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Questions to be posed to the Secretary of the Army by the BRAC Commission on August 20, 2005

Intellectual Capital - Commissioner Bilbray

- On May 18th, during your initial testimony before the Commission, I asked you a question regarding the impact of a loss of intellectual capital upon the Army's ability to effectively execute its C4ISR mission. You stated that re-locating the C4ISR functions from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground (Aberdeen) could be managed, since those functions were "R&D" and "Strategic" in nature, and that accordingly, any disruption would have no tactical impact, even though you anticipated that only 26% of the affected employees would actually choose to move. On June 6th, we transmitted a written inquiry to DoD asking how the potential impact of the loss of intellectual capital was taken into consideration in formulating this recommendation. Inexplicably, the answer that we received on July 12th was "TBD" and we have *never* been provided with a response to that question, despite the fact that understanding the full impact of the intellectual capital issue upon the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth is absolutely essential. In fact, it is unclear to the Commission how DoD could have arrived at the conclusion to close Fort Monmouth and re-locate to Aberdeen without fully considering this issue. Why wasn't an answer provided to the Commission previously, in accordance with our request?
- The National Defense University (NDU) is the premier academic institution in DoD. It is NDU's opinion that this proposed move can be expected to result in the loss of about 75% of the affected technical personnel. It goes on to say that, since Aberdeen has no C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) expertise or culture, re-constituting the organization will take years, and that productivity in this key area will suffer, particularly during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Are you aware of this opinion .
- A previous BRAC move of the Electronic Test and Devices Laboratory from Fort Monmouth to Maryland resulted in only 10% of the personnel re-locating. Additionally, a similar move of a C4ISR activity from Vint Hill Farms Station, VA, when that post closed, to Fort Monmouth, resulted in even fewer personnel re-locating. A recently completed Harris poll of Fort Monmouth personnel indicates that a similarly small number will re-locate should this recommendation be approved. In your judgment, is there *any* percentage of personnel loss that would pose a significant risk of mission failure and loss of Warfighter lives?
- With regard to your testimony that the functions performed at Fort Monmouth are "R&D" and "Strategic" in nature, the Commission has learned that more than half of the Army's National Stock Numbered items in the field are sustained and managed by Fort Monmouth; that uninterrupted DoD satellite communications are dependant on the facilities there; and that they are meeting urgent requirements for C4ISR technology in the field (such as Firefinder, counter-

Improvised Explosive Device systems, Blue Force Tracking, etc.) and, most importantly, that those actions are saving Warfighters' lives *every day*. In fact, Fort Monmouth has a major tactical mission as well as a strategic one. In light of the fact that DA/DoD was evidently not aware of the significant tactical role played by Fort Monmouth, do you now agree that the proposed re-location would have an immediate tactical impact that will be exacerbated by the loss of intellectual capital cited by NDU and confirmed by both historical data and a recently completed survey of the affected workforce?

Unique Features at Fort Monmouth - Commissioner Bilbray

- We also submitted a written inquiry asking about unique features related to the Fort Monmouth installation that need to be considered in conjunction with this recommendation in order to fully assess the advantages and disadvantages of such a re-location. This question was prompted, among other things, by the extensive satellite communications facilities that we toured while visiting the installation. That question was also answered "TBD" and again, we have *never* been provided with a response. Are you prepared to answer that question today? Why wasn't an answer provided to the Commission previously, in accordance with our request?

Inaccurate Data - Commissioner Coyle

- Revised COBRA information has been developed indicating that the projected "pay back" period for recovering the DoD investment in this proposed re-location would extend for 44 years rather than the 6 years estimated by DoD. One portion of that DoD estimate was the \$21M identified as the costs of re-locating the United States Military Academy Preparatory School to West Point. We have since been provided with the military construction request generated by West Point in anticipation of the move, and it is clear that the costs, in fact, are at least 10 times higher than DoD projected. Please explain how DoD miscalculated that estimate so seriously.
- We have been informed that when Fort Monmouth reviewed the published DoD BRAC data, it noticed that the cost data associated with operating the post was significantly in error, and submitted revised certified data on July 12th. Although that data was received by DA, it was never forwarded to the Commission regardless of the fact that it resulted in a \$40M reduction in the previously calculated Fort Monmouth annual operating costs. Do you have any knowledge of this? If so, why was that information, or the impact thereof on the DoD recommendations, never provided to the Commission?
- The "Criteria 7 Evaluation Tool" used by DoD to assess the relative community infrastructures involved in the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth, shows a "Risk Evaluation" rating of "Low" for the proposed re-location. However, the Commission noted that, in the DoD demographics analysis underlying that tool, the population of Monmouth and Ocean Counties, NJ is listed as 11,262,127. In

fact, the population of those two counties is exactly 1/10th of that, and it appears, incredibly, that the DoD evaluators placed the decimal point in the wrong place. The result was that a key analytical data point was inflated by a factor of 10, and had the correct population figure been used, the entire risk evaluation rating would have been significantly changed. The Commission is also aware of another instance in this analysis where the same type of problem occurred (i.e., the student/teacher ratio in the Aberdeen region being identified as 1 teacher to every 1.2 students), leading to the inescapable conclusion that *all* of the data in this area is suspect. Accordingly, why shouldn't this recommendation be reconsidered?

