

NAVAL AIR STATION BRUNSWICK, MAINE

BRAC COMMISSION REGIONAL
FIELD HEARING
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
JULY 6, 2005




TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAB

1. Agenda: Brunswick Naval Air Station, BRAC Regional hearing, July 6, 2005, Boston, Massachusetts
2. Executive Summary
3. Senator Snowe's opening remarks/case review for the realignment of NAS Brunswick (*with supporting slides*)
4. Rear Admiral Rich's remarks on military judgement and operational issues
5. Senator Collin's remarks on the military value of NAS Brunswick (*with supporting slides*)
6. Senator Snowe's remarks on costs and cost savings (*with supporting slides*)
7. Representative Allen's remarks on the economic impact to the Maine Midcoast Region (*with supporting slides*)
8. Senator Snowe's closing remarks on the realignment of NAS Brunswick (*with supporting slides*)

AGENDA

**BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION
BRAC COMMISSION REGIONAL HEARING, JULY 6, 2005**

Boston Convention and Exhibition Center
415 Summer Street, Boston, MA

1. OPENING STATEMENT/CASE OVERVIEW - Senator Olympia J. Snowe

2. MILITARY VALUE/MISSION

A. RADM Harry Rich, United States Navy, Retired
Former Commander, Patrol Wings Atlantic

B. Senator Susan M. Collins

3. COSTS AND COST SAVINGS - Sen. Olympia J. Snowe

4. ECONOMIC IMPACT - Rep. Thomas H. Allen

5. CLOSING ARGUMENTS - Sen. Olympia J. Snowe

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Defense recommendation to realign elements at Naval Air Station Brunswick, specifically to remove the P-3 and C-130 aircraft squadrons and their supporting personnel, results from a failure to properly apply the Base Closure and Realignment Criteria. *Substantial Deviations from the Selection Criteria are listed below:*

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 1: Current/Future Missions & Operational Readiness

- Ignored Homeland Defense missions such as maritime domain awareness, maritime interdiction and proliferation security.
- Degrades readiness by requiring detachments from Jacksonville to perform missions which can only be performed from NAS Brunswick.
- Ignored introduction of Multi-Mission Aircraft.
- No data calls to evaluate joint war fighting capabilities.

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 2: Availability of Facilities

- Inadequately considers the only infrastructure available to support MMA: NAS Brunswick has only hangar capable of receiving the Boeing 737 MMA aircraft.
- Excess capacity would actually be exacerbated as the realignment of NAS Brunswick will increase hangar excess capacity due to the requirement to build additional MMA-capable hangars at NAS Jacksonville.

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 3: Contingency, Mobilization & Surge Capacity

- No data calls or scenarios conducted to evaluate ability to accommodate contingency or surge operations or training.
- Did not consider role of maritime patrol for Homeland Defense under NORTHCOM in seamless conjunction for operations and training with Guard and Reserve forces for Homeland Security (at NAS Brunswick's future Armed Forces Reserve Center).

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 4: Costs and Manpower Implications

- Failed to consider cost savings impact of MMA on personnel and facilities costs – result is inflated savings and shorter than achievable payback.
- Failed to account for higher mission costs due to the additional distances aircraft must fly to deploy/perform missions or transits.
- Failed to consider impact of fatigue life expenditure on P-3 aircraft due to the additional distances aircraft must fly to deploy/perform missions or transits.
- Failed to consider impacts of detachment and surge operations on personnel tempo.
- Failed to consider Naval Reserve demographics, e.g., VP-92 (reserve squadron) may be unable to achieve full manning at Jacksonville in the presence of other Reserve patrol and reconnaissance units.

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 5: Extent and Timing of Savings

- Failed to properly account for introduction of MMA impact on personnel and facilities costs. For example, over-estimated number of maintenance personnel eliminated under realignment scenario as MMA contractor will provide maintenance personnel - not Navy.
- Failed to analyze any scenario considering initial fleet introduction of MMA at NAS Brunswick instead of NAS Jacksonville thereby eliminating (and postponing other) MILCON and other requirements at Jacksonville.

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 6: Economic Impact

- Incorrectly placed NAS Brunswick in the Portland MSA, claiming an adverse economic impact of only 1.3% – grossly underestimating actual impact by a factor of eight.
- Calculated the economic impact based on the assumption that all 4,000+ military personnel at BNAS are active duty. Only 2,718 military positions at BNAS are active duty.
- Reduces total current active duty military in the region by 85%.

Testimony of
Senator Olympia J. Snowe
before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
on
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Opening Statement and Case Overview
July 6, 2005

Mr. Chairman and esteemed Members of the Commission, on behalf of the State of Maine, the Governor and its congressional delegation, I will now proceed to the case of Brunswick Naval Air Station.

As you know, Brunswick is the only fully operational, active-duty airfield in the Northeast United States. And yet, DoD proposes to move its mission – and the crucial protection it provides – over 1,200 miles away.

Single-siting of maritime patrol aircraft in this instance doesn't make sense – because geography matters, and strategic location is the primary attribute for operational bases such as Brunswick.

Over the next hour, we will address DoD's realignment recommendation, providing data and analysis that will lead to one inescapable conclusion – that realignment is no more the answer for Brunswick than full closure. Moreover, we will present evidence today that both refutes the Department's official realignment recommendation, and also demonstrates how and *why* DoD definitively took the issue of closure *off the table*.

SLIDE ONE

You will hear that, on ten separate occasions, officials including the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Commanders of Fleet Forces Command, and the

Northern Command spoke to Brunswick's military value...that, as the OSD's Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) concluded, "the total closure of NAS Brunswick would adversely impact Department of the Navy aviation operations in the Northeast United States."

In the end, it was NORTHCOM's recognition of Brunswick's strategic military value that persuaded the IEC to keep Brunswick open. That same rationale should have been a repudiation of single-siting of maritime patrol forces on the East Coast – and underscores the vital necessity of maintaining Brunswick as a fully active and operational Naval Air Station.

Indeed, the case we will present today will demonstrate that the Department of Defense recommendation to realign NAS Brunswick by removing the P-3 and C-130 aircraft squadrons and their supporting personnel, and relocating them to Jacksonville, Florida, results from a failure to properly apply the selection criteria.

Criterion 1

With regard to Criterion # 1 that speaks to capacity and readiness we will show at least four deviations.

SLIDE TWO

First, the recommendation ignores Brunswick's advantages for operations and training by the current Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft force, and will actually degrade our nation's readiness by requiring detachments from Jacksonville to perform missions which can only be performed from Brunswick.

Second, no data calls were made to evaluate the new criteria of joint war fighting capabilities. Indeed, the only gaining scenarios run were for aviation assets from Reserve Air Bases before Brunswick was considered for closure – and even *these* weren't revisited after the final decision to instead realign.

Third, as mentioned, in reviewing Navy meeting minutes, we find the strategic location of Brunswick was raised as a concern on at least *10 separate occasions*.

In fact, the Commander of the Northern Command concluded that closing Brunswick would negatively affect the Navy's ability to support Northern Command's homeland defense missions...and the Commander of the Navy's Fleet Forces Command has requested an operational airfield in the northeast under Navy control.

And finally, the Navy failed to assign Brunswick a Military Value score for its Strategic Location *despite* the fact that geography is a primary attribute of strategic value, *despite* DoD's recognition of Brunswick's strategic value, and *despite* the fact that, in August of 2004, the Navy Analysis Group was presented a list of recommended airfields that should be *assigned* military value scores for strategic location – *and Brunswick was on that list.*

Together, these and other facts we will cite demonstrate that the recommendation to realign Brunswick substantially deviates from Criterion One.

Criterion 2

With regard to Criterion # 2 -- the availability of facilities – we will show three primary deviations.

SLIDE THREE

First, DoD clearly ignored Brunswick's value as a base for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions, including those necessary to support maritime domain awareness, protect against the greatest threat against this country -- WMD attack -- and respond to other threats to the Northeast.

Second, the DoD failed to recognize that Brunswick is the only base with the infrastructure in place today to support the aircraft of the future – the Multi-Mission Maritime, or MMA, Aircraft. *Only* Brunswick has a hangar capable of receiving these aircraft.

And third, DoD overlooked the fact that realignment will only increase, not decrease, excess hangar capacity – with Jacksonville required to build the special MMA-capable hanger the Navy already built at Brunswick with an investment of \$34 million. And let me just note that, under a full *closure*, the Navy would still, of course, be required to duplicate existing infrastructure – *and* operate detachments for homeland defense from limited East Coast facilities.

Criterion 3

With regard to Criterion # 3 -

SLIDE FOUR

- ability to accommodate surge, we will show DoD conducted *no* data calls...ran *no* scenarios...to evaluate the total force requirements necessary to sustain that capability.

Moreover, DoD failed to recognize the potential advantages of joining MARITIME PATROL forces under NORTHCOM for homeland defense, with National Guard and Reserve forces at a future Armed Forces Reserve Center at Brunswick -- for the purposes of bolstering Homeland Security.

Criterion 4

With regard to Criterion # 4 -- the cost of operations and manpower implications -- we will demonstrate three primary deviations --

SLIDE FIVE

First, DoD failed to account for the higher mission costs attributable to the additional distances aircraft must fly to perform missions or transits which could be done more economically from NASB.

Second, DoD failed to consider the adverse personnel impact of this realignment on those performing detachment and surge operations from Brunswick.

And third, DoD failed to consider Naval Reserve demographics, which indicate that VP-92 will be unable to achieve full manning at Jacksonville in the presence of other Reserve Patrol and Reconnaissance squadrons.

Criterion 5

And on the related subject of Criterion # 5 -- the extent and timing of cost savings -- you will see at least three deviations.

SLIDE SIX

First, you will see DoD simply ignored the impending introduction of the MMA.

The DOD's recommendation to relocate Brunswick's aircraft and support personnel to Jacksonville completely overlooks the costs of transitioning from the P-3 aircraft to the MMA during the payback period.

As a result of these erroneous calculations, the Navy's net present savings claim of \$239 million is inflated – while the actual figure is \$56 million. Likewise, the Navy wrongly asserts a payback period of 4 years, when the reality is actually *9 years*.

Second, DoD seriously over-estimated the number of maintenance personnel eliminated under realignment. In fact, about 40% of those positions are already slated for elimination by the MMA program, and therefore cannot be counted as cost savings over the 20-year payback period.

And third, DoD failed to consider any scenario that would have assigned the MMA or other aviation assets to Brunswick. Such scenarios had the potential to eliminate the substantial MILCON that will be required at Jacksonville if this recommendation for realignment is approved.

Criterion 6

Finally, as regards Criterion # 6 --

SLIDE SEVEN

Economic impact -- you will hear how the Navy inaccurately placed Brunswick in the Portland Metropolitan Statistical Area versus an independent labor market of its own.

As a result, the economic impact from Brunswick's realignment is actually eight times greater than claimed by the Department for this rural region and the State of Maine – all the more stunning given that *two* Maine facilities on the recommendation list are merely 80 miles apart.

Conclusion

Chairman Principi, Commissioners, this will be the case you will hear over the next hour. We appreciate your kind attention and, with that, Rear Admiral Harry Rich, U.S. Navy retired, former Commander, Patrol Wings Atlantic, will speak in greater depth with regard to the issue of military value.

NAS Brunswick

Essential Strategic Asset - Valued by Senior Leadership

Secretary of the Navy

Chief of Naval Operations

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Commander, Northern Command

Commander, Fleet Forces Command

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

"This is a military value question more than anything else . . . we're really keeping a strategic capability in the Northeast. That's what it boils down to."

*--ADM Vern Clark
Testimony to BRAC Commission
May 17, 2005*

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 1: Current/Future Missions & Operational Readiness

- Ignores Brunswick advantages -- degrades readiness by requiring detachments from Jacksonville to perform missions which can only be performed from NASB.
- No data calls to evaluate joint war fighting capabilities.
- Ignores Brunswick's strategic location -- Homeland Defense missions such as maritime domain awareness, maritime interdiction and proliferation security suffer through realignment.
- No military value score for strategic location.

Ignores introduction of Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft.

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 2: Availability of Facilities

- Ignores Brunswick's military value for Homeland Defense.
- Inadequately considers the only infrastructure available to support MMA: NAS Brunswick has only hangar capable of receiving the Boeing 737 MMA aircraft.
- Excess capacity would actually be exacerbated as the realignment of NAS Brunswick will increase hangar excess capacity due to the requirement to build additional MMA-capable hangars at NAS Jacksonville.

Gaining scenarios were not revisited after DoD overturned closure scenario

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 3: Contingency, Mobilization & Surge Capacity

- No data calls or scenarios conducted to evaluate ability to accommodate contingency or surge operations or training.
- Did not consider role of maritime patrol for Homeland Defense under NORTHCOM in seamless conjunction for operations and training with Guard and Reserve forces for Homeland Security (at NASB's future Armed Forces Reserve Center).

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 4: Costs and Manpower Implications

- Failed to account for higher mission costs due to the additional distances aircraft must fly to deploy/perform missions or transits.
- Failed to consider impacts of detachment and surge operations on personnel tempo.
- Failed to consider Naval Reserve demographics, e.g., VP-92 (reserve squadron) may be unable to achieve full manning at Jacksonville in the presence of other Reserve patrol and reconnaissance units.

No consideration of cost savings impact of MMA on personnel and facilities costs – result is inflated savings and shorter than achievable payback.

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 5: Extent and Timing of Savings

- Failed to properly account for introduction of MMA impact on personnel and facilities costs.
- Failed to correctly estimate the number of maintenance personnel eliminated under realignment scenario; MMA contractor will provide maintenance personnel - not Navy.
- Failed to analyze any scenario considering initial fleet introduction of MMA at NAS Brunswick instead of NAS Jacksonville thereby eliminating (and postponing other) MILCON and other requirements at Jacksonville.

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 6: Economic Impact

- Incorrectly placed NAS Brunswick in the Portland MSA, claiming an adverse economic impact of only 1.3% – grossly underestimating actual impact by a factor of eight.

Incorrectly calculated the economic impact based on the assumption that all 4,000+ military personnel at BNAS are active duty. Only 2,718 military positions at BNAS are active duty.

Reduces total current active duty military in the region by 85%

Testimony of

**Rear Admiral Harry Rich
United States Navy, Retired
Former Commander, Patrol Wings Atlantic Fleet**

**Before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
On**

Naval Air Station, Brunswick

Military Judgment and Operational Issues

July 6, 2005

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, ladies and gentlemen,

My role in today's hearing is to address the operational issues that are of concern if NAS Brunswick is realigned as proposed by DOD.

I have selected four issues that would be of great concern to me if I were the operational commander. I will briefly discuss each of them.

I have assumed that the role of the Atlantic Fleet long range Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, as part of DOD's Homeland Defense mission, will be to defend our Atlantic coast, all 32 thousand miles of it, in concert with the U.S. Coast Guard, against terrorist's attempts to deliver weapons of mass destruction into our highly vulnerable ports. As we are all painfully aware, that mission came into sharp focus on 9-11.

To execute that mission will require ocean surveillance around the clock out to 1000 miles. It can be expected that the concentration of targets will be in the North Atlantic shipping lanes.

