

7/20/05
(from Dayton Community)

Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation

**TECH-6
WPAFB**

DoD BRAC Recommendation

Realign Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, and Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating Air & Space Information Systems Research and Development & Acquisition to Hanscom Air Force Base, MA.

DAYTON REGION RECOMMENDATION

Retain the Development and Fielding Systems Group (DFSG) and other Operational Support Systems Group (OSSG) elements at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB)

RATIONALE

1. There is a clear risk of failure in DFSG operations supporting acquisition programs, thereby, jeopardizing logistics support for warfighting commanders. Specifically, **Military Value Criteria 1**, the current and future mission capabilities, will be **critically** degraded, with a potential cost in dollars, performance, and schedule delays due to the realignment of DFSG and OSSG elements to Hanscom AFB.
2. As Table I illustrates, the BRAC recommendation's Personnel Projections are understated at 2250 versus the 6,612 computed by the Dayton Region. Moreover, local Dayton Region Information Technology (IT) contractors supporting DFSG's acquisition mission are part of the intellectual capital and not accounted for in the calculation of Military Value. Neither development nor Advisory and Assistance Service (A&AS) DFSG on-site contractors were factored into the BRAC COBRA equation. This skews the actual costs of realignment (**Military Value Criteria 1 and 4**). The Dayton Region's calculations (please see Tables and Charts A, B, and C below) reveal that, **rather than the BRAC-reported saving of \$229 million dollars, there would be a loss to DOD of \$421 million. This loss to DOD exceeds \$800 million when the number of development contractors affected by the realignment is considered.**

**Table I
Personnel Projections**

Source of Numbers	2006-2011 Period			Total
	Direct Job	Indirect Job	Non-A&AS	
BRAC Report	(1262)*	(988)	0	(2250)
Local Validation	(1462)	(2300)**	(2400)	(6162)

* 715 current Direct Contractors (A&AS) not accounted for in BRAC COBRA Analysis and exist on the OSSW Manning Chart (as of 04 December 2004) for a total of 1462 direct jobs

** An indirect factor of 1.57 stated in the Economic Impact Analysis more accurately reflects indirect jobs and is used in Air Force Base calculations

3. In the COBRA analysis, TECH-0042, page 45, the data reflects that 55% of the 606 Civilians, or 333 civilians, will move to Boston. The TECH-0042 COBRA Analysis uses a "Standard Civilian annual salary" of \$59,959.18, page 20, which equates to a GS-10 Step 8 in the Boston area (General Schedule Salary table for Hanscom AFB). Page 20, TECH-0042 COBRA Analysis, also reflects a Standard "Civilians Not Willing to Move" as 6% of the civilian population. Of the current 606 DFSG Civilians, 247 civilians (40%) will be eliminated and 359 civilian positions will be realigned to the Hanscom AFB UMD. In addition, the 715 current A&AS direct contractors are not factored into the analysis. Of the current 142 DFSG Military position, only 39 will realign to Hanscom (27%), page 6, Economic Impact Data. On the same page, the data reflects that DFSG will lose 658 Direct Contractors (This direct contractor recognition is not reflected in the COBRA data). In summary, 1462 direct personnel support the current DFSG mission at WPAFB. The BRAC recommendation indicates it can continue the mission with 39 Military, 359 civilians, and 658 direct contractors, for a total of 1056 personnel, a reduction of 28%.

Table A and Chart A below are from the TJCSG COBRA analysis (COBRA Net Present Value Report [COBRA V6.10] 4-20-05, page 42 of 50). These show a "start" date of 2006, a "final" year of 2008, and an 8-year "payback" in year 2016. However, the BRAC COBRA Report does not include the Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS) contractors authorized for utilization on the OSSW manning documents. A&AS is the government acronym for Advisory and Assistance Services, which means those services, provided under contract by nongovernmental sources to support or improve successful performance of ongoing Federal operations (FAR 2.101). As such, these A&AS personnel needed to be included in the COBRA analysis, as they were included in some of the TJCSG data call questions, as well as the TJCSG Economic Impact Report, TECH-0042C: Air & Space C4ISR DAT&E Consolidation, page 4. Page 4 indicates that Hanscom AFB will gain 1412 A&AS Contractors in 2006. The cost of these Direct Contractors has not been included in the COBRA analysis.

TABLE A

BRAC 05 "Net Present Value Report" (Baseline)
 There Were No Contractor
 Costs Factored into the COBRA Analysis.

Year	Cost	Factor	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	50,556,665	0.9862873	49,863,397	49,863,397
2007	107,518,433	0.9594234	103,155,701	153,019,097
2008	49,936,875	0.9332913	46,605,651	199,624,748
2009	-35,421,483	0.9078709	-32,158,134	167,466,615
2010	-19,949,483	0.8831429	-17,618,244	149,848,370
2011	-35,421,483	0.8590884	-30,430,185	119,418,185
2012	-35,421,483	0.8356891	-29,601,347	89,816,838
2013	-35,421,483	0.8129271	-28,795,083	61,021,754
2014	-35,421,483	0.7907851	-28,010,781	33,010,973
2015	-35,421,483	0.7692463	-27,247,845	5,763,129
2016	-35,421,483	0.748294	-26,505,683	-20,742,555
2017	-35,421,483	0.7279125	-25,783,740	-46,526,295
2018	-35,421,483	0.7080861	-25,081,460	-71,607,755
2019	-35,421,483	0.6887997	-24,398,307	-96,006,061
2020	-35,421,483	0.6700386	-23,733,761	-119,739,822
2021	-35,421,483	0.6517885	-23,087,315	-142,827,138
2022	-35,421,483	0.6340355	-22,458,478	-165,285,615
2023	-35,421,483	0.6167661	-21,846,770	-187,132,385
2024	-35,421,483	0.599967	-21,251,721	-208,384,106
2025	-35,421,483	0.5836255	-20,672,881	-229,056,987

This Chart A (Below) reflects the BRAC Adjusted Cost/Saving and NPV.

CHART A




Table B and Chart B with A&AS Contractors **included** are explained below.

**TABLE
B**

**BRAC 05 "Net Present Value Report" Adjusted to Include
DFSG A&AS Contractor Support Costs. These Costs Were
Not Included in the COBRA Analysis.**

Year	Cost	Factor	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	92,916,665	0.986287	91,642,527	91,642,527
2007	149,878,433	0.959423	143,796,876	235,439,402
2008	92,296,875	0.933291	86,139,870	321,579,273
2009	6,938,517	0.907871	6,299,278	327,878,551
2010	22,410,517	0.883143	19,791,689	347,670,240
2011	6,938,517	0.859088	5,960,799	353,631,039
2012	6,938,517	0.835689	5,798,443	359,429,482
2013	6,938,517	0.812927	5,640,509	365,069,991
2014	6,938,517	0.790785	5,486,876	370,556,866
2015	6,938,517	0.769246	5,337,429	375,894,295
2016	6,938,517	0.748294	5,192,051	381,086,346
2017	6,938,517	0.727913	5,050,633	386,136,979
2018	6,938,517	0.708086	4,913,067	391,050,046
2019	6,938,517	0.6888	4,779,248	395,829,295
2020	6,938,517	0.670039	4,649,074	400,478,369
2021	6,938,517	0.651789	4,522,446	405,000,814
2022	6,938,517	0.634036	4,399,266	409,400,081
2023	6,938,517	0.616766	4,279,442	413,679,523
2024	6,938,517	0.599967	4,162,881	417,842,404
2025	6,938,517	0.583626	4,049,495	421,891,899

CHART B




Table B and Chart B above, using the same formulae as in the TJCSG chart, includes the 1412 Direct Contractors required at Hanscom AFB for this scenario. Included in the "Cost" column of the chart is a conservative, additional cost of \$30,000 per contractor in Boston versus Dayton (\$100,000 per Direct Contractor in Dayton versus \$130,000 per Direct Contractor in Boston). (Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics - Computer and Mathematical Science Occupations average: Boston MSA average salary (\$76,870); Dayton Springfield MSA average salary (\$61,360) - Escalation Factor for cost of living in Boston 1.30; Government cost of an A&AS IT Contractor ~ \$100,000, applying the cost of living index of 130 to \$100,000 equals ~\$130,000 for the same IT A&AS Contractor in Boston). This additional cost per Direct Contractor amounts to \$42,360,000 additional cost per year in Boston to support the Hanscom AFB scenario (1412 Direct Contractors at an increased cost of \$30,000 each). In the year 2025, rather than the BRAC-reported saving of \$229 million dollars, there is a loss of \$421 million dollars – there will NEVER be a savings.

TABLE C

**BRAC 05 "Net Present Value Report" Adjusted to Include
DFSG A&AS and Development Contractor Support Costs.
These Costs Were Not Included in the COBRA Analysis.**

Year	Cost	Factor	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	133,176,665	0.9862873	131,350,453	131,350,453
2007	190,138,443	0.9594234	182,423,271	313,773,725
2008	132,556,875	0.9332913	123,714,178	437,487,903
2009	47,198,517	0.9078709	42,850,160	480,338,063
2010	62,670,517	0.8831429	55,347,022	535,685,085
2011	47,198,517	0.8590884	40,547,698	576,232,784
2012	47,198,517	0.8356891	39,443,286	615,676,070
2013	47,198,517	0.8129271	38,368,954	654,045,023
2014	47,198,517	0.7907851	37,323,884	691,368,907
2015	47,198,517	0.7692463	36,307,285	727,676,192
2016	47,198,517	0.748294	35,318,367	762,994,559
2017	47,198,517	0.7279125	34,356,391	797,350,950
2018	47,198,517	0.7080861	33,420,614	830,771,563
2019	47,198,517	0.6887997	32,510,324	863,281,888
2020	47,198,517	0.6700386	31,624,828	894,906,716
2021	47,198,517	0.6517885	30,763,451	925,670,167
2022	47,198,517	0.6340355	29,925,535	955,595,702
2023	47,198,517	0.6167661	29,110,445	984,706,147
2024	47,198,517	0.599967	28,317,553	1,013,023,700
2025	47,198,517	0.5836255	27,546,258	1,040,569,958

Table C above and Chart C below, using the same formulae as in the TJCSG chart, includes the 1412 Direct Contractors required at Hanscom AFB for this scenario, as well as 1342 development contractors that currently work for DFSG (the Dayton Region believes the number of actual development contractors is about 2000 to 2400). Included in the "Cost" column of the chart is a conservative additional cost of \$30,000 per contractor in Boston versus Dayton (\$100,000 per Direct

Contractor in Dayton versus \$130,000 per Direct Contractor in Boston). (Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics - Computer and Mathematical Science Occupations average: Boston MSA average salary (\$76,870); Dayton Springfield MSA average salary (\$61,360) - Escalation Factor for cost of living in Boston 1.30; Government cost of an A&AS IT and Development Contractor ~ \$100,000, applying the cost of living index of 130 to \$100,000 equals ~\$130,000 for the same IT A&AS Contractor in Boston). This additional cost per Direct Contractor (A&AS) and Development contractors, amounts to \$82,620,000 additional cost per year in Boston to support the Hanscom AFB scenario (2754 Total Contractors [1412 A&AS and 1342 Development Contractors] at an increased cost of \$30,000 each). In the year 2025, rather than the BRAC-reported saving of \$229 million dollars, there is **a loss of \$1.0 BILLION dollars** – there will **NEVER** be a savings! **If the full facts were utilized in the calculation of costs, as well as the constrained availability of land at Hanscom AFB, this realignment recommendation would not have happened.** Additionally, the creation of Hanscom as a “Center of Excellence” for potential “Joint” growth in the future is not feasible due to high costs in the Boston area and the lack of available land to expand.

CHART C




Table D and Chart D below represent recent data from the Air Force regarding the DFSG military and civilian personnel, and includes the DFSG A&AS contractors as well as the Development contractors associated with DFSG’s mission. The new data indicate that the additional costs (based on tables 1 to 3 below) per contractor is \$23,874 versus our first estimate of \$30,000. In any case, the NPV for Chart D shows a cost of over \$700 million dollars in 2025, and there will **NEVER** be a savings to this scenario.

TABLE D

Year	Cost	Factor	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	116,306,641	0.986287	114,711,763	114,711,763
2007	173,268,109	0.959423	166,237,478	280,949,241
2008	115,686,551	0.933291	107,969,252	388,918,493
2009	30,328,193	0.907871	27,534,084	416,452,577
2010	45,800,193	0.883143	40,448,115	456,900,692
2011	-35,421,483	0.859088	-30,430,185	426,470,507
2012	30,328,193	0.835689	25,344,940	451,815,447
2013	30,328,193	0.812927	24,654,610	476,470,057
2014	30,328,193	0.790785	23,983,083	500,453,140
2015	30,328,193	0.769246	23,329,850	523,782,990
2016	30,328,193	0.748294	22,694,405	546,477,395
2017	30,328,193	0.727913	22,076,271	568,553,666
2018	30,328,193	0.708086	21,474,972	590,028,638
2019	30,328,193	0.6888	20,890,050	610,918,688
2020	30,328,193	0.670039	20,321,060	631,239,748
2021	30,328,193	0.651789	19,767,567	651,007,316
2022	30,328,193	0.634036	19,229,151	670,236,467
2023	30,328,193	0.616766	18,705,401	688,941,868
2024	30,328,193	0.599967	18,195,915	707,137,783
2025	30,328,193	0.583626	17,700,307	724,838,090

CHART D




Table 1
Annually Recurring Increased Cost of Labor Resulting from Moving Direct Contractor¹ Jobs to
Hanscom AFB
Not Counted in the Defense Department COBRA Analysis²
(Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation)

Donor Area	Number of Direct Contractor Jobs Moving to Boston ³	Annual Salary per Job at Donor Base ⁴	Total Annual Wages Paid for Direct Contract Jobs at Donor Base	Annual Salary per Job Moved to the Boston Area ⁵	Total Annual Wages Paid for Direct Contract Jobs at Boston	Increased Annual Cost of Wages in Boston	Increased Annual Cost of Non-Wage Benefits in Boston ⁶	Total Annual Increased Cost to Air Force for Direct Contract Jobs Moved to Boston
Dayton, OH	658	\$61,360	\$40,374,880	\$76,870	\$50,580,460	\$10,205,580	\$3,020,852	\$13,226,432
Montgomery, AL	698	\$55,650	\$38,843,700	\$76,870	\$53,655,260	\$14,811,560	\$4,384,222	\$19,195,782
San Antonio, TX	56	\$59,120	\$3,310,720	\$76,870	\$4,304,720	\$994,000	\$294,224	\$1,288,224
Total	1,412	\$176,130	\$82,529,300	\$230,610	\$108,540,440	\$26,011,140	\$7,699,297	\$33,710,437

¹ "Direct Contractor" jobs, also known as Assistant and Advisory Services (A&AS) jobs, are private sector jobs that perform on-base services in direct support of the government unit's mission.

² The COBRA analysis apparently did recognize pay differentials for civilian government workers.

³ Source: "Economic Impact Report." BRAC Report Volume 12 (Technical) G - TECH-0042C Criterion 6 Report.

⁴ These numbers are based on a July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing, "DSFG Orientation AFMC BRAC Site Survey Team," presented by the Development and Fielding Systems Group, which used the figure of \$61,360 per direct contractor job for the Dayton-Springfield area (page 23). This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for the Dayton-Springfield, MSA Ohio for computer and mathematical occupations (Standard Occupational Classification 15-0000). The other figures are for the corresponding positions for Montgomery, Alabama MSA; and San Antonio, Texas. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, Standard Occupational Classification.

⁵ This number is taken from the same July 12, 2005 Air Force Briefing. This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for Boston, Massachusetts-New Hampshire PMSA. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, for computer and mathematical occupations (Standard Occupational Classification 15-0000).

⁶ Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits.

Table 2
Annually Recurring Increased Cost of Labor Resulting from Moving Development Contractor⁷ Jobs
From Dayton, Ohio Area to Boston, Massachusetts Area
Not Counted in the Defense Department COBRA Analysis⁸
(Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation)

Number of Jobs in the Dayton area that would move to Boston ⁹	Annual Salary per Job in Dayton ¹⁰	Total Salary per job in Dayton	Annual Salary per Job in Boston Area ¹¹	Total Annual Wages in Boston	Increased Annual Cost of Wages in Boston	Increased Annual Cost of Non-Wage Benefits in Boston ¹²	Total Increased Cost to Air Force
1342	\$90,450	\$121,383,900	\$107,070	\$143,687,940	\$22,304,040	\$6,601,996	\$28,906,036

⁷ These are private jobs with employers who have contracts to perform development and Sustainment work for the Development and Fielding Systems Group (DFSG) headquartered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, outside Dayton, Ohio

⁸ The COBRA analysis apparently did recognize pay differentials for civilian government workers.

⁹ This figure is taken from page 23 of a July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing, "DSFG Orientation AFMC BRAC Site Survey Team," presented by the Development and Fielding Systems Group. The source is described as, "Estimates based on contract awards to community."

¹⁰ This figure is taken from the same July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing. This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for Dayton-Springfield, Ohio, MSA for the Standard Occupational Classification series 11-3021, Computer and information systems managers. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates.

¹¹ This figure is taken from the same July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing. This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for Boston, Massachusetts-New Hampshire PMSA for the Standard Occupational Classification series 11-3021, Computer and information systems managers. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates.

¹² Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits.

Table 3	
Annually Recurring Increased Cost of Labor Resulting from Moving Identified¹³	
Contractor Jobs to Hanscom AFB	
Not Counted in the Defense Department COBRA Analysis	
(Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation)¹⁴	
Annually recurring increased labor costs for direct contractor jobs from Dayton, Ohio; Montgomery, Alabama, and San Antonio, Texas	\$33,710,437
Annually recurring increased labor costs for development contractor jobs from Dayton, Ohio	\$28,906,036
Total annually recurring costs	\$62,616,473

¹³ "Identified" means only specific jobs identified by the Department of Defense. These are identified either in the Department of Defense documents provided as justification for BRAC decision or the July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing, "DSFG Orientation AFMC BRAC Site Survey Team," presented by the Development and Fielding Systems Group. This does not include development contractor jobs in Montgomery, Alabama, or San Antonio, Texas. According to the "Statement for the Record" provided by Brig. Gen. (ret.) Paul Hankins, Special Assistant, City of Montgomery and Montgomery Area Chamber of Commerce, to the Atlanta, Georgia hearing of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission on June 30, 2005, there are a total of 940 contractors support the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group (OSSG) in Montgomery, Alabama. This is 242 more jobs than accounted for in the Defense Department's BRAC data. If this jobs were moved to the Boston area from Montgomery using the same formula of the DFSG jobs from Dayton, then it would add another \$8,408,747 in annually recurring labor costs. However, this figure is excluded from the chart because the number cannot be verified using only Defense Department data.

¹⁴ See tables 1 and 2 for supporting data and sources.

4. The DFSG is deeply involved with **Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)** software solutions from private industry. Since the private industry has had the lead in developing software solutions, it has been in the best interest of the DoD to capitalize on proven software that is adaptable to DoD like functions. The current private industry technology solution is Enterprise Resource Planning or ERP. According to Gartner Research Publications, ERP implementations are risky endeavors and users must take control of their own destinies. Gartner Dataquest surveyed 265 U.S.-based IT and business managers. Gartner lists six critical success factors for implementing ERP. One of the success factors is that the functional managers must be involved and set realistic expectations and then manage them throughout the implementation process as the project conditions evolve. Another factor for success is to focus on the users. Inclusion of users in all activities is important along with having top management involvement and support in the whole project. Gartner recommends that External Service Providers (ESPs) should work with the client/end users. End users must have an ongoing involvement with the initiative. The DFSG is the ESP for AFMC functional users and their managers. It is critically important to the success of the implementation process to have them collocated at AFMC (**Military Value Criteria 1 and 4**). (Source: Gartner Research Publication Dates: 10 September 2002 ID Number TG-15-4868; 7 September 2004 ID Number G00122936; 10 December 2003 ID Number ITSV-WW-EX-0390, 23 September 2002 ID Number SPA-17-7897).

5. The Selection Criteria used for the C4ISR grouped missions do not adequately measure the military value of the Acquisition, Development and Fielding mission of the DFSG. As noted earlier, the COBRA analysis did not include all the direct positions annotated on the Unit Manning Document (UMD). Specifically, the A&AS contractors assigned to the DFSG to perform job descriptions that would otherwise be performed by authorized military or civilian personnel were excluded from the COBRA analysis. This represents a **substantial and critical deviation** from the approved selection criteria. However, in the ESC/OSSW organization chart, dated 7 December 2004, presented by the ESC OSSG Director in a briefing in an Air Force Information Technology day (See attachment 1) the Total DFSG manpower included 142 Military, 606 Civilian, and 715 A&AS Contractors, for a total of 1462 employees in the DFSG. The 715 A&AS Contractors are on the UMD and are part of the DFSG organization. They are **omitted** in the COBRA calculations and represent 49% of the direct personnel effort to accomplish the DFSG mission.

6. Also, in the BRAC Economic Impact Data for TECH-0042C: Air & Space C4ISR DAT&E Consolidation, page 6, the data show 864 Direct Contractor reduction for DFSG, and on page 4 the data reflects a gain of 1412 Direct Contractors for Hanscom AFB. The COBRA data does not reflect this significant direct contractor increase in the cost of moving DFSG or OSSG to Hanscom. The cost of A&AS contractor support in the Boston area will be significantly more costly than in the Dayton OH (see following paragraphs and Table II).

7. Compounding the unrealistic expectation of accomplishing this realignment is the assumption that 55% of the civilians will move. Historically, less than 20% of the people will actually move. It should also be noted that many civilians in DFSG are retired military and will not move with the position. Additionally, a doubtful expectation exists that Hanscom AFB can hire 189 qualified (the correct figure may be closer to over 250 civilian positions and over 500 direct contractor positions) civilians in the Boston area that they need to fill the DFSG

authorizations (page 48 TECH-0042 COBRA Analysis). Adding to the enormity of the task will be the Boston area contracting firms trying to hire the same individuals to fill their contractor ranks to compete for the direct contractor support to DFSG at Hanscom. WPAFB currently has the contractor talent that is required. Many of the personnel in the contractor pool of personnel have the knowledge, skills and abilities required to perform DFSG's mission due to the many military and civilian retirees in the Dayton area who previously worked for the Air Force and at WPAFB as civilian or military employees. This intellectual capital, equal in required experience that exists in the Dayton region, will be scarce in the Boston area and will be purchased at a much higher cost. This may be one of the reasons why the DFSG personnel numbers were so drastically cut and reduced for realignment to Hanscom (28% reduction in personnel) – to make the BRAC costs appear less, regardless of the impact on mission accomplishment. The “proximity to the customer” in the TJCSG selection criteria under “synergy” was not a major factor in C4IRS but it is critical for DFSG mission accomplishment (Source: TJCSG Analysis and Recommendations (Volume XII, 19 May 2005, Part V. Appendix B, page B-10).

8. The Dayton Region has built up the contractor support to the DFSG over the years. This capability did not appear overnight...it has taken a number of years to put the proper foundation in place. The Greater Dayton IT Alliance has compiled data to illustrate the depth of Information Technology personnel available within the Dayton/Springfield MSA. Six Standard Occupational Classifications (SOC) exits in the MSA and range from Computer & Information Systems Managers, Engineering Managers, Computer hardware Engineers, to Computer Operators and Computer Control Programmers & Operators. The Ohio Department of Jobs & Family Services identifies a total in all IT related SOC's in the Dayton/Springfield MSA of 16,810 personnel employed in the IT area. The ODJFS projects that by 2010 the total will be 22,440. The U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics shows the Dayton MSA with an IT employment of 14,290 in 2002.
9. The larger Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) capabilities desired by the Air Force as well as DoD are now beginning to reap the rewards of the DFSG's leadership and capability it has established. The other Services have invested huge sums of money in enterprise applications with limited success because they failed to properly address the development issues and risks. The BRAC recommendation to move DFSG to Hanscom has not captured or grasped the differences required for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Business Management Information Technology (BMIT) acquisition. Hanscom's competencies are in the area of Command and Control (C2)...not BMIT.
10. The Department of Defense does not perform IT Research and Development on Business Management (Operations Support) Systems. DoD's announced policy for its Business Management Modernization Program (Air Force identifies it as Operational Support Modernization Program) is to acquire Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), specifically Enterprise Resource Planning, solutions. Therefore combining DFSG within the C4ISR mission group with selection criteria that measures R&D-type performance with the ultimate goal of producing a product is substantially flawed. The TJCSG measures do not account for the skills and abilities required to produce the services performed by the DFSG. DFSG provides acquisition services to AFMC functional users in Financial, contracting, and Logistics areas who then, enabled by the business (i.e., operational support) systems, provide capability to the war fighter. Geographical separation of the acquisition service provider (DFSG) from the functional users and managers at Headquarters AFMC injects significant

risk of acquisition program failure and increased costs. This collocation of the service provider (DFSG) to its users and system managers (located at Wright-Patt AFB) is a major critical element in the success or failure of development and fielding according to both government auditors and private industry research publications. (Source: Gartner Research & GAO-05-381, April 29, 2005; GAO-05-723T, June 8, 2005).

11. DFSG provides acquisition services to AFMC functional users, who then, enabled by the business (i.e., operational support) systems, provide capability to the warfighter. Geographical separation of the acquisition service provider (DFSG) from the functional users and managers at Headquarters AFMC injects significant risk of acquisition program failure and increased costs. This collocation of the service provider (DFSG) with its users and system managers (located at Wright-Patterson AFB) is a major critical element in the success or failure of development and fielding according to both government auditors and private industry research publications (Military Value Criteria). (Source: Gartner Research & GAO-05-381, April 29, 2005; GAO-05-723T, June 8, 2005)
12. The Department of Defense does not perform IT Research and Development on Business Management (Operations Support) Systems acquired and used by DFSG. DoD's announced policy for its Business Management Modernization Program (Air Force identifies it as Operational Support Modernization Program) is to acquire Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), specifically Enterprise Resource Planning, solutions (Military Value Criteria 1 and 4)
13. The inclusion of a business systems acquisition organization like DFSG in the broad C4ISR category was inappropriate, misleading and negatively impacts Military Value Criteria 1. Most of the work conducted at Hanscom AFB relates to developing and acquiring C4ISR systems and subsystems rapidly produced as weapons systems for the warfighter. DFSG does not develop and acquire C4ISR systems and subsystems. DFSG is an organization focused on acquiring COTS computer software, assisting its functional customers with business process reengineerings, evaluating the functionality of commercial-off-the-shelf business management solutions like Enterprise Resource Planning, managing requirements put in Requests For Proposals, and managing the acquisition and fielding of business management, also known as, operational support systems for the Air Force and DoD.
14. Sufficient land for Military Construction Programs is not available at Hanscom AFB (Military Value Criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8). "Roughly 40 acres" are required. "Hanscom reported its largest parcel is 18.27 acres, and only 8.4 unconstrained acres are zoned for industrial ops." (Source: Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts – Criterion 8, Technical Joint Cross Service Group, Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation).

Bottom line: The Dayton Region Recommends that the 1462 DFSG personnel remain at WPAFB, collocated with their primary systems users and managers (**Military Value Criteria 1 and 4**), providing the best support to the DFSG customer, reduced risk of failure, availability of land and facilities to accommodate further anticipated joint growth (**Military Value Criteria 2**), reduced cost of operations (**Military Value Criteria 4**), and preservation of the intellectual capital already in place in the Dayton Region. Further recommend that if rational consolidation is the target, then DoD ought to

DEFENSE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION
2521 S. CLARK STREET, SUITE 600
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
(703) 699-2950

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: June 15, 2005
TIME: 9:00 am
MEETING WITH: Wright-Patterson AFB and Community Officials
OBJECTIVE: To discuss the BRAC recommendations affecting WPAFB
JCSG STAFF: Lester C. Farrington
Lesia Mandzia

OTHER COMMISSION PARTICIPANTS:

None.

NON-COMMISSION PARTICIPANT(S):

Name/Title/Phone Number

WPAFB OFFICIALS

- COL Peter F. Hoene---AFMC Special Assistant for BRAC, 937-257-8975
- Linda McLaughlin---Ass't. to the Commander, 88th Base Wing, 937-257-3942
- CAPT Jason Decker---Public Affairs, 937-257-6306
- Mark Paulson---AF Research Lab, 937-904-6765
- Debra Miesle---AFMC/SGS, 937-656-3652
- Wendell Banks---AF Research Lab, 937-656-0818DPCX,
- William Borger---AF Research Lab, 937-255-2520
- Charlene Xander---AFMC/Manpower, 937-257-0323
- Tom Stafford---AFMC/XPS, 937-257-4141
- Paul Ulrich---46OG/OGM/OL-AC, 937-255-6302
- John Murphy---46G/OGM/OI-AC, 937-255-6302
- CAPT Elizabeth Miller---AFMC/SGSR, 937-656-3647

Lori Stryker---AFSG/OMY, 937-257-8389
Lynn Moad---DFSG/DC, 937-257-2714
Doug Fleser---DFSG/OM, 937-257-1955
Pete Jacques---88 ABW/LGRRP, 937-904-3160
Gus Reed---AF Research Lab, 937-255-3267
Jay Asher---ASC/XPP, 937-904-8572
Barbara O'Brien---88 ABW/CECX, 937-257-4804
Linda Cardwell---88 MSS/DPC, 937-257-3699
Jerry Stryker---88 MSS/DPCX, 937-257-1888

COMMUNITY OFFICIALS

Louis C. Ferraro, Jr.,-- Ferro Consulting, 937-427-3834
Jim Leftwich—Dayton Development Coalition, 937-229-9074

MEETING RESULTS/FOLLOW-UP ACTION:

We met with the community officials at a separate meeting outside the base following the meeting with WPAFB officials.

Air Force officials provided us with a Mission Briefing of Air Force Materiel Command and then discussed each of the 7 BRAC recommendations affecting WPAFB. (4 technical, 2 medical and 1 hqs. & support). The net effect of these recommendations is a GAIN of 589 military personnel and a LOSS of 170 civilian personnel. Following the discussions we were given a windshield tour of Area B of the base that will be affected by the recommendations.

WPAFB officials made the point that they support the Secretary of Defense BRAC recommendations and they are not in a position to speculate or provide opinions on the results or the analysis behind the recommendations. After discussing each recommendation, WPAFB officials stated that the recommendations are not without challenges. Three challenges were discussed—(1) manpower (recruiting sufficient numbers of people for the skills required, (2) MILCON (determining the most appropriate locations to build on the base) and (3) implementation (ensuring organizational changes don't impact mission, ensuring new structure is aligned with common goals and metrics and the reconstitution of specialized functions).

WPAFB officials made the point that the Base has sufficient capacity and space to accommodate the influx of added workload to be received. They further stated that with respect to the sensor work to be received from Rome Lab, the work is compatible with the work that WBAFB now performs on sensors. Officials estimated that 718 people now work in WPAFB's Sensor Directorate (138 officers, 1 enlisted, and 579 civilian personnel).

As a result of our visit, WPAFB agreed to take on the following action items at our request:

1. **The number of people in WPAFB, Rome & Hanscom Sensor Directorates**
2. **Clarification of terminology—DFSG, OSSG & CFS.**
3. **The intent of the Rotary Wing Transfer—V-22, PRV, or both?**
4. **A discussion as to what (function and people) is moving out of WPAFB to China Lake concerning Live Fire testing. More precise terminology and specifics needed.**
5. **The intent of the CP0 consolidation (Hqs. & Support)**
6. **Results of recent WPAFB review of manpower impacts (SWAT team results).**
7. **Any disconnects/inconsistencies identified by WPAFB concerning the BRAC recommendations that need clarification.**
8. **Map of WPAFB showing facilities/areas affected by BRAC recommendations (incoming & outgoing)**

COMMUNITY MEETING

Community officials take issue with the recommendation that calls for Development and Fielding Group (DFSG) and other Operational Support Systems Group elements to Hanscom (Tech-6, 22). They are concerned with the evaluation of military value and the lack of available real estate at Hanscom to accommodate the movement from WPAFB.

They made the following points:

1. **Evaluation of military did not capture all available data**
2. **Local Dayton information technology contractors were not accounted for in the calculation of military value.**
3. **Collocation of acquisition and users should be maintained at WBAFB.**
4. **DOD does not perform IT R&D on Business Management Operations.**
5. **Inclusion of a business systems acquisition organization like DFSG in C4ISR was inappropriate and misleading.**
6. **Sufficient land for MILCON is not available at Hanscom AFB. Roughly, 40 acres are required and only 8.4 unconstrained acres are available.**
7. **Relocation to Hanscom does not adequately address the enormous differences in cost of operations between Hanscom and WPAFB.**

Community officials provided a working paper and other data at the conclusion of the meeting.

WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB
DAYTON COMMUNITY
(TECH-6)
(Rec. #179)

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Louis C. Ferraro (Associate) [lferraro@greentreegroup.com]
Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 10:35 AM
To: Lester C. Farrington (E-mail); Joe Greene (E-mail)
Subject: DFSG / C4ISR Definition / etc.
Attachments: DFSG C4ISR Chart - 11 Aug 05.ppt; C4ISR Definition.ppt; Les Farrington-Why Move Ver 20.doc

Les & Joe,

Attached are two slides we are working on - one defines C4ISR and the other shows a picture of where DFSG and OSSG fit into the whole system.


In addition, attached is our latest version of the answers to the questions Les sent us.

Because of the short timeframe, this is the first time Joe Greene has seen our new effort. We didn't want to appear that we are not a player in C4ISR because we do provide the warfighter operational support data for command and control use through GCSS to GCCS - both of which are C4ISR systems.

Please let me know if you have questions. We are also looking for additional slides of C4ISR to pass on to you.

Regards,

Lou



"C4ISR" refers to systems that are part of the Command, Control, Communications,

Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance domain.

C4ISR is defined in the Joint Technical Architecture (now DoDAF) as those systems that:

- Support properly designated commanders in the exercise of authority and direction over

assigned and attached forces across the range of military operations;

- Move data that is critical to the conduct of military operations;

- Collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, or interpret available information concerning foreign countries or areas;

- Systematically observe aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means; and

- Obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or secure data concerning the

meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

Why Move OSSG and DFSG to Hanscom AFB?

TJCSG Answer: For C4ISR RDAT&E, the TJCSG strove to address two of the biggest C4ISR concerns (Deleted “Gripes”) that come from the operational community.

- 1) the various systems delivered to the field don’t work well together (i.e., they don’t interoperate), and
- (2) The technology takes too long to get the field and thus is dated when it’s finally fielded.

Community Response: *Correct.* There is room for improvement in integration and speed of fielding of C4ISR systems. It is important to establish that DFSG and OSSG **do not** produce C4ISR systems; they develop and sustain automated business systems including COTS ERP solutions that produce data for inclusion in C4ISR Command and Control systems.

TJCSG Answer: The root cause of these concerns is the multiple dispersed C4ISR RDAT&E activities.

Community Response: *Incorrect.* Delays and lack of interoperability can be the result of any failure during the development or integration of the components. The most likely point of failure is the integration level that could be the result of insufficient architectural standards that are not the responsibility of DFSG and OSSG. Dispersal of activities related to C4ISR RDAT&E activities is not a significant factor.

TJCSG Answer: The natural tendency of geographically separate units (GSUs), such as OSSG and DFSG, is to pursue technical solutions that use local Information Technology (IT) assets and products with which they are familiar.

Community Response: *Incorrect.* This answer suggests that there is somehow an IT “culture” in Dayton that is inferior to the IT culture in Boston. Top IT specialists at both locations are trained at the same kind of schools and learn the same development tools. There is enormous fluidity and cross-interaction throughout the country of IT workers, perhaps more so than most major industries because of the volatility and constant advancement of the technology.¹

TJCSG Answer: This can lead to unique, not readily interoperable IT solutions that do not reflect the state-of-the-art especially when the GSUs are located in places of lesser (Deleted “Relatively low”) IT intellectual capital.

Community Response: *Incorrect.* Problems with the development of C4ISR and automated business systems are not the consequence of developing those systems in a place of “lesser”

¹ The absurdity of this argument can be noted in the recent selection by Hewlett-Packard of NCR President Mark Hurd as HP President. The fact that Hurd spent virtually his entire career in Dayton working for NCR in no way suggested to the HP hiring team that he only knew Dayton-style IT. While we consider this item to be preposterously arrogant we will stay focused on an objective and factual reply.

IT intellectual capital. Moreover, the Dayton area has a robust IT community with hundreds of highly competitive IT-related business and major university IT programs. The intellectual capital at Wright-Patterson and Gunter AFB is as knowledgeable, if not more so, of current IT COTS technology as anywhere in the government and industry.

TJCSG Answer: The result is that extra effort, manpower and time is required to integrate the C4ISR products from those two Support Groups with the C4ISR products from the remainder of the Operations Support Systems Wing and the other C4ISR Wings, all of which are located at Hanscom AFB.

Community Response: *Partially correct.* The requirement for extra resources to integrate automated business systems products with C4ISR is largely the result of inadequate architectural standards, which serve as the "instructions" to the two support groups. If the standards are not adequate, the products from the support groups will not integrate properly no matter how well the products are developed.

TJCSG Answer: Similarly, co-locating the Air & Space C4ISR Research (currently at Wright-Patterson AFB) with the Development, Acquisition and Test & Evaluation (non-open air range) at Hanscom AFB is designed to reduce the cycle time required to field Information Systems technology and ease the integration of new technology into C4ISR products headed for the field.

Community Response: *Incorrect.* Air & Space C4ISR research has no direct relation to the work of DSFG, which is to acquire and develop business systems, nor with the work of OSSG. Consequently, co-locating Air & Space C4ISR research with DFSG and OSSG at Hanscom cannot be expected to have significant synergistic benefits. Consolidation of Air & Space C4ISR research at Hanscom may have research benefits but the benefits are not likely to affect the problems associated with integration of DFSG and C4ISR products.

TJCSG Answer: With fewer seams in RDAT&E process, the SECDEF Recommendation to realign C4ISR RDAT&E to Hanscom AFB is consistent with the BRAC Criteria (i.e., Military Value) and should (Deleted "Will"), dramatically reduce the personnel, cycle time and effort required to deliver Air & Space C4ISR capability to the operational community.

Community Response: *Incorrect.* The relevant seam is not between DFSG / OSSG and the C4ISR work coordinated at Hanscom. Therefore, eliminating the geographical separation will not solve the problems. Moving DFSG to Hanscom will disrupt existing work and remove development from collocation with the principal customer (HQ AFMC), thus increasing risk of failure. Moreover, by moving work from a relatively low cost labor market to a significantly more expensive labor market, additional cost-cutting pressures are likely to further hamper results. Consequently, the move of DFSG / OSSG will not reduce the personnel, cycle time, and effort required to deliver Air & Space C4ISR capability to the

Comment [MSOffice1]: I had the comment, "Note: The remainder of the Operations Support Systems Wing, i.e., the Engineering and Integration Squadron is responsible for the architectural standards and is located now at Hanscom AFB, Wright-Patterson AFB, and Maxwell AFB. Physical movement of the units to Hanscom AFB will not improve the architectural standards.

I'm concerned about pointing out that OSSW, which develops the architectural standards, is dispersed geographically. We argue that the big picture problem is the development of architectural standards. We don't have an argument against consolidating OSSW at Hanscom. So, there is a logical argument that OSSW should be consolidated at Hanscom.

DCN:11670

operational community and it should be rejected as a substantial deviation from BRAC military value criteria.

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DAYTON COMMUNITY
(TECH-6)
Rec # 179)

Appendix:

**Analysis of Job Movements and Costs Not Included in Original Scenario to Consolidate Air
and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation**

At Hanscom Air Force Base

Costs of “Development Contractors” Should be Considered in Move to Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation at Hanscom Air Force Base

The Dayton community asserts that the annually recurring cost of moving the Development and Fielding Systems Group (DFSG) from Dayton, Ohio, to Boston will increase because of the greater cost of labor for both direct contractor (also known as “embedded” or A&AS contractors) and development contractor positions. Development contractor workers are employed by contractors to perform the development and maintenance tasks, and typically work off-site. Neither increased cost was included in the COBRA run and both could be substantial.¹ Most of the work of DFSG is actually performed by development contractors.²

The contention that the direct contractor positions will move to Boston is not in dispute. These jobs by their very nature are co-located with direct government jobs. The data provided to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission include these jobs as lost to the Dayton, Ohio; Montgomery, Alabama, and San Antonio, Texas communities and specific numbers are provided. There is also no dispute that the cost of labor will be higher in the Boston area than in the receiving site.

The assertion that the development contractor jobs will move to Boston has been argued with the contention that the development contractor jobs do not have to be co-located with the direct government jobs. Under this argument, because theoretically the development contractor jobs could be located anywhere, it would be inappropriate to score them as a loss to the donor base area and as a gain for the receiver site.

However, in this case, one of the key underlying justifications for the move of DFSG to Boston is the assertion that Boston’s intellectual capital is greater than Dayton—in other words, the Air Force wants to move DFSG specifically to take advantage of the IT workforce in the Boston area. *Not only does the Air Force fully expect the development contractor positions to move from donor sites to Boston, the military value argument is predicated on this happening.*

The number of development contractor positions that move could be subject to conjecture. However, there is no disputing that at least a significant percentage will move if one accepts the premise that the work needs to be performed using the “higher intellectual capital” in Boston.³ There is also no disputing the significantly higher cost of computer-related labor in the Boston area, which is documented in Bureau of Labor Statistics and other measures.

Even accepting that less than 100 percent of the development contractor positions would move, the resulting annually recurring costs are so great as to make this move untenable.

¹ Internal Air Force working papers estimate the annually recurring costs for labor of moving direct contractor positions to be \$9.7 million, which does not include non-salary benefits. The community estimates that the real cost, including non-salary benefits (insurance, vacation, etc.) is \$13.2 million.

² According to figures provided by the Air Force to Senator DeWine, 1,790 development contractors perform work for DFSG, and 1,342 (75 percent) of those live in the Dayton area.

³ If this premise is not accepted, then the move should be summarily rejected.

Table 1
Annually Recurring Increased Cost of Labor Resulting from Moving Direct Contractor¹ Jobs to Hanscom AFB
Not Counted in the Defense Department COBRA Analysis²
Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Donor Area	Number of Direct Contractor Jobs Moving to Boston ³	Annual Salary per Job at Donor Base ⁴	Cost to Air Force per Job at Donor Base (Annual Salary plus Non-Wage Benefits) ⁵	Total Cost to Air Force for Direct Contract Jobs at Donor Base	Annual Salary per Job Moved to the Boston Area ⁶	Cost to Air Force per Job at Hanscom (Annual Salary plus Non-Wage Benefits) ⁷	Total Cost to Air Force for Direct Contract Jobs at Hanscom	Total Annual Increased Cost to Air Force for Direct Contractor Jobs Moved to Boston
Dayton, OH	658	\$61,360	\$79,523	\$52,325,844	\$76,870	\$99,624	\$65,552,276	\$13,226,432
Montgomery, AL	698	\$55,650	\$72,122	\$50,341,435	\$76,870	\$99,624	\$69,537,217	\$19,195,782
San Antonio, TX	56	\$59,120	\$76,620	\$4,290,693	\$76,870	\$99,624	\$5,578,917	\$1,288,224
Total	1,412	\$176,130		\$106,957,973			\$140,668,410	\$33,710,437

8

¹ "Direct Contractor" jobs, also known as Assistant and Advisory Services (A&S) jobs, are private sector jobs that perform on-base services in direct support of the operation of the government unit's mission.

² The COBRA analysis apparently did recognize pay differentials for civilian government workers.

³ Certified Data. Source: "Economic Impact Report." BRAC Report Volume 12 (Technical) G - TECH-0042C Criterion 6 Report.

⁴ These numbers are based on a July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing, "DSFG Orientation AFMC BRAC Site Survey Team," presented by the Development and Fielding Systems Group, which used the figure of \$61,360 per direct contractor job for the Dayton-Springfield area (page 23). This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for the Dayton-Springfield, MSA Ohio for computer and mathematical occupations (Standard Occupational Classification 15-0000). The other figures are for the corresponding positions for Montgomery, Alabama MSA; and San Antonio, Texas. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, Standard Occupational Classification.

⁵ Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits. This number is determined by taking the base annual salary in the previous column and adding 29.6 percent.

⁶ This number is taken from the same July 12, 2005 Air Force Briefing. This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for Boston, Massachusetts-New Hampshire PMSA. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, for computer and mathematical occupations (Standard Occupational Classification 15-0000).

⁷ Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits. This number is determined by taking the base annual salary in the previous column and adding 29.6 percent.

Table 2
Annually Recurring Increased Cost of Labor Resulting from Moving Development Contractor¹ Jobs
From Dayton, Ohio Area to Boston, Massachusetts Area
Not Counted in the Defense Department COBRA Analysis²
Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Number of Jobs in the Dayton area that would move to Boston ³	Annual Salary per Development Contractor Job in Dayton ⁴	Cost to Air Force per Job at Donor Base (Annual Salary plus Non-Wage Benefits) ⁵	Total Cost to Air Force for Development Contractor Jobs in Dayton Area	Annual Salary per Development Contractor Job in Boston Area ⁶	Cost to Air Force per Job in Boston Area (Annual Salary plus Non-Wage Benefits) ⁷	Total Cost to Air Force for Development Contract Jobs in Boston Area	Total Increased Cost to Air Force ⁸
1342	\$90,450	\$117,223	\$157,313,534	\$107,070	\$138,763	\$186,219,570	\$28,906,036

¹ These are private jobs with employers who have contracts to perform development and Sustainment work for the Development and Fielding Systems Group (DFSG) headquartered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, outside Dayton, Ohio

² The COBRA analysis apparently did recognize pay differentials for civilian government workers.

