

Senator Richard Durbin
Talking Points
Base Realignment and Closure Regional Hearing
St. Louis
June 20, 2005

I want to thank the Commissioners, Admiral Gehman, General Turner, and Congressman Hansen, for coming here to St. Louis University. And thanks to Senator Bond and the Missouri delegation for hosting this important discussion.

I especially want to thank the community members who have journeyed here from Illinois and Iowa because they recognize the critical importance of military facilities to our economies and our security.

Basic Principles

As set out in law, the base closure and realignment process is governed by several core principles.

First, the single most important factor to be considered is the military value of a facility to our national security.

Second, the process is to be open and transparent.

Third, the objective is to enhance readiness and security while saving money.

The integrity of the base closure process depends upon adherence to all these principles.

Military Value

Military value measures current and future mission capabilities, land and air availability, surge and mobilization capacities, environmental factors, and cost of operations and labor force implications.

In all these categories, our Illinois facilities score well.

As we will demonstrate, the Department of Defense has in some cases seriously deviated from its own criteria in making its realignment recommendations.

Data Delayed ^{ARE} ~~is~~ Data Denied

The second issue is one of process.

The Department of Defense released its base closure and realignment list on May 13th.

It has taken weeks, however, to pry loose the data that theoretically justifies that list, and that effort is still going on.

The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has had to go so far as to issue a subpoena to the Pentagon to try and gain full access to the decision making process.

And I know that you, the BRAC Commission, and your staff, have been handicapped by these same delays and same denial of information. I appreciate the fact that this hearing was postponed, to give us more time to prepare.

However, these are thousands and thousands of documents for communities, congressional offices, and the Commission itself to sift through and evaluate. Data delayed is effectively data denied.

Illinois and the Realignment Process

A number of facilities in Illinois are affected by the Department of Defense's proposed realignments.

Scott, Peoria, and Great Lakes

First, Scott Air Force Base and Peoria Air National Guard Base are scheduled to receive both additional planes and additional people to serve expanded missions.

Scott and Peoria are well situated to undertake these expanded responsibilities.

Great Lakes Naval Training Center, however, is slated to receive heavy cuts in its work force, which Mayor Rockingham will address.

Rock Island Arsenal

Today, though, I would primarily like to discuss the proposed realignments of Rock Island Arsenal and Capital Airport in Springfield.

Rock Island Arsenal is a vital national security asset that really consists of two different installations.

The first is the traditional manufacturing center, which has been a critical and reliable source of materiel during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Along with gun mounts, artillery carriages, and recoil mechanisms, much of the armor that is now protecting soldiers and vehicles in Iraq was manufactured right at Rock Island.

Despite this critical work, the Pentagon recommends cutting 180 positions from the manufacturing center.

We believe this recommendation is based on an error in classification and a misunderstanding of this work.

The second side of Rock Island Arsenal are its administrative and headquarters employees.

The Department of Defense proposes removing a number of these administrative functions. That would be a mistake.

Rock Island has the space, the security environment, and the work force to grow. Those are assets we should take advantage of.

The Department of Defense proposes taking as many as 1500 direct jobs from the Arsenal, according to our estimates.

Key proposals include moving TACOM, the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command; transferring so-called depot maintenance work; and moving the Army's top-rated Civilian Human Resources Agency, all to installations with lower overall military value rankings.

When you factor in the true costs of such a move – including substantial construction costs and higher annual operating expenses at the receiving end – the financial return on your investment is zero.

These moves appear to be based on flawed assumptions, mistaken measurements of available space, and outdated workload estimates.

These proposals deserve serious reconsideration by the Commission.

Springfield Capital Airport

The Department of Defense has also recommended transferring the 15 F-16s of the 183d Fighter Wing to Fort Wayne, Indiana.

This recommendation is deeply flawed because it is based on flawed data about military value, recruiting, retention and cost.

Military Value and Recruiting

The primary consideration of the BRAC process is supposed to be military value.

This recommendation, however, moves these aircraft to a base in Fort Wayne that DOD has numerically scored as having a lower military value than Springfield.

The reason cited for violating the military value principle is the strong recruiting potential in Fort Wayne.

