



BRAC 2005 - Query Response Manager



Response to 0303

Question:

Questions for Chairman Principi
Base Closure and Realignment Commission
May 18, 2005

Hearing on Department of the Army Recommendations and Methodology

1. During his testimony, Under Secretary Wynne indicated that the Commission would receive the certified detailed data supporting the Secretary's recommendations sometime this week. Can you tell me whether those instructions were passed to the Army and when can we expect to receive this data that is critical to our analysis?

As you know, the BRAC materials are undergoing Security Review, as directed by OSD. They are working as fast as possible, and expect to have the materials to you soon.

2. DOD's 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Report* identifies over 13,000 personnel as "undistributed or Overseas Reductions," associated with a category called "Germany, Korea, and Undistributed." The Commission needs to know what is planned for these troops. Who are they and where will they go? *(Volume 1, Part 1, Appendix C, BRAC 2005 Closure and Realignment Impacts by State, page C-28)

Answer: Approximately 15,500 Soldiers will return from units inactivating in Europe and approximately 6,300 Soldiers will return from units inactivating in Korea.

Type of European Units Inactivating and the number of Soldiers assigned:

Augmentation to various European-based Units 1350
Garrison / Base Support (98th and 104th Area Support Groups) 550
Theater Support Command (200th TSG) 660
Division Support Command (123d Main Support Battalion) 1125
Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Brigade Headquarters (69th ADA Brigade) 140
Corps-level Logistics (512th Maintenance Company) 470
Division and Corps-level Military Intelligence (101st Military Intelligence Battalion) 1150
Military Police (1st Military Police Company) 470

Brigade Reconnaissance Troops (F Troop, 1st Cavalry) □150
Finance and Personnel (512th Personnel Services Battalion) □380
Divisional Signal Battalions (121st Signal Battalion) □954
Corps-level and Above Signal (43d Signal Battalion) □2150
Combat Support Hospital (67th Combat Support Hospital) □400
Various Medical, Dental, and Veterinary (30th Medical Brigade) □675
Infantry Battalion (4th Infantry Battalion (OPFOR)) □648
Corps and Divisional Artillery (27th Field Artillery Battalion) □1350
Corps and Divisional Engineer (16th Engineer Battalion) □1900
Corps and Divisional Aviation (501st Aviation Battalion) □1050

Type of Korean Units Inactivating and the number of Soldiers assigned:

Augmentation to various Korean-based Units □215
Garrison / Base Support (23d Area Support Group) □260
Theater Support Command (194th Ordnance Battalion) □310
Division Support Command (702d Main Support Battalion) □1120
Corps-level Logistics (595th Maintenance Company) □300
Division and Corps-level Military Intelligence (102d Military Intelligence Battalion) □330
Military Police (2d Military Police Company) □260
Finance and Personnel (177th Finance Battalion) □72
Corps-level and Above Signal (201st Signal Battalion) □960
Various Medical, Dental, and Veterinary (377th Medical Company) □135
Armor Battalion (72d Armor Battalion) □618
Corps and Divisional Artillery (37th Field Artillery Battalion) □1060
Corps and Divisional Engineer (2d Engineer Battalion) □500
Corps and Divisional Aviation (17th Aviation Brigade) □115

3. □ So many Army-related recommendations pertain to the reserve component activities where personnel changes are below the personnel threshold levels (i.e. 300 authorized civilians) where closure action under the BRAC law would be required. Why are you proposing these reserve component actions under BRAC when BRAC is not needed to authorize them? If we were to look closely at each of these reserve actions, how many of them actually save money?

- □ The Army is transforming and the Reserve Components are transforming along with the rest of the Army. Installations are the flagships upon which we build readiness and deployment capabilities.
- □ Therefore, it makes good business sense to include Reserve Component facilities in the BRAC analysis as part of a complete Army infrastructure review.
- □ The BRAC process has largely overlooked the small RC facilities in the past and subsequently missed a great opportunity to save resources that are badly needed to fund other RC high priorities that contribute to warfighting capabilities.
- □ Of the 44 RC recommendations, 16 generated NPV costs, which causes the payback period for all RC recommendations to be eight years.

- It is important to note that avoided costs, not captured in the COBRA model, would cause 12 of these 16 recommendations to have NPV savings.

4. Improved business practices. Are any of the proposed savings a result of improved business practices – that is, have you assumed savings because of improvements in the organization, processes, or available resources rather than closures or realignments? If so, please provide details on the improvements and methodology of calculating savings.

- Yes, the Army has assumed some savings because of improvements in the organization, processes, or available resources rather than closures or realignments. The Army's improved business practice savings mainly come in the efficiencies we generate when combining back offices. For example, we expect efficiencies that will generate personnel savings when we combine the back office functions of the Armor and Infantry Schools.
- The Army used standard manpower analysis to complete this work, coordinated with TRADOC for each of the school analyses to ensure we were both exhaustive in our search for savings, but prudent in the taking of those savings. The Army TABS Group also provided their approach document and model results to the Director of Army Manpower, who reviewed their approach and certified it.
- "The Army developed a detailed methodology for determining manpower savings when assessing Base Operations impacts, and when consolidating organizations. In the absence of full manpower studies, I certify that the methods used by The Army Basing Study (TABS) Group are analytically sound and provide quality estimates of savings that are likely to be achievable during implementation of BRAC initiatives."

SUGGESTED COMMISSION QUESTIONS

Process

1. Late removal of bases from Army-related BRAC lists. Can the Army bases disapproved for closure or realignment by DOD's Infrastructure Executive Committee (IEC) and the Army's Senior Review Group (SRG) late in the process—from mid-April forward—be identified for the Commission on a list that includes a brief statement of the reason for each action?

- Carlisle Barracks, PA - The IEC determined that the benefits of maintaining the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks outweighed the savings associated with relocating the College and closing Carlisle Barracks. Its proximity to Washington, DC provides access to national and international policy makers, enhancing the educational experience through involvement of key leaders in the curriculum. Carlisle has a State-of-the-Art Conference Center (supports Strategic Leadership studies and exercises) and Army Heritage and Education Center (contains 14 million historical items), both of

which are central to the educational experience and would be very costly and difficult to replicate elsewhere. In the military judgment of the IEC, these benefits outweighed the savings associated with closing Carlisle Barracks.

- Soldier Systems Center (Natick, MA) - The IEC determined that the costs and manpower implications associated with closing Soldier Systems Center outweighed the benefits. Relocation/replication of the assets was very costly (Approx \$380M in one-time costs), and the investment took a long time to pay back (28 years).
- Adelphi (MD) - The IEC determined that the costs and manpower implications associated with closing Adelphi outweighed the benefits. Relocation/replication of the assets was very costly (Approx \$550M in one-time costs), and the investment took a long time to pay back (58 years).
- Pueblo Chemical Depot, (CO) – The Industrial JCSG withdrew the candidate recommendation that closed Pueblo Chemical Depot because they determined that the Chemical Munitions Demil mission could not be completed in time to support the closure IAW the BRAC 05 implementation period as specified in the legislation.

2. Leased Space. It appears that some of the moves out of leased space in the National Capitol Region (NCR) move the same activities into leased space at their new locations, such as the headquarters for Installation Management Agency (IMA) move to Ft Sam Houston. If this is the case, how does this support the initiative of moving out of leased space, and enhancing force protection? Aren't we just trading one landlord for another?