³ This figure is taken from page 23 of a July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing, "DSFG Orientation AFMC BRAC Site Survey Team," presented by the Development and Fielding Systems Group. The source is described as, "Estimates based on contract awards to community."

⁴ This figure is taken from the same July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing. This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for Dayton-Springfield, Ohio, MSA for the Standard Occupational Classification series 11-3021, Computer and information systems managers. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates.

⁵ Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits. This number is determined by taking the base annual salary in the previous column and adding 29.6 percent.

⁶ This figure is taken from the same July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing. This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for Boston, Massachusetts-New Hampshire PMSA for the Standard Occupational Classification series 11-3021, Computer and information systems managers. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates.

⁷ Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits. This number is determined by taking the base annual salary in the previous column and adding 29.6 percent.

⁸ Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits.

Table 3
Annually Recurring Increased Cost of Labor Resulting from Moving Identified¹
Contractor Jobs to Hanscom AFB
Not Counted in the Defense Department COBRA Analysis
Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test
& Evaluation²

Annually recurring increased labor costs for direct contractor jobs from Dayton, Ohio; Montgomery, Alabama, and San Antonio, Texas	\$33,710,437
Annually recurring increased labor costs for development contractor jobs from Dayton, Ohio	\$28,906,036
Total annually recurring costs	\$62,616,473

¹ "Identified" means only specific jobs identified by the Department of Defense. These are identified either in the Department of Defense documents provided as justification for BRAC decision or the July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing, "DSFG Orientation AFMC BRAC Site Survey Team," presented by the Development and Fielding Systems Group. This does not include development contractor jobs in Montgomery, Alabama, or San Antonio, Texas. According to the "Statement for the Record" provided by Brig. Gen. (ret.) Paul Hankins, Special Assistant, City of Montgomery and Montgomery Area Chamber of Commerce, to the Atlanta, Georgia hearing of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission on June 30, 2005, there are a total of 940 contractors support the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group (OSSG) in Montgomery, Alabama. This is 242 more jobs than accounted for in the Defense Department's BRAC data. If this jobs were moved to the Boston area from Montgomery using the same formula of the DFSG jobs from Dayton, then it would add another \$8,408,747 in annually recurring labor costs. However, this figure is excluded from the chart because the number cannot be verified using only Defense Department data.

² See tables 1 and 2 for supporting data and sources.

Table 4		
Comparisons of Defense Department Estimate Versus Inclusion of Increased Labor Costs		
	<i>Defense Department Estimate Without Increased Labor Costs</i>	<i>Defense Department Estimate With Increased Labor Costs</i>
Annually recurring savings after implementation	\$36.2 million	-\$26.4 million
Net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period	\$115.3 million	-260.3 million

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

WRIGHT-PATTERSON
TECH-6 RECOMMENDATION
(Rec#179)

From: Louis C. Ferraro (Associate) [lferraro@greentreegroup.com]
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 10:22 AM
To: Lester C. Farrington (E-mail)
Cc: Joe Greene (E-mail)
Subject: DFSG Labor Costs
Attachments: DFSG BRAC Labor Costs.doc

Les,

This is a paper addresses TECH 6 and why we should include the increased cost of labor for development contractors who work for DFSG. We think we have a powerful case that the increased cost of labor for development contractors should be included. Given the fact that the DoD recommendation is already questionable, this data further solidifies the case against moving DFSG.

Additionally, after reading the Don DeYoung paper, I believe a case can be made that, not only did the DoD back into moving DFSG to Hanscom, but, the DoD is also using BRAC to make programmatic changes -- moving people during BRAC to perhaps sidestep the congressional oversight.

Regards,

Lou

DCN:11670

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Oliver, Stacie (DeWine) [Stacie_Oliver@dewine.senate.gov]
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 2:47 PM
To: Lester.Farrington@wso.whs.mil
Subject: DFSG Community COBRA
Attachments: DFSG Community COBRA.doc

Les -

I apologize for sending this document late, but I know that you have received most of this information from the Dayton Development Coalition throughout the deliberation process. The document that I have attached is a thorough review of the COBRA analysis for the Development and Fielding Systems Group. I greatly appreciate you taking a few minutes to look at it. If you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call at 202-224-1359 or 301-996-5051.

Best of luck and please let me know if I can be of any assistance.

V/r
Stacie

*Stacie L. Oliver
Military Legislative Assistant
Office of Senator Mike DeWine
140 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
ph: (202) 224-2315
fx: (202) 224-6519*

8/29/2005

**Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and
Acquisition, Test and Evaluation:
Community Analysis of Defense Department COBRA Run**

Summary Comparison of DoD Estimates versus Community Estimates					
	One-Time Costs	Net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period (negative sign indicates loss)	Annually recurring costs and savings to the Department after implementation (negative sign indicates loss)	Net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years (negative sign indicates greater savings than costs)	Payback period
DoD	\$254.4 million	-\$115.3 million	\$36.2 million	-\$238.0 million	8 years
Community	\$245.9 million ¹	-\$471.7 million	-\$51.8 million	\$947.4 million ²	Never

Notes	Description	Dollar Value	Principal Sources
	Major Annually Recurring Costs Not Included in Defense Department Projections		
1	Increased cost of labor for moving “embedded contractors” from Dayton, OH to Boston area	\$13.2 million	DoD Information provided to BRAC Commission, Bureau of Labor Statistics
2	Increased cost of labor for moving “embedded contractors” from Montgomery, AL to Boston area	\$19.2 million	DoD Information provided to BRAC Commission, Bureau of Labor Statistics
3	Increased cost of labor for moving “embedded contractors” from San Antonio, TX, to Boston area	\$1.3 million	DoD Information provided to BRAC Commission, Bureau of Labor Statistics
4	Increased cost of labor for moving development contractors from Dayton, OH, to Boston area	\$25.8 million	DoD Information provided to Sen. DeWine, Bureau of Labor Statistics
5	Customer interaction due to location changes	\$1.3 million	AF Working Paper, “Disconnects and Inconstancies”

¹ The Defense Department’s estimates of one time costs are understated. These costs do not reflect the MILCON costs that were significantly reduced during the deliberations of the Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG). For example, the MILCON costs do not include construction of additional facilities necessary for a major expansion of the Hanscom population like dining halls, child care facilities, religion meeting rooms, and fitness centers. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment “Base Visit Report” to Hanscom Air Force Base on July 29, 2005 had this line: “There is significant communication footprint (growth) required for incoming mission at Hanscom (COBRA estimates \$9M—the need may be \$30M). See BRAC Commission document #6688. Estimates of people willing to move from Dayton, Montgomery, and San Antonio are probably much overstated, which also increases one-time costs.

² Although outside the scope of BRAC requirements, it is interesting to note that the total cost to the Defense Department of this move exceeds \$1 billion after 22 years (2027).

6	Contracting out government positions that were eliminated but for which work is still required.	\$9.8 million	AF Working Paper, "Disconnects and Inconstancies"; also community estimate
	Major Annually Recurring Cost Savings Overstated in Defense Department Projections		
7	Elimination of 135 personnel slots at WPAFB AFB that had been scheduled to be eliminated for programmatic reasons incorrectly scored to BRAC	\$8.9 million	AF Working Paper, "Disconnects and Inconstancies" (Mostly confirmed with information from DoD)
8	Elimination of 75 personnel slots at Maxwell AFB that had been scheduled to be eliminated for programmatic reasons incorrectly scored to BRAC	\$3.2 million	DoD Information provided to BRAC Commission

Notes

1. "Embedded contractors" (sometimes referred to as "direct contractors" or A&AS Contractors—Advisory and Assistance) are non-government contract employees who work on base, often side-by-side the government personnel. They perform many functions similar to the government personnel. The numbers for embedded contractors came from the Defense Department economic impact report, which identified the employees who would lose their jobs in Dayton, Montgomery, and San Antonio. This report assumes that those employees will have to be rehired in the Boston area. If they have to be rehired, their wages will likely be the prevailing wages in the Boston area for similar work in Dayton. Wages information is derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For more information on the calculation behind this figure, see Appendix I.

2. See Note 1.

3. See Note 1.

4. "Development contractors" are employees of private companies which have contracts with DFSG to perform specific development work. According to figures provided by the Defense Department to Senator DeWine, There are 1,790 development contractors working on DFSG work. Of those, 75 percent, or 1,342 live in the Dayton area. A significant number is likely to move to Boston if DFSG moves to Boston. The figure here assumes 90 percent of the development contractors in the Dayton area will move to Boston. Wages information is derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For more information on the calculation behind this figure, see Appendix II. Note: Appendix II calculates the cost for all Dayton development contractors moving to Boston; for the purposes of this COBRA model, only 90 percent are assumed to move. For further justification why the development contractors will be required to move, see Appendix III.

5. These are increased costs resulting from the greater expense involved with communicating with DFSG's principal customer base, which is Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (HQ

AFMC). This includes TDY, air fare, and vehicle rental. The calculation is based on \$1,500 per trip times two trips annually for 50 percent of the workforce. The calculation is half the rate derived from the internal Air Force working paper, "Disconnects and Inconsistencies."

6. BRAC data anticipate the elimination of 650 officer, enlisted, and civilian authorized slots for the combined DFSG and OSSG operations, a 34 percent cut. Of those, 211 are cuts of "phantom" positions which have already been eliminated (or scheduled for elimination for non-BRAC reasons). The Air Force is aware that it cannot perform the work with such deep cuts and is anticipating hiring back some positions as contract workers. The Air Force working paper, "Disconnects and Inconsistencies" estimates that 390 of those positions will have to be rehired. For the purposes of this paper, that number is considered high. Hence, the figure of 100 workers at an annually recurring cost of \$98,000 each is used.

7. The original BRAC data scored cost savings for eliminating 206 of the 604 DFSG positions at Wright-Patterson at the time of the baseline. However, the Defense Department used the wrong baseline. Of the 604 positions, 135 were already scheduled to be eliminated through programmatic cuts outside the BRAC process. (The 135 figure came from the Air Force working paper, "Disconnects and Inconsistencies.") The Defense Department is incorrectly claiming the cost savings of those positions. (According to the Defense Department, there are now only 488 authorized positions for DFSG. In other words, 116 of the eliminated slots that were supposed to result in cost savings for BRAC are already gone!) See Appendix IV.

8. The original BRAC data scored cost savings for eliminating 434 of the 1273 Gunter/Maxwell positions at the time of the baseline. However, the Defense Department used the wrong baseline. Of the 434 positions, 76 were already scheduled to be eliminated through programmatic cuts outside the BRAC process. In fact, according to the Defense Department data provided to the Defense Base Closure Commission, as of February 28, 2005 all 76 positions had already been eliminated. For more information, see Appendix IV.

Note on Source Documents

Some of this information came from an Air Force internal working document called "2005 BRAC Process TECH-0042 Part 7, C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation Disconnects & Inconsistencies," generally referred to in this paper as "Disconnects and Inconsistencies." This document has not been made public. It is believed that this document was prepared in response to a July 7, 2005 directive from SAF/IEB (Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis) asking all major commands to identify disconnects, inconsistencies or need for clarification.³ Despite repeated requests from several Congressional offices and the Defense Base Closure Commission, this document has not been released. About the time that the requests were made, a directive was issued to stop site surveys.

³ The existence of this directive is disclosed in a July 15, 2005 memo from Lt. Col. David L. Johansen to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. See document #5340, question 7.

APPENDIX I
Annually Recurring Increased Cost of Labor Resulting from Moving Direct Contractor¹ Jobs to Hanscom AFB
Not Counted in the Defense Department COBRA Analysis²
Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Donor Area	Number of Direct Contractor Jobs Moving to Boston ³	Annual Salary per Job at Donor Base ⁴	Cost to Air Force per Job at Donor Base (Annual Salary plus Non-Wage Benefits) ⁵	Total Cost to Air Force for Direct Contract Jobs at Donor Base	Annual Salary per Job Moved to the Boston Area ⁶	Cost to Air Force per Job at Hanscom (Annual Salary plus Non-Wage Benefits) ⁷	Total Cost to Air Force for Direct Contract Jobs at Hanscom	Total Annual Increased Cost to Air Force for Direct Contractor Jobs Moved to Boston
Dayton, OH	658	\$61,360	\$79,523	\$52,325,844	\$76,870	\$99,624	\$65,552,276	\$13,226,432
Montgomery, AL	698	\$55,650	\$72,122	\$50,341,435	\$76,870	\$99,624	\$69,537,217	\$19,195,782
San Antonio, TX	56	\$59,120	\$76,620	\$4,290,693	\$76,870	\$99,624	\$5,578,917	\$1,288,224
Total	1,412	\$176,130		\$106,957,973			\$140,668,410	\$33,710,437

¹ "Direct Contractor" jobs, also known as Assistant and Advisory Services (A&AS) jobs, are private sector jobs that perform on-base services in direct support of the operation of the government unit's mission.

² The COBRA analysis apparently did recognize pay differentials for civilian government workers.

³ Certified Data. Source: "Economic Impact Report." BRAC Report Volume 12 (Technical) G - TECH-0042C Criterion 6 Report.

⁴ These numbers are based on a July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing, "DSFG Orientation AFMC BRAC Site Survey Team," presented by the Development and Fielding Systems Group, which used the figure of \$61,360 per direct contractor job for the Dayton-Springfield area (page 23). This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for the Dayton-Springfield, MSA Ohio for computer and mathematical occupations (Standard Occupational Classification 15-0000). The other figures are for the corresponding positions for Montgomery, Alabama MSA; and San Antonio, Texas. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, Standard Occupational Classification.

⁵ Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits. This number is determined by taking the base annual salary in the previous column and adding 29.6 percent.

⁶ This number is taken from the same July 12, 2005 Air Force Briefing. This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for Boston, Massachusetts-New Hampshire PMSA. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, for computer and mathematical occupations (Standard Occupational Classification 15-0000).

⁷ Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits. This number is determined by taking the base annual salary in the previous column and adding 29.6 percent.

REGIONAL HEARING ISSUE SUMMARY
Buffalo Regional hearing
June 27, 2005

JZCH-6

Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH

Witness: Rep. David Hobson (OH-7)

- Analysis does not include 715 direct, on-site contractor employees required to sustain the operation at either DFSG & OSSG. Also assumes 2400 positions will be reduced but no supporting documentation.
- Collocating Air Force Material Command (AFMC) at W-P would be easier, less expensive and the "functional owners of the business processes that the information systems support" are located.

Witness: Congressman Turner

- Missions gained through proposed recommendations "enhance bases capabilities and creates additional centers of excellence".
- Reject recommendation that relocates the Air & Space Information Systems Research and Developments Acquisition to Hanscom in Massachusetts because it is based on \$410M promised in state funding if the DoD brings new technical missions to the installation (they will increase capacity and infrastructure).
- Hanscom must be expanded to accept nearly 1400 jobs (1200 Jobs from Maxwell AFB, AL) but DoD's recommendation recognizes that unconstrained land is not available. Massachusetts suggests the installation needs state subsidized-aid to support additional functions.

Witness: General Lester Lyles

- Single largest employer in Dayton, Ohio.
- DFSG supports critical wartime initiatives that are performed by off-base contractors located in the Dayton area.
- DFSG mission is associated with business-related technology while the C4SRI mission relates to embedded information technology.
- DFSG draws from the IT community based in Dayton whose work relates to business management systems. Argues the IT companies in Dayton as well as the contractors who support wartime initiatives were not included when determining MILVAL.
- Scenario requires approximately 40 acres of land Hanscom has approx. 19 acres of available land; but only 8 acres of unconstrained land is zoned for industrial operations (criteria #2)
- DoD's data significantly understates cost (criteria #4). Justification is provided showing costs as high as \$200M not accounted for.

REGIONAL HEARING ISSUE SUMMARY

Buffalo Regional hearing

June 27, 2005

DFAS Cleveland, OH

Witness: Fred Nance, chairman of the Cleveland Defense Industry Alliance

- Inaccurate calculation of MILVAL criteria for all DFAS operations (this does not affect Cleveland's ranking).
- MILVAL should focus on people/services provided vs. facility assessment (90% the former and 10% the latter)
- DFAS services do not need to be located on DoD installations and the JC-S group exemplified this in their recommendation to move 3,500 employees to Indianapolis (which is not on DoD installation). Also, the recommendation ignores the 435 non-DoD civilians that remain in the building.
- Inconsistent method of analysis (binary vs. linear) was performed. For example, Cleveland's facility has 19 unique corporate process application but they received the same score as Denver even though they only have 5.
- The facility should not be penalized for high lease cost because the Federal Government charges \$29.12 per sq. /ft. even though the market average is \$14.70.

Witness: Representative Steven LaTourette (OH-14)

- Review entire DFAS Analysis.

Witness: Jane L. Campbell, Mayor of Cleveland

- Operations can be consolidated in Cleveland because they have plans for a new site which can meet security considerations, have advanced telecommunications capabilities and that can be expanded.

Witness: Rep. Stephanie Tubbs-Jones (OH-11)

- Cleveland has the highest poverty rate in the country (31.1%)
- NASA is laying off 1000 workers
- Was the disruption of services considered?
- 90% of the facilities workers have been there on average over 5 years. Where will you find qualified employees?
- \$52M to house in receiving communities

Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH

Witness: Senator Mike Dewine

- The installation can support the proposed recommendation as well as more missions in the future.

REGIONAL HEARING ISSUE SUMMARY

Buffalo Regional hearing

June 27, 2005

DFAS Dayton, OH

Witness: Marilou Smith, Mayor, City of Kettering

- Economic impact of closing Gentile AF Station in 93 was 1 billion dollars.
- Reject proposal to close facility

Witness: Rep. Michael Turner

- Deviation from criteria 4 because costs exceed savings
- AFMC (which oversees 11 of the bases serviced by DFAS-Dayton) is headquartered at W-P. AFMC also controls 60% of the AF budget.
- Rent free 50 year lease provided by the city

Mansfield Lahm Air Guard Station & Springfield-Beckley Air Guard, OH

Witness: Michael G. Oxley (OH-4)

- AF template same for all components while other services developed separate templates
- No Adjutant General input in the development of the AF criteria but the Army National Guard's TAG was involved.
- MILVAL pertaining to personnel was miscalculated.
- Capacity analysis was inaccurate 12 PAA BBEDDDOWN cost is \$13.7M while the cost at Maxwell (just to gain 4 aircrafts) is \$15.9M. COBRA analysis indicates the total cost for shifting to receiving facilities is \$21.6M. Therefore, there is a negative return on investment (\$-7.9M).

Witness: Rep. David Hobson (OH-7)

- Only had one day to review the COBRA data before members of staff visited.
- The unit is an F-16 Formal Training Units (AF stated there was only one).
- The timeline for the recommendation is nonsensical because the pilots are kept until 2010 but maintenance and personnel are removed in 2007 and the students are removed in 2008. \$80M secured for the mission to be kept until 2015.
- AF projections indicate F-16 aircrafts will not be flying past 2015 (at the latest) yet NPV shows it will take more than 18 years to realize a turn on the initial investment. Expected savings past 2015 are not real.
- The unique structure and mission capabilities, homeland defense missions and the cost of training new recruits were not taken into account.

REGIONAL HEARING ISSUE SUMMARY
Buffalo Regional hearing
June 27, 2005

Witness: Major General Greg Wyatt, Adjutant General

- Tags were never consulted by the AF during the BRAC process.
- "Material Deviations" from Law
- PAA realignment and MILVAL evaluation resulted in proposals to close 5 and realign 28 ANG bases
- AF used the MCI tool to rank bases and establish MILVAL but there are critical differences between various components in the services.
- ANG is the most efficient component, providing 47% of the Total Air Composition at approximately 8% of the Total Annual AF Budget, why did AF use efficiency as justification?

Witness: Governor Bob Taft

- Bases are slated to grow even though they are significantly below 100% strength are slated to grow.

Statement of Rep. Michael Turner
Before the 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission
Buffalo, NY
June 25, 2005

Thank you Chairman Principi and members of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today concerning Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. I am Mike Turner, the representative from the Third Congressional District of Ohio. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base is split between the third and seventh congressional districts. I am pleased to be here with retired Air Force general and former commander of Air Force Materiel Command headquartered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Lester Lyles.

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Background

Wright-Patterson is the premier research and development base in the United States Air Force and is the birthplace, home and future of aerospace. Virtually every fixed wing aircraft in the history of the Air Force has been designed, built, purchased or tested at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. As in the first century of flight, Wright-Patterson is where weapon systems of the future are conceived, tested, and modified until worthy of acceptance as part of the most responsive deterrent force in military aviation history. Today, Wright-Patterson is one of the largest, most effective and important bases in the Air Force.

Wright-Patterson is vital to our national security because of the base's contribution to the United States Air Force and its contribution to our ability to fight and win the global war on terrorism. Wright-Patterson is home to the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC), responsible for the acquisition of all current Air Force aircraft and for the development, modernization and sustainment of current aircraft. It is home to Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), responsible for the discovery, development, and integration of new technologies for our air and space assets. The National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) is also headquartered at Wright-Patterson and it has taken on greater responsibility in keeping America safe as it provides critical, real-time intelligence to US combatant commanders in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Wright-Patterson is a key military asset and the co-location of the various missions enable the base to effectively and efficiently meet current and emerging threats.

Wright-Patterson's advantage is that the high value intelligence, defense acquisition, research and development capabilities are co-located permitting cooperation, communication and efficiency. The mission gains contained within the Defense Department's recommendations enhance the base's capabilities and creates additional "centers of excellence." I strongly encourage the Commission to approve these recommendations.

DoD's recommendation to relocate air & space information systems research and development & acquisition (C4ISR) to Hanscom Air Force Base should not be approved by the Commission. This recommendation is based on incorrect data and analysis and violates criteria number seven of the established selection criteria. In selecting installations for closure or realignment, DoD

will consider "the ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel."

During the public comment period on the BRAC criteria, comments were received on criteria seven asking the Defense Department to view the ability of community infrastructure to support the military as evolving and consider the willingness and capacity of communities to make additional investments. In response, the DoD stated "the Department must focus on the existing, demonstrated ability of a community to support its installation, especially as potential investment actions may not translate into reality." In essence, the Defense Department's statement seeks to ensure that communities will not engage in a bidding war to keep installations open or missions at a particular base. Yet, this is exactly what has happened. A high-stakes bidding war between communities is not in the best interest of the nation.

In September 2004, a delegation from Massachusetts visited Wright-Patterson Air Force Base to pitch a development plan for Hanscom Air Force Base. The plan calls for \$410 million in state funding to increase the infrastructure and capacity of Hanscom "on the condition that the Department of Defense commit to bringing new technical military missions to Hanscom." The Department of Defense did recommend the consolidation of these technical missions to Hanscom.

In response to concerns raised about this proposal, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment sent a letter to House Armed Services Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter clarifying the use of such proposals by the Defense Department in creating their BRAC recommendations. The letter stated, "the Department will not include such promised considerations within the BRAC process... The statute also requires that military value be the primary consideration in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations using certified data. Proposals from the public do not constitute certified data that our analysis relies upon."

As the body created to review the Department of Defense recommendations, the Commission has the responsibility to ensure DoD did not deviate from its own criteria in making its recommendations. I request that you overturn the recommendation to relocate the air & space information systems research and development & acquisition (C4ISR) to Hanscom and keep them at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base where they are more able to efficiently perform their mission.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

DEFENSE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION
2521 S. CLARK STREET, SUITE 600
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
(703) 699-2950

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: June 15, 2005
TIME: 9:00 am
MEETING WITH: Wright-Patterson AFB and Community Officials
OBJECTIVE: To discuss the BRAC recommendations affecting WPAFB
JCSG STAFF: Lester C. Farrington
Lesia Mandzia

OTHER COMMISSION PARTICIPANTS:

None.

NON-COMMISSION PARTICIPANT(S):

Name/Title/Phone Number

WPAFB OFFICIALS

COL Peter F. Hoene---AFMC Special Assistant for BRAC, 937-257-8975
Linda McLaughlin---Ass't. to the Commander, 88th Base Wing, 937-257-3942
CAPT Jason Decker---Public Affairs, 937-257-6306
Mark Paulson---AF Research Lab, 937-904-6765
Debra Miesle---AFMC/SGS, 937-656-3652
Wendell Banks---AF Research Lab, 937-656-0818DPCX,
William Borger---AF Research Lab, 937-255-2520
Charlene Xander---AFMC/Manpower, 937-257-0323
Tom Stafford---AFMC/XPS, 937-257-4141
Paul Ulrich---46OG/OGM/OL-AC, 937-255-6302
John Murphy---46)G/OGM/OI-AC, 937-255-6302
CAPT Elizabeth Miller---AFMC/SGSR, 937-656-3647

Lori Stryker---AFSG/OMY, 937-257-8389
Lynn Moad---DFSG/DC, 937-257-2714
Doug Fleser---DFSG/OM, 937-257-1955
Pete Jacques---88 ABW/LGRRP, 937-904-3160
Gus Reed---AF Research Lab, 937-255-3267
Jay Asher---ASC/XPP, 937-904-8572
Barbara O'Brien---88 ABW/CECX, 937-257-4804
Linda Cardwell---88 MSS/DPC, 937-257-3699
Jerry Stryker---88 MSS/DPCX, 937-257-1888

COMMUNITY OFFICIALS

Louis C. Ferraro, Jr.,-- Ferro Consulting, 937-427-3834
Jim Leftwich---Dayton Development Coalition, 937-229-9074

MEETING RESULTS/FOLLOW-UP ACTION:

We met with the community officials at a separate meeting outside the base following the meeting with WPAFB officials.

Air Force officials provided us with a Mission Briefing of Air Force Materiel Command and then discussed each of the 7 BRAC recommendations affecting WPAFB. (4 technical, 2 medical and 1 hqs. & support). The net effect of these recommendations is a GAIN of 589 military personnel and a LOSS of 170 civilian personnel. Following the discussions we were given a windshield tour of Area B of the base that will be affected by the recommendations.

WPAFB officials made the point that they support the Secretary of Defense BRAC recommendations and they are not in a position to speculate or provide opinions on the results or the analysis behind the recommendations. After discussing each recommendation, WPAFB officials stated that the recommendations are not without challenges. Three challenges were discussed—(1) manpower (recruiting sufficient numbers of people for the skills required, (2) MILCON (determining the most appropriate locations to build on the base) and (3) implementation (ensuring organizational changes don't impact mission, ensuring new structure is aligned with common goals and metrics and the reconstitution of specialized functions).

WPAFB officials made the point that the Base has sufficient capacity and space to accommodate the influx of added workload to be received. They further stated that with respect to the sensor work to be received from Rome Lab, the work is compatible with the work that WBAFB now performs on sensors. Officials estimated that 718 people now work in WPAFB's Sensor Directorate (138 officers, 1 enlisted, and 579 civilian personnel).

As a result of our visit, WPAFB agreed to take on the following action items at our request:

1. The number of people in WPAFB, Rome & Hanscom Sensor Directorates
2. Clarification of terminology—DFSG, OSSG & CFS.
3. The intent of the Rotary Wing Transfer—V-22, PRV, or both?
4. A discussion as to what (function and people) is moving out of WPAFB to China Lake concerning Live Fire testing. More precise terminology and specifics needed.
5. The intent of the CP0 consolidation (Hqs. & Support)
6. Results of recent WPAFB review of manpower impacts (SWAT team results).
7. Any disconnects/inconsistencies identified by WPAFB concerning the BRAC recommendations that need clarification.
8. Map of WPAFB showing facilities/areas affected by BRAC recommendations (incoming & outgoing)

COMMUNITY MEETING

Community officials take issue with the recommendation that calls for Development and Fielding Group (DFSG) and other Operational Support Systems Group elements to Hanscom (Tech-6, 22). They are concerned with the evaluation of military value and the lack of available real estate at Hanscom to accommodate the movement from WPAFB.

They made the following points:

1. Evaluation of military did not capture all available data
2. Local Dayton information technology contractors were not accounted for in the calculation of military value.
3. Collocation of acquisition and users should be maintained at WBAFB.
4. DOD does not perform IT R&D on Business Management Operations.
5. Inclusion of a business systems acquisition organization like DFSG in C4ISR was inappropriate and misleading.
6. Sufficient land for MILCON is not available at Hanscom AFB. Roughly, 40 acres are required and only 8.4 unconstrained acres are available.
7. Relocation to Hanscom does not adequately address the enormous differences in cost of operations between Hanscom and WPAFB.

Community officials provided a working paper and other data at the conclusion of the meeting.

DCN:11670

TECH-4

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Louis C. Ferraro (Associate) [lferraro@greentreegroup.com]
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 11:47 AM
To: Lester C. Farrington (E-mail)
Cc: Lesia Mandzia (E-mail)
Subject: Development & Fielding Support Group (DFSG)

Rec'd 7/18/05
Community Input

Attachments: DC DFSG WPAFB DATA.doc



DC DFSG WPAFB
DATA.doc (49 KB)...

Les,

Here is some additional data we have been able to garner from the Air Force regarding DFSG. This paper shows disconnects and inconsistencies in the DoD BRAC TECH-0042 Report.

Please add this data to the prior data submitted for DFSG and the disconnects on the DoD BRAC Report on C4ISR Consolidation. If you have any questions, please give me a call.

We (Jim Leftwich and I) are planning on to brief at your offices this Wednesday at 1000 hours. Hope to see you then.

Thanks,

Lou

<<DC DFSG WPAFB DATA.doc>>

The Greentree Group
937-490-5528

2005 BRAC Process TECH-0042 Part 7

C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation

Disconnects & Inconsistencies Topics

Highlight of Findings

- **Bottom Line...Dayton-Springfield MSA Economic Impact/Job Loss Significantly Understated**
- **Increases AF Infrastructure - - Payback Calculation in Error**
 - Cost Understated
 - Savings Overstated
- **TJCSG Military Value (MV) for C4ISR D&A Calculation in Error**
 - WPAFB higher in almost every MV category except D&A for Information Systems
 - Double Counting/Co-mingling of Hanscom and Maxwell Data.
 - Question 04289 : Identifies IMDS and DCAPES as an Hanscom AFB program; however, both are at Maxwell AFB, AL
- **Analysis provided to Commission different than AF Implementation Plan**
 - Actual Plan Includes Realignment of 3 Additional AF Installations
 - Hill AFB, UT; Tinker AFB, OK; Randolph AFB, TX
 - Actual Plan Does not Have a Supporting COBRA Run
 - Actual Plan includes Use of Lease Space Until MILCON is ready for occupancy (2008-2010)
 - Actual Plan includes Contracting out of 390 programming jobs currently at Maxwell AFB
 - Same approach may be used for Hill AFB, Tinker AFB, and Randolph AFB
- **TJCSG for C4ISR**
 - Did Not Apply 2025 Force Structure Plan for data and analysis
 - Did Not Apply equal analyses for each site
 - No COBRA runs for realignment of D&A Business Information Systems Workload at
 - Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
 - Maxwell AFB, AL
 - Hill AFB, UT
 - Tinker AFB, OK
 - Lackland AFB, TX
 - Randolph AFB, TX
 - Inclusion of Business Information Systems inconsistent with C4ISR definition and application of Technical Criteria as indicated in BRAC documents.

Military Value (MV) Discussion

- **Military Value is the predominate decision criteria for the movement of the development and acquisition workload for movement to Hanscom AFB**
- **TJCSG Military Value (MV) Score for C4ISR Development & Acquisition Calculation in Error**
 - WPAFB higher in almost every MV category except D&A for Information Systems
 - Double Counting/Co-mingling of Hanscom and Maxwell Data.
 - Question 04289 : Identifies IMDS and DCAPES as an Hanscom AFB program; however, both are at Maxwell AFB, AL

- **TJCSG “information systems” data qualifier for questions related to D&A workload**
 - Counts all workload at Hanscom AFB which is predominately C2ISR yet,
 - Does not recognize C2ISR Information Systems Workload at ASC and AFRL on Wright-Patterson AFB or
 - Development and Acquisition Workload at ASC and AFRL on Wright-Patterson AFB
 - Predominately, the DFSG acquisition and engineering workforce was recruited from
 - Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB
 - HQ AFMC, Wright-Patterson AFB
 - Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB
 - DFSG has current MOAs in place for cross-training and utilization of personnel
- **MV of WPAFB is higher than Hanscom AFB**
 - Only two exclusions found: Battlespace and C4ISR D&A
 - MV for C4ISR T&E delta not statistically significant

C4ISR Vs. Business Systems WPAFB Workload Misclassified

C4ISR Joint Technical Architecture Definition, Systems that:

- support properly designated commanders in the exercise of authority and direction over assigned and attached forces across the range of military operations;
 - collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, or interpret available information concerning foreign countries or areas;
 - systematically observe aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means; and
 - obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.
- **Business Systems: 21 Jun 2004 USD ATL Memo, Transformational Options:**
 - 30. Examine DoD’s business management operations to include the complex network of finance, logistics, personnel, acquisition, and other management processes and information systems that are used to gather the financial data needed to support day-to-day management and decision-making.
 - 36. Review the efforts of the Business Management Modernization Program and all other information technology studies being conducted by OSD and the military departments with a goal of determining opportunities for transferring, consolidating, or privatizing all or part of information technology services and systems.
 - Also directs use/look at other AF and OSD studies like MID 905

Analysis Disconnects

- **USD AT&L Memo on 20 Year Force Structure Plan**
 - **TJCSG C4ISR did not use**
 - 20 year force structure plan for 2005 to 2025
 - Probable end-strength levels
 - **IMPACT: Costs and Savings are Incorrectly stated showing a personnel elimination savings of over 200 positions**
 - **Note: As stated in the Jul 05 GAO report. Savings appear to be over stated.**
 - **Wrong Baseline Used**
 - **Planned Personnel Reductions (MID905, Work Force Shaping) included as savings.**
 - **Historically, AFMC funds civilian payroll at approximately 96%**
 - Therefore, all savings with AFMC civilian personnel is overstated by 4%
- **DoD BRAC Technical JCSG Report Misleading**
 - **DoD BRAC Report - - “This recommendation will reduce the number of C4ISR technical facilities from 6 to 2.”**
 - Edwards
 - Eglin AFB

- Hanscom AFB
- Wright-Patterson AFB
- Maxwell AFB,
- Lackland AFB
- **Factual Error:**
 - TJCSG Source documentation does not list Wright-Patterson or Maxwell as technical facilities
- **TJCSG exempted 17** locations were from consideration ... with less than **31** full time equivalent work years ... military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.
- 3 AF Locations with 30 or more personnel were not addressed by the report: Hill AFB, Tinker AFB, Randolph AFB

Factual Errors

- The AF plans to realign three additional C4ISR activities that were not part of published recommendation or included in the analysis.
 - Hill AFB 60 Civ, 3 Mil, 38 Embedded Contractors
 - Tinker AFB 57 Civ, 0 Mil, 25 Embedded Contractors
 - Randolph AFB 77 Civ, 13 Mil, 183 Embedded Contractors
 - No COBRA Accomplished
 - No Published Military Value Analysis for D&A for Hill or Randolph
 - ESC Submitted the data but it was not incorporated in the COBRAs published.

One-Time Costs Understated

- GCSS Instance Replication
 - 2 Sites \$???M
 - Location of Second Site
 - Single Instance has Contingency Operations Plan Implications
- Productivity Loss (Allowed in Previous BRAC COBRAs)
 - Overhires and Contractors to fill the gap
 - COBRA \$0 | SATAF \$2.5M
- Interim Production Support (Allowed in Previous BRAC COBRAs)
 - Cost to Maintain Dual Capability to mitigate Customer Risk
 - COBRA \$0 | SATAF \$7.5M
- ESC Leased Space Costs not included
- COBRA % of Civilian that will relocate 75%
- SATAF % Of Civilians that **will not relocate** 95%
 - Actual Estimate Based on “Unofficial” Employee Feedback
 - Cost of Living Delta
 - Hanscom Area 38% More Expense

- Net Change in Disposable Income – \$22K .
- % Retirement Eligible (Optional+Early) 57.5%
- Local Employment Options: AFRL, ASC, HQ AFMC

- Unemployment Compensation
 - COBRA: \$272 for 16 Weeks
 - State of Ohio: \$425 for 26 to 39 Weeks

- Training for Civilian New Hires at Hanscom (Allowed in Previous BRACs)
 - COBRA \$0
 - SATAF \$3K Per Person

Recurring Costs Understated

Cost of Doing Business

- Embedded Contractors
 - Delta between Contractor cost at WPAFB and Hanscom AFB
 - » \$9.7M annually
 - Direct development contractor cost impact -- TBD

- Customer Interaction due to location changes \$2.6M annually
 - TDY, Air Fare, Care Rental
 - Avg \$3K per trip X 2 trips annually for 50% of workforce

- ESC Assumption 390 Maxwell Positions will be contracted out
 - Conservatively Increase of \$4.7M annually
 - Was not in BRAC original proposal

- 227K square feet of space Identified at WPAFB for deactivation
 - 88th ABW is not going to deactivate the space
 - Therefore Recurring BOS Cost are understated and Savings are overstated

- BOS Savings Appear to be inconsistent
 - 50% Increase in Hanscom Population only increases BOS 24%
 - 50% Increase in Hanscom Population only increases Sustainment 12%

MILCON Issues

- What is the Beneficial Occupancy Date of the Facility?
 - People are scheduled to move in FY06 – FY08
 - Parking Lot Funded in FY08
 - Hanscom Infrastructure Upgrade Funded in FY08
 - Systems Furniture/Facility Outfitting Funded in FY10

- ESC Plan to Lease Space Until Facility Completed
 - In Direct Conflict of BRAC Goal for reduction in DoD Leased Space
 - Expense not included in the Analysis

- Facility Description Types in Hanscom CE Estimate do not match Types in Final BRAC Provided to the Commission

Economic Impact to Dayton-Springfield MSA

– **BRAC Report:** Job Loss 2,250 Unemployment .44%

– **SATAF Analysis:** Job Loss 6,241 Unemployment 1.22%
• Based on WPAFB EIC Multipliers

Current WPAFB Jobs Baseline – 1111 Jobs

- Military – 55
- Civilian – 429
- Support Contractors- 627

Current Indirect Jobs – 1681

- Indirect Jobs from Military - 23
- Indirect Jobs from Civilians - 674
- Indirect Jobs from Support Contractors – 984

Development Contractors (Estimated) – 1342

Indirect Jobs from Development Contractors – 2107

Total Dayton Area Jobs - 6241

DCN:11670

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

L.C. FARRINGTON
8/8/05

DFSG (DAYTON)

From: Louis C. Ferraro (Associate) [lferraro@greentreegroup.com]
Sent: Sunday, August 07, 2005 3:44 PM
To: Lester C. Farrington (E-mail)
Subject: DFSG @ WPAFB

Community Impact

Attachments: DFSG Briefing_-_AFIT_Day_-_Mr Weber 2.ppt; DFSG OSSG OSSW.doc; DC1 DFSG C4ISR 29 July 05 Ver 11.doc



DFSG



DFSG OSSG



DC1 DFSG C4ISR

ing_-_AFIT_Day_-_fOSSW.doc (28 KB) 29 July 05 Ver ...

Les,

I have updated and attached our C4ISR Issue Paper for DFSG.

Also attached is my first try (too long) to summarize the mission of DFSG and why it should not be consolidated under C4ISR or at Hanscom. I will have this finalized tomorrow after some other folks help scale it down.

I am also attaching a slide presentation by the SES in charge of OSSW at Hanscom FYI.

I am still looking for why the COBRA MCP for Hanscom went from \$444 to \$131 million when they pulled out Rome and never added any of the required construction back in. Backing up this assumption is the DoD BRAC Recommendation shows a 50% Increase in Hanscom Population with only an increase BOS of 24% only an increase Sustainment of 12%. This lack of increase suggests that COBRA Screen 5 was not adjusted upward when all the gains and losses (Pulling Rome AFB out) at Hanscom were accomplished. In Military Construction costs, this omission could be as high as \$313Million.

My FAX number is 937-490-5510 or 5511.

Hope you are having a fun weekend -- Lou

<<DFSG Briefing_-_AFIT_Day_-_Mr Weber 2.ppt>> <<DFSG OSSG OSSW.doc>> <<DC1 DFSG C4ISR 29 July 05 Ver 11.doc>>

The Greentree Group
937-490-5528

WPAFB/DFSG/OSSG Missions Versus Hanscom C4ISR Mission

	<u>DFSG/OSSG</u>
1. Mission Compatibility with Hanscom C4ISR	Very Little
2. Available DFSG/OSSG-type Intellectual Capital at Hanscom	Unlikely
3. Knowledge of Legacy Systems/software at Hanscom	Little, if any
4. Need for R&D for mission completion as C4ISR at Hanscom	None
5. Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Software used	Yes
6. C4ISR Product end result as Hanscom	No
7. Product oriented like Hanscom	No
8. Acquisition and Sustainment orientation <i>unlike</i> Hanscom	Yes
9. Need to be collocated with customer <i>unlike</i> Hanscom	Yes
10. Risk of mission failure increased if moved to Hanscom	Yes
11. Need to be consolidated at Hanscom	Little advantage
12. Increased Military Value if consolidated at WPAFB	Yes
13. Increased cost if moved to Hanscom	Yes
14. Savings realized if moved to Hanscom	Never
15. MCP Savings realized if OSSW moved to WPAFB	\$131M in MCP
16. Yearly cost avoidance if OSSW moved to WPAFB	\$42M per year
17. Need for Research Labs and Test & Evaluation	None
18. Collocation with the Program Executive Officer important	Not critical
19. Available Land for substantial further growth at Hanscom	No
20. Available Land for substantial further growth at WPAFB	Yes
21. Current DFSG contracts require work done within 25 mi.	Yes
22. Available Development contractors at WPAFB	Yes

DoD BRAC Recommendation shows a 50% Increase in Hanscom Population with only an increase in BOS of 24% only an increase in Sustainment of 12%. This lack of increase suggests that COBRA Screen 5 was not adjusted upward when all the gains and losses at Hanscom were accomplished. In Military Construction costs, this omission could be as high as \$313Million.

Business Systems, as described in the 21 Jun 2004 USD ATL Memo, Transformational Options is as follows:

- 30. Examine DoD's business management operations to include the complex network of finance, logistics, personnel, acquisition, and other management processes and information systems that are used to gather the financial data needed to support day-to-day management and decision-making.
- 36. Review the efforts of the Business Management Modernization Program and all other information technology studies being conducted by OSD and the military departments with a goal of determining opportunities for transferring, consolidating, or privatizing all or part of information technology services and systems.

Using the above definition, coupled with an understanding of the DFSG and OSSG Business Systems missions, the inclusion of a business systems acquisition and sustainment organizations, such as DFSG and OSSG, in the broad C4ISR category was inappropriate, misleading and substantially deviates from final selection criteria 1.

Most of the work conducted at Hanscom AFB relates to developing and acquiring Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and subsystems (products) for rapid production as weapons systems for the warfighter. DFSG and OSSG do not research, develop and acquire C4ISR systems and subsystems.

DFSG is a service organization focused on acquiring COTS computer software, assisting its functional customers with business process reengineering, evaluating the functionality of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) business management solutions like Enterprise Resource Planning, managing requirements put in Requests For Proposals, and managing the acquisition and fielding of business management (also known as operational support systems) for the Air Force and DoD. Critical to the success of this mission is maintaining close proximity to, and constant "face-to-face" communication with the functional customer.


The Department of Defense does not perform IT Research and Development on Business Management (Operations Support) Systems acquired and used by DFSG. DoD's announced policy for its Business Management Modernization Program (Air Force identifies it as Operational Support Modernization Program) is to acquire Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), specifically Enterprise Resource Planning, solutions – this does not require the C4ISR R&D methodology (final criteria 1 and 4).

Inclusion of DFSG's Business Information Systems mission is inconsistent with C4ISR definition and application of Technical Criteria as indicated in BRAC documents.

Military Value is the predominate decision criteria for the movement of DFSG's development and acquisition workload to Hanscom AFB. However, the TJCSG Military Value (MV) Score for C4ISR Development & Acquisition Calculation is in Error

- WPAFB is higher in almost every MV category except D&A for Information Systems
- Double Counting/Co-mingling of Hanscom and Maxwell Data. Question 04289: Identifies two systems (IMDS and DCAPES) as an Hanscom AFB program; however, both are at Maxwell AFB, AL.


**Electronic Systems Center
Operations Support Systems Wing**



**Air Force
Information Technology
Day
7 December 2004**

***Presented By:
Mr. Frank P. Weber, SES
Director,
Operations Support Systems Wing***

Electronic Systems Center



Operations Support Systems Wing


Workforce: > 3,600 Personnel

- 230 Officer
- 670 Enlisted
- 1,200 Civilians
- 1,500 Contractors



Mission Areas

- Program Management
- Operations & Sustainment
- IT Commodities Acquisition



3612

Over 190 Programs – Valued over \$1 Billion – Across 16 + Mission Areas - Worldwide

Finance – Security – Transportation - Supply – Munitions – Civil Engineering – Contracting – Budget - Medical – Logistics Plans – General Support - Human Resources – Maintenance – Operations – Communications – IT Services

Operations Support Systems Wing

Operations Support Systems Wing
 (Mr. Frank Weber, SES)
 (Col Steve Muhs)

Force Protection Systems Squadron
 (Col Peter Axup)

To Deliver Integrated Force Protection Solutions That Enable Our Users To "See First, Understand First And Act First..."
Total Force: 131
Mil: 33
Civ: 22
Contr: 76

Development & Fielding Group
 (Ms. Deb Haley, SES)

Support the USAF Goals for Information Dominance Through Acquiring, Developing, Maintaining, Reengineering and Providing Technical Services for Information Systems.
Total Force: 1462
Mil: 142
Civ: 606
Contr: 715

Operations & Sustainment Group
 (Actg: Col Vic Jevsevar)

Provide & Support Secure Combat Support Information Systems & Networks For The Air Force & DoD Components
Total Force: 1711
Mil: 686
Civ: 449
Contr: 576

Engineering Integration Squadron
 (Mr. Steve Wright)

Provide world-class, robust systems engineering, technical management, and support services to the Operations Support Systems Wing
Total Force: 308
Mil: 49
Civ: 123
Contr: 136

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(937) 222-1323 fax
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Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation

DoD BRAC Recommendation

Realign Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, and Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating Air & Space Information Systems Research and Development & Acquisition to Hanscom Air Force Base, MA.

DAYTON REGION RECOMMENDATION

Retain the Development and Fielding Systems Group (DFSG) and other Operational Support Systems Group (OSSG) elements at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB)

HIGHLIGHTS OF ANALYSIS:

- **Bottom Line – Significant deviations in the application of BRAC Selection Criteria, Military Value, are evident.**
- **The Dayton-Springfield MSA Economic Impact/Job loss is significantly understated.**
- **The BRAC Recommendation is “tainted” by Massachusetts’ \$410M offer - “If you keep Hanscom open, we will expand it for you.”**
- **Certified data in the BRAC Report shows only 8.4 acres available for a “roughly 40 acre” requirement.**
- **Contractor Manpower Equivalents (embedded contractors) were not properly counted as mission resources.**
- **Costs of realignment were understated in DOD analysis**
 - **Increases in Embedded Contractor Costs not counted**
 - **Hanscom population increases by 50%, yet BOS increases only 24%**
 - **Hanscom population increases by 50%, yet sustainment increases only 12%**
- **Savings were overstated**
 - **Increased cost of Boston-based contractors will exceed \$14 million per year.**
 - **Deltas in Direct development contractor costs are not included. Net Present Value “savings” of \$229M in DOD BRAC recommendation is really a “loss” to DOD of nearly \$1B**
- **DFSG’s Business Systems Mission was improperly categorized as C4ISR.**

Summary of Rationale to Reject BRAC Recommendation

1. There is a **clear risk of failure** in DFSG operations supporting acquisition programs, thereby, jeopardizing logistics support for warfighting commanders. This represents a **substantial deviation from final criteria 1**, the current and future mission capabilities, because of the potential for lowered performance and schedule delays due to the realignment of DFSG and OSSG elements to Hanscom AFB.
2. As Table I illustrates, the Defense Department **understates personnel loss** in the Dayton area (2250 jobs lost, according to original estimate, versus 6,612). Moreover, local Dayton Region Information Technology (IT) contractors supporting DFSG's acquisition mission are part of the **intellectual capital** and not accounted for in the calculation of military value. Neither development nor Advisory and Assistance Service (A&AS) DFSG on-site contractors were factored into the BRAC COBRA equation. This skews the actual costs of realignment (**substantial deviation from final criteria 1 and 4**). The Dayton Region's calculations (please see Tables and Charts A, B, and C below) reveal that, **rather than the Defense Department reported saving of \$229 million dollars, there would be a loss to DOD of \$421 million**. This loss to DOD exceeds \$800 million when the number of *development* contractors affected by the realignment is considered.

**Table I
Personnel Projections**

Source of Numbers	2006-2011 Period			Total
	Direct Job	Indirect Job	Non-A&AS	
BRAC Report	(1262)*	(988)	0	(2250)
Local Validation	(1462)	(2300)**	(2400)	(6162)

* 715 current Direct Contractors (A&AS) **not accounted for** in BRAC COBRA Analysis and exist on the OSSW Manning Chart (as of 04 December 2004) for a total of 1462 direct jobs

** An indirect factor of 1.57 stated in the Economic Impact Analysis more accurately reflects indirect jobs and is used in Air Force Base calculations

3. In the COBRA analysis, TECH-0042, page 45, the data estimate that 55% of the 606 Civilians, or 333 civilians, will move to Boston. The TECH-0042 COBRA Analysis uses a "Standard Civilian annual salary" of \$59,959.18, page 20, which equates to a GS-10 Step 8 in the Boston area (General Schedule Salary table for Hanscom AFB). Page 20, TECH-0042 COBRA Analysis, also reflects a Standard "Civilians Not Willing to Move" as 6% of

the civilian population. Of the current 606 DFSG Civilians, 247 civilians (40%) will be eliminated and 359 civilian positions will be realigned to the Hanscom AFB UMD. In addition, the 715 current A&AS direct contractors are not factored into the analysis. Of the current 142 DFSG Military position, only 39 will realign to Hanscom (27%), page 6, Economic Impact Data. On the same page, the data reflects that DFSG will lose 658 Direct Contractors (**This direct contractor recognition is not reflected in the COBRA data**). In summary, 1462 direct personnel support the current DFSG mission at WPAFB. The BRAC recommendation indicates it can continue the mission with 39 Military, 359 civilians, and 658 direct contractors, for a total of 1056 personnel, a reduction of 28%.

Table A and Chart A below are from the TJCSG COBRA analysis (COBRA Net Present Value Report [COBRA V6.10] 4-20-05, page 42 of 50). These show a “start” date of 2006, a “final” year of 2008, and an 8-year “payback” in year 2016. However, the BRAC COBRA Report does not include the Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS) contractors authorized for utilization on the OSSW manning documents. A&AS positions provide services under contract by nongovernmental sources to support or improve successful performance of ongoing Federal operations (FAR 2.101). As such, these A&AS personnel needed to be included in the COBRA analysis, as they were included in some of the TJCSG data call questions, as well as the TJCSG Economic Impact Report, TECH-0042C: Air & Space C4ISR DAT&E Consolidation, page 4. Page 4 indicates that Hanscom AFB will gain 1412 A&AS Contractors in 2006. The cost of these Direct Contractors has not been included in the COBRA analysis.

TABLE A

BRAC 05 "Net Present Value Report" (Baseline) There Were No Contractor Costs Factored into the COBRA Analysis.

Year	Cost	Factor	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	50,556,665	0.9862873	49,863,397	49,863,397
2007	107,518,433	0.9594234	103,155,701	153,019,097
2008	49,936,875	0.9332913	46,605,651	199,624,748
2009	-35,421,483	0.9078709	-32,158,134	167,466,615
2010	-19,949,483	0.8831429	-17,618,244	149,848,370
2011	-35,421,483	0.8590884	-30,430,185	119,418,185
2012	-35,421,483	0.8356891	-29,601,347	89,816,838
2013	-35,421,483	0.8129271	-28,795,083	61,021,754
2014	-35,421,483	0.7907851	-28,010,781	33,010,973
2015	-35,421,483	0.7692463	-27,247,845	5,763,129
2016	-35,421,483	0.748294	-26,505,683	-20,742,555
2017	-35,421,483	0.7279125	-25,783,740	-46,526,295
2018	-35,421,483	0.7080861	-25,081,460	-71,607,755
2019	-35,421,483	0.6887997	-24,398,307	-96,006,061
2020	-35,421,483	0.6700386	-23,733,761	-119,739,822
2021	-35,421,483	0.6517885	-23,087,315	-142,827,138
2022	-35,421,483	0.6340355	-22,458,478	-165,285,615
2023	-35,421,483	0.6167661	-21,846,770	-187,132,385
2024	-35,421,483	0.599967	-21,251,721	-208,384,106
2025	-35,421,483	0.5836255	-20,672,881	-229,056,987

This Chart A (Below) reflects the BRAC Adjusted Cost/Saving and NPV.

CHART A




Table B and Chart B with A&AS Contractors included are explained below.

TABLE B

BRAC 05 "Net Present Value Report" Adjusted to Include DFSG A&AS Contractor Support Costs. These Costs Were Not Included in the COBRA Analysis.

Year	Cost	Factor	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	92,916,665	0.986287	91,642,527	91,642,527
2007	149,878,433	0.959423	143,796,876	235,439,402
2008	92,296,875	0.933291	86,139,870	321,579,273
2009	6,938,517	0.907871	6,299,278	327,878,551
2010	22,410,517	0.883143	19,791,689	347,670,240
2011	6,938,517	0.859088	5,960,799	353,631,039
2012	6,938,517	0.835689	5,798,443	359,429,482
2013	6,938,517	0.812927	5,640,509	365,069,991
2014	6,938,517	0.790785	5,486,876	370,556,866
2015	6,938,517	0.769246	5,337,429	375,894,295
2016	6,938,517	0.748294	5,192,051	381,086,346
2017	6,938,517	0.727913	5,050,633	386,136,979
2018	6,938,517	0.708086	4,913,067	391,050,046
2019	6,938,517	0.6888	4,779,248	395,829,295
2020	6,938,517	0.670039	4,649,074	400,478,369
2021	6,938,517	0.651789	4,522,446	405,000,814
2022	6,938,517	0.634036	4,399,266	409,400,081
2023	6,938,517	0.616766	4,279,442	413,679,523
2024	6,938,517	0.599967	4,162,881	417,842,404
2025	6,938,517	0.583626	4,049,495	421,891,899

CHART B




Table B and Chart B above, using the same formulae as in the TJCSG chart, includes the 1412 Direct Contractors required at Hanscom AFB for this scenario. Included in the “Cost” column of the chart is a conservative, additional cost of \$30,000 per contractor in Boston versus Dayton (\$100,000 per Direct Contractor in Dayton versus \$130,000 per Direct Contractor in Boston). (Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics - Computer and Mathematical Science Occupations average: Boston MSA average salary (\$76,870); Dayton Springfield MSA average salary (\$61,360) - Escalation Factor for cost of living in Boston 1.30; Government cost of an A&AS IT Contractor ~ \$100,000, applying the cost of living index of 130 to \$100,000 equals ~\$130,000 for the same IT A&AS Contractor in Boston). This additional cost per Direct Contractor amounts to \$42,360,000 additional cost per year in Boston to support the Hanscom AFB scenario (1412 Direct Contractors at an increased cost of \$30,000 each). In the year 2025, rather than the BRAC-reported saving of \$229 million dollars, there is a loss of \$421 million dollars – there will *never* be a savings.

TABLE C

BRAC 05 "Net Present Value Report" Adjusted to Include DFSG A&AS and Development Contractor Support Costs. These Costs Were Not Included in the COBRA Analysis.

Year	Cost	Factor	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	133,176,665	0.9862873	131,350,453	131,350,453
2007	190,138,443	0.9594234	182,423,271	313,773,725
2008	132,556,875	0.9332913	123,714,178	437,487,903
2009	47,198,517	0.9078709	42,850,160	480,338,063
2010	62,670,517	0.8831429	55,347,022	535,685,085
2011	47,198,517	0.8590884	40,547,698	576,232,784
2012	47,198,517	0.8356891	39,443,286	615,676,070
2013	47,198,517	0.8129271	38,368,954	654,045,023
2014	47,198,517	0.7907851	37,323,884	691,368,907
2015	47,198,517	0.7692463	36,307,285	727,676,192
2016	47,198,517	0.748294	35,318,367	762,994,559
2017	47,198,517	0.7279125	34,356,391	797,350,950
2018	47,198,517	0.7080861	33,420,614	830,771,563
2019	47,198,517	0.6887997	32,510,324	863,281,888
2020	47,198,517	0.6700386	31,624,828	894,906,716
2021	47,198,517	0.6517885	30,763,451	925,670,167
2022	47,198,517	0.6340355	29,925,535	955,595,702
2023	47,198,517	0.6167661	29,110,445	984,706,147
2024	47,198,517	0.599967	28,317,553	1,013,023,700
2025	47,198,517	0.5836255	27,546,258	1,040,569,958

Table C above and Chart C below, using the same formulae as in the TJCSG chart, includes the 1412 Direct Contractors required at Hanscom AFB for this scenario, as well as 1342 development contractors that currently work for DFSG (the Dayton Region believes the number of actual development contractors is about 2000 to 2400). Included in the "Cost" column of the chart is a conservative additional cost of \$30,000 per contractor in Boston versus Dayton (\$100,000 per Direct Contractor in Dayton versus \$130,000 per Direct Contractor in Boston). (Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics - Computer and Mathematical Science Occupations average: Boston MSA average salary (\$76,870); Dayton Springfield MSA average salary (\$61,360) - Escalation Factor for cost of living in Boston 1.30; Government cost of an A&AS IT and Development Contractor ~ \$100,000, applying the cost of living index of 130 to \$100,000 equals ~\$130,000 for the same IT A&AS Contractor in Boston). This additional cost per Direct Contractor (A&AS) and Development contractors, amounts to \$82,620,000 additional cost per year in Boston to support the Hanscom AFB scenario (2754 Total Contractors [1412 A&AS and 1342 Development Contractors] at an increased cost of \$30,000 each). In the year 2025, rather than the BRAC-reported saving of \$229 million dollars, there is a *loss of \$1.0 billion dollars* – there will *never* be a savings! Additionally, the creation of Hanscom as a "Center of Excellence" for potential "Joint" growth in the future is not feasible due to high costs in the Boston area and the lack of available land to expand.

CHART C





Table D and Chart D below represent recent data from the Air Force regarding the DFSG military and civilian personnel, and include the DFSG A&AS contractors as well as the Development contractors associated with DFSG’s mission. The new data indicate that the additional costs (based on tables 1 to 3 below) per contractor is \$23,874 versus our first estimate of \$30,000. In any case, the NPV for Chart D shows a cost of over \$700 million dollars in 2025, and there will never be a savings to this scenario.

TABLE D

Year	Cost	Factor	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	116,306,641	0.986287	114,711,763	114,711,763
2007	173,268,109	0.959423	166,237,478	280,949,241
2008	115,686,551	0.933291	107,969,252	388,918,493
2009	30,328,193	0.907871	27,534,084	416,452,577
2010	45,800,193	0.883143	40,448,115	456,900,692
2011	-35,421,483	0.859088	-30,430,185	426,470,507
2012	30,328,193	0.835689	25,344,940	451,815,447
2013	30,328,193	0.812927	24,654,610	476,470,057
2014	30,328,193	0.790785	23,983,083	500,453,140
2015	30,328,193	0.769246	23,329,850	523,782,990
2016	30,328,193	0.748294	22,694,405	546,477,395
2017	30,328,193	0.727913	22,076,271	568,553,666
2018	30,328,193	0.708086	21,474,972	590,028,638
2019	30,328,193	0.6888	20,890,050	610,918,688
2020	30,328,193	0.670039	20,321,060	631,239,748
2021	30,328,193	0.651789	19,767,567	651,007,316
2022	30,328,193	0.634036	19,229,151	670,236,467
2023	30,328,193	0.616766	18,705,401	688,941,868
2024	30,328,193	0.599967	18,195,915	707,137,783
2025	30,328,193	0.583626	17,700,307	724,838,090

CHART D



4. The DFSG is deeply involved with **Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)** software solutions from private industry. Since the private industry has had the lead in developing software solutions, it has been in the best interest of the DoD to capitalize on proven software that is adaptable to DoD like functions. The current private industry technology solution is Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). According to **Gartner Research Publications**, ERP implementations are **risky endeavors** and users must take control of their own destinies. Gartner Dataquest surveyed 265 U.S.-based IT and business managers. Gartner lists six critical success factors for implementing ERP. One of the success factors is that the functional managers must be involved and set realistic expectations and then manage them throughout the implementation process as the project conditions evolve. **Another factor for success is to focus on the users.** Inclusion of users in all activities is important along with having top management involvement and support in the whole project. Gartner recommends that External Service Providers (ESPs) should work with the client/end users. End users must have an ongoing involvement with the initiative. The DFSG is the ESP for AFMC functional users and their managers. **It is critically important to the success of the implementation process to have them collocated at AFMC (final criteria 1 and 4).** (Source: Gartner Research Publication Dates: 10 September 2002 ID Number TG-15-4868; 7 September 2004 ID Number G00122936; 10 December 2003 ID Number ITSV-WW-EX-0390, 23 September 2002 ID Number SPA-17-7897).
5. **The Selection Criteria used for the C4ISR grouped missions do not adequately measure the military value of the Acquisition, Development and Fielding mission of the DFSG.** As noted earlier, the COBRA analysis

did not include all the direct positions annotated on the Unit Manning Document (UMD). Specifically, the A&AS contractors assigned to the DFSG to perform job descriptions that would otherwise be performed by authorized military or civilian personnel were excluded from the COBRA analysis. This represents a substantial and critical deviation from the approved selection criteria. However, in the ESC/OSSW organization chart, dated 7 December 2004, presented by the ESC OSSG Director in a briefing in an Air Force Information Technology day (See attachment 1) the Total DFSG manpower included 142 Military, 606 Civilian, and 715 A&AS Contractors, for a total of 1462 employees in the DFSG. The 715 A&AS Contractors are on the UMD and are part of the DFSG organization. They are omitted in the COBRA calculations and represent 49% of the direct personnel effort to accomplish the DFSG mission.

6. Also, in the BRAC Economic Impact Data for TECH-0042C: Air & Space C4ISR DAT&E Consolidation, page 6, the data show 864 Direct Contractor reduction for DFSG, and on page 4 the data reflects a gain of 1412 Direct Contractors for Hanscom AFB. The COBRA data does not reflect this significant direct contractor increase in the cost of moving DFSG or OSSG to Hanscom. The cost of A&AS contractor support in the Boston area will be significantly more costly than in the Dayton, Ohio.
7. Compounding the unrealistic expectation of accomplishing this realignment is the assumption that 55% of the civilians will move. **Historically, less than 20% of the people will actually move**, especially to such a high cost of living areas as Boston. It should also be noted that many civilians in DFSG are retired military and will not move with the position. Additionally, a doubtful expectation exists that Hanscom AFB can hire 189 qualified (the correct figure may be closer to over 250 civilian positions and over 500 direct contractor positions) civilians in the Boston area that are needed to fill the DFSG authorizations (page 48 TECH-0042 COBRA Analysis). Adding to the difficulty of the task will be the Boston area contracting firms trying to hire the same individuals to fill their contractor ranks to compete for the direct contractor support to DFSG at Hanscom. The Dayton area currently supplies the required contractor talent. Many of the personnel in the contractor pool of personnel have the knowledge, skills and abilities required to perform DFSG's mission due to the many military and civilian retirees in the Dayton area who previously worked for the Air Force and at WPAFB as civilian or military employees. This intellectual capital will be more expensive in the Boston area. This may be one of the reasons why the DFSG personnel numbers were reduced for realignment to Hanscom (28% reduction in personnel). The "proximity to the customer" in the TJCSG selection criteria under "synergy" was not a major factor in C4IRS but it is critical for DFSG mission accomplishment (Source: TJCSG Analysis and Recommendations (Volume XII, 19 May 2005, Part V. Appendix B, page B-10).

8. It has taken many years to develop the contractor network in the Dayton area that supports DFSG. The Greater Dayton IT Alliance has compiled data to illustrate the depth of Information Technology personnel available within the Dayton/Springfield MSA. Six Standard Occupational Classifications (SOC) exits in the MSA and range from Computer & Information Systems Managers, Engineering Managers, Computer hardware Engineers, to Computer Operators and Computer Control Programmers & Operators. The Ohio Department of Jobs & Family Services identifies a total in all IT related SOCs in the Dayton/Springfield MSA of 16,810 personnel employed in the IT area. The ODJFS projects that by 2010 the total will be 22,440. The U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics shows the Dayton MSA with an IT employment of 14,290 in 2002.
9. The larger Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) capabilities desired by the Air Force as well as DoD are now beginning to reap the rewards of the DFSG's leadership and capability it has established. The other services have invested large amounts of money in enterprise applications with limited success because they failed to properly address the development issues and risks. The Defense Department's recommendation to move DFSG to Hanscom has not considered the differences required for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Business Management Information Technology (BMIT) acquisition. Hanscom's competencies are in the area of Command and Control (C2)...not BMIT.
10. The Department of Defense does not perform IT Research and Development on Business Management (Operations Support) Systems. DoD's announced policy for its Business Management Modernization Program (Air Force identifies it as Operational Support Modernization Program) is to acquire Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), specifically Enterprise Resource Planning, solutions. Therefore combining DFSG within the C4ISR mission group with selection criteria that measures R&D-type performance with the ultimate goal of producing a product is substantially flawed. The TJCSG measures do not account for the skills and abilities required to produce the services performed by the DFSG. DFSG provides acquisition services to AFMC functional users in Financial, contracting, and Logistics areas who then, enabled by the business (i.e., operational support) systems, provide capability to the war fighter. Geographical separation of the acquisition service provider (DFSG) from the functional users and managers at Headquarters AFMC injects significant risk of acquisition program failure and increased costs. This collocation of the service provider (DFSG) to its users and system managers (located at Wright-Patt AFB) is a major critical element in the success or failure of development and fielding according to both government auditors and private industry research publications. (Source: Gartner Research & GAO-05-381, April 29, 2005; GAO-05-723T, June 8, 2005).

11. DFSG provides acquisition services to AFMC functional users, who then, enabled by the business (i.e., operational support) systems, provide capability to the warfighter. Geographical separation of the acquisition service provider (DFSG) from the functional users and managers at Headquarters AFMC injects significant risk of acquisition program failure and increased costs. This collocation of the service provider (DFSG) with its users and system managers (located at Wright-Patterson AFB) is a major critical element in the success or failure of development and fielding according to both government auditors and private industry research publications (Military Value Criteria). (Source: Gartner Research & GAO-05-381, April 29, 2005; GAO-05-723T, June 8, 2005)
12. The Department of Defense does not perform IT Research and Development on Business Management (Operations Support) Systems acquired and used by DFSG. DoD's announced policy for its Business Management Modernization Program (Air Force identifies it as Operational Support Modernization Program) is to acquire Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), specifically Enterprise Resource Planning, solutions (final criteria 1 and 4)
13. The inclusion of a business systems acquisition organization like DFSG in the broad C4ISR category was inappropriate, misleading and substantially deviates from final criteria 1. Most of the work conducted at Hanscom AFB relates to developing and acquiring C4ISR systems and subsystems rapidly produced as weapons systems for the warfighter. DFSG does not develop and acquire C4ISR systems and subsystems. DFSG is an organization focused on acquiring COTS computer software, assisting its functional customers with business process reengineering, evaluating the functionality of commercial-off-the-shelf business management solutions like Enterprise Resource Planning, managing requirements put in Requests For Proposals, and managing the acquisition and fielding of business management (also known as operational support systems) for the Air Force and DoD.
14. Sufficient land for Military Construction Programs is not available at Hanscom AFB (final criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8). "Roughly 40 acres" are required. "Hanscom reported its largest parcel is 18.27 acres, and only 8.4 unconstrained acres are zoned for industrial ops." (Source: Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts – Criterion 8, Technical Joint Cross Service Group, Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation).

Bottom line

The Dayton Region Recommends that the 1462 DFSG personnel remain at WPAFB, collocated with their primary systems users and managers (**final criteria 1 and 4**), providing the best support to the DFSG customer, reduced risk of failure, availability of land and facilities to accommodate further anticipated joint growth (**final criteria**

2), reduced cost of operations (**final criteria 4**), and preservation of the intellectual capital already in place in the Dayton Region.

2005 BRAC Process TECH-0042 Part 7

C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation: Disconnects & Inconsistencies

Highlight of Findings

- Bottom Line...Dayton-Springfield MSA Economic Impact/Job Loss Significantly Understated
- Increases AF Infrastructure - - Payback Calculation in Error
- Cost Understated
- Savings Overstated

- TJCSG Military Value (MV) for C4ISR D&A Calculation in Error
 1. WPAFB higher in almost every MV category except D&A for Information Systems
 2. Double Counting/Co-mingling of Hanscom and Maxwell Data.
 - **Question 04289: Identifies IMDS and DCAPES as a Hanscom AFB program; however, both are at Maxwell AFB, AL**
 - **Analysis provided to Commission different than AF Implementation Plan**
 - **Actual Plan Includes Realignment of 3 Additional AF Installations**
 - Hill AFB, UT; Tinker AFB, OK; Randolph AFB, TX
 - **Actual Plan Does not Have a Supporting COBRA Run**
 - **Actual Plan Includes Use of Lease Space Until MILCON is ready for occupancy (2008-2010)**
 - **Actual Plan includes Contracting out of 390 programming jobs currently at Maxwell AFB**
 - **Same approach may be used for Hill AFB, Tinker AFB, and Randolph AFB**
- TJCSG for C4ISR

- Did Not Apply 2025 Force Structure Plan for data and analysis
- Did Not Apply equal analyses for each site
 - No COBRA runs for realignment of D&A Business Information Systems Workload at
 - Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
 - Maxwell AFB, AL
 - Hill AFB, UT
 - Tinker AFB, OK

- Lackland AFB, TX
 - Randolph AFB, TX
- Inclusion of Business Information Systems inconsistent with C4ISR definition and application of Technical Criteria as indicated in BRAC documents.

Military Value (MV) Discussion

- Military Value is the predominate decision criteria for the movement of the development and acquisition workload for movement to Hanscom AFB
- TJCSG Military Value (MV) Score for C4ISR Development & Acquisition Calculation in Error
 - WPAFB higher in almost every MV category except D&A for Information Systems
 - Double Counting/Co-mingling of Hanscom and Maxwell Data.
 - Question 04289: Identifies IMDS and DCAPES as an Hanscom AFB program; however, both are at Maxwell AFB, AL
- TJCSG “information systems” data qualifier for questions related to D&A workload
 - Counts all workload at Hanscom AFB which is predominately C2ISR yet,
 - Does not recognize C2ISR Information Systems Workload at ASC and AFRL on Wright-Patterson AFB or
 - Development and Acquisition Workload at ASC and AFRL on Wright-Patterson AFB
 - Predominately, the DFSG acquisition and engineering workforce was recruited from
 - Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB
 - HQ AFMC, Wright-Patterson AFB
 - Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB
 - DFSG has current MOAs in place for cross-training and utilization of personnel
- MV of WPAFB is higher than Hanscom AFB
- Only two exclusions found: Battlespace and C4ISR D&A
 - MV for C4ISR T&E delta not statistically significant

C4ISR Vs. Business Systems WPAFB Workload Misclassified

C4ISR Joint Technical Architecture Definition, Systems that:

- Support properly designated commanders in the exercise of authority and direction over assigned and attached forces across the range of military operations;
- Collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, or interpret available information concerning foreign countries or areas;

- Systematically observe aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means; and
- Obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

Business Systems: 21 Jun 2004 USD ATL Memo, Transformational Options:

- 30. Examine DoD's business management operations to include the complex network of finance, logistics, personnel, acquisition, and other management processes and information systems that are used to gather the financial data needed to support day-to-day management and decision-making.
- 36. Review the efforts of the Business Management Modernization Program and all other information technology studies being conducted by OSD and the military departments with a goal of determining opportunities for transferring, consolidating, or privatizing all or part of information technology services and systems.
- Also directs use/look at other AF and OSD studies like MID 905

Analysis Disconnects

USD AT&L Memo on 20-Year Force Structure Plan

- TJCSG C4ISR did not use
 - 20 year force structure plan for 2005 to 2025
 - Probable end-strength levels
- IMPACT: Costs and Savings are Incorrectly stated showing a personnel elimination savings of over 200 positions
- Note: As stated in the Jul 05 GAO report. Savings appear to be over stated.
 - Wrong Baseline Used
 - Planned Personnel Reductions (MID905, Work Force Shaping) included as savings.
 - Historically, AFMC funds civilian payroll at approximately 96%
 - Therefore, all savings with AFMC civilian personnel is overstated by 4%

DoD BRAC Technical JCSG Report Misleading

- DoD BRAC Report - - "This recommendation will reduce the number of C4ISR technical facilities from 6 to 2."
 - Edwards
 - Eglin AFB
 - Hanscom AFB
 - Wright-Patterson AFB

- Maxwell AFB
- Lackland AFB
- Factual Error:
 - TJCSG Source documentation does not list Wright-Patterson or Maxwell as technical facilities
- TJCSG exempted 17 locations were from consideration ... with less than 31 full time equivalent work years ... military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.
- 3 AF Locations with 30 or more personnel were not addressed by the report: Hill AFB, Tinker AFB, Randolph AFB

Factual Errors

- The AF plans to realign three additional C4ISR activities that were not part of published recommendation or included in the analysis.
 - Hill AFB 60 Civ, 3 Mil, 38 Embedded Contractors
 - Tinker AFB 57 Civ, 0 Mil, 25 Embedded Contractors
 - Randolph AFB 77 Civ, 13 Mil, 183 Embedded Contractors
- No COBRA Accomplished
- No Published Military Value Analysis for D&A for Hill or Randolph
- ESC Submitted the data but it was not incorporated in the COBRAs published.

One-Time Costs Understated

- GCSS Instance Replication
 - 2 Sites \$???M
 - Location of Second Site
 - Single Instance has Contingency Operations Plan Implications
- Productivity Loss (Allowed in Previous BRAC COBRAs)

Overhires and Contractors to fill the gap

- COBRA \$0 | SATAF \$2.5M
- Interim Production Support (Allowed in Previous BRAC COBRAs)

Cost to Maintain Dual Capability to mitigate Customer Risk

- COBRA \$0 | SATAF \$7.5M
- ESC Leased Space Costs not included

- COBRA % of Civilian that will relocate 75%
- SATAF % Of Civilians that will not relocate 95%

Actual Estimate Based on "Unofficial" Employee Feedback

Cost of Living Delta

- Hanscom Area 38% More Expense
- Net Change in Disposable Income – \$22K.

% Retirement Eligible (Optional+Early) 57.5%

Local Employment Options: AFRL, ASC, HQ AFMC

- Unemployment Compensation

COBRA: \$272 for 16 Weeks

State of Ohio: \$425 for 26 to 39 Weeks

- Training for Civilian New Hires at Hanscom (Allowed in Previous BRACs)

COBRA \$0

SATAF \$3K Per Person

Recurring Costs Understated

Cost of Doing Business

Embedded Contractors

- Delta between Contractor cost at WPAFB and Hanscom AFB
 - \$9.7M annually
- Direct development contractor cost impact -- TBD

Customer Interaction due to location changes \$2.6M annually

- TDY, Air Fare, Care Rental
- Avg \$3K per trip X 2 trips annually for 50% of workforce

ESC Assumption 390 Maxwell Positions will be contracted out

- Conservatively Increase of \$4.7M annually
- Was not in BRAC original proposal

227K square feet of space Identified at WPAFB for deactivation

- 88th ABW is not going to deactivate the space
- Therefore Recurring BOS Cost are understated and Savings are overstated
- BOS Savings Appear to be inconsistent
 - 50% Increase in Hanscom Population only increases BOS 24%
 - 50% Increase in Hanscom Population only increases Sustainment 12%

MILCON Issues

- What is the Beneficial Occupancy Date of the Facility?
 - People are scheduled to move in FY06 – FY08
 - Parking Lot Funded in FY08
 - Hanscom Infrastructure Upgrade Funded in FY08
 - Systems Furniture/Facility Outfitting Funded in FY10
- ESC Plan to Lease Space Until Facility Completed
 - In Direct Conflict of BRAC Goal for reduction in DoD Leased Space
 - Expense not included in the Analysis
- Facility Description Types in Hanscom CE Estimate do not match Types in Final BRAC Provided to the Commission

Economic Impact to Dayton-Springfield MSA

- BRAC Report: Job Loss 2,250 Unemployment .44%
- SATAF Analysis: Job Loss 6,241 Unemployment 1.22%
 - Based on WPAFB EIC Multipliers

Current WPAFB Jobs Baseline – 1111 Jobs

- Military – 55
- Civilian – 429
- Support Contractors- 627

Current Indirect Jobs – 1681

- Indirect Jobs from Military - 23
- Indirect Jobs from Civilians - 674
- Indirect Jobs from Support Contractors – 984

Development Contractors (Estimated) – 1342

Indirect Jobs from Development Contractors – 2107

Total Dayton Area Jobs - 6241

Dayton Development Coalition Working Paper

**Excerpts from Technical Joint Cross Service Group
Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and
Acquisition, Test and Evaluation**

**Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR
Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation**

Recommendation: Realign Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, and Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating Air & Space Information Systems Research and Development & Acquisition to Hanscom Air Force Base, MA.

Justification: This recommendation will reduce the number of technical facilities engaged in Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics and Information Systems RDAT&E from 6 to 2. Through this consolidation, the Department will increase efficiency of RDAT&E operations resulting, in a multi-functional center of excellence in the rapidly changing technology area of C4ISR.

Payback (Projected): The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$254.4M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of \$115.3M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$36.2M with a payback expected in 8 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$238.0M.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2250 jobs (1262 direct jobs and 988 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Dayton, OH, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.44 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: This recommendation has the potential to impact air quality at Hanscom. Additional operations at Hanscom may impact archeological sites, which may constrain operations. This recommendation may require building on constrained acreage at Hanscom. The hazardous waste program at Hanscom will need modification. Additional operations may impact wetlands at Hanscom, which may restrict operations.

This recommendation has no impact on dredging; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; waste management; or water resources. This recommendation will require spending approximately \$0.5M cost for waste management and environmental compliance activities. This cost was included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the bases in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.

DAYTON REGION RECOMMENDATION

The Development and Fielding Systems Group (DFSG) and other Operational Support Systems Group elements at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB) should *not* be realigned to Hanscom AFB for the following reasons:

1. Substantial data evaluations of DFSG's Military Value were not captured in the DOD BRAC analyses, and have the potential to increase the risk of failure in operations support acquisition programs, thereby jeopardizing logistics support for warfighting commanders.
2. Local Dayton Region IT development contractors supporting DFSG's acquisition mission are part of the intellectual capital and not accounted for in the calculation of Military Value. (The A&AS DFSG on-site contractors were factored into the BRAC equation).
3. DFSG provides acquisition services to AFMC functional users, who then, enabled by the business (i.e., operational support) systems, provide capability to the war fighter. Geographical separation of the acquisition service provider (DFSG) from the functional users and managers at Headquarters AFMC injects significant risk of acquisition program failure and increased costs. This collocation of the service provider (DFSG) to its users and system managers (located at Wright-Patt AFB) is a major critical element in the success or failure of development and fielding according to both government auditors and private industry research publications. (Source: Gartner Research & GAO-05-381, April 29, 2005; GAO-05-723T, June 8, 2005)
4. The Department of Defense does *not* perform IT Research and Development on Business Management (Operations Support) Systems. DOD's announced policy for its Business Management Modernization Program (Air Force identifies it as Operational Support Modernization Program) is to acquire Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), specifically Enterprise Resource Planning, solutions.
5. The inclusion of a **business systems acquisition** organization like DFSG in the broad C4ISR category was inappropriate and misleading. Most of the work

conducted at Hanscom AFB relates to developing and acquiring embedded C4ISR systems and subsystems rapidly produced as **weapons systems** for the warfighter. DFSG is an Acquisition organization focused on assisting its functional customers with business process reengineering, evaluating the functionality of commercial-off-the-shelf business management solutions like Enterprise Resource Planning, managing requirements put in Requests For Proposals, and managing the acquisition and fielding of business management, aka operational support systems for the Air Force and DOD.

6. Sufficient land for Military Construction Programs is not available at Hanscom AFB. "Roughly 40 acres" are required. "Hanscom reported its largest parcel is 18.27 acres, and only 8.4 unconstrained acres are zoned for industrial ops." (Source: Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts – Criterion 8, Technical Joint Cross Service Group, Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation).
7. The DOD recommendation to realign DFSG, and other Operations Support Systems Wing elements located at Wright-Patterson AFB, does not adequately address the enormous differences in cost of operations between Hanscom AFB, MA and Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. Examination of the "Economy" and "Cost of Living" data in the following table reveals that costs of operation for activities realigned to Hanscom AFB will soar because of locality pay differentials, difficulty in hiring qualified Government and contractor personnel (lower unemployment rate in Boston), housing costs, etc.

**Table I
Personnel Projections**

Source of Numbers	2006-2011 Period			Total
	Direct Job	Indirect Job	Non-A&AS	
BRAC Report	(1262)	(988)	0	(2250)
Local Validation	(1262)	(988)	(2400)	(4650)

**Table II
Economic Projections**

GENERAL	Dayton	Boston	Washington	Los Angeles	US Avg.
State	OH	MA	DC	CA	USA
Population	168,256	557,056	511,636	3,687,700	290,809,777
County	Montgomery	Suffolk	District of Columbia	Los Angeles	N/A
Metro Area	Dayton-Springfield	Boston	Washington	Los Angeles-Long Beach	N/A
Population	168256	557056	511636	3687700	48,662
RACE					
White	59.50%	56.20%	30.90%	50.80%	81.80%
Black	39.10%	28.70%	63.40%	14.00%	10.40%
Asian	1.00%	8.20%	2.80%	12.40%	11.60%
Amer. Indian	0.20%	0.40%	0.30%	0.40%	0.80%
Other	0.20%	6.50%	2.70%	22.40%	3.50%
Hispanic	1.00%	14.80%	7.60%	49.70%	11.00%
PROFESSIONS					
Executive	10.20%	14.40%	16.30%	13.00%	12.60%
Professional	12.30%	18.60%	23.00%	14.10%	14.70%
Technical	3.80%	4.50%	4.70%	3.20%	3.60%
Sales	10.00%	9.70%	6.90%	11.30%	12.50%
Clerical	18.20%	19.50%	21.20%	17.40%	15.90%
Blue-collar	45.60%	33.40%	27.90%	41.00%	40.70%
ECONOMY					
Income per cap.	\$13,677	\$22,916	\$27,334	\$21,865	\$21,658
Household inc.	\$31,162	\$46,267	\$45,388	\$48,978	\$44,958
Unemp. rate	3.80%	2.20%	2.30%	5.50%	4.00%
Rec. job growth	1.50%	1.90%	2.90%	3.40%	2.60%

Sales taxes	6.50%	5.00%	5.75%	8.10%	6.35%
Income taxes	7.24%	5.95%	9.50%	6.00%	4.60%
COST OF LIVING					
Overall	95.1	132	127.7	140	100
Housing	84.6	160.9	152	199	100
Food	100.4	114.2	110.2	110	100
Transportation	104.6	118.7	136.4	113.4	100
Utilities	102.5	138.1	97	119.7	100
Health	96.1	130.7	123.6	114.4	100
Miscellaneous	98.4	110	114.3	107	100
HOUSING					
	Dayton	Boston	Washington	Los Angeles	US Avg.
Median home cost	98380	187180	176860	231510	\$146,102
Home apprec.	3.10%	13.20%	11.60%	12.50%	7.80%
Prop. tax rate	\$20	\$15	\$15	\$11	\$16.43
Home cost index	84.6	160.9	152	199	100
Homes owned	47.30%	27.00%	37.80%	41.10%	59.10%
Homes rented	41.30%	62.30%	48.90%	51.80%	32.60%
Homes vacant	11.40%	10.70%	13.40%	7.10%	8.30%
HEALTH					
	Dayton	Boston	Washington	Los Angeles	US Avg.
Phys. per cap.	328	923	702	240	230
Health cost index	96.1	130.7	123.6	114.4	100
CRIME					
	Dayton	Boston	Washington	Los Angeles	US Avg.
Violent crime	1,063.70	1,302.10	1,627.70	1,283.20	446.1
EDUCATION					
	Dayton	Boston	Washington	Los Angeles	US Avg.
High sch. grad.	76.20%	78.30%	76.80%	71.10%	79.50%
2yr. coll. grad.	6.90%	6.10%	3.60%	8.10%	7.60%
4yr. coll. grad.	11.50%	21.00%	19.00%	19.10%	17.30%

PhD Graduates	5.20%	12.90%	19.60%	9.10%	8.50%
School expend.	\$5,954%	\$9,040%	\$8,048%	\$5,118%	\$5,928
Rupl/tchr. ratio	17	16.5	14.9	22.8	17.7
CLIMATE	Dayton	Boston	Washington	Los Angeles	US Avg.
Rainfall (in.)	36.7	42.9	39	14.6	34.6
Snowfall (in.)	29	41	16	0.1	24.3
Precip. days	131	253	111	36	109
Sunny days	182	205	207	258	213
Days over 90	17	12	37	5	34
Freezing days	117	99	75	0	83
Avg. July high	85	82	88.2	83	85.9
Avg. Jan. low	19	22	27.7	48	26.8
Comfort index (higher=better)	33	36	26	43	34
Elevation ft.	740	20		267	750
Area (sq. mi.)	55	48.4	61.4	469.3	20.2
TRANSPORTATION	Dayton	Boston	Washington	Los Angeles	US Avg.
Commute time	17.8	23.3	25.6	24.7	19.1
COMMUTE MODE					
Auto (alone)	72.10%	40.20%	36.00%	65.70%	75.90%
Carpool	12.70%	11.00%	11.60%	15.60%	13.10%
Mass transit	7.7	30.8	35.8	10.3	2.80%
Bike or walk	6.00%	15.90%	13.70%	5.40%	5.70%
Work at home	1.60%	2.20%	3.00%	3.00%	2.60%
PLACE OF WORK					
Same county	88.60%	70.50%	78.00%	97.30%	78.10%
Different county	10.80%	28.60%	0.00%	2.40%	18.60%
Different state	0.60%	0.90%	22.00%	0.30%	3.20%

TECH-6
C4ISR

DAYTON

From: Louis C. Ferraro (Associate) [lferraro@greentreegroup.com]
Sent: Thursday, August 11, 2005 10:27 AM
To: Lester C. Farrington (E-mail)
Cc: Joe Greene (E-mail)
Subject: C4ISR Definition

Les,

Below is the best definition I was able to find on C4ISR. It is accurate and will help distinguish between C4ISR systems that are created through R&D to support the weapon systems for the warfighter, and the DFSG / OSSG Business Systems (COTS and Legacy) that provide command and control data feeds to support the warfighter. These Business Systems are very dissimilar from the Hanscom produced, embedded software and subsystems installed in, and/or supporting the E-3A AWACS, JSTARS, LINK 16, etc. - many of which require the R&D to create.

I am also working on a C4ISR slide to present a "picture" of C4ISR and where Hanscom, DFSG and OSSG fit into the "picture". The goal is to have it simple enough to be quickly understandable in a briefing. Hope to have it by tomorrow morning.

Cheers,

Lou

- > "C4ISR" refers to systems that are part of the Command, Control,
- > Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
- > Reconnaissance domain.
- > C4ISR is defined in the Joint Technical Architecture (now DoDAF) as
- > those systems that:
- > * support properly designated commanders in the exercise of authority
- > and direction over assigned and attached forces across the range of
- > military operations;
- > * move data that is critical to the conduct of military operations;
- > * collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, or interpret
- > available information concerning foreign countries or areas;
- > * systematically observe aerospace, surface or subsurface areas,
- > places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic,
- > or other means; and
- > * obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods,
- > information about the activities and resources of an enemy or
- > potential enemy, or secure data concerning the meteorological,
- > hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

Lou

The Greentree Group
937-490-5528

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

TECH - 6
DAYTON

From: Louis C. Ferraro (Associate) [lferraro@greentreegroup.com]
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 10:22 AM
To: Lester C. Farrington (E-mail)
Cc: Joe Greene (E-mail)
Subject: DFSG Labor Costs
Attachments: DFSG BRAC Labor Costs.doc

Les,

This is a paper addresses TECH 6 and why we should include the increased cost of labor for development contractors who work for DFSG. We think we have a powerful case that the increased cost of labor for development contractors should be included. Given the fact that the DoD recommendation is already questionable, this data further solidifies the case against moving DFSG.

Additionally, after reading the Don DeYoung paper, I believe a case can be made that, not only did the DoD back into moving DFSG to Hanscom, but, the DoD is also using BRAC to make programmatic changes -- moving people during BRAC to perhaps sidestep the congressional oversight.

Regards,

Lou

Costs of “Development Contractors” Should be Considered in Move to Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation at Hanscom Air Force Base

The Dayton community asserts that the annually recurring cost of moving the Development and Fielding Systems Group (DFSG) from Dayton, Ohio, to Boston will increase because of the greater cost of labor for both direct contractor (also known as “embedded” or A&AS contractors) and development contractor positions. Development contractor workers are employed by contractors to perform the development and maintenance tasks, and typically work off-site. Neither increased cost was included in the COBRA run and both could be substantial.¹ Most of the work of DFSG is actually performed by development contractors.²

The contention that the direct contractor positions will move to Boston is not in dispute. These jobs by their very nature are co-located with direct government jobs. The data provided to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission include these jobs as lost to the Dayton, Ohio; Montgomery, Alabama, and San Antonio, Texas communities and specific numbers are provided. There is also no dispute that the cost of labor will be higher in the Boston area than in the receiving site.

The assertion that the development contractor jobs will move to Boston has been argued with the contention that the development contractor jobs do not have to be co-located with the direct government jobs. Under this argument, because theoretically the development contractor jobs could be located anywhere, it would be inappropriate to score them as a loss to the donor base area and as a gain for the receiver site.

However, in this case, one of the key underlying justifications for the move of DFSG to Boston is the assertion that Boston’s intellectual capital is greater than Dayton—in other words, the Air Force wants to move DFSG specifically to take advantage of the IT workforce in the Boston area. *Not only does the Air Force fully expect the development contractor positions to move from donor sites to Boston, the military value argument is predicated on this happening.*

The number of development contractor positions that move could be subject to conjecture. However, there is no disputing that at least a significant percentage will move if one accepts the premise that the work needs to be performed using the “higher intellectual capital” in Boston.³ There is also no disputing the significantly higher cost of computer-related labor in the Boston area, which is documented in Bureau of Labor Statistics and other measures.

Even accepting that less than 100 percent of the development contractor positions would move, the resulting annually recurring costs are so great as to make this move untenable.

¹ Internal Air Force working papers estimate the annually recurring costs for labor of moving direct contractor positions to be \$9.7 million. which does not include non-salary benefits. The community estimates that the real cost, including non-salary benefits (insurance, vacation, etc.) is \$13.2 million.

² According to figures provided by the Air Force to Senator DeWine, 1,790 development contractors perform work for DFSG, and 1,342 (75 percent) of those live in the Dayton area.

³ If this premise is not accepted, then the move should be summarily rejected.

Appendix:

**Analysis of Job Movements and Costs Not Included in Original Scenario to Consolidate Air
and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation
At Hanscom Air Force Base**

Table 1
Annually Recurring Increased Cost of Labor Resulting from Moving Direct Contractor¹ Jobs to Hanscom AFB
Not Counted in the Defense Department COBRA Analysis²
Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Donor Area	Number of Direct Contractor Jobs Moving to Boston ³	Annual Salary per Job at Donor Base ⁴	Cost to Air Force per Job at Donor Base (Annual Salary plus Non-Wage Benefits) ⁵	Total Cost to Air Force for Direct Contract Jobs at Donor Base	Annual Salary per Job Moved to the Boston Area ⁶	Cost to Air Force per Job at Hanscom (Annual Salary plus Non-Wage Benefits) ⁷	Total Cost to Air Force for Direct Contract Jobs at Hanscom	Total Annual Increased Cost to Air Force for Direct Contractor Jobs Moved to Boston
Dayton, OH	658	\$61,360	\$79,523	\$52,325,844	\$76,870	\$99,624	\$65,552,276	\$13,226,432
Montgomery, AL	698	\$55,650	\$72,122	\$50,341,435	\$76,870	\$99,624	\$69,537,217	\$19,195,782
San Antonio, TX	56	\$59,120	\$76,620	\$4,290,693	\$76,870	\$99,624	\$5,578,917	\$1,288,224
Total	1,412	\$176,130		\$106,957,973			\$140,668,410	\$33,710,437

8

¹ "Direct Contractor" jobs, also known as Assistant and Advisory Services (A&AS) jobs, are private sector jobs that perform on-base services in direct support of the operation of the government unit's mission.

² The COBRA analysis apparently did recognize pay differentials for civilian government workers.

³ Certified Data. Source: "Economic Impact Report." BRAC Report Volume 12 (Technical) G - TECH-0042C Criterion 6 Report.

⁴ These numbers are based on a July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing, "DSFG Orientation AFMC BRAC Site Survey Team," presented by the Development and Fielding Systems Group, which used the figure of \$61,360 per direct contractor job for the Dayton-Springfield area (page 23). This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for the Dayton-Springfield, MSA Ohio for computer and mathematical occupations (Standard Occupational Classification 15-0000). The other figures are for the corresponding positions for Montgomery, Alabama MSA; and San Antonio, Texas. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, Standard Occupational Classification.

⁵ Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits. This number is determined by taking the base annual salary in the previous column and adding 29.6 percent.

⁶ This number is taken from the same July 12, 2005 Air Force Briefing. This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for Boston, Massachusetts-New Hampshire PMSA. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, for computer and mathematical occupations (Standard Occupational Classification 15-0000).

⁷ Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits. This number is determined by taking the base annual salary in the previous column and adding 29.6 percent.

Table 2
Annually Recurring Increased Cost of Labor Resulting from Moving Development Contractor¹ Jobs
From Dayton, Ohio Area to Boston, Massachusetts Area
Not Counted in the Defense Department COBRA Analysis²
Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Number of Jobs in the Dayton area that would move to Boston ³	Annual Salary per Development Contractor Job in Dayton ⁴	Cost to Air Force per Job at Donor Base (Annual Salary plus Non-Wage Benefits) ⁵	Total Cost to Air Force for Development Contractor Jobs in Dayton Area	Annual Salary per Development Contractor Job in Boston Area ⁶	Cost to Air Force per Job in Boston Area (Annual Salary plus Non-Wage Benefits) ⁷	Total Cost to Air Force for Development Contract Jobs in Boston Area	Total Increased Cost to Air Force ⁸
1342	\$90,450	\$117,223	\$157,313,534	\$107,070	\$138,763	\$186,219,570	\$28,906,036

¹ These are private jobs with employers who have contracts to perform development and Sustainment work for the Development and Fielding Systems Group (DFSG) headquartered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, outside Dayton, Ohio

² The COBRA analysis apparently did recognize pay differentials for civilian government workers.

³ This figure is taken from page 23 of a July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing, "DSFG Orientation AFMC BRAC Site Survey Team," presented by the Development and Fielding Systems Group. The source is described as, "Estimates based on contract awards to community."

⁴ This figure is taken from the same July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing. This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for Dayton-Springfield, Ohio, MSA for the Standard Occupational Classification series 11-3021, Computer and information systems managers. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates.

⁵ Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits. This number is determined by taking the base annual salary in the previous column and adding 29.6 percent.

⁶ This figure is taken from the same July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing. This number corresponds to the mean annual wages estimates of the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for Boston, Massachusetts-New Hampshire PMSA for the Standard Occupational Classification series 11-3021, Computer and information systems managers. See May 2004 Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates.

⁷ Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits. This number is determined by taking the base annual salary in the previous column and adding 29.6 percent.

⁸ Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." This study determined the national average for employee benefits is equal to 29.6 percent of base salary. This includes paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings, legally required benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) and other benefits.

Table 3 Annually Recurring Increased Cost of Labor Resulting from Moving Identified¹ Contractor Jobs to Hanscom AFB Not Counted in the Defense Department COBRA Analysis Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation²	
Annually recurring increased labor costs for direct contractor jobs from Dayton, Ohio; Montgomery, Alabama, and San Antonio, Texas	\$33,710,437
Annually recurring increased labor costs for development contractor jobs from Dayton, Ohio	\$28,906,036
Total annually recurring costs	\$62,616,473

¹ "Identified" means only specific jobs identified by the Department of Defense. These are identified either in the Department of Defense documents provided as justification for BRAC decision or the July 12, 2005 Air Force briefing, "DSFG Orientation AFMC BRAC Site Survey Team," presented by the Development and Fielding Systems Group. This does not include development contractor jobs in Montgomery, Alabama, or San Antonio, Texas. According to the "Statement for the Record" provided by Brig. Gen. (ret.) Paul Hankins, Special Assistant, City of Montgomery and Montgomery Area Chamber of Commerce, to the Atlanta, Georgia hearing of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission on June 30, 2005, there are a total of 940 contractors support the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group (OSSG) in Montgomery, Alabama. This is 242 more jobs than accounted for in the Defense Department's BRAC data. If this jobs were moved to the Boston area from Montgomery using the same formula of the DFSG jobs from Dayton, then it would add another \$8,408,747 in annually recurring labor costs. However, this figure is excluded from the chart because the number cannot be verified using only Defense Department data.

² See tables 1 and 2 for supporting data and sources.

Table 4		
Comparisons of Defense Department Estimate Versus Inclusion of Increased Labor Costs		
	<i>Defense Department Estimate Without Increased Labor Costs</i>	<i>Defense Department Estimate With Increased Labor Costs</i>
Annually recurring savings after implementation	\$36.2 million	-\$26.4 million
Net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period	\$115.3 million	-260.3 million

**TECH 6
DAYTON**

August 15, 2005

Memo to: Les Farrington, BRAC Commission Senior Staff Analyst**From:** The Dayton Development Coalition (DDC)**Subject:** Decisions on Personnel Movements and MILCON Made With Insufficient Justification for Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation at Hanscom Air Force Base

The Dayton community asserts that the decisions on personnel movements which drive military construction and other costs for the move (Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR RDATA at Hanscom) were made without supporting evidence in order to ensure a predetermined outcome would prevail.

The final COBRA analysis for the move appears to ignore 1,412 direct contractor positions at donor locations for military construction needs and other costs.

The economic impact report for the scenario (April 4, 2005) indicates that a total of 1,412 direct contractor positions (also known as “embedded” or A&AS contractors) are employed in the support of missions to be moved to Hanscom.¹ If these positions took the same 30 percent cut as civilian and military positions that means 988 additional employees would be moved to Hanscom with the resulting increased BOS, Sustainment, military construction, communications footprint, and other expenses.

Military construction needs were based on faulty inputs of available Hanscom space

The minutes of the Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) of January 10, 2005 assert that because Hanscom has more than 4,000 FTEs of available space, no new military construction (MILCON) is required. The 4,000 FTE figure is not credible. A total of 5,705 employees work at Hanscom, which amounts to about 650 square feet of building space per person² (which is about the same as Wright-Patterson Air Force Base). To have space available for an additional 4,000 FTEs is to suggest that Hanscom is currently 40 percent empty.

A 30 percent across-the-board cut was imposed on incoming positions instead of 15 percent for most scenarios without explanation.

The TCSG decided to apply a 15 percent reduction for “consolidation” and “joint” scenarios in all personnel required to move as a default assumption unless the subgroup’s military judgment and data support smaller or deeper reductions.³ On March 31, 2005, the TCSG agreed to apply a 30 percent reduction without justification or explanation. This resulted in reduced costs for MILCON and other expenses.

¹ Wright-Patterson: 658; Maxwell: 698; Lackland, 56.

² From the web page of the 66th Air Base Wing Public Affairs Office.

³ See TJCSG minutes January 13, 2005 and February 10, 2005.

MILCON needs at Hanscom were reduced from \$444.3 million to \$160 million without sufficient justification.

The January 4, 2005 COBRA run indicated that \$444.3 million in MILCON was required for the move. This included consolidating activities from Rome, New York, which was later dropped. The resulting MILCON needs should have been about 40 percent less. In the DoD BRAC Report, May 13, 2005, the TJCSG reflects a figure of \$131 million for MILCON requirements at Hanscom. The reduction in required MILCON costs remains unexplained!

The following are facts extracted from TJCSG minutes and COBRA documents that raise numerous questions regarding the military value and cost of the subject recommendation. In fact, the following excerpts and associated COBRA data would suggest that the TJCSG deliberately and methodically adjusted costs factors and COBRA assumptions in order to achieve cost and military value figures that would justify this recommendation. The recommendation was apparently conceived from the strategic vision the TJCSG set forth rather than from an analytical approach that is supposed to govern recommendations. Our analyses were bolstered by similar issues raised in an 18 June 2004 letter to the TJCSG by Mr. Don DeYoung (atch).

Cost Discussions

Below are figures directly from COBRA spreadsheets followed by our observation and analysis.

COBRA Inputs Spreadsheet "TECH-0042p7 USAF Complete.xls" dated 04 Jan 05

- Assumptions for COBRA run TECH-0008/0042 part 7
- Screen 3: Personnel Movements
 - From Rome AFB To Hanscom AFB
 - Officer – 65
 - Enlisted – 32
 - Civilians - 640
 - From WPAFB To Hanscom AFB
 - Officer – 50
 - Enlisted – 7
 - Civilians - 521
 - From Lackland AFB To Hanscom AFB
 - Officer – 9
 - Enlisted – 2
 - Civilians – 40
 - From Maxwell To Hanscom AFB
 - Officer – 135
 - Enlisted – 534
 - Civilians – 528
- Screen 5 – Base Information (Dynamic)

- One-time moving costs - \$292,890,000
- One-time IT costs - \$8,969,000
- One-time unique costs - \$72,481,000
- Screen 7 - Base Information (Military Construction)
 - Total - \$444,373,000

DDC Observation and Analysis:

The initial scenario defined by the TJCSG included the movement of personnel and missions from Rome to Hanscom. Accordingly, the related cost included those figures. The DDC conducted a COBRA analysis of this move minus the Rome AFB component. In conducting the analysis, we removed the Rome AFB personnel numbers from the move and reduced the associated cost on Screens 5 & 7 by 40%, which is the same percentage reduction in personnel that resulted from removing Rome AFB.

The results of our analysis are as follows:

- Payback:
 - One time Cost: \$ 657,678,000
 - Net Implementation Costs: \$ 693,877,000
 - Annual Recurring Savings (Costs): (\$4,843,000)
 - Payback Time: Never
 - NPV (Savings): \$ 726,979,000

The key points here are that there is never a payback on this move and in fact, the recurring costs continue to drive the costs higher.

Technical JCSG 071T Minutes 10 Jan 05

- Historically, 15% manpower saving have been realized using COBRA for consolidation scenarios in past BRAC rounds. Therefore, Mr. Shaffer recommended the TJCSG standardize this 15% assumption across the board for all TJCSG consolidation scenarios. (p. 1)
- Assumptions for COBRA run TECH-0008/0042 part 7
 - Since Hanscom has over 4000 FTEs of available space per the capacity percentage report 010705, no new MILCOM is required to house the less than 2000 D&A FTEs from WPAFB, Lackland AFB, and Maxwell AFB and the less than 850 of AFRL /IF FTEs from WPAFB and Rome, NY.
 - Since it is unknown what the net result of the manpower gains and losses at Hanscom AFB will be, it is premature to estimate any costs for increases to support infrastructure such as Child Care Facility additions, etc...
 - The net result of the above two assumptions is to remove all the Screen 5 MILCON costs from the next COBRA run for TECH-0008/0042 Part 7.
 - Since no manpower savings were taken for the benefits of consolidation, an estimated reduction of 272 total positions – 180 positions from WPAFB, 85 positions from Maxwell AFB and 7 positions from Lackland AFB – (less than 15% of the 1826 positions involved) will be made as the

benefits of consolidation and be included as manpower savings in the next COBRA run. (P:7)

- Payback:
 - One time Cost: \$50,800,000
 - Net Implementation Costs: \$1,500,000
 - Annual Recurring Savings: \$9,600,000
 - Payback Time: 6 years
 - NPV (Savings): (\$84,600,000)

DDC Observation and Analysis:

It is unclear what information is contained in the referenced capacity report, as it has not been made available by the DoD for review. A DoD COBRA titled "C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation Tech008pt7_13Jan05" included the assumptions that there would be no MILCON costs and no unique cost (Screens 5 & 7 in the COBRA model had been zeroed out for Hanscom AFB). Additionally, the manpower numbers in the movement tables reflected a manpower reduction of 31.33% vs. the standard 15% dictated by the TJCSG. The following is information extracted from the COBRA run "C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation Tech008pt7_13Jan05".

- Screen 3: Personnel Movements (A reduction of 527 from the previous run)
 - From WPAFB To Hanscom AFB
 - Officer – 34
 - Enlisted – 5
 - Civilians - 359
 - From Lackland AFB To Hanscom AFB
 - Officer – 8
 - Enlisted – 2
 - Civilians – 34
 - From Maxwell To Hanscom AFB
 - Officer – 122
 - Enlisted – 212
 - Civilians – 478
- Screen 5 – Base Information (Dynamic)
 - One-time moving costs - \$0
 - One-time IT costs - \$0
 - One-time unique costs - \$0
- Screen 7 - Base Information (Military Construction)
 - Total - \$0

The following were the results of the COBRA run.

- Payback:
 - One time Cost: \$ 48,622,000
 - Net Implementation Costs: \$3,303,000
 - Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 8,850,000
 - Payback Time: 6 years

- NPV (Savings): (\$80,375,000)

Technical JCSG 075 Minutes 13 Jan 05

- For “Consolidation” and “Joint” scenarios, the TJCSG decided to apply a 15% reduction in all personnel required to move, as a default assumption, unless the subgroup’s military judgment and data do support smaller or deeper reductions.
- For “Co-Located” scenarios, the TJCSG decided to not adopt a default and/or Subgroup assumption and allow the subgroups to propose whatever personnel reduction makes the most sense for each individual scenario. (P.2)

DDC Observation and Analysis:

As highlighted above, the TJCSG had already applied a manpower reduction of over 30% to this particular scenario.

Technical JCSG 093 Minutes 08 Feb 05

- All scenarios shall be based on the overarching strategy. If the candidate recommendation is to move to a location with lower military value, there needs to be a special review of the strategy for validation. (P.1)
- Mr. Mleziva presented the analysis for TECH-0008/0042.
 - The TJCSG decided to inactivate the land T&E portion of TECH-0008/0042 as the payback period was in excess of 100 years.
 - The TJCSG directed the C4ISR subgroup to proceed with preparation of the candidate recommendation package for the air portion of TECH-0008/0042. (P.2)
- Slide C4ISR RDAT&E Center Billets Overview (p.9)
 - Consolidate to – Billet reduction
 - Hanscom 376
- Slide Tech-0008/0042C C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation Air and Space Information System RDAT&E (Page 13)
 - Impacts: -5609 Jobs (3267 direct, 2342 Indirect)
 - Payback:
 - One time Cost: \$50.8M
 - Net Implementation Costs: \$1.5M
 - Annual Recurring Savings: \$9.6M
 - Payback Time: 6 years
 - NPV (Savings): (\$84.6M)

DDC Observation and Analysis:

As of 10 Feb 2005, the Air C4ISR scenario was still absent any MILCON or unique cost associated with the scenario.

Technical JCSG 094 Minutes 10 Feb 05

- The Subgroups shall apply a standard 15% reduction to the total number of government and on-site contractors being relocated from the donor to the receiver site for all scenarios. Each subgroup may provide rationale to change this standard to the TJCSG for approval.

DDC Observation and Analysis:

At this point in time, the Air C4ISR Consolidation was already working with a 30% reduction, yet there was no rationale provided for the deviation from the standard 15%.

Technical JCSG 106a Minutes 01 Mar 05

- (Slide) Tech-0008/0042C C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation Air and Space Information System RDAT&E (Page 13)
- (Slide 23) Payback (pg. 17)
 - One time Cost: \$51.1M
 - Net Implementation Costs: \$19.3M
 - Annual Recurring Savings: \$13.12M
 - Payback Time: 4 years
 - NPV (Savings): (\$137.03M)

DDC Observation and Analysis:

It is difficult to ascertain the specific assumptions under which the scenario was run on 01 Mar 2005. Based on the results, it is evident that the scenario which is being briefed on this day is not the same scenario that was reviewed by the Air Force prompting the letter from Mr. Pease to Mr. Potochney referenced below.

Technical JCSG 115 Minutes 10 Mar 05

- The Air Force BRAC Office has expressed concern regarding the 60% increase of population at Hanscom AFB associated with TECH-0034 and 0042. (P.2)
- Letter from Gerald F. Pease, Jr to Peter J. Potochney, Director, OSD BRAC Office
 - Tech 0009/0034 and Tech-0042: These CRs increase the Hanscom AFB population by more than 60% at an estimated cost of several hundred million dollars. This situation also calls for a further deliberative scrub of the estimated cost and an examination of alternatives should the costs remain as currently estimated.
- The TJCSG has approved the use of FTEs and test hours as the final measures of technical capacity. This will be added to the CRs. (p. 3)

Technical JCSG 126 Minutes 24 Mar 05

- HANSCOM Cleanup - Key Points: This is in the works.
-

Technical JCSG 132 Minutes 31 Mar 05

- The TJCSG agreed to the middle ground figure of \$160M in MILCON required to accommodate the new MILCON req't for TECH-0042C as well as a 30% vs 15%

efficiency factor. The C4ISR will prepare a new CR (TECH-0042CR), which will document the new MILCON and efficiency data as agreed to by the AF BRAC office and the TJCSG. (P.3)

DDC Observation and Analysis:

As mentioned earlier, by the time the letter from Mr Pease was received by the TJCSG, the scenario had already been shifted to reflect a 30% manpower savings as a result of the consolidation. The scenario that resulted at this point was "J1 - C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation Tech042pt7_scrubbed_updated1APR2005(6.10)". The assumptions for this scenario included:

- Screen 3: Personnel Movements (A total reduction of 30% from the original 1826)
 - From WPAFB To Hanscom AFB
 - Officer – 34
 - Enlisted – 5
 - Civilians - 359
 - From Lackland AFB To Hanscom AFB
 - Officer – 8
 - Enlisted – 2
 - Civilians – 34
 - From Maxwell To Hanscom AFB
 - Officer – 95
 - Enlisted – 374
 - Civilians – 370
- Screen 5 – Base Information (Dynamic)
 - Facilities shutdown
 - WPAFB - 226,956 sq ft
 - Maxwell AFB – 443,982 sq ft
 - Costs
 - One-time moving costs - \$ 16,309,000
 - One-time IT costs - \$ 8,969,000
 - One-time unique costs - \$ 38,282,000
 - Environment costs - \$ 486,000
- Screen 7 - Base Information (Military Construction)
 - Total - \$ 131,325,000

These assumptions can be questioned and challenged in a couple of areas. First, in the manpower movement from Maxwell, there has been a shift in the demographics of the personnel moving. The original numbers call for 122 officers, 212 enlisted, and 478 civilians. Over the various runs and reductions, the DoD took the 30% reduction and shifted the makeup of the work force from higher cost officers and civilians to lower cost enlisted. Additionally, the DoD takes credit for facilities closure at both WPAFB and Maxwell. It is unclear whether a facilities closure at WPAFB is realistic.

The following were the results of the COBRA run.

- Payback:
 - One time Cost: \$ 252,369,000
 - Net Implementation Costs: \$ 117,219,000
 - Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 35,421,000
 - Payback Time: 8 years
 - NPV (Savings): (\$ 229,057,000)

Final DDC COBRA Run Correcting Disconnect and Inconsistencies

The DDC executed a COBRA run for this scenario based upon correcting a number of disconnects and inconsistencies highlighted above. The changes are reflected in the assumptions for personnel movement, facilities shutdown, and MILCON.

Assumptions

- Screen 3: Personnel Movements (A total reduction of 15% from the original 1826)
 - From WPAFB To Hanscom AFB
 - Officer – 43
 - Enlisted – 7
 - Civilians - 441
 - From Lackland AFB To Hanscom AFB
 - Officer – 8
 - Enlisted – 2
 - Civilians – 34
 - From Maxwell To Hanscom AFB
 - Officer – 115
 - Enlisted – 454
 - Civilians – 449
- Screen 5 – Base Information (Dynamic)
 - Facilities shutdown
 - WPAFB - 0 sq ft
 - Maxwell AFB – 443,982 sq ft
 - Costs
 - One-time moving costs - \$ 16,309,000
 - One-time IT costs - \$ 30,000,000 (based on minutes from BRAC Commission analyst visit to Hanscom on July 29, 2005).
 - One-time unique costs - \$ 38,282,000
 - Environment costs - \$ 486,000
- Screen 7 - Base Information (Military Construction)
 - Adjusted cost of MILCON to reflect the same cost/sq ft as applied to original COBRA run
 - Total - \$ 164,730,000

The following were the results of the conservative COBRA run.

- Payback:

- One time Cost: \$ 315,285,000
- Net Implementation Costs: \$ 196,854,000
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 31,426,000
- Payback Time: 12 years
- NPV (Savings): (\$ 113,902,000)

These numbers are extremely conservative and the cost and NPV of this scenario continues to erode as other factors are considered. For example, not accounted for in this run are the following disconnects.

- **Unexplained cost reductions**

- One-time moving costs: From \$ 292,890,000 (4 Jan 05) to \$ 16,309,000 (1 Apr 05)
- One-time unique costs: From \$ 72,481,000 (4 Jan 05) to \$ 38,282,000 (1 Apr 05)
- Military Construction Costs: From \$444,373,000 (4 Jan 05) to \$131,325,000 (1 Apr 05)

Cost of production increases as a result of doing business in Hanscom vs. either of the donor sites, which results in an increased recurring cost of \$62,616,473 as demonstrated in paper from DDC titled "Costs of "Development Contractors" Should be Considered in Move to Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation at Hanscom Air Force Base", dated 15 August 2005.

When these various costs are adjusted and refactored in the equation (e.g. half of the original one time moving costs and MILCON cost for base infrastructure like child care, fitness center etc...), the following are the results.

- **Payback:**
 - One time Cost: \$ 461,721,000
 - Net Implementation Costs: \$ 345,784,000
 - Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 30,934,000
 - Payback Time: 20 years
 - NPV (Savings): \$37,074,000

Military Value Discussions

Technical JCSG 078 Minutes 19 Jan 05

- The briefing was primarily for the TJCSG principals to capture the TJCSG overarching framework and candidate recommendation. A version of this briefing will be used to show the ISG the TJCSG's first set of candidate recommendations.
- It was noted the briefing initially mentions FTEs and does not address Capacity and Military Value.
- The number FTE's include government personnel and on-site contractors. (p. 2)
- Slide 25 largest installations/facilities by FTE (p.8)
 - 3. WPAFB
 - 17. Hanscom AFB

Technical JCSG 081T Minutes 24 Jan 05

- TECH-0040 went forward as a candidate recommendation without the Military Value analysis being completed for Air Force Office of Scientific Research. The lessons learned from this are for each subgroup to ensure all Military Value and Capacity Analyses are complete. (P.1)

Technical JCSG 124 Minutes 23 Mar 05

- The IG is auditing the TJCSG Military Value Analysis and is finding it very hard to audit due to the complexity and lack of documentation. The TJCSG is working with the IG to improve the documentation. (P.3)

Technical JCSG 147T Minutes 27 Apr 05

- The final report will include the statement proposed by Mr. Shaffer regarding the acknowledgment of the differences between the Dec 2004 cutoff and Feb 2005 data in the report. The statement will be, "Capacity and Military Value data were updated from the initial final report throughout January and February 2005 using certified data received in response to scenario data calls. The updates did not change any scenarios, and did not change relative rankings of facilities." Before going final, the TJCSG needs to still confirm the accuracy of this statement. (p. 1)

DDC Observation and Analysis: All of the minutes clearly indicate that the TJCSG was forging conclusions to fit a desired outcome without the definition of Military Value. Candidate recommendations were being forwarded even though the defined Military Value test was lacking. Complicating the TJCSG's conclusions are the Group's internal issues regarding the measurement of Military Value and capacity as depicted in the DeYoung letter (atch). **Accurate and timely Military Value data would not only have stopped the proposed DFSG movement to Hanscom, it would have rendered a logical proposal to bring Hanscom's OSSW resources to Wright-Patterson.**

Why Move OSSG and DFSG to Hanscom AFB?

TJCSG Answer: For C4ISR RDAT&E, the TJCSG strove to address two of the biggest C4ISR concerns (Deleted “Gripes”) that come from the operational community.

- 1) the various systems delivered to the field don’t work well together (i.e., they don’t interoperate), and
- (2) The technology takes too long to get the field and thus is dated when it’s finally fielded.

Community Response: *Correct.* There is room for improvement in integration and speed of fielding of C4ISR systems. It is important to establish that DFSG and OSSG **do not** produce C4ISR systems; they develop and sustain automated business systems including COTS ERP solutions that produce data for inclusion in C4ISR Command and Control systems.

TJCSG Answer: The root cause of these concerns is the multiple dispersed C4ISR RDAT&E activities.

Community Response: *Incorrect.* Delays and lack of interoperability can be the result of any failure during the development or integration of the components. The most likely point of failure is the integration level that could be the result of insufficient architectural standards that are not the responsibility of DFSG and OSSG. Dispersal of activities related to C4ISR RDAT&E activities is not a significant factor.

TJCSG Answer: The natural tendency of geographically separate units (GSUs), such as OSSG and DFSG, is to pursue technical solutions that use local Information Technology (IT) assets and products with which they are familiar.

Community Response: *Incorrect.* This answer suggests that there is somehow an IT “culture” in Dayton that is inferior to the IT culture in Boston. Top IT specialists at both locations are trained at the same kind of schools and learn the same development tools. There is enormous fluidity and cross-interaction throughout the country of IT workers, perhaps more so than most major industries because of the volatility and constant advancement of the technology.⁴

TJCSG Answer: This can lead to unique, not readily interoperable IT solutions that do not reflect the state-of-the-art especially when the GSUs are located in places of lesser (Deleted “Relatively low”) IT intellectual capital.

⁴ The absurdity of this argument can be noted in the recent selection by Hewlett-Packard of NCR President Mark Hurd as HP President. The fact that Hurd spent virtually his entire career in Dayton working for NCR in no way suggested to the HP hiring team that he only knew Dayton-style IT. While we consider this item to be posterously arrogant we will stay focused on an objective and factual reply.

Community Response: *Incorrect.* Problems with the development of C4ISR and automated business systems are not the consequence of developing those systems in a place of “lesser” IT intellectual capital. Moreover, the Dayton area has a robust IT community with hundreds of highly competitive IT-related business and major university IT programs. The intellectual capital at Wright-Patterson and Gunter AFB is as knowledgeable, if not more so, of current IT COTS technology as anywhere in the government and industry.

TJCSG Answer: The result is that extra effort, manpower and time is required to integrate the C4ISR products from those two Support Groups with the C4ISR products from the remainder of the Operations Support Systems Wing and the other C4ISR Wings, all of which are located at Hanscom AFB.

Community Response: *Partially correct.* The requirement for extra resources to integrate automated business systems products with C4ISR is largely the result of inadequate architectural standards, which serve as the “instructions” to the two support groups. If the standards are not adequate, the products from the support groups will not integrate properly no matter how well the products are developed.

TJCSG Answer: Similarly, co-locating the Air & Space C4ISR Research (currently at Wright-Patterson AFB) with the Development, Acquisition and Test & Evaluation (non-open air range) at Hanscom AFB is designed to reduce the cycle time required to field Information Systems technology and ease the integration of new technology into C4ISR products headed for the field.

Community Response: *Incorrect.* Air & Space C4ISR research has no direct relation to the work of DSFG, which is to acquire and develop business systems, nor with the work of OSSG. Consequently, co-locating Air & Space C4ISR research with DFSG and OSSG at Hanscom cannot be expected to have significant synergistic benefits. Consolidation of Air & Space C4ISR research at Hanscom may have research benefits but the benefits are not likely to affect the problems associated with integration of DFSG and C4ISR products.

TJCSG Answer: With fewer seams in RDAT&E process, the SECDEF Recommendation to realign C4ISR RDAT&E to Hanscom AFB is consistent with the BRAC Criteria (i.e., Military Value) and should (Deleted “Will”), dramatically reduce the personnel, cycle time and effort required to deliver Air & Space C4ISR capability to the operational community.

Community Response: *Incorrect.* The relevant seam is not between DFSG / OSSG and the C4ISR work coordinated at Hanscom. Therefore, eliminating the

geographical separation will not solve the problems. Moving DFSG to Hanscom will disrupt existing work and remove development from collocation with the principal customer (HQ AFMC), thus increasing risk of failure. Moreover, by moving work from a relatively low cost labor market to a significantly more expensive labor market, additional cost-cutting pressures are likely to further hamper results. Consequently, the move of DFSG / OSSG will not reduce the personnel, cycle time, and effort required to deliver Air & Space C4ISR capability to the operational community and it should be rejected as a substantial deviation from BRAC military value criteria.


C4ISR Definition

"C4ISR" refers to systems that are part of the Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance domain.

C4ISR is defined in the Joint Technical Architecture (now DoDAF) as those systems that:

- Support properly designated commanders in the exercise of authority and direction over assigned and attached forces across the range of military operations;
- Move data that is critical to the conduct of military operations;
- Collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, or interpret available information concerning foreign countries or areas;
- Systematically observe aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means; and
- Obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

Business Systems Information Technology Missions VS. RDAT&E Missions



Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

TECH-6
(WPAFB)
Congressional Package)
Rec'd 7/21/05

July 20, 2005

The Honorable Anthony Principi
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We understand that the Air Force, as part of planning for proposed BRAC realignments, is identifying "disconnects and inconsistencies" among data used in putting DOD BRAC recommendations together and actual "as is" data from activities affected by realignments or closures. We are particularly interested in promptly receiving Air Force information concerning disconnects and inconsistency data related to the recommended realignment of the Development and Fielding Systems Group and elements of the Operations Support Systems Wing at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base versus C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation data used by the DOD Technical Joint Cross-Service Group in recommending this realignment.

We are enclosing preliminary data we received to assist you in telling the Air Force the type of data you are seeking.

Thank you in advance for your consideration.

Sincerely,



DAVID L. HOBSON
Member of Congress



MIKE TURNER
Member of Congress

Enclosure

2005 BRAC Process TECH-0042 Part 7

C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation

Disconnects & Inconsistencies Topics

Highlight of Findings

- **Bottom Line...Dayton-Springfield MSA Economic Impact/Job Loss Significantly Understated**
- **Increases AF Infrastructure -- Payback Calculation in Error**
 - Cost Understated
 - Savings Overstated
- **TJCSG Military Value (MV) for C4ISR D&A Calculation in Error**
 - WPAFB higher in almost every MV category except D&A for Information Systems
 - Double Counting/Co-mingling of Hanscom and Maxwell Data.
 - Question 04289 : Identifies IMDS and DCAPEs as an Hanscom AFB program; however, both are at Maxwell AFB, AL
- **Analysis provided to Commission different than AF Implementation Plan**
 - Actual Plan Includes Realignment of 3 Additional AF Installations
 - Hill AFB, UT; Tinker AFB, OK; Randolph AFB, TX
 - Actual Plan Does not Have a Supporting COBRA Run
 - Actual Plan Includes Use of Lease Space Until MILCON is ready for occupancy (2008-2010)
 - Actual Plan includes Contracting out of 390 programming jobs currently at Maxwell AFB
 - Same approach may be used for Hill AFB, Tinker AFB, and Randolph AFB
- **TJCSG for C4ISR**
 - Did Not Apply 2025 Force Structure Plan for data and analysis
 - Did Not Apply equal analyses for each site
 - No COBRA runs for realignment of D&A Business Information Systems Workload at
 - Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
 - Maxwell AFB, AL
 - Hill AFB, UT
 - Tinker AFB, OK
 - Lackland AFB, TX
 - Randolph AFB, TX
 - Inclusion of Business Information Systems inconsistent with C4ISR definition and application of Technical Criteria as indicated in BRAC documents.

Military Value (MV) Discussion

- **Military Value is the predominate decision criteria for the movement of the development and acquisition workload for movement to Hanscom AFB**
- **TJCSG Military Value (MV) Score for C4ISR Development & Acquisition Calculation in Error**
 - WPAFB higher in almost every MV category except D&A for Information Systems
 - Double Counting/Co-mingling of Hanscom and Maxwell Data.
 - Question 04289 : Identifies IMDS and DCAPEs as an Hanscom AFB program; however, both are at Maxwell AFB, AL

- **TJCSG "Information systems" data qualifier for questions related to D&A workload**
 - Counts all workload at Hanscom AFB which is predominately C2ISR yet,
 - Does not recognize C2ISR Information Systems Workload at ASC and AFRL on Wright-Patterson AFB or
 - Development and Acquisition Workload at ASC and AFRL on Wright-Patterson AFB
 - Predominately, the DFSG acquisition and engineering workforce was recruited from
 - Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB
 - HQ AFMC, Wright-Patterson AFB
 - Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB
 - DFSG has current MOAs in place for cross-training and utilization of personnel
- **MV of WPAFB is higher than Hanscom AFB**
 - Only two exclusions found: Battlespace and C4ISR D&A
 - MV for C4ISR T&E delta not statistically significant

C4ISR Vs. Business Systems WPAFB Workload Misclassified

C4ISR Joint Technical Architecture Definition, Systems that:

- support properly designated commanders in the exercise of authority and direction over assigned and attached forces across the range of military operations;
 - collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, or interpret available information concerning foreign countries or areas;
 - systematically observe aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means; and
 - obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.
- **Business Systems: 21 Jun 2004 USD ATL Memo, Transformational Options:**
 - 30. Examine DoD's business management operations to include the complex network of finance, logistics, personnel, acquisition, and other management processes and information systems that are used to gather the financial data needed to support day-to-day management and decision-making.
 - 36. Review the efforts of the Business Management Modernization Program and all other information technology studies being conducted by OSD and the military departments with a goal of determining opportunities for transferring, consolidating, or privatizing all or part of information technology services and systems.
 - Also directs use/look at other AF and OSD studies like MID 905

Analysis Disconnects

- **USD AT&L Memo on 20 Year Force Structure Plan**
 - **TJCSG C4ISR did not use**
 - 20 year force structure plan for 2005 to 2025
 - Probable end-strength levels
 - **IMPACT: Costs and Savings are Incorrectly stated showing a personnel elimination savings of over 200 positions**
 - **Note: As stated in the Jul 05 GAO report. Savings appear to be over stated.**
 - **Wrong Baseline Used**
 - **Planned Personnel Reductions (MID905, Work Force Shaping) included as savings.**
 - **Historically, AFMC funds civilian payroll at approximately 96%**
 - Therefore, all savings with AFMC civilian personnel is overstated by 4%
- **DoD BRAC Technical JCSG Report Misleading**
 - **DoD BRAC Report - - "This recommendation will reduce the number of C4ISR technical facilities from 6 to 2."**
 - Edwards
 - Eglin AFB

- Net Change in Disposable Income – \$22K .
- % Retirement Eligible (Optional+Early) 57.5%
- Local Employment Options: AFRL, ASC, HQ AFMC

- Unemployment Compensation
 - COBRA: \$272 for 16 Weeks
 - State of Ohio: \$425 for 26 to 39 Weeks

- Training for Civilian New Hires at Hanscom (Allowed in Previous BRACs)
 - COBRA \$0
 - SATAF \$3K Per Person

Recurring Costs Understated

Cost of Doing Business

- Embedded Contractors
 - Delta between Contractor cost at WPAFB and Hanscom AFB
 - » \$9.7M annually
 - Direct development contractor cost impact -- TBD

- Customer Interaction due to location changes \$2.6M annually
 - TDY, Air Fare, Care Rental
 - Avg \$3K per trip X 2 trips annually for 50% of workforce

- ESC Assumption 390 Maxwell Positions will be contracted out
 - Conservatively Increase of \$4.7M annually
 - Was not in BRAC original proposal

- 227K square feet of space Identified at WPAFB for deactivation
 - 88th ABW is not going to deactivate the space
 - Therefore Recurring BOS Cost are understated and Savings are overstated

- BOS Savings Appear to be inconsistent
 - 50% Increase in Hanscom Population only increases BOS 24%
 - 50% Increase in Hanscom Population only increases Sustainment 12%

MILCON Issues

- What is the Beneficial Occupancy Date of the Facility?
 - People are scheduled to move in FY06 – FY08
 - Parking Lot Funded in FY08
 - Hanscom Infrastructure Upgrade Funded in FY08
 - Systems Furniture/Facility Outfitting Funded in FY10

- ESC Plan to Lease Space Until Facility Completed
 - In Direct Conflict of BRAC Goal for reduction in DoD Leased Space
 - Expense not included in the Analysis

- Facility Description Types in Hanscom CE Estimate do not match Types in Final BRAC Provided to the Commission

Economic Impact to Dayton-Springfield MSA

- **BRAC Report:** Job Loss 2,250 Unemployment .44%

- **SATF Analysis:** Job Loss 6,241 Unemployment 1.22%
 - Based on WPAFB EIC Multipliers

Current WPAFB Jobs Baseline – 1111 Jobs

- Military – 55
- Civilian – 429
- Support Contractors- 627

Current Indirect Jobs – 1681

- Indirect Jobs from Military - 23
- Indirect Jobs from Civilians - 674
- Indirect Jobs from Support Contractors – 984

Development Contractors (Estimated) – 1342

Indirect Jobs from Development Contractors – 2107

Total Dayton Area Jobs - 6241

DCN:11670
OCT-18-2004 11:35

AIR FORCE SAF LLH

202 685 2592 P.02



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC 20330-1000

15 OCT 2004

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

SAF/LL
1160 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1160

The Honorable Michael R. Turner
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3503

Dear Mr. Turner

You have expressed concerns regarding press reports that the U.S. Air Force may be considering a proposal to move the Air Force Research Laboratory from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, to Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts. We assure you those press reports are false.

However, no one can predict the results of the upcoming Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. As required by the BRAC statute, we will consider all installations equally using published selection criteria, the force structure plan, and our installation inventory. All BRAC recommendations will be based solely on data certified in accordance with the statute and submitted through formal Air Force and Department of Defense BRAC processes.

We hope this letter has allayed your concerns. Rest assured that senior Air Force leaders are well aware of the incredible work being done by the talented and patriotic workforce at Wright-Patterson. Please do not hesitate to contact us with any questions.

Very respectfully

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Scott S. Custer".

SCOTT S. CUSTER
Major General, USAF
Director, Legislative Liaison

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

May 18, 2005

The Honorable Anthony Principi
Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 S. Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:


Thank you for your hard work and dedication and for that of the members of the commission and your staff, as you undertake the important process of reviewing our nation's military resources in formulating a BRAC recommendation that will ensure the strengthening of our national security. Now that Secretary Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense have issued their recommendations, pursuant to the BRAC process, I am seeking confirmation of the BRAC commission's application of the BRAC review criteria.

Attached is an October 8, 2004 correspondence from Raymond F. DuBois, Deputy-Under Secretary of Defense, to Congressman Duncan Hunter, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, confirming DOD's policy towards community proposals to invest future resources to improve or expand base infrastructure for consideration within the BRAC process. Secretary DuBois confirmed that such proposals do not constitute certified data upon which DOD will rely.

From a policy perspective, it is important that communities hosting military facilities have confidence that the BRAC commission will not consider offers of monetary, or land or facility enhancements in making its final recommendations. Absent such assurances, communities may needlessly spend countless hours garnering resources in anticipation of a specious opportunity to impact the BRAC process.

Again, thank you for your service and I appreciate your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,



Rep. Terry Everett
Member of Congress



Rep. Michael R. Turner
Member of Congress



Rep. Mike Rogers
Member of Congress

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC 20330-1000

15 OCT 2004

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

SAF/LL
1160 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1160The Honorable Michael R. Turner
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3503

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Very respectfully

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SCOTT S. CUSTER
Major General, USAF
Director, Legislative Liaison

DCN:11670



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

ACQUISITION
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OCT 8 2004

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your request for consideration of proposals to invest future resources to improve or expand base infrastructure and their consideration within the BRAC process.

While the Department welcomes any actions that improve military-community relationships and the quality of life for our nation's armed forces, it will not include such promised considerations within the BRAC process. The statute authorizing the BRAC process requires that the Department review all military installations equally based on approved, published selection criteria and a force structure plan. The statute also requires that military value be the primary consideration in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations using certified data. Proposals from the public do not constitute certified data that our analysis relies upon.

I trust you find this information helpful.

Sincerely,

Raymond F. DuBois
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Environment)

cc: The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Member



DCN:11670

**OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000ACQUISITION
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OCT 8 2004

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your request for consideration of proposals to invest future resources to improve or expand base infrastructure and their consideration within the BRAC process.

While the Department welcomes any actions that improve military-community relationships and the quality of life for our nation's armed forces, it will not include such promised considerations within the BRAC process. The statute authorizing the BRAC process requires that the Department review all military installations equally based on approved, published selection criteria and a force structure plan. The statute also requires that military value be the primary consideration in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations using certified data. Proposals from the public do not constitute certified data that our analysis relies upon.

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Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts - Criterion 8

Scenario ID#: TECH0042C

<u>General Environmental Impacts</u>	
Environmental Resource Area	Edwards
Air Quality	The base is in non-attainment for ozone (maintenance). An initial conformity analysis indicated that a conformity determination is not required. No air permit revision is necessary. A critical air quality region is located within 100 miles of the installation, but it does not restrict operations.
Cultural/ Archeological/ Tribal Resources	There are 2989 archaeological sites, and there is a native American tribe interested in burial sites on the installation but they do not impact operations. There are also 7 historic properties and 4 historic districts making up 8,461 acres. Additional operations may impact these areas which may impact operations.
Dredging	No impact
Land Use Constraints/ Sensitive Resource Areas	No impact to land use from scenario
Marine Mammals/ Marine Resources/ Marine Sanctuaries	No impact
Noise	No increase in off-base noise is expected
Threatened& Endangered Species/ Critical Habitat	T&E species and critical habitats already restrict operations (use of high explosives on the range) with a Biological Opinion. Additional operations may impact T&E species and/or critical habitats. In addition, the Biological Opinion will need to be evaluated to ensure the scenario conforms to it.
Waste Management	No impact
Water Resources	No impact
Wetlands	Wetlands do not exist. No impact.

<u>Impacts of Costs</u>	
	Edwards
Environmental Restoration	DERA money spent through FY03 (\$K): 277868 Estimated CTC (\$K): 645215 DO NOT ENTER IN COBRA
Waste Management	None
Environmental Compliance	FY07 Air Conformity Analysis: \$50K

<u>General Environmental Impacts</u>	
Environmental Resource Area	Eglin
Air Quality	No impact
Cultural/ Archeological/ Tribal Resources	No impact
Dredging	No impact
Land Use Constraints/ Sensitive Resource Areas	No impact
Marine Mammals/ Marine Resources/ Marine Sanctuaries	No impact
Noise	No impact
Threatened& Endangered Species/ Critical Habitat	No impact
Waste Management	No impact
Water Resources	No impact
Wetlands	No impact

<u>Impacts of Costs</u>	
	Eglin
Environmental Restoration	DERA money spent through FY03 (\$K): 72200 Estimated CTC (\$K): 35142 DO NOT ENTER IN COBRA
Waste Management	No impact
Environmental Compliance	No impact

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<u>General Environmental Impacts</u>	
Environmental Resource Area	Hanscom
Air Quality	An initial air conformity analysis indicated that a conformity determination is not needed. Carpooling initiatives are used as an emission reduction technique.
Cultural/ Archeological/ Tribal Resources	One archaeological site is present but does not constrain operations. A native American tribe is in contact, but not formally, with the base regarding cultural land. Additional operations may impact these sites, which may constrain operations.
Dredging	No impact
Land Use Constraints/ Sensitive Resource Areas	The scenario requires roughly 40 acres; Hanscom reported it's largest parcel is 18.27 acres, and only 8.4 unconstrained acres are zoned for industrial ops. This scenario may require building on constrained acreage. Sensitive resource areas exist but do not constrain operations. Additional operations may impact these areas, which may constrain operations.
Marine Mammals/ Marine Resources/ Marine Sanctuaries	No impact
Noise	No impact
Threatened& Endangered Species/ Critical Habitat	No T&E species or critical habitats exist. No impact to T&E species is expected.
Waste Management	The hazardous waste program will need modification.
Water Resources	The state requires a permit for withdrawal of groundwater.
Wetlands	Wetlands restrict 5% of the base. Wetlands do not currently restrict operations. Additional operations may impact wetlands, which may restrict operations.

<u>Impacts of Costs</u>	
	Hanscom
Environmental Restoration	DERA money spent through FY03 (\$K): 41797 Estimated CTC (\$K): 10461 DO NOT ENTER IN COBRA
Waste Management	FY07 Hazardous Waste Program Modification: \$100K
Environmental Compliance	FY06 NEPA cost: \$336K FY07 Air Conformity Analysis \$50K

<u>General Environmental Impacts</u>	
Environmental Resource Area	Lackland
Air Quality	No impact
Cultural/ Archeological/ Tribal Resources	No impact
Dredging	No impact
Land Use Constraints/ Sensitive Resource Areas	No impact
Marine Mammals/ Marine Resources/ Marine Sanctuaries	No impact
Noise	No impact
Threatened& Endangered Species/ Critical Habitat	No impact
Waste Management	No impact
Water Resources	No impact
Wetlands	No impact

<u>Impacts of Costs</u>	
	Lackland
Environmental Restoration	DERA money spent through FY03 (\$K): 50297 Estimated CTC (\$K): 200559 DO NOT ENTER IN COBRA
Waste Management	No impact
Environmental Compliance	No impact

<u>General Environmental Impacts</u>	
Environmental Resource Area	Maxwell
Air Quality	No impact
Cultural/ Archeological/ Tribal Resources	No impact
Dredging	No impact
Land Use Constraints/ Sensitive Resource Areas	No impact
Marine Mammals/ Marine Resources/ Marine Sanctuaries	No impact
Noise	No impact
Threatened& Endangered Species/ Critical Habitat	No impact
Waste Management	No impact
Water Resources	No impact
Wetlands	No impact

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<u>Impacts of Costs</u>	
	Maxwell
Environmental Restoration	DERA money spent through FY03 (\$K): 19123 Estimated CTC (\$K): 7713 DO NOT ENTER IN COBRA
Waste Management	No impact
Environmental Compliance	No impact

<u>General Environmental Impacts</u>	
Environmental Resource Area	Wright-Patterson
Air Quality	No impact
Cultural/ Archeological/ Tribal Resources	No impact
Dredging	No impact
Land Use Constraints/ Sensitive Resource Areas	No impact
Marine Mammals/ Marine Resources/ Marine Sanctuaries	No impact
Noise	No impact
Threatened& Endangered Species/ Critical Habitat	No impact
Waste Management	No impact
Water Resources	No impact
Wetlands	No impact

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<u>Impacts of Costs</u>	
	Wright-Patterson
Environmental Restoration	DERA money spent through FY03 (\$K): 156972 Estimated CTC (\$K): 34261 DO NOT ENTER IN COBRA
Waste Management	No impact
Environmental Compliance	No impact

DFSG Jobs (Data From DSFG Briefing July 12, 2005 (With Mathematical Errors Corrected))

	Jobs	Mean Salary (Dayton- Springfield)	Annual Payroll	Mean Salary (Boston)	Estimated Annual Payroll
Military	55	\$68,407	\$3,762,385	\$81,781	\$4,497,955
Civilian	429	\$71,754	\$30,782,466	\$87,490	\$37,533,210
Support Contractors	702	\$61,360	\$43,074,720	\$76,870	\$53,962,740
Subtotal	1,186		\$77,619,571		\$95,993,905
Indirect Jobs from Military	23	\$36,387	\$836,901	\$48,230	\$1,109,290
Indirect Jobs from Civilians	674	\$36,387	\$24,524,838	\$48,230	\$32,507,020
Indirect Jobs from Support Cont	1,102	\$36,387	\$40,098,474	\$48,230	\$53,149,460
Total WPAFB Jobs	2,985		\$143,079,784		\$182,759,675
Development Contractors	1,342	\$90,450	\$121,383,900	\$107,070	\$143,687,940
Indirect Jobs for Dev. Contrs	2,107	\$36,387	\$76,667,409	\$48,230	\$101,620,610
Total Dev. Contractor Jobs	3,449		\$198,051,309		\$245,308,550
Total	6,434		\$341,131,093		\$428,068,225

DFSG Jobs (Data From DSFG Briefing July 12, 2005) Showing Boston-Dayton Cost Comparison Totals

	Jobs	Mean Salary (Dayton- Springfield)	Annual Payroll	Mean Salary (Boston)	Estimated Annual Payroll	Difference Between Boston and Dayton- Cost to AF
Military	55	\$68,407	\$3,762,385	\$81,781	\$4,497,955	\$735,570
Civilian	429	\$71,754	\$30,782,466	\$87,490	\$37,533,210	\$6,750,744
Support Contractors	702	\$61,360	\$43,074,720	\$76,870	\$53,962,740	\$10,888,020
Subtotal	1,186		\$77,619,571		\$95,993,905	\$18,374,334
Indirect Jobs from Military	23	\$36,387	\$836,901	\$48,230	\$1,109,290	
Indirect Jobs from Civilians	674	\$36,387	\$24,524,838	\$48,230	\$32,507,020	
Indirect Jobs from Support Cont	1,102	\$36,387	\$40,098,474	\$48,230	\$53,149,460	
Total WPAFB Jobs	2,985		\$143,079,784		\$182,759,675	
Development Contractors	1,342	\$90,450	\$121,383,900	\$107,070	\$143,687,940	\$22,304,040
Indirect Jobs for Dev. Contrs	2,107	\$36,387	\$76,667,409	\$48,230	\$101,620,610	
Total Dev. Contractor Jobs	3,449		\$198,051,309		\$245,308,550	
Total	6,434		\$341,131,093		\$428,068,225	\$40,678,374

DFSG Jobs (Data From DSFG Briefing July 12, 2005 (With 29.6 percent benefit factor))

	Jobs	Mean Salary (Dayton- Springfield)	Annual Wages and Estimated Compensation	Mean Salary (Boston)	Estimated Annual Wages and Compensation	Difference Between Boston and Dayton
Military	55	\$68,407	\$4,876,051	\$81,781	\$5,829,350	\$953,299
Civilian	429	\$71,754	\$39,894,076	\$87,490	\$48,643,040	\$8,748,964
Support Contractors	702	\$61,360	\$55,824,837	\$76,870	\$69,935,711	\$14,110,874
Subtotal	1,186		\$100,594,964		\$124,408,101	\$23,813,137
Indirect Jobs from Military	23	\$36,387	\$1,084,624	\$48,230	\$1,109,290	
Indirect Jobs from Civilians	674	\$36,387	\$31,784,190	\$48,230	\$32,507,020	
Indirect Jobs from Support Cont	1,102	\$36,387	\$51,967,622	\$48,230	\$53,149,460	
Total WPAFB Jobs	2,985		\$185,431,400		\$211,173,871	
Development Contractors	1,342	\$90,450	\$157,313,534	\$107,070	\$186,219,570	\$28,906,036
Indirect Jobs for Dev. Contrs	2,107	\$36,387	\$99,360,962	\$48,230	\$101,620,610	
Total Dev. Contractor Jobs	3,449		\$256,674,496		\$287,840,180	
Total	6,434		\$442,105,897		\$499,014,051	\$52,719,173

Notes

1. Some of increased costs for federal workers (but not contractors) were taken into consideration for original BRAC estimates.
2. The 29.6 benefit factor comes from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--March 2005." It is a national average and includes non-wage compensation including insurance, leave, retirement, and other benefits.



DCN:11670



DFSG Orientation

AFMC BRAC Site Survey Team

July 12, 2005

Presented By:
Mrs. Debra Haley
Director
Development and Fielding
Systems Group



DCM-11670

Agenda



Proposed realignment of the DFSG

Function of the DFSG

COBRA Disconnects



BRAC Proposed Realignment

DCN:11670



- Air & Space Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Information Systems Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E)
 - MSG from Wright-Patterson AFB } to Hanscom AFB
 - SSG from Maxwell-Gunter AFB }
- Justification
- Reduce Technical Facilities
- Increase likelihood of fielding interoperable systems



Agenda



Proposed realignment of the DFSG

Function of the DFSG

COBRA Disconnects



Operations Support Systems Wing



DCN:11670

Operations Support Systems Wing
(Mr. Frank Weber)
(Col James Shaw)

Force Protection Systems Squadron
(Col Ken Hasegawa)

Dvlpmnt & Fielding Systems Group
(Ms. Debra Haley)


Ops & Sustain Systems Group
(Mr. Greg Garcia)

Eng/Integration Systems Squadron
(Mr. Steve Wright)


Acquire and Deliver
Horizontally-integrated
IT Solutions and
Capabilities to Airmen
and Commanders


Provide and Support
Secure
Combat Support
Information Systems
&
Networks
For
The Air Force
& DoD Components

Provide
World-Class, Robust
Systems Engineering,
Technical Management,
And Support Services To
The Operations Support
Systems Wing




Organizational Relationships





(Old) MSG Mission






(Old) MSG Contractor/Government Composite



DCN:11670

Contractors 702 FY04/4 Government 603*
(Authorizations)




Total Personnel Equivalents = 1,305
*546 Civilian and 57 Military authorizations



Development & Fielding Systems Group



DCN:11670



LEGEND
WPAFB
Gunter
Randolph



DFSG Contribution to Operational Support



DCN:11670


- IT Acquisition expertise
- Business process reengineering
- Change management
- Acquisition discipline
- Enterprise integration/interoperability
- Operational focus
- Cross domain efficiencies
- Architectural/domain integration



IT Acquisition Expertise



DCN:11670





Enterprise Integration/Interoperability



DAF:11670

Integration


Graphical interface to analytical data – dashboard

Enterprise MRO Process(es)

Common Business Rules Repository

Enterprise Data & Data Model

GCSS AF- I/F



Interoperability

Providing two-way capability regardless of form-factor

Training and deployment readiness

ECSS and DEAMS Financial Capabilities cooperate

DoD and Air Force Budget Data

Classified and unclassified GCSS





Where We Have Been


DCN:11670



- 138 systems primarily custom coded
- Source Lines of Code (SLOC) often exceeded several million
- Nearly every system had its own database with little or no horizontal data sharing
- All data exchanged via point-to-point interfaces
- Average 25 point-to-point interfaces each (Stock Control: 1,200+)
- Each system had its own HW and SW infrastructure
 - HW: IBM, HP, Sun, Tandem, etc. in multiple versions
 - OS: VM, UNIX, Solaris, HPUX, etc. in multiple versions
- Primary customer – functionals
- Business processes optimized for functional execution


Where We Have Been

Within a Domain




***Our Challenge:
Size & Complexity***

- *Within a single domain*
- *Between multiple domains*



***Many point-to-point
interfaces, each with
its own formats &
protocols***

Across Domains






Current State (with ERPs)



DCN:11670


Our ERP Challenge:


- An ERP can integrate much data within its domain
- Must still interoperate with legacy systems within its domain
- Must still interoperate with other domains







Technical Approach - Interoperability






11670

The Desired End State: Info Management For The Enterprise




shared, subject-area vocabularies



enterprise understanding



Use of Capability





Summary

DCN:11670



- DFIG is postured to:

Acquire and Deliver Horizontally-integrated IT Solutions and Capabilities to Airmen and Commanders

- Enhanced Technical Information Management System (ETIMS) - Total life cycle cost: \$258M through FY19
- Enterprise Information Management (EIM) - Total life cycle cost: \$45M through FY09
- Deployment Readiness System (DRS) - Total life cycle cost: \$80M through FY16
- Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) - Total life cycle cost: \$2.993B in then-year dollars through FY22
- Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS) - Total life cycle cost: \$419.9 M through FY18



Agenda



DCN:11670

Proposed realignment of the DFSG

Function of the DFSG

COBRA Disconnects




COBRA Disconnects



DCN:11670

- 75% of staff assumed to move
- Hanscom time to fill data?
- BOS savings mixed w/efficiencies
 - Unintelligible
 - 2006 for WP -2008 for Maxwell
- WP RIF Costs in 2006 – too Soon
- MILCON costs differ
 - COBRA \$131M
 - AF \$154M
- Hanscom MiiVal?
- Netcentric (in or out – Lyles)
- Equipment moving costs

7/21/2005



Impacts To Community



- Economic Impact on Community: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2250 jobs (1262 direct jobs and 988 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Dayton, OH Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.44 percent of economic area employment. *(source: DoD Documentation to BRAC Commission)*

- Disconnects:
 - Includes ~ 100 AF Civilian @ other locations
 - Does not reflect current W-P baseline
 - AF Civilians – 429
 - AF Military – 58
 - Support contractors – 702
 - Does not include other contract activity



Impact to Community (cont)

Current WPAFB Jobs Baseline	Jobs	Mean Salary Dayton-Springfield	Annual Pay Roll	Mean Salary Boston	Estimated Annual Pay Roll
Military	55	\$68,407	\$3,762,399	\$81,781	\$81,836
Civilian	429	\$71,754	\$30,782,252	\$87,490	\$37,533,330
Support Contractors	702	\$61,360	\$43,074,720	\$76,870	\$53,962,740
Subtotal	1,186		\$77,619,370		\$91,577,906
Indirect Jobs from Military	23	\$36,387	\$820,527	\$48,230	\$1,087,587
Indirect Jobs from Civilians	674	\$36,387	\$24,507,736	\$48,230	\$32,484,352
Indirect Jobs from Support Contrs	1,102	\$36,387	\$40,103,568	\$48,230	\$53,156,212
Total WPAFB Jobs	2,984		\$65,431,831		\$86,728,151
Development Contractors (estimates based on contract awards to community)	1,342	\$90,450	\$121,383,900	\$107,070	\$143,687,940
Indirect Jobs from Dev Contrs	2,107	\$36,387	\$76,665,226	\$48,230	\$101,617,716
Total Dev Contractor Jobs	3,449		\$198,049,126		\$245,305,656
TOTAL	6,433		\$263,480,957		\$332,033,807
References:					
- Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Economic Impact Analysis, 30 Sep 2004					
- More Than Dollars Alone: the Economic and Security Significance of Hanscom Air force Base and the Natick Soldier Systems Center, Sep 2004, Massachusetts Defense Technology Initiative					
- U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics, May 2004 Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates					



Space Requirements

OSSW WP	Groups	PEs	Net Sq Ft	Gross Sq Ft	2003 \$ WP	2006 \$ WP	2006 \$ Hanscom
Bld 266/262	OSSG, DFSG, EISS	1397	226,820	283,525	\$56.7 M	\$62.0 M	\$65M
DISA; AF Owned	OSSG, DFSG	13	2,400	3,000	\$0.6M	\$0.66M	\$0.7M
Area B	DFSG	8	1,850	2,312	\$0.46M	\$0.5M	\$0.53M
KTR sites	OSSG, DFSG		32,000	40,000	\$8.0M	\$8.75M	\$9.2M
Warehouse Bld 280	OSSG, DFSG, EISS	89	18,710	23,388	\$2.3M	\$2.6M	\$2.7M
Total			281,780	352,225	\$68.1M	\$74.5M	\$78.5M

- Items not included in estimates
 - Building furnishings: systems furniture, carpeting, conference room furniture
 - Parking facilities
 - Landscaping
 - Upgrade of base infrastructure: Electrical, Sewer, base maintenance
- Computer / office space: \$200/SqFt, Warehouse space: \$100/SqFt
- Eng study required to refine estimate: Exact sizing of Air Handlers, Power Conditioners, UPS, Generator Backup Sys, Fire Suppression Sys, Water Detection Sys
- Certain IT systems being supported require Classified environment
 - Security; DoD & AFR SCIFF requirements



Equipment / Systems Relocation



DCN:11670

Group / Squadron	SPO	Sys Being Supported	Main Frames	Unix Servers	Windows Servers	Tandem Servers
DFSG	FN	13	1	149	151	0
DFSG	SB					
DFSG	NN	5	0	21	5	0
DFSG	EC	ERP/ECSS	0	0	0	0
OSSG	KS	8	0	0	11	0
OSSG	LR	39	14	50	34	0
EISS	EIE	All - VIC				
EISS	EIE	All - ITAC	0	85	96	0
Total						
EISS	EIE	All - AFKS DISA	40 Teradata nodes	80 Disk Arrays	66	1 Tape Disk

- Equipment relocation risks
 - System users can not accept any down time; Parallel equip will need to be available
 - Warranties may be voided if equipment is shut down transported and stood up
 - Re-certification costs
- Contractor support
 - Support contracts will require modification
 - Relocate GFE presently located at off base contractor facilities



Networks Infrastructure Specifications



DSN:11670

	SIPERNET; 100MG	NIPERNET; 100MG	NIPERNET; 1GB	
Drops	12	1350	140	
	T-1	RAS	DSN	VTC
Dedicated Circuits	13			ISDN
				40
	Peak	Avg		
Bandwidth	800MG	68MG		
	Phone Drops	Fax Drops	Blackberry	
Telephones	1760	100	40	

- Connectivity to support contractor facilities will need to be re-established: T1 lines to Hanscom
- Firewall issues will need to be re-addressed
- Future growth can be accommodated by OC 192 (10GB/Sec) line located parallel to WP area A that runs from Cincinnati to Dayton to Columbus to New York to DC

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Louis C. Ferraro (Associate) [lferraro@greentreegroup.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2005 5:01 PM
To: Carroll (E-mail); Lesia Mandzia (E-mail); Lester C. Farrington (E-mail)
Subject: BRAC ISSUE PAPERS

Attachments: DC1 Mesa Sensors Info Sys Dir 29 July 05 Ver 5.doc; DC1 BROOKS 29 Jul 05 Ver 5.doc; DC1 DFSG C4ISR 29 July 05 Ver 11.doc; DC1 AFIT - NPS 7-29-05 Ver 6.doc; Kennedy \$410 Mass Offer.doc



DC1 Mesa Sensors Info Sys Dir ... DC1 BROOKS 29 Jul 05 Ver 5.doc... DC1 DFSG C4ISR 29 July 05 Ver ... DC1 AFIT - NPS 7-29-05 Ver 6.d... Kennedy \$410 Mass Offer.doc (2...

Les, Lesia & Syd,

Attached are Issue Papers on DFSG (TECH 6), Brooks, Sensors for Defense Research Lab - WPAFB, AFIT, and a news article for Les' amusement.

Syd, look forward to seeing you next week. My cell phone # is 937-469-4953 if you need anything.

> Cheers,

>

> Lou

> > <<DC1 Mesa Sensors Info Sys Dir 29 July 05 Ver 5.doc>> > > <<DC1

> > BROOKS 29 Jul 05 Ver 5.doc>> > > <<DC1 DFSG C4ISR 29 July 05 Ver

> > 11.doc>> > > <<DC1 AFIT - NPS 7-29-05 Ver 6.doc>> > > <<Kennedy

> > \$410 Mass Offer.doc>>

> The Greentree Group

> 937-490-5528

>

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Defense Research Service Led Laboratories

BRAC Recommendation

Close the Air Force Research Laboratory, Mesa City, AZ. Relocate all functions to Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH.

Realign Air Force Research Laboratory, Hanscom, MA, by relocating the Sensors Directorate to Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH, and the Space Vehicles Directorate to Kirtland Air Force Base, NM.

Realign Rome Laboratory, NY, by relocating the Sensor Directorate to Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH, and consolidating it with the Air Force Research Laboratory, Sensor Directorate at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH.

Realign Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH, by relocating the Information Systems Directorate to Hanscom Air Force Base, MA.

Dayton Region Recommendation:

Recommend the BRAC Commission approve the DOD recommendations in their entirety, particularly the consolidation of Sensors research at Wright-Patterson AFB. The movement of these fragmented sensor functions from Hanscom and Rome to WPAFB will complete the consolidation of the Air Force's Sensor Science & Technology efforts that were begun in 1998 with the formation of Air Force Research Laboratory. Locating these sensor activities adjacent to related technology directorates, e.g., Materials and Manufacturing, Air Vehicles, Human Effectiveness, and Propulsion and Power, will further enhance the development of sensor technology so critical to Air Force war fighting capabilities.

BRAC Justification: This recommendation realigns and consolidates portions of the Air Force Research Laboratory to provide greater synergy across technical disciplines and functions. It does this by consolidating geographically separate units of the Air Force Research Laboratory.

A realignment of Air Force Research Laboratory Human Factors Division from Brooks City Base, TX, research to Wright Patterson AFB was initially part of this recommendation, and still exists, but is presented in the recommendation to close Brooks City Base, TX. This recommendation enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of the Defense to exploit a center-of-mass of scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$164.6M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is cost of \$45.0M. Annual recurring

savings to the Department after implementation are \$41.1M, with a payback expected in 4 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$357.3M.

DAYTON REGION RECOMMENDATION

Recommend approval of the recommendations consolidating Sensors research and development at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

The world's foremost airborne electronic (Avionics) systems have evolved over 80-plus years at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), Dayton, Ohio. This evolution came from the national leadership assigned to the precursor WPAFB organizations to the Sensors Directorate.

Unfortunately, over the years, growth of sensor-related functions at other locations has prevented Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) at WPAFB from gaining the benefits and synergy of a geographically consolidated sensor development function. The movement of these fragmented sensor functions from Hanscom and Rome to WPAFB will complete the consolidation of the Air Force's Sensor Science & Technology efforts that were begun in 1998 with the formation of AFRL. Locating these sensor activities adjacent to related technology directorates, e.g., Materials and Manufacturing, Air Vehicles, Human Effectiveness, and Propulsion and Power, will further enhance the development of sensor technology so critical to Air Force war fighting capabilities.

Moreover, collocation of a consolidated, full-spectrum sensors directorate with the major Air Force Program Acquisition Offices of the Aeronautical Systems Center will further the synergistic effects and help accelerate the rapid transition of new capabilities to the warfighter.

Testimony from New York individuals and organization at the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission regional hearing in Buffalo, New York, on June 27, 2005 regarding the recommendation to realign Rome Lab Sensors work to WPAFB, opposed the sensors move because:

- No BRAC analysis was done at the receiving site on some of the following Rome assets
- Rome has unique topography that is elevated and has no clutter
- Special radar antennae and labs were not considered in the cost of moving
- Required radio frequency licenses to do the work do not exist at WPAFB
- Rome has on-going critical work, done with the Army that cannot be interrupted
- Rome has significant intellectual capital that will not move with the work

The Dayton Region response to New York's Testimony regarding Rome's arguments/positions against realignment of the Sensor mission to WPAFB is:

1. The BRAC process examined every receiving site, including WPAFB, to determine if it could bed-down an influx of received assets due to realignment. Also, excess capacity will be generated in the Sensors Directorate at WPAFB due to the relocation of IF personnel to Hanscom AFB.
2. There are no known insurmountable issues with relocating the required equipment from Rome Labs to WPAFB. Antennae can be disassembled and reassembled.
3. Wright-Patt can quickly apply for RF licenses as once Rome did. It may be that the RF licenses may even be transferable.
4. On-going critical work with any mission can and will be interrupted or delayed slightly due to realignment. If it cannot be delayed, WPAFB's realignment planning team can work with the Army to have Rome's work temporarily performed by the Army.

Dayton Development Coalition

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Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation

DoD BRAC Recommendation

Realign Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, and Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating Air & Space Information Systems Research and Development & Acquisition to Hanscom Air Force Base, MA.

DAYTON REGION RECOMMENDATION

Retain the Development and Fielding Systems Group (DFSG) and other Operational Support Systems Group (OSSG) elements at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB)

HIGHLIGHTS OF ANALYSIS:

- **Bottom Line – Significant deviations in the application of BRAC Selection Criteria, Military Value, are evident.**
- **The Dayton-Springfield MSA Economic Impact/Job loss is significantly understated.**
- **The BRAC Recommendation is “tainted” by Massachusetts’ \$410M offer - “If you keep Hanscom open, we will expand it for you.”**
- **Certified data in the BRAC Report shows only 8.4 acres available for a “roughly 40 acre” requirement.**
- **Contractor Manpower Equivalents (embedded contractors) were not properly counted as mission resources.**
- **Costs of realignment were understated in DOD analysis**
 - **Increases in Embedded Contractor Costs not counted**
 - **Hanscom population increases by 50%, yet BOS increases only 24%**
 - **Hanscom population increases by 50%, yet sustainment increases only 12%**
- **Savings were overstated**
 - **Increased cost of Boston-based contractors will exceed \$14 million per year.**
 - **Deltas in Direct development contractor costs are not included. Net Present Value “savings” of \$229M in DOD BRAC recommendation is really a “loss” to DOD of nearly \$1B**
- **DFSG’s Business Systems Mission was improperly categorized as C4ISR.**

Summary of Rationale to Reject BRAC Recommendation

1. There is a **clear risk of failure** in DFSG operations supporting acquisition programs, thereby, jeopardizing logistics support for warfighting commanders. This represents a **substantial deviation from final criteria 1**, the current and future mission capabilities, because of the potential for lowered performance and schedule delays due to the realignment of DFSG and OSSG elements to Hanscom AFB.
2. As Table I illustrates, the Defense Department **understates personnel loss** in the Dayton area (2250 jobs lost, according to original estimate, versus 6,612). Moreover, local Dayton Region Information Technology (IT) contractors supporting DFSG's acquisition mission are part of the **intellectual capital** and not accounted for in the calculation of military value. Neither development nor Advisory and Assistance Service (A&AS) DFSG on-site contractors were factored into the BRAC COBRA equation. This skews the actual costs of realignment (**substantial deviation from final criteria 1 and 4**). The Dayton Region's calculations (please see Tables and Charts A, B, and C below) reveal that, **rather than the Defense Department reported saving of \$229 million dollars, there would be a loss to DOD of \$421 million**. This loss to DOD exceeds \$800 million when the number of *development* contractors affected by the realignment is considered.

Table I
Personnel Projections

Source of Numbers	2006-2011 Period			Total
	Direct Job	Indirect Job	Non-A&AS	
BRAC Report	(1262)*	(988)	0	(2250)
Local Validation	(1462)	(2300)**	(2400)	(6162)

* 715 current Direct Contractors (A&AS) **not accounted for** in BRAC COBRA Analysis and exist on the OSSW Manning Chart (as of 04 December 2004) for a total of 1462 direct jobs

** An indirect factor of 1.57 stated in the Economic Impact Analysis more accurately reflects indirect jobs and is used in Air Force Base calculations

3. In the COBRA analysis, TECH-0042, page 45, the data estimate that 55% of the 606 Civilians, or 333 civilians, will move to Boston. The TECH-0042 COBRA Analysis uses a "Standard Civilian annual salary" of \$59,959.18, page 20, which equates to a GS-10 Step 8 in the Boston area (General Schedule Salary table for Hanscom AFB). Page 20, TECH-0042 COBRA Analysis, also reflects a Standard "Civilians Not Willing to Move" as 6% of

the civilian population. Of the current 606 DFSG Civilians, 247 civilians (40%) will be eliminated and 359 civilian positions will be realigned to the Hanscom AFB UMD. In addition, the 715 current A&AS direct contractors are not factored into the analysis. Of the current 142 DFSG Military position, only 39 will realign to Hanscom (27%), page 6, Economic Impact Data. On the same page, the data reflects that DFSG will lose 658 Direct Contractors (**This direct contractor recognition is not reflected in the COBRA data**). In summary, 1462 direct personnel support the current DFSG mission at WPAFB. The BRAC recommendation indicates it can continue the mission with 39 Military, 359 civilians, and 658 direct contractors, for a total of 1056 personnel, a reduction of 28%.

Table A and Chart A below are from the TJCSG COBRA analysis (COBRA Net Present Value Report [COBRA V6.10] 4-20-05, page 42 of 50). These show a “start” date of 2006, a “final” year of 2008, and an 8-year “payback” in year 2016. However, the BRAC COBRA Report does not include the Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS) contractors authorized for utilization on the OSSW manning documents. A&AS positions provide services under contract by nongovernmental sources to support or improve successful performance of ongoing Federal operations (FAR 2.101). As such, these A&AS personnel needed to be included in the COBRA analysis, as they were included in some of the TJCSG data call questions, as well as the TJCSG Economic Impact Report, TECH-0042C: Air & Space C4ISR DAT&E Consolidation, page 4. Page 4 indicates that Hanscom AFB will gain 1412 A&AS Contractors in 2006. The cost of these Direct Contractors has not been included in the COBRA analysis.

TABLE A

BRAC 05 "Net Present Value Report" (Baseline) There Were No Contractor Costs Factored into the COBRA Analysis.

Year	Cost	Factor	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	50,556,665	0.9862873	49,863,397	49,863,397
2007	107,518,433	0.9594234	103,155,701	153,019,097
2008	49,936,875	0.9332913	46,605,651	199,624,748
2009	-35,421,483	0.9078709	-32,158,134	167,466,615
2010	-19,949,483	0.8831429	-17,618,244	149,848,370
2011	-35,421,483	0.8590884	-30,430,185	119,418,185
2012	-35,421,483	0.8356891	-29,601,347	89,816,838
2013	-35,421,483	0.8129271	-28,795,083	61,021,754
2014	-35,421,483	0.7907851	-28,010,781	33,010,973
2015	-35,421,483	0.7692463	-27,247,845	5,763,129
2016	-35,421,483	0.748294	-26,505,683	-20,742,555
2017	-35,421,483	0.7279125	-25,783,740	-46,526,295
2018	-35,421,483	0.7080861	-25,081,460	-71,607,755
2019	-35,421,483	0.6887997	-24,398,307	-96,006,061
2020	-35,421,483	0.6700386	-23,733,761	-119,739,822
2021	-35,421,483	0.6517885	-23,087,315	-142,827,138
2022	-35,421,483	0.6340355	-22,458,478	-165,285,615
2023	-35,421,483	0.6167661	-21,846,770	-187,132,385
2024	-35,421,483	0.599967	-21,251,721	-208,384,106
2025	-35,421,483	0.5836255	-20,672,881	-229,056,987

This Chart A (Below) reflects the BRAC Adjusted Cost/Saving and NPV.




Table B and Chart B with A&AS Contractors included are explained below.

TABLE B

BRAC 05 "Net Present Value Report" Adjusted to Include DFSG A&AS Contractor Support Costs. These Costs Were Not Included in the COBRA Analysis.

Year	Cost	Factor	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	92,916,665	0.986287	91,642,527	91,642,527
2007	149,878,433	0.959423	143,796,876	235,439,402
2008	92,296,875	0.933291	86,139,870	321,579,273
2009	6,938,517	0.907871	6,299,278	327,878,551
2010	22,410,517	0.883143	19,791,689	347,670,240
2011	6,938,517	0.859088	5,960,799	353,631,039
2012	6,938,517	0.835689	5,798,443	359,429,482
2013	6,938,517	0.812927	5,640,509	365,069,991
2014	6,938,517	0.790785	5,486,876	370,556,866
2015	6,938,517	0.769246	5,337,429	375,894,295
2016	6,938,517	0.748294	5,192,051	381,086,346
2017	6,938,517	0.727913	5,050,633	386,136,979
2018	6,938,517	0.708086	4,913,067	391,050,046
2019	6,938,517	0.6888	4,779,248	395,829,295
2020	6,938,517	0.670039	4,649,074	400,478,369
2021	6,938,517	0.651789	4,522,446	405,000,814
2022	6,938,517	0.634036	4,399,266	409,400,081
2023	6,938,517	0.616766	4,279,442	413,679,523
2024	6,938,517	0.599967	4,162,881	417,842,404
2025	6,938,517	0.583626	4,049,495	421,891,899

CHART B




Table B and Chart B above, using the same formulae as in the TJCSG chart, includes the 1412 Direct Contractors required at Hanscom AFB for this scenario. Included in the “Cost” column of the chart is a conservative, additional cost of \$30,000 per contractor in Boston versus Dayton (\$100,000 per Direct Contractor in Dayton versus \$130,000 per Direct Contractor in Boston). (Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics - Computer and Mathematical Science Occupations average: Boston MSA average salary (\$76,870); Dayton Springfield MSA average salary (\$61,360) - Escalation Factor for cost of living in Boston 1.30; Government cost of an A&AS IT Contractor ~ \$100,000, applying the cost of living index of 130 to \$100,000 equals ~\$130,000 for the same IT A&AS Contractor in Boston). This additional cost per Direct Contractor amounts to \$42,360,000 additional cost per year in Boston to support the Hanscom AFB scenario (1412 Direct Contractors at an increased cost of \$30,000 each). In the year 2025, rather than the BRAC-reported saving of \$229 million dollars, there is a loss of \$421 million dollars – there will *never* be a savings.

TABLE C

BRAC 05 "Net Present Value Report" Adjusted to Include DFSG A&AS and Development Contractor Support Costs. These Costs Were Not Included in the COBRA Analysis.

Year	Cost	Factor	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	133,176,665	0.9862873	131,350,453	131,350,453
2007	190,138,443	0.9594234	182,423,271	313,773,725
2008	132,556,875	0.9332913	123,714,178	437,487,903
2009	47,198,517	0.9078709	42,850,160	480,338,063
2010	62,670,517	0.8831429	55,347,022	535,685,085
2011	47,198,517	0.8590884	40,547,698	576,232,784
2012	47,198,517	0.8356891	39,443,286	615,676,070
2013	47,198,517	0.8129271	38,368,954	654,045,023
2014	47,198,517	0.7907851	37,323,884	691,368,907
2015	47,198,517	0.7692463	36,307,285	727,676,192
2016	47,198,517	0.748294	35,318,367	762,994,559
2017	47,198,517	0.7279125	34,356,391	797,350,950
2018	47,198,517	0.7080861	33,420,614	830,771,563
2019	47,198,517	0.6887997	32,510,324	863,281,888
2020	47,198,517	0.6700386	31,624,828	894,906,716
2021	47,198,517	0.6517885	30,763,451	925,670,167
2022	47,198,517	0.6340355	29,925,535	955,595,702
2023	47,198,517	0.6167661	29,110,445	984,706,147
2024	47,198,517	0.599967	28,317,553	1,013,023,700
2025	47,198,517	0.5836255	27,546,258	1,040,569,958

Table C above and Chart C below, using the same formulae as in the TJCSG chart, includes the 1412 Direct Contractors required at Hanscom AFB for this scenario, as well as 1342 development contractors that currently work for DFSG (the Dayton Region believes the number of actual development contractors is about 2000 to 2400). Included in the "Cost" column of the chart is a conservative additional cost of \$30,000 per contractor in Boston versus Dayton (\$100,000 per Direct Contractor in Dayton versus \$130,000 per Direct Contractor in Boston). (Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics - Computer and Mathematical Science Occupations average: Boston MSA average salary (\$76,870); Dayton Springfield MSA average salary (\$61,360) - Escalation Factor for cost of living in Boston 1.30; Government cost of an A&AS IT and Development Contractor ~ \$100,000, applying the cost of living index of 130 to \$100,000 equals ~\$130,000 for the same IT A&AS Contractor in Boston). This additional cost per Direct Contractor (A&AS) and Development contractors, amounts to \$82,620,000 additional cost per year in Boston to support the Hanscom AFB scenario (2754 Total Contractors [1412 A&AS and 1342 Development Contractors] at an increased cost of \$30,000 each). In the year 2025, rather than the BRAC-reported saving of \$229 million dollars, there is a *loss of \$1.0 billion dollars* – there will *never* be a savings! Additionally, the creation of Hanscom as a "Center of Excellence" for potential "Joint" growth in the future is not feasible due to high costs in the Boston area and the lack of available land to expand.

CHART C





Table D and Chart D below represent recent data from the Air Force regarding the DFSG military and civilian personnel, and include the DFSG A&AS contractors as well as the Development contractors associated with DFSG’s mission. The new data indicate that the additional costs (based on tables 1 to 3 below) per contractor is \$23,874 versus our first estimate of \$30,000. In any case, the NPV for Chart D shows a cost of over \$700 million dollars in 2025, and there will never be a savings to this scenario.

TABLE D

Year	Cost	Factor	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	116,306,641	0.986287	114,711,763	114,711,763
2007	173,268,109	0.959423	166,237,478	280,949,241
2008	115,686,551	0.933291	107,969,252	388,918,493
2009	30,328,193	0.907871	27,534,084	416,452,577
2010	45,800,193	0.883143	40,448,115	456,900,692
2011	-35,421,483	0.859088	-30,430,185	426,470,507
2012	30,328,193	0.835689	25,344,940	451,815,447
2013	30,328,193	0.812927	24,654,610	476,470,057
2014	30,328,193	0.790785	23,983,083	500,453,140
2015	30,328,193	0.769246	23,329,850	523,782,990
2016	30,328,193	0.748294	22,694,405	546,477,395
2017	30,328,193	0.727913	22,076,271	568,553,666
2018	30,328,193	0.708086	21,474,972	590,028,638
2019	30,328,193	0.6888	20,890,050	610,918,688
2020	30,328,193	0.670039	20,321,060	631,239,748
2021	30,328,193	0.651789	19,767,567	651,007,316
2022	30,328,193	0.634036	19,229,151	670,236,467
2023	30,328,193	0.616766	18,705,401	688,941,868
2024	30,328,193	0.599967	18,195,915	707,137,783
2025	30,328,193	0.583626	17,700,307	724,838,090

CHART D



4. The DFSG is deeply involved with **Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)** software solutions from private industry. Since the private industry has had the lead in developing software solutions, it has been in the best interest of the DoD to capitalize on proven software that is adaptable to DoD like functions. The current private industry technology solution is Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). According to **Gartner Research Publications**, ERP implementations are **risky endeavors** and users must take control of their own destinies. Gartner Dataquest surveyed 265 U.S.-based IT and business managers. Gartner lists six critical success factors for implementing ERP. One of the success factors is that the functional managers must be involved and set realistic expectations and then manage them throughout the implementation process as the project conditions evolve. **Another factor for success is to focus on the users.** Inclusion of users in all activities is important along with having top management involvement and support in the whole project. Gartner recommends that External Service Providers (ESPs) should work with the client/end users. End users must have an ongoing involvement with the initiative. The DFSG is the ESP for AFMC functional users and their managers. **It is critically important to the success of the implementation process to have them collocated at AFMC (final criteria 1 and 4).** (Source: Gartner Research Publication Dates: 10 September 2002 ID Number TG-15-4868; 7 September 2004 ID Number G00122936; 10 December 2003 ID Number ITSV-WW-EX-0390, 23 September 2002 ID Number SPA-17-7897).
5. **The Selection Criteria used for the C4ISR grouped missions do not adequately measure the military value of the Acquisition, Development and Fielding mission of the DFSG.** As noted earlier, the COBRA analysis

did not include all the direct positions annotated on the Unit Manning Document (UMD). Specifically, the A&AS contractors assigned to the DFSG to perform job descriptions that would otherwise be performed by authorized military or civilian personnel were excluded from the COBRA analysis. This represents a substantial and critical deviation from the approved selection criteria. However, in the ESC/OSSW organization chart, dated 7 December 2004, presented by the ESC OSSG Director in a briefing in an Air Force Information Technology day (See attachment 1) the Total DFSG manpower included 142 Military, 606 Civilian, and 715 A&AS Contractors, for a total of 1462 employees in the DFSG. The 715 A&AS Contractors are on the UMD and are part of the DFSG organization. They are omitted in the COBRA calculations and represent 49% of the direct personnel effort to accomplish the DFSG mission.

6. Also, in the BRAC Economic Impact Data for TECH-0042C: Air & Space C4ISR DAT&E Consolidation, page 6, the data show 864 Direct Contractor reduction for DFSG, and on page 4 the data reflects a gain of 1412 Direct Contractors for Hanscom AFB. The COBRA data does not reflect this significant direct contractor increase in the cost of moving DFSG or OSSG to Hanscom. The cost of A&AS contractor support in the Boston area will be significantly more costly than in the Dayton, Ohio.

7. Compounding the unrealistic expectation of accomplishing this realignment is the assumption that 55% of the civilians will move. **Historically, less than 20% of the people will actually move**, especially to such a high cost of living areas as Boston. It should also be noted that many civilians in DFSG are retired military and will not move with the position. Additionally, a doubtful expectation exists that Hanscom AFB can hire 189 qualified (the correct figure may be closer to over 250 civilian positions and over 500 direct contractor positions) civilians in the Boston area that are needed to fill the DFSG authorizations (page 48 TECH-0042 COBRA Analysis). Adding to the difficulty of the task will be the Boston area contracting firms trying to hire the same individuals to fill their contractor ranks to compete for the direct contractor support to DFSG at Hanscom. The Dayton area currently supplies the required contractor talent. Many of the personnel in the contractor pool of personnel have the knowledge, skills and abilities required to perform DFSG's mission due to the many military and civilian retirees in the Dayton area who previously worked for the Air Force and at WPAFB as civilian or military employees. This intellectual capital will be more expensive in the Boston area. This may be one of the reasons why the DFSG personnel numbers were reduced for realignment to Hanscom (28% reduction in personnel). The "proximity to the customer" in the TJCSG selection criteria under "synergy" was not a major factor in C4IRS but it is critical for DFSG mission accomplishment (Source: TJCSG Analysis and Recommendations (Volume XII, 19 May 2005, Part V. Appendix B, page B-10).

8. It has taken many years to develop the contractor network in the Dayton area that supports DFSG. The Greater Dayton IT Alliance has compiled data to illustrate the depth of Information Technology personnel available within the Dayton/Springfield MSA. Six Standard Occupational Classifications (SOC) exits in the MSA and range from Computer & Information Systems Managers, Engineering Managers, Computer hardware Engineers, to Computer Operators and Computer Control Programmers & Operators. The Ohio Department of Jobs & Family Services identifies a total in all IT related SOCs in the Dayton/Springfield MSA of 16,810 personnel employed in the IT area. The ODJFS projects that by 2010 the total will be 22,440. The U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics shows the Dayton MSA with an IT employment of 14,290 in 2002.
9. The larger Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) capabilities desired by the Air Force as well as DoD are now beginning to reap the rewards of the DFSG's leadership and capability it has established. The other services have invested large amounts of money in enterprise applications with limited success because they failed to properly address the development issues and risks. The Defense Department's recommendation to move DFSG to Hanscom has not considered the differences required for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Business Management Information Technology (BMIT) acquisition. Hanscom's competencies are in the area of Command and Control (C2)...not BMIT.
10. The Department of Defense does not perform IT Research and Development on Business Management (Operations Support) Systems. DoD's announced policy for its Business Management Modernization Program (Air Force identifies it as Operational Support Modernization Program) is to acquire Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), specifically Enterprise Resource Planning, solutions. Therefore combining DFSG within the C4ISR mission group with selection criteria that measures R&D-type performance with the ultimate goal of producing a product is substantially flawed. The TJCSG measures do not account for the skills and abilities required to produce the services performed by the DFSG. DFSG provides acquisition services to AFMC functional users in Financial, contracting, and Logistics areas who then, enabled by the business (i.e., operational support) systems, provide capability to the war fighter. Geographical separation of the acquisition service provider (DFSG) from the functional users and managers at Headquarters AFMC injects significant risk of acquisition program failure and increased costs. This collocation of the service provider (DFSG) to its users and system managers (located at Wright-Patt AFB) is a major critical element in the success or failure of development and fielding according to both government auditors and private industry research publications. (Source: Gartner Research & GAO-05-381, April 29, 2005; GAO-05-723T, June 8, 2005).

11. DFSG provides acquisition services to AFMC functional users, who then, enabled by the business (i.e., operational support) systems, provide capability to the warfighter. Geographical separation of the acquisition service provider (DFSG) from the functional users and managers at Headquarters AFMC injects significant risk of acquisition program failure and increased costs. This collocation of the service provider (DFSG) with its users and system managers (located at Wright-Patterson AFB) is a major critical element in the success or failure of development and fielding according to both government auditors and private industry research publications (Military Value Criteria). (Source: Gartner Research & GAO-05-381, April 29, 2005; GAO-05-723T, June 8, 2005)
12. The Department of Defense does not perform IT Research and Development on Business Management (Operations Support) Systems acquired and used by DFSG. DoD's announced policy for its Business Management Modernization Program (Air Force identifies it as Operational Support Modernization Program) is to acquire Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), specifically Enterprise Resource Planning, solutions (final criteria 1 and 4)
13. The inclusion of a business systems acquisition organization like DFSG in the broad C4ISR category was inappropriate, misleading and substantially deviates from final criteria 1. Most of the work conducted at Hanscom AFB relates to developing and acquiring C4ISR systems and subsystems rapidly produced as weapons systems for the warfighter. DFSG does not develop and acquire C4ISR systems and subsystems. DFSG is an organization focused on acquiring COTS computer software, assisting its functional customers with business process reengineerings, evaluating the functionality of commercial-off-the-shelf business management solutions like Enterprise Resource Planning, managing requirements put in Requests For Proposals, and managing the acquisition and fielding of business management (also known as operational support systems) for the Air Force and DoD.
14. Sufficient land for Military Construction Programs is not available at Hanscom AFB (final criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8). "Roughly 40 acres" are required. "Hanscom reported its largest parcel is 18.27 acres, and only 8.4 unconstrained acres are zoned for industrial ops." (Source: Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts – Criterion 8, Technical Joint Cross Service Group, Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation).

No

Bottom line

The Dayton Region Recommends that the 1462 DFSG personnel remain at WPAFB, collocated with their primary systems users and managers (**final criteria 1 and 4**), providing the best support to the DFSG customer, reduced risk of failure, availability of land and facilities to accommodate further anticipated joint growth (**final criteria**

2), reduced cost of operations (**final criteria 4**), and preservation of the intellectual capital already in place in the Dayton Region.

2005 BRAC Process TECH-0042 Part 7

C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation: Disconnects & Inconsistencies

Highlight of Findings

- Bottom Line...Dayton-Springfield MSA Economic Impact/Job Loss Significantly Understated
- Increases AF Infrastructure - - Payback Calculation in Error
- Cost Understated
- Savings Overstated

- TJCSG Military Value (MV) for C4ISR D&A Calculation in Error
 1. WPAFB higher in almost every MV category except D&A for Information Systems
 2. Double Counting/Co-mingling of Hanscom and Maxwell Data.
 - **Question 04289: Identifies IMDS and DCAPEs as a Hanscom AFB program; however, both are at Maxwell AFB, AL**
 - **Analysis provided to Commission different than AF Implementation Plan**
 - **Actual Plan Includes Realignment of 3 Additional AF Installations**
 - **Hill AFB, UT; Tinker AFB, OK; Randolph AFB, TX**
 - **Actual Plan Does not Have a Supporting COBRA Run**
 - **Actual Plan Includes Use of Lease Space Until MILCON is ready for occupancy (2008-2010)**
 - **Actual Plan includes Contracting out of 390 programming jobs currently at Maxwell AFB**
 - **Same approach may be used for Hill AFB, Tinker AFB, and Randolph AFB**

- TJCSG for C4ISR

- Did Not Apply 2025 Force Structure Plan for data and analysis
- Did Not Apply equal analyses for each site
 - No COBRA runs for realignment of D&A Business Information Systems Workload at
 - Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
 - Maxwell AFB, AL
 - Hill AFB, UT
 - Tinker AFB, OK

- Lackland AFB, TX
 - Randolph AFB, TX
- Inclusion of Business Information Systems inconsistent with C4ISR definition and application of Technical Criteria as indicated in BRAC documents.

Military Value (MV) Discussion

- Military Value is the predominate decision criteria for the movement of the development and acquisition workload for movement to Hanscom AFB
- TJCSG Military Value (MV) Score for C4ISR Development & Acquisition Calculation in Error
 - WPAFB higher in almost every MV category except D&A for Information Systems
 - Double Counting/Co-mingling of Hanscom and Maxwell Data.
 - Question 04289: Identifies IMDS and DCAPES as an Hanscom AFB program; however, both are at Maxwell AFB, AL
- TJCSG “information systems” data qualifier for questions related to D&A workload
 - Counts all workload at Hanscom AFB which is predominately C2ISR yet,
 - Does not recognize C2ISR Information Systems Workload at ASC and AFRL on Wright-Patterson AFB or
 - Development and Acquisition Workload at ASC and AFRL on Wright-Patterson AFB
 - Predominately, the DFSG acquisition and engineering workforce was recruited from
 - Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB
 - HQ AFMC, Wright-Patterson AFB
 - Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB
 - DFSG has current MOAs in place for cross-training and utilization of personnel
- MV of WPAFB is higher than Hanscom AFB
- Only two exclusions found: Battlespace and C4ISR D&A
 - MV for C4ISR T&E delta not statistically significant

C4ISR Vs. Business Systems WPAFB Workload Misclassified

C4ISR Joint Technical Architecture Definition, Systems that:

- support properly designated commanders in the exercise of authority and direction over assigned and attached forces across the range of military operations;
- collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, or interpret available information concerning foreign countries or areas;

- systematically observe aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means; and
- obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

Business Systems: 21 Jun 2004 USD ATL Memo, Transformational Options:

- 30. Examine DoD's business management operations to include the complex network of finance, logistics, personnel, acquisition, and other management processes and information systems that are used to gather the financial data needed to support day-to-day management and decision-making.
- 36. Review the efforts of the Business Management Modernization Program and all other information technology studies being conducted by OSD and the military departments with a goal of determining opportunities for transferring, consolidating, or privatizing all or part of information technology services and systems.
- Also directs use/look at other AF and OSD studies like MID 905

Analysis Disconnects

USD AT&L Memo on 20 Year Force Structure Plan

- TJCSG C4ISR did not use
 - 20 year force structure plan for 2005 to 2025
 - Probable end-strength levels
- IMPACT: Costs and Savings are Incorrectly stated showing a personnel elimination savings of over 200 positions
- Note: As stated in the Jul 05 GAO report. Savings appear to be over stated.
 - Wrong Baseline Used
 - Planned Personnel Reductions (MID905, Work Force Shaping) included as savings.
 - Historically, AFMC funds civilian payroll at approximately 96%
 - Therefore, all savings with AFMC civilian personnel is overstated by 4%

DoD BRAC Technical JCSG Report Misleading

- DoD BRAC Report - - "This recommendation will reduce the number of C4ISR technical facilities from 6 to 2."
 - Edwards
 - Eglin AFB
 - Hanscom AFB 1. Edwards AFB

- Wright-Patterson AFB 2. Hanscom AFB
- Maxwell AFB
- Lackland AFB
- Factual Error:
 - TJCSG Source documentation does not list Wright-Patterson or Maxwell as technical facilities
- TJCSG exempted 17 locations were from consideration ... with less than 31 full time equivalent work years ... military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.
- 3 AF Locations with 30 or more personnel were not addressed by the report: Hill AFB, Tinker AFB, Randolph AFB

Factual Errors

- The AF plans to realign three additional C4ISR activities that were not part of published recommendation or included in the analysis.
 - Hill AFB 60 Civ, 3 Mil, 38 Embedded Contractors
 - Tinker AFB 57 Civ, 0 Mil, 25 Embedded Contractors
 - Randolph AFB 77 Civ, 13 Mil, 183 Embedded Contractors
 - No COBRA Accomplished
 - No Published Military Value Analysis for D&A for Hill or Randolph
 - ESC Submitted the data but it was not incorporated in the COBRAs published.

One-Time Costs Understated

- GCSS Instance Replication
 - 2 Sites \$???M
 - Location of Second Site
 - Single Instance has Contingency Operations Plan Implications
- Productivity Loss (Allowed in Previous BRAC COBRAs)

Overhires and Contractors to fill the gap

- COBRA \$0 | SATAF \$2.5M
- Interim Production Support (Allowed in Previous BRAC COBRAs)

Cost to Maintain Dual Capability to mitigate Customer Risk

- COBRA \$0 | SATAF \$7.5M

- ESC Leased Space Costs not included
- COBRA % of Civilian that will relocate 75%
- SATAF % Of Civilians that will not relocate 95%

Actual Estimate Based on "Unofficial" Employee Feedback

Cost of Living Delta

- Hanscom Area 38% More Expense
- Net Change in Disposable Income – \$22K.

% Retirement Eligible (Optional+Early) 57.5%

Local Employment Options: AFRL, ASC, HQ AFMC

- Unemployment Compensation

COBRA: \$272 for 16 Weeks

State of Ohio: \$425 for 26 to 39 Weeks

- Training for Civilian New Hires at Hanscom (Allowed in Previous BRACs)

COBRA \$0

SATAF \$3K Per Person

Recurring Costs Understated

Cost of Doing Business

Embedded Contractors

- Delta between Contractor cost at WPAFB and Hanscom AFB
 - \$9.7M annually
- Direct development contractor cost impact -- TBD

Customer Interaction due to location changes \$2.6M annually

- TDY, Air Fare, Care Rental
- Avg \$3K per trip X 2 trips annually for 50% of workforce

ESC Assumption 390 Maxwell Positions will be contracted out

- Conservatively Increase of \$4.7M annually
- Was not in BRAC original proposal

227K square feet of space Identified at WPAFB for deactivation

- 88th ABW is not going to deactivate the space
- Therefore Recurring BOS Cost are understated and Savings are overstated
- BOS Savings Appear to be inconsistent
 - 50% Increase in Hanscom Population only increases BOS 24%
 - 50% Increase in Hanscom Population only increases Sustainment 12%

MILCON Issues

- What is the Beneficial Occupancy Date of the Facility?
 - People are scheduled to move in FY06 – FY08
 - Parking Lot Funded in FY08
 - Hanscom Infrastructure Upgrade Funded in FY08
 - Systems Furniture/Facility Outfitting Funded in FY10
- ESC Plan to Lease Space Until Facility Completed
 - In Direct Conflict of BRAC Goal for reduction in DoD Leased Space
 - Expense not included in the Analysis
- Facility Description Types in Hanscom CE Estimate do not match Types in Final BRAC Provided to the Commission

Economic Impact to Dayton-Springfield MSA

- BRAC Report: Job Loss 2,250 Unemployment .44%
- SATAF Analysis: Job Loss 6,241 Unemployment 1.22%
 - Based on WPAFB EIC Multipliers

Current WPAFB Jobs Baseline – 1111 Jobs

- Military – 55
- Civilian – 429
- Support Contractors- 627

Current Indirect Jobs – 1681

- Indirect Jobs from Military - 23
- Indirect Jobs from Civilians - 674
- Indirect Jobs from Support Contractors – 984

Development Contractors (Estimated) – 1342

Indirect Jobs from Development Contractors – 2107

Total Dayton Area Jobs - 6241

TECH-6

DRAFT LACKLAND



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS CENTER (AFSPC)
LOS ANGELES, CA

AUG 09 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUPPLY & STORAGE JOINT-CROSS SERVICE GROUP
CHAIRMAN, TECHNICAL JOINT-CROSS SERVICE GROUP
CHAIRMAN, INDUSTRIAL JOINT-CROSS SERVICE GROUP

FROM: SMC/CC
2420 Vela Way, Suite 1866
Los Angeles AFB
El Segundo CA 90245-4659


SUBJECT: Realignment of the Cryptologic Systems Group Space Communications Security Acquisition and Sustainment Mission

1. Based on further understanding and assessment, we believe the DOD BRAC recommendation to separate and relocate the space communications security (COMSEC) support operations and responsibilities, currently performed at Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, will likely have significant adverse program and cost impact on the development and operations of our military satellites.
2. The Cryptologic Systems Group (CSG) is currently organized and aligned to provide cradle-to-grave acquisition, maintenance, material management, testing, and warehousing support to Air Force, NRO, and select NASA satellite programs. The co-location of procurement, maintenance, logistics, and distribution functions for space COMSEC enables cross flow of knowledge and optimizes program office operating manpower through shared expertise. The CSG consolidation also reduced overhead costs required to duplicate unique resources at multiple locations and preserves unique space support skills not readily available elsewhere. Space support personnel average 10 years experience in space security product development and operations and require top-secret clearances, special background investigations, and Special Compartmented Information (SCI) access.
3. The realignment recommendation would fragment the Cryptologic Systems Group responsibilities and operations across four geographically separated locations and require the realignment of 69 people. The maintenance portion would go to Tobyhanna in Pennsylvania, item management services would move to Robins AFB in Georgia, management of acquisition would move to Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts, and the warehouse for equipment and key material would remain in San Antonio, Texas. Space-specific technical skills are not present at these locations and would be inadequate in depth to achieve the needed synergy for adequate space program support. Costs associated with the physical relocation of space-specific facilities, with specific technical and security requirements, have not been scoped or funded at the gaining facilities. They will certainly offset any cost savings attributed to the realignment of the 69 people.
4. Military satellite developments and operations are high cost, high profile missions that deliver space based navigation, meteorological, communications, and surveillance capabilities to the warfighter. The support infrastructure for these systems is critical to their performance and requires a level of personnel expertise and physical facilities which will be lost under the current DOD realignment recommendation. SMC requests that the recommendation to realign the Cryptologic Systems Group Space Communications Security Acquisition and Sustainment Mission be reversed.

MICHAEL A. HAMEL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

GUARDIANS OF THE HIGH FRONTIER

DRAFT



*BRAC 14041106
 JULY 11, 2005*

**Cryptologic Systems Group
 (CPSG)**

- The current DoD recommendation to disassemble the CPSC has the potential to severely damage our national security.
- This action appears to violate at least one BRAC military value criteria.


Before Recommendation to BRAC

Customer – CPSSG

Current



Customer






Provider

After Recommendation to BRAC Customer – Multiple Providers

OD Recommendation




Customer



CRPSG is THE Joint DoD Organization for:

- National Intelligence Support
- Space Communications Security
- Highly Classified Special Projects
- Electronic Key Management
- Specialized Facilities & Capabilities



Finally, one must note that this research depends on non-human primates. A primate colony and certified vivarium exist in San Antonio TX but not in Dayton OH.

Intro Doug Williams

4. Cryptologic Systems Group: Col (ret) Doug Williams

Good morning Chairman Principi and Commissioners.

The Cryptologic Systems Group, or CPSG provides highly specialized support to a host of military and non-military governmental agencies. These agencies depend on the CPSG to protect their most sensitive and classified operations. Because of the secretive nature of the CPSG's work, my comments will be limited to just a few observations and will emphasize our belief that the proposed realignment of the Cryptologic Systems Group has a very real potential to severely damage our national security. The Defense Department first proposed closure of the CPSG and realignment of its functions during the 1995 BRAC. At that time the CPSG was part of the San Antonio Air Logistics Center. Fortunately, the '95 BRAC Commission recognized that the vital functions performed by the CPSG should be left intact as a part of Lackland AFB. We don't know what lead to the department's recommendation to break up the CPSG during this current BRAC round but there are indications the intelligence community was not

sufficiently involved in the decision. We know, for example, that the National Security Agency has formally expressed concern about the realignment recommendation. In addition, the DOD realignment proposal appears to violate BRAC military value criteria in that it would decrease efficiency and adversely affects the war fighter. This slide shows what I mean. As you can see, CPSG customers, such as tactical commanders, the National Security Agency, or National Reconnaissance Office currently enjoy "one-stop support" for all the tools, products, and services they need to protect sensitive, classified operations. This next slide reveals how the process will change if the proposed CPSG realignment takes place: customers would have to go to five different geographic locations to get the service they now get by making one call to the CPSG. It's reasonable to assume that speed and efficiency of even the most sensitive and important operations will suffer. Among the hundreds of realignments suggested by DoD for this BRAC, the disassembly of the Cryptologic Systems Group is one that could directly threaten the security of our nation and the safety of our troops. To summarize, the CPSG is a joint organization that supports vital national security and intelligence functions. Breaking it apart has the potential to do real harm. We urge you to carefully weigh and consider the background data we've provided. We look forward to answering your questions and working with your staff on this matter. Thank you for your time and attention.

BACKGROUND ON ISSUES DELING WITH
CRYPTOLOGIC SYSTEMS GROUP (CPSG)
Lackland, AFB, San Antonio, TX.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION:

Three separate recommendations disestablish the CPSG:

1. (IND-15): disestablish all depot maintenance capabilities at Lackland AFB and relocate the depot maintenance (Non-Airborne), and Radio to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA.
2. (S&S-7): Relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center, Columbus, OH.

Relocate the procurement management and related support functions for Depot level reparable to Robins Air Force Base.

3. (Tech-6): Relocate Air & Space Information Systems Research and Development & Acquisition to Hanscom AFB, MA. (Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation).

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED and INSTALLATION CONCERNS:

Preliminary Issues Identified:

Taken separately the recommendations do not capture the mission value of the CPSG nor represent fairly the costs associated with the breakup of collective functions.

Military value criteria –

The proposed realignment of the CPSG does not seem to take into consideration the full scope of the secretive nature of the CPSG's work or the support CPSG provides to a host of military and non-military government agencies.

- Commissioner Hill was given a classified briefing by CPSG.
- NSA has formally expressed concern about the realignment.
- Agency officials have disagreed on costs and the ability to effectively relocate some classified mission capability.

The cost of operations and manpower implications –

We have identified a number of costs that were not captured or need to be updated within the COBRA analysis. We are meeting with Agency officials to clarify these disconnects.

The Cryptologic Systems Groups (CPSG) at Lackland; expressed these concerns

- a. secure facility requirements not addressed in COBRA data as part of MILCON;
- b. vibration isolated foundation slab is required;
- c. runway required for special projects missions;
- d. longer runway is required than available at Tobyhanna;
- e. 259 contractor billets not addressed;
- f. Incorrect number of personnel identified for Columbus Consumable ICP Support;
- g. No personnel identified to perform procurement management and related support functions for depot level reparable;
- h. Equipment movement cost is \$22m higher than estimated by DoD;
- i. CPSG repair and return times (presently 5 days) will increase because of the need to ship the items where presently those functions are located together;
- j. Recurring transportation cost will occur to move equipment between warehouse and TYAD;
- k. Maintenance facilities at gaining activity do not meet current requirements to satisfy national space mission; and
- l. Presently, CPSG customers come to one place for their acquisition, depot maintenance, inventory control, integrated material management and packaging, handling, storage and transport of items. The BRAC recommendation splits CPSG into 6 pieces at 5 different locations.

Recommendation Tech #6 – Relocating the Air and Space Systems Research and Development and Acquisition Lackland to Hanscom (along with Maxwell and WPAFB)

**Answers from the Cryptologic Systems Group (CPSG) – Lackland AFB, TX
2 July 2005**

- 1. Hanscom acquires electronics systems for the Air Force. How will the addition of the Cryptologic Systems Group provide increased synergy to Hanscom's acquisition functions?**

Increased synergy:

We design and field systems used by customers across the DOD. Yes, some of the System Program Offices (SPOs) using our products are located at Hanscom AFB. Information Assurance (IA) is an important part of the infrastructure required to achieve the Global Information Grid. Net-centric warfare and the new programs like airborne networks rely on our security techniques in order to be able to exchange classified information securely and confidently.

There is a great deal of **synergy lost – both internally and externally.** San Antonio is a center of excellence for IA. The acquisition activity located at the CPSG has been placed here (some by Hanscom AFB) because of the technical expertise of the CPSG and its partners/customers located nearby. **We are collocated with:** the Air Intelligence Agency (AIA), the 33rd Information Operations Squadron, NSA Texas, the Air Force Information Warfare Center, the Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team, the Air Force Information Warfare Battle Lab, and a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) communications office. **We receive requirements, develop, test and field products with our co-located customers and partners.**

Internal synergy lost:

The DOD proposal splits the CPSG into 6 pieces. Recommendations from **3 separate functional Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSGs)** (Technical, Industrial, and Supply and Storage) were included in the DOD recommendation. The Intel JCSG was not involved or aware. There **may be functional synergies gained** by the recommendations, but there **certainly are mission and intel synergies lost.** Because of the classified nature of our intel missions, we emphasized this synergy during the analyst tours of the Air Force Technical Applications Center (nuclear monitoring), Consolidated SIGINT Support Activity (national intel), and special projects areas.

Other synergies

There are also r

- Our (CIP
- Man (they

*TECH-6
Lackland*

Antonio partners.
telligence personnel management system
.IA
(tractor) come from the intel community
nd clearances)

- Our network services are provided by AIA (SIPRNET, JWICS, NSA and several others (classified))
- The AIA printing office performs our classified printing for such products as Communications Security operational and maintenance manuals and voice call sign/key management documents
- The AIA/CC is the Air Force's Service Cryptologic Element (SCE). The SCE manages cryptologic resources and workload for the AF and reports to NSA

2. What are the mission/functions of Lackland's Cryptologic Group and does this function exist elsewhere?

Mission/Functions:

The CPSG is responsible for cryptologic products (entire lifecycle). More specifically, the CPSG:

- Provides COMSEC keying material for the **DOD**.
- Acquires fields and sustains satellite COMSEC for the **DOD**.
- Sustains all national intel systems for the **DOD**.
- Provides special projects services for the **DOD**.
- Acquires, fields and sustains ground Communications Security (COMSEC) equipment for the **Air Force**. Some activity is for the **DOD**.

There is some duplication of function in the depot maintenance of ground COMSEC equipment. The Army, Navy, and Air Force each have ground COMSEC maintenance activities. NOTE: This is a small part of the maintenance activity of the CPSG that has been identified for movement to Tobyhanna Army Depot. Please reference cost data and disconnects in this area. Additionally, the Navy is retaining their ground COMSEC maintenance activity.

Clarification regarding non-space COMSEC acquisition: The acquisition functions performed at the CPSG are not performed anywhere else. All COMSEC SPO's (across the DOD) are "chartered" by the National Security Agency – the acquisition workload is assigned based upon many factors and the services agree to use common products.

3. Why is it important to co-locate this cryptologic function to a base that does not perform this function? What is the specific impact on military value?

The DoD **recommendation is to consolidate C4ISR acquisition activities**. The move is a functional one – not specific to the cryptologic mission. That is, cryptography is not just used in the C4ISR systems acquired at Hanscom AFB – the CPSG provides cryptographic products and services for all acquisition activities in the Air Force (many for the DOD – see #2 above).

We are 44 of over 1300 positions being consolidated at Hanscom AFB. Even if this recommendation is accepted, **Hanscom will not perform all COMSEC acquisition** -

cryptographic acquisition is not being consolidated there. **Indeed, not all Hanscom C4ISR acquisition is included in the consolidation** – including an ESC acquisition activity here in San Antonio.

4. What assurance exists that the right types of technical personnel will move to Hanscom (high cost area) and to what extent are these skills already available in the Hanscom area?

We have not surveyed our personnel to determine who will relocate to Hanscom AFB. Because there are many job opportunities in the San Antonio area (NSA Texas is creating 800 new intel jobs), **we believe that a very small number will elect to move to Hanscom.**

The Boston area is **extremely costly and positions there are already coded as “hard to fill”**. The DoD **recommendation adds over 1300 positions to the base (44 are currently CPSG – we believe the correct number to be 83)**. Hanscom does very little organic technical work – **engineering work is primarily done by FFRDC and contractors**. We don't believe there will be a problem finding the right types of technical personnel. However, the CPSG currently does the majority of its engineering work organically, if we follow the Hanscom model, we'll be confronted with the congressional MITRE STE cap and a very large bill (approximately \$280K per FFRDC/contractor man-year vs \$100K per organic man-year).

5. How many buildings/square feet will be needed at Hanscom and what portion needs to be secure?

The COBRA model for Tech #6 identifies approximately 44 billets* (54 minus 10 eliminated). For the 44 billets moving to Hanscom AFB, it would require 9,000 SF of Secure/Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) space with approximately 2,000 SF designated for SCIF/Special Access Programs (a SCIF within a SCIF concept).

*** Note – this requirement is anticipated to change (increase) after a mission workload assessment through the AFMC Site Survey Plan process is validated, which would in turn increase the amount of SCIF/Special Access space required.**

Recommendation Tech #6 relocates Air & Space Systems Research & Dev. & Acq. from Lackland to Hanscom (along with Maxwell & WPAFB)

Justification cites reduction of the number of technical facilities engaged in air and space sensors, electronic warfare, and electronics and information systems RDAT&E. Push is for multi-functional centers of excellence.

- 1. Hanscom acquires electronics systems for the Air Force. How will the addition of the Cryptologic Systems Group provide increased synergy to Hanscom's acquisition functions?**
- 2. What are the mission/functions of Lackland's Cryptologic Group and does this function exist elsewhere?**
- 3. Why is it important to co-locate this cryptologic function to a base that does not perform this function? What is the specific impact on military value?**
- 4. What assurance exists that the right types of technical personnel will move to Hanscom (high cost area) and to what extent are these skills already available in the Hanscom area?**
- 5. How many buildings/square feet will be needed at Hanscom and what portion needs to be secure?**



Cryptologic Systems Group

"Ensuring Information Superiority and Agile Combat Support"



The Cryptologic Systems Group

Welcomes

Ms. Lesia Mandzia
Mr. Thomas Pantelides

BRAC Commission Analysts


29 Jun 2005

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
Slide #1



Unit Strength



CPSG Total Force: 801
Unit Manning Document



Numbers Continue to Grow throughout FY05 – FY11

CPSG Acquisition Total: 258
BRAC Scenario 663 (16 Feb 05)

*Contractor Man-year Equivalents

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
Slide #2



CPSG's Acquisition Functions




Public Key Infrastructure



Electronic Key Mgt System




IFF Crypto



Cryptographic Modernization

Modernization & Transformation Approach




Cyber-Lighthouse



Combat Information Transport System



Minuteman III ICBM Crypto




Space Telemetry Tracking & Control



Secure Airborne Networks



Cross Domain Solutions



Crypto Rekey Systems



UNCLASSIFIED "Ensuring Information Superiority and Agile Combat Support"

Slide #3




CPSG Acquisition Funding

As Of: 31 May 05



*Doesn't include CDS or CITS funding.




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Slide #7



CPSG Synergy With The San Antonio Community




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Slide #5



2005 DoD BRAC Recommendation for CPSG Acquisition - TECH 0042



Total COBRA positions identified (543) versus CPSG UMD (542)

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Slide #6



C4ISR RDAT&E Acquisition To Hanscom AFB Disconnects



- ◆ **Personnel**
 - **Manpower Underestimated For C4ISR Workload**
 - 44 Billets Identified In COBRA TECH 0042 (AISRD&A)
 - Certified Number Much Higher Required For Full CPSG C4ISR RDAT&E Acquisition Workload (Information Systems, Sensors/Electronics/Electronic Warfare, Space Platforms, And Nuclear Technology)
- ◆ **Milcon**
 - **Hanscom AFB Facility Requirements**
 - Secure Facility Requirements Not Addressed In COBRA Data As Part Of MILCON
 - ~ None Identified By Appropriate Facility Activity Code (FAC)
- ◆ **Funding – N/A**

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Slide #7



C4ISR RDAT&E Acquisition To Hanscom AFB Issues



- ◆ **Personnel**
 - **Manpower Underestimated For C4ISR Workload**
 - CPSG Has 156 Contractors Supporting Acquisition Activities
- ◆ **Milcon**
 - **Hanscom AFB Facility Requirements**
 - FY07 Start Date Probably Not Feasible In The Event MILCON Is Required (1300 Total Acquisition Personnel Projected To Move To Hanscom AFB Overall)
 - Contractor Personnel Will Also Require Secure Facilities (Not Specifically Addressed)
- ◆ **Funding**
 - **Increased Costs Due To Burdened Rates And Location (Boston Vs San Antonio)**
 - Average Cost In SATX Is \$125K Vs Boston Is \$239K
 - Recurring Additional Cost Of \$17.8M / Year In Boston
 - **Hard-to-fill Positions Due To Geographic Location (Hanscom AFB, MA)**

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Slide #8

Cryptologic Systems Group

"Ensuring Information Superiority and Agile Combat Support"

CPSG Points of Contact:

Col Jerry T. Corley - Commander

210-977-2253

jerry.corley@lackland.af.mil

Mr. Ronnie L. Carter - Executive Director


210-977-2253

ronnie.carter@lackland.af.mil

Ms. Diane Salazar - CPSG BRAC Response Team Lead

210-977-6770

diane.salazar@lackland.af.mil



Cryptologic Systems Group (CPSG)
230 Hall Blvd, Ste 126
San Antonio TX 78243
DSN: 969-2253, COMM 210-977-2253

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Cryptologic Systems Group

"Ensuring Information Superiority and Agile Combat Support"


Questions?




UNCLASSIFIED




CPSG's Acquisition Functions




Public Key Infrastructure




Electronic Key Mgt System




IFF Crypto




Crypto Rekey Systems




Minuteman III ICBM Crypto




Space Telemetry Tracking & Control




Secure Airborne Networks




Cross Domain Solutions



Cryptographic Modernization



Cyber-Lighthouse



Combat Information Transport System





Cryptologic Systems Group

"Ensuring Information Superiority and Agile Combat Support"



The Cryptologic Systems Group (CPSG)

Mission Briefing

26 Jun 2005

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
Slide #1



History and Awards



More Than 60 Years of "Recognized Excellence"



136th Signal Radio Intelligence Company
Army Air Corps

USAF Security Service
(Now AIA)

San Antonio Air Logistics Center
(AFMC)

Cryptologic Systems Group
(ESC)

1963 - AFOUA 1970 - AFOUA 1984 - AFOEA 1990 - AFOEA 2001 - Outstanding Small Depot
 1977 - AFOUA 1986 - AFOEA 1993 - AFOEA 2002 - Outstanding Small Depot
 1978 - AFOUA 1988 - AFOEA 1999 - AFOEA 2004 - Outstanding Small Depot


AFOUA - AF Outstanding Unit Award
AFOEA - AF Organizational Excellence Award

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
Slide #2



Location / Facilities




Unit Strength





CPSG Funding

As Of: 31 Mar 05




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Slide #5



CPSG FACILITIES

Total: 391K SQ FT in use (Special Note: 74% of total is Secure/SCIF/Special Access space)




- ▨ SCIF/SECURE Warehouse (114077 SF)
- ▨ Unclass Warehouse (87380 SF)
- Secure Transportation (10000 SF)
- SCIF MA Maint/Supt (58186 SF)
- ▨ SCIF ZJ Special Access (16227 SF)
- SCIF/SECURE ADMIN (69197 SF)
- ▨ UNCLASS Admin (5793 SF)
- ▨ Leased Space (30150 SF)
Note: 22450 SF is Secure

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Slide #6

Vision

"A Secure Global Information Grid (GIG)"




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Slide #7



MS – Mission Support



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Slide #8







LG – Logistics



Commander



- **Controlled Inventory and Accountability**
- **Stock, Store and Issue**
- **Transportation and Shipping**
- **Preservation and Packaging**
- **DEMIL and Asset Destruction**
- **Logistics Data Management / Analysis**
- **Logistics Data Systems Support**
- **Engineering and Tech Data Management**
- **Cryptologic Help Desk**




MA – Maintenance



Commander




- **Production Support Division**
- **Hardware Maintenance Division**
 - **COMSEC**
 - **SIGINT (National Intel)**
 - **Technical Applications**
 - **Automated Test Equipment**






NI – Information Assurance




IA Product Area Directorate (PAD)

- Innovative GIG IA Solutions
 - Research ongoing: Air, Ground, Space
 - Airborne Network IA PMO
 - Vulnerability Management PMO
- Dynamic Key Management
 - Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) SPO
 - AF Electronic Key Mgmt System SPO
 - DoD Central Office of Record
- Maintaining GIG IA Software
- Customer Security Services




ZX – Crypto Modernization


Program Office



- Develop, Acquire and Field Modern Crypto Technologies and Solutions that Support Robust Security, Interoperability, Flexibility and Compatibility with Evolving Key Management Infrastructures.
- Support the Transformation of Crypto Capabilities to Enable Future Joint Network-Centric Operations



Modernization & Transformation Approach






ZJ – Special Projects





- Procurement and Acquisition Logistics of Type 1 NSA Approved INFOSEC Products in Support of DoD Space Applications
- Technical Repair Center (TRC) for Space Applications Crypto
- Focal Point for Developing and Advocating Space Cryptographic Modernization Requirements
 - Area of Convergence for Both MILSAT and IC Requirements
- Specialized Logistics Operations for INFOSEC Support to Air Force Advanced Research and Development Programs



ZC – COMSEC Products




- Secure Products Division – Sustainment
 - Traditional Cryptographic Equipment
 - Commercially Endorsed COMSEC
- COMSEC Acquisition Management
 - Crypto Development Program Offices
 - IFF, CI-13, KOK-13/13A
- Information Assurance Technical Assistance Center (ITAC)





ZI – Intel & Force Protect




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Slide #15



Customers – Worldwide

"Stakeholder Satisfaction"



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Slide #16



Somewhere . . .



A Warfighter:

- ▣ Mission Plans With Intelligence... Enabled by CPSG
- ▣ Uses a Call Sign... Provided by CPSG
- ▣ Talks Securely... Maintained/Keyed by CPSG
- ▣ Navigates With Secure GPS... Provided by CPSG
- ▣ Lands at a Base... Protected by CPSG
- ▣ Weapons Secured... by CPSG

Personnel, Resources, & Mission
Made More Secure... by CPSG

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Slide #17

Cryptologic Systems Group

"Ensuring Information Superiority and Agile Combat Support"

CPSG Points of Contact:

Col Jerry T. Corley - Commander

210-977-2253

jerry.corley@lackland.af.mil

Mr. Ronnie L. Carter - Executive Director


210-977-2253

ronnie.carter@lackland.af.mil

Ms. Diane Salazar - CPSG BRAC Response Team Lead

210-977-6770


diane.salazar@lackland.af.mil




Cryptologic Systems Group (CPSG)
 230 Hall Blvd, Ste 126
 San Antonio TX 78243
 DSN: 969-2253, COMM 210-977-2253



2005 DoD BRAC Recommendation for Cryptologic Systems Group



2005 DoD BRAC Recommendation for Cryptologic Systems Group




Total COBRA positions identified (543) versus CPSG UMD (542)

NOTES: Although not depicted, 259 contractor positions @CPSG would also be relocated or eliminated.



2005 DoD BRAC Recommendation for CPSG Acquisition – TECH 0042



Total COBRA positions identified (543) versus CPSG UMD (542)

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Slide #21



C4ISR RDAT&E Acquisition To Hanscom AFB Disconnects



- ◆ **Personnel**
 - Manpower Underestimated for C4ISR Workload
 - ◆ 44 billets identified in COBRA TECH 0042 (AISRD&A)
 - Is this only for the Information Systems acquisition piece?
 - ◆ Certified number much higher required for full CPSG C4ISR RDAT&E acquisition workload (Information Systems, Sensors/Electronics/Electronic Warfare, Space Platforms, and Nuclear Technology)
- ◆ **MILCON**
 - Hanscom AFB Facility Requirements
 - ◆ Secure facility requirements not addressed in COBRA data as part of MILCON
 - None identified by appropriate Facility Activity Code (FAC)
- ◆ **Funding – N/A**

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Slide #22



C4ISR RDAT&E Acquisition To Hanscom AFB Issues




- ◆ **Personnel**
 - Manpower Underestimated for C4ISR Workload
 - CPSG has 156 contractors supporting acquisition activities

- ◆ **MILCON**
 - Hanscom AFB Facility Requirements
 - FY07 start date probably not feasible in the event MILCON is required (1300 total acquisition personnel projected to move to Hanscom AFB overall)
 - Contractor personnel will also require secure facilities (not specifically addressed)

- ◆ **Funding**
 - Decreased Mission Effectiveness
 - Increased costs due to burdened rates and location (Boston vs San Antonio)
 - ~ Average cost in SA is \$125K vs Boston at \$239K
 - Hard-to-fill positions due to geographic location (Hanscom AFB, MA)



2005 DoD BRAC Recommendation for CPSG Depot Maintenance – IND 0086



Total COBRA positions identified (543) versus CPSG UMD (542)



INDUSTRIAL

Depot Maintenance to Tobyhanna Army Depot (TYAD) Disconnects



- ◆ **Personnel** –
 - 137 CIV Billets with Zero (0) MIL identified
 - Tech Applications maintenance is supported by 100% military
 - Space & Air/Ground Crypto supported by 54% military
- ◆ **MILCON**
 - None identified in COBRA data
 - ZJ Space Vibration Isolated Foundation (SVIF) slab
 - Runway requirements (Minuteman III, Peacekeeper & TAP missions (eleven-thousand foot runway essential for WC-135 aircraft)
 - SCIF/Special Access Facilities required
- ◆ **Funding**
 - Discrepancy in Equipment Movement Cost
 - \$3.052M for movement of depot maintenance equipment incorrect
 - ~ Lackland (CPSG) certified estimate significantly higher at \$21M
 - Additionally, must include \$4.8M certified recurring transportation cost (direct annual cost to move equipment between warehouse and TYAD)



INDUSTRIAL


Depot Maintenance to Tobyhanna Army Depot (TYAD) Issues



- ◆ **Personnel**
 - 5 Army and 5 Navy SIGINT (CSSA) positions not identified
- ◆ **MILCON**
 - FY07 start date probably not feasible in the event MILCON is required
- ◆ **Funding** – N/A
- ◆ **Other** –
 - Space and Airborne missions not specifically addressed in BRAC language
 - AETC/OL (Keesler) Maintenance Trainers not addressed in BRAC language (currently co-located with CPSG space crypto mission)
 - Possible negative impact to negotiated contract “repair & return” times (SIGINT CSSA mission support)
 - Continuous operations requirements
 - ICBM (Peacekeeper and Minuteman III) Electro-Magnetic Interference Shielded Lab (SCIF)
 - ~ 24/7 operation; one of a kind in DoD; congressional approval required relocation



2005 DoD BRAC Recommendation for CPSG ICP/IMM – S&S 0035R



Total COBRA positions identified (543) versus CPSG UMD (542)

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Slide #27



Supply and Storage (S&S) Integrated Material Management (IMM) To Robins AFB GA Disconnects



◆ Personnel –

- Personnel mix identified incorrect
 - Currently includes manpower for Stock, Store, Issue and Distribution (SSID) functions

◆ MILCON

- Underestimated Facility Cost
 - COBRA MILCON dollars estimated at \$26M – for warehouse only which is not moving from LACKLAND AFB)
 - Facility MILCON/Rehab identified for IMM administrative FAC space is incorrect
 - ~ No required Secure/SCIF office space identified

◆ Funding – N/A

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Slide #28



Supply and Storage (S&S) Integrated Material Management (IMM) To Robins AFB GA Issues



- ◆ **Personnel**
 - 5 Army + 5 Navy COMSEC (EKMS - Key Mgmt) positions not identified
 - Personnel mix include SSID personnel numbers


- ◆ **MILCON - N/A**

- ◆ **Funding - N/A**

- ◆ **Other**
 - **Continuous operations requirements**
 - ◆ **Electronic Key Management System (EKMS) and Voice Call Signs (VCS)**
 - ~ 24/7 operation supporting 801 Tri-Service customers
 - ~ Provides cryptographic key material via automated secure dial-in accessed bulletin board (at DISA-Kelly USA)
 - Collocation of CPSG key managers and DISA activity required due to closed network encrypted point-to-point requirement
 - ~ VCS requires 24/7 access via NIPRNET and SIPRNET



2005 DoD BRAC Recommendation for CPSG Consumables - S&S 0035R



Total COBRA positions identified (543) versus CPSG UMD (542)



Supply and Storage (S&S) Inventory Control Point (ICP) for Consumables To Columbus OH Disconnects




- ◆ **Personnel –**
 - Incorrect number of personnel identified (17) for DSC – Consumable ICP support
 - ◆ CPSG currently employs two full-time employees performing consumable item management services

- ◆ **MILCON – N/A**

- ◆ **Funding – N/A**



2005 DoD BRAC Recommendation for CPSG Support for DLRs – S&S 0035R



Total COBRA positions identified (543) versus CPSG UMD (542)

NOTES: Although not depicted, 259 contractor positions @CPSG would also be relocated or eliminated.




**Supply and Storage (S&S)
Procurement Management & Related Support for DLRs
To Robins GA
Disconnects**



- ◆ **Personnel –**
 - No personnel identified to perform procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables (DLRs)
- ◆ **MILCON – N/A**
- ◆ **Funding – N/A**



**2005 DoD BRAC Recommendation
for
CPSG Supply Storage Issue & Distribution (SSID)**



Total COBRA positions identified (543) versus CPSG UMD (542)



**Supply and Storage (S&S)
Stock, Store, Issue & Distribution (SSID)
Lackland AFB TX
Disconnects**



- ◆ **Personnel –**
 - Zero (0) personnel identified (left in place at CPSG) to perform the SSID function in the BRAC language


- ◆ **MILCON**
 - COBRA MILCON dollars estimated at \$26M – for warehouse only under IMM COBRA Data if realigned from LACKLAND AFB/CPSG
 - Certified number (from Robins) much larger at \$52M MILCON cost for required Secure Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) (only applies to warehouse facility requirements if realigned)

- ◆ **Funding**
 - Must include a shared \$4.8M recurring transportation cost with maintenance (cost to move property to/from activities)

Cryptologic Systems Group

“Ensuring Information Superiority and Agile Combat Support”

Questions?





**2005 DoD BRAC Recommendations
Disconnects
(Roll-Up)**



◆ **Personnel**

- **Manpower Underestimated for C4ISR Workload (Acquisition)**
 - 44 billets identified in COBRA TECH 0042 (AISRD&A)
 - ~ Is this only for the Information Systems acquisition piece?
 - ~ Full CPSG C4ISR RDAT&E acquisition workload covers Information Systems, Sensors/Electronics/Electronic Warfare, Space Platforms, and Nuclear Technology
- **137 CIV Billets with Zero (0) MIL identified (Industrial/Depot Maintenance)**
 - Tech Applications maintenance is supported by 100% military
 - Space & Air/Ground Crypto supported by 54% military
- **Personnel mix identified incorrect (IMM and Warehouse/SSID)**
 - Currently includes manpower for Stock, Store, Issue and Distribution (SSID) functions
 - Zero personnel left in place for SSID support
- **Incorrect number of personnel identified (17) for DSC – Consumable ICP support (IMM/Consumables)**
 - CPSG currently employs two full-time employees performing consumable item management services
- **No personnel identified to perform procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables (DLRs) (IMM/Depot Level Repairable Procurement Management)**



**2005 DoD BRAC Recommendations
Disconnects
(Roll-Up)**



◆ **MILCON**

- **Hanscom AFB Facility Requirements (Acquisition)**
 - Secure facility requirements not addressed in COBRA data as part of MILCON
 - ~ None identified by appropriate Facility Activity Code (FAC)
- **None identified in COBRA data (Industrial/Depot Maintenance)**
 - ZJ Space Vibration Isolated Foundation (SVIF) slab
 - Runway requirements (Minuteman III, Peacekeeper & TAP missions (eleven-thousand foot runway essential for WC-135 aircraft)
 - SCIF/Special Access Facilities required
- **Underestimated Facility Cost (IMM/Robins)**
 - COBRA MILCON dollars estimated at \$26M – for warehouse only which is not moving
 - Certified number (from Robins) much larger at \$52M MILCON cost for required Secure Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) (only applies to warehouse facility requirements)
 - Facility MILCON/Rehab for IMM administrative FAC space is incorrect
 - ~ Secure/SCIF office space not identified at all



**2005 DoD BRAC Recommendations
Disconnects
(Roll-Up)**



◆ **Funding**

- **Discrepancy in Equipment Movement Cost (Industrial/Depot Maintenance)**
 - \$3.052M for movement of depot maintenance equipment incorrect
 - ~ Lackland (CPSG) certified estimate significantly higher at \$21M
 - Additionally, must include \$4.8M certified recurring transportation cost (direct annual cost to move equipment between warehouse and TYAD)
- **Must include a shared \$4.8M recurring transportation cost with maintenance (cost to move property to/from activities) (IMM/SSID)**



**2005 DoD BRAC Recommendations
Issues
(Roll-Up)**



◆ **Personnel**

- **Manpower Underestimated for C4ISR Workload (Acquisition)**
 - CPSG has 156 contractors supporting acquisition activities
- **5 Army and 5 Navy SIGINT (CSSA) positions not identified (Industrial/Depot Maintenance)**
- **5 Army + 5 Navy COMSEC (EKMS - Key Mgmt) positions not identified (IMM/Robins)**
 - Personnel mix include SSID personnel numbers



**2005 DoD BRAC Recommendations
Issues
(Roll-Up)**



◆ **MILCON**

- **Hanscom AFB Facility Requirements (Acquisition)**
 - FY07 start date probably not feasible in the event MILCON is required (1300 total acquisition personnel projected to move to Hanscom AFB overall)
 - Contractor personnel will also require secure facilities (not specifically addressed)
- **FY07 start date probably not feasible in the event MILCON is required (Industrial/Depot Maintenance)**



**2005 DoD BRAC Recommendations
Issues
(Roll-Up)**





◆ **OTHER**

- **Space and Airborne missions not specifically addressed in BRAC language**
- **AETC/OL (Keesler) Maintenance Trainers not addressed in BRAC language** (currently co-located with CPSG space crypto mission)
- **Possible negative impact to negotiated contract "repair & return" times (SIGINT CSSA mission support)**
- **Continuous operations requirements (Industrial/Depot Maintenance)**
 - ICBM (Peacekeeper and Minuteman III) Electro-Magnetic Interference Shielded Lab (SCIF)
 - ~ 24/7 operation; one of a kind in DoD; congressional approval required relocation
- **Continuous operations requirements (IMM/Robins)**
 - Electronic Key Management System (EKMS) and Voice Call Signs (VCS)
 - ~ 24/7 operation supporting 801 Tri-Service customers
 - ~ Provides cryptographic key material via automated secure dial-in accessed bulletin board (at DISA-Kelly USA)
 - Collocation of CPSG key managers and DISA activity required due to closed network encrypted point-to-point requirement
 - ~ VCS requires 24/7 access via NIPRNET and SIPRNET




CPSG Synergy With The San Antonio Community





2005 DOD BRAC Recommendation for CPSG Acquisition – TECH 0042



DCN:11670

Total COBRA positions identified (543) versus CPSC UMD (542)

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C4ISR RDAT&E Acquisition To Hanscom AFB Disconnects



◆ Personnel

– Manpower Underestimated For C4ISR Workload


- 44 Billets Identified In COBRA TECH 0042 (AISRD&A)
- Certified Number Much Higher Required For Full CPSG C4ISR RDAT&E Acquisition Workload (Information Systems, Sensors/Electronics/Electronic Warfare, Space Platforms, And Nuclear Technology)

◆ Milcon

– Hanscom AFB Facility Requirements

- Secure Facility Requirements Not Addressed In COBRA Data As Part Of MILCON
 - ~ None Identified By Appropriate Facility Activity Code (FAC)

◆ Funding – N/A



C4ISR RDATA&E Acquisition To Hanscom AFB Issues



- ◆ **Personnel**
 - Manpower Underestimated For C4ISR Workload
 - CPSSG Has 156 Contractors Supporting Acquisition Activities
- ◆ **Milcon**
 - Hanscom AFB Facility Requirements
 - FY07 Start Date Probably Not Feasible In The Event MILCON IS Required (1300 Total Acquisition Personnel Projected To Move To Hanscom AFB Overall)
 - Contractor Personnel Will Also Require Secure Facilities (Not Specifically Addressed)
- ◆ **Funding**
 - Increased Costs Due To Burdened Rates And Location (Boston Vs San Antonio)
 - Average Cost In SATX Is \$125K Vs Boston Is \$239K
 - Recurring Additional Cost Of \$17.8M / Year In Boston
 - Hard-to-fill Positions Due To Geographic Location (Hanscom AFB, MA)

Cryptologic Systems Group

“Ensuring Information Superiority and Agile Combat Support”

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**Cryptologic Systems Group (CPSG)
230 Hall Blvd, Ste 126
San Antonio TX 78243
DSN: 969-2253, COMM 210-977-2253**

DCN:11670

UNCLASSIFIED

Cryptologic Systems Group

“Ensuring Information Superiority and Agile Combat Support”

Questions?



UNCLASSIFIED

DCN:11670
Questions

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 1/2
ta As Of 4/20/2005 4:12:53 PM, Report Created 4/20/2005 4:41:49 PM

What functions are going from Lackland to Hanscom?

cal JCSG
abase\COBRA Database\TECH-0042\TECH-0042 Part 7\6.10\J1 - C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation
ated1APR2005(6.10).CBR
RDAT&E Consolidation
abase\COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

Does Lackland take issue with the relocation? (8 Years)

9,057
2,369

		ant Dollars (\$K)					Total	Beyond
		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	-----	-----
Person	1,603	111,596	0	0	0	0	131,325	0
Overhd	1,538	-7,546	-14,315	-37,688	-37,688	-37,688	-133,324	-37,688
Moving	26,742	3,469	968	-447	-447	-447	4,635	-447
Missio	0	0	34,768	0	0	0	61,511	0
Other	944	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		0	28,516	2,714	18,186	2,714	53,073	2,714
TOTAL	50,557	107,518	49,937	-35,421	-19,949	-35,421	117,219	-35,421
		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
		-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
POSITIONS ELIMINATED								
Off	22	0	52	0	0	0	74	
Enl	3	0	203	0	0	0	206	
Civ	191	0	179	0	0	0	370	
TOT	216	0	434	0	0	0	650	
POSITIONS REALIGNED								
Off	0	0	137	0	0	0	137	
Enl	0	0	381	0	0	0	381	
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ	0	0	763	0	0	0	763	
TOT	0	0	1,281	0	0	0	1,281	

Summary:

Realign Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, and Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating Air & Space Information Systems Research and Development & Acquisition to Hanscom Air Force Base, MA. Realign Eglin Air Force Base, FL, by relocating Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare & Electronics and Information Systems Test & Evaluation to Edwards Air Force Base, CA.

Source Files:

1. TECH 0042 p7 USAF Complete 4 Jan 2005
2. Assumptions 5 Jan 2005 Approved TJCSG Telecon
3. Assumptions 10 Jan 2005 Approved TJCSG Telecon
4. Reduction Distribution (Dtd 31 Mar 05)
5. (Lackland tonnage file) SDD from USAF
6. TJCSG Telecon Minutes dtd 30Mar2005
7. TECH-0042p7with Hanscom CE(1).xls
8. OSD Database Question 3013
9. USAF document JS-609

Source file 2 eliminated Rome Laboratory from scenario subsequent to the receipt of source file 1.
Source file 2 eliminated Brooks City-Base from scenario subsequent to the receipt of source file 1.
Source file 3 eliminated NAS PATUXENT River from scenario.

Department : Technical JCSG
 Scenario File : E:\Database\COBRA Database\TECH-0042\TECH-0042 Part 7\6.10\J1 - C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation
 Tech042pt7_scrubbed_updated1APR2005(6.10).CBR
 Option Pkg Name: C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation
 Std Fctrs File : E:\Database\COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
MilCon	19,729	111,596	0	0	0	0	131,325	0
Person	9,724	8,484	24,102	18,293	18,293	18,293	97,189	18,293
Overhd	3,028	4,958	14,335	12,921	12,921	12,921	61,084	12,921
Moving	26,742	0	35,951	0	0	0	62,693	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	944	0	28,516	2,714	18,186	2,714	53,073	2,714
TOTAL	60,167	125,038	102,905	33,927	49,399	33,927	405,365	33,927

Savings in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	8,121	16,030	38,417	55,981	55,981	55,981	230,513	55,981
Overhd	1,490	1,490	13,367	13,367	13,367	13,367	56,449	13,367
Moving	0	0	1,183	0	0	0	1,183	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	9,611	17,519	52,968	69,349	69,349	69,349	288,145	69,349

Department : Technical JCSG
 Scenario File : E:\Database\COBRA Database\TECH-0042\TECH-0042 Part 7\6.10\J1 - C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation
 Tech042pt7_scrubbed_updated1APR2005(6.10).CBR
 Option Pkg Name: C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation
 Std Fctrs File : E:\Database\COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base:	Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (ZHTV)						
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Officers	0	0	34	0	0	0	34
Enlisted	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	359	0	0	0	359
TOTAL	0	0	398	0	0	0	398

From Base:	Lackland AFB, TX (MPLS)						
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Officers	0	0	8	0	0	0	8
Enlisted	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	34	0	0	0	34
TOTAL	0	0	44	0	0	0	44

From Base:	Maxwell AFB, AL (PNQS)						
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Officers	0	0	95	0	0	0	95
Enlisted	0	0	374	0	0	0	374
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	370	0	0	0	370
TOTAL	0	0	839	0	0	0	839

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into Hanscom AFB, MA (MXRD)):	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Officers	0	0	137	0	0	0	137
Enlisted	0	0	381	0	0	0	381
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	763	0	0	0	763
TOTAL	0	0	1,281	0	0	0	1,281

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES FOR: Hanscom AFB, MA (MXRD)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Officers	11	0	0	0	0	0	11
Enlisted	30	0	0	0	0	0	30
Civilians	61	0	0	0	0	0	61
TOTAL	102	0	0	0	0	0	102

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action) FOR: Hanscom AFB, MA (MXRD)	Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
	915	924	0	2,333

COBRA ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v6.10)

Data As Of 4/20/2005 4:12:53 PM, Report Created 4/20/2005 4:41:49 PM

Department : Technical JCSG
 Scenario File : E:\Database\COBRA Database\TECH-0042\TECH-0042 Part 7\6.10\J1 - C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation
 Tech042pt7_scrubbed_updated1APR2005(6.10).CBR
 Option Pkg Name: C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation
 Std Fctrs File : E:\Database\COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (ZHTV)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Jobs Gained-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Mil	23	0	39	0	0	0	62
NET CHANGE-Mil	-23	0	-39	0	0	0	-62
Jobs Gained-Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Civ	183	0	359	0	0	0	542
NET CHANGE-Civ	-183	0	-359	0	0	0	-542
Jobs Gained-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Lackland AFB, TX (MPLS)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Jobs Gained-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Mil	2	0	10	0	0	0	12
NET CHANGE-Mil	-2	0	-10	0	0	0	-12
Jobs Gained-Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Civ	8	0	34	0	0	0	42
NET CHANGE-Civ	-8	0	-34	0	0	0	-42
Jobs Gained-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Maxwell AFB, AL (PNQS)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Jobs Gained-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Mil	0	0	724	0	0	0	724
NET CHANGE-Mil	0	0	-724	0	0	0	-724
Jobs Gained-Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Civ	0	0	549	0	0	0	549
NET CHANGE-Civ	0	0	-549	0	0	0	-549
Jobs Gained-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Hanscom AFB, MA (MXRD)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Jobs Gained-Mil	41	0	518	0	0	0	559
Jobs Lost-Mil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Mil	41	0	518	0	0	0	559
Jobs Gained-Civ	61	0	763	0	0	0	824
Jobs Lost-Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Civ	61	0	763	0	0	0	824
Jobs Gained-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobs Lost-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NET CHANGE-Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

COBRA Disconnects - Source Reference Data

14-Jul-05

COBRA JSCG Ref:	COBRA Disconnect	Data-Call / Scenario Source Document	Issue	Data-Call / Scenario Data Provided	Notes:
TECH 0042	Manpower Shortage for C4ISR Acquisition Workload	Tech 0008, Part 7, (3 Dec 04)	Only for <u>Air Information Systems</u> RD&A	55.8 Contractors 39.8 Civilian 8.8 Officers 2 Enlisted (FY06 Numbers)	COBRA Data used this input for <u>C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation</u> . Contractors were not included to transfer in COBRA
TECH 0042	Manpower Shortage for C4ISR Acquisition Workload	ESC/XP Email Tasker (Jan 05) "CPSG_SSG_MSG As-Is" (HAF Email: Scenario 663 Feb 05)	Scenario called for "minimum number of Acquisition Personnel to relocate to Hanscom AFB"	156 Contractors 95 Civilian 4 Officers 3 Enlisted	Included all of CPSG's Current and Projected Incoming (FY05/06) Acquisition Personnel
TECH 0042	MILCON Requirements for SCIF/Special Purpose Space	ESC/XP Email Tasker (Jan 05) "CPSG_SSG_MSG As-Is" (HAF Email: Scenario 663 Feb 05)	No MILCON included in COBRA for SCIF facilities (incorrect FAC codes)	Identified need for SCIF and Special Purpose space	Tasker only asked for "lab space or special purpose space". Email from ESC (14 Feb 05) stated "all we need to know is the number of people that would have to be moved. We will calculate the space requirements and IT requirements..."
TECH 0042	Funding Requirements for Classified Networks/Comms	ESC/XP Email Tasker (Jan 05) "CPSG_SSG_MSG As-Is" (HAF Email: Scenario 663 Feb 05)	Classified Intelligence Networks and Communications Required - Cost / Manpower to be determined	NSANET JWICS SIPRNET COMMAS AFEKMS - Tier 1 (40 Lines) STU III, STE, NSTS Lines (NSA Grey Phone) NRO System Space COMSEC Network	Tasker only asked for "lab space or special purpose space". Email from ESC (14 Feb 05) stated "all we need to know is the number of people that would have to be moved. We will calculate the space requirements and IT requirements..."

COBRA JSCG Ref:	COBRA Disconnect	Data-Call / Scenario Source Document	Issue	Data-Call / Scenario Data Provided	Notes:
IND 0086	Incorrect Manpower Mix - 137 Civilian Billets Identified to transfer to Tobyhanna (0 Military).	BRAC Data Call #1, Section 9.502 (Jan 04) Lackland Expanded Tasker 12 (Dec 04) (Combined IND 0066/0076/0086))	Data Call Never asked for Manpower mix. Only asked for Direct Labor Hours (capacity) by Commodity Group.	FY03 DLH (K) Radio: 26.08225 Crypto: 65.97225 Computers: 72.10975 Electronic Components (non-airborne): 23.01375 Other: 65.205625	Tech Apps: 100% Military; Space/Air/Ground Crypto: 54% Military; <u>SIGINT Maintenance (CSSA)</u> 5 Army/5 Navy Personnel Not Identified; <u>AETC-OL Trainers</u> Not Addressed; <u>AIA ESSA Program Military Billet</u> Not Addressed
IND 0086	MILCON / Facility Requirements	Lackland Expanded Tasker 12 (Dec 04) (Combined IND 0066/0076/0086))	No MILCON in COBRA Data for Space Environmental Test Facility	Identified \$1.76M for Space Environmental Test Facility	
IND 0086	MILCON / Facility Requirements	No Data-Call / Scenario asked for Runway Requirements	Runway Required for ICBM, USAEDS (11,000 Ft Req'd for WC-135), Special Projects Missions	None	
IND 0086	Funding - Discrepancy in Depot Maintenance Equipment Movement Cost	BRAC Scenario S&S 0035R (21 Apr 05) Lackland Expanded Tasker 12 (Dec 04) (Combined IND 0066/0076/0086))	\$3.052M MILCON identified in COBRA too low (plus \$7.1M for Personnel)	CPSG Certified Estimate Significantly Higher at \$25.5M plus \$4.8M Recurring Transportation Cost to Move Equipment Between Warehouse and TYAD	During the AFMC Site Survey, the warehouse components of S&S 0035R were extracted from roll-up cost (\$35.8M) due to the Warehouse and Distribution function remaining at Lackland AFB. Those extractions included \$14M from items #11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18 and \$16M of pipeline spares for Space COMSEC (which are still included elsewhere).
IND 0086	Funding Requirements for Classified Networks/Comms	S&S 0050 ver. 2 (Mar 05)	Classified Intelligence and Logistics Networks and Communications Required	Cost / Manpower to be determined	Identified disconnect in AFMC Site Survey
S&S 0035R	Incorrect Manpower Mix for SSID	BRAC Scenario S&S 0035R (Apr 05)	Zero Personnel Left for Stock, Store, Issue, and Distribution Functions	51 Civ, 34 Enlisted, 9 Space Warehouse Personnel	
S&S 0035R	Incorrect Manpower Mix for EKMS	AFMC Site Survey Draft Disconnect (Jun 05)	Five Army and Five Navy COMSEC (EKMS-Key Mgt) Positions Not Identified		

COBRA JSCG Ref:	COBRA Disconnect	Data-Call / Scenario Source Document	Issue	Data-Call / Scenario Data Provided	Notes:
S&S 0035R	Incorrect Manpower Mix for Consumable ICP Support	AFMC Site Survey Draft Disconnect (Jun 05)	Incorrect Number of Personnel Identified for DSC-Columbus Consumable ICP Support (17)	Stocklisted Consumable Workload at CPSG is 2 FTEs	
S&S 0035R	Incorrect Manpower Mix for Proc Mgt for DLRs	S&S 0023 (Dec 04) S&S 0028 (Dec 04)	No Personnel Identified to Perform Procurement Management and Related Support Functions For Depot Level Repairables	Scenario asked for "DLR Asset Management" billets versus DLR "Procurement" Management.	Note: Actual CPSG DLR Procurement Mgt Estimated at 8 FTEs
S&S 0035R	MILCON Requirements for IMM	BRAC Scenario S&S 0035R (Apr 05) S&S 0050 ver. 2 (Mar 05)	Facility Type Not Correct for CPSG IMM Requirements - Secure/SCIF Office Space Not Reflected in COBRA	Robins AFB MILCON For all Inbound is \$9.4M (COBRA). MILCON for CPSG Secure Facilities / Special Access Equals \$9.4M Alone	
S&S 0035R	Funding Requirements for Pipeline Spares	BRAC Scenario S&S 0035R (Apr 05) AFMC Site Survey Draft Disconnect (Jun 05)	\$105.2M Requirement Not Reflected in COBRA	\$16M for Space COMSEC Pipeline Assets in S&S 0035R; \$82.5M for SIGINT / \$6.7 for Air/Ground COMSEC Pipeline Assets in AFMC Site	Total \$105.2M One-Time Cost for Spare Pipeline Assets for Space, Ground, SIGINT (Required due to split of Maintenance and Warehouse)
S&S 0035R	Funding Requirements fro Comms / Networks	BRAC Scenario S&S 0035R (Apr 05)	Classified Intelligence and Logistics Networks and Communications Requirements Not Reflected in COBRA	SIPRNET NIPRNET JWICS NSANET GCCS TS/SCI and NSA Servers	Cost/Manpower Requirements Specific to Gaining Locations
S&S 0035R	Continuity of Operations Requirements	AFMC Site Survey Draft Disconnect (Jun 05)	EKMS - Tier 1 Voice Call Sign System ICBM Lab		24/7 DoD Continuous Operations Support Required

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Mr. Pantelides,

I'm sending you a copy of Mr. Black's memorandum to the Chairmans of the Joint Cross Service Groups with our concerns on the BRAC recommendation.

18 July, Ron and I traveled down to attend a meeting with Mark Van Gilst, Mike Aimone, Wayne Howard and a cast of eight others. We voiced our concerns again as had been stated in Mr Black's memo, our draft response to Congressman Gonzales. Basically the attendees at this meeting said our concerns were unfounded and provided another response to Congressman Gonzales.

Attached are three documents;

#1 is Mr. Black's memo

#2 Draft from Mr. Doody in response to Congressman Gonzales

#3 Draft response we left the 18 July meeting with in response to Congressman Gonzales.

V/R

Debbie Lauer

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

30 June 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUPPLY & STORAGE JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP
CHAIRMAN, TECHNICAL JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP
CHAIRMAN, INDUSTRIAL JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP
CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP


SUBJECT: NSA Consolidated SIGINT Support Activity (CSSA) at Lackland AFB

It has come to our attention that the DOD BRAC recommendation to close the NSA Consolidated SIGINT Support Activity (CSSA) at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, TX will have a major impact on the national intelligence community's worldwide support effort. This consolidated activity, which includes a technical repair center, warehouse, materiel and program management, was established in 1996 as a result of a comprehensive economic and efficiency study conducted by NSA and the military services, which recommended depot, integrated materiel management, and inventory control point consolidation for SIGINT systems. A competition was held among all the services, and a contract was awarded to the Air Force to provide worldwide depot support for SIGINT equipment from a single location. This activity provides a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility with on-line connectivity to NSA's secure network for worldwide tracking of all parts within our field operations including partner countries. The 98 CSSA personnel are required to have a Top Secret SI clearance with a lifestyle polygraph and full background check. The 1993 Director's Point Paper summarizing the study and a 1996 briefing describing the Depot Consolidation are attached.

The military SIGINT consolidation effort resulted in a \$32M annual savings to NSA and has improved return/repair rates by over 20% over the last 8 years. The CSSA has developed a unique interactive web portal providing real-time status of all repairs. Based on the high level of customer satisfaction within the SIGINT community, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) decided to use the CSSA for their SIGINT repairs as well.

The DOD BRAC recommendation breaks up the one-stop depot into four parts graphically dispersed in the U.S. The maintenance portion would go to Tobyhanna in Pennsylvania, and 36 billets would be moved there. Fifty-six billets would be moved to Robins AFB in Georgia for item management services; four additional billets would be moved to Robins for procurement support, but to the Defense Logistics Agency vice the Air Force. The last 2 billets would go to Columbus, Ohio, for consumables. The warehouse appears to be staying in San Antonio.

NSA requests that the decision to disperse the Consolidated SIGINT Support Activity be reversed.


WILLIAM B. BLACK, JR.
Acting Director

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Encls:
a/s

Copy Furnished:
Director National Intelligence

**POINT PAPER
DEPOT CONSOLIDATION**

23 March 1993

BACKGROUND:

- SIGINT DEPOT MAINTENANCE IS DONE BY ALL THREE SERVICES AND NSA
- TRI-SERVICE VERIFIED DATA:

	<u>TRANSACTIONS</u>	<u>FUNDING</u>	<u>SPARES</u>	<u>MANPOWER</u>
AIR FORCE:	2,108	14.4M	\$241.9M	290 (138 ARE COMSEC)
ARMY:	1,917	13.8M	\$111.9M	208
NAVY:	2,435	6.2M	\$ 30.1M	34
NSA:	29,031	14.4M	\$ 5.7M	88

- NSA PROPOSED CONSOLIDATION AT NSA WITH A POTENTIAL SAVINGS OF \$30M/YEAR; SERVICES AGREED WITH CONSOLIDATION, BUT NOT AT NSA.
- SERVICES BRIEFED POTENTIAL \$20M/YEAR SAVINGS THROUGH CONSOLIDATION OF MILITARY DEPOTS.
- THE FY95 APPROPRIATIONS BILL CONTAINED A REQUIREMENT FOR "COMPETITION" IF MORE THAN \$3M IS MOVED FROM A DEPOT. WORK NOT MOVED DOES NOT HAVE TO BE COMPETED.
- NSA (JACK DEVINE) AGREED TO PROCEED WITH A COMPETITION DURING A MEETING WITH THE SERVICES ON 3 NOV AND TOOK UNDER ADVISEMENT WHAT TO COMPETE.
- AT THE 3 NOV MEETING, GEN. CURTIS STATED THAT HE FELT THAT THE COMPETITION COULD BE COMPLETED BY JULY 95; CURRENT OPTIMISTIC ESTIMATES PROJECT APRIL 96 WITH TRANSITION UP TO TWO YEARS BEYOND.

IMPORTANT FACTORS:

- 65% OF THE DEPOT WORK DONE AT NSA IS FOR NSAW
- NSA HAS REDUCED SPARES BASED ON QUICK TURNAROUND
- MANY OF THE ITEMS REPAIRED AT NSA ARE UNIQUE WITH LITTLE OR NO REPAIR DOCUMENTATION VS. WORK DONE BY THE SERVICES WHICH IS WELL DEFINED WITH COMPLETE REPAIR DOCUMENTATION AND SPARES IN PLACE
- TRANSPORTATION WILL INCREASE TURNAROUND TIME AND HANDLING COST AT NSA IF A SERVICE WINS THE COMPETITION.
- SECURITY IS A MAJOR CONCERN FOR REPAIR AND HANDLING OF COVERT ITEMS.
- COMPETITION WAS TO BE STREAMLINED, BUT SERVICE "REQUIREMENTS" SUCH AS THE USE OF THE COST COMPATIBILITY HANDBOOK ARE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT BECAUSE OF NSA'S ACCOUNTING SYSTEM.
- UNDER THE CURRENT CONSOLIDATION PROPOSAL, FUTURE COST OF DOING BUSINESS IS UNCERTAIN BECAUSE THE TOTAL COST OF REPAIR WILL BE NEGOTIATED AFTER AWARD. EACH YEAR, COST WILL BE RENEGOTIATED.

CONCLUSION:

- BECAUSE OF THE ABOVE, IT IS UNWISE AND PROBABLY NOT POSSIBLE FOR NSA OR THE NSA WORK LOAD TO BE INCLUDED IN THE COMPETITION.

COURSE OF ACTION:

- SERVICES WILL COMPETE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF MILITARY DEPOTS USING A MERIT BASED EVALUATION AND SELECTION PROCESS.
- NSA DEPOT WORK WILL NOT BE COMPETED
- NSA WILL NOT COMPETE.

DEPOT CONSOLIDATION

COMBINED SIGINT SUPPORT ACTIVITY

DEPOT CONSOLIDATION - WHAT IS IT?

- * A DEPOT IS THE INVENTORY CONTROL ACTIVITY (PICA) THAT PROVIDES PIPELINE SPARES AND REPAIR AND RETURN SERVICE FOR FIELDDED SYSTEMS**

- * PICA'S HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN DETERMINED AT MEILSERS AND SHARED BETWEEN FOUR PARTIES**

- * WITH CONSOLIDATION, ALL FIELD SITES (OVERSEAS AND RSOC'S) WILL BE SUPPORTED BY ONE PROVIDER**

WHY CONSOLIDATE?

- * **CONSOLIDATION HAS BEEN PROPOSED FOR OVER 25 YEARS.**
- * **TODAY'S FISCAL IMPERATIVES, COMBINED WITH TECHNOLOGY DRIVERS AND THE NEED FOR NEW BUSINESS PRACTICES, HAVE FORCED IT.**

THE FISCAL IMPERATIVES

- * FY93 DIRECT FUNDING IN SUPPORT OF FOUR DEPOTS: \$ 48.8M
- * SPARES INVESTMENT: \$389.6M
- * PROJECTED ANNUAL SAVINGS THRU CONSOLIDATION: \$20 - 30M

THE TECHNOLOGY DRIVERS

- * THE COTS REVOLUTION**
- * HEAVILY SOFTWARE DRIVEN SOLUTIONS**
- * HIGHER SYSTEM RELIABILITY**
- * RAPID TURNOVER INHERENT IN MODERN TECHNOLOGY**
- * MORE ABILITY FOR FIRST ECHELON MAINTENANCE**
- * DECLINING REPAIR TRANSACTION VOLUMES**
- * DECLINING BUDGETS**

PT. 1

NEW BUSINESS PRACTICES

- * **LOWER INVESTMENT - "JUST-IN-TIME" INVENTORY**
- * **MORE OEM AND CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE**
- * **MORE FIRST ECHELON MAINTENANCE (FRONT END INVESTMENT)**
- * **SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE "BER" DECISION PROCESS**
- * **EXPRESS TURN-AROUND REPAIR AND SHIPPING SERVICES**

HOW ARE WE CONSOLIDATING?

- * **SEP 94 JIB BRIEFED ON TWO OPTIONS:
CONSOLIDATE AT SIGINT SERVICE CENTER - SAVE \$30M/YEAR
CONSOLIDATE AT SERVICE DEPOT - SAVE \$20M/YEAR**
- * **DIRNSA ASKED FOR THIRD OPTION - SIGINT SERVICE CENTER
WITH INCREASED MILITARY PRESENCE**
- * **FY95 APPROPRIATIONS BILL DICTATED FORMAL COMPETITION TO
MOVE WORK**
- * **DIRNSA WAS ADVISED AND THE FORMAL COMPETITION PROCESS
COMMENCED**
- * **NSA/J4 (NOW J5) LED EFFORT TO DEVELOP THE SOW**
- * **ARMY/IMMC LED EFFORT TO DEFINE THE "MERIT BASED
COMPETITION PROCESS"**

KEY PARAMETERS OF THE COMPETITION

- * **WORKLOAD INCLUDED AND IS LIMITED TO OVERT FIELD SITES (OVERSEAS AND RSOC'S) AND 2ND. AND 3RD. PARTY PARTNERS**
- * **DIRNSA WAS THE SOURCE SELECTION AUTHORITY - WITH ADVICE FROM A TRI/SERVICE SOURCE SELECTION ADVISORY COUNCIL**
- * **THE THREE SERVICES SUBMITTED PROPOSALS - NSA DID NOT**
- * **ARMY COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS COMMAND, AT FT. MONMOUTH, ADMINISTERED THE COMPETITION ON OUR BEHALF**
- * **SOURCE SELECTION EVALUATION BOARD WAS COMPRISED OF PERSONNEL FROM THE THREE SERVICES AND NSA**

PROPOSAL EVALUATION SUMMARY

- * **ALL SERVICES PROPOSED ACCEPTABLE CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS, MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES**
- * **ALL SERVICES PROPOSED ACCEPTABLE TECHNICAL APPROACHES AND EQUIPMENT/FACILITY RESOURCES**
- * **COST WAS THE DISCRIMINATING FACTOR**

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- * THE DEPOT WILL WORK DIRECTLY WITH THE OPERATIONAL CUSTOMERS TO PROVIDE SUPPORT**

- * DEPOT WILL PROVIDE MONTHLY, QUARTERLY AND ANNUAL REPORTS ON WORK COMPLETED, TRANSACTION COST AND COST TO DATE, AND PROBLEMS SURFACED/SOLVED**

- * NSA/J5 WILL MONITOR, EVALUATE AND FUND THE DEPOT AND MAINTAIN LATERAL INTERFACE WITH THE OPERATIONAL CUSTOMERS**

SCHEDULE

- * **24 JAN 96** **SOURCE DECISION**
- * **12 - 13 FEB 96** **POST-AWARD CONFERENCE**
- * **MAR - APR 96** **SITE SURVEYS - ARMY**
- * **MAY 96** **SITE SURVEYS - NAVY**
- * **AUG 96** **SITE SURVEYS -NSA**
- * **MAY - SEP 96** **MOVE ARMY AND NAVY EQUIP**
- * **SEP - NOV 96** **MOVE NSA EQUIPMENT**
- * **1 JANUARY 97** **TRANSITION COMPLETE**
HOW WILL THE FIELD SITES BE EFFECTED??

- * **ONE PROVIDER FOR REPAIR AND RETURN AND PARTS SUPPORT**

- * **NEW BUSINESS PRACTICES (JUST-IN-TIME INVENTORY AND PRIORITY DRIVEN REPAIR ACTIONS) WILL REDUCE DOWN-TIME AND HAZ-CONS**

- * **THE J5 DEPOT CONSOLIDATION AND FIELD SUPPORT PROGRAM OFFICE WILL BE YOUR BROKER AND ADVOCATE**

SUMMARY

- * AFTER MORE THAN 25 YEARS OF TALKING, DEPOT CONSOLIDATION IS HAPPENING**

- * IT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED NOT LATER THAN 2QFY97**

- * YOU ARE THE CUSTOMER AND A CRITICAL PARTICIPANT IN THE PROCESS**

Question:

Does the NSA have any concerns regarding the DoD's proposed BRAC actions regarding the CPSG, and if so, what are those concerns?

Answer:

The National Security Agency (NSA) does have a number of major concerns with the proposal to close the Cryptologic Systems Group (CPSG) at Lackland AFB and disperse its activities to four locations. The NSA Consolidated SIGINT Support Activity (CSSA) is a subordinate activity of the CPSG. The Acting Director of the NSA believes closure and dispersal of the CSSA would have a major impact on support to intelligence community collection efforts worldwide.

The CSSA provides depot-level signals intelligence (SIGINT) repair and maintenance support to Combatant Commanders and national partners. It includes a repair center, warehouse, and material and program management. This consolidated activity was established in 1996 as a result of a comprehensive economic and efficiency study conducted by the NSA and the military services. A competition was held among the services, and a contract was awarded to the Air Force to provide worldwide depot support for SIGINT equipment from a single location. This military SIGINT support consolidation effort resulted in over \$32 million in annual savings. It also improved repair/return rates by more than 20 percent over the last 8 years. The CSSA has achieved a high level of satisfaction within the SIGINT community.

The dispersal of the CSSA breaks up the one-stop depot into four geographical locations. This will increase the cycle time for critical equipment repairs and jeopardize mission readiness. It will increase the support cost for the NSA as spares will have to be placed on site with the mission systems and in some extremely critical locations redundant systems will have to be in place. In some of our critical locations, adding spares would pose unacceptable additional risk. Many of these locations are sparsely manned and requiring mission personnel to have to deal with four different locations can be confusing and time consuming.

The CSSA is the Intelligence Community's SIGINT Depot-level Repair and Maintenance Center of Excellence, and to break it up dilutes this vital capability in support of mission execution. This dispersal jeopardizes the intellectual capital that has been focused on the SIGINT mission and the INTEL community for the past nine years and puts them at great risk.

Question: Also, what impact will such a move have on the NSA, and on the NSA's previously announce plans to expand it presence in San Antonio?

Answer:

The dispersal of the Consolidated SIGINT Support Activity from San Antonio would impact cost and mission readiness as stated above. NSA/CSS Texas would face the some of the same challenges to mission readiness as other sites in the worldwide signals intelligence (SIGINT) enterprise. In addition, this could affect some plans for the future development of NSA/CSS Texas.

NSA/CSS Texas is slated to establish the Americas Technical Center (ATC) as a new mission and as part of their build out plan. The ATC will have a similar function to NSA's European Technical Center (ETC) & Pacific Technical Center (PTC): to provide technical and logistic services. NSA/CSS Texas plans for the CSSA to provide the following support to the ATC: technical support, warehouse, receiving, shipping, and logistics support. NSA/CSS Texas will not duplicate functions that currently exist locally. Should the CSSA end up being dispersed this will cause a change of plans for NSA's ATC portion of the build out.

Currently, CSSA provides shipping functions for NSA/CSS Texas. The Activity provides technical troubleshooting onsite at NSA Texas, if required, for critical systems. CSSA sometimes uses NSA/CSS Texas mission systems for final testing of repaired component if the Activity does not have onsite mock-ups. The CSSA has a close relationship with NSA/CSS Texas and loss of the CSSA will directly impact their mission.

DCN:11670

#3

The Honorable Charles A. Gonzalez
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20516-4320

Dear Congressman Gonzalez:

Thank you for your recent inquiry concerning the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendation to relocate the Cryptologic Systems Group (CPSG) from Lackland AFB to other Department of Defense installations. In your letter you highlighted four concerns, responses to which are provided below:

1. *Did the Intelligence Joint Service Group participate in the Industrial, Supply and Storage and Technical Joint Cross Service Group recommendations?*

Early in the DoD BRAC process the CPSG function was assigned for analysis to the above mentioned groups with the Intelligence Joint Cross Service Group in a support or advisory capacity. In addition, detailed recommendations were reviewed by the Joint Cross Service Group Executive Secretaries, the Military Department's BRAC Directors, the Infrastructure Steering Group and the Infrastructure Executive Council.

2. *Does NSA have any concerns regarding the DoD proposed BRAC actions and if so, what are those concerns?*

During the deliberative process, the NSA representative of the Intelligence Joint Cross Service Group did not raise any issues with the CPSG recommendation. Subsequent to the Secretary of Defense's BRAC submissions, NSA indicated to the Chairmen of the above joint groups that they had concerns with the recommendation regarding CPSG. Concurrently, the BRAC Commission has asked a series of questions concerning the CPSG. The Department has addressed and responded to those concerns in the attached document.

3. *What impact will the recommendations have on NSA cryptological operations?*

As indicated in response to a similar question from the BRAC Commission, there are no known operational impacts as a result of these recommendations. Furthermore, while a consolidated CPSG at Lackland AFB may be an optimal for NSA, it is at the expense of the Department of Defense because at its current location and it represents a suboptimal operation. During the

implementation phase it is imperative that the Department will ensure no operational impacts to national security

4. *Will there be an impact on previously announced plans to expand its presence in San Antonio?*

It is too early to determine the impact on previously announced plans to expand the SIGINT analysis capability in San Antonio. However, the Consolidated SIGINT Support Activity has a close working relationship with NSA/Central Security Service Texas and this would be considered during implementation of these BRAC recommendations.

Thank you for the opportunity to address your questions.

Sincerely,

Carol A. Haave
Chair
Intelligence Joint Cross Service Group



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
2521 SOUTH CLARK STREET, SUITE 600
ARLINGTON, VA 22202
TELEPHONE: 703-699-2950
FAX: 703-699-2735

July 11, 2005
JCS #11

Chairman:
The Honorable Anthony J. Principi

Commissioners:
The Honorable James H. Blibrey
The Honorable Philip E. Coyle, III
Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., USN (Ret.)
The Honorable James V. Hansen
General James T. Hill, USA (Ret.)
General Lloyd W. Newton, USAF (Ret.)
The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner
Brigadier General Sue Ellen Turner, USAF (Ret.)

Executive Director:
Charles Battaglia

**THE "RED" ANSWERS BELOW ARE RESPONSE INPUT TO S&S
JCSG FROM THE TECHNICAL JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP.**

Mr. Bob Meyer
Director
BRAC Clearinghouse
1401 Oak St.
Roslyn VA 22209

Dear Mr. Meyer:

I respectfully request a written response from the Department of Defense concerning the following requests, which pertain to the impact of DoD's BRAC recommendations on the Cryptologic Systems Groups (CPSG) at Lackland Air Force Base :

First, as a point of clarification, is it the intent of the recommendations to:

- ◆ *Relocate the Air and Space Information Systems Research, Development and Acquisition to Hanscom Air Force Base, MA. (Technical 6)*

Yes

- ◆ *Relocate the depot maintenance of Computers, Crypto, and Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), and Radio to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA; and disestablish all depot maintenance capabilities. (Industrial 15)*
- ◆ *Relocate the Depot-level Reparables procurement management and related support functions to Warner Robins Air Force Base, GA, and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, Ohio, ICP Functions. (Supply & Storage 7)*
- ◆ *Relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated materiel management Technical Support Inventory Control Point (ICP) Functions For Consumable Items To Defense Supply Center Columbus, Ohio, And Re-Establish Them As Defense Logistics Agency ICP Functions. (Supply & Storage 7)*
- ◆ *Relocate the remaining integrated materiel management, user and related support functions to Warner Robins. (Supply And Storage JCSG (Supply & Storage 7)*

◆ *Retain the Stock, Store, Issue and Cargo Movement Activities at Lackland.*

If the intent of the recommendations listed above is correct as written, it would be an atypical arrangement to store crypto in one place and ship it to another for repair because of security and cost concerns. What are the additional annual recurring costs of maintaining separate maintenance and storage capacity? What is the additional one-time cost for establishing a spare pipeline?

N/A for the TJCSG

Lackland estimates a much higher cost for moving depot maintenance equipment than the COBRA model. Can you provide a current estimate for the movement of equipment for all of the recommended relocations?

In accordance with the certified data provided, the TJCSG included the costs of moving 50 tons of equipment from Lackland AFB to Hanscom AFB as part of the Information Systems RD&A realignment – COBRA calculated the cost as \$70,615. (Reference TECH-0042C COBRA dated 1 Apr 2005)

What location and which mission will receive the space environmental test facility if it is relocated? What is the estimated cost of relocation, including the associated construction cost for the required vibration isolated foundation slab, and which mission will it support?

N/A for the TJCSG

How did DoD handle specialized equipment and facility infrastructure costs required to perform the CSSA mission in COBRA?

N/A for the TJCSG

Does Tobyhanna have a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) and special access? If not, what will be the cost of providing a SCIF?

N/A for the TJCSG

The technical applications maintenance is supported by 100% military with the Space and Air/Ground crypto supported by 54% military. Tech 6 shows Lackland losing 12 military positions, will any military positions remain as a result of these recommendations? For example, what will happen to the five Army and five Navy Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) maintenance personnel, the Electronic Systems Security Assessment (ESSA) program military billet for a stand-alone mission, the training mission of space and terrestrial Crypto maintenance personnel and the six Army and six Navy COMSEC (Electronic Key Management System) /SIGINT (Consolidated SIGINT Support Activity-National Intel) positions? We need more detail of how many military positions, locations, and functions will be relocated or eliminated and how many will remain?

TJCSG does not have this info – likely AF/DP is only source

Why do the recommendations not address the 259 contractor billets at Lackland? How will the large numbers of contractors not considered affect costs associated with the recommendations?

DCN:11670

The reported support contractor personnel (56 for the Information Systems RD&A realignment to Hanscom AFB) were considered as part of Criteria 6 (reference page 12 of 13). As the government is not responsible for relocating support contractors, such costs were not included in COBRA.

Will the realignment of functions adversely affect mission capability as it relates to turnaround times (presently 5 days) and customer special operational needs?

N/A for the TJCSG

How will the realignment of functions affect mission capability as it relates to the runway requirements of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, Atomic Energy Detection System, and Special Projects these missions?

No known impact for the Information Systems RD&A realignment to Hanscom AFB

Is there a specific mission requirement that requires the Consolidated SIGINT Support Activity (CSSA) mission to physically be performed at Lackland, given that NSA Texas has been established?

N/A for the TJCSG

Can the recommended receiving locations handle special security level of equipment?

Yes for the Information Systems RD&A realignment to Hanscom AFB

What was the process used by the Industrial JCSG to determine realignment candidates and how was military value a factor in their recommendation to realign Lackland Crypto Product Support Group?

How did Lackland CPSG stack up as far as military value scores for the commodities they produced against other producers?

Does Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA do similar work to the work that is done at Lackland CPSG? Please provide examples of similar and dissimilar work at both locations.

How did Lackland's Inventory Control Point (ICP) rank in terms of military value relative to Warner Robbins AFB, GA and Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH?

What percentage of NSA line items does the CPSG manage? What is the percent for other organizations?

Why are you moving ICP functions to Warner Robbins, AFB, GA?

Why are you moving Lackland's ICP consumable functions to Defense Supply Center, Columbus?

Is there an operational impact as a result of this recommendation? If yes, please quantify in terms of dollars; direct labor hours; mission performance; frequency of impact; etc.

TJCSG believes careful transition planning can preclude an operational impact during the move to Hanscom AFB

DCN:11670

Have you evaluated the "disconnects" identified by Lackland? How will these disconnects affect cost savings estimates and the overall recommendation?

The TJCSG is unaware of the "disconnects" referred to, so we cannot answer the question

What operational or intermediate level maintenance functions remain at Lackland after the recommended realignments?

What is the planned use of the CPSG compound after the recommended realignments?

I would appreciate your response by July 15, 2005. Please provide a control number for this request and do not hesitate to contact me if I can provide further information concerning this request.

Yours sincerely,

*Frank Cirillo
Director
Review & Analysis*

DRAFT**JOINT BASE VISIT REPORT****EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA****6 JULY 2005****COMMISSION STAFF:**

LTC Kevin Felix (Army Senior Analyst)
 Tim MacGregor (Air Force Senior Analyst)

LIST OF ATTENDEES:**EGLIN**

Attendees For BRAC Commission Analysts Site Visit			
Rank/ Grade	First Name	Last Name	Office
Maj Gen	Robert W.	Chedister	Program Executive Officer for Weapons and Air Armament Center (AAC) Commander
SES	Bob	Arnold	46 Test Wing Technical Advisor
Colonel	Ed	Cabrera	46 Test Wing Vice Commander
Colonel	Tim	Gaffney	Base Civil Engineer (BCE)and 96 Civil Engineering Group Commander
Colonel	Joe	Zeis	46 Test Wing Commander
GM-15	Mike	Clark	Deputy Base Civil Engineer
Lt Col	Mark	Lutton	Deputy Director, 46 Test Wing Plans and Programs
Lt Col	Ken	Plaks	46 Test Squadron Commander
Lt Col	Gretchen	Rauch	Deputy Director, AAC Plans and Programs
Lt Col	Ken	Scratchfield	46 Range Squadron Commander
Lt Col	Kari	Smith	AAC Commander's Action Group
GS-15	Dale	Bridges	46 Operations Group Technical Advisor
GS-15	Wanda	Jones-Heath	96 Air Base Wing, Director of Staff
GS-15	Dennis	Love	Director, AAC Plans & Programs & BRAC Office Of Primary Responsibility for Eglin
GS-14	Danny	Pugh	AAC/XPP Programs Division, Chief
GS-13	Rick	Appleby	Program Analyst & Action Officer, AAC Strategic Plans Division
GS-13	Jane	Barnes	96 Civil Engineering Group
GS-13	Renee	Herring	Program Analyst & Action Officer, AAC Strategic Plans Division
GS-13	Chris	Smith	BRAC Team Lead & Action Officer, AAC Programs Division
GS-13	Bridget	Tuominen	Action Officer, Commander's Action Group
GS-12	Cathay	Windsor	Program Analyst & Action Officer, AAC Programs Division
1Lt	Anita	Skipper	Briefer - Eglin Overview

DRAFT**BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:****EGLIN AFB, FL**

- Eglin Air Force Base belongs to the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), and the Air Armament Center (AAC) is the host unit. More than 45 associate units call Eglin home.
- AAC and AFMC share the same mission of “Deliver War-Winning Technology, Acquisition Support, Sustainment, and Expeditionary Capabilities to the Warfighter.”
 - Along with the mission of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition which is “Provide the Leadership, Direction, Policy, and Resources to Acquire Superior Systems, Supplies, and Services to Accomplish the Air Force Mission,” the Air Armament Center (AAC) Strategic Principle is to be the Nation’s Center of Excellence for Air Armament and Combat-Ready Forces that enable us to deliver war-winning capabilities... on time, on cost.
 - In all the Air Armament Center develops, tests, acquires, and sustains integrated Air Armament and provides expeditionary combat support needed to defend the United States and its interests...today and tomorrow.
- Eglin is one of the largest Air Force bases in the world, covering 724 square miles of reservation and 97,963 square miles of water ranges in the Gulf of Mexico. They accomplish their mission through the dedication and hard work of approximately 11,500 military and 11,000 civilians supporting multiple commands and agencies.
 - In addition, Eglin supports approximately 41,000 retired military members in the local area.
 - Eglin’s land range consists of 463,000 acres or 724 square miles; that is well-over 3 times the area encompassed by the Washington, DC beltway. In addition, Eglin is the only range east of the Mississippi that allows supersonic flight. This immense land range is complemented by an even larger water range.
 - Eglin has approximately 123,000 square miles of water available. The combined land and water restricted airspace is more than 134,000 square miles and is vitally important to our future national security

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION:

There are five recommendations that involve Eglin AFB: Army-10, DoN-21, E&T-10, Tech-6, and Tech-18

- **Army-10: “Fort Bragg, NC”**
 - Realign Fort Bragg, NC, by relocating the 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) to Eglin AFB, FL, and by activating the 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82d Airborne Division and relocating European-based forces to Fort Bragg, NC.

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- **DoN-21: “Recommendation for Closure and Realignment of Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, PA, and Cambria Regional Airport, Johnstown, PA”**
 - o Close Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, PA.
 - Relocate all Navy and Marine Corps squadrons, their aircraft and necessary personnel, equipment and support to McGuire Air Force Base, Cookstown, NJ.
 - Relocate the minimum amount of manpower and equipment to support intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Tire and Wheel, non-destruction inspections, and Aviation Life Support System equipment to McGuire Air Force Base.
 - Relocate intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication & Manufacturing, and Support Equipment to Fleet Readiness Center East, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC.
 - Deactivate the 111th Fighter Wing (Air National Guard) and relocate assigned A-10 aircraft to:
 - 124th Wing (Air National Guard), Boise Air Terminal Air Guard Station, Boise, ID (three primary aircraft authorized);
 - 175th Wing (Air National Guard), Martin State Airport Air Guard Station, Baltimore, MD, (three primary aircraft authorized);
 - 127th Wing (Air National Guard), Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Mount Clemens, MI (three primary aircraft authorized) and
 - Retired (six primary aircraft authorized).
 - Relocate Armed Forces Reserve Center Expeditionary Combat Support manpower to Eglin Air Force Base, FL.
 - Relocate Co A/228th Aviation to Fort Dix, Trenton, NJ.
 - Relocate Reserve Intelligence Area 16 to Fort Dix.
 - Establish an enclave for the Army Reserve units remaining on or relocating to Willow Grove and the Air National Guard 270th Engineering Installation Squadron.
 - Realign Cambria Regional Airport, Johnstown, PA, by relocating Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 775 Detachment A, to include all required personnel, equipment, and support, to McGuire Air Force Base.

- **E&T-10: “Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site”**
 - o Realign Luke Air Force Base, AZ, by relocating to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, a sufficient number of instructor pilots and operations support personnel to stand up the Air Force’s portion of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Initial Joint Training Site, hereby established at Eglin Air Force Base, FL.
 - o Realign Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA, by relocating to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, a sufficient number of instructor pilots and operations support personnel to stand up the Marine Corps’ portion of the JSF Initial Joint Training Site, hereby established at Eglin Air Force Base, FL.
 - o Realign Naval Air Station Oceana, VA, by relocating to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, a sufficient number of instructor pilots, operations, and maintenance support personnel to stand up the Navy’s portion of the JSF Initial Joint Training Site, hereby established at Eglin Air Force Base, FL.

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- Realign Sheppard Air Force Base, TX, by relocating to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, a sufficient number of front-line and instructor-qualified maintenance technicians and logistics support personnel to stand up the Air Force's portion of the JSF Initial Joint Training Site, hereby established at Eglin Air Force Base, FL.
- Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, by relocating to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, a sufficient number of front-line and instructor-qualified maintenance technicians and logistics support personnel to stand up the Department of the Navy's portion of the JSF Initial Joint Training Site hereby established at Eglin Air Force Base, FL.
- **Tech-6: "Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation"**
 - Realign Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, and Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating Air & Space Information Systems Research and Development & Acquisition to Hanscom Air Force Base, MA.
 - Realign Eglin Air Force Base, FL, by relocating Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare & Electronics and Information Systems Test & Evaluation to Edwards Air Force Base, CA.
- **Tech-18: "Create an Air Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center"**
 - Realign Hill Air Force Base, UT, by relocating Weapons and Armaments In-Service Engineering Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation to Eglin Air Force Base, FL.
 - Realign Fort Belvoir, VA, by relocating Defense Threat Reduction Agency National Command Region conventional armament Research to Eglin Air Force Base, FL.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION:

- **Army-10: "Fort Bragg, NC"**
 - This recommendation co-locates Army Special Operation Forces with Air Force Special Operations Forces at Eglin AFB. This realignment of forces enhances military value and training capabilities by locating Special Operations Forces (SOF) in locations that best support Joint specialized training needs, and by creating needed space for the additional brigade at Fort Bragg. This recommendation is consistent with and supports the Army's Force Structure Plan submitted with the FY 06 budget, and provides the necessary capacity and capability, including surge, to support the units affected by this action. This recommendation never pays back. However, the benefits of enhancing Joint training opportunities coupled with the positive impact of freeing up needed training space and reducing cost of the new BCT by approximately \$54-\$148M (with family housing) at Fort Bragg for the Army's Modular Force transformation, justify the additional costs to the Department.
- **DoN-21: "Recommendation for Closure and Realignment Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, PA, and Cambria Regional Airport, Johnstown, PA"**

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- This recommendation will reduce excess capacity while creating new joint opportunities in the McGuire Air Force Base/Fort Dix/Naval Aviation Engineering Station Lakehurst military concentration area. This recommendation leverages maintenance and operational efficiencies within Marine Corps Reserve Aviation and maintains reserve forces in areas with favorable demographics. Inclusion of the realignment of Cambria Regional Airport in this recommendation allows the assets currently housed there to be collocated with their headquarters at McGuire Air Force Base. The major intermediate maintenance functions are consolidated into a Fleet Readiness Center, which reduces the number of maintenance levels and streamlines the way maintenance is accomplished with associated significant cost reductions.
 - This recommendation enables Air Force Future Total Force transformation by consolidating the A-10 fleet at installations of higher military value, and contributes to Army's establishment of the Northeast Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.
 - The USAF KC-135E model aircraft (16 primary aircraft authorized) at McGuire Air Force Base, NJ, retire. The capacity created by the Air Force force structure retirement of KC-135Es (16 primary aircraft authorized) from McGuire Air Force Base enables the execution of this recommendation.
- **E&T-10: "Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site"**
- This recommendation establishes Eglin Air Force Base, FL as an Initial Joint Training Site that teaches entry-level aviators and maintenance technicians how to safely operate and maintain the new Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) (F-35) aircraft.
 - The Department is scheduled to take delivery of the F-35 beginning in 2008. This joint basing arrangement will allow the Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO) process to establish a DoD baseline program in a consolidated/joint school with curricula that permit services latitude to preserve service-unique culture and a faculty and staff that brings a "Train as we fight; jointly" national perspective to the learning process.
- **Tech-6: "Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation"**
- This recommendation will reduce the number of technical facilities engaged in Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics and Information Systems RDAT&E from 6 to 2. Through this consolidation, the Department will increase efficiency of RDAT&E operations resulting, in a multi-functional center of excellence in the rapidly changing technology area of C4ISR.
- **Tech-18: "Create an Air Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center"**
- Eglin is one of three core integrated weapons and armaments RDAT&E centers (with China Lake, CA, and Redstone Arsenal, AL) with high MV and the largest concentration of integrated technical facilities across all three functional areas.
 - Eglin AFB has a full spectrum array of Weapons & Armaments (W&A) Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) capabilities. Accordingly, relocation of Hill AFB and DTRA NCR W&A capabilities will further complement and strengthen Eglin as a full spectrum W&A RDAT&E Center.
 - The overall impact of this recommendation will be to:

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- Increase W&A life cycle and mission related synergies/integration;
- Increase efficiency; reduce operational costs; retain the required diversity of test environments; and
- Facilitate multiple uses of equipment, facilities, ranges, and people.
- Hill AFB and DTRA NCR technical facilities recommended for relocation have lower quantitative MV than Eglin AFB in all functional areas.
- This recommendation includes Research, D&A, and T&E conventional armament capabilities in the Air Force and DTRA NCR.
 - It consolidates armament activities within the Air Force and promotes jointness with DTRA NCR. It also enables technical synergy, and positions the DoD to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise within the RDAT&E community that currently resides as DoD specialty locations.
 - This recommendation directly supports the Department's strategy for transformation by moving and consolidating smaller W&A efforts into high military value integrated centers, and by leveraging synergy among RD&A, and T&E activities.
 - Capacity and military value data established that Eglin AFB is already a full-service, integrated W&A RDAT&E center. Relocation of W&A D&A In-Service Engineering (ISE) from Hill AFB to Eglin AFB will increase life cycle synergy and integration. ISE encompasses those engineering activities that provide for an "increase in capability" of a system/sub-system/component after Full Operational Capability has been declared. ISE activities mesh directly with on-going RDAT&E at Eglin AFB.
- Relocation of DTRA NCR W&A technical capabilities will increase life cycle synergy and integration at Eglin AFB.
 - Conventional armament capabilities possessed by DTRA NCR directly complement on-going RDAT&E at Eglin AFB. Cost savings from the relocation of DTRA NCR to Eglin AFB will accrue largely through the elimination of the need for leased space, and by virtue of the fact that Eglin AFB can absorb the DTRA NCR (and Hill AFB) functions without the need for MILCON.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

- After several briefings by Eglin's commanders and installation staff, the Commission staff participated in a short "windshield" tour of the installations.
 - Key facilities on Eglin Air Force Base included the current location of the 33rd Fighter Wing (likely bed-down site for the JSF) and possible bed-down locations for the 7th Special Forces Group.

JOINT KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

- No "showstoppers" were identified for this recommendation. However, some key issues related to the recommendations for Eglin Air Force Base were identified.
 - Currently, the installation is concerned with the disposition of the 33rd Fighter Wing.
 - Neither E&T-10 nor any other specific BRAC recommendation discusses the disposition of the 55-58 PAA F-15Cs/Ds of the 33rd FW.

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- It has an impact on the installation's ability to make decisions of the location of the 133 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft.
 - If the F-15Cs/Ds are not moved elsewhere, significant new construction and ramp space will be required to support the JSF operation.
 - An AF/IL footnote on page 12 (for ETCR 0052 Apr version 6.10.cbr) in the COBRA data for screen two states, "E&T 0052 and E&T 0055 were analyzed under the assumption that the 33 FW at Eglin had been relocated, and the vacated capacity could be utilized by the JSF mission."
 - AF Team has submitted QFR to OSD requesting planned and/or programmed disposition of 33rd FW.
- The installation's planning is comparatively behind that of other installations affected by BRAC, but planning was being accelerated at the time of the base visit.
- There are a few unknowns in terms of stationing of the 7th SF Group that need to be resolved.
 - These unknowns include both on and off-base housing availability for the soldiers and their families who are, in the aggregate, more senior in rank.
 - They also include environmental impact studies after selection of the 7th SF Group's bed-down location.
 - Eglin Air Force Base is not fully "built out" and has both training capacity and buildable acres to accommodate the increased personnel strength.
- Senior installation leaders are confident that the addition of the JSF training operation will be accomplished without problem.
- With the addition of the JSF training operation, efficient airspace management on the Eglin and Tyndall ranges and MOAs will be vital, especially for the highly desired, mid-week, midday (daylight) hours.
 - Installation airspace managers assured us that they have a scheduling process in-place to de-conflict multiple competing demands for the airspace.
 - When posed with analysis of additional demand for the ranges based upon the OSD rejected Navy proposal (DON Scenarios 0139, 0140, 0151 and 0153) to close NAS Oceana and move ~200+ jets of the Navy Master Jet Base (MJB) to Moody AFB, GA, Eglin airspace personnel noted that there would be significant impact on the ranges.
 - BRAC Analyst assessment: Scheduling and deconfliction would be extremely critical. It would likely be very difficult, and potentially impossible, to completely meet all user demands if the MJB routinely required Eglin range airspace in addition to the JSF training slated for Eglin.
 - Routing into the ranges from the Moody area is strictly controlled and limited
 - Issues would have to be resolved regarding who would pay for the additional air traffic control, range control, and associated costs associated with the MJB use
- The five recommendations impacting Eglin result in an overall increase of 2,218 direct jobs. Military Family Housing and dormitory/barracks space on Eglin is insufficient to support the increased population.
 - Availability of housing in the immediate area is limited. Preliminary estimates of housing likely affordable to the majority of inbound personnel indicate that they may have to commute 45-60 minutes for acceptable housing.
 - The primary community immediately adjacent to Eglin, AFB, Niceville, FL, has seen homes double in value in just the past three years. It's anticipated they will triple those

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original values within the next few years. Most of the homes will likely be priced well out of range of the average NCO inbound to Eglin.

INSTALLATION CONCERNS RAISED

- The installation is preparing to support the recommendations. At the time of the Commission visit, planning with the 7th SF Group had been limited to VTCs. The installation is aware of some of the initial training and range requirements, but more detailed discussions are forthcoming.
- The installation leadership stated that some of their greater challenges will be issues related to Criteria 7. One example is that the installation stated that Eglin AFB's on-base child care already has a 400 family waiting list.
- See above regarding concerns raised related to disposition of 33rd Fighter Wing F-15s.
- ~~Installation personnel support the SECDEF's BRAC recommendations, though expressed concern over possible incorrect data used to establish recommendation Tech-6: "Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation."~~
 - o The installation reps who briefed and discussed their concerns also advised us that they were addressing the issue through their parent command, Air Force Material Command (AFMC), and through the Air Force's BRAC office at the Pentagon (SAF/IEB).
 - Eglin personnel have also been coordinating their concerns with Edwards AFB, the other installation involved in the recommendation. According to the Eglin reps, Edwards is in agreement with their assessment and recommendation. Both Eglin and Edwards report to AFMC.
 - o The specific portion of recommendation ~~Tech-6~~ they were concerned about involved the realignment of Eglin AFB by relocating Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare & Electronics and Information Systems Test & Evaluation to Edwards Air Force Base, CA.
 - The proposed realignment involves two primary components: Electronic Warfare (EW) and Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4).
 - The realignment shifts EW and C4 entities from Eglin to Edwards
 - Eglin personnel concur that the shift of EW to Edwards is straightforward and supported
 - Eglin personnel believe that AF and/or OSD BRAC personnel may have used incorrect data when proposing the realignment of the C4 entity
 - o They also note that the OSD BRAC COBRA data available online [D&E - TECH-0042C MilVal & Capacity 05052005 FTE.doc, Page 6, "Information Systems Technology T&E," dated 4 May 05] cites approximately 552 personnel working C4 at Edwards and only 78 at Eglin..
 - o Eglin checked with Edwards, and Edwards states that they never replied with 552 in response to any data call and they do not know what this number represents. Eglin notes that Information Systems is a broad category and can be construed to be several different systems depending on definitions. Both Eglin and Edwards agree

*OK with
Sandy EW
Concerns about
Information Systems (C4)*

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that the numbers are significantly wrong and that there is minimal overlap between the two. Both request a restudy of the question with clearer, more meaningful data.

- A slide provided by Eglin states:
 - “BRAC assumed approx 17% consolidation manpower savings
 - 78 Eglin slots becomes 65 Edwards slots
 - No consolidation means no savings”
- ~~Eglin contends that the decision to move Eglin C4 personnel to Edwards was very likely based in large part on the significantly incorrect number of C4 personnel indicated at Edwards~~
 - Consolidating 78 Eglin slots with 552 Edwards slots would appear efficient, though in reality, comparing like mission areas, 265 Eglin personnel would consolidate with far fewer like-missioned Edwards personnel. The real calculation would likely completely undermine any savings associated with the move, and in fact, generate tremendous costs.
- Additionally, Eglin believes that analysts may have misunderstood or failed to fully appreciate the distinct skill sets, MilCon and technical equipment differences between EW and C4 entities, as well as the impacts that removing the C4 piece from Eglin will have on Eglin’s remaining Research, Development, Test and Evaluation operations.
 - Eglin cites an AF/IL MilCon estimate of \$38M for C4 operations. Eglin recently completed a C2 test facility at a cost of \$20M. That facility would need to be recreated at Edwards.
 - Eglin cites that Developmental Test and Operational Test entities at the base will be degraded with loss of the C4 mission, as well Weapons Development programs
 - They note significant C4 capability will still be required at Eglin:
 - Air Force Special Operations Command C4 test
 - Network centric weapons development
 - Link-16 Gulf Common Net
- Bottom Line: Eglin supports the SECDEF, though is working with Edwards AFB, AFMC, and AF and OSD BRAC offices to ensure that actions regarding C4 capability provide “smart consolidation while preserving ability to accomplish mission”
 - Alternate proposal includes organizing functionally (EW & C4), leaving C4 entity at Eglin with a small C4 detachment at Edwards, while consolidating EW assets at Edwards.

*Question about
MilCon
• not included or
500 COBRA
because Edwards
has access to
intelligence
65 people*

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

None were raised during the base visit.

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REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

1. Assist the installation in determining the disposition of the 33rd Fighter Wing's aircraft. The answers associated with this issue will set the conditions for the installation to conduct more detailed planning and analysis in terms of the issues that may be associated with implementing the recommendations. The installation requested that the Commission refine the recommendation to ensure the disposition is specified in the final recommendation.
2. Confirm the accuracy of the data regarding number of C4 personnel at Edwards. Document that Eglin is working in conjunction with Edwards AFB and AFMC to ensure that C4 operations are accurately accounted for within the BRAC process, and that they appropriately consolidated.

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

PORTION

From: Wearren Ernest Capt SAF/IEB
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 1:40 PM
To: Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Mahn Ronald L Maj HQ AFMC/XPB; Laffey Thomas M LtCol SAF/IEBJ; Hoene Peter F Col HQ AFMC/XPB
Subject: C4ISR T&E Eglin to Edwards
Attachments: Short Description of the C2ISR T&E Process.doc

Mr Farrington,
 Information you requested is captured below. Please let me know if you have any further questions. Also, if you don't mind, please send a request to the OSD Clearinghouse so that we can officially close the loop.
 Thanks.
 vr ew

Ernest L. Wearren Jr., Capt, USAF
 Executive Officer, SAF/IEB
 Room, 5C283
 (703) 693-3631, FAX 697-4376
 DSN 22X-XXXX

SUBJECT: A -DO- Explain the C2ISR T&E process and how BRAC will affect end-to-end T&E and systems integration (SOCCER #1252005)

1. PURPOSE: To provide an explanation on the C2ISR T&E process and how BRAC will affect end-to-end T&E systems integration as requested by CC in an e-mail as quoted below.

2. BACKGROUND: CC comments: "I need to better understand what the C2ISR T&E process involves and how the BRAC recommendations on moving "sensor and C2" T&E west will actually affect the end-to-end T&E and systems integration business. For example, it's not clear to me that individual system T&E is the same as proven system integration into the larger C2ISR network. With that in mind, it's clear that the use of proven and integrated systems will best be done in a place that is conducting large scale exercises and experiments, but the T&E of the piece parts may not be best done there. So let's look at the full range of DT, OT, Experimentation, and Exercising and Training to make sure we understand all the pieces, and who and where they will be done." Although the BRAC recommendation pertains specifically to C4ISR, much of the T&E discussion centers on a subset, i.e., C2ISR.

3. DISCUSSION:

- The response to this SOCCER is provided in three parts. The first part describes "What does the C2ISR T&E Process Involve?" The second part is "who/where is DT, OT, experimentation, exercises and training done? And the final part is "how does the BRAC recommendation actually affect end-to-end T&E and systems integration?"

- This paper will discuss that the approach recommended by BRAC for moving C2ISR from Eglin to Edwards can be implemented, but the costs for implementation and the overall impacts to T&E will be much higher than previously anticipated.

PART I - What does the C2ISR T&E Process Involve?

- Current AF test policy emphasizes "seamless verification" between the contractor and developmental and

operational testing teams using an integrated test team approach. This applies to all test programs, including C2ISR systems. The process starts with the component level evaluation in labs and integration test facilities. Testing then progresses to platform centric evaluations (such as aircraft). It moves on to full interoperability testing and finishes with complete mission integration and operationally realistic testing.

-- AFI 99-103 documents the T&E process by milestone phase from the component level through early operational assessments to realistic operational testing. It discusses the proper procedures to follow for DT and OT. It can be used to help design experimentation, exercises and training. (For a detailed description of the C2ISR T&E process, see Tab 1).

-- C2ISR testing parallels the test process for any complex system: subsystem, component development early in DT, with increasingly more operationally representative environments as the system matures and transitions from DT to OT.

DT	OT	FOT&E	Exercises/Training
Labs	End-to-End Tests	User T&E	Red Flag
Contractor Fac	Full AOC Ops	Full Employment	User Exercises
Systems Integ Labs	System of Systems	CAOC-X	CAOC-N
Subsystem Dev	Live/Virtual	Red Flag	
Modeling, Sim		JEFX	
Early AOC Ops			
Platform Tests			
Distributed Mission Testing			

-- It is the consensus of the AAC, AFFTC and ESC commanders that C2ISR testing, as currently done, has significantly improved over the past few years. Eglin's contribution to C2ISR T&E has helped improve the early development process.

PART II - Who/where is DT, OT, experimentation, exercises and training done?

- C4ISR systems include all command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, sensors or recon systems used by a commander for planning, commanding, directing or controlling forces. (There are a significant number of programs associated with this mission area; see attached the ESC organizational chart listing all of their programs in Tab 2).

-- Figure 11 was extracted from AFMAN 99-111, which has been provided in Tab 3. It captures the C2ISR T&E community locations as of 1996. Additionally, there are activities at numerous contractor locations.

-- One major T&E location worth highlighting that has become operational since the development of the figure in Tab 2 is the AFC2ISR Transformation Center (this is an expansion of what was formerly known as CAOC-X) with the C2ISR Battlelab at Langley AFB. This is a key hub for C2ISR OT. They are responsible for AOC experimentation and the evaluation of ISR platform integration with the AOC. The 46 TS maintains an operating location at Langley to facilitate integration and synchronization of DT with the operational testers and to keep in touch with warfighter requirements. The BRAC recommendation would not directly affect the capability of Langley to accomplish AOC integration testing.

-- With regard to exercises, they are conducted at a multitude of locations. The primary objective of an exercise is training; however exercises often have the secondary objective of providing a realistic battle rhythm for C2ISR system tests. Care must be taken when incorporating developmental C4 systems into an exercise because an immature system can compromise the quality of training. The BRAC recommendation only affects those exercises that directly tie into the Eglin range or Eglin weapons integration efforts.

-- Regarding the DT piece of C2ISR, testing is done at multiple locations to include every relevant contractor facility. Here is a short list of some major DT programs. Testing conducted at Eglin AFB would be directly affected by the C2ISR move.

--- A good portion of the DT and some of the OT of the AOC weapon system and its associated applications are accomplished at Eglin. The OT community (605 TES, Hurlburt Field, FL) makes use of the

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Eglin AOC lab to do unit level testing and regression testing. The close proximity of the 605 TES and the 46 TS at Hurlburt and Eglin, respectively, and the related C2ISR T&E work and subject matter expertise, provide tremendous synergy for this mission area. Further, it provides the opportunity to pool manpower and equipment to accomplish test events.

--- Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS), and the Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning and Execution Segment (DCAPES) systems are tested at the new C2ISR test facility at Eglin.

--- The Mission Planning Community performs DT at Eglin AFB and has realized the synergy by collocation of the acquisition and test organizations. ESC stood up a software integration lab collocated with an acquisition squadron detachment and development contractors. The 46 TS has been designated the DT RTO for all mission planning systems. AFOTEC Det 2, also at Eglin, is responsible for IOT&E with the 28 TES (ACC) doing FOT&E, although much OT of mission planning systems occurs away from Eglin at operational units.

--- Datalinks are also tested at Eglin using the 46 TS Datalink Test Facility (DTF). Eglin is the RTO for Link 16, SADL and the ASDI. It is also the airborne domain lead for Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime and Fixed (JTRS AMF).

--- Aircraft testing to include E-8, E-10/MP-RTIP and E-3 testing is primarily conducted at Melbourne, FL, and Seattle, WA respectively. On-aircraft integration is done at Edwards, but Eglin does some of the interoperability testing as well.

--- Intel systems, to include the Global Broadcast System, Intel Broadcast Service and the Family of Beyond Line of Site Terminals (SATCOM aircraft terminals) have designated Eglin as the RTO.

--- The Information Operations (Information Attack mission area) community is centered at KellyUSA. This organization is under the 46 TS but should not be affected by the BRAC recommendation. However, the information assurance (computer network defense) testing of selected C2 systems has been expanding over the past few years. Significant certification and security testing is being performed at Eglin.

--- Global Combat Support System, programs like AF Portal and network security are tested at Eglin.

--- Base Installation Security System (BISS), radars and new ATC equipment programs have conducted tests at Eglin and use the 46 TS as RTO. AFOTEC Det 2 is responsible for OT of BISS and they are also located at Eglin.

--- Big Safari - RC-135 and other aircraft are based out of Greenville, TX.

-- Regarding other OT agencies, AFOTEC Det 3 (headquartered at Kirtland AFB) conducts the bulk of their C2ISR testing with the CAOC-X at Langley AFB.

PART III - How does the BRAC recommendation actually affect end-to-end T&E and systems integration?"

- The final question is "How does the BRAC recommendation actually affect the end-to-end T&E system integration when we move sensor and C2 T&E west." The AFMC BRAC team is actively involved in researching the implications of moving 65 government positions, a small amount of equipment and building no facilities for C2ISR to Edwards. It is important to note that in addition to the government personnel there are 200 contractors supporting C2ISR DT work at Eglin.

-- C2ISR testing can be conducted wherever it is properly resourced with appropriate facilities and manning. However, moving testing from Eglin to Edwards by moving the government personnel with no facility construction would have a significant negative effect on C2ISR testing. Existing working relationships and synergy between DT, OT and the operational community would be degraded. Furthermore, it would also introduce a transition challenge as we build-up C2ISR testing at Edwards.

-- Eglin currently has the primary responsibility for developmental testing of C2ISR. Significant elements of the C2ISR operational test community (AFOTEC, 605 TES, 53 WG, 28 TES) are collocated. Eglin currently has about 265 total personnel (government and contractor) doing C2ISR testing. Eglin is the RTO for about half of ESC's portfolio of programs and is responsible for C2 systems (such as AOC/TBMCS, GCCS, DCAPES and Cheyenne Mountain), battle control systems (such as BCS-F/M), tactical data links (such as Link 16 and SADL), communications systems (such as JTRS and GBS), enterprise systems (such as ECSS and GCSS), and mission planning (such as PFPS and JMPS). A brand new facility was built at Eglin for C2 testing at a

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MILCON cost \$11.4M and equipment cost of \$6M in FY04.

--- Eglin benefits from the synergy of working with co-located operational test organizations promoting seamless verification. In addition, their location supports the creation of a networked environment to support experimentation, exercises and training. This is critically important to the weapon systems being developed. Operators are heavily involved early in the testing phases. As the weapon system matures, testing often moves to more operational settings, such as the CAOC-X, and Eglin's role is lessened.

--- As a collateral mission, the 46 TS is responsible for putting up the Gulf Common Network everyday. This Link 16 network is available to all Gulf Range testers and trainers (Navy, SOF, 53rd Wg, 33rd Wg and Tyndall AFB Training). Implementation of BRAC recommendations would require another agency to take on this mission or this service would be ended. No other organization is designated to take on this responsibility after the BRAC move.

-- Edwards is currently the DT hub for EW testing. Edwards currently has about 400 (government and contractor) personnel doing EW testing with only a small number doing C2ISR testing. AFFTC experience resides with integrating tactical data links on air platforms (this is separate from the network-centric and weapons-centric testing Eglin does). Additionally, they have expertise with modeling and simulation of enemy integrated air defense networks to assess EW systems effectiveness. The BRAC recommendations describe the sensors and EW pieces moving from Eglin to Edwards and these are straightforward consolidations where the center of mass already resides at Edwards.

--- EW and C4 are different disciplines with different skill sets. EW requires the knowledge of RF transceivers, digital signal processing, low observables, and threat emitters, among other things. C4, by contrast, requires the knowledge of computer science, communications, data base administration and computer system administration, among other things. The infrastructures required are very different as well. EW requires anechoic chambers, threat systems, and range airspace, while C4 requires computers, bandwidth and instrumented networks. Additionally, the Info Systems T&E military value at Eglin was determined in the BRAC process to be approximately 70% higher than that at Edwards (DOD BRAC Recommendations Vol 12).

-- The BRAC C2ISR T&E recommendations will be difficult to implement. Edwards and Eglin are working together to develop details for implementation, but standing up a new, large C2ISR T&E effort will require a significant level of effort.

--- Manpower to execute the mission will be problematic for three reasons. First, Edwards does not have an experienced cadre ready to absorb the new mission. Next, the BRAC assumed a 17% manpower "consolidation savings." Since there will be no significant consolidation, there will be no manpower savings and the 17% cut in government positions represents a cut in ability to test/field C4 systems. Third, during the 1995 BRAC 58 positions were moved, but only one person relocated. Software engineers are extremely marketable, particularly in California, so it will likely be difficult to find 265 qualified new hires (government civil service and contractors) in a timely fashion.

---- Standing up C2ISR at Edwards will require growing new intellectual capital which will impact ongoing and future C2ISR test programs in the form of delays and the quality of testing. While it will require both time and money to reconstitute this capability, both areas do share some common T&E skill sets, culture, and relationship to the larger development communities and cross-training of some Edwards personnel would be feasible.

--- There will likely be some MILCON requirements at Edwards to implement this recommendation, despite the original model saying \$0 dollars for facilities. The HAF/IL estimate, based on Eglin's answer to BRAC data currently says the amount is expected to be \$38M. Costs to reconstitute the BISS capabilities are not included in this amount and are yet to be determined.

--- After the move, there will be residual actions relating to C2ISR operations/testing at Eglin. First, many of the ongoing weapon development programs being tested at Eglin will continue to need network elements. Secondly, AFSOC is dependent on existing C2ISR network elements and would need some workaround. Third, the Gulf Common Network test and training network will need to be reconstituted by another agency. The Link 16 network is put up daily by the 46 TW for Navy, ACC, AFSOC and AFMC users.

--- It has taken the 46 TW approximately 10 years to build the current C2ISR testing capabilities. In a best case scenario, in which Edwards is able to find, hire and train suitable personnel in a timely fashion, it would be

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reasonable to expect a delay or slow down in the USAF's ability to develop and field war-winning C2ISR technology. During that period the ability of the USAF to perform testing in this mission area will be severely curtailed.

- The AFMC team supports the SECDEF recommendations for BRAC regarding relocating Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare & Electronics and Information Systems Test & Evaluation from Eglin AFB, FL to Edwards Air Force Base, CA.

-- The mission of the BRAC implementation team will be to accurately describe the resources that will be required to relocate C2ISR testing. The exact impact is dependent to some degree on the implementation option chosen.

- The BRAC recommendation reflected a desire to consolidate EW and C2ISR developmental test at one location. If the equipment and 65 people are moved as specified in the BRAC recommendation, then maintaining an effective C2ISR DT capability will require significant near-to-mid-term work-arounds, (TDY support, less than optimal DT locations, reduced synergy.) The near-term impacts to C2ISR weapon systems development will potentially include: delayed programs; slipped test schedules; reduced weapon systems functionality; delayed certifications for OT; and reduced performance during the transition phase. The interests of the warfighter may not be best served by coupling EW and C2ISR developmental test. HQ AFMC and the test centers are actively working together to develop a plan on how to meet the intent of the SECDEF's recommendation, while minimizing the short and long-term affect on the warfighter. This plan will identify the resource disconnects and impacts to the C2ISR mission area.

//signed, jrr, DATE//

JEFFREY R. RIEMER

Brigadier General, USAF

Director of Operations

3 Tabs

1. Summary of AFMAN 99-111 T&E Process
2. ESC Organization Chart (C2ISR Programs tested by Eglin)
3. T&E Locations as shown in AFMAN 99-111 Figure 11

-----**Tab 1 (Short description of C2ISR T&E Process)**



Short Description of
the C2ISR...

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Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

TECH 6 C4ISR
EGLIN TO EDWARDS
PORTION

From: Mleziva Matt Ctr SAF/AQX
Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2005 9:10 AM
To: Buckstad, Robert, COL, OSD-ATL; Eberhart, Roy CTR BRAC , TJCSG; Evans, Steven S Col BRAC
Cc: Short, James, Dr, OSD-ATL; Cenicerios, Christian G LCDR BRAC; Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: HOT//JCS Task 64 -- Info technology from Eglin to Edwards/S: 18 Aug
Importance: High
Attachments: Tasker 922C - JCS #64 response.doc

Buck - discussed responses with Les Farrington a few minutes ago - I've drafted formal responses to the Tasker (see attached) and have added Les as an info addressee on this email due to the very short time constraint

Roy - please initiate formal processing of response

- cheers, Matt

-----Original Message-----

From: Buckstad, Robert, COL, OSD-ATL
Sent: Thu 8/18/2005 7:38 AM
To: Mleziva Matt Ctr SAF/AQX; Eberhart, Roy CTR BRAC , TJCSG; Evans, Steven S Col BRAC
Cc: Short, James, Dr, OSD-ATL; Cenicerios, Christian G LCDR BRAC
Subject: HOT//JCS Task 64 -- Info technology from Eglin to Edwards/S: 18 Aug

Mr Mleziva: Action please. Attached letter is about transferring info tech from Eglin to Edwards. Mr Farrington, BRAC Commission, needs response on this letter today. A interim, immediate verbal response may be helpful. This is very urgent. More to follow.

COL Evans/LCDR Cenicerios -- Mr M may need COBRA info, please be ready to provide on a priority basis.

Mr Eberhart -- study the attached letter. Info Technology is a TJCSG responsibility. Per convo with you yesterday, you said the clearinghouse assigned this action to Industrial. Per my convo with Mr Berry, IJCSG has not worked the problem. It seems that the clearing house mis-assigned the work effort and TJCSG staff missed the info technology reference. Mr Farrington may have resubmitted the tasker. Please track this closely.

vr.
Buck//

ROBERT D. BUCKSTAD, COL, Chief of Staff, OSD-ATL, ODDRE, Plans and Programs, TJCSG BRAC 2005, 3030 Defense Pentagon, Room 3D1089, Wash DC 20301-3030, (703) 695-0552 (desk), 703-695-0005 (office), 703-795-0433 (cell), fax: 703-695-4885 (U),
robert.buckstad@osd.mil

"... What is the basis and rationale for transferring info technology resources from Eglin to Edwards , given that Eglins military value score is almost twice that of Edwards? ... For each impacted facility(eglin and

What is the basis and rationale for transferring information technology resources from Eglin AFB to Edwards AFB, given that Eglin's military value score is almost twice that of Edwards?

Due to the very close operational and systems linkage between information technology and sensors, EW and electronics (collectively referred to as C4ISR), the TJCSG objective was to consolidate all of those activities in one location. In T&E, sensors and EW are the most infrastructure intensive portions of C4ISR requiring large open-air ranges with controlled RF characteristics and expensive test resources. Consequently, the TJCSG recommended C4ISR T&E consolidation at the location with the highest military value in the sensors, EW and electronics portion of C4ISR (not the information technology portion). That location for air and space C4ISR was Edwards AFB.

For each impacted facility (Eglin and Edwards Air Force Bases) please identify the number of officers, enlisted, civilian and mission essential contractors employed as of January 1, 2005 who were primarily supporting (1) electronic warfare, and (2) electronics and information systems test and evaluation specialties.

The TJCSG does not have the information you requested. The certified information we do have is only for Eglin AFB (as we did not develop a scenario that realigned Edwards AFB) and is as of 30 Sep 2003. That information shows (reference COBRA) 25 Officers (of which 20 positions were realigned and 5 positions were eliminated), 3 Enlisted (all realigned) and 50 Civilians (of which 42 positions were realigned and 8 positions were eliminated).

We have been informed that the Air Force developed an estimate indicating that \$38 million in MILCON dollars would be required to replicate facilities at Edwards to house information systems personnel recommended for relocation to Edwards. Is this information accurate? Please explain why the MILCON requirements were excluded from the COBRA analysis.

The Air Force did develop an estimate indicating that \$38 million in MILCON dollars would be required to build a new facility for the activity proposed to be realigned. However, certified data (reference Appendix E to Recommendation TECH-0042C) indicated over 2 million square feet of excess capacity at Edwards AFB for C4ISR T&E activity. Therefore the TJCSG did not include any MILCON funds in TECH-0042C for Edwards AFB.

edwards) please identify teh number of officers, ... contractors ... why MILCON excluded from COBRA?"

TECH-6
EGLIN
PORTION

Anthony J. Principi, Chairman
BRAC Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi,

First, thank you, the commission, and the commission staff for your commitment and personal sacrifices in executing your complex mission on a very tight timeline. I, as you, want the final 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions to be based upon the best information available and logical application of BRAC selection criteria. I understand the importance and support the BRAC process for shaping the nation's defense infrastructure to meet national security needs of today and the future. The DoD has presented recommendations for enhanced leverage of the natural and intellectual resources associated with the military installations in Florida's First Congressional District. Their recommendations all include some realignment of missions away from these installations.

As I mentioned in my remarks at the New Orleans Regional hearing last week the logic and data for justifying some of these realignments were illogical and flawed. The NAS Pensacola issues were discussed in detail at the recent hearing. The purpose of this letter is to address another illogical recommendation associated with Eglin AFB.

The DoD Technical Joint Cross-Service Group recommended actions intended to consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation (RDAT&E) within the Air Force. I fully support the intent to increase efficiency through reductions in the number of technical facilities engaged in Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare, Electronics and information Systems RDAT&E where feasible. One of these actions was the realignment of Eglin AFB, FL, Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare & Electronics and Information Systems Test & Evaluation to Edwards AFB, CA. Based upon assessment of the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group's analysis data and rationale, this recommendation is clearly illogical and flawed. The action is inconsistent with the BRAC selection criterion of Military Value.

- Eglin's Military Value for Information Systems T&E is almost double that of Edwards. The Group made a significant error in methodology for lumping military value data of dissimilar functions into one bin: Air & Space Sensors; Electronic Warfare & Electronics; and Information Systems. The Group's flawed methodology also included significant under estimating of the infrastructure and manpower required to support this type testing. The resulting MILCON error is in the range of \$50-70M. The ability to reconstitute the capability did not address the synergistic joint environment consisting of the 505th Command and Control Wing at Hurlburt Field (located within Eglin range) and the Navy's Expeditionary Warfare Test Bed 65 miles East in Panama City, FL.

- The Cross-Service Group's analysis of Electronic Warfare & Electronics was significantly flawed. There will be no savings accrued if these capabilities are consolidated at Edwards. However, as recognized in the BRAC 95 legislation, degradation in operational readiness of Air Force Special Operations forces and timely, cost efficient operations in support of Air Combat Command forces will occur. The reason these capabilities exist on the Eglin range, is to provide operational test and training needs of the 16th Special Operations Wing and operational test needs of the 53rd Wing. The 16th assets (high demand, low density) are located at Hurlburt Field which lies within the Eglin Range and the 53rd is located on Eglin main base. Due to the high ops tempo and limited availability of aircraft (helo and fixed wing), special operations forces, the distance to Edwards ranges and limited schedule capacity of those ranges deny our special forces the opportunity to train and test. This is an unacceptable degradation in operational readiness. Likewise, the 53rd Wg issue is timely access to Edwards ranges in support of real time needs and the costs for deployment. There will be no savings, just degradation in operational readiness. Just as importantly however, with the fielding of new data link capable high precision air armament systems such as the Small Diameter Bomb and others, these range capabilities are now recognized as an integral part of Air Armament RDT&E which is already consolidated at Eglin.

Had this Cross-Service Group validated their data and logic this realignment by vetting findings with AF leadership at Air Force Material Command, Edwards AFB, and Eglin AFB, I am certain this recommendation would have been abandoned. This recommendation makes does not result in a more efficient infrastructure and degrades the Air Force's ability to sustain operational readiness of its special operations and combat air force.

Respectfully, I request your analysis team review my comments and meet with my staff subject matter expert to review additional detail prior to commission final deliberations on this issue. My point of contact is Charles Elliott, (202) 225-4136.

DCN:11670



BRAC Implementation



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Lt. Col. Ken "Taz" Plaks
Commander, 46 TS
(850) 882-5935 (DSN 872)

Distribution Statement D. Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. DoD Contractors only; Critical Technology, 7 May 2003. Other requests shall be referred to the 46 Test Squadron, 401 W Choctawhatchee Ave, Suite 218, Eglin AFB FI 32542-5725



Overview

- Background
- Implementation
- Impacts
- Alternatives
- Summary


*We support the SECDEF, however
implementation will be challenging*



Background



- **CAISR Eglin AFB.** Move the Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare & Electronics and Information Systems Test & Evaluation to Edwards Air Force Base, CA
 - **What:** Realign Eglin Air Force Base, FL, by relocating Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare & Electronics and Information Systems Test & Evaluation to Edwards Air Force Base, CA.
 - **Why:** This recommendation will reduce the number of technical facilities engaged in Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare, & Electronics and Information Systems RDAT&E from 6 to 2. This, in turn, will increase the likelihood of fielding interoperable systems, reduce overlapping infrastructure, and increase the efficiency of operations.
- **-78 FY07 \$0 MILCON**



Background





- “Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare & Electronics and Information Systems Test & Evaluation” are missions, not units
- Multiple Units Involved
 - 46 TW
 - 53 WG
 - 46 TS
 - 28 TES
 - 605 TES
 - Det 2 AFOTEC
- Appears to target DT
 - This represents about half of ESC’s programs



Systems Involved

- C2
 - AOC, DCGS, GCSS, GCCS, CCICCS, DJC2,
- BCS
 - BCS-F/M
- Datalinks, Radios and MILSATCOM
 - Link 16, SADL, MP-CDL, WDL, EPLRS, SATCOM, JTRS, FAB-T, GBS
- Mission Planning
 - JMPS, PFPS, MPS, Taskview, etc
- Base Defense
 - Vindicator, IR/RF sensors, fence sensors, motion detectors
- Logistics/Enterprise Resource Planning
 - GCSS, ECSS, LOGFAC, DCAPEs, AF Portal
- EW
 - TEWS, LAIRCM/DIRCM, FOTD







Background

- EW and C4 are different disciplines
 - Skills:
 - EW: RF, DSP, LO, threats
 - C4: Sysad, data base, comp sci
 - Infrastructure
 - EW: anechoic chambers, threats, airspace
 - C4: computers, base, bandwidth
- Previous GOSG/BRAC results:
 - Edwards: EW
 - Eglin: C4

This number is approximate, but was 552 on BRAC website





EW Implementation





- EW Piece will be straightforward
- Edwards already has most AF EW DT
 - Edwards:Eglin ratio is almost 20:1—easily absorbed
- Considerable infrastructure and expertise
 - Standing EW directorate
 - Large pool of Govt experts to provide leadership
- Some residual EW capability will still be required at Eglin
 - AFSOC test and in garrison training
 - Atmospheric diversity for EO/IR
 - JPRIMES
 - F-15



C4 Implementation

- C4 Piece will have to be recreated from scratch
- Eglin has almost all AF C4 DT
 - Edwards:Eglin ratio is almost 1:27—tremendous challenge
- No infrastructure
 - Zero MILCON allotted, but significant amount required to recreate capability at Edwards
 - Previous SAF/IL estimate \$38M
 - Eglin C2 Test Facility: \$20M (June 2005)
 - C3 base replacement
- Minimal experience/expertise
 - Experience limited to datalink platform integration
 - Intellectual capital will not move
 - Previous BRAC 1 out of 58 moved
 - With concerted effort can recreate in 5-10 years





C4 Implementation (Cont)



- Manpower challenges
 - BRAC assumed approx 17% consolidation manpower savings
 - 78 Eglin slots becomes 65 Edwards slots
 - No consolidation means no savings
- Significant C4 capability will still be required at Eglin
 - AFSOC C4 test
 - Network centric weapons development
 - Tight integration with AOC/Datalinks
 - Link-16 Gulf Common Net
 - 325FW (Tyndall), 33FW (Eglin), AFSOC




Impact: C4 Test



- Test can be more critical for C2 systems than for aircraft
 - Implications of being wrong/missing something
 - Think strategically/operationally, not tactically
- Test is a process, not an equipment list
 - Familiarity breeds contempt
 - Barriers to entry are low
- Requires trained, experienced testers
 - Knowledge transfer from similar systems
 - Professional C2 test also includes performance
- We are the best in the world at C2 performance testing


C2 Performance Overview

Server Monitoring







Delivery Stats

Machine	Submitted	Submitted/Min	Delivered	Delivered/Min	Avg Delivery (min)
DEMO1	49	15.57	47	25.73	36.50
DEMO2	54	15.63	94	63.45	62.88
DEMO3	39	10.74	78	45.95	50.61
DEMO4	60	83.27	2	21.04	75.37




Automated Regression
Simulated Users

Network
Monitoring



Client Monitoring






Cheyenne Mtn Example



Strategic Impact

727Kbps x2
(1.454 Mbps)

Data Available Upon Request



AOC WS



Synergy with operational test

Keeping C2 Projects On Time and On Budget


Data Available Upon Request

DCN:11670

Blocking locks on Oracle server due to improper user query at improper time



Small Diameter Bomb



Link-16
Network

AOC
Incorporates
DGPS Master
Station (DMS)


AOC

AOC

AOC

AOC

AOC



Formatting & Network Errors

Synergy with developers



Data Available Upon Request




C4 Impacts

- DT/OT Synergy will be degraded
 - Real loss, but hard to quantify
- DT/Weapons development synergy will be degraded
 - Informal contact yields large gains
- Graceful transition is unlikely
 - Software test is a very marketable skill
 - Return to pre-1995 level of C4 test performance
 - At best, a multi-year pause in AF's C4 transformation



Implementation Alternatives

- AFMC is actively studying
- Preserve spirit/intent of the recommendation without impacting mission
 - Spirit/intent was consolidation
 - Language grants some flexibility in interpretation/implementation
- Latest data
 - 5 vs 552
 - Eglin C2 Test Facility
- Tester involvement
- Decouple EW and C4
 - Disjoint subsets
 - Different skills





Implementation Alternatives

- Option: Organize functionally, regardless of location
 - Pre-BRAC flight operations reorg model
 - EW to Edwards
 - C4 to Eglin
 - Unity of command
- AFMC is studying for proposal to AF/OSD
 - Will probably involve a small AFFTC det at Eglin and a small 46TS det at Edwards
- Both Eglin and Edwards agree best solution
 - Advocacy, expertise, synergy
- Provides smart consolidation while preserving ability to accomplish mission



Summary

- We support the SECDEF
 - Standing by to implement as directed
- Taken at face value, recommendation will cause significant impacts
 - At best, a multi-year pause in C4 transformation
- We have an opportunity to achieve consolidation and improve network centric development
 - The USAF made a conscious decision in 1995
 - Yielding great benefits to the warfighter
 - We must be very careful not to reverse the gains of the last 10 years