In mission planning enroute time to the target area is a critical factor. Enroute time from Brunswick, for the P-3, to the shipping lanes is less than 30 minutes. From Jacksonville it's

three hours. To me as the operational commander that would be unacceptable if there is a viable alternative. And there is! I would immediately move the planes back to Brunswick. Which begs the question: "Why move them in the first place?"

Operational commanders can be expected to require 24-hour manned aircraft coverage on targets of special interest. Using a mission profile of 12 hours, which is generally accepted as maximum for the P-3, the crew can go out 1000 miles in about 3 hours, stay on station six hours and return to base. Total flight time 12 hours. From Jacksonville that profile fits; three hours to the shipping lanes, six hours on station and three hours home. That requires 4 flights per day to provide 24-hour coverage. That's 48 flight hours at a cost of just under \$8000 per flight hour (\$7,876). From Brunswick that same coverage would be achieved with just over two sorties per day, about 25 flight hours, or roughly half the cost of staging from Jacksonville.

Rapid response has been the hallmark of VP squadrons for more than 50 years. Urgent deployments to the Mediterranean or Middle East are not uncommon and it would take at least three hours longer from Jacksonville than from Brunswick. The added cost would be 25-30 thousand dollars per aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, it's somewhat ironic that during your recent visit to NAS Brunswick there were two Jacksonville based P-3s sitting on the ramp. They were enroute home from Sigonella in the Mediterranean and were forced to stop at Brunswick to refuel.

Having dual runways available may seem like a minor factor, but let me assure you it's not if you are forced to land on a taxiway because of a crash on the active runway; or even repaving as happened at Sigonella. NAS Brunswick has parallel 8000 ft. Runways that have recently been resurfaced. If one becomes unusable for any reason, operations can continue uninterrupted.

Finally, I would be very concerned about unnecessarily using up the precious service life remaining in our fleet of P-3s. As the CNO, Admiral Clark, recently stated at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, "... because of high demand, we are flying the wings off the P-3s. Two years ago we had 220 P-3s in the navy inventory. We've been forced to retire 70 in the last 18 months. They reached the end of their service life and were no longer considered safe to fly. The 150 remaining must be made to last until the MMA, the follow-on aircraft, becomes operational in 2012 at the earliest. Unless we restrict flying in non-wartime environments and eliminate every transit and enroute hour possible, the P-3 may not make it to the transition window. Because of the increased flight hours inherent in DOD's plan for NAS Brunswick, realignment will only exacerbate this problem.

Mr. Chairman, as you've heard me say before, a strategy to protect our extensive coastal borders is key to homeland defense, and, as you know, that strategy is just evolving. If the role of the Atlantic Fleet Maritime Patrol Force is as I have postulated, then a fully capable, operational air station strategically located in the Northeast with permanently assigned long range Maritime Patrol Aircraft is absolutely critical to success.

There is only one left and DOD proposes to essentially put NAS Brunswick in mothballs and single site all six Atlantic Fleet VP squadrons 1000 miles to the south.

Mr. Chairman, members of the commission, it's probably a gross understatement, but I have great difficulty understanding the logic in such a move.

Thank you.

RADM Harry Rich USN (Ret)

Former Commander Patrol Wings

Atlantic Fleet

Testimony of

Senator Susan M. Collins

**before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
on**

Naval Air Station, Brunswick

**Military Value and Mission
July 6, 2005**

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners. I am Senator Susan Collins.

DoD's first BRAC criterion focuses on current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force. This includes the impact on joint warfighting, training and readiness.

(show disappearing bases slide)

Brunswick is the only fully capable operational DoD airfield remaining north of New Jersey. Previous BRAC rounds closed all other active duty air bases in the Northeast, as this slide demonstrates.

(pause for slide)

Brunswick is strategically located adjacent to the great circle routes for ships and aircraft crossing the North Atlantic. This location makes Brunswick a vital link in our national defense posture and critical for surveillance of ships coming from Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

(show slide)

Indeed, its proximity to major population centers, combined with its ability to support every aircraft in the DoD inventory, makes BNAS essential across the full range of homeland defense operations and contingencies.

Brunswick's unique location provides it with *correspondingly unique capabilities* for current and future operations in the defense of our homeland. Brunswick was a key base for homeland defense during the months following September 11th, providing P-3 surveillance missions under Operation Vigilant Shield, and land-based combat air patrol for Navy ships at sea.

And only Brunswick Naval Air Station can perform such missions efficiently in the future. Maritime patrol assets from Brunswick will continue to be needed to locate and monitor ships in the North Atlantic, including those potentially carrying weapons of mass destruction, cruise missiles, or other threats to our shores.

(show MPA coverage area slide)

Maritime Domain Awareness is a key component of homeland defense. Properly based Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft, or "MPRA," is essential to this increasingly important mission.

As Rear Admiral Rich has pointed out, response time and endurance on-station are critical in MPRA operations, and the location of a maritime patrol aircraft base is critical to those capabilities. The removal of full-time, operationally ready maritime patrol assets from the northeast is contrary to the very concept of Maritime Domain Awareness and would leave our nation vulnerable.

Removal of these aircraft would *degrade readiness* by requiring detachments from Jacksonville, Florida, to perform missions that can be performed much more efficiently and effectively from Brunswick. It is a move that would increase the risk of failure in the defense of our homeland, a mission in which even a single failure could be catastrophic.

A review of the Navy's analysis group minutes proves that the strategic location of Brunswick was confirmed by warfighting commands no fewer than ten separate times during the deliberations. The Commander of Fleet Forces and the Commander of Northern Command repeatedly voiced grave concerns to the Navy about the potential loss of Brunswick to their warfighting readiness.

These commanders also said that the closure of Brunswick would damage the Navy's ability to support Northern Command's homeland defense missions. Removal of Brunswick's air assets would have the same negative effects on this mission as would closure.

The minutes show that the military value of individual facilities was determined early in the BRAC review process. In August 2004, the Navy's infrastructure team presented the Navy analysis group with a list of 33 airfields that should be assigned military value scores for strategic location. Brunswick Naval Air Station was on that list.

(show slide)

Yet, the Navy determined that only two airfields would receive scores for strategic location. The fact that Brunswick was not given any credit for its strategic location after two commanders weighed in no fewer than ten times about the strategic value of Brunswick's location is inexplicable.

(show slide) The minutes of a January 2005 Navy analysis group meeting show that discussions were held on whether a scenario to close Brunswick was desirable, quote,

“in light of the fact that Brunswick is the last active-duty DoD air base in New England and is relatively un-encroached, the significant capital investment in facilities there, the requirement for a homeland defense capability in this region, and the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent.”

Despite these concerns and those of our operational commanders, the Navy still forwarded to the Infrastructure Executive Council a recommendation to close Brunswick. As far as we can determine from a review of the minutes, the overriding factor that led the Navy to ignore the many advantages of Brunswick was a goal to locate maritime patrol aircraft at a single site on the East Coast. Yet, the Commander of Fleet Forces warned that: (show slide)

“Closure of NAS Brunswick supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3/MMA force at the unacceptable expense of *closing a base offering numerous transformational and maritime Homeland Defense basing opportunities.*”¹

The IEC subsequently rejected the recommendation to close Brunswick because, and I quote again, “Department of Navy leadership expressed concern that closure of NAS Brunswick could have strategic implications regarding Northern Command’s homeland defense strategy and would result in the loss of the only Naval aviation footprint in New England.”²

¹ Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team MEMORANDUM FOR THE DON ANALYSIS GROUP, 7 Feb 2005 (N-RP-0432), Enclosure 8, Slide 11

² Report of DAG Deliberations of 8 February 2005 (N-RP-501), Page 11.

Commissioners, this statement recognizes that Brunswick is not just a training site or staging area. It is an operational airfield in the defense of our nation.

The Navy's recommendation to close Brunswick was overturned by the Council due to the base's overwhelming strategic military value. This determination should have triggered the reconsideration of single-siting maritime patrol forces on the East Coast. Yet, we can find no evidence that this occurred. The first measure of military value – the impact on mission capabilities and operational readiness --was ignored.

The second BRAC criterion measures military value by considering the availability and condition of a base's land, facilities, and associated airspace. This is what the Navy's Infrastructure Analysis Team stated on January 11, 2005, concerning the infrastructure at Brunswick (show slide):

- “NASB, the last active duty DOD airfield in New England, is available 24/7, 365, and offers unique Joint /NATO strategic, physical, and training assets.
- NASB is strategically located to base maritime homeland defense missions.
- Of note, NASB has no encroachment issues, nearly 1,000 acres available for expansion, 63,000 square miles of unencumbered training airspace, and nearly 12,000 Navy-owned mountainous acres capable of accommodating joint exercises and meeting all Navy / Marine Corps Atlantic Fleet Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training requirements at a single site.
- Armed aircraft can depart NASB and enter offshore operating areas without over-flying populated areas.”

Brunswick Naval Air Station is in first-class condition, with more than \$120 million in recapitalization and military construction during the past five years. As a result of this investment, DoD has, in effect, an all-new airfield at Brunswick.

(show slide)

With its side-by-side 8,000-foot runways, there are literally no aircraft in the DoD's current or future inventory that Brunswick cannot support either in a transient role or permanent assignment.

(show slide)

Other investments included: (show slide)

- Hangar 6 - Six Bays
- Runway Recapitalization
- Ramp & Taxiway Repairs
- Aircraft Control Tower
- Family Housing, Phases I, II & III
- Transient Quarters
- Relocated Base Entrance

NATO has recognized the importance of Brunswick to its operational capability, and backed up that recognition with significant investment in the base's facilities. The station's NATO-built fuel farm regularly supports all types of foreign aircraft. Its state-of-the-art Tactical Support Center, also NATO-funded, provides essential command and control for operational and exercise flights by U.S. and NATO maritime patrol aircraft. (show slide)

Of great significance, as has been mentioned, is the fact that Brunswick has the only hangar capable of hosting the MMA aircraft, which is scheduled to replace the P-3 starting in 2012. This hangar was specifically designed to support the MMA and its related unmanned aerial vehicles.

The recommendation to realign Brunswick significantly deviated from BRAC selection criterion two by inadequately considering the value of this brand-new infrastructure. Under realignment, additional MMA-capable hangars would need to be constructed in Jacksonville. Rather than reduce excess capacity, this realignment would increase it and require significant military construction costs.

As home to the four active duty squadrons, Brunswick provides basing and support essential to the entire Maritime Patrol Aircraft force under the Navy's new Fleet Response / Flexible Deployment concept.

This concept increases the proportion of MPRA aircraft and crews at bases in the United States, and requires them to maintain a high state of readiness for immediate surge deployments to overseas bases. The Station's simulator capacity is essential to meet the training needs of the fleet's P-3 crews. I would note that the simulators at Jacksonville are already at maximum utilization now.

Brunswick's facilities, unencumbered airspace, and location at the nearest point in the United States to Europe and the Middle East provide the capabilities to support the Fleet Response concept. The conditions of criterion two are fully met by Brunswick Naval Air Station, but not properly recognized by this realignment proposal.

The third BRAC criterion is the ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future force requirements.

(show slide)

Brunswick's role during *Operation Iraqi Freedom* clearly demonstrates its ability to accommodate mobilization and surge requirements. Brunswick is the preferred refueling stop for tactical jet and turboprop aircraft crossing the Atlantic Ocean. The base hosted or provided logistical support for more than 120 aircraft returning from Middle East operations.

Brunswick also provided berthing for more than 850 DoD personnel returning from Iraq to the U.S. through Brunswick. The base's ramp space is sufficient to park more than 250 maritime patrol or other large aircraft under maximum surge conditions.

Additionally, as the northeasternmost base in the United States, Brunswick supports mobilization efforts every day. Naval Air Station Brunswick is the closest U.S military airfield to the current theater of operations.

Despite all the talk of transformation and jointness during this BRAC round, it is remarkable that the Navy did not ask in even one data call whether Brunswick could expand its current missions to more fully utilize the Air Station's capacity. The only gaining scenarios run were for aviation assets from reserve air bases before Brunswick was considered for closure. This option was not even revisited after the final decision was made to realign, rather than close, Brunswick.

Clearly, the Navy and the OSD missed a tremendous opportunity to strengthen U.S. military capabilities by not placing other operational forces at Brunswick to fulfill current and


future total force requirements that meet contingency, mobilization, surge operations, and training missions.

A realignment of Brunswick Naval Air Station to a Naval Air Facility eviscerates the military value of Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance assets by removing them from *a superb facility in a critical theater of operations*. It would require future detachments – from one U.S. base to another – to meet mission requirements.

The removal of Brunswick's aircraft would significantly and dangerously degrade operational readiness. It would reduce response time in times of crisis. This proposed realignment would not meet the needs of Northern Command's homeland defense missions. It would result in a Navy and a Department of Defense that will operate less effectively and efficiently, and with many hidden costs.


Taken together, the first three criteria I have discussed are a measure of the most crucial elements of military value, now and in the future. By any fair and complete assessment, Brunswick Naval Air Station measures up. It must remain fully operational.

Senator Snowe is our next speaker.



1988

© 1988, 1997 Microsoft and/or its suppliers. All rights reserved.




2005


McGuffe AFB

NAS Brunswick

© 1998-1997 Microsoft and/or its suppliers. All rights reserved.

NAS Brunswick's Strategic Importance





**CURRENT MPA
COVERAGE AREA**

Mercator Projection
Radius of all circles = 1000 NM

Brunswick: Homeland Defense Requirement


19. The DAG further discussed whether this scenario is desirable in light of the fact that NAS Brunswick is the last active-duty DOD air base in New England and is relatively unencroached, the significant capital investment in facilities there, the requirement for a homeland defense capability in this region, and the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent. The DAG concluded that the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent. The DAG concluded that the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent. The DAG concluded that the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent.

Deliberative Document - For Discussion Purposes Only - Do Not Distribute

8

"Brunswick is the last active-duty DoD air base in New England and is relatively un-encroached, the significant capital investment in facilities there, the requirement for a homeland defense capability in this region, and the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent."

Brunswick: Unacceptable Expense if Closed



Department of the Navy
Infrastructure Analysis Team

Scenario Issues

- CFFC

Description: This scenario relocates all VP squadrons, VPU-1 and VR-62 (Reserve C-130) squadron to NAS Jacksonville and closes NAS Brunswick. It also results in the closure of the SERE School at Rangley and relocates that training function to the Norfolk Fleet Concentration Area. Due to operational synergies derived from basing aircraft with other similar type/modell/series aircraft VP-62 is recommended to be based at NAS JRB Willow Grove vice NAS Jacksonville. Extensive construction is required at NAS Jacksonville to support this scenario as well as construction and land acquisition of approximately 6000 acres to support the relocated SERE training in the vicinity of Norfolk. This scenario eliminates the last active duty DOD base in New England. NAS Brunswick is strategically located to support Homeland Security Missions. Amplification of impacts to Strategic Missions is being provided via SPOC via SIPRNET. The closure of NASB supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3/MMA force at the unacceptable expense of a base offering numerous transformational and maritime Homeland Security basing opportunities. This scenario also removes any future transformational flexibility options at NAS Jacksonville as all remaining build-able acres are now being committed.

