

DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

BRIAN SCHWEITZER
GOVERNORARMED FORCES RESERVE CENTER
1900 WILLIAMS STREET

STATE OF MONTANA

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
MAJOR GENERAL RANDALL D. MOSLEY
(406) 324-3000 - FAX (406) 324-3011PO BOX 4789
HELENA, MONTANA 59604-4789

June 16, 2005

TO: The Honorable Anthony J. Principi, Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
BRAC Commission Field Hearing, Portland, Oregon

FROM: Major General Randall D. Mosley
The Adjutant General, Montana

Sir;

I am the Adjutant General for the state of Montana and the commander of the Montana Army and Air National Guard. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and present testimony concerning the Air Force BRAC recommendations pertaining to Montana's 120th Fighter Wing in Great Falls, Montana.

I would first like to state emphatically that I concur with the overall objective of the Base Realignment and Closure process as it was originally stated almost two years ago. Our nation needs to divest marginal installations whose military value has diminished over the years. Air bases that were once sited well outside surrounding communities now find themselves literally under siege by residential areas and their air operations encumbered by increasingly heavy civilian air traffic. There needed to be an objective military capabilities assessment that looked beyond historical basing practices and political posturing.

Unfortunately, after examining the Department of the Air Force BRAC Analysis and Recommendations, I am concerned the criteria used for determining military value fell short of the mark. The very real and complex issues needing thoughtful analysis were instead handled by criteria only marginally touching on the subject. Further, I believe the criteria were skewed against the smaller installations typically associated with an Air National Guard facility and also against the less populated areas of the United States. Finally, the Military Compatibility Index Scores were not even followed in the basing decisions and force structure changes applied to Montana's 120th Fighter Wing.

I would like to offer to the Commission some clear examples where I believe the criteria failed to measure the ability to fully train current and future fighters in air-to-air and air-to-ground missions.

First, the criteria evaluating the suitability of Special Use Airspace failed to consider the requirement of modern airborne sensor systems to have access to contiguous large volumes of airspace. Such airspace must be unencumbered by the numerous noise restrictions dictated by large communities underlying the airspace or encroachment by civilian airline and general aviation traffic.

Formulas 1245 and 1266 only marginally awarded credit for volume; however, allowed cumulative points for each Special Use Airspace within 150 Nautical Miles (NM) of the installation. Therefore, a base with numerous small, "postage stamp" airspaces may not have received as much credit in the volume for each airspace, but received cumulative points for each of the airspaces. Conversely, an installation with only one, high volume airspace only received points for the single airspace.

(SLIDE OF AIRSPACE OVER FLORIDA)

Specifically, the Hays Military Operating Area (MOA) in north Central Montana offers low level training from 500 feet Above Ground Level (AGL) to Flight Level (FL) 180 in an area 50 NM by 120 NM. The Air Traffic Control Assigned Airspace (ATCAA) above the MOA extends from FL 180 to FL 510, but offers a full 120 NM by 90 NM volume. When combined with the adjacent Cutbank and Shelby ATCAAs, this medium to high altitude volume is expanded to a 290 NM downrange look. If placed over the state of Florida, this airspace covers the vast majority of the peninsula from Jacksonville to Miami, across to Tampa. Nowhere is this incredibly unique capability given the credit it deserves by the criteria used in the formula.

I believe both formulas incorrectly and heavily awarded value for legacy systems oriented air-to-ground gunnery ranges and did not address either the training requirements for future tactical aircraft, or the training requirements for current aircraft equipped with state-of-the-art sensors and weaponry. Fully 50 percent of each formula was weighted toward the possession of a gunnery range, regardless of the size of the range, the type of weaponry that can be expended, or of the target array's composition.

Current "dumb" bomb training requirements have significantly decreased in recent years, going from an 800-range sortie requirement for an ANG F-16 wing in 1998 to a 124-range sortie requirement today. This requirement is projected to diminish even further as electronic scoring evaluation becomes more prevalent and allows aircrew to "attack" the diverse cultural targets sets in a Special Use Airspace instead of the "bombing circle" in use at conventional ranges. This diminishing trend will continue as the training requirements evolve to reflect the current Combatant Commanders' insistence on minimizing collateral damage by employing only precision-guided munitions. The need for ballistic bomb deliveries is rapidly becoming antiquated and obsolete.

In fact, very few ranges in the Continental United States allow the live drop of the precision guided munitions modern aircrew are training to employ. With their standoff capability, these weapons have an extremely large ballistic footprint to ensure the munitions remain over restricted property from release to any potential impact point. The criteria, as

outlined, fails to make that distinction and in fact encourages practicing with precision-guided munitions where it may not be appropriate.

