

Statement to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission

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Mr. Chairman and members of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, I am pleased to appear before you today and grateful for the work you are doing for our nation.

Today I will discuss with you our National Defense Strategy, the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review, and our Global Defense Posture changes - all of which provide the strategic foundation for the Department's BRAC recommendations.

National Defense Strategy

Mr. Chairman, our National Defense Strategy outlines an active, layered approach to the defense of the nation and its interests. We seek to create conditions conducive to respect for the sovereignty of nations and a secure international order favorable to freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity.

Our National Defense Strategy identifies four strategic objectives:

- **Secure the United States from direct attack.** We make it our top priority to dissuade, deter, and defeat those who seek to harm the United States directly, especially extremist enemies with weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
- **Strengthen alliances and partnerships.** We will expand the community of nations that share principles and interests with us. This includes helping partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests;
- **Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.** We will promote the security, prosperity, and freedom of action of the United States and its partners by securing access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons; and
- **Establish favorable security conditions.** Working with others in the U.S. Government, we will create conditions for a favorable international system

by honoring our security commitments and working with other nations to bring about a common appreciation of threats; a broad, secure, and lasting peace; and the steps required to protect against these threats.

We accomplish these objectives through assuring, dissuading, deterring, and when necessary defeating adversaries:

- **assuring allies and friends** by demonstrating our resolve to fulfill our alliance and other defense commitments and help protect common interests;
- **dissuading potential adversaries** from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions, particularly by developing our own key military advantages;
- **deterring aggression and countering coercion** by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the will to resolve conflicts decisively on favorable terms; and
- at the direction of the President, **defeating adversaries** at the time, place and in the manner of our choosing—setting the conditions for future security.

Mr. Chairman, four guidelines structure our strategic planning and decision-making:

- We will focus our military planning, posture, operations, and capabilities on the **active, forward, and layered defense** of our nation, our interests, and our partners;
- We will **continually transform** how we approach and confront challenges, conduct business, and work with others;
- We will use a **capabilities-based approach** to operationalize this strategy by setting priorities among competing capabilities to address mature and emerging challenges; and
- We will **manage risks** across the Department associated with resources and operations. We will consider the full range of such risks and manage clear tradeoffs.

Quadrennial Defense Review

Mr. Chairman, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will operationalize our new National Defense Strategy and shape the future force. The Department launched the formal review in March 2005, and the QDR Report will be submitted to Congress with the FY07 budget request.

The QDR will take a 20-year outlook. It will examine the capabilities that the Department and the nation need to contend with challenges in four focus areas:

- Building partnerships to hasten the demise of terrorist extremist networks;
- Defending the homeland in depth;
- Shaping the choices of key nations at strategic crossroads; and
- Preventing the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile state or non-state actors for when classic deterrence is ineffective.

A theme cutting across all of these focus areas – and a central element of the National Defense Strategy – is how we might help our allies and partners to develop their own capacities to confront security challenges that we have in common.

Mr. Chairman, rather than looking solely at weapons systems and force structure, the QDR will look at all aspects of the Department of Defense through the lens of the four focus areas, employing six separate, but complimentary lines of approach:

- The needed mix of warfighting capabilities;
- Joint enablers, such as logistics, space, and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance;
- Roles, missions, and organizations for the next two decades;
- Manning and balancing the force for a 21st-century “human capital strategy”;

- Business practices and processes, such as financial dealings, fiscal planning, corporate governance, supply chain management, and strategic planning; and
- Requisite DOD authorities in areas such as Title 5, Title 10, and Title 32, and internal directives needed for a transformed department.

The 2005 QDR differs significantly from past QDRs in that it recognizes that the United States is a nation at war. It will build upon lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that we live in an environment of uncertainty—we cannot adequately predict when, where, or how we might need to next use our forces.

To avoid “stovepiping” of issues and resource priorities, the Department’s senior leaders are the driving force managing all aspects of the QDR. This QDR also will be inclusive: in addition to close consultations with Congress, we will solicit ideas from other government agencies, defense industry, and our international partners to benefit from their strategic thinking.

Finally, during this QDR, the force sizing construct will be treated as an output, not an input to the process. Past QDRs spent much time discussing the proper “size” of the force. This time we will first determine the right mix of capabilities that we need to face our uncertain future, and then we will address any necessary force construct changes that may be needed.