Draft Deliverable Document - For Discussion Purposes Only - Do Not Release Under FOIA

11

“Closure of NAS Brunswick supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3/MMA force at the unacceptable expense of closing a base offering numerous transformational and maritime Homeland Defense basing opportunities. This scenario also removes any future transformational flexibility options at NAS Jacksonville as all remaining build-able acres are now being committed.”

Report of DAG Decisions of 11 January 2005 (N-RP-0432), Page 147.

Brunswick: Only Naval Aviation Footprint in New England


25. CDR Deputy presented updated COBRA results for scenario DON-0133, which would close NAS Brunswick, ME, and relocate naval aviation and non-naval aviation assets to numerous receiver sites. Enclosure (6) pertains. Ms. Davis informed the DAG that DON senior leadership has expressed concern that closure of NAS Brunswick could have strategic implications regarding U.S. Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) homeland defense strategy and would result in the loss of the only Naval aviation footprint in New England. The DAG directed the IAT to examine BRAC 2005 options other than the current plan. She stated that the IAT Operations Group is currently examining alternative scenarios to realign operations. She explained that a realignment scenario would involve moving Brunswick into a Naval Air Facility (NAF) at Jacksonville, FL, and relocating naval aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville. This would require the relocation of aviation assets and necessary ROS personnel to Jacksonville and maintaining the operational capability of the Jacksonville airfield. She further explained that a deactivated Jacksonville airfield would relocate all aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville and retain a caretaker workforce. Ms. Davis also reminded the DAG that the IEG, at its 27 January 2005 deliberative session, directed the DAG to consult with the Air Force concerning possible relocation of the Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group

Deliberative Document - For Discussion Purposes Only - Do Not Release Under FOIA
- 11 -

Department of Navy leadership expressed concern that closure of NAS Brunswick could have strategic implications regarding U.S. Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) homeland defense strategy and would result in the loss of the only Naval aviation footprint in New England

Brunswick:

Navy Highlights Military Value




"NASB, the last active duty DOD airfield in New England, is available 24/7, 365 and offers unique Joint/NATO strategic, physical, and training assets"

"NASB is strategically located to base maritime homeland defense missions"

"Of note, NASB has no encroachment issues, nearly 1,000 acres available for expansion, 63,000 square miles of unencumbered training airspace, and nearly 12,000 Navy-owned mountainous acres capable of accommodating joint exercises and meeting all Navy/Marine Corps Atlantic Fleet SERE training requirements at a single site."

"Armed aircraft can depart NASB and enter offshore operating areas without over-flying inhabited areas."

Dual Runways



Recent Recapitalization

Hangar 6 - Six bays (\$33.9M, completed FY 05)

Runway Recapitalization (\$10.7M, FY 01-05)

Ramp & Taxiway Repairs (\$8.7M, FY 03)

Aircraft Control Tower (\$8.2M, FY 05)

Family Housing - Phases I, II & III - 220 Homes (\$33.4M, FY 01-05)

Transient Quarters (\$17.7M, FY 04)

Re-Located Base Entrance (\$1.65M, FY 04)

Separate Truck & Vendor Entrance (\$1.3 M, FY 04)

Small-Arms-Range (\$940K, FY 05)


MWD Kennel (\$346K, FY 05)

40 Natural Gas Boilers (\$7.0M, FY 05)

NATO Fuel Farm



Hangar 6



**Brunswick Hosts 123 Aircraft
Returning from Middle East
Operations**

66 F/A-18

6 C-40

32 A/V-8

2 C-9

17 C-130

Testimony of
Sen. Olympia J. Snowe
before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
on
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Costs and Cost Savings
July 6, 2005

Good afternoon.

As I said earlier, the Navy's justification for the realignment of Naval Air Station, Brunswick is based solely on reducing operating costs while single-siting the **East Coast Maritime Patrol community** at Naval Air Station Jacksonville.

The Navy proposes to accomplish these cost savings primarily by merging depot and intermediate maintenance activities thus **“reducing the number of maintenance levels and streamlining the way maintenance is accomplished with associated significant cost reductions.”**

Today we intend to demonstrate that the cost savings put forward by the Navy are erroneous and built upon assumptions that can not withstand even rudimentary scrutiny.

We will highlight how the Navy's analysis process led to overstated personnel savings, ignored mission costs and understated military construction which led to a flawed conclusion - that realignment of NAS Brunswick was fiscally viable.

While the Navy's recommendation postulates that a one-time investment of \$147.6 million will result in a 20-year savings of \$239 million with an expected 4-year payback, we will show a significantly different outcome: a 9-year payback and a 20-year savings of only \$56 million.

Are we willing to sacrifice the unique strategic advantage that NAS Brunswick offers in securing our homeland in order to save a theoretical \$2.8 million annually? This is an extremely small margin to support a decision with such far-reaching national security implications.

Our analysis is based on the work of **Mr. Ed Anderson** whom many of you met during your visit to Brunswick.

He is a senior aviation economics consultant and former P-3 pilot who works for one of America's foremost aviation industry analysis firms who has setup and run the COBRA model to measure the cost impact of identified errors in the data and methodology.

In deconstructing the COBRA scenario report and data calls, he identified errors that raise serious concerns about the validity of the DOD case for realigning NAS Brunswick.

The errors were primarily due to basing the cost analysis solely on the P-3 without accounting for planned reduction in support requirements due to the MMA program...

Failure to account for increased mission costs; military construction cost avoidances at NAS Brunswick...

And unrealistic assumptions concerning the timing of military construction at NAS Jacksonville and ability to accommodate Brunswick squadrons according to the proposed schedule.

First, the Navy's most significant error was to base their 20-year cost analysis solely on the P-3C aircraft, while ignoring the fact that the Navy plans to begin phasing out the P-3 in 2012, replacing them with a smaller fleet of contractor-maintained Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft or MMA, a key element in the Navy's 20-year Force Structure Plan.

This is precisely where the Navy's cost savings argument begins to unravel because the entire financial case for single-siting East Coast P-3s rests on the hypothetical elimination of 403 personnel by 2011 and continuing through the remaining 20 years of the projection.

SLIDE ONE

This “straight-line projection” of personnel savings is fundamentally flawed because 157 of those personnel will be replaced by Boeing as part of the **Contractor Logistic Support or CLS program** that was part of the justification for replacing the P-3 with the MMA. The CLS program will also result in the reduction of facilities for which the Navy has claimed savings under BRAC.

These errors alone result in an understatement of recurring costs by \$14.2 million annually.

SLIDE TWO

Second, the Navy’s analysis completely ignores the substantial increase in mission costs that will result from basing Maritime Patrol Aircraft at Jacksonville rather than Brunswick.

Given that it is 1200 miles from NAS Jacksonville to NAS Brunswick and, by extension, that much further to P-3 deployment sites, operational areas and exercise areas, the increased flying time for every sortie is 4 to 7 hours per round trip at a cost of about \$8,000 per flight hour.

For example, a single round trip to **Sigonella, Italy** or the **Mideast** will cost an additional \$55,000 in the P-3 and an estimated \$37,000 for the MMA. This error alone results in an understatement of Mission Costs by \$2.5 million annually.

Also closely tied to the increased mission costs of flying from NAS Jacksonville rather than NAS Brunswick are the simple fact of life costs of moving the squadrons to NAS Jacksonville. As we conducted our analysis, again, we found the Navy, while meticulous in some details, missed the big picture in others.

For example, their analysis calculates the costs of moving people, vehicles, household goods, and so forth to Florida.

However, it makes no allowance for the cost of relocating the aircraft, nor does it make any allowance for the numerous liaison flights that will take place between Brunswick and Jacksonville before and after the move.

Since it costs over \$27,500 to fly each P 3 the 1200 miles from Brunswick to Jacksonville, even if the squadrons move during deployment, they will have to fly an additional three hours or so to reach NAS Jacksonville. This oversight results in an understatement of one-time moving costs by \$2.6 million.

The **third** area in which we found the Navy's analysis faulty was in their overstatement of military construction cost avoidances at NAS Brunswick. Navy analysts claimed \$6.7 million in savings due to the cancellation of Hangar 1 demolition efforts and the cancellation of the weapons magazine replacement project.

These credits are incorrectly applied to the realignment scenario because should NAS Brunswick be converted to an active Naval Air Facility, it would still be necessary to demolish Hangar 1 and it would still be necessary to complete the **Weapons Magazine Replacement** in order to support future detachments of operational aircraft.

Under the realignment scenario, the Navy should not claim these savings and therefore understated military construction costs by \$6.7 million.

Finally, the Navy also failed to properly consider the timing and phasing of military construction projects at NAS Jacksonville.

We found a note in the **Patrol Wing Five realignment scenario data call** that indicated the first NAS Brunswick based squadron would relocate in 2009 upon completion of hangar military construction.

But the same scenario shows that military construction in Jacksonville could not possibly be completed by then because the space for hangars and ramps will still be occupied by active duty S-3 squadrons.

The Navy's analysis also wrongly assumes that NAS Jacksonville would be able to accommodate 50% of Brunswick's squadrons when military construction is half complete. It just doesn't work that way – you can't put aircraft, or people, into a half-finished hangar. No squadron relocation can take place until all military construction is complete.

This argument is supported by language submitted by NAS Jacksonville in response to the realignment scenario data call:

SLIDE THREE

“NAS Jacksonville has no available hangar space suitable to house the types of aircraft that are relocating. Per latest Naval Facilities Command planning criteria, each relocating squadron is entitled to one Type II hangar module. Quantity is based on a total of five modules.”

SLIDE FOUR

“The S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years, thus freeing up these hangars for demolition. Due to the size of the hangars, they are not suitable to accommodate any of the squadrons and aircraft proposed for relocation.”

SLIDE FIVE

“Child Street, a major traffic artery on NAS Jacksonville, must be relocated. Unless Child Street is relocated, there is insufficient area available to construct the required hangar and parking apron.”

Given that the Navy proposes to spend \$119 million to build *additional* hangar modules for the Brunswick squadrons, the realignment of NAS Brunswick actually increases naval aviation excess capacity.

Relocating NAS Brunswick aircraft squadrons and personnel requires military construction of hangars and ramp space to accommodate not only the near-term arrival of the MMA, but also to meet shortfalls in hangar space for the additional NAS Brunswick P-3 squadrons thereby increasing the number of overall hangar modules.

But the Navy also failed to account for the “Type III” MMA-capable hangars in the Navy's capacity analysis.

Although the Navy recognized that the MMA would enter the Fleet during the 20-year BRAC implementation period, the evaluation process did not allow for **“the introduction of aircraft types not currently on board an activity...”**

This restriction, therefore, prohibited the consideration of the MMA's introduction even though the Navy was well aware that it would occur one year later in 2012. Not considering the new MMA-capable hangar – already constructed at Brunswick with an investment of \$34 million -- *ignores* this valuable infrastructure and illustrates that the Navy's methodology for calculating excess capacity is fundamentally flawed.

Even the **Department of the Navy's Analysis Group** realized that realignment is not the right decision.

SLIDE SIX

A review of the meeting minutes for 24 January 2005 reveals that the group **“determined the scenario to realign NAS Brunswick did not provide a good return on investment since it would still require significant MILCON costs to relocate the aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville and would provide reduced savings since fewer billets would be eliminated.”**

It is clear that the Navy failed to think through the costs of realignment. After the recommendation for closure was overturned because of Brunswick's acknowledged strategic value, the Navy scrambled to develop a rationale and cost savings to justify realignment, but failed to conduct a rigorous analysis that would account for the future MMA role at Brunswick, the increased mission costs and the hidden costs underlying the realignment decision. We can only conclude that the drive for false savings was overwhelming.

SLIDE SEVEN

When the Navy's cost analysis is corrected to reflect the above additional considerations, the financial justification for realignment fails. The payback period becomes a more realistic 9 years versus 4 years and the purported 20-year net present value savings of \$238.8 million is closer to \$56.5 million.

It is clear that the Navy's sole reason for recommending the realignment of NAS Brunswick – cost savings – is not supportable by the facts.

The Navy's analysis does not comply with the expressed requirement of military value criteria number **four** to consider the cost of operation and manpower implications or selection criteria number **five** to consider the extent and timing of saving and therefore is a substantial deviation.


Projection of Personnel Savings Fundamentally Flawed

Of projected elimination of 403 personnel by 2011:

- 157 to be replaced by Boeing as part of Contractor Logistic Support program with introduction of MMA
- In reality, 246 positions eliminated as a result of realignment.

Personnel cost savings greatly overstated

GREAT CIRCLE ROUTE FROM NAS JACKSONVILLE TO BAGHDAD, IRELAND, SIGONELLA, & ICELAND



All routes lead past NAS Brunswick

Brunswick: Realignment Does Not Provide Good Return on Investment

Deliberative Document - For Discussion Purposes Only - Do Not Release Under FOIA

Subj: REPORT OF DAG DELIBERATIONS OF 24 JANUARY 2005

continuing to consult with the Marine Corps and 1st Naval Construction Division concerning alternate receiving sites. See slide 11 of enclosure (7). CDR Deputy indicated that 1st Naval Construction Division was considering Westover AFB, MA, as a possible receiving site. Mr. Leather then reviewed the recurring costs and savings for scenario DON-0138. We explained that the most significant recurring savings would result from the elimination of billets. See slides 12 through 14 of enclosure (7).

23. The DAG determined that the scenario to realign NAS Brunswick did not provide a good return on investment. It would still require significant MILCON costs to relocate aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville. Savings since fewer billets would be eliminated. It was determined that relocation of FASOTRAGM to MCAS Cherry Point was preferable since MILCON costs and would provide a SERE school (there is a SERE school in San Diego). Accordingly, the IAT Operations Team to conduct SERE through 8 analyses and CRRA for scenario DON-0138, which relocates FASOTRAGM to MCAS (Cherry Point) for the DAG's review.


24. CDR Deputy, LtCol Terri E. Bredag, USMC, and Mr. Leather presented updated COBRA results for three scenarios that realign NAS Oceana, VA, and relocate aviation assets to NAS Whiting Field, FL (scenario DON-0140), MCAS Beaufort, SC (scenario DON-0151), and Moody AFB, GA (scenario DON-0153). Enclosure (8) pertains. CDR Deputy reminded the DAG that it decided to remove scenario DON-0139, which would realign NAS Oceana and relocate assets to NAS Pensacola, FL, from further consideration at its 17 January 2005 deliberative session. CDR Deputy informed the DAG that the updated COBRA results contained the same assumptions applied to the COBRA results reviewed by the DAG at its 17 January 2005 deliberative session. See slide 2 of enclosure (8). Mr. Leather recapped the updated COBRA results, noting that an evaluation of the one-time costs and steady state savings indicates the following Payback periods and 20-year NPV costs for the three scenarios: Scenario DON-0140 - Payback in 24 years and 20-year NPV costs approximating \$191.7M; Scenario DON-0151 - Payback in over 100 years and 20-year NPV costs approximating \$594.1M; and, Scenario DON-0153 - Payback in 14 years and 20-year NPV savings approximating \$16.9M. See slide 3 of enclosure (8).