(SLIDE OF A TYPICAL BOMBING CIRCLE AND AN URBAN IRAQ TARGET ARRAY)

Current wartime employment procedures require aircrew to, quite literally, "dig out" the target from an incredibly complex urban setting or from a very entrenched and camouflaged natural environment. Current gunnery ranges—particularly those not associated with a large complex—have very simplistic targets that do nothing to train aircrew beyond the basic employment skills necessary. Instead, the majority of aircrew training comes from either "dry" weapons employment with electronic scoring or in a simulator.

Secondly, the criteria fail to fully account for either the urban sprawl or for the exponential growth in commercial and general aviation, both encroaching on our airspaces and airbases.

Formula 1207 supposedly addresses the level of mission encroachment on an installation. This is certainly a valid concern and one that should be carefully analyzed. However, the formula only identifies areas immediately around an airfield that are encroached by the noise of operations. It fails to address the myriad of other encroachment issues that are involved with the takeoff, departure, recovery, traffic patterns, and landing of modern jet aircraft. These other areas of concern may literally take place up to 10 miles away from an airfield. It is not uncommon on many bases to require aircraft to make turns to avoid noise sensitive areas miles away from the base on either departure or on arrival. Quite literally, takeoff and recovery at some large Air Force installations is nearly as involved as the tactical mission.

In a similar manner, selecting "the percentage of installation departures delayed by Air Traffic Control (ATC)" as the sole criteria to evaluate "ATC Restrictions to Operations" is just too simplistic and does nothing to measure the true costs of deconflicting intensive military operations (particularly fighter operations) with crowded civilian airfield zones.

An objective evaluation of ATC restrictions would be far more encompassing and complex. At a minimum, it should evaluate: 1) Noise mitigation procedures that adversely affect military operations (i.e., quiet hours, mandatory departures with tail winds, minimum range turns from takeoff impacting radar trail procedures, reductions in training events that can be accomplished in the local area, restrictions on types of traffic pattern training events); 2) Hazardous Air Traffic Reports (HATRs) filed by near misses between military and civilian aircraft; and 3) The number of agreements between military and civilian control agencies to mitigate conflicts.

And unfortunately, the issue of encroachment in calculating the value of airspace is not even addressed.

The criteria evaluating the military value of the installations totally ignored the cost efficiency or flexibility of ANG bases

(SLIDE OF THE C-5S ON THE RAMP AT GREAT FALLS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT)

Formulas 1214 and 1241 address the fuel dispensing capacity of the installation and the amount of government-owned ramp space. However, Air National Guard ((ANG) units have developed close working relationships with their fuel vendors and host civil airport authorities. These C-5s are parked on civilian ramp space in cooperation with Great Falls Airport Authority and all of the necessary extra fuel was delivered on schedule by the oil refinery located in Great Falls.

The formulas measuring infrastructure condition were such that they favor large complexes on government property, imposing quite literally a "one size fits all" approach. Air National Guard Civil Engineer regulations restricted units from building additional hangars or increasing their ramp size holdings beyond those authorized for the number of aircraft possessed. However, formulas 8 and 1221 penalized the installations for operating within ANG-imposed constraints. In fact, even though the 120th Fighter Wing ramp space is deemed sufficient by both Air National Guard and Air Force standards to sustain operations for up to 36 fighters, they received no points.


It is my belief that failing to confront these very real issues has led to recommendations that retain bases with marginal and declining military value. Instead of basing our present and future forces where they can fully train to exploit our technological advantages, it appears they will be based where they have historically been based, regardless of what limitations may be present. Instead of increasing the Air Force and Air National Guard fighter training operations in Montana, the recommendations in the Air Force BRAC report eliminate it, discarding the largest overland airspace in the Continental United States.

Which brings me to my last point: If you simply take the Military Comparability Index (MCI) ranking at face value, then why was the 120th Fighter Wing chosen to lose its flying mission and transfer three of their Block 30 aircraft and associate personnel to a base with a lesser MCI score that will have to undergo an aircraft conversion to fly those aircraft—an action that will take months and millions of dollars?