- In general the Army did not move any of its units from leased space to leased space.
- While moving out of leased space is a desirable end state, the Army objectives of gaining efficiencies in functions and creating joint opportunities for training and operations also drove Army analysis.
- Each unit and activity transferred out of leased space in the NCR has been placed to enhance its operational or support capability through consolidations or co-locations. In very few cases, that entailed movement to another leased location.
- We may take advantage of enhanced-use lease opportunities on federal locations. E.g., Fort Sam Houston when it is to our benefit, primarily to reduce cost and create force protection.
- The result of these hard decisions is a basing configuration that better supports our transforming Army, provides force protection and saves money.

3. BRAC restrictive guidance. Did OSD direct Army groups responsible for generating the BRAC list to remove or add any installation closures or realignments to the final BRAC list? If so, what installations?

- No. The Army worked closely with OSD and the JCSGs to generate the best possible package of recommendations. OSD did not direct any changes to the final list of Army recommendations.

4. Past BRAC rounds. Looking back at past BRAC rounds, did Army accomplish as

much of its closure and realignment plan as was feasible or did unexpected circumstances limit implementation? What can this BRAC round do to better execute identified closures and realignments, to realize promised savings, and to accommodate community transition concerns?

- The Army has completed all closure and realignment actions from prior BRAC rounds, and these actions have resulted in \$945M in annual recurring savings.
- The most significant potential improvement in the process is to accelerate the closure and realignment actions as well as the environmental cleanup and property transfer. Delays in the process allow idle facilities to decline and may result in lost opportunities for redevelopment for the local communities. The Army is committed to the goal of accelerating BRAC 2005 implementation from 6 to 4 years. Communities should organize themselves to prepare a redevelopment plan as quickly as possible following Congressional approval of the final BRAC decisions.

5. US Government Agency inclusion on Army bases. What is the increase of use of Army bases by non-DOD US Government agencies resulting from this BRAC rebasing plan? Is there greater potential for use of Army bases by non-DOD US Government agencies and how would that be funded? Is there unsatisfied demand by non-DOD US Government agencies for use of Army bases?

- There is no increase in the use of Army bases by non-DOD US Government agencies resulting from this BRAC rebasing plan.
- The Army anticipates that other local, state and federal agencies may participate in these actions as part of the implementation process.
- Funding for the participation of non-DOD agencies would have to be determined as part of implementation negotiations.
- The unsatisfied demand will not be known until the excess and surplus screening is accomplished, soon after the recommendations have been approved.

6. Tracking of proposals. Yesterday's testimony mentioned that 845 locations are affected by the 222 recommendations. Why are there a number of realignments (gains, losses and disestablishment of capability) not listed in the formal listings by state or the complete list of indexed actions by state, but actions on those installations can be found within the narrative for each of the teams? (For example: Watervliet Arsenal, Lima Tank Plant, Tooele Army Depot, Sierra Army Depot.)

- The Joint Cross Service Groups, especially the Industrial Group, moved "workload" from one location to another, but did not move workforce; hence these actions do not constitute closures or realignments. The JCSGs believed that there was excess capacity across their function and that such workload moves could be accommodated as well as reduce excess capacity.

Force Structure

7. Relocating Guard and Reserve units to nearby Army installations The Commission appreciates the essential contribution to national defense and domestic emergencies made by our Guard and Reserve forces. Many Guard and Reserve units and personnel are currently located within 50 miles of Army installations, but nevertheless maintain separate bases and facilities. Not all Guard and Reserve locations that could move onto nearby Army installations are planning to do so even though many Army installations have space for them, improved security could result, and some Reserve Component basing costs could be reduced. Is there additional opportunity to relocate some Guard and Reserve units from separate bases to Army installations, and eliminate additional facilities?

- We do not have specific data regarding the impact on RC personnel that will result from relocations.
- The distances they must travel to the new sites are generally less than 50 miles which is the maximum distance permitted by Army policy for involuntarily relocating reserve personnel. Beyond a 50 mile radius, reservists are not required to relocate if their unit is moved.
- The 50 mile radius is considered a local commuting distance from one site to another.
- In all cases the Regional Readiness Commands (RCC) and states carefully considered this issue with particular emphasis on recruiting and retention demographics.
- One exception to this rule involves the transformation of U.S. Army Reserve RRCs from 10 to 4. In these cases, several units move more than 50 miles as the Army reorganizes its Army Reserve Command and Control structure.
- Reserve Component facilities are community based properties. As such, these centers and armories are postured to take advantage of recruiting and retention opportunities in the immediate vicinity. This is not always possible on a large installation and demographic studies support this.
- Where practicable, the Army moved RC units onto existing major installations to leverage training opportunities, and to improve the quality of services and security for those units.
- There is significant additional opportunity to establish additional AFRCs. Time and modeling constraints limited how many recommendations could be developed for BRAC 2005. Only nine percent of the 4020 RC properties were included in this submission.

8. Guard & Reserve. Many of the Army's Reserve Component related recommendations are predicated on the ability to acquire land to construct new facilities, often adjacent to existing Guard facilities. What is the Army's estimate of land acquisition costs and are those costs reflected in their COBRA costs and savings calculations? How can the Commission be assured that the Army will be able to purchase needed land, and how is this an efficiency?

- The Army included a land acquisition cost estimate for each of the

recommendations that require the construction of a new AFRC on a future property.

- The cost to acquire property varies greatly from one part of the country to another as you might expect. Land costs in some areas are as low as \$200K, while in other parts of the country they could approach \$2M.
- As part of the analysis, the State and Regional Readiness Command facility management officers identified potential sites that the Army could acquire for the new construction projects. The known costs to purchase those properties were incorporated into the cost/savings analysis.

9. Guard & Reserve. How does the Army expect to dispose of existing excess reserve property? To the extent that land sales are planned, does the Army have any projection of revenues from such sales?

- The Army will use all options available in the property disposal "tool box" to include the reserve property exchange (RPX) authority authorized by recent legislation at the reserve component properties. The Army will work closely with affected State Governors and TAGs in the case of National Guard facilities. The Army did not develop revenue projections as part of the BRAC basing study process, and will develop revenue projections as part of implementation and with the BRAC budgets.

10. State Adjutant's General involvement in BRAC decisions DOD testimony indicated that The Adjutant Generals (TAG) were involved in reserve component-related BRAC recommendations. Were TAGs in agreement with all BRAC recommendations affecting their states? Were there notable exceptions?

- Yes, all TAGs were in agreement with "Army Reserve Component recommendations affecting the ARNG in their states. Each participating State's Adjutant General, or their appointed representative, provided written concurrence to their proposals. There were no notable exceptions.
- We expect the State governors to agree with these proposals during the implementation process.

11. Return of overseas units. DOD may not have indicated basing for all of the returning troops from Europe and Korea. How can the Commission be assured that a facility identified for realignment or closure might not later be needed? How can decisions about potential excess basing capacity be discussed without knowing all basing needs?

- The Army accounts for IGPBS unit requirements that are returning within BRAC related actions. The Army also accounts for the capacity required at those installations touched by IGPBS and modularity requirements that occur prior to the BRAC implementation period. Installations touched by IGPBS may require MILCON, but the installations that they impact have high value and training assets to accommodate unit

requirements.

- The Army also accounted for those soldiers returning from overseas that are supporting the modular force structure by looking at aggregate Army requirements for 43 BCTs and maintaining surge capability for up to 48 BCTs.
- The Army has not recommended closure of any installation of sufficient size and composition to handle maneuver units which may return from overseas.