Deliberative Document - For Discussion Purposes Only - Do Not Release Under FOIA

- 11 -

“determined that the scenario to realign NAS Brunswick did not provide a good return on investment since it would still require significant MILCON costs to relocate the aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville and would provide reduced savings since fewer billets would be eliminated.”

NET SAVINGS DUE TO BNAS REALIGNMENT (Net Present Value)



Realignment results in a payback period of 9 years (not 4) and 20 year savings of only \$56 million (not \$238 million)

**Testimony of
Representative Tom Allen
before the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission Regional Field Hearing
on
Naval Air Station Brunswick
Economic Impact
July 6, 2005**

Good afternoon, Chairman Principi and Members of the Commission.

At the end of the Maine portion of the hearing, Governor Baldacci will testify to the overall economic impact on Maine of the three recommendations that affect us.

I will speak now to the Department of Defense's economic analysis for Brunswick. By using the wrong labor market in its analysis, the Department grossly underestimated the negative impact of the realignment recommendation. This constitutes a deviation from Criteria 6.

The Department calculated the impact of the NAS Brunswick realignment within the Portland-South Portland-Biddeford Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). But Brunswick isn't in the Portland MSA. Brunswick has its own, separate Labor Market Area called the Bath-Brunswick LMA.

[insert ALLEN slide 1 – map]

This map of Southern Maine shows these two separate labor markets.

According the DOD figures, the realignment of Brunswick would result in the loss of 2,317 military jobs, 42 military contractor jobs, 61 direct civilian jobs, and 1,846 indirect civilian jobs, for a total of 4,266 net jobs lost. By incorrectly placing NAS Brunswick in the Portland MSA, DOD claimed an adverse economic impact of only **1.3 percent**. The reality is many orders of magnitude higher.

NAS Brunswick accounts for one-third of all jobs in the Town of Brunswick. Looking just at the net direct job loss (2,420), the realignment would result an adverse economic impact of **15.2 percent** on the Town.

Expanding the scale a bit, NAS Brunswick accounts for 13 percent of all jobs in the Bath-Brunswick LMA. Looking just at both the direct and indirect job lost (4,266), the realignment would cause a loss of **10.4 percent** in this labor market. That 10.4 percent is the figure that DOD should have used for its economic impact analysis.

[insert ALLEN slide 2 – bar chart]

Thus, the negative effect on the local economy is **8 times** greater than what DOD claims.

A corrected adverse economic impact figure of 10.4 percent would leave Brunswick with the third highest economic hit, on a percentage basis, of any community on the list, after Cannon Air Force Base, NM, and the Crane Naval Support Activity, IN.

We also believe that the DOD projection for number of civilian jobs lost (61) is low. The civilians are there to support the uniformed personnel. Since the realignment removes all active duty presence at the base, it is reasonable to expect a higher proportion of civilian jobs would vanish. If the present ratio of military to civilian jobs remains after realignment, the number of civilian jobs lost could exceed 600, or 10 times the DOD forecast. This prospect would increase the economic impact to **11.8 percent** in the Labor Market Area.

Given the flawed analysis, we believe that DOD has substantially deviated from Criteria 6, consideration of economic impact.


As three of you saw during your site visit, Brunswick is a small town, with a population of just over 21,000. There are only 79,000 people in the LMA. According to an economic analysis by the State, the downsizing would cause a payroll reduction of \$136 million, retail sales losses of \$16 million, rental losses of \$13 million, financial and

insurance sector losses of \$12 million, and construction industry losses of \$10 million. All are annual figures.

Just 10 miles down the road from Brunswick is Bath Iron Works. With 6,000 jobs, it is the largest single-site employer in the State of Maine. Bath Iron Works is facing potentially dramatic reductions in its workforce, due to a widening production gap between the end of the DDG-51 destroyer program and the start of the DD-X destroyer. We know that this private company is outside the purview of the Commission, but the downsizing of both the air station and the shipyard, at the same time, would deliver a double blow to the community. We appreciate that the Commission is willing to consider additional information about economic impact, and urge you to consider the consequences of the potential evaporation of military-related jobs and industry in the State.

Thank you. Senator Snowe will now make closing comments.


NAS Brunswick Economic Impact Evaluated in Wrong Labor Market



Source: Maine Department of Labor, Labor Market Information Services

Economic Impact on Brunswick

Corrected effect is 8 times larger



DOD estimate
(wrong labor market)

Actual impact
(correct labor market)

**Testimony of
Senator Olympia J. Snowe**

**before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
on**

Naval Air Station, Brunswick

Closing Arguments

July 6, 2005

Mr. Chairman and esteemed Members of the Commission, thank you for your time and attention in this hour.

In the end, the facts show that DoD's recommendation to realign Brunswick is based on an *overvaluation* of cost savings and a gross *undervaluation* of strategic importance. This equation adds up to a grave risk for America's maritime security and our national homeland defense.

It is a litany of failures that undermines DoD's sole justification for realignment on the basis of cost savings --

A failure to account for cost savings from the airplanes of the future...

A failure to account for the new \$34 million hanger at Brunswick to *house* those aircraft...

A failure to consider the full cost of moving squadrons to Jacksonville...

A failure to recognize the accompanying increased mission costs.

In other words, the Navy's claim of cost savings is a mirage. What is *real*, however, is the new, post- 9-11 threat environment in which we live – and Brunswick's indispensable strategic value *within* that new environment.



SLIDE ONE

The Secretary of the Navy...the Chief of Naval Operations...the Commanders of Fleet Forces Command...and the Northern Command on *ten separate occasions* have stated that Brunswick is *vital* to the maritime defense of the nation -- leaving us with only one question --

Why, then, has the Department of Defense deserted the Northeastern United States, leaving us devoid of any active military aviation assets?

SLIDE TWO

Given DoD does not even attempt to justify this proposed realignment on the basis that it enhances homeland security..or bolsters readiness...or increases our mission capabilities...

And *given* we have shown that their cost savings calculation -- DoD's *sole justification* for realignment -- *fails*...



The *overwhelming strategic military value* of NAS Brunswick should trump any decision to close or realign this vital national asset. Because without a fully functional base, ready to respond at a moment's notice, our nation's maritime security will be at risk -- and therefore, Brunswick should remain an active, fully-operational Naval Air Station.

Thank you, and we would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

NAS Brunswick

Essential Strategic Asset - Valued by Senior Leadership

Secretary of the Navy

Chief of Naval Operations

Commandant of the Marine Corps


Commander, Northern Command

Commander, Fleet Forces Command

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

"This is a military value question more than anything else . . . we're really keeping a strategic capability in the Northeast. That's what it boils down to."

**- ADM Vern Clark
Testimony to BRAC Commission
May 17, 2005**



1988

Loring AFB

Plattsburg AFB

Griffiss AFB

Pease AFB

Westover AFB


McGuire AFB

NAS Brunswick


NAS S. Weymouth

RAF Otis AFB

© 1988-1997 Microsoft and/or its suppliers. All rights reserved.



© 1988-1997 Microsoft and/or its suppliers. All rights reserved.



2005

NAS Brunswick

McGraw-Hill

© 1988-1997 Microsoft and/or its suppliers. All rights reserved.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAB

1. Agenda: Brunswick Naval Air Station, BRAC Commission Hearing, Washington DC, August 10, 2005.
2. Senator Snowe's opening remarks.
3. Rear Admiral Rich's and Captain Dean's remarks:
 - Arguments against closure
 - Arguments against realignment
 - Arguments for a fully operational airfield
4. Representative Allen's remarks on the impacts of closure on the community.
5. Governor Baldacci's remarks on the impacts of closure on the State/Region.
6. Senator Collins' closing remarks.

Supporting documentation

7. White Paper on "Naval Aviation Excess Capacity and East Coast Maritime Patrol Aircraft: A Flawed Process."
8. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress titled "Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response"
9. Letter dated 26 July 2005 from Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, Ms. Anne Davis
10. Testimony of William Babbitt, National Association of Government Employees, R1-77
11. Town of Brunswick Proclamation;
Town of Bath Proclamation;
Town of Topsam Proclamation

**AGENDA
for
BRAC COMMISSION HEARING**

August 10, 2005

**NAVAL AIR STATION, BRUNSWICK
Brunswick, ME**

216 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC

1. OPENING STATEMENT - Sen. Olympia Snowe

2. ARGUMENTS AGAINST CLOSURE

RADM Harry Rich, USN (Ret)
CAPT Ralph Dean, USN (Ret)

3. ARGUMENTS AGAINST REALIGNMENT - CAPT Dean

4. ARGUMENTS FOR A FULLY OPERATIONAL AIRFIELD - RADM Rich

5. IMPACTS OF CLOSURE

- On Community - Rep. Tom Allen
- On State/Region - Gov. John Baldacci

6. CLOSING ARGUMENTS - Sen. Susan Collins

Testimony of

Senator Olympia J. Snowe

BRAC Commission

Naval Air Station, Brunswick

Opening Statement

August 10, 2005

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, we thank you for this opportunity to speak in support of Naval Air Station Brunswick. We also thank each of you for visiting Brunswick to learn first-hand why it is the nation's premiere maritime patrol base.

The purpose of today's hearing is to address your consideration to close Brunswick. We are here to present the facts; facts that demonstrate that closing Brunswick poses an unacceptable risk to our nation's security. In doing so, we understand that, pursuant to the BRAC statute, the standard we must meet is that closure would be "inconsistent" with military value and other criteria of the law.

We will meet that standard because closing Brunswick – the only remaining fully operational, active-duty airfield in the Northeast – is inconsistent with the readiness value of Criterion 1, the training and staging values of Criterion 2, as well as the contingency, mobilization and surge values of Criterion 3.

Our case is built on two overarching and indisputable facts -

First, in defending the US homeland, geography matters. And if Brunswick is closed, it would be the ninth airfield closed by BRAC in the last 16 years, leaving – in the aftermath of the devastating attacks of 9-11 -- *no* fully operational, active duty airfields north of McGuire Air Force Base in central New Jersey. Creation of such an expansive, strategic void is clearly inconsistent with each of Criteria 1, 2 and 3.

Second – 'uncertain but foreseeable' -- as DoD has repeatedly said, is the very essence of the threat to our homeland defense and security.

That is exactly why Congress saw fit to require both DoD and this Commission to consider the surge and contingency requirements in Criterion 3 when making your respective

recommendations. And that is exactly why DoD concluded, when looking out the mandatory 20-year BRAC window in the face of such foreseeable threats, that it *could not close Brunswick* -- the last remaining fully operational airfield in the Northeast.

Over the next hour, we will demonstrate specifically why DoD expressly considered and repeatedly rejected such closure. You will hear from two former military commanders who understand current and future national security, homeland defense and homeland security requirements.

Our first witness will be Rear Admiral Harry Rich, former Commander of all the maritime patrol wings and squadrons in the Atlantic theater.

He will demonstrate that, on ten separate occasions during the BRAC process and on several occasions since -- including in testimony to this Commission -- the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Commanders of Fleet Forces Command, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Northern Command and OSD's Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) all recognized and validated Brunswick's distinct military value. And this position has been re-stated emphatically twice -- in a DoD letter of July 14 to the commission, and in a Navy letter of July 26 in response to our request for a clear delineation of the homeland defense and surge requirements for Brunswick.

Following Admiral Rich will be retired P-3 pilot Captain Ralph Dean who, during several tours with operational squadrons and wing staffs, oversaw numerous detachment operations.

He will review DoD documents, released by the Department after it published its BRAC list in May, that illustrate how Brunswick will support DoD's emerging homeland security role...

Documents such as the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, released in June, that requires the Department to provide maximum awareness of threats in air and sea approaches -- as well as maritime interception capabilities...

Where, in the words of DoD, successful responses are measured in "hours, not days."...

And, as maintained by the CNO in this report, there is a need to "extend the security of the United States seaward..." The bottom line is, closure denies rapid deployment."

And documents such as the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness -- released in response to the National Security Presidential Directive 41 -- that requires maritime domain assets to “support the entire spectrum of national security events – from the Global War on Terrorism and stability operations to disaster response and recovery.”

Of course, Brunswick squadrons already -- consistent with the readiness and support values of Criteria 1 and 3 -- actively and successfully support such objectives.

But there is also the distinct military value of Brunswick’s crucial *future* capacity.

Here, all of the DoD’s emerging homeland defense planning documents make clear that surprise and uncertainty are precisely what DoD needs to plan for. And the military values of contingency and surge included in Criteria 3 are there for exactly that reason. Given DoD’s clear and emerging requirements for both flexibility and uncertainty, removing a diverse and strategic asset like Brunswick for maritime and land surveillance at this critical planning stage is simply not a risk that DoD is willing to take.

Captain Dean will explain how the Navy’s realignment recommendation to make Brunswick a “warm” base will require sustained detachment operations that will add millions to the cost of operations, increase already stretched personnel tempo, and effectively decrease the remaining service life of the P-3 – all counter to Criteria 4 and 5.

And he will also detail why such detachment operations cannot be run from just any airfield; that they in fact require specialized air and ground crews... maintenance facilities...mobile operations centers...and security for aircraft and weapons – and that we have not seen any comprehensive analyses of potential detachment airfields elsewhere in the Northeast.

Admiral Rich will return to explain why keeping Brunswick fully operational is the only valid option.

For example, he will discuss the introduction of the Multimission Maritime Aircraft and its associated Maritime Surveillance UAV, and why Brunswick, with the Navy’s only MMA-compatible hanger, dual runways, and egress over water into 63,000 square miles of unencumbered airspace make Brunswick the ideal MMA and UAV base now.

Finally, Congressman Allen and Governor Baldacci will detail the adverse economic and community impacts that a full closure will have on our state, and Senator Collins will provide the closing arguments as to why national security dictates a fully operational base.

In summary, DoD expressly considered and repeatedly rejected closing Brunswick because DoD knew – from both current operations and foreseeable future events – that closure would tie the planning hands of DoD and complete the full abandonment of the Northeast.

Either result, let alone both, is plainly inconsistent with Criteria 1 through 4 and the national defense requirements of our country. Or, as a high ranking war-fighting commander told me last spring regarding Brunswick, we should first “do no harm”.

I turn now to Admiral Rich, who will speak in greater depth to the strategic value and component commander requirements of Brunswick.

Testimony of

RADM Harry Rich, USN (ret)

BRAC Commission

Naval Air Station, Brunswick

Arguments Against Closure

August 10, 2005

Mr. Chairman, members of the commission, again, we thank you for the opportunity to express our concerns about the future of NAS Brunswick.

SLIDE – CASE OVERVIEW

Your options for Brunswick, as shown on this slide are three - close it; realign it; or leave it as it is.

Closing the last fully capable operational air station in the Northeast is fraught with danger. It is contrary to the expressed wishes of both the DoD and Navy, and ignores a vital NORTHCOM operational imperative.

The second option; realignment, as proposed by DoD, just doesn't make sense. We will show that it can't be justified on a financial basis and it distorts the defensive posture of the Atlantic Fleet Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force to such a degree that operational effectiveness would be significantly degraded. Response time to urgent operational tasking would be delayed three hours or more at a time when minutes mean the difference between success and failure.