The 120th Fighter Wing has demonstrated time and time again their willingness to support National and State missions. In 2001, despite still being in an aircraft conversion status, the 120th had aircraft on alert and ready to go within two hours of the planes impacting the World Trade Center. After 9/11, the 120th supported at least six Air Expeditionary Force deployments back to back, performing Air Sovereignty Alert at Nellis AFB, Travis AFB, March ARB, Buckley AFB, and deploying to both Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, and Balad Air Base, Iraq. During that same period, the 120th scored exceptionally well on an Air Combat Command Unit Compliance Inspection and an Air National Guard Environmental Hazard and Safety Inspection. Recently, in 2004, the 120th Fighter Wing earned the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award, the ANG Maintenance Effectiveness Award, and the ANG Outstanding Security Forces Award.


I ask the Commission to do what I believe the Air Force BRAC recommendations failed to do: evaluate the ability of the 120th Fighter Wing to train for combat in Montana, and to potentially look at expanding the utilization of the State's unique airspace and unencroached airfields. I offer for submission our State's detailed analysis of how the criteria used by the Air Force were unfair in general and toward our State in particular. I hope, as the Air Force BRAC Recommendations are reviewed and reworked that, unlike in the initial round when the State Adjutant Generals were not consulted, we are brought into the conversation to the benefit of our Nation.

Thank you for your time today, and for your consideration of Montana's unique capability to support the Nation's defense.




RANDALL D. MOSLEY
Major General, Montana National Guard
The Adjutant General


Fighter Force Inventory



Increased Reliance on ANG




F/A-22 Cost Comparison




=

- Flying 75 F16s for 1 year
- 1 Fighter Wing Equivalent
- Train and equip over 5,000 experienced personnel



National Airspace Usage



5 Flights

Civilian "Free Flight" Operations - Thanksgiving 2001


Take Off Time (EST)	Special Use Airspace
2100-2200	Warning
1600-1700	Alert
1400-1500	MOA
1130-1230	Prohibited
0900-1000	Restricted



FAA
A-10-01-001

TRAINING FOR TODAY GROWTH FOR THE FUTURE

Find, Fix, Track,
Target, Engage,
and Assess




GAOC



Florida Comparison




Legacy Training vs Reality



Eagle Range, UTAH

Fallujah, IRAQ



Airport Infrastructure



MOU Expansion at zero fixed cost



MONTANA TESTIMONY 17 JUNE 2005 PORTLAND OREGON
SENATOR BAUCUS
SENAOR BURNS
MGEN MOSLEY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - POINT PAPER

SENATOR BAUCUS:

- 1. USAF unprecedented drawdown prior to new aircraft replacement endangers the national security of our country**
- 2. USAF fails to recognize the reliance of our nation on the highly experienced and cost-effective Air National Guard in these incredibly dynamic times**
- 3. MCI (Military Capacity Index of an installation) process – was flawed**
- 4. MCI process missed the huge airspace and training potential in Montana**
- 5. Fighter “Bathtub” is worsened significantly by the FTF plan to remove older aircraft well before their replacements are built**
- 6. I recommend we delay the implementation of the Air Force portion of BRAC recommendations until QDR is complete**
- 7. ANG is a significant contributor to the war effort, AEF rotations, and State Emergencies. USAF and remaining ANG units will be tasked far heavier if these cuts occur**
- 8. Proposed ANG cuts have marginal, if any, cost savings resulting in a huge loss of capability and people**
- 9. 1 ea F-22 = 75 ANG F-16s + 5000 people for a year**
- 10. Homeland Security, which was virtually overlooked by the USAF BRAC process, will be significantly and negatively impacted**

MGEN MOSLEY:

- 1. I believe in the BRAC process, however I am concerned the USAF criteria used for determining military value fell short of the mark.**
- 2. Criteria was skewed against the smaller installations typically associated with an Air National Guard facility and also against the less populated areas of the United States, such as Montana**
- 3. MCI Scores were not even followed in the basing decisions and force structure changes applied to Montana's 120th Fighter Wing.**
- 4. USAF criteria evaluating the suitability of Special Use Airspace failed to consider the requirement of modern airborne sensor systems to have access to contiguous large volumes of airspace.**
- 5. USAF MCI criteria favors old fashioned dumb bombing ranges in favor of large airspaces which are and will be further required for newer technologies.**
- 6. Montana airspace is OVERLAND and is the size of the Florida peninsula and is unencumbered by people and or civil aviation.**
- 7. "Dumb bomb" postage stamp sized training ranges were given much more credit than large continuous airspaces while the future requirements of PGM munitions will be the opposite.**
- 8. USAF criteria fails to fully account for either the urban sprawl or for the exponential growth in commercial and general aviation, both encroaching on our airspaces and airbases.**
- 9. MCI assessment of local air-traffic overlooks the many encroachment problems associated with large AF bases in major metropolitan areas**
- 10. The criteria evaluating the military value of the installations totally ignored the cost efficiency of flexibility of the Air National Guard bases.**
- 11. Fuel capacity at ANG installations does not include huge volumes available and used by their civilian airport neighbors**
- 12. ANG units have relatively small but very efficient ramp and infrastructure which was severely downgraded by the MCI criteria**

Why Montana?