12.□Unit Rebasing. The Army is currently moving many units from one base to another base under Army Modularity. Does the DOD BRAC report include these numbers? If not, why not? If not, how will these additional forces impact costs and the impact on base and community infrastructure?

- In 2003, the Army announced plans to activate and temporarily station ten Brigade Combat Teams as part of the Army's Modular Force Transformation. The Army considered all 10 BCTs and the various modular support units in its overall analysis.
- The Army validated the temporary stationing of five of these BCTs in its report.
- The other five are included in the Army's BRAC recommendations related to Ft Bliss, TX, Ft Bragg, NC, Ft Carson, CO, Ft Knox, KY, and Ft Riley, KS.
- The costs associated with the activation of these units and the impact on the installation and community are addressed in these recommendations.

13.□Joint/Cross Service Installations. DOD has emphasized joint and cross-service criteria in its BRAC plans. To what extent will Army bases evolve from principally single-service bases to significant joint/cross-service use as a result of BRAC rebasing?

- Over the years, Army installations have evolved to host numerous joint and interagency organizations and functions.
 - o□Since 9/11, most Army installations have established cooperative relationships with a wide variety of local, state and federal agencies, mostly oriented toward supporting the training and command and control of first responders in times of emergencies.
 - o□BRAC 2005 recommendations will accelerate this trend.
- Within the Reserve Component, there will be extensive joint/cross-service use of the proposed new facilities.
 - o□Of the 125 new facilities, 27 will be joint and 96 will be multi-component.
 - o□All of them will offer the opportunity for further joint and interagency participation during the implementation process.
- The opportunities within the Active Component are also significant.
 - o□Twenty Army installations will receive a variety of support functions from other services
 - o□Seven Army installations will combine installation management functions with other nearby installations from other services.

Cost

14. Army Materiel Command (AMC) & Leased Space. A theme affecting a number of AMC recommendations is to move AMC elements out of leased space, however it is not always clear how these moves result in consolidation and economic efficiencies: moving the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) from Ft. Monmouth to Aberdeen, MD; the Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) personnel located at Rock Island, IL to Detroit, MI, and AMC Headquarters personnel from Ft. Belvoir, VA to Huntsville, AL. It is unclear what the goal was. Since we do not yet have the Army details, please discuss your logic for these and other command moves.

- AMC Headquarters is currently in a leased, temporary building. Moving it to Redstone Arsenal allows it to gain synergy with one of its Major Subordinate Command Headquarters. This move also enables business process reengineering as back room operations will be integrated, and personnel requirements reduced.

- The move of the Tank Automotive & Armaments Command (TACOM) Integrated Materiel Management Center (IMMC) from Rock Island Arsenal consolidates an outlying IMMC with its parent IMMC, which is located at TACOM HQs, Detroit Arsenal.

- The key to these consolidations is the increase in effectiveness created from working together, the back office reductions created from sharing support activities, and the overhead efficiencies gained from closing installations.

15. Army budgeting to implement BRAC The Overseas Basing Commission indicated that the Army plan for basing of overseas units returning to the US may benefit from scheduling that allows time for the receiving US bases to more fully prepare the infrastructure needed to accommodate returning units. Required military infrastructure includes base housing, headquarters, training, and maintenance facilities; Civilian community infrastructure includes family housing, schools, roads, and diverse municipal services.

a. Do Army BRAC implementation plans allow enough flexibility for gaining bases and gaining communities to have the time and resources to prepare for the arrival of the planned additional personnel?

- The challenge to the Army is to balance operational requirements against the reality of time and the affordability of implementing the realignments recommended in BRAC 2005. The Army will develop implementation plans this summer and fall, pending final approval of recommendations that will integrate the return of the affected overseas components with related BRAC actions. Early and comprehensive planning with the installations and local communities will permit creation of flexible and effective implementation plans.

b. Do Army's plans address the losing community needs, as was suggested recently

by DOD?

- The Army is prepared to work directly with affected local communities and in coordination with the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) as they assist the communities during the implementation of BRAC 2005. The Army will build on experience from the first four rounds and work to lessen the transition impact with accelerated BRAC implementation and property transfer.

c. Will the next budget request for Army include information that will lay out the budget and funding plan to match the BRAC basing plan so that Congress (the Armed Services and Defense Appropriations committees) and the impacted communities can see the matching of funds to BRAC moves?

- The DoD BRAC budgets are traditionally presented in alignment with the Commission closure and realignment actions.
- This organization displays the cost and savings associated with each specific Commission decision.
- For gaining installations that are affected by multiple actions, you would go to the corresponding closure and realignment actions to obtain the total impact. This multiple action scenario will occur at installations such as Fort Bliss.

d. Specifically, please speak to this at Ft Bliss where 11,000 additional troops will be quartered.

- While the Army recognizes that this will be a challenge, we believe that through proper scheduling of the unit moves and working closely with the community, using the tools of the Office of Economic Adjustment, we will be able to provide adequate support to the Soldiers and their families.

16. Activity (CRTA) and the Northern Warfare Training Center were moved from Ft Greely to Ft Wainwright. The training location did not change and remains at Bolio Lake for CRTA. The 2005 Army plan moves the CRTA back to Ft Greely. The cost for the 95 BRAC move was \$23.1 million with a savings of \$17.9 million. The 2005 proposal costs \$50,000 with a savings of \$200,000 yet the 2005 proposal appears to be a simple reversal of the 1995 decision. Could you comment on this? Will the Army lose some or all of the original planned \$17.9 million in savings?

- This recommendation relocates 5 employees of CRTA headquarters to Ft Greely to improve efficiency of operations and enhance personnel safety.

- This unit, although realigned under Ft. Wainwright in BRAC 95, is only 10 miles south of Ft Greely but 100 miles from Ft. Wainwright's cantonment area. This action would avoid a 200 mile round trip between quarters and work sites. Decreases the risks associated with the required year-round travel in extreme weather conditions.

- The savings of \$17.9M from BRAC 95 was a result of closing Fort Greely. After the closure, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) moved in to Ft Greely and turned it back in full operation as a missile launch site.
- The Army will not lose the savings from the BRAC 1995 realignment of Fort Greely since the 2005 recommendations build on the savings achieved in the prior round. The 2005 recommendation only moves the CRTA personnel back to Fort Greely which creates the efficiency of co-location and thus the additional savings.

Recommendation / Function Specific

17.□Ft Monroe Closure. How do the moves to Ft Eustis and Ft Knox enhance military value? Does Ft Eustis have existing facilities comparable to those at Ft Monroe or will TRADOC and Installation Management Agency require new facilities?

- Both Ft. Knox (#12) & Ft. Eustis (#33) have higher Military Value than Ft. Monroe #68 and Ft. McPherson #51. Each installation has additional operational and training capabilities that enhance readiness and excess capacity to accommodate functions from other installations.
- Moves to Ft Eustis reduces excess capacity through consolidation; the move of NETCOM headquarters, TRADOC headquarters and IMA to Ft. Eustis consolidates the Northeastern and Southeastern commands into a single Eastern Command Center and reduces the distance between TRADOC to the Joint Forces Command headquarters. Together, these moves streamline military command and control capabilities
- The consolidation of the Army's Human Resources command to Ft. Knox (includes the collocation of Accession and Cadet Commands) creates a center of excellence for military personnel and the Army's recruiting functions.