Finally, we will show that the third option; keeping NAS Brunswick fully operational with its assigned fleet air wing remaining in place, is the only viable option available.

In addition, it offers several money-saving, readiness enhancing options, such as introducing the follow-on Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft at Brunswick instead of Jacksonville and moving the reserve C-130 squadrons from Willow Grove to Brunswick

instead of McGuire AFB. These options are valid only if Brunswick remains fully operational.

SLIDE -CNO QUOTE

The closure option was rejected by senior leaders in DoD and Navy no fewer than 10 times during this year's BRAC deliberations.

The Chief of Naval Operations' *military judgment* is reflected in the statement on this slide...

SLIDE – WYNNE QUOTE

And by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on this slide...

SLIDE - WILLARD QUOTE

And by this quote from Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Willard's testimony on July 18. . .

SLIDE – DAVIS QUOTE

And finally, by the Secretary of the Navy's Special Assistant for Base Realignment and Closure. The quotes on this slide plus Admiral Willard's statement from the previous slide basically state our case in a nutshell.

SLIDE – CFFC QUOTE

The highest priority in your deliberations must be given to operational imperatives expressed by the commander responsible for implementing the homeland defense strategy.

In March of this year Commander, Fleet Forces Command (NORTHCOM's maritime component commander) told the Navy's Analysis Group, and I quote: "Closure of NAS Brunswick supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3, MMA force at the unacceptable expense of closing a base offering numerous

transformational and homeland defense basing opportunities” (end quote) Powerful testimony from the man responsible for homeland defense.

Captain Dean will further discuss why NAS Brunswick *specifically* is the clear and obvious choice to meet the component commander’s requirement.

Testimony of

CAPT Ralph Dean, USN (ret)

BRAC Commission

Naval Air Station, Brunswick

Arguments Against Closure and Realignment

August 10, 2005

SLIDE – NASB IS MEETING . . . TODAY

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, the Department of Defense determination that NAS Brunswick is essential is founded in stated requirements to meet a very real threat, and the air station's unique capability to meet that threat. The nation's Strategy for Homeland Defense states (quote) "terrorists or rogue states will attempt multiple, simultaneous mass casualty attacks against the US homeland." (unquote)

Just as chilling is the Congressional Research Service assessment that an attack by terrorists armed with a nuclear device would kill at least 50,000 and as many as 1 million Americans. The Homeland Defense Strategy further states, (quote) "Adversaries [will present us] with a host of new challenges. They may attempt to use commercial vessels to transport terrorists or weapons to the United States. They may attempt to intrude on U.S. airspace with low-attitude aircraft, cruise missiles, and UAVs. They may attempt to convert maritime vessels, aircraft, and other modes of transportation into weapons." (unquote)

That's serious language, the most specific in the strategy in regard to the threat anywhere.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul McHale, has stated that he realized as soon as he took office that the biggest single area in which he could make gains was in maritime defense – against attack from the sea.

That threat has led to the requirement for a layered defense of the US homeland. That mission is being carried out by assets at NAS Brunswick *today*. Commander, Patrol Wing Five at NAS Brunswick has been designated as Commander, Task Unit 20.12.1, responsible to Commander, Second Fleet and NORTHCOM for Maritime Domain Awareness. His area of responsibility extends out 1500 nautical miles east over the Atlantic.

The scope of the requirement at any given time varies. Right now P-3 crews at Brunswick are providing a 12-hour ready alert for NORTHCOM. After the September 11, 2001 attacks a four-hour, armed ready alert was provided at Brunswick. That level of tasking and more could return at any time with the turn of events or a single piece of newly gained intelligence.

The second quote on this slide is critical. What is true of homeland defense missions in general is true in spades of maritime patrol and reconnaissance. The two key metrics are “how soon can you get there?” and “how long can you stay?” When you answer those questions you realize – basing matters.

SLIDE – MARITIME PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE BASING. . .

This slide shows the current basing of both active and reserve P-3 squadrons, and shows why, when defending a geographic area, *geography* matters.

The closure option has been soundly rejected by DoD and the Navy and ruled unacceptable by the operational commander because it eliminates his only valid homeland defense basing option in a critical area – at a time when the threat is very real. Homeland defense is zero-defect work; a single mistake or failure is unacceptable. Clearly Mr. Chairman, closure is not a viable option.

Now some points about NAS Brunswick itself.

There is an enormous difference between just any suitable runway and a military air base. There is a correspondingly large difference between just any military airfield and a fully capable maritime patrol aircraft base.

Some may suggest that the operational requirement could be met with P-3 detachments to anywhere in the region. That is wrong.

SLIDE – TYPICAL P-3 DETACHMENT

As a point of interest, a nominal P-3 detachment is described on this slide. About one-half a squadron, enabling 3 launches a day – until the first aircraft breaks. P-3s can carry a small pack-up kit with some spare parts. Before long, the following is required:

SLIDE – DETACHMENT REQUIREMENTS

It is a fact that P-3 aircraft and crews perform detachment operations every day. It is just as true that those detachments cannot be performed out of a suitcase for very long.

Maritime patrol aircraft are complex platforms with a complex set of missions and demanding support requirements. Mission capability declines rapidly without fixed support and/or a robust (and expensive) logistics train.

With any detachment of any scope or duration, logistics support inevitably follows – and soon. They don't call it a "tail" for nothing; it is attached to the front end and is not far behind. Our maritime patrol aircraft bases in the United States, and all major P-3 deployment sites overseas, have evolved to provide this support, cost-effectively *relative to the suitcase option*.

NAS Brunswick is a system of systems, if you will - command and control (not just for maritime patrol, but for military operations of almost any kind), flight facilities, air traffic control, security and force protection, and systems to respond rapidly to aircraft and aircrew requirements. Many a detachment mission has been lost due to a failed aircraft generator, brake actuator, flight instrument or any of a thousand other P-3 components. Not at Brunswick. A call on the radio and the part is on the way to the bird. Crews and maintainers take that, and all the other support available at an MPA base, for granted - until their first preflight on any detachment. That level of support is just not available at any detachment site.

I have gone on about detachment operations longer than I should have, because anyone who would say that the requirement can be met that way is really missing the

point and this is critical. I remind you of the two key metrics – speed of response and endurance on station. For this requirement, the metrics mandate total, continuous readiness in the region everyday, year round and completely invalidate detachment operations as an option.

SLIDE – THE ANSWER. . .

So NAS Brunswick isn't just any runway, or just any military airfield, but a Maritime Patrol Aircraft base – and it is one heck of a base from which to operate. Some of its characteristics are listed here. Of particular importance to Fleet Forces Command are those regarding weapons storage, handling, and delivery – unique to NAS Brunswick in the region, *and* the resilience afforded by dual runways. (anyone who thinks that is not important should try flying into NAS Norfolk this summer. Their only runway is closed for repaving.)

SLIDE – WHY NASB IS THE ANSWER – OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

There are other reasons why NAS Brunswick is the answer. A few of those related to costs which would be incurred under any other option are listed here. None are trivial. The remaining fatigue life in the P-3 inventory is a precious asset which must be expended efficiently.

The impact on personnel of the additional detachments and deployments which would be required, the increased family separations and resulting effect on retention also cannot be ignored. Family separation is the number one reason which causes sailors to leave the Navy.

SLIDE – WHY NASB IS THE ANSWER – OTHER CONSIDERATIONS (2)

Insufficient P-3 simulator capacity exists at Jacksonville to adequately support the entire East Coast P-3 force. The simulators at Jacksonville are just about max'ed out now; in use 18 hours a day – 95% of capacity.

Moving beyond the maritime patrol community, twenty-nine tenant and supported activities would have to find another home or lifeline. These include the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape school, ship's crew berthing and flight support for the Supervisor of Shipbuilding command at Bath, and the entire Naval Air Reserve

demographic in New England, which would be abandoned if NAS Brunswick were to close.

The final bullet on this slide is important, too. Brunswick is the preferred refueling stop for tactical jet and turboprop aircraft returning from Europe and CENTCOM. Also, quoting Ms. Davis again, NAS Brunswick is, (quote) "...an important location for aviation training, because it can and will remain capable of logistically supporting all of the aircraft currently in the DoD inventory. Its utility is not limited to DoD aircraft, but includes aircraft of the air national guard and other federal agencies." (unquote)

As a personal aside, I'd like to note that I have trained and instructed at every P-3 base from Pt. Mugu to Brunswick, from Jacksonville to Whidbey Island (and we used to have quite a few in between). I can say unequivocally, that encroachment, expandable pattern and variety of weather, is the best of them all for training. It's user-friendly and always open. In 2004 the NAS had zero hours of closure for weather.

SLIDE – NAS BRUNSWICK – CLOSURE DELIBERATIONS ...

With all of that one wonders how closing the air station could have been considered by the Navy – and it was, early in the process before military judgment was applied by senior Navy and DoD leaders.

Those early Navy deliberations were founded almost solely on quantitative measures based on eliminating excess capacity – a methodology fine for depots or widget factories, but not for operational bases. Those bases must be where they are needed, when they are needed. (and by the way, the Navy incorrectly calculated the capacity at its east coast maritime patrol bases anyway – we have provided you with a summary of that in your handouts).

SLIDE – REALIGNMENT

Having discussed closure at some length, I would like to very briefly touch on realignment – a proposal which has been a real head-scratcher for us. We've finally concluded that realignment is the failed result of the Navy's determination to save some money by single-siting like aircraft, that momentum, running up against the DoD determination – "wait a minute, you cannot close this national asset." Realignment is

neither fish nor fowl. It would degrade the readiness of the maritime patrol force, and save precious little money in the process. In the final analysis, it just doesn't make sense.

SLIDE OFF

We've addressed closure and touched on the realignment proposal. Admiral Rich will now conclude with the third option before you – retaining Naval Air Station Brunswick.

Sir.....

Testimony of

RADM Harry Rich, USN (ret)

BRAC Commission

Naval Air Station, Brunswick

Arguments For a Fully Operational Airfield

August 10, 2005

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the only option remaining, the clear choice, is to keep NAS Brunswick fully operational with the assigned air wing squadrons remaining in place. Only this option fully realizes the current and future military value of this national asset.

SLIDE – CURRENT NASB CAPABILITIES

NAS Brunswick is ready now for the aircraft that will replace the P-3, the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft. No other maritime patrol air station can make that claim.

NAS Brunswick is ready now to accept expansion of current roles, for example, receiving the naval reserve squadrons from Willow Grove, rather than moving them to McGuire Air Force Base, saving over \$50 million in additional military construction funds.

SLIDE – NASB CURRENT CAPABILITIES (2)

NAS Brunswick is an ideal site for unmanned aerial vehicle operations from the standpoints of both efficiency and flight safety. The Broad-Area Maritime Surveillance UAV (known as BAMS) will accompany the MMA. In the words of RADM Mike Holmes, Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Group, (quote) “the BAMS UAV is going to play a big part in what the maritime patrol and reconnaissance community does in the future. Much of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that we’re picking up with the P-3 and the EP-3 can be transitioned to a UAV.” (Unquote) NAS Brunswick is ready for that future now.

As the Commander, Fleet Forces Command noted, there are “transformational opportunities” at NAS Brunswick. One of these is the establishment of a homeland security/homeland defense “center of excellence.” The currently funded Armed Forces Reserve Center at Brunswick, will site National Guard, Marine reserve, and other units reporting to NORTHCOM for homeland security missions. Where homeland security *and homeland defense* assets are co-located, the potential for expanding missions and synergistic gains is great. Numerous government agencies, such as customs, DEA, INS and others, beyond DoD and the Department of Homeland Security, all have a stake in the future of NAS Brunswick.

SLIDE – THE BOTTOM LINE. . .

Most important of all – retaining NAS Brunswick and its assigned patrol wing optimizes the defensive posture of the Atlantic fleet long range maritime patrol and reconnaissance force. It ensures strategic flexibility at a time when the maritime defense strategy is still evolving and the threat seems to be escalating. It takes advantage of and makes good the huge investment the Navy has made to ensure the last remaining DoD operational air field in the northeast is ready for the next decade and beyond.

SLIDE OFF

The Navy has done well over the past 10 years, spending more than \$120 million to modernize and upgrade NAS Brunswick to make it fully ready for the future of maritime patrol aviation, and indeed all of DoD aviation. As most of you have seen, it’s ready now. The new \$32 million hangar is the only one of its kind designed specifically for the follow-on MMA aircraft, and as you have seen, NAS Brunswick is essentially a brand new airfield.

I was stationed in Brunswick three times during my 35 years on active duty and, in my opinion, no military installation in the country enjoys stronger support than the men and women of NAS Brunswick receive from the citizens of Maine. It’s a great place to live and work.

Retention figures from Brunswick-based squadrons reflect the quality of life in the greater Brunswick area. Just ask any sailor.

For these reasons and countless more, we believe our Navy and our country will be best served if the military value and strategic location of NAS Brunswick are leveraged in every way possible to enhance our national defense posture.

SLIDE – CURRENT MPA COVERAGE AREA (MAP)

The single most often used term to describe the value of NAS Brunswick is “strategic location.” To fully appreciate what that means you have to look at a map showing the location of maritime patrol airfields on the East Coast.

Take a good look at this slide. Those circles are 1000 nm – that equates to 3 hours flight time in the P-3. As the chart shows, targets of interest in the southern part of our coastal area and even in the Gulf of Mexico can be effectively covered by P-3s based in Jacksonville.

Now look at where the targets will be concentrated in the North Atlantic shipping lanes. Note how much of the shipping lanes are included in the 1000 mile circle from Jacksonville.

Ask yourself – if you were the operational commander responsible for defending the most populous part of the United States, the Northeast, where would you locate your maritime patrol forces in order to optimize their effectiveness?

We need to remind ourselves that we are at war and the enemy is probably the most insidious and unpredictable we’ve ever faced. The front lines are no longer just overseas. They are everywhere in the western world including our extensive Atlantic coastline. Making changes to critical infrastructure at this time is fraught with danger and can be justified only by showing that the change will significantly enhance our defense posture.

SLIDE – SUMMARY

Clearly, closing NAS Brunswick is not a viable option. Nothing could compensate for the loss of readiness inherent in such a move. The issue is national security, not excess capacity or single-siting aircraft

Realignment, as proposed by DoD, isn't much better. Yes, it would preserve a strategic asset for future use, but the need when viewed in the light of September 11, 2001 is more likely to be for immediate use. With the planes in Florida and a fully capable airfield in Maine left empty, the word "immediate" just wouldn't fit anymore. It would be *worse* than having a fire house with no fire engines. That leaves keeping NAS Brunswick fully operational, with the assigned air wing remaining in place, as the only remaining option.

(SLIDE OFF)

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, you have a most unenviable task. Your challenge is to demonstrate wisdom and the moral courage to decide what is in the best interest of our country and national security.

If you do that, I'm confident a fully operational NAS Brunswick will continue to be a critical link in our national defense posture for many years to come.

We wish you well and we thank you for your dedication to public service.

I will now be followed by Congressman Allen...

Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine



Case Overview

- Why Closure is not an acceptable option for NAS Brunswick: DOD has made the case.
- Why Realignment is a flawed concept and inappropriate for NASB.
- Why Maintaining NASB as a fully-capable Naval Air Station is the only acceptable option for the Navy, the Department of Defense, and the nation.

Brunswick Closure Rejected by **Department of Defense**

“This is a military value question more than anything else... We're really keeping a strategic capability in the Northeast. That's what it boils down to.”

*- ADM Vern Clark
Testimony to BRAC Commission
May 17, 2005*

Brunswick Closure Rejected by **Department of Defense**

“It came to our mind that having a strategic presence near borders in America made sense from a homeland security standpoint, made sense from a strategic surge and future capability standpoint.....”

*- The Hon. Michael W. Wynne
Testimony to BRAC Commission
July 18, 2005*

Brunswick Closure Rejected by Department of Defense

“Brunswick provided us that strategic ability to readily access the maritime environment in the extreme Northeast.”

- ADM Robert Willard
Testimony to BRAC Commission
July 18, 2005

NAS Brunswick Closure Rejected by **Department of Defense**

**Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for Base
Realignment and Closure**

- *“The loss of NAS Brunswick will increase P-3 response time to any maritime threat against the northeast coast of the United States.”*
- *“NAS Brunswick also has enormous strategic value as the last remaining DoD airfield in the northeast.”*

Ms. Anne R. Davis
Letter July 20, 2005

NAS Brunswick Closure Rejected by Department of Defense

Commander, Fleet Forces Command

*“Closure of NAS Brunswick supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3/MMA force **at the unacceptable expense of closing a base offering numerous transformational and maritime Homeland Defense basing opportunities.**”*

- CFFC input to DON Analysis Group, March 2005


NASB is Meeting Requirements for Homeland Defense Today

“Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” Department of Defense, June 2005

- “The United States must have a **concept of operations for the active, layered maritime defense** of the US homeland. Such a concept will require naval forces to be responsible to US Northern Command...”
 - “Timely in response and readily accessible, Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions require a **rapid response, often measured in hours, not days.**”
- RESULT - COMPATRECONWING Five and its P-3 squadrons at Brunswick have been assigned responsibility as a Task Unit Commander under NORTHCOM for Maritime Domain Awareness and other responsibilities within his assigned sector of the North Atlantic.**

Maritime Patrol Basing for Homeland Defense

*When Defending a Geographic Area,
Geography Matters!*



Typical P-3 Detachment Operations

- 5 Aircraft
- 5 Crews (11 Members Each)
- Maintenance Crew (20+)
- Mobile Operations Control Center (MOCC) and 12 Member Cadre (C-130 Required)

Capability:

- 3 Sorties/1 Ready Alert Per 24 Hours
- Assumes NO aircraft out of service for maintenance

Detachment Support Requirements

- Consumables (e.g., search stores)
- Undersea Warfare and air-to-surface weapons
- P-3 Supply support/storage and management
- Physical Security requirements
- Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence (C4I) facilities and staff
- Generic and P-3 specific aircraft support equipment
- Intermediate maintenance, test facilities, and robust logistics train
- Transportation; berthing; messing; specialized area training
- Dedicated planning and execution

Detachments will not get cheaper or easier with MMA and its contractor maintenance support

The Answer: Brunswick's Current Capabilities

- **The last remaining fully-capable active duty military airfield protecting the northeastern U.S.**
- **Ideal for MPRA and other operational missions**
 - Dual runways for flexibility and resilience
 - “Feet wet” at end of runway – optimal for live weapons missions
 - Outstanding weapons storage and handling capability and capacity
 - State-of-the-art command and control facilities
 - Fully secured perimeter for force protection and mission assurance

Why Brunswick is the Answer:

Additional Considerations

- Impact of fatigue on remaining service life of the P-3 aircraft inventory
- Flight hours for transit to detachment operations
- Flight hours for transit to other theaters of operations
 - NAS Brunswick location optimal
- Increased Personnel Tempo and per diem expenses

Why Brunswick is the Answer:

Additional Considerations

- P-3 Flight Simulator and Weapons Systems Trainers
 - Readiness Impact and/or Replacement costs
- Impact/costs to tenant and other supported activities

- Impact on all of DOD aviation

Navy BRAC Deliberations


- Capacity analysis alone is inappropriate in determining **where operational bases are needed.**
- Savings from capacity reduction are irrelevant if they result in an operational base not being *where it is needed, when it is needed.*
- The Navy's overarching determination that single-siting like aircraft is always desirable completely ignored strategic location and other key military value factors.

Realignment: A Flawed and Contradictory Recommendation

- Like closure, realignment fails to optimize the positioning and readiness of the maritime patrol and reconnaissance force.

- Realignment provides no significant savings
 - *Savings incorrectly calculated by Navy*
 - *AIMD savings overstated (ignored MMA introduction)*
 - *Incorrectly stated demolition costs*
 - *Increased costs of operations from and transits to the Northeast (and other theaters) not included*
 - *Hidden costs (also associated with closure) were ignored*

Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine



Brunswick's Additional Missions

- Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft Basing and Support

- Introduction of MMA at Brunswick would eliminate 50% of MILCON required at Jacksonville under a closure scenario for Brunswick, and would postpone the other 50%.**

- Basing for Reserve units from NAS JRB Willow Grove

Brunswick's Additional Missions

- **Broad Area Maritime Surveillance UAV**
 - Dual runways ideal for UAV operations
 - Immediate, unencumbered access to overwater airspace
- **Air Force Reserve Predator UAV units**

Seamless Homeland Security/Homeland Defense


The Bottom Line:

Component Commander Requirements

- NAS Brunswick, with its assigned Air Wing, is the single, clear choice to meet those requirements, because...
- *Only a fully capable Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft base in the region can:*
 - **Optimize strategic laydown of MPRA force**
 - **Maximize force readiness and efficiency**
 - **Be cost-effective over the long term**

Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine





KEFLAVIK

SHIPPING LANES

BRUNSWICK

JACKSONVILLE

CURRENT MPA COVERAGE AREA

Mercator Projection

Radius of all circles = 1000 NM

Military Judgment: Brunswick is Vital

1. Closure: *Rejected* by the most senior DoD officials in the BRAC process.
2. Realignment: A flawed concept that degrades readiness and is inappropriate for NAS Brunswick.
3. Fully operational: Brunswick, with assigned Air Wing in place, is ***the only acceptable option for the Navy, DoD, and the nation.***

Testimony of
Representative Tom Allen
before the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
on
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Community and Workforce Impact
Washington, DC
August 10, 2005

I am Congressman Tom Allen from the First District of Maine. I will speak to the additional, far-reaching negative impacts that closure, as compared to realignment, would have on the community and the workforce.

I represent the Naval Air Station's three home towns:

- Brunswick, which hosts the main base and the airfield;
- Topsham, which hosts housing, a Commissary, a Marine and Army recruiting headquarters and MWR activities; and
- Bath, with its Supervisor of Shipbuilding command that oversees destroyer construction at Bath Iron Works. NAS Brunswick hosts the tenant command for all SUPSHIP activities at Bath.

I want to emphasize that the towns do not want this base closed. Unequivocally, the community wants NAS Brunswick open and actively defending the nation.

[show slide 1]

The town councils of Brunswick, Topsham and Bath unanimously passed proclamations in support of an open and fully operational NAS Brunswick. I ask consent to include in the record copies of these proclamations.

The community and NAS Brunswick have established numerous cooperative arrangements and integrated activities. This slide highlights examples of community support.

[show slide 2]

The workforce at NAS Brunswick is indispensable to the ability of the base to carry out its mission. Their labors turned \$120 million of investment into a fully modern facility, and built the only hangar at any maritime patrol base able to support the new Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft.

I ask consent to include in the record testimony by Bill Babbin of the National Association of Government Employees local R1-77. His statement represents the views of the 643 civilian workers at NAS Brunswick, all of whom would lose their jobs and ability to serve the nation under closure. Bill speaks to the pride of the workforce, their concerns about closure on our national security, and addresses the high quality of life for sailors and their families in Brunswick.

[slide off]

NAS Brunswick plays an irreplaceable role in the military life of the community and the region. As the only active duty operational base for more than 200 miles, Brunswick enables New Englanders to work and train alongside sailors on active duty, from young people in the Naval Sea Cadet program to the 1,100 Reservists who come from throughout the region to drill. If the base is closed, this cultural connection will be lost.

Our entire society will suffer if the military way of life, and the values of patriotism, service and sacrifice, is not accessible to Americans in every corner of the country.

I now turn to Governor Baldacci.

Town Proclamations



The Town of Brunswick...



The Town of Topsham...



The City of Bath...

“... declare and affirm their complete support for the retention of NAS Brunswick as a fully operational naval air station.”

all June 1, 2005

Community support for NAS Brunswick

- Military/Community Council cited as model by commanders
- NASB Commander on Board of MidCoast Chamber of Commerce
- Chamber provides Community Resource Guide for military families
- NASB representative on Town's Comprehensive Planning Committee
- Town's Economic Development Department coordinates with NASB to meet needs of military families
- Town-NASB mutual aid agreements on firefighting and police jurisdiction
- Regular meetings between Town Manger and NASB Commander
- Brunswick School Department's military transition programs

Testimony of
Governor John Baldacci
before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
on
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Economic Impact of Closure
August 10, 2005

I am Governor John Baldacci and I am going to address the economic impact of closing Naval Air Station Brunswick. The challenges presented by this closure are similar to those presented by realignment, which I discussed on July 6th. However, the Department of Defense's own analysis shows that the impact on the region and state from a full closure are far greater. Naval Air Station Brunswick is one of Maine's largest employers and its loss will be devastating.

The Department of Defense generated an economic impact report when it considered closing rather than realigning Brunswick, a scenario that DOD ultimately rejected for the reasons you just heard from Admiral Rich and Captain Dean. **(PUT UP SLIDE ONE)** The report states that closing Brunswick will result in the loss of 2,700 military and 658 non-military personnel. The ripple impact of these job losses will be an additional 2,659. Thus the total indirect and direct job losses caused by closing NASB will be 6,017 jobs.

Naval Air Station Brunswick is located in rural Mid-Coast Maine, in the Bath-Brunswick Labor Market, which has a workforce of just over 40,000. **(PUT UP SLIDE TWO)** The 6,017 positions that will be lost through closure represent 15% of this labor market. In fact, closure of NASB will be the second most devastating BRAC action by economic area in the country. Such a significant loss will be a catastrophe and will cause unemployment in the area to increase from 4.1% to 15%.


The economic impact estimated by DOD is only a partial picture of what will actually happen. Critically, the DOD analysis ignores the economic effects of population migrations. In their analysis, it is as if all military personnel were to leave, but their families were to stay behind. This will be the case in Brunswick, where up to 5,700 dependents of military personnel will leave the area under the proposed closure. This will have a significant ripple effect.

Job losses will be difficult for every state; but the size of many other states' economies will help them soften the blow. Maine has a small population and a small workforce compared to other states. Additionally, the mid-coast Maine economy is today struggling with major workforce reductions at Bath Iron Works (BIW), builder of Navy destroyers, located next-door to Brunswick. In 2004 and 2005, BIW laid off 675 workers from jobs paying some of the highest wages in the region; and 500 of these individuals are still on unemployment. This situation coupled with the small size of the state work force to absorb positions lost through this closure, will present extreme challenges for the region.

In 2004, the Naval Air Station had a \$211 million direct impact on the local economy. The removal of 6,017 positions from the area and this significant loss of spending will cripple the region for many years to come. Let me be clear: the closure of Naval Air Station Brunswick will have the direct effect of a federally-induced, major economic recession for this region, one from which our economists calculate it will be a full decade in recovery.

Thank you for your time. I am pleased to introduce Senator Susan Collins.


Economic Impact of NASB Closure



Source: Department of Defense, *Economic Impact Report*, BRAC Scenario DON-138

BRAC Job Loss by Economic Area

Area	State	Area Employment	BRAC Loss as % of Area
Clovis	NM	23,348	-20.5%
Bath-Brunswick	ME	40,117	-14.99%
Martin County	IN	8,525	-11.6%
Norwich/New London	CT	168,620	-9.4%
Fairbanks	AK	54,469	-8.6%
Rapid City	SD	79,970	-8.5%
Grand Forks	ND	66,242	-7.4%
Mountain Home	ID	14,441	-6.2%
King George County	VA	14,171	-5.5%
Elizabethtown	KY	65,926	-4.5%



Sources: Department of Defense, *Base Closure and Realignment Report Vol. 1 of 2 Results & Processes*, May 2005 AND Maine Department of Labor, *Labor Market Services*

**STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS
BRAC COMMISSION HEARING
WASHINGTON, D.C.
AUGUST 10, 2005
BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION**

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, I am Senator Susan Collins. We complete our presentation today by returning to the critical consideration of military value.

The closure of Brunswick Naval Air Station would be harmful to our national and homeland security. That is not just my personal opinion; it is the considered and repeated military judgment of the Department of Defense. This judgment has been stated many times during the BRAC deliberative process and most recently was reiterated in a July 26, 2005, letter from the Navy to me, which I ask be included in the record.

The Department of Defense rejected the closure of Brunswick Naval Air Station because of the base's clear military value, specifically its strategic location, surge capability, and ability to handle all DoD aircraft.

In its July 26th letter from Anne Davis, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for Base Realignment and Closure, the Navy laid out a compelling case for the retention of Brunswick. While this letter reiterates the Department's proposal for realignment, it actually makes a strong case *against* closure. Let me read the Navy's own words from this letter:

"Commander Fleet Forces Command supports retention of Brunswick ... because it will support future requirements for homeland defense and surge capability. The *specific* Maritime Homeland Defense requirement is stated in terms of response time to any maritime threat against the northeast coast of the United States. Because this area is not a standard operating area for U.S. naval vessels, and because of the proximity of NAS Brunswick to the great circle navigation routes from Europe, P-3s operating out of NAS Brunswick currently provide the Maritime Homeland Defense initial response coverage.

“United States Northern Command, working in cooperation with the military departments and the U.S. Coast Guard, is developing an air-to-surface concept of operations that will address this responsiveness concern with other assets or force packages that will be combined with the current P-3 mission capabilities to facilitate maximum response flexibility. Numerous sites in the northeast have been considered as potentially feasible locations to conduct P-3 detachment operations ... and NAS Brunswick *continues to be viewed by the Navy as the optimal site in New England.*”

The letter continues: “In addition to its location in the northeast, NAS Brunswick is an *ideal location* ... because it has a fully functional weapons facility that can support all weapons available for deployment aboard the P-3, and because its geographic location permits armed aircraft to depart on maritime missions without flying over inhabited areas” end quote. In fact, the letter does not fully recognize the complete scope of Brunswick’s capabilities to support weapons requirements of other platforms, including surface combatants.

The letter goes on to say: “NAS Brunswick also has *enormous strategic value* as the last remaining active DoD airfield in the northeast. NAS Brunswick supports ... several large NATO joint training exercise opportunities. In addition, NAS Brunswick is a critical logistics and refueling hub for DoD aircraft flowing in and out of the U.S. Central Command and U.S. European Command theatre of operations.

