Cold War, when we knew, or thought we knew, where we would fight. Today, however, we often fight in places that few, if any, had predicted. Thus, we should recognize the limits of our intelligence. We need to plan to counteract surprise. Our goal is to have forces positioned forward on a continual basis in areas with access and facilities that enable them to reach any potential crisis spots quickly.

Second is creating the capacity to act both within and across regions. During the Cold War, we focused on threats to specific regions and tailored our military presence to those regions. Now we are dealing with challenges that are global in nature. We need to improve our ability to project power from one region to another and to manage forces on a global basis.

Third is the requirement to strengthen allied roles and build new partnerships. We want to ensure that our allies and friends recognize that we are actually strengthening our commitment to secure our common interests. Changes to our global posture aim to help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, strategies, and doctrines. We are exploring ways in which we and they together can transform our partnership to best enhance our collective defense capabilities. At the same time, we seek to tailor our military's overseas "footprint" to suit local conditions, to reduce friction with host nations, and to respect local sensitivities.

Fourth, we must develop rapidly deployable capabilities. Our forces need to be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations, which puts a premium on establishing flexible legal and support arrangements with our allies and partners.

Finally, we have to focus on effective military capabilities, not numbers of personnel, units, or equipment. Our key purpose is to push relevant capabilities forward. We now can have far greater capabilities forward than in the past, with smaller numbers of permanently stationed forces. In the Cold War, "bean counting" numbers of personnel in administrative regions was perceived to have a direct relationship to our ability to succeed in anticipated conflicts. But this is no longer the case. Capabilities matter, not numbers.

Building Blocks of our Global Defense Posture

Mr. Chairman, let me make clear what we mean by the word "posture." Many think only of our footprint of facilities, but posture also includes presence, force management, surge capability, and prepositioning.

First, our posture includes the **facilities** that make up our overseas **footprint** where our forces live, train, and operate. We will retain and consolidate many of our main operating bases in places like Germany, Italy, the U.K., Japan, and Korea, but we also will rely on forward operating sites with rotational presence and pre-positioned equipment. We also will need access to a broader range of facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence, but with periodic service or contractor support, which we call cooperative security locations.

Second, our posture includes our **presence**, the permanent and rotational forces that conduct military activities worldwide, from security cooperation to crisis response. Their activities include training, exercises, and operations. They involve both small units working together in a wide range of capacities and major formations conducting elaborate exercises to achieve proficiency in joint and combined operations.

Third, our posture supports our new approach to **force management** which seeks both to relieve the stresses on our military forces and their families and to manage our forces on a global rather than a regional basis. Accompanied tours that were designed in an era of static deployments have become more of a hardship for families as service members deploy more frequently from forward locations. Accompanying dependents more often find themselves in a state of double separation: separated both from their loved ones and extended support networks back in the United States. The planned changes to our posture support Service initiatives designed to facilitate personnel management, provide predictability in scheduling, and offer more stability at home. Also, we are now managing our

forces globally, rather than tying forces and their training only to particular regions. Combatant Commanders no longer “own” forces in their theaters.

Fourth, managing our military forces globally also allows us to **surge** a greater percentage of the force where and when it is needed anywhere in the world. Forces are apportioned as needed and sourced from anywhere in the world.

Finally, our posture changes involve a greater use of **prepositioned equipment**, strategically located and globally managed, to support training with our allies and partners and to facilitate the rapid deployment of forces where and when they are needed.

Key Changes and Continuities

Mr. Chairman, these changes in footprint, presence, force management, surge, and prepositioning are reshaping our ability to support diplomacy and project necessary military power in all theaters.

In Asia, we are building upon our traditional ground, air, and naval access in Northeast Asia to operate effectively despite the vast distances in the theater. This will require additional naval and air capabilities forward in the region. We are consolidating facilities and headquarters in Japan and Korea to gain efficiencies and to enable regional and global action. We will have a more frequent presence of special operations forces throughout the region.

Our future posture in Europe will be characterized by lighter and more deployable ground capabilities, leading-edge air and naval power and advanced training facilities. The center of gravity of our presence in Europe will shift south and east, allowing for more rapid deployment to the Middle East, Africa, and other potential hot spots. A major change will be the return of the two legacy maneuver divisions from Europe to the United States, replacing them with our transformational Stryker capability. We also are retaining our advanced mobility infrastructure in places like Ramstein in Germany.