18.□Ft Monmouth Closure. Ft Monmouth is an acquisition and research installation. Is there concern that highly trained technology expertise will be lost in the move of these important Army functions?

- A total of 2,569 skilled employee positions will move from Ft Monmouth, NJ to Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD.
- The retention of the workforce is a factor in all BRAC closure recommendations. The loss of intellectual capital is expected in every move.
 - o□For example, in 1997, when the Aviation Research and Engineering Development Center, Aviation Management, and PEO Aviation (Aviation-Troop Command) were relocated from St Louis, MO, to form the Aviation and Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL, 26% of employees decided to stay in the St Louis area. 593 positions

were needed to be filled after the move.

o□ Team Redstone was fully aware of the personnel losses expected, planned for and executed a comprehensive hiring plan, and is today a successful Life Cycle Management Center (LCMC) for Aviation and Missile.

o□ We expect that the new organization at APG will also plan, manage the transition and execute effectively.

19.□ Ft Gilliam and Ft McPherson Closures. Are the closures of Ft Gilliam and Ft McPherson independent? Ft McPherson is located on a major transportation hub. Is there concern about transportation access for FORSCOM after the move? Why would USARC not be relocated to a site with a large concentration of reserve component forces rather than Pope AFB?

•□ Yes, these closures are independent.

•□ No, there is no concern about transportation access for FORSCOM. FORSCOM will relocate to Pope / Fort Bragg and will have adequate transportation available to meet their needs.

•□ In the Army's judgment, USARC would be more effective with the units located at Pope / Fort Bragg, especially FORSCOM. Their mission is coordinating mission accomplishment with FORSCOM. Their value is not enhanced through relocation with a group of Reserve units.

20.□ Depot Maintenance & 50/50 The law requires that no more than 50 percent of a service's depot maintenance workload can be contracted out in order to retain a viable organic base to perform this work. What assurances can you provide us that implementation of your recommendations will not violate the "50/50" provision?

•□ The Industrial Joint Cross Service Group determined that there was excess capacity of 2.1 million direct labor hours of work that Red River was doing which could be distributed among 4 other Depots (Tobyhanna Army Depot, Anniston Army Depot, Letterkenny Army Depot, and Marine Corps Logistics Base- Albany).

•□ Industrial JCSG also recommended that an additional 2.2 million direct labor hours of capacity for combat vehicles be established at Anniston Army Depot and 400,000 direct labor hours of tactical wheeled vehicle capacity be established at Letterkenny Army Depot.

•□ With this additional 2.6 million direct labor hours, the Army has sufficient capacity within its Depots to meet all known requirements and the capability to surge to meet unforeseen requirements, so there will be no need to contract out.

21. Depot Maintenance 50/50 reporting How will the service consolidation of intermediate and depot level maintenance activities affect the ability to accurately account for depot level maintenance under 50/50 reporting requirements?

- The Industrial JCSG did not combine Army intermediate sites (DOLs) with Depot maintenance. This will have no impact on 50/50 reporting

22. Red River Army Depot It is not surprising to see Red River Army Depot on the list given prior BRAC round discussions. The HMMMV is a critical Army vehicle that has been in short supply and you have leveraged Red River greatly to achieve some of your goals. How does your recommendation to close Red River impact Army operations, transformation to modularity, and the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy?

- The existing capacity post BRAC, with the addition of the 2.6 million direct labor hours of capacity being established at Anniston Army Depot and Letterkenny Army Depot, will ensure that the Army can meet our transformation to modularity and continue to meet our Tactical Wheeled Vehicle strategy.

23. Realign Pope AFB to Ft Bragg Given the Air Force's planned reduction in stationed airlift at Pope AFB after realignment, is the Army satisfied that sufficient airlift capability will exist at Pope to meet its increased training and operational requirements, resulting from the addition of an airborne brigade?

- The AF has committed to maintaining the capability to support Army mission requirements at Pope AFB, NC. They will not necessarily need to maintain it at Pope.

Environmental

24. Environmental Costs. The commission has been informed that the COBRA model does not include costs for environmental restoration. If so, are there any BRAC installations where such costs would be in excess of \$10 million? Please provide a complete list of these locations, with a description for each of the environmental problems and an estimate of the clean-up costs.

- This is correct, COBRA does not capture environmental restoration costs for closing installations, since the Department of Defense has a legal obligation to perform environmental restoration regardless of whether the base is closed, realigned, or remains open.

- Yes; there are some Active Army installations that have been proposed for closure under this BRAC round that have outstanding estimated restoration costs of greater than \$10 million. These installations and their reported FY03 environmental restoration costs are shown in following table.

Installation Reported FY03 Estimated Environmental Restoration Costs
(Millions)

Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant \$10.5

Fort Gillem \$18.0

Fort McPherson \$12.97

USAG Selfridge \$13.3

Hawthorne Army Depot \$382.2

Umatilla Chemical Depot \$10.3

Red River Army Depot \$49.1

Deseret Chemical Depot \$67.0

- After performing environmental surveys on closing installations, it is possible that additional installations may pass the \$10.0 million environmental remediation threshold.
- A majority of the listed installations have groundwater, surface water and soil contamination issues. In addition, the chemical depots and munitions plants will likely require additional decontamination to address significant explosives, chemical and heavy metal contamination.
- (If pressed) additional information on individual environmental requirements can be found at <http://aec.army.mil/usaec/cleanup>.

25. The reuse potential, and hence fair market value, of property will be affected if property is conveyed with institutional controls. For example, a deed restriction requiring fencing, signage, or limiting the reuse of the property to only specified activities.

We would appreciate it if you would discuss any sites that you are aware of where there will be prime property conveyed with institutional controls.

Could you please provide any additional or supplemental information for the record?

- The use of institutional controls at any specific installation will not be available until the Army assesses the environmental condition of the property and recommends restoration plans and environmental remedies in response to specific contamination. The Army plans to restore the property condition to support a like reuse scenario that is fully protective of human health and the environment, and to make decisions on alternative cleanup levels based on economics in coordination with the regulators and the local community.

Economic

26. Retiree medical access. Closure or downsizing of medical facilities can have a significant adverse effect on the local retiree community. The Commission has been

informed that the COBRA model includes estimates of TRICARE costs. Has the Army determined if adequate health care will be available locally to fully meet the medical needs of each retiree community?

- The Army considered the impact on TRICARE within the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) Model. The TRICARE algorithms were developed by the DOD medical community and were meant to address GAO criticisms concerning past BRAC, which had not considered the TRICARE impacts across their recommendations.
- Most importantly, the Medical JCSG specifically reviewed patient care utilization as a part of its BRAC analysis.

- The Army also reviewed the cumulative impact on each installation across all of the recommendations and asked members from the medical JCSG to attend all of these sessions to ensure the Army accounted for medical impacts.

- Finally, the Army also considered the availability of medical care within the local area of an installation in their Military Value analysis and their local area analysis.

- (Military Value attribute #29, medical care availability, measures the number of primary/specialty care providers available within the local area)

27.□DOD/Army Assistance to Gaining Communities. Some communities that are gaining jobs are suggesting that DOD/Army help build transportation and other municipal infrastructure. What is DOD/Army policy on financially helping affected communities and can you identify in the budget associated money?

- As in prior rounds the Army will work with local communities to assess the transportation and socio-economic impact of BRAC decisions. To the extent that the BRAC decisions will adversely impact the local communities, the Army will fund improvements to mitigate these impacts. These improvements will become part of appropriate Defense budget requests during the BRAC implementation period FYs 06-11.