“Brunswick will also continue to function as an important location for aviation training, because it can and will remain capable of logistically supporting all of the aircraft currently in DoD inventory. Its utility is not limited to DoD aircraft, but includes aircraft of the Air National Guard and other Federal agencies.”

Commissioners, these are not my words; they are the Navy’s. Closing Brunswick would leave the Northeast more vulnerable to threats and would create an intolerable risk for the Department and the nation. Moreover, the DoD recommendation to realign Brunswick ignores the Department’s emphasis on what the Department itself describes as the base’s “enormous strategic value.”

Although Ms. Davis' response in this letter is focused on using Brunswick for detachment operations, it clearly states that this naval air station is vital for the Maritime Homeland Defense of the northeast United States.

The closure or realignment of Brunswick, and the subsequent removal of the base's aircraft, would significantly and dangerously degrade operational readiness and would increase response time in emergencies. The proposed realignment would not meet the needs of Northern Command's homeland defense missions and would result in diminished effectiveness and lower efficiency, with numerous hidden costs associated with detachments.

Commissioners, closure or realignment would violate the BRAC criteria. The Navy, Department of Defense and national security are best served by a fully operational base at Brunswick. Thank you for your attention to our presentations.

Naval Aviation Excess Capacity and East Coast Maritime Patrol Aircraft: A Flawed Analysis

Issue: East Coast Naval Aviation excess capacity in the Maritime Patrol Aircraft Community is not as large as currently calculated..

Discussion: In a Secretary of Defense memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments dated November 15, 2002, the Secretary stated that “At a minimum, BRAC 2005 must eliminate excess physical capacity.”¹ The memorandum further states that “BRAC 2005 should be the means by which we reconfigure our current infrastructure into one in which operational capacity maximizes *both* warfighting capability and efficiency.”² From this guidance, the Department of the Navy analyzed Aviation Operations using a capacity data call that was created to measure an installation’s ability to house aviation squadrons and units while properly maintaining aircraft, providing ample airfield operating resources and training infrastructure, and ensuring sufficient support facilities.³ What these capacity data calls failed to measure, however, were the conditions of many hangars that are currently considered either substandard or inadequate. When the Navy’s existing Aviation Operations capacity is closely examined, it will be seen that many hangars today are actually planned for demolition in the near future which will reduce overall “excess capacity.”

The principal capacity metric for Aviation Operations used by the Navy was the “Hangar Module.” A Hangar Module was defined as the hangar space, line space, administrative space, operational space, and maintenance shop space required to house one aircraft squadron. Additionally, since actual hangar space is dependent on the type of aircraft to be housed in a particular hangar, data was collected for two different types of

¹ Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments dated November 15, 2002; Subject: Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure; page 1.

² Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments dated November 15, 2002; Subject: Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure; page 1.

³ DOD Base Closure and realignment Report to the Commission; Department of the Navy, Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV), page C-2.

hangars – Type I hangars, built to house carrier-based aircraft, and Type II hangars built to house larger aircraft, such as the P-3.⁴ It should be noted that during the Department of the Navy's Analysis Group (DAG) meeting on 31 August 2004 concerns that the new Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) and the C-40 (both Boeing 737 aircraft) did not fit into one of the two hangar module types was highlighted. A review of all DAG meeting minutes did not reveal any additional discussions concerning this discrepancy in hangar types for the MMA or C-40. It can only be assumed that the Navy erroneously considered that the C-40 and MMA aircraft can be housed in Type II hangars.

Volume IV (Department of the Navy, Analyses and Recommendations) of the DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission states that the Navy's two recommendations for closure (NAS Atlanta and NAS Willow Grove) decreases excess capacity for Aviation Operations from 19% to 16%.⁵ Not considered in this review of excess capacity are the future reductions of capacity due to the demolition of old, unusable hangars. For the East Coast Maritime Patrol community, the capacity reported through the data call process actually counted hangars that were graded either substandard or inadequate and never considered the fact that many of these hangars are scheduled for demolition.

Navy analysis determined that NAS Brunswick currently has 20 Type II Hangar Modules. At the time of the Navy's capacity data call two hangars with Service Facility Condition Codes of "Inadequate" were included in the total number of hangar modules. Since this data call, Hangar 3, which equated to 4 hangar modules, has been demolished and Hangar 1, which is another 4 hangar modules, is due to be demolished in FY06 due to failing rafters.⁶ Reducing the available hangar modules at NAS Brunswick due to the demolition of Hangars 1 and 3 will leave this base with a capacity of only 12.

⁴ DOD Base Closure and realignment Report to the Commission; Department of the Navy, Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV), pages C-2 and C-3.

⁵ DOD Base Closure and realignment Report to the Commission; Department of the Navy, Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV), page C-8

⁶ BRAC Capacity Data Call, 7 January; Certified by: Anne Davis; Originating Activity: NAS Brunswick, ME; Date: 3/28/2005; page 72

Additionally, Navy analysis determined that NAS Jacksonville has a capacity of 20.5 Type II hangar modules. These hangar modules equate to nine different hangar structures with seven structures given a Service Facility Condition Code of "Substandard." Four hangars, Hangars 113, 114, 115, and 116, are to be demolished following the completion of the S-3 aircraft sundown plan in FY08. These four hangars must be demolished to provide ramp space prior to the arrival of the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), the follow on aircraft to the P-3, and are old and not suitable for the MMA. Hangars 113, 114, 115, and 116 represent eight hangar modules. There are also three other hangars at NAS Jacksonville with Service Facility Conditions Codes of "Substandard" that host the Navy's helicopter community. Several of these hangars are also to be demolished to make ready for the construction of new helicopter hangar facilities at Jacksonville.⁷

Finally, of the 20.5 hangar modules at NAS Jacksonville, only 7.5 modules are used by the P-3 and C-40 communities (Hangar 1000 – 5 modules; VP-30 hangar with 2.5 modules). None of these modules are capable of hosting the MMA or C-40 aircraft which are derivatives of Boeing's 737 aircraft. As a result, a new MMA hangar is planned to be built at NAS Jacksonville and major renovations will be needed to hangar 1000.

In summary, it can be seen from the above analysis that the excess capacity believed to exist at the two East Coast Maritime Patrol air bases will soon be greatly reduced due to the demolition of substandard and inadequate hangars. Capacity at NAS Brunswick has already been reduced 4 hangar modules with the demolition of Hangar 3 in December 2004. When Hangar 1 is demolished in FY06, the base capacity will be further reduced four additional hangar modules. The net result is a hangar capacity at NAS Brunswick of 12 hangar modules. At NAS Jacksonville, hangar capacity will be reduced as the S-3 aircraft community completes decommissioning in FY08. When hangars 113, 114, 115 and 116 are demolished to create ramp space for the introduction

⁷ BRAC Capacity Data Call, 7 January; Certified by Anne Davis; Originating Activity, NAS Jacksonville, FL; 3/28/2005, page 87

of the MMA aircraft, excess capacity will be reduced by eight hangar modules. Capacity at Jacksonville will be further reduced as substandard hangars are demolished for the recapitalization of hangars for the helicopter community. Although new hangars will be built at Jacksonville for the MMA and for Navy helicopters, the demolition of old, substandard hangars will yield a net reduction in overall hangar capacity at the base. Thus, from this analysis it can be seen that the overall excess capacity within Naval Aviation is much less than currently calculated and the recommendations to consolidate all Navy MPA squadron at one air base should be carefully reconsidered.

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response

Jonathan Medalia
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Summary

This report focuses on a possible terrorist nuclear attack on a U.S. seaport, a low-probability but high-consequence threat. Ports are vulnerable; an attack could cause local devastation and affect the global economy. Terrorists might obtain a bomb in several ways, though each presents difficulties. Current ability to detect a bomb appears limited. The United States is using technology, intelligence, international cooperation, etc., to try to thwart an attack. Issues for Congress include choosing a suitable level of effort, safeguarding foreign nuclear material, improving port security, and mitigating economic effects of an attack. This report will be updated as developments occur.

Background

Terrorists have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction – chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Hearings and media articles since September 11 have highlighted radiological dispersal devices, or “dirty bombs,” which would use standard explosives or other means to disperse radioactive materials. Dirty bombs would be quite feasible for a terrorist group to make, given the limited expertise needed and the availability of explosives and radioactive material. An attack with such a weapon likely would kill or injure few people and cause little property damage, though it could cause panic and might require closing some areas for an undetermined time. While a terrorist attack using a nuclear weapon (a device that caused a substantial nuclear explosive yield, as distinct from a dirty bomb) has much lower feasibility, it merits consideration because it would have much higher consequence.

The September 11 attacks showed that many U.S. facilities could be attractive targets for terrorist attack. One set of targets that has attracted attention from Congress is the nation’s seaports. (See CRS Report RS21079, *Maritime Security: Overview of Issues*.) If terrorists smuggled a Hiroshima-sized bomb (15 kilotons) into a port and set it off, the attack would destroy buildings out to a mile or two; start fires, especially in a port that handled petroleum and chemicals; spread fallout over many square miles; disrupt commerce; and kill many people. By one estimate, a 10- to 20-kiloton weapon detonated in a major seaport or Washington, DC, would kill 50,000 to 1 million people and would

result in direct property damage of \$50 to \$500 billion, losses due to trade disruption of \$100 billion to \$200 billion, and indirect costs of \$300 billion to \$1.2 trillion.¹

Terrorists might try to smuggle a bomb into a U.S. port in many ways, such as in a tanker or a dry bulk freighter, but sea containers may provide them a particularly attractive route. A container is “[a] truck trailer body that can be detached from the chassis for loading into a vessel, a rail car or stacked in a container depot.”² Much of the world’s cargo moves by container.³ The (then) U.S. Customs Service processed 5.7 million containers entering the United States by ship in 2001.⁴ It screens data for all these containers,⁵ but inspects “only about 2 percent of the total volume of trade entering the country each year.”⁶ Containers could easily hold a nuclear weapon. Robert Bonner, Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, believes that an attack using a bomb in a container would halt container shipments, leading to “devastating” consequences for the global economy, bringing some countries to “the edge of economic collapse.”⁷ The October 2002 lockout of West Coast ports demonstrated some of these ripple effects on the world economy on a small scale. People can, however, find ways to minimize economic problems. The Y2K computer bug did not result in disaster, in part because organizations took steps to ward off the problem. In an effort to reduce port vulnerability, Congress passed S. 1214, Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295).

Terrorist nuclear weapons: routes to a bomb. A terrorist group (as distinct from a nation) might obtain a nuclear bomb by several plausible routes. In each case, a reasonable estimate of explosive yield is that of the Hiroshima bomb, 15 kilotons, equivalent to the explosive force of 15,000 tons of TNT.

Russia. Strategic nuclear weapons (long-range weapons the Soviet Union would have used to attack the United States) are reportedly well guarded on missiles or, thanks in part to U.S. assistance, in storage. In contrast, thousands of lower-yield weapons intended for use in combat are less well secured, and numbers and locations are uncertain. (See CRS Issue Brief IB98038, *Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control*)

¹ Abt Associates, “The Economic Impact of Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability,” executive summary, April 30, 2003, p. 7. [http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/ES-Economic_Impact_of_Nuclear_Terrorist_Attacks.pdf]

² U.S. Department of Transportation. Maritime Administration. “Glossary of Shipping Terms.” [<http://www.marad.dot.gov/publications/glossary/C.html>]. Typical dimensions of a container are 40 ft by 8½ ft by 8 ft.

³ U.S. Department of the Treasury. Customs Service. Factsheet: “U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative to Safeguard U.S., Global Economy.” February 2002. [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/press_releases/22002/02222002.xml]

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ U.S. Department of the Treasury. Customs Service. Fact Sheet: “The ‘2 Percent Myth’: Automated System, Technology, People Screen Cargo for Contraband,” May 2002.

⁶ U.S. Department of the Treasury. Customs Service. Robert Bonner, U.S. Customs Commissioner, Speech Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., January 17, 2002. [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/jan172002.xml]

⁷ Ibid.

Issues.) Terrorists might buy or steal one of these weapons. The weapons might (or might not) have devices to prevent unauthorized use, or terrorists might lack confidence that they could make a weapon work. Without such confidence, terrorists might “mine” the weapon for nuclear materials and components to make their own device.

Pakistan. Other nations have nuclear weapons. U.S., British, French, and Israeli weapons are thought to be well guarded. Chinese weapons are also thought to be well guarded, though less is known on this point. Control is less certain for India and Pakistan. Of the two, it appears more likely that terrorists might obtain a bomb from Pakistan. That nation asserts that it has complete control over its weapons, but that could change if Pakistan were taken over by Islamic fundamentalists sympathetic to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In this scenario, the “donors” would presumably give the terrorists detailed instructions for operating the bombs.

Build a bomb. The Hiroshima bomb was a “gun assembly” weapon. Its nuclear explosive component was a gun barrel about 6 inches in diameter by 6 feet long. It was capped at each end, with standard explosive at one end, a mass of uranium highly enriched in the isotope 235 (highly enriched uranium, or HEU) at the other end, and a second HEU mass in the middle. Detonating the explosive shot one mass of HEU into the other, rapidly assembling a mass large enough to support a fission chain reaction. (Plutonium cannot be used.) This is the simplest type of nuclear weapon. U.S. scientists had such high confidence in the design that they did not test the Hiroshima bomb.

Many experts believe that a terrorist group having access to HEU and the requisite skills, but without the resources available to a nation, could build such a weapon. Five former Los Alamos nuclear weapons experts held that a crude nuclear weapon “could be constructed by a group not previously engaged in designing or building nuclear weapons, providing a number of requirements were adequately met.”⁸ The requirements they list, though, are substantial. They include detailed design drawings and specifications; individuals skilled in a wide range of weapons skills; the necessary equipment; and extensive preparations to create a bomb quickly once in possession of HEU so as to reduce the risk of detection. A National Research Council study presents another view. “The basic technical information needed to construct a workable nuclear device is readily available in the open literature. The primary impediment that prevents countries or technically competent terrorist groups from developing nuclear weapons is the availability of SNM [special nuclear materials, i.e., HEU and plutonium-239], especially HEU.”⁹

It would be difficult for a terrorist group to obtain enough HEU for a weapon. Many nations have gone to great lengths to protect it. The International Atomic Energy Agency has safeguards to protect, among other things, HEU in nuclear reactors. The United States has had a number of programs over the past decade to help former Soviet republics protect nuclear weapons, material, and knowledge. (See CRS Report 97-1027, *Nunn-*

⁸ J. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Maraman, and Jacob Wechsler, “Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?” Washington, Nuclear Control Institute. n.d., n.p. [<http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm>].

⁹ National Research Council. Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism. *Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism*. Washington, National Academy Press, 2002, p. 40. [<http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10415.html>].

CRS-4

Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress.) Perhaps the best evidence that these efforts have succeeded so far is that terrorists have not detonated a nuclear weapon. At the same time, some are concerned that terrorists could obtain HEU. For example, the National Research Council study noted above rated the threat level from SNM from Russia as “High – large inventories of SNM are stored at many sites that apparently lack inventory controls and indigenous threats have increased.”¹⁰

Vulnerability of ports and shipping. Ports may be attractive targets for terrorists. With many of the largest ports in or near major cities, a nuclear bomb detonated in a port could kill many thousands of people, interrupt flows of U.S. commerce, and perhaps cause a global economic disruption. Ports are vulnerable. Many are flat, being at the ocean’s edge, so would offer little shielding against weapon effects. Some have great quantities of inflammable material, such as fuel; fires could extend the area of destruction and release toxic gases. While ports may stretch on for miles, a 15-kiloton weapon would have enough force to destroy many key facilities of a typical port.