This reason doesn't hold water. Here in Springfield, the 183rd already has excellent recruiting; it's over 100 percent critically manned.

Enclave Units and Undervaluing the Air Guard

Indeed, this recommended move may create a problem where none previously existed.

The Air Force has done no studies about the viability of Air Guard wings without any actual Air Guard aircraft.

Will such units be able to recruit and retain good people if the central mission – flying fighter aircraft – is removed?
The Air Force has no ideal

The Air Force has substantially underestimated the true costs of this move, by not paying sufficient attention to the unique recruiting and retention patterns of the Air Guard.

When the Air Force projected the personnel costs of this move, it only considered full-time Guardsmen, not the many part-time Guardsmen who make of the bulk of the force.

These Guardsmen are rooted in their communities and their full-time careers. They are not going to move to Fort Wayne.

DOD officials have frankly admitted that they did not calculate the costs of losing experienced Guardsmen. These losses just did not fit into their models and algorithms.

The war in Iraq has taught us many things, not least the enormous contribution that the National Guard makes to our defense.

Cost Payback: Never

Furthermore, the Air Force's own analysis shows that there is no cost savings in this move. The projected payback for the transfer of the Capital Airport F-16s to Fort Wayne is not 5 years, it's not 10 years, it's never.

Fighter Capabilities

The 183rd Fighter Wing has a long history of fighter operations and performs vital homeland defense missions. It is a top-notch unit. The 183d has outperformed all comparable units in Mission Capable Rates since 2001.

It is unwise for America to disrupt the capabilities of this unit with a move when that move is based on flawed information.

DCN: 11664

7

Legal Argument

Finally, we do not believe that it is legal to move the planes without the permission of the Governor. As you probably know, the Illinois Attorney General is looking into this matter.

Conclusions

BRAC was designed to make us safer as a nation, to save money, and to be an open and transparent process.

The Pentagon's proposed realignments will produce none of these results.

The Rock Island and Springfield decisions defy common sense and ignore the clear degradation of military value and the significant negative community impact.

I hope the Commission will take a hard look at these Illinois realignments.

I want to again thank you for coming here today and for your work on the Commission.

From Illinois, you will hear from Senator Obama, Governor Blagojevich, Congressmen Evans and Shimkus, Mayors Freemire, Davlin, and Rockingham, Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity Director Jack Lavin, as well as a dedicated team of community leaders.

My colleagues from Iowa, Senator Grassley and Harkin and the Iowa delegation, will talk to you about their concerns and support for the Rock Island Arsenal.

Again, let me thank you for your time and commitment and let me introduce to you to my colleague, Senator Barack Obama.

Testimony of the Honorable Ray LaHood, IL-18
BRAC Regional Hearing, St. Louis, Missouri
June 20, 2005

Admiral Gehman, General Turner, and Congressman Hansen, thank you for the opportunity to submit a short statement on behalf of the 183d Fighter Wing, Capital Air National Guard Station, Springfield, Illinois.

I would like to commend the men and women of the Illinois Air National Guard, and the 183rd Fighter Wing in particular, for their hard work in the defense of our nation. Additionally, the local community strongly supports the 183rd. From our U.S. Senators Durbin and Obama, to Congressmen Shimkus, Evans, and myself, through the local leadership of Mayor Tim Davlin and the many grassroots supporters, no community is more proud of their local unit than Springfield is of the 183rd.

We need to be clear on what the Department of Defense's base closure recommendation is: it is a way to move equipment, not reduce infrastructure. We have all heard the many media stories about how this BRAC round will shed excess infrastructure and save billions of dollars. Moving aircraft from the 183rd Fighter Wing to the 122nd Fighter Wing does neither. It is an attempt to go around the Congress and move equipment with no oversight, no plan, and no benefit.

It will be pointed out in testimony today that the Pentagon completely ignored their own announced criteria when choosing to move aircraft from the 183rd Fighter Wing. Simply put, the Pentagon plan moves the aircraft to a base with a lower military value. Much has been made of the unprecedented amount of data that this round of BRAC has generated. That data does not lie – Springfield has a higher military value, a higher fighter MCI, and a higher F-16 unit ranking than the 122nd Fighter Wing in Ft. Wayne.

