

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners,

My presentation to you today covers a realignment of Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta, Georgia to make room for a Navy move from Naval Air Station Oceana in Virginia.

Moody Air Force Base is presently the home of five Air Force training and support squadrons with 122 aircraft and approximately 5,000 military and civilian personnel.

opposed

Moody has 2 parallel runways

Moody 60.72 on Search & Rescue

DCN:11691



6. Moody Air Force Base, GA

Realign:

- Moody AFB, GA. All aircraft and manpower to be distributed at DoD discretion.

Requirements:

- TBD

Associated DoD Recommendations:

- AF-6: Maintenance moves between Moody and Shaw AFB. Moody gains A-10 aircraft from Eielson realignment.
- AF-35: Moody gains A-10 aircraft from Pope realignment.
- E&T-14: Moody loses training mission and T-6 and T-38 aircraft to multiple AFBs.

Navigation icons: Home, Back, Forward, Next, Refresh, Exit


Under this realignment, all U.S. Air Force assets at Moody AFB would be required to relocate to other suitable facilities.

The current list of realignment and closure recommendations ^{contains} ~~currently contains~~ three minor realignments concerning Moody. The maintenance moves between Moody and Shaw AFB involve moving base-level ALQ-184 intermediate maintenance from Moody to Shaw and in turn relocating base-level TF-34 engine intermediate maintenance from Shaw to Moody. Under this same recommendation, the Department recommends relocating 12 A-10s from Eielson AFB, AK to Moody AFB.

The Department of Defense also recommends relocating 36 A-10 aircraft from Pope Air Force Base to Moody.

Additionally, the current Department of Defense position realigns Moody by relocating its Primary Phase of Fixed-wing Pilot Training and Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals Training along with the associated aircraft, namely the T-6s and T-38s, to multiple Air Force Bases.

DCN:11691



 **6. Moody Air Force Base, GA**

Reasons for Consideration:

- Allows for NAS Oceana closure and relocation of Master Jet Base flying mission to Moody.
- Allows staff to perform in depth analysis.
- If voted on today, the Commission could consider the realignment of Moody Air Force Base to make it a Navy installation

Navigation icons: Up, Left, Right, Home, and EXIT.

The primary reason to consider adding Moody AFB for further realignment is to provide a potential location for Naval Air Station Oceana's Master Jet Base. As previously mentioned the operational and training capability at Oceana is significantly constrained by Airspace and field boundary encroachment.

For initial analysis pertaining to this potential ADD, the staff assumed that all major units at Moody would have to depart the base and be relocated to other locations. For purposes of the COBRA analysis, the Air Force was given leave to select the future locations for the departing units.

Placing Moody as an addition to the Secretary's list would allow the staff to formally explore this option through in-depth analysis. If voted on today, the Commission could consider the realignment of Moody Air Force Base to make it a Navy installation.

DCN:11691



6. Moody Air Force Base, GA

INSTALLATION	TABLE OF PERSONNEL CHANGES							
	OUT		IN		NET GAIN/(LOSS)		CONT.	TOTAL DIRECT
	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV		
Moody AFB, GA	(4,603)	(286)	0	0	(4,603)	(286)	0	(4,889)

- Navy would bring in 10,000 people.

↑ ← ▶ ↺ ↻ EXIT

The chart on this slide shows the manpower implications of redistributing *all* of Moody's Air Force forces and functions. As a result, the net personnel loss would be 4,603 military positions and 286 civilian positions, with a total direct impact of 4,889 positions. Again, these numbers reflect the Air Force departure from Moody AFB. The numbers do not consider the arrival of any Navy units, which would comprise approximately 10,000 people.

DCN:11691



6. Moody Air Force Base, GA


COBRA DATA 14 July 2005	
One Time Cost	\$178.7 M
Net Implementation Savings	(\$220.6 M)
Annual Recurring Savings	(\$131.1 M)
Payback Period	1 year
Net Present Value at 2025	(\$1,476.4 M)

EXIT

As previously discussed by my colleague, the Navy ran four COBRA scenarios for closing NAS Oceana. To briefly recap, one such scenario included relocating the Master Jet Base to Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta, GA. To carry out this realignment, the COBRA run shows a one-time cost of \$494 million with a payback period of 13 years.