Front-line ability to detect nuclear weapons is limited. CRS visits to the Customs Service in Baltimore in July 2002 and the Coast Guard in Philadelphia in August 2002 produced the following information. Customs’ Container Security Initiative (CSI) seeks to improve security at foreign ports for U.S.-bound containers, but Customs inspectors do not inspect cargo there and do not control personnel selection or port operations. The Coast Guard cannot open containers at sea for various reasons. For example, they are tightly packed and the door is part of a container’s structure, so one container under others might crumple if the door were opened. Technology is lacking. A Coast Guard officer wrote, “our method of detecting nuclear and biological weapons is ... our eyes, ears, and brains. We currently have no more sophisticated equipment than that.” At Baltimore, Customs inspects about 2 percent of containers. For some, it uses a sophisticated machine that x-rays entire containers; for others, it unloads all items from a container, may x-ray them, and searches some items. Customs agents have pager-size radiation detectors. Terrorists could exploit weaknesses. They could infiltrate foreign ports as inspectors or longshoremen, and pass a container with a weapon into a secured zone. The Coast Guard almost certainly could not detect a bomb in a container or in the structure of a ship. Customs targets containers for inspection based on cargo manifest data, port of last call, shipping line, etc. Terrorists, however, could be expected to go to great lengths to make a bomb-carrying container appear normal. Small radiation detectors might detect highly radioactive isotopes usable in dirty bombs, but could not be sure of detecting less-radioactive uranium-235. Once a ship arrives in port, any inspection could be too late.

Responses and Countermeasures

The central approach to reducing vulnerability to a terrorist nuclear attack is defense in depth, which uses multiple methods to detect and interdict a weapon. Many existing technologies aid this effort; others are under development. Intelligence seeks clues that terrorists were trying to obtain HEU or to make or smuggle a bomb. Coast Guard, Customs, and others conduct inspections. U.S. agreements with foreign governments help

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 44.

screen cargo.¹¹ Although no one method is perfect, together they can increase the odds of detecting a weapon. It would be harder to evade several means of detection than just one, as attempts to reduce what one sensor detects may make a bomb more visible to another sensor using a different signature, or may reduce the likelihood that the bomb would work. Further, a terrorist group would not know the limits of detection capability, so would have to assume a capability greater than what existed. Defense in depth could involve outfitting every port, airport, and border crossing with several types of sensors and the personnel to operate them, expanding intelligence capabilities with new sensors and analysts, placing more U.S. agents in foreign ports, and upgrading Coast Guard and Customs equipment and adding personnel. Such steps would involve large costs.

While press articles focus on how the United States can augment its detection capabilities, the struggle is two-sided. If we deploy a new sensor at some ports, terrorists might detonate a weapon before it is inspected, or hide it in a container bound for another port. If foreign ports screened containers before being loaded onto U.S.-bound ships, they could infiltrate the port. If we secured the world's largest ports, they could use smaller ones. If we assured the security of every U.S.-bound container, they might smuggle a weapon in a freighter or supertanker. If we secured all U.S.-bound containers, they might ship a bomb to Mexico and bring it into the United States in a small boat or airplane. In short, despite overwhelming advantages that the United States and its trading partners possess in technology and organization, terrorists have other advantages.

Policy Options

Securing nuclear materials. The possibility that a terrorist group could make a nuclear weapon given enough HEU, and the difficulty of preventing terrorists from smuggling a weapon into a U.S. port, show the value of the effort to secure nuclear weapons and materials in Russia and elsewhere. Are current efforts sufficient?

Forensics. The United States can often identify the origin of nuclear material used in a bomb. This forensic capability strengthens the value of controlling Russian nuclear weapons and materials: finding that material for a bomb detonated in the United States came from Russia, a likely source, would in all probability lead to the conclusion that the material was stolen rather than that Russia conducted the attack. At the same time, augmenting already-excellent forensic capability through technology and intelligence could help deter other nations from giving nuclear materials to a terrorist group.

Ports in major cities. The terrorist weapons discussed earlier have much less explosive yield than nuclear weapons carried by bombers and long-range missiles, and a smaller destructive radius. Blast damage might extend 1 to 2 miles. (Fire and fallout

¹¹ For example, the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Bureau of the Department of Homeland Security implements the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which involves bilateral agreements with foreign ports that export to the United States. Under CSI, which began in January 2002, CBP teams work with host governments to identify high-risk containers for screening before the containers leave port. A CBP website reports in August 2003 that the top 20 ports worldwide, which handle about 70% of containers destined for the United States, participate in CSI, and that more will participate.

[http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/import/cargo_control/csi] See also Bonner, Speech Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

July 26, 2005

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Collins:

This is in response to the July 21, 2005, email from Ms. Mackenzie Eaglen of your staff concerning the strategic value of Naval Air Station (NAS) Brunswick. Specifically, Ms. Eaglen asked: "What is the strategic importance of BNAS and define the associated homeland defense and surge capability requirements of BNAS?"


Commander Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) supports retention of NAS Brunswick as a Naval Air Field (NAF) because it will support future requirements for homeland defense and surge capability. The specific Maritime Homeland Defense (MHL) requirement is stated in terms of response time and aircraft mission capabilities. The loss of NAS Brunswick will increase P-3 response time to any maritime threat against the northeast coast of the United States. Because this area is not a standard operating area for U.S. naval vessels, and because of the proximity of NAS Brunswick to the great circle navigation routes from Europe, P-3s operating out of NAS Brunswick currently provide the MHL initial response coverage. United States Northern Command, working in cooperation with the military departments and the U.S. Coast Guard, is developing an air-to-surface concept of operations that will address this responsiveness concern with other assets or force packages that will be combined with the current P-3 mission capabilities to facilitate maximum response flexibility. Numerous sites in the northeast have been considered as potentially feasible locations to conduct P-3 detachment operations (although additional detailed analysis is required), and NAS Brunswick continues to be viewed by the Navy as the optimal site in New England for P-3 detachment operations. In addition to its location in the northeast, NAS Brunswick is an ideal location to support P-3 detachment missions because it has a fully functional weapons facility that can support all weapons available for deployment onboard the P-3, and because its geographic location permits armed aircraft to depart on maritime missions without flying over inhabited areas.

NAS Brunswick also has enormous strategic value as the last remaining active DoD airfield in the northeast. NAS Brunswick supports (and NAF Brunswick will continue to support) several large NATO joint training exercise opportunities. In addition, NAS Brunswick is a critical logistics and refueling hub for DoD aircraft flowing in and out of the U.S. Central Command and U.S. European Command theatre of operations. NAS Brunswick will also continue to function as an important location for aviation training, because it can and will remain capable of logistically supporting all of the aircraft currently in the DoD inventory. Its utility is not limited to DoD aircraft, but includes

aircraft of the Air National Guard and other Federal agencies. NAS Brunswick will function in a similar manner to NAS Key West, which also has no home-based operational assets. In addition, NAF Brunswick will continue to be the home of the Department of the Navy's east coast Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) School, and will also continue to host Navy and Marine Corps reserve units.

I trust this information satisfactorily addresses your immediate concerns. My staff is available to meet with your staff to respond to any specific questions. If we can be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Anne Rathmell Davis". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "A".

Anne Rathmell Davis
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy
For Base Realignment and Closure

Testimony of
William L. Babbin
National Association of Government Employees, R1-77
before the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
on
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Washington, DC
August 10, 2005

My name is Bill Babbin. I am the president of the National Association of Government Employees local R1-77 at Naval Air Station Brunswick (NASB).

You've read the quotes and heard the remarks made by many in senior leadership positions throughout the Defense Department regarding the value of NASB. I'd also like to share with you today the thoughts and concerns of the proud men and women who serve the NASB in various capacities. Many of my brothers and sisters have spent their entire life tied to the military in one capacity or another and are very proud of their service to their nation and consider the military in general an extended family. We serve each day knowing that each of us is as equally important as the other in accomplishing the mission of the Navy. We know the high value of NASB for today and the future of America.

The employees of NASB have worked tirelessly to help bring the millions of dollars in investments in infrastructure to make NASB a base for today and tomorrow. We also realize that the threats to our great nation will change and along with those changes so must the mission of Navy. For this very reason we built the brand new 32 million dollar hangar, the only hangar today in the inventory able to accommodate the new Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft. We understand the value of having a base with dual 8,000 foot runways, unencumbered airspace, easy access to the major shipping lanes and our close proximity to Europe.

I'd like to also talk about the quality of life in Maine because I think this is an important factor when DOD considers the quality of life for its military members and the location of a military facility. The data the DOD collected for this subject showed some interesting results that didn't surprise me but just enforced what I have always known as a father of three living in Maine. And that is that Maine is a great place to raise a family.

These DOD numbers showed that the local Uniform Crime Reports per 100,000 people for the Brunswick area was 3,148, well below the national average of 4,118. Jacksonville was 5,821 per 100,000, well above the national average.

It also showed that Brunswick area had a physician to patient ratio of 1:212, while Jacksonville is at 1:384.

Moreover Brunswick average pupil to teacher ratio is 12:1 with an average high school graduation rate of 87 percent. Jacksonville has a pupil to teacher ratio of 19:1 with an average high school graduation rate of 68 percent.

The unemployment numbers for Brunswick are 3 percent. For Jacksonville they are 5 percent. For spouses who have to move and locate work in Jacksonville it will compound the problem.

Those numbers, combined with the strategic location, unencumbered air space, room to grow, easy access to the sea-lanes and the infrastructure investments already made, paint a clear picture for those of us who provide the services for the Naval Air Station: that NASB should remain intact as is.

The workers of NASB serve her proudly and want to continue to do so. NASB needs viable missions that keep planes flying at NASB and the military community alive in the area for the security of America.

**TOWN OF BRUNSWICK
PROCLAMATION IN SUPPORT OF THE
BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION**

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is the only active military facility capable of providing aerial surveillance and interdiction along the United States northeastern corridor, more commonly known as the New England coast and the Maritimes; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is a major asset in the support of Homeland Security and Defense, and, more particularly, in the fight against terrorism in the United States; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is geographically situated such that joint forces may operate and train together; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is sufficient in size and capacity to allow joint military use with both active and reserve units; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick has recently been completely reconstructed to handle any aircraft in the military inventory, past, present and projected for the future; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick has a logistical advantage as the only fully operational air facility in the northeast; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is a welcome and vital link in the continued success of the economy of the Bath, Brunswick, Topsham region and the entire social fabric of the surrounding communities;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that,

The Town of Brunswick, Maine declares and affirms its complete support for the retention of NAS Brunswick as a fully operational naval air station;


The community fully supports the Constitutional rights and authority of the BRAC Commission in requiring the deliverance of any and all pertinent Department of Defense data for a full review by said commission; and

The community supports and encourages the retention of all assets now currently located at NAS Brunswick, allowing for the continued security of the United States homeland, in general, and the northeastern coastline, in particular; and

The community would expect the Department of Defense to recognize the inherent vital economic and protective role that NAS Brunswick holds in the northeast, in particular, and for the United States, at large; and

The community fully endorses and sanctions NAS Brunswick in its current use, as well as its potential use in establishing essential joint military force structures in the future defense of the American homeland.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that this Proclamation seeks and enjoins the continuation of the Department of the Navy activities as enumerated above at NAS Brunswick.



Signed this 1st day of June, 2005.



Forrest Lowe, Chairman

JUNE 1, 2003

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is the only active military facility capable of providing aerial surveillance and interdiction along the United States northeastern corridor, more commonly known as the New England coast and the Maritimes; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is a major asset in the support of Homeland Security and Defense, and, more particularly, in the fight against terrorism in the United States; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is geographically situated such that joint forces may operate and train together; and


WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is sufficient in size and capacity to allow joint military use with both active and reserves units; and





WHEREAS NAS Brunswick has recently been completely reconstructed to handle any aircraft in the military inventory, both past, present and projected for the future; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick has a logistical advantage as the only fully operational air facility in the northeast; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is a welcome and vital link in the continued success of the Bath, Brunswick, Topsham region economy and the entire social fabric of the surrounding communities;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT PROCLAIMED AND RESOLVED that the City of Bath, Maine declares and affirms through this vote complete support by the Honorable Bath City Council for the retention of NAS Brunswick as a fully operational naval air station; that the Bath City Council fully supports the Constitutional rights and authority of the BRAC Commission in requiring the deliverance of any and all pertinent Department of Defense data for a full review by said commission; that the Bath City Council supports and encourages the retention of all assets now currently located at NAS Brunswick, allowing for the continued security of the United States homeland, in general, and the Northeastern Coastline, in particular; that the Bath City Council would expect the Department of Defense to recognize the inherent vital economic and protective role that NAS Brunswick holds in the northeast; in particular, and for the United States, at large; that the Bath City Council fully endorses and sanctions NAS Brunswick in its current use, as well as its potential use in establishing essential joint military force structures in the future defense of the American homeland; and through this Proclamation seeks and enjoins the continuation of the Department of Navy activities as enumerated above at NAS Brunswick.


Andrew Winglass, Chairperson

	
	_____
	_____
	_____



**TOWN OF TOPSHAM
PROCLAMATION IN SUPPORT OF THE
BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION**

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is the only active military facility capable of providing aerial surveillance and interdiction along the United States northeastern corridor, more commonly known as the New England coast and the Maritimes; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is a major asset in the support of Homeland Security and Defense, and, more particularly, in the fight against terrorism in the United States; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is geographically situated such that joint forces may operate and train together; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is sufficient in size and capacity to allow joint military use with both active and reserve units; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick has recently been completely reconstructed to handle any aircraft in the military inventory, past, present and projected for the future; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick has a logistical advantage as the only fully operational air facility in the northeast; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is a welcome and vital link in the continued success of the economy of the Bath, Brunswick, Topsham region and the entire social fabric of the surrounding communities;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that,

The Town of Topsham, Maine declares and affirms its complete support for the retention of NAS Brunswick as a fully operational naval air station;

The community fully supports the Constitutional rights and authority of the BRAC Commission in requiring the deliverance of any and all pertinent Department of Defense data for a full review by said commission; and

The community supports and encourages the retention of all assets now currently located at NAS Brunswick, allowing for the continued security of the United States homeland, in general, and the northeastern coastline, in particular; and

The community would expect the Department of Defense to recognize the inherent vital economic and protective role that NAS Brunswick holds in the northeast, in particular, and for the United States, at large; and

The Community fully endorses and sanctions NAS Brunswick in its current use, as well as its potential use in establishing essential joint military force structures in the future defense of the American homeland.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that this Proclamation seeks and enjoins the continuation of the Department of the Navy activities as enumerated above at NAS Brunswick.

Signed this 1st day of June, 2005.



Donald Russell
Donald Russell, Chairman