One of the only reasons the Pentagon gave in their recommendation for moving the 183rd Fighter Wing's aircraft is recruiting, which is not one of the 2005 BRAC selection criteria. In fact, in this one case, the Pentagon says recruiting is more important than military value. I say go ahead and consider recruiting. The 183rd has outstanding recruiting numbers, and has for many years – in times of peace and times of war. The Springfield unit is more than 100% critically manned. You simply cannot get much better than that.

The outstanding recruiting statistics reveal much about the 183rd Fighter Wing, and about Central Illinois. These men and women are *eager* to serve. They joined the Air National Guard so they could serve both their community and their country, and they have done both superbly. If we lose these planes, if we lose the fire fighters, we lose all of those who support them. These folks will not move to Indiana. The Springfield area is their home. It is where they chose to work, raise their families, and serve our country. The Guard will lose these fantastic men and women, and it will be a terrible loss for our armed forces.

I urge the Commission to continue to carefully scrutinize the Pentagon's recommendations. You will see that there is no military, financial, political, or practical reason to move the 183rd Fighter Wing. We need them right where they are.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

TESTIMONY TO THE

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JOINT STATEMENT
OF

THE HONORABLE MICHAEL L. DOMINGUEZ
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

GENERAL JOHN P. JUMPER
CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

17 May 2005

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission, we are pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Air Force base closure and realignment recommendations. We look forward to working with you as you consider all Department of Defense recommendations over the next few months.

Overview

Downsizing infrastructure is a difficult task, as all Air Force bases are outstanding installations. They stand as a credit to our Nation as a whole and to the exceptional communities that support them. However, we must make difficult decisions and reduce and realign our infrastructure, to posture ourselves for the security challenges we face, and to preserve our limited resources for readiness and modernization. The Air Force recommendations represent bold steps to accomplish those ends. We will move our smaller force structure into fewer, larger, and more effective combat squadrons. Air Force recommendations include 10 base closures and 62 base realignment actions. Each of these individual closure or realignment recommendations may affect multiple bases. Our 72 actions will affect 115 of the 154 installations the Air Force considered within the BRAC process.

Air Force Goals for BRAC

The Air Force recommendations reaffirm the Department of Defense's commitment to defend the homeland, establish a capabilities-based defense strategy, and challenge the military departments to transform themselves to better meet new threats in a changed security

environment. Consistent with the goals outlined by the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force established four BRAC goals to support right-sizing of the force and to enhance our capabilities:

- Maximize war-fighting capability efficiently.
- Transform the Total Air Force by realigning our infrastructure to meet future defense strategy.
- Maximize operational capability by eliminating excess physical capacity.
- Capitalize on opportunities for joint activity.

We are pleased to report that the Air Force would meet its goals through these recommendations, and in turn meet the overarching goals set for the Department by the Secretary of Defense.

Maximizing War-Fighting Capability

The Air Force recommendations maximize our war-fighting capability by effectively consolidating older weapons systems into fewer, but larger squadrons. These more optimally sized units are more efficient and more operationally effective because of economies of scale. For example, we base weapons systems such as the F-16 fighter to allow us to leverage common support requirements for these weapons systems while reducing cost and duplication. And we consolidate like weapons systems where practical at the fewest operational locations; for example, we place the entire B-1 bomber fleet at Dyess AFB, Texas, and the entire active duty CONUS C-130 tactical airlift fleet at Little Rock AFB, Arkansas.

Our recommendations increase almost all fighter squadrons from 15 aircraft to 18 or 24 aircraft. The Air National Guard's F-15 squadron at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, is the only exception to this fighter basing strategy because of location and recruiting. Hickam's F-15 fighters are important to Homeland Defense, but Hawaii's geographic location can pose training challenges, as it is expensive to host adversarial fighter units for training. In addition, Hickam's Air National

Guard wing also flies KC-135 aircraft and will have a C-17 mission; therefore, leaving the unit sized at its current 15 fighter aircraft to recruit to these other weapons systems was the right solution.

Our recommendations also increase mobility squadrons from 8 aircraft to 12 or 16 aircraft. We made some exceptions to increasing reserve component mobility squadron sizes, either because of capacity or recruiting. We applied military judgment to size these units either to the maximum available installation capacity at no extra cost, or at the current or maximum force structure size that capitalizes on that location's recruiting demographics.