The Air Force also ran a scenario which considers the departure of Air Force Assets for an Oceana move to Moody. The COBRA data from this run shows a one-time cost of approximately \$179 million with a payback period of 1 year and a net present value of those savings in 2025 of \$1.5 billion.

DCN:11691



ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF COMMENTS
Impact on Total Force (Criteria 1)	TBD	TBD	Disposition of current Moody force structure at discretion of DoD.
Availability/sufficiency of facilities at Moody (Criteria 2)	Require ~\$500 million in MILCON to accommodate MJB	TBD	Substantial amount of MILCON may be required due to need for increased military housing, runways, ramp, etc.
Availability of training areas (Criteria 2)	TBD	TBD	Flight restrictions and scheduling coordination could pose issues.
Economic impact & ability of community infrastructure to support personnel (Criteria 6 & 7)	TBD	Believes they can support an additional 15,000 military personnel.	The relocation of ~10,000 personnel would result in an ~10% net direct increase of jobs. The community's ability to absorb this increase is questionable.

There are four issues I'd like to discuss.

The first issue deals with the impact on total force and operational readiness. There are a number of Air Force assets currently at Moody AFB that would need to be relocated to other suitable Air Force installations. Those assets include the manpower as well as the aircraft associated with the 820th Security Forces Group and the Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) forces. As the disposition of these assets would be left to the Department of Defense, the impact on the receiving locations and communities is currently unknown.

The second issue, also discussed in the Oceana presentation, corresponds to the availability of facilities at Moody. Closing NAS Oceana and relocating its personnel, aircraft, and equipment to Moody would require a significant amount of military construction. A substantial amount of MILCON would also be necessary to build additional runways, hangars, and ramp space. In addition, there is a substantial shortfall in personnel support facilities needed to meet Navy requirements. At present, there are approximately 300 on-base family housing units at Moody with an additional 350 slated for construction and 95 for demolition, for a total projected 555 units of military family housing.

The third issue is related to the availability of suitable training areas. At Moody AFB, there are currently no over-water training ranges owned or operated by Moody which are necessary for naval flight training operations. In addition, adding upwards of 200+ naval aircraft to the air-to-ground or air-to-air training airspace in the region could produce challenges in scheduling of airspace use.

The fourth issue summarized on this slide deals with economic impact on the existing communities near Moody AFB. Relocating approximately 10,000 personnel to an MSA with ~~a population of~~ ^{employment} approximately 60,000 would result in a net direct increase in jobs of almost 10 percent. Though the community believes it could support an additional 15,000 military personnel, given the current status of on-base housing at Moody as well as other quality of life considerations, the community's ability to absorb such a population increase is questionable.

DCN:11691



6. Moody Air Force Base, GA

DoD Response:

- Navy examined several alternatives for an east coast MJB, including Moody AFB.
- While Moody is a feasible alternative to Oceana, it has a number of factors that make it less desirable than retaining Oceana, including significant one-time MILCON costs.
- The best basing alternative for East Coast tactical aviation would be to build a new 21st century Master Jet Base, but such action would occur outside the BRAC window.
- Relocating to Moody within the timeframe of this BRAC would require extensive infrastructure upgrades, take significant time and resources, and still would not attain the operational or quality of life standards expected of this century.

GAO Comment:

- None


EXIT

In the July 1 BRAC Commission letter, we asked the Department of Defense to provide comment to the following question: What consideration was given to the realignment of the Master Jet Base (MJB) located at NAS Oceana, VA, to Moody AFB, GA? DoD responded, "In the case of realignment to Moody AFB, while it was considered a feasible alternative, it would incur significant one-time costs (almost \$500 million) and result in a long payback period (14 years). We concluded the best long-term basing alternative for East Coast Navy tactical aviation would be to build a new 21st century naval air station able to accommodate legacy and planned high performance aircraft, but such action would optimally occur outside the BRAC window."

In addition, DoD commented that "relocating to Moody (built in 1940) or another existing installation within the timeframe of this BRAC would require extensive infrastructure upgrades, take significant time and resources, and still would not attain the operational or quality of life standards expected of this century."

GAO's BRAC report did not comment specifically on DoD's recommendation for Moody.

DCN:11691



I would like to reiterate that if voted in favor of today, Moody Air Force Base would be added for consideration to DoD's list of recommendations for closure or realignment as a realignment to make way for a Navy move from Oceana to Moody. This ADD would complement the existing OSD recommendation for changing missions at Moody by opening the full range of potential activities at Moody for additional analysis by the staff.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my presentation. We will be happy to address any questions you or the other Commissioners have prior to any motions made.