Answer:

Questions for Chairman Principi
Base Closure and Realignment Commission
May 18, 2005

Hearing on Department of the Army Recommendations and Methodology

1. During his testimony, Under Secretary Wynne indicated that the Commission would receive the certified detailed data supporting the Secretary's recommendations sometime this week. Can you tell me whether those instructions were passed to the Army and when can we expect to receive this data that is critical to our analysis?

- As you know, the BRAC materials are undergoing Security Review, as directed by OSD. They are working as fast as possible, and expect to have the materials to you soon.

2. DOD's 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Report* identifies over 13,000 personnel as "undistributed or Overseas Reductions," associated with a category called "Germany, Korea, and Undistributed." The Commission needs to know what is planned for these troops. Who are they and where will they go? *(Volume 1, Part 1, Appendix C, BRAC 2005 Closure and Realignment Impacts by State, page C-28)

- Answer: Approximately 15,500 Soldiers will return from units inactivating in Europe and approximately 6,300 Soldiers will return from units inactivating in Korea.

- Type of European Units Inactivating and the number of Soldiers assigned:

Augmentation to various European-based Units 1350
Garrison / Base Support (98th and 104th Area Support Groups) 550
Theater Support Command (200th TSG) 660
Division Support Command (123d Main Support Battalion) 1125
Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Brigade Headquarters (69th ADA Brigade) 140
Corps-level Logistics (512th Maintenance Company) 470
Division and Corps-level Military Intelligence (101st Military Intelligence Battalion) 1150
Military Police (1st Military Police Company) 470
Brigade Reconnaissance Troops (F Troop, 1st Cavalry 150
Finance and Personnel (512th Personnel Services Battalion) 380
Divisional Signal Battalions (121st Signal Battalion) 954
Corps-level and Above Signal (43d Signal Battalion) 2150
Combat Support Hospital (67th Combat Support Hospital) 400
Various Medical, Dental, and Veterinary (30th Medical Brigade) 675
Infantry Battalion (4th Infantry Battalion (OPFOR)) 648
Corps and Divisional Artillery (27th Field Artillery Battalion) 1350
Corps and Divisional Engineer (16th Engineer Battalion) 1900
Corps and Divisional Aviation (501st Aviation Battalion) 1050

Type of Korean Units Inactivating and the number of Soldiers assigned:

Augmentation to various Korean-based Units 215
Garrison / Base Support (23d Area Support Group) 260
Theater Support Command (194th Ordnance Battalion) 310
Division Support Command (702d Main Support Battalion) 1120
Corps-level Logistics (595th Maintenance Company) 300
Division and Corps-level Military Intelligence (102d Military Intelligence Battalion) 330
Military Police (2d Military Police Company) 260
Finance and Personnel (177th Finance Battalion) 72
Corps-level and Above Signal (201st Signal Battalion) 960
Various Medical, Dental, and Veterinary (377th Medical Company) 135
Armor Battalion (72d Armor Battalion) 618
Corps and Divisional Artillery (37th Field Artillery Battalion) 1060
Corps and Divisional Engineer (2d Engineer Battalion) 500

Corps and Divisional Aviation (17th Aviation Brigade) 115

3. So many Army-related recommendations pertain to the reserve component activities where personnel changes are below the personnel threshold levels (i.e. 300 authorized civilians) where closure action under the BRAC law would be required. Why are you proposing these reserve component actions under BRAC when BRAC is not needed to authorize them? If we were to look closely at each of these reserve actions, how many of them actually save money?

- The Army is transforming and the Reserve Components are transforming along with the rest of the Army. Installations are the flagships upon which we build readiness and deployment capabilities.
- Therefore, it makes good business sense to include Reserve Component facilities in the BRAC analysis as part of a complete Army infrastructure review.
- The BRAC process has largely overlooked the small RC facilities in the past and subsequently missed a great opportunity to save resources that are badly needed to fund other RC high priorities that contribute to warfighting capabilities.
- Of the 44 RC recommendations, 16 generated NPV costs, which causes the payback period for all RC recommendations to be eight years.
- It is important to note that avoided costs, not captured in the COBRA model, would cause 12 of these 16 recommendations to have NPV savings.

4. Improved business practices. Are any of the proposed savings a result of improved business practices – that is, have you assumed savings because of improvements in the organization, processes, or available resources rather than closures or realignments? If so, please provide details on the improvements and methodology of calculating savings.

- Yes, the Army has assumed some savings because of improvements in the organization, processes, or available resources rather than closures or realignments. The Army's improved business practice savings mainly come in the efficiencies we generate when combining back offices. For example, we expect efficiencies that will generate personnel savings when we combine the back office functions of the Armor and Infantry Schools.
- The Army used standard manpower analysis to complete this work, coordinated with TRADOC for each of the school analyses to ensure we were both exhaustive in our search for savings, but prudent in the taking of those savings. The Army TABS Group also provided their approach document and model results to the Director of Army Manpower, who reviewed their approach and certified it.
- "The Army developed a detailed methodology for determining manpower savings when assessing Base Operations impacts, and when consolidating organizations. In

the absence of full manpower studies, I certify that the methods used by The Army Basing Study (TABS) Group are analytically sound and provide quality estimates of savings that are likely to be achievable during implementation of BRAC initiatives.”

SUGGESTED COMMISSION QUESTIONS

Process

1. Late removal of bases from Army-related BRAC lists. Can the Army bases disapproved for closure or realignment by DOD's Infrastructure Executive Committee (IEC) and the Army's Senior Review Group (SRG) late in the process-from mid-April forward- be identified for the Commission on a list that includes a brief statement of the reason for each action?

- Carlisle Barracks, PA - The IEC determined that the benefits of maintaining the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks outweighed the savings associated with relocating the College and closing Carlisle Barracks. Its proximity to Washington, DC provides access to national and international policy makers, enhancing the educational experience through involvement of key leaders in the curriculum. Carlisle has a State-of-the-Art Conference Center (supports Strategic Leadership studies and exercises) and Army Heritage and Education Center (contains 14 million historical items), both of which are central to the educational experience and would be very costly and difficult to replicate elsewhere. In the military judgment of the IEC, these benefits outweighed the savings associated with closing Carlisle Barracks.
- Soldier Systems Center (Natick, MA) - The IEC determined that the costs and manpower implications associated with closing Soldier Systems Center outweighed the benefits. Relocation/replication of the assets was very costly (Approx \$380M in one-time costs), and the investment took a long time to pay back (28 years).
- Adelphi (MD) - The IEC determined that the costs and manpower implications associated with closing Adelphi outweighed the benefits. Relocation/replication of the assets was very costly (Approx \$550M in one-time costs), and the investment took a long time to pay back (58 years).
- Pueblo Chemical Depot, (CO) – The Industrial JCSG withdrew the candidate recommendation that closed Pueblo Chemical Depot because they determined that the Chemical Munitions Demil mission could not be completed in time to support the closure IAW the BRAC 05 implementation period as specified in the legislation.

2. Leased Space. It appears that some of the moves out of leased space in the National Capitol Region (NCR) move the same activities into leased space at their new locations, such as the headquarters for Installation Management Agency (IMA) move to Ft Sam Houston. If this is the case, how does this support the initiative of moving out of leased space, and enhancing force protection? Aren't we just trading one landlord for another?