Our recommendations leverage the inherent strengths and advantages of our Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces to maximize the Air Force's capabilities. At the same time, we have maintained the balance across the active duty and reserve components, both in aircraft and in manpower. Reserve component manpower that becomes available as a result of Air Force BRAC recommendations will be reinvested into emerging Air Force missions. Our recently established Future Total Force (FTF) office on the Air Staff will work with the Reserve Component and the Adjutant Generals to determine how to distribute those emerging missions across Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces and organizations. BRAC and the FTF are fundamental, complementary elements that will reshape the Air Force for the future.

Meet Future Defense Strategy

The Air Force recommendations also realign Air Force force structure to better support future defense strategy. The strategic objectives of the 2005 National Defense Strategy include defending the United States homeland from direct attack, securing strategic access, and retaining global freedom of action. The Air Force recommendations help secure the homeland

by providing the required capability to meet North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) missions from our proposed constellation of bases. Our recommendations ensure we retain the right bases to support enduring missions of Global Strike, Global Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and Global Mobility, and ensure we maintain unimpeded access to space. For example, we retain C-17s near new Army Stryker brigades in Alaska and Hawaii, providing strategic mobility and response in the western Pacific. Our recommendations also retain the right bases for emerging needs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and the Joint Unmanned Combat Aerial System.

Eliminate Excess Physical Capacity

As mentioned earlier, we have made 10 closure and 62 realignment recommendations that will eliminate excess capacity within the Air Force. Of the 142 Air Force installations that have operational flying missions today, our recommendations reduce that number by 28 flying units, representing a 20% reduction. We reduce our excess flightline infrastructure by 37%, but still retain sufficient ramp space for surge, emerging missions, or to accommodate Air Force aircraft permanently based overseas in the event we ever have to return those forces. We also reduce excess building and facility infrastructure by 79%, yet retain sufficient square footage for surge or emerging missions. Though we eliminate this excess, we maximize operational capability and maintain the surge capacity we need.

Capitalize On Opportunities For Joint Activity

Finally, our recommendations, independently and in conjunction with recommendations from other Services and the Joint Cross-Service Groups, capitalize on opportunities for joint

activity by hosting sister Service combat and combat support organizations. For example, we will host the Headquarters for the Third Army--the Army's United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) supporting component command--at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, where it will be located with the Air Force's USCENTCOM component, Headquarters Ninth Air Force.

Through the Department's recommendations we will host the joint initial training location for the Joint Strike Fighter at Eglin AFB, Florida, to provide Air Force, Navy, and Marine operators and maintainers with a location that meets the needs of all -- while providing easy access to the range and airspace complexes near the Gulf of Mexico. Eglin AFB will also host the Army's Seventh Special Forces Group, pairing this combat unit with Air Force special operations forces and the robust training areas of the Eglin complex.

While we transfer ownership of Pope AFB, North Carolina, to the Army at Fort Bragg, enabling other Army recommendations that move forces to Fort Bragg, we retain an airlift squadron and an aerial port capability to continue to support the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps. In addition, our recommendations place optimally sized A-10 fighter squadrons in proximity to Fort Polk, Louisiana, and Forts Benning and Stewart, Georgia, to provide the close air support assets needed to support joint training.

Air Force BRAC Process

The Air Force's BRAC analysis was grounded in the force structure plan, our physical infrastructure inventory, and the BRAC selection criteria. Our Air Force infrastructure analysis was shaped by three underlying tenets. First, military value, both quantitative and qualitative, was the predominant factor. Second, all installations were treated impartially, regardless of

whether or not they were considered for closure or realignment in the past. Third, military value was not determined solely on an installation's current mission, but also on its capacity to support other enduring Air Force missions.

The Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) developed Air Force BRAC recommendations. The BCEG was comprised of 12 general officers and civilian executives representing the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and a wide array of Headquarters Air Force functional staff areas. The Air Force Audit Agency was integrated throughout our entire process to ensure Air Force data collection and analytical processes were comprehensive and auditable.