In the Middle East, our goal is presence without permanence. We are maintaining what we call “warm” facilities for rotational forces and contingency purposes, building on cooperation and access provided by host nations during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

In Africa and the Western Hemisphere, we require an array of smaller cooperative security locations for contingency access in some remote areas, but we will not be building new bases.

Linkage to Base Realignment and Closure

Mr. Chairman, the National Defense Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, Global Defense Posture changes and domestic BRAC round are key, interlinked elements that support transformation. A well supported, capabilities-based force structure should have infrastructure that is best sized and placed to support national security needs and emerging mission requirements. The revised *BRAC Force Structure Plan* and the *Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing Infrastructure Requirements at Overseas Facilities*, both recently transmitted to Congress, align with our National Defense Strategy.

Since some overseas personnel will return to the United States, global posture changes will influence BRAC recommendations designed to support the warfighter more effectively and efficiently. The linkage to BRAC ensures that our forces returning to the U.S. will relocate not merely where they best fit, but rather where they are best postured. The Secretary will provide his recommendations for domestic closures and realignments to the Commission and Congress by May 16th as required by the BRAC 2005 statute.

Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by commending this commission as it works to implement necessary, far-reaching, and enduring changes to strengthen America's defense infrastructure.

**Suggested Questions for 9:30 AM, May 4, 2005 Hearing
Force Structure Plan, Global Posture Review, Quadrennial Review
(Testimony from the Office Secretary of Defense and Office of the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)**

1. The Department has reportedly taken a "global" look at basing this time that was not evident during the 1990s. Why have you taken this approach, and can you explain that process?
2. Since some forces are already returning from overseas prior to the release of BRAC recommendations, can you explain the imperative to accomplish this now, before the Department has decided the final destination of CONUS-bound forces?
3. ~~Secretary Rumsfeld told the SASC, "We do not expect our forces to fight where they are stationed. We know that our forces will need to move to the fight wherever it is." How has the Department integrated analysis and findings from the on-going Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) to ensure our mobility forces can get our troops to the fight?~~
4. ~~How has the Department prepared for the returning troops and their families in such areas as military family housing and schools? What specifically is the Department doing to ensure that it does not degrade the quality of life of the troops and their families returning to bases in the US?~~
5. ~~How is the Department ensuring that overseas-based troops do not rotate to the CONUS until the receiving bases and communities are ready for them? What oversight efforts are in place?~~
6. ~~No list of overseas bases to be closed has been released to date, although we anticipate an interim list will soon be available. How will the Department coordinate this with the BRAC recommendation?~~

7. What is the state of negotiations with the allies? Press accounts from Germany and Japan and other countries have highlighted local national impressions that information on DOD and central government intentions has been lacking. With whom within the various national governments have you been negotiating, and is it possible to identify issues that could delay or derail planned redeployments?
8. How would you characterize the interagency coordination and cooperation involved in these negotiations with foreign governments? For example, the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency, to name a few, have significant stakes in the adjustment of military bases and of US forces stationed overseas. What roles have these agencies played in planning the adjustment of the DOD footprint and in negotiations with Allied governments?
9. What is the state of planning for the redeployment of troops from overseas to the United States? Have the specific units been identified and a schedule developed? Can the schedule be made available to the BRAC Commission? Will these units be brought home individually as whole divisions, as whole brigades, or at some lower level of command?
10. How will the movement of these troops be funded? Do you expect the BRAC account to pay for this movement, or will funds come out of the defense appropriation? What is the magnitude and timing of the associated costs?
11. Will the bulk of the troops redeploy directly to the United States, or will they rotate home only after augmenting forces deploying to Iraq?

12. If there was another round of base closure activity in the next few years, do you feel it will be realistic to again base the recommendations of that round on a 20-year period?
13. Did the different approach in this cycle's force planning approach regarding a greater range of conflict scenarios vs. a established number of conflicts, allow you to consider more or less joint cross-service options as in past base closure rounds? If more options, please explain, if you can, why that was the case.
14. With the expected return of a great number of troops to the United States over the next several years, do you expect the terrorist threat against United States bases will increase or decrease?
15. Are the recent Army Transformation efforts in synch with those recommendations the Department will provide to this Commission in the next two weeks?
16. Please explain the thought process in reducing the Aircraft Carriers from 12 to 11, given what appears to be a great need than ever before in world wide presence,
17. Please explain how the reduction of aircraft carriers from 12 to 11 aligns with the ongoing transformation approach as well as with the current philosophy of not to focus on specific conflicts but rather a wider range of scenarios.
18. Given that the Air Force level of Air Expeditionary Forces remains constant over at least the next six years, does that indicate a great level of success with that number over the last five years.
19. With the development of the AEFs, the Air Force CONUS basing approach has changed measurably since the last round of BRAC.