DCN:11691

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 2/2
 Data As Of 7/14/2005 2:54:06 PM, Report Created 7/14/2005 2:55:00 PM

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : A:\COBRA USAF CT-0457 (S-150) Close Moody for Oceana.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: COBRA USAF CT-0457 Moody (USAF -150)
 Std Fcsts File : C:\COBRA\COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
MILCON	10,028	111,418	0	0	0	0	121,446	0
Person	0	0	0	26,927	17,073	0	61,073	17,073
Overhd	3,475	3,868	3,217	21,139	19,307	19,307	70,314	19,307
Moving	0	0	9,285	17,157	0	0	26,443	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1,359	558	5,691	15,130	11,644	11,644	46,036	11,644
TOTAL	14,871	115,845	18,194	80,353	48,025	48,025	325,313	48,025

Savings in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	5,994	5,994	5,994	82,849	150,588	150,588	384,026	150,588
Overhd	202	0	0	27,685	27,685	27,685	101,038	28,523
Moving	0	0	0	5,766	0	0	5,766	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	776	50,127	1,035	2,937	0	0	54,895	0
TOTAL	6,972	56,121	7,049	119,237	178,273	178,273	545,326	179,111

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 1/2
 Data As Of 7/14/2005 2:54:06 PM, Report Created 7/14/2005 2:54:59 PM

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : A:\COBRA USAF CT-0457 (S-150) Close Moody for Oceana.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: COBRA USAF CT-0457 Moody (USAF -150)
 Std Fcsts File : C:\COBRA\COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

Net Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
MILCON	10,028	111,418	0	0	0	0	121,446	0
Person	0	0	-55,922	-133,515	-133,515	-133,515	-322,952	-133,515
Overhd	-2,519	-2,126	-2,777	-8,377	-8,377	-8,377	-30,723	-9,216
Moving	-202	0	9,285	11,391	0	0	20,474	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	593	-49,569	4,636	12,193	11,644	11,644	-8,859	11,644
TOTAL	7,899	59,724	-11,144	-38,884	-130,248	-130,248	-220,614	-131,086

POSITIONS ELIMINATED	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Off	0	0	0	156	0	0	156
Enl	0	0	0	1,272	0	0	1,272
S-u	0	0	0	186	0	0	186
Civ	0	0	0	1,596	0	0	1,596
TOT	0	0	0	3,204	0	0	3,204

POSITIONS REALIGNED	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Off	0	0	0	267	0	0	267
Enl	0	0	0	2,908	0	0	2,908
S-u	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	0	118	0	0	118
TOT	0	0	0	3,293	0	0	3,293

Summary:
 In response to Congressional Tasking CT-0457, this COBRA exercise identifies the additive costs for the removal of all USAF activities from Moody AFB, GA so the USN can use the facilities for approximately 250 jet aircraft from the Master Jet Base Oceana, Virginia Beach, VA. The 48 A-10 aircraft provided to Moody in other BRAC scenarios will instead move to Holloman AFB, NM. The 820th Security Forces Group will move to Keesler AFB, MS. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) forces will be divided between Davis and Moody AFB. The 3rd Air Support and Rescue Squadron (ASRS) will be divided between Moody AFB and Keesler AFB. The 34th Civil Engineer Squadron (CES) will be divided between Moody AFB and Keesler AFB. The 4th and 5th Air Support and Rescue Squadrons (ASRS) will go to Davis Monthan AFB, AZ. Tanker stays to support the Navy. Support unrelaxed to the station will go to USAF Base X. Most movements occur in 2008 with manpower authorizations moving the first day of 2009 and effective closure late in 2009.

If this action is seriously considered for implementation, USAF will need to update the Eielson and Pope scenarios to produce more accurate cost savings projections.