IMPACT:



The Military in Montana

The current military missions in Great Falls, Montana have a substantial economic impact throughout a nine county region, totaling approximately \$466 million.

By combining assets of Malmstrom Air Force Base and the Montana Air and Army National Guard, Great Falls has the potential to become a choice Air Combat Center, and serve as an ideal location for other military missions, including the Department of Defense and Homeland Security functions.




341st Space Wing



120th Fighter Wing



Company B,
1-163rd Infantry



- With a population that is less dense than the rest of the country, Montana offers unrestricted access to uncongested airspace, with lots of room to grow!
- Montana offers outstanding training capabilities, due to the vast overland airspace and substantial runways at both Malmstrom Air Force Base and Great Falls International Airport.
- The runway located at Malmstrom is 11,500 feet long and 200 feet wide. It is also equipped with a jet fuel hydrant refueling system. (inactive)
- Great Falls has clear flying days (VFR) 328 days a year.
- The Great Falls Military Affairs Committee was honored with the Fisher Distinguished Humanitarian award in 1999 by the Department of Defense. It was the first and only time the award had been bestowed on a committee.

B.A.S.E.
P.O. Box 1608
Great Falls, MT 59403
406-454-1934

Did You Know?


- Malmstrom Air Force Base employs 4,244 people and contracts 1,378 more. In addition, there are 4,131 family members of military personnel.

- Malmstrom's Missile Complex is spread over 23,500 square miles in nine Central Montana counties: Cascade, Chouteau, Fergus, Judith Basin, Lewis and Clark, Pondera, Teton, Toole, and Wheatland.

- The total estimated economic impact of Malmstrom is \$324,232,877.

- Malmstrom has the youngest community in the Air Force: 55% of officers are Lieutenants, 52% of which are under the age of 30, and 79% of enlisted are under the age of 25.

- Malmstrom offers many unique capabilities to Great Falls and its surrounding communities, such as mutual aid/firefighting, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Law Enforcement Working Dogs, Emergency Management, and Helicopter Rescue.



Minuteman III

Did You Know?


- The Montana Army National Guard (MNG) predates Montana's 1889 statehood.



- The Great Falls mobility facility completed construction in July 2003, and is located at Malmstrom Air Force Base.

- There are 135 guardsmen in Company B. Statewide, MNG has 3,500 members.

- As a Mechanized Infantry mission, the MNG uses M2A2 Bradley Fighting vehicles.



Did You Know?

- The Montana Air National Guard (MANG) currently possesses the most capable multi-role fighter in the inventory, the F-16 Fighting Falcon. MANG hopes to bring a F/A-22 Raptor or a F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to the Guard.



- The economic impact of the Montana (Air Force and Army) National Guard is \$142,000,000.

- The lack of encroachment in both airspace and fields makes MANG extremely valuable.

- MANG facilities in Great Falls are conveniently located near Great Falls International Airport.

- MANG has a highly experienced workforce, noting F-16 pilots with a total of 81,000 hours, and military experience totaling 14,608 years.




F-16 Fighting Falcon

- By combining assets of MANG and Malmstrom, Great Falls has the potential to become a choice Air Combat Center.

Airport Infrastructure



MOU Expansion at zero fixed cost



DCN: 11578



MONTANA TESTIMONY 17 JUNE 2005 PORTLAND OREGON
SENATOR BAUCUS
SENAOR BURNS
MGEN MOSLEY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - POINT PAPER

SENATOR BAUCUS:

- 1. USAF unprecedented drawdown prior to new aircraft replacement endangers the national security of our country**
- 2. USAF fails to recognize the reliance of our nation on the highly experienced and cost-effective Air National Guard in these incredibly dynamic times**
- 3. MCI (Military Capacity Index of an installation) process – was flawed**
- 4. MCI process missed the huge airspace and training potential in Montana**
- 5. Fighter “Bathtub” is worsened significantly by the FTF plan to remove older aircraft well before their replacements are built**
- 6. I recommend we delay the implementation of the Air Force portion of BRAC recommendations until QDR is complete**
- 7. ANG is a significant contributor to the war effort, AEF rotations, and State Emergencies. USAF and remaining ANG units will be tasked far heavier if these cuts occur**
- 8. Proposed ANG cuts have marginal, if any, cost savings resulting in a huge loss of capability and people**
- 9. 1 ea F-22 = 75 ANG F-16s + 5000 people for a year**
- 10. Homeland Security, which was virtually overlooked by the USAF BRAC process, will be significantly and negatively impacted**