Global Defense Posture Strategy

Mr. Chairman, the Administration’s efforts to strengthen America’s global defense posture will result in the most profound re-ordering of U.S. military forces overseas since the Cold War.

We are redefining our military’s forward presence by strengthening our ability to meet our security commitments in the midst of a dynamic and uncertain geopolitical landscape. Transforming our global defense posture is an important part of our broader effort to transform the Department to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

Similar to the National Defense Strategy and the ongoing QDR, we conducted our global defense posture review thoroughly and deliberately. We collaborated with our interagency partners – particularly the State Department – early in the process. We made an intensive effort to consult with our allies and partners to incorporate their views, with trips to 20 capitals, ambassadorial discussions, and 20 Hill visits for briefings and testimony. The results were

gratifying: within 24 hours of President Bush's speech last August announcing his intention to move forward with our global posture plans, officials of key allies and partners made strong statements of support for our strategy and our proposals. Because we had kept our Russian and Chinese counterparts apprised of our proposed changes, there was no negative reaction from these countries. This helped assure our European and Asian allies.

Mr. Chairman, we also have regularly briefed Members of Congress and their personal and committee staffs throughout our review, with over 40 such briefings to date. We provided a detailed Report to Congress in the fall of 2004. We also have worked closely with the Overseas Basing Commission in its efforts to provide Congress with its assessment of our global presence, basing, and infrastructure needs.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate some of the strategic principles of the global posture changes; summarize some of the most prominent changes; and address the BRAC process in more detail.

First, let me clarify what we have aimed to achieve:

- We are not aiming at retrenchment, curtailing U.S. commitments, isolationism or unilateralism. Instead, we want to strengthen our ability to fulfill our international commitments;
- We want to ensure our future alliances are capable, affordable, sustainable, and relevant;
- We are not narrowly focused on numbers of troops overseas; instead we are focusing on the effective capabilities of our forces and those of our allies;
- We are not talking about fighting in place, but about our ability to rapidly get to the fight; and
- We are not only talking about basing, we are talking about relationships and activities and the ability to move forces when and where they are needed.

Some historical context may be useful. The September 11th attacks clarified our understanding of the key security issues that we will face in the 21st-century. These include:

- the nexus among terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

- ungoverned areas within states, which can serve as both a breeding ground and a sanctuary for terrorists; and
- the adoption of asymmetric approaches – including irregular warfare – that adversaries could use to counter U.S. conventional military superiority.

Mr. Chairman, just as we have updated our National Defense Strategy and worked to transform our alliances to meet these security challenges, we also recognized the importance of transforming our global posture. Much of our in-place posture still reflects a Cold War structure – forward stationed forces configured to fight near where they were based.

Now, nearly 15 years after the end of the Cold War, we know that the premises underlying our posture have changed fundamentally: we no longer expect our forces to fight in place; our forces need to be able to rapidly project power into theaters that may be far from where they are based.

Global Defense Posture Themes

Mr. Chairman, five key strategy themes guide our Global Defense Posture changes:

First is the need to improve flexibility to contend with uncertainty. Much of our existing overseas posture was established during the Cold War, when we knew, or thought we knew, where we would fight. Today, however, we often fight in places that few, if any, had predicted. Thus, we should recognize the limits of our intelligence. We need to plan to counteract surprise. Our goal is to have forces positioned forward on a continual basis in areas with access and facilities that enable them to reach any potential crisis spots quickly.

Second is creating the capacity to act both within and across regions. During the Cold War, we focused on threats to specific regions and tailored our military presence to those regions. Now we are dealing with challenges that are global in nature. We need to improve our ability to project power from one region to another and to manage forces on a global basis.

Third is the requirement to strengthen allied roles and build new partnerships. We want to ensure that our allies and friends recognize that we are actually strengthening our commitment to secure our common interests. Changes to our global posture aim to help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, strategies, and doctrines. We are exploring ways in which we and they together can transform our partnership to best enhance our collective defense capabilities. At the same time, we seek to tailor our military's overseas "footprint" to suit local conditions, to reduce friction with host nations, and to respect local sensitivities.

Fourth, we must develop rapidly deployable capabilities. Our forces need to be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations, which puts a premium on establishing flexible legal and support arrangements with our allies and partners.