- In general the Army did not move any of its units from leased space to leased space.
- While moving out of leased space is a desirable end state, the Army objectives of gaining efficiencies in functions and creating joint opportunities for training and operations also drove Army analysis.

- Each unit and activity transferred out of leased space in the NCR has been placed to enhance its operational or support capability through consolidations or co-locations. In very few cases, that entailed movement to another leased location.
- We may take advantage of enhanced-use lease opportunities on federal locations. E.g., Fort Sam Houston when it is to our benefit, primarily to reduce cost and create force protection.
- The result of these hard decisions is a basing configuration that better supports our transforming Army, provides force protection and saves money.

3. BRAC restrictive guidance. Did OSD direct Army groups responsible for generating the BRAC list to remove or add any installation closures or realignments to the final BRAC list? If so, what installations?

- No. The Army worked closely with OSD and the JCSGs to generate the best possible package of recommendations. OSD did not direct any changes to the final list of Army recommendations.

4. Past BRAC rounds. Looking back at past BRAC rounds, did Army accomplish as much of its closure and realignment plan as was feasible or did unexpected circumstances limit implementation? What can this BRAC round do to better execute identified closures and realignments, to realize promised savings, and to accommodate community transition concerns?

- The Army has completed all closure and realignment actions from prior BRAC rounds, and these actions have resulted in \$945M in annual recurring savings.
- The most significant potential improvement in the process is to accelerate the closure and realignment actions as well as the environmental cleanup and property transfer. Delays in the process allow idle facilities to decline and may result in lost opportunities for redevelopment for the local communities. The Army is committed to the goal of accelerating BRAC 2005 implementation from 6 to 4 years. Communities should organize themselves to prepare a redevelopment plan as quickly as possible following Congressional approval of the final BRAC decisions.

5. US Government Agency inclusion on Army bases. What is the increase of use of Army bases by non-DOD US Government agencies resulting from this BRAC rebasing plan? Is there greater potential for use of Army bases by non-DOD US Government agencies and how would that be funded? Is there unsatisfied demand by non-DOD US Government agencies for use of Army bases?

- There is no increase in the use of Army bases by non-DOD US Government agencies resulting from this BRAC rebasing plan.
- The Army anticipates that other local, state and federal agencies may participate in these actions as part of the implementation process.
- Funding for the participation of non-DOD agencies would have to be determined as part of implementation negotiations.
- The unsatisfied demand will not be known until the excess and surplus screening is accomplished, soon after the recommendations have been approved.

6. Tracking of proposals. Yesterday's testimony mentioned that 845 locations are affected by the 222 recommendations. Why are there a number of realignments (gains, losses and disestablishment of capability) not listed in the formal listings by state or the complete list of indexed actions by state, but actions on those installations can be found within the narrative for each of the teams? (For example: Watervliet Arsenal, Lima Tank Plant, Tooele Army Depot, Sierra Army Depot.)

- The Joint Cross Service Groups, especially the Industrial Group, moved "workload" from one location to another, but did not move workforce; hence these actions do not constitute closures or realignments. The JCSGs believed that there was excess capacity across their function and that such workload moves could be accommodated as well as reduce excess capacity.

Force Structure

7. Relocating Guard and Reserve units to nearby Army installations The Commission appreciates the essential contribution to national defense and domestic emergencies made by our Guard and Reserve forces. Many Guard and Reserve units and personnel are currently located within 50 miles of Army installations, but nevertheless maintain separate bases and facilities. Not all Guard and Reserve locations that could move onto nearby Army installations are planning to do so even though many Army installations have space for them, improved security could result, and some Reserve Component basing costs could be reduced. Is there additional opportunity to relocate some Guard and Reserve units from separate bases to Army installations, and eliminate additional facilities?

- We do not have specific data regarding the impact on RC personnel that will result from relocations.
- The distances they must travel to the new sites are generally less than 50 miles which is the maximum distance permitted by Army policy for involuntarily relocating reserve personnel. Beyond a 50 mile radius, reservists are not required to relocate if their unit is moved.
- The 50 mile radius is considered a local commuting distance from one site to another.
- In all cases the Regional Readiness Commands (RCC) and states carefully considered this issue with particular emphasis on recruiting and retention demographics.
- One exception to this rule involves the transformation of U.S. Army Reserve RRCs from 10 to 4. In these cases, several units move more than 50 miles as the Army reorganizes its Army Reserve Command and Control structure.
- Reserve Component facilities are community based properties. As such, these centers and armories are postured to take advantage of recruiting and retention opportunities in the immediate vicinity. This is not always possible on a large installation and demographic studies support this.
- Where practicable, the Army moved RC units onto existing major installations to

leverage training opportunities, and to improve the quality of services and security for those units.

- There is significant additional opportunity to establish additional AFRCs. Time and modeling constraints limited how many recommendations could be developed for BRAC 2005. Only nine percent of the 4020 RC properties were included in this submission.

8. Guard & Reserve. Many of the Army's Reserve Component related recommendations are predicated on the ability to acquire land to construct new facilities, often adjacent to existing Guard facilities. What is the Army's estimate of land acquisition costs and are those costs reflected in their COBRA costs and savings calculations? How can the Commission be assured that the Army will be able to purchase needed land, and how is this an efficiency?

- The Army included a land acquisition cost estimate for each of the recommendations that require the construction of a new AFRC on a future property.
- The cost to acquire property varies greatly from one part of the country to another as you might expect. Land costs in some areas are as low as \$200K, while in other parts of the country they could approach \$2M.
- As part of the analysis, the State and Regional Readiness Command facility management officers identified potential sites that the Army could acquire for the new construction projects. The known costs to purchase those properties were incorporated into the cost/savings analysis.

9. Guard & Reserve. How does the Army expect to dispose of existing excess reserve property? To the extent that land sales are planned, does the Army have any projection of revenues from such sales?

- The Army will use all options available in the property disposal "tool box" to include the reserve property exchange (RPX) authority authorized by recent legislation at the reserve component properties. The Army will work closely with affected State Governors and TAGs in the case of National Guard facilities. The Army did not develop revenue projections as part of the BRAC basing study process, and will develop revenue projections as part of implementation and with the BRAC budgets.

10. State Adjutant's General involvement in BRAC decisions DOD testimony indicated that The Adjutant Generals (TAG) were involved in reserve component-related BRAC recommendations. Were TAGs in agreement with all BRAC recommendations affecting their states? Were there notable exceptions?

- Yes, all TAGs were in agreement with "Army Reserve Component recommendations affecting the ARNG in their states. Each participating State's Adjutant General, or their appointed representative, provided written concurrence to their proposals. There were no notable exceptions.
- We expect the State governors to agree with these proposals during the

implementation process.

11. Return of overseas units. DOD may not have indicated basing for all of the returning troops from Europe and Korea. How can the Commission be assured that a facility identified for realignment or closure might not later be needed? How can decisions about potential excess basing capacity be discussed without knowing all basing needs?

- The Army accounts for IGPBS unit requirements that are returning within BRAC related actions. The Army also accounts for the capacity required at those installations touched by IGPBS and modularity requirements that occur prior to the BRAC implementation period. Installations touched by IGPBS may require MILCON, but the installations that they impact have high value and training assets to accommodate unit requirements.
- The Army also accounted for those soldiers returning from overseas that are supporting the modular force structure by looking at aggregate Army requirements for 43 BCTs and maintaining surge capability for up to 48 BCTs.
- The Army has not recommended closure of any installation of sufficient size and composition to handle maneuver units which may return from overseas.