Does this arrangement increase or decrease your basing requirements. Does this arrangement give the Department of Defense more or less Joint Cross Service options?

20. Will a greater emphasis on Joint Service assignment allow the Department to reduce previously independent infrastructure like training, research and logistics?
21. We anticipate bold recommendations to support, encourage and instill *Jointness* through realignment of forces and training. Will the Department's plans to improve joint interoperability be matched with an equally bold and innovative approach to establishing and stressing joint training? Assuming yes, please elaborate.

Wars Strain U.S. Military Capability, Pentagon Reports

By JOSH WHITE
and ANN SCOTT TYSON
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Defense Department acknowledged yesterday that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have stressed the U.S. military to a point where it is at higher risk of less swiftly and easily defeating potential foes, though officials maintained that U.S. forces could handle any military threat that presents itself.

An annual risk assessment by Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded that commanders are having difficulty meeting the higher standards imposed on them by conflicts around the world, including the military effort against terrorism. Presented to members of Congress yesterday, the assessment found that the risk has increased but is trending lower, according to defense and military officials who briefed reporters at the Pentagon yesterday.

Underscoring the stress facing the armed services, the Army reported separately yesterday that its recruiting efforts are continuing to slip, as recruiters nationwide obtained less than 60 percent of the April goal of 6,600 new recruits into the active-duty force. It was the third straight month in which the Army missed its recruiting goal, and it represents a significant downward trend.

According to the Army, the recruiting effort is 16 percent behind where it should be at this point in the fiscal year, and current figures project a nearly 10 percent shortfall by the end of the fiscal year in September. Army recruiting officials believe enhanced recruiting efforts and incentives should increase their enlistments over the summer, but they would have to consistently beat monthly goals over the next five months to meet annual goals. While the Army should have had 42,585 new recruits for the year as of the end of April, it had 35,833. It hopes to have 80,000 new enlistments this fiscal year.

"We are still cautiously optimistic," said Col. Joseph Curtin, an Army spokesman.

Myers's risk assessment is a rare open acknowledgment that the stresses on the force and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could have an impact on other military operations. Although the assessment does not

indicate a greater threat to the nation, or a greater threat to the military, it does indicate that additional conflicts could take longer, or eat up more resources, than expected.

Military and defense officials spoke to reporters on the condition of anonymity yesterday because the risk assessment is a classified document, but they wanted to emphasize that the heightened risk does not indicate vulnerability on the part of U.S. forces and that it should not be read by other nations as an opportunity to attack. The officials said the United States would win any project-

ed conflict across the globe, but the path to victory could be more complicated.

"There is no doubt of what the outcome is going to be," a top defense official said. "Risk to accomplish the task isn't even part of the discussion. The way we accomplish the task is."

A senior military official said, for example, that it is obvious that if another conflict arises while the United States does battle in Iraq and Afghanistan and fights the global war on terrorism, it would not be as easily accomplished as if the other three

conflicts did not exist.

"It wouldn't be as pretty," the official said.

Defense officials are also working to mitigate the risks by following through with plans to transform the military, making it more agile and lethal, and by looking at how U.S. troops are positioned around the globe. By raising operational standards, officials say commanders can save lives by acting faster and by using fewer resources.

The military's need for manpower on the ground, however, continues to highlight demands on the Army

and the Marines, the two services charged with conducting the ongoing wars. Along with the Army missing recruiting targets, the Marines missed contracting targets in February and March, though by relatively small amounts. The Army Reserve has also missed its recruiting targets each of the past four months, in some cases dramatically.

The shortage of recruits has the Army's boot camps running at lower-than-usual capacity. The Army's basic training center at Fort Benning, Ga., is training seven companies currently, half of its maximum

capacity of 14 companies, according to Col. Bill Gallagher, commander of the Basic Combat Training Brigade. Moreover, each company of fresh recruits is smaller than usual, with only 190 troops compared with a maximum possible of 220, he said.

The only way the Army can meet its annual recruiting goal is with a large surge of enlistments this spring and summer, leading Fort Benning officials to prepare for "a huge influx, in case it happens," Gallagher said. Last year, however, there was "no summer surge," he said.

As of the end of March, 7,800 infantry soldiers had been trained at Fort Benning, compared with a target of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

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