Finally, we have to focus on effective military capabilities, not numbers of personnel, units, or equipment. Our key purpose is to push relevant capabilities forward. We now can have far greater capabilities forward than in the past, with smaller numbers of permanently stationed forces. In the Cold War, “bean counting” numbers of personnel in administrative regions was perceived to have a direct relationship to our ability to succeed in anticipated conflicts. But this is no longer the case. Capabilities matter, not numbers.

Building Blocks of our Global Defense Posture

Mr. Chairman, let me make clear what we mean by the word “posture.” Many think only of our footprint of facilities, but posture also includes presence, force management, surge capability, and prepositioning.

First, our posture includes the **facilities** that make up our overseas **footprint** where our forces live, train, and operate. We will retain and consolidate many of our main operating bases in places like Germany, Italy, the U.K., Japan, and Korea, but we also will rely on forward operating sites with rotational presence and pre-positioned equipment. We also will need access to a broader range of facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence, but with periodic service or contractor support, which we call cooperative security locations.

Second, our posture includes our **presence**, the permanent and rotational forces that conduct military activities worldwide, from security cooperation to crisis response. Their activities include training, exercises, and operations. They involve both small units working together in a wide range of capacities and major formations conducting elaborate exercises to achieve proficiency in joint and combined operations.

Third, our posture supports our new approach to **force management** which seeks both to relieve the stresses on our military forces and their families and to manage our forces on a global rather than a regional basis. Accompanied tours that were designed in an era of static deployments have become more of a hardship for families as service members deploy more frequently from forward locations. Accompanying dependents more often find themselves in a state of double separation: separated both from their loved ones and extended support networks back in the United States. The planned changes to our posture support Service initiatives designed to facilitate personnel management, provide predictability in scheduling, and offer more stability at home. Also, we are now managing our

forces globally, rather than tying forces and their training only to particular regions. Combatant Commanders no longer “own” forces in their theaters.

Fourth, managing our military forces globally also allows us to **surge** a greater percentage of the force where and when it is needed anywhere in the world. Forces are apportioned as needed and sourced from anywhere in the world.

Finally, our posture changes involve a greater use of **prepositioned equipment**, strategically located and globally managed, to support training with our allies and partners and to facilitate the rapid deployment of forces where and when they are needed.

Key Changes and Continuities

Mr. Chairman, these changes in footprint, presence, force management, surge, and prepositioning are reshaping our ability to support diplomacy and project necessary military power in all theaters.

In Asia, we are building upon our traditional ground, air, and naval access in Northeast Asia to operate effectively despite the vast distances in the theater. This will require additional naval and air capabilities forward in the region. We are consolidating facilities and headquarters in Japan and Korea to gain efficiencies and to enable regional and global action. We will have a more frequent presence of special operations forces throughout the region.

Our future posture in Europe will be characterized by lighter and more deployable ground capabilities, leading-edge air and naval power and advanced training facilities. The center of gravity of our presence in Europe will shift south and east, allowing for more rapid deployment to the Middle East, Africa, and other potential hot spots. A major change will be the return of the two legacy maneuver divisions from Europe to the United States, replacing them with our transformational Stryker capability. We also are retaining our advanced mobility infrastructure in places like Ramstein in Germany.

In the Middle East, our goal is presence without permanence. We are maintaining what we call “warm” facilities for rotational forces and contingency purposes, building on cooperation and access provided by host nations during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

In Africa and the Western Hemisphere, we require an array of smaller cooperative security locations for contingency access in some remote areas, but we will not be building new bases.

Linkage to Base Realignment and Closure

Mr. Chairman, the National Defense Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, Global Defense Posture changes and domestic BRAC round are key, interlinked elements that support transformation. A well supported, capabilities-based force structure should have infrastructure that is best sized and placed to support national security needs and emerging mission requirements. The revised *BRAC Force Structure Plan* and the *Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing Infrastructure Requirements at Overseas Facilities*, both recently transmitted to Congress, align with our National Defense Strategy.

Since some overseas personnel will return to the United States, global posture changes will influence BRAC recommendations designed to support the warfighter more effectively and efficiently. The linkage to BRAC ensures that our forces returning to the U.S. will relocate not merely where they best fit, but rather where they are best postured. The Secretary will provide his recommendations for domestic closures and realignments to the Commission and Congress by May 16th as required by the BRAC 2005 statute.

Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by commending this commission as it works to implement necessary, far-reaching, and enduring changes to strengthen America's defense infrastructure.