Testing Capabilities and Facilities - Commissioner Coyle

- One of the stated principal rationales for this proposal was the perceived advantage of having RDA activities co-located with test and evaluation facilities. However, we have learned that there are few C4ISR test facilities at Aberdeen, and that the majority of the C4ISR test facilities used by Fort Monmouth activities are on the installation itself, nearby, at the Joint Base (Fort Dix, McGuire Air Force Base and Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station), or at other locations throughout the U.S., including the designated test site for the testing of electronic equipment, in Arizona. In light of that fact, how would the perceived advantage of co-locating RDA activities with their test facilities be achieved by re-locating the C4ISR activities from Fort Monmouth and Fort Belvoir to Aberdeen?
- When DoD made the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth and re-locate the C4ISR activities resident there to Aberdeen, were you aware that they maintained extensive test and evaluation facilities at the Joint Base engaged in Airborne Electronic Warfare/Unmanned Aerial Vehicle programs as well as the acclaimed "On-the -Move-Testbed", among others? Our understanding is that neither Fort Monmouth nor the Joint Base was ever asked about such presence in any data calls.

Inconsistencies in the BRAC Recommendations - Commissioner Coyle

- The C4ISR activities at Fort Monmouth seem to be unique among major DA RDA activities, in that all others appear to be remaining at their present "limited use" locations. Only the activities at Fort Monmouth and Fort Belvoir were targeted for re-location. Given that the site identified for that re-location has minimal C4ISR activities resident there, can you explain why these RDA activities were treated differently?
- DoD informed the Commission that the proposed re-locations of the Soldier Systems Center (SSC) from Natick, MA and the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) from Adelphi, MD to Aberdeen were rejected as being "too costly" and for unspecified "political reasons". Accordingly, it would appear that if the proposed re-location of the C4ISR activities from Fort Monmouth is, in fact, even more costly than that for SSC or ARL, that it would be DoD's position that that action

should similarly be rejected. What were the "political reasons" for the rejection of the recommendations involving ARL and SSC?

FORT MONMOUTH---BRAC FACT MATRIX

POINT	ARMY	ACTUAL FACTS	ANALYSIS
Intellectual Capital	Can live with losses; only R&D	80% loss anticipated; 10 year reconstitution unacceptable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Based on past BRAC moves Supported By NDU Analysis Harris Survey Confirms
Support for Operational Readiness (current war)	Not Considered	Critical current war and sustainment mission not recognized	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> War support impacted Readiness and Sustainment heavily impacted Modularity of current Army Force impacted
Program Disruption	Not Considered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> \$Billions in disruption of current & future force Disruption ripples to Army/Joint Systems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Critical programs analyzed Loss of expertise in BRAC window Disruption of any one program impacts others
Cost To Relocate	\$822M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> \$ 1.5B \$1.8B with/workforce reconstruction. Ft. Monmouth & BRAC data used 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> USMAPS Cost \$ 220M Lab Facilities Omitted Aviation Facilities Omitted
Recurring Savings	\$143M	\$74M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Used Incorrect Ft. Monmouth data Didn't consider reimbursable tenant & regional support costs
Payback	6 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 33 years 44 years w/workforce reconstitution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Validated By COBRA
Military Value	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Highest Mission Ranking from TJSCG Installation Ranking 50 of 97 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disregarded mission value of C4ISR Disregarded Installation Value of Joint Base and existing experiments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ft. Monmouth with Joint base equal to APG Highest C4ISR Mission Technical Military Value (undisputed)
Jointness	None	Current alignment with Joint Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Breaks Existing Joint Experiments Cannot be done at APG Opportunity to expand Joint Experimentation lost
RDA Consolidation	Accomplish at Aberdeen	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Already Exists at Ft. Monmouth No C4ISR Infrastructure & people at Aberdeen 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Considerable MILCON required R still at Adelphi Move bulk of RDA to location with no capability
RDAT&E Consolidation	Gain efficiencies at Aberdeen	C4ISR testing done at other Army designated sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> C4ISR testing done at Ft. Huachuca, Yuma Proving Grd, and Ft. Hood etc No capability for C4ISR testing at Aberdeen
Enclave Savings	N/A	Save \$20M/year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Avoid all closure costs and save BOS by consolidating with Joint Base