MIL 4603
 CIV 286
 TOTAL 4889
 DVI

DCN:11691

COBRA PERSONNEL/SF/SUSTAINMENT/RECAP/BOS DELTAS REPORT (COBRA V6.10) - Page 2
 Date As Of 7/14/2005 2:54:06 PM, Report Created 7/14/2005 2:54:53 PM
 Department : USAF
 Scenario File : A:\COBRA USAF CT-0457 (S-150) Close Moody for Oceana.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: COBRA USAF CT-0457 Moody (USAF -150)
 Sld Facts File : C:\COBRA\COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

Base	Personnel			Recapitalization (2005\$)			Chg/Per
	Start	Finish	Change	Start	Finish	Change	
Moody AFB	4,889	0	-4,889	5,994,203	0	-5,994,203	1,226
Eglin AFB	11,759	12,508	749	19,971,215	20,204,686	233,471	316
Patrick AFB	4,552	4,565	13	8,171,339	8,402,091	230,752	34
Holloman AFB	5,816	1,261	4,555	16,622,404	17,079,710	457,306	34
Davis-Monthan AFB	7,807	2,047	5,760	12,293,214	12,375,371	82,157	342
BASE X (AIR FORCE)	2,940	0	2,940	6,909,608	6,909,608	0	0
TOTAL	35,472	33,876	1,596	69,961,983	64,971,466	-4,990,517	-7%

Base	Square Footage			Sustain + Recap + BOS (2005\$)			Chg/Per
	Start	Finish	Change	Start	Finish	Change	
Moody AFB	2,033,000	0	-2,033,000	28,521,231	0	-28,521,231	-100%
Eglin AFB	6,183,000	6,305,413	122,413	93,747,270	3,590,489	4%	4,737
Patrick AFB	3,211,000	3,282,565	71,565	75,295,714	10,336,235	14%	10,006
Holloman AFB	5,286,000	5,311,000	25,000	59,487,820	63,837,631	4,349,811	7%
Davis-Monthan AFB	3,793,000	3,826,950	33,950	62,698,323	63,618,601	920,278	1%
BASE X (AIR FORCE)	1,597,403	1,947,403	350,000	33,451,368	33,451,368	0	0%
TOTAL	22,433,403	20,673,331	-1,760,072	349,703,938	340,486,220	-9,215,718	-3%

Base	Plant Replacement Value (2005\$)			Sustain + Recap + BOS (2005\$)			Chg/Per
	Start	Finish	Change	Start	Finish	Change	
Moody AFB	16,940,817	0	-16,940,817	28,521,231	0	-28,521,231	-100%
Eglin AFB	64,038,015	67,235,373	3,197,358	93,747,270	3,590,489	4%	4,737
Patrick AFB	33,678,177	33,924,680	246,503	75,295,714	10,336,235	14%	10,006
Holloman AFB	22,991,027	26,812,259	3,821,232	59,487,820	63,837,631	4,349,811	7%
Davis-Monthan AFB	35,228,806	36,008,652	779,846	62,698,323	63,618,601	920,278	1%
BASE X (AIR FORCE)	18,380,156	18,380,156	0	33,451,368	33,451,368	0	0%
TOTAL	221,256,999	222,361,320	1,104,322	349,703,938	340,486,220	-9,215,718	-3%

* "Start" and "Finish" values for Personnel and BOS both include the Programmed Installation Population (non-BRAC) changes, so that only changes attributable to the BRAC action are reflected in the "Change" columns of this report.

COBRA PERSONNEL/SF/SUSTAINMENT/RECAP/BOS DELTAS REPORT (COBRA V6.10)
 Date As Of 7/14/2005 2:54:06 PM, Report Created 7/14/2005 2:54:52 PM
 Department : USAF
 Scenario File : A:\COBRA USAF CT-0457 (S-150) Close Moody for Oceana.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: COBRA USAF CT-0457 Moody (USAF -150)
 Sld Facts File : C:\COBRA\COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

Base	Personnel			Square Footage			Chg/Per
	Start	Finish	Change	Start	Finish	Change	
Moody AFB	4,889	0	-4,889	2,033,000	0	-2,033,000	-100%
Eglin AFB	11,759	12,508	749	6,183,000	6,305,413	122,413	2%
Patrick AFB	4,552	4,565	13	3,211,000	3,282,565	71,565	2%
Holloman AFB	5,816	1,261	4,555	5,286,000	5,311,000	25,000	0%
Davis-Monthan AFB	7,807	2,047	5,760	3,793,000	3,826,950	33,950	1%
BASE X (AIR FORCE)	2,940	0	2,940	1,597,403	1,947,403	350,000	22%
TOTAL	35,472	33,876	1,596	22,433,403	20,673,331	-1,760,072	-8%

Base	Square Footage			Base Operations Support (2005\