Rather than focus on fungible attributes of an installation, such as assigned personnel or equipment and forces that could be relocated, our military value assessment stressed installation characteristics that were outside the control of the Air Force or would be difficult to replicate elsewhere without great expense or complexity. These characteristics include an installation's geographic location and proximity to other physical features or defense activities, terrain, and prevailing weather. Those installation characteristics that would be difficult to reconstitute elsewhere might include high volume military training airspace, the local transportation infrastructure, intercontinental ballistic missile silos, or basic airfield infrastructure.

The Air Force assessed the military value of its operational bases using certified data obtained from the individual installations. We not only considered the physical capacity of our installations, but also the operational capacity--to include airspace and ranges--and the natural capacity. Applying operational capability data collected through a Web-based tool to BRAC Selection Criteria 1-4, and the weighted guidance assigned by the BCEG, each of the 154

installations the Air Force considered under BRAC received a score for each of eight mission areas considered by the BCEG. These eight mission areas were: fighter, bomber, airlift, tanker, space, Special Operations Forces (SOF)/Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C2ISR), and unmanned aerial vehicles. The objective was to find an optimal long-term basing plan that, within physical and operational constraints, located the Air Force's long-term force structure at installations that had the highest overall military value.

The Air Force started the scenario development process using an optimization model developed by the Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency. We then deliberated to refine the optimization model output until we achieved a set of potential scenarios. Once an optimal basing plan was identified, the Air Force analysis teams developed a related group of potential base closure and realignment options to implement this basing plan. The BCEG reviewed these proposals and, often with refinement, selected the most promising to become scenarios and to undergo further analysis. Again, an iterative process of review and refinement continued until the BCEG approved each candidate recommendation for consideration by the Department of Defense review group, the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC).

The costs and savings for each scenario were determined through application of a costing model, the Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA). Air Force scenario analysis also considered BRAC Selection Criteria 6-8: the economic impact on the communities; the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to host missions, forces, and personnel; and the environmental impact. Unlike the first four selection criteria, which were installation-dependent, selection criteria six, seven, and eight were scenario-dependent, meaning the information

gathered for these criteria was related to a proposed action, not to the status quo. However, certain factors related to selection criteria seven and eight also were captured in military value analysis as they contributed to an installation's ability to support future and existing missions and the availability and condition of land and airspace.

During this process, scenarios from other Services that affected Air Force installations were worked through the Joint Action Scenario Team (JAST). Opportunities for joint basing were worked into Air Force scenarios and formal analysis, and were considered as part of the development of the Service's own candidate recommendations. Similarly, scenarios from the seven Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSG) that affected Air Force installations were worked in coordination with the Air Force.

Anticipated Costs and Savings and Implementation Schedule

We estimate a total savings and cost avoidance of over \$2.6 billion dollars for both personnel and infrastructure during the implementation years, and savings and cost avoidance of over \$1.2 billion each year thereafter. The Air Force will reinvest any reserve component manpower made available as a result of BRAC realignments or closures into other high priority Air Force missions, including emerging missions.

The Air Force has begun to develop an implementation schedule for these 2005 recommendations should they be approved, and we will work closely with the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, and our active duty major commands to further develop and refine this schedule.

In prior rounds of BRAC, the Air Force established an excellent record of closing bases

as quickly as possible. This aggressive approach provides the quickest savings to the Air Force and assists the local communities in their efforts to develop the closure and implementation plans necessary to begin economic revitalization. The Air Force will ensure that efforts are undertaken to maximize savings at these installations and to work closely with the local communities to facilitate a prompt transition and the best reuse opportunities.

Summary

In conclusion, BRAC offers the Air Force the opportunity to accomplish four things. First and foremost, it transforms our smaller force structure into fewer, larger, more effective combat squadrons. Second, it ensures the transformed force and the infrastructure we retain provides the capabilities necessary to support the future defense strategy. Third, it increases overall efficiency by eliminating excess plant capacity while retaining the surge capability we need. Fourth, it supports joint basing initiatives in smart ways.

Mr. Chairman, we have looked to the future for our mission and our infrastructure requirements, and these recommendations provide for an Air Force that is and will be capable of responding to any challenge, in any theater, at any time. Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you today. Our staff will be made fully available to answer the Commission's questions as it considers the Department's recommendations.