SENATOR BURNS:

- 1. USAF recommendations focus on past requirements and training areas and do not look at future needs**
- 2. USAF will eliminate the most important resource of our Air National Guard: its experienced personnel.**
- 3. Gen Foglesong: "Our installations, ranges and airspace are critical national assets that allow the AF to test new equipment, develop new tactics, and train our forces to be combat-ready."**
- 4. Montana has huge continuous high and low training airspace unencumbered by the encroachment of people or civilian aircraft**
- 5. USAF BRAC recommendations absolutely stunned me as they affected our State in that they failed to properly evaluate and reward areas with the highest military value.**
- 6. Malmstrom AFB should be considered by the USAF for a future Fighter Wing to take advantage of the tremendous training opportunities in Montana**
- 7. Montana's huge airspace offers great opportunities to train big packages involving all of the newest intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance ground forces and newest aircraft and train the entire "sensor to shooter" loop**
- 8. USAF recommendations assume that the Air National Guard work force is equally as mobile as the active duty. When in fact Guard personnel are firmly embedded in their respective communities, still want to serve, and will be unable to under these recommendations.**
- 9. Consolidation may be good and make sense for the Active Duty, but it strikes at the very heart of the community based ties and hometown recruiting base of the Guard.**
- 10. In short, our country, our Air Force, and our Air National Guard will lose the most valuable commodity it possesses: experienced patriots.**
- 11. These recommendations threaten the future, leave us under-manned and under-armed for a long time, and cause irreparable harm to a critical component of our force structure.**
- 12. Please consider stopping the AF portion of the DOD BRAC recommendations**

MGEN MOSLEY:

- 1. I believe in the BRAC process, however I am concerned the USAF criteria used for determining military value fell short of the mark.**
- 2. Criteria was skewed against the smaller installations typically associated with an Air National Guard facility and also against the less populated areas of the United States, such as Montana**
- 3. MCI Scores were not even followed in the basing decisions and force structure changes applied to Montana's 120th Fighter Wing.**
- 4. USAF criteria evaluating the suitability of Special Use Airspace failed to consider the requirement of modern airborne sensor systems to have access to contiguous large volumes of airspace.**
- 5. USAF MCI criteria favors old fashioned dumb bombing ranges in favor of large airspaces which are and will be further required for newer technologies.**
- 6. Montana airspace is OVERLAND and is the size of the Florida peninsula and is unencumbered by people and or civil aviation.**
- 7. "Dumb bomb" postage stamp sized training ranges were given much more credit than large continuous airspaces while the future requirements of PGM munitions will be the opposite.**
- 8. USAF criteria fails to fully account for either the urban sprawl or for the exponential growth in commercial and general aviation, both encroaching on our airspaces and airbases.**
- 9. MCI assessment of local air-traffic overlooks the many encroachment problems associated with large AF bases in major metropolitan areas**
- 10. The criteria evaluating the military value of the installations totally ignored the cost efficiency of flexibility of the Air National Guard bases.**
- 11. Fuel capacity at ANG installations does not include huge volumes available and used by their civilian airport neighbors**
- 12. ANG units have relatively small but very efficient ramp and infrastructure which was severely downgraded by the MCI criteria**

- 13. Montana was chosen to lose its flying mission and transfer three of their Block 30 aircraft and associate personnel to a base with a lesser MCI score that will have to undergo an aircraft conversion to fly those aircraft—an action that will take months and millions of dollars?**
- 14. Montana ANG personnel have excelled in the defense of the US and in supporting the USAF mission and have earned many awards for excellence, which is considered nowhere in the MCI criteria.**
- 15. Please evaluate the ability of the 120th Fighter Wing to train for combat in Montana, and to potentially look at expanding the utilization of the State's unique open airspace and un-encroached airfields**
- 16. I hope, as the Air Force BRAC Recommendations are reviewed and reworked that, unlike in the initial round when the State Adjutant Generals were not consulted, we are brought into the conversation to the benefit of our Nation.**