12. Unit Rebasing. The Army is currently moving many units from one base to another base under Army Modularity. Does the DOD BRAC report include these numbers? If not, why not? If not, how will these additional forces impact costs and the impact on base and community infrastructure?

- In 2003, the Army announced plans to activate and temporarily station ten Brigade Combat Teams as part of the Army's Modular Force Transformation. The Army considered all 10 BCTs and the various modular support units in its overall analysis.
- The Army validated the temporary stationing of five of these BCTs in its report.
- The other five are included in the Army's BRAC recommendations related to Ft Bliss, TX, Ft Bragg, NC, Ft Carson, CO, Ft Knox, KY, and Ft Riley, KS.
- The costs associated with the activation of these units and the impact on the installation and community are addressed in these recommendations.

13. Joint/Cross Service Installations. DOD has emphasized joint and cross-service criteria in its BRAC plans. To what extent will Army bases evolve from principally single-service bases to significant joint/cross-service use as a result of BRAC rebasing?

- Over the years, Army installations have evolved to host numerous joint and interagency organizations and functions.
 - Since 9/11, most Army installations have established cooperative relationships with a wide variety of local, state and federal agencies, mostly oriented toward supporting the training and command and control of first responders in times of emergencies.

- BRAC 2005 recommendations will accelerate this trend.
- Within the Reserve Component, there will be extensive joint/cross-service use of the proposed new facilities.
 - Of the 125 new facilities, 27 will be joint and 96 will be multi-component.
 - All of them will offer the opportunity for further joint and interagency participation during the implementation process.
- The opportunities within the Active Component are also significant.
 - Twenty Army installations will receive a variety of support functions from other services
 - Seven Army installations will combine installation management functions with other nearby installations from other services.

Cost

14. Army Materiel Command (AMC) & Leased Space. A theme affecting a number of AMC recommendations is to move AMC elements out of leased space, however it is not always clear how these moves result in consolidation and economic efficiencies: moving the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) from Ft. Monmouth to Aberdeen, MD; the Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) personnel located at Rock Island, IL to Detroit, MI, and AMC Headquarters personnel from Ft. Belvoir, VA to Huntsville, AL. It is unclear what the goal was. Since we do not yet have the Army details, please discuss your logic for these and other command moves.

- AMC Headquarters is currently in a leased, temporary building. Moving it to Redstone Arsenal allows it to gain synergy with one of its Major Subordinate Command Headquarters. This move also enables business process reengineering as back room operations will be integrated, and personnel requirements reduced.
- The move of the Tank Automotive & Armaments Command (TACOM) Integrated Materiel Management Center (IMMC) from Rock Island Arsenal consolidates an outlying IMMC with its parent IMMC, which is located at TACOM HQs, Detroit Arsenal.
- The key to these consolidations is the increase in effectiveness created from working together, the back office reductions created from sharing support activities, and the overhead efficiencies gained from closing installations.

15. Army budgeting to implement BRAC The Overseas Basing Commission indicated that the Army plan for basing of overseas units returning to the US may benefit from scheduling that allows time for the receiving US bases to more fully prepare the infrastructure needed to accommodate returning units. Required military infrastructure includes base housing, headquarters, training, and maintenance facilities; Civilian community infrastructure includes family housing, schools, roads, and diverse municipal services.

- a. Do Army BRAC implementation plans allow enough flexibility for gaining bases and

gaining communities to have the time and resources to prepare for the arrival of the planned additional personnel?

- The challenge to the Army is to balance operational requirements against the reality of time and the affordability of implementing the realignments recommended in BRAC 2005. The Army will develop implementation plans this summer and fall, pending final approval of recommendations that will integrate the return of the affected overseas components with related BRAC actions. Early and comprehensive planning with the installations and local communities will permit creation of flexible and effective implementation plans.

b. Do Army's plans address the losing community needs, as was suggested recently by DOD?

- The Army is prepared to work directly with affected local communities and in coordination with the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) as they assist the communities during the implementation of BRAC 2005. The Army will build on experience from the first four rounds and work to lessen the transition impact with accelerated BRAC implementation and property transfer.

c. Will the next budget request for Army include information that will lay out the budget and funding plan to match the BRAC basing plan so that Congress (the Armed Services and Defense Appropriations committees) and the impacted communities can see the matching of funds to BRAC moves?

- The DoD BRAC budgets are traditionally presented in alignment with the Commission closure and realignment actions.
- This organization displays the cost and savings associated with each specific Commission decision.
- For gaining installations that are affected by multiple actions, you would go to the corresponding closure and realignment actions to obtain the total impact. This multiple action scenario will occur at installations such as Fort Bliss.

d. Specifically, please speak to this at Ft Bliss where 11,000 additional troops will be quartered.

- While the Army recognizes that this will be a challenge, we believe that through proper scheduling of the unit moves and working closely with the community, using the tools of the Office of Economic Adjustment, we will be able to provide adequate support to the Soldiers and their families.

16. Activity (CRTA) and the Northern Warfare Training Center were moved from Ft Greely to Ft Wainwright. The training location did not change and remains at Bolio Lake for CRTA. The 2005 Army plan moves the CRTA back to Ft Greely. The cost for the 95 BRAC move was \$23.1 million with a savings of \$17.9 million. The 2005 proposal costs \$50,000 with a savings of \$200,000 yet the 2005 proposal appears to be a simple reversal of the 1995 decision. Could you comment on this? Will the Army lose some or all of the original planned \$17.9 million in savings?

- This recommendation relocates 5 employees of CRTA headquarters to Ft Greely to improve efficiency of operations and enhance personnel safety.
- This unit, although realigned under Ft. Wainwright in BRAC 95, is only 10 miles south of Ft Greely but 100 miles from Ft. Wainwright's cantonment area. This action would avoid a 200 mile round trip between quarters and work sites. Decreases the risks associated with the required year-round travel in extreme weather conditions.
- The savings of \$17.9M from BRAC 95 was a result of closing Fort Greely. After the closure, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) moved in to Ft Greely and turned it back in full operation as a missile launch site.
- The Army will not lose the savings from the BRAC 1995 realignment of Fort Greely since the 2005 recommendations build on the savings achieved in the prior round. The 2005 recommendation only moves the CRTA personnel back to Fort Greely which creates the efficiency of co-location and thus the additional savings.

Recommendation / Function Specific

17. Ft Monroe Closure. How do the moves to Ft Eustis and Ft Knox enhance military value? Does Ft Eustis have existing facilities comparable to those at Ft Monroe or will TRADOC and Installation Management Agency require new facilities?

- Both Ft. Knox (#12) & Ft. Eustis (#33) have higher Military Value than Ft. Monroe #68 and Ft. McPherson #51. Each installation has additional operational and training capabilities that enhance readiness and excess capacity to accommodate functions from other installations.
- Moves to Ft Eustis reduces excess capacity through consolidation; the move of NETCOM headquarters, TRADOC headquarters and IMA to Ft. Eustis consolidates the Northeastern and Southeastern commands into a single Eastern Command Center and reduces the distance between TRADOC to the Joint Forces Command headquarters. Together, these moves streamline military command and control capabilities
- The consolidation of the Army's Human Resources command to Ft. Knox (includes the collocation of Accession and Cadet Commands) creates a center of excellence for military personnel and the Army's recruiting functions.

18. Ft Monmouth Closure. Ft Monmouth is an acquisition and research installation. Is there concern that highly trained technology expertise will be lost in the move of these important Army functions?

- A total of 2,569 skilled employee positions will move from Ft Monmouth, NJ to Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD.

- The retention of the workforce is a factor in all BRAC closure recommendations. The loss of intellectual capital is expected in every move.

○ For example, in 1997, when the Aviation Research and Engineering Development Center, Aviation Management, and PEO Aviation (Aviation-Troop Command) were relocated from St Louis, MO, to form the Aviation and Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL, 26% of employees decided to stay in the St Louis area. 593 positions were needed to be filled after the move.

○ Team Redstone was fully aware of the personnel losses expected, planned for and executed a comprehensive hiring plan, and is today a successful Life Cycle Management Center (LCMC) for Aviation and Missile.

○ We expect that the new organization at APG will also plan, manage the transition and execute effectively.

19. Ft Gilliam and Ft McPherson Closures. Are the closures of Ft Gilliam and Ft McPherson independent? Ft McPherson is located on a major transportation hub. Is there concern about transportation access for FORSCOM after the move? Why would USARC not be relocated to a site with a large concentration of reserve component forces rather than Pope AFB?

- Yes, these closures are independent.
- No, there is no concern about transportation access for FORSCOM. FORSCOM will relocate to Pope / Fort Bragg and will have adequate transportation available to meet their needs.
- In the Army's judgment, USARC would be more effective with the units located at Pope / Fort Bragg, especially FORSCOM. Their mission is coordinating mission accomplishment with FORSCOM. Their value is not enhanced through relocation with a group of Reserve units.

20. Depot Maintenance & 50/50 The law requires that no more than 50 percent of a service's depot maintenance workload can be contracted out in order to retain a viable organic base to perform this work. What assurances can you provide us that implementation of your recommendations will not violate the "50/50" provision?

- The Industrial Joint Cross Service Group determined that there was excess capacity of 2.1million direct labor hours of work that Red River was doing which could be distributed among 4 other Depots (Tobyhanna Army Depot, Anniston Army Depot, Letterkenny Army Depot, and Marine Corps Logistics Base- Albany).
- Industrial JCSG also recommended that an additional 2.2 million direct labor hours of capacity for combat vehicles be established at Anniston Army Depot and 400,000 direct labor hours of tactical wheeled vehicle capacity be established at Letterkenny Army Depot.
- With this additional 2.6 million direct labor hours, the Army has sufficient capacity within its Depots to meet all known requirements and the capability to surge to meet unforeseen requirements, so there will be no need to contract out.

21. Depot Maintenance 50/50 reporting How will the service consolidation of intermediate and depot level maintenance activities affect the ability to accurately account for depot level maintenance under 50/50 reporting requirements?

- The Industrial JCSG did not combine Army intermediate sites (DOLs) with Depot maintenance. This will have no impact on 50/50 reporting

22. Red River Army Depot It is not surprising to see Red River Army Depot on the list given prior BRAC round discussions. The HMMMV is a critical Army vehicle that has been in short supply and you have leveraged Red River greatly to achieve some of your goals. How does your recommendation to close Red River impact Army operations, transformation to modularity, and the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy?

- The existing capacity post BRAC, with the addition of the 2.6 million direct labor hours of capacity being established at Anniston Army Depot and Letterkenny Army Depot, will ensure that the Army can meet our transformation to modularity and continue to meet our Tactical Wheeled Vehicle strategy.

23. Realign Pope AFB to Ft Bragg Given the Air Force's planned reduction in stationed airlift at Pope AFB after realignment, is the Army satisfied that sufficient airlift capability will exist at Pope to meet its increased training and operational requirements, resulting from the addition of an airborne brigade?

- The AF has committed to maintaining the capability to support Army mission requirements at Pope AFB, NC. They will not necessarily need to maintain it at Pope.

Environmental

24. Environmental Costs. The commission has been informed that the COBRA model does not include costs for environmental restoration. If so, are there any BRAC installations where such costs would be in excess of \$10 million? Please provide a complete list of these locations, with a description for each of the environmental problems and an estimate of the clean-up costs.

- This is correct, COBRA does not capture environmental restoration costs for closing installations, since the Department of Defense has a legal obligation to perform environmental restoration regardless of whether the base is closed, realigned, or remains open.

- Yes; there are some Active Army installations that have been proposed for closure under this BRAC round that have outstanding estimated restoration costs of greater than \$10 million. These installations and their reported FY03 environmental restoration costs are shown in following table.

Installation Reported FY03 Estimated Environmental Restoration Costs
(Millions)

Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant \$10.5

Fort Gillem \$18.0

Fort McPherson \$12.97

USAG Selfridge \$13.3

Hawthorne Army Depot \$382.2

Umatilla Chemical Depot \$10.3

Red River Army Depot \$49.1

Deseret Chemical Depot \$67.0

- After performing environmental surveys on closing installations, it is possible that additional installations may pass the \$10.0 million environmental remediation threshold.
- A majority of the listed installations have groundwater, surface water and soil contamination issues. In addition, the chemical depots and munitions plants will likely require additional decontamination to address significant explosives, chemical and heavy metal contamination.
- (If pressed) additional information on individual environmental requirements can be found at <http://aec.army.mil/usaec/cleanup>.

25. The reuse potential, and hence fair market value, of property will be affected if property is conveyed with institutional controls. For example, a deed restriction requiring fencing, signage, or limiting the reuse of the property to only specified activities.

We would appreciate it if you would discuss any sites that you are aware of where there will be prime property conveyed with institutional controls.

Could you please provide any additional or supplemental information for the record?

- The use of institutional controls at any specific installation will not be available until the Army assesses the environmental condition of the property and recommends restoration plans and environmental remedies in response to specific contamination. The Army plans to restore the property condition to support a like reuse scenario that is fully protective of human health and the environment, and to make decisions on alternative cleanup levels based on economics in coordination with the regulators and the local community.

Economic

26. Retiree medical access. Closure or downsizing of medical facilities can have a significant adverse effect on the local retiree community. The Commission has been informed that the COBRA model includes estimates of TRICARE costs. Has the Army determined if adequate health care will be available locally to fully meet the medical

needs of each retiree community?

- The Army considered the impact on TRICARE within the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) Model. The TRICARE algorithms were developed by the DOD medical community and were meant to address GAO criticisms concerning past BRAC, which had not considered the TRICARE impacts across their recommendations.
- Most importantly, the Medical JCSG specifically reviewed patient care utilization as a part of its BRAC analysis.

- The Army also reviewed the cumulative impact on each installation across all of the recommendations and asked members from the medical JCSG to attend all of these sessions to ensure the Army accounted for medical impacts.

- Finally, the Army also considered the availability of medical care within the local area of an installation in their Military Value analysis and their local area analysis.

- (Military Value attribute #29, medical care availability, measures the number of primary/specialty care providers available within the local area)

27. DOD/Army Assistance to Gaining Communities. Some communities that are gaining jobs are suggesting that DOD/Army help build transportation and other municipal infrastructure. What is DOD/Army policy on financially helping affected communities and can you identify in the budget associated money?

- As in prior rounds the Army will work with local communities to assess the transportation and socio-economic impact of BRAC decisions. To the extent that the BRAC decisions will adversely impact the local communities, the Army will fund improvements to mitigate these impacts. These improvements will become part of appropriate Defense budget requests during the BRAC implementation period FYs 06-11.

References:

Approved By:



Larry Wright

Date: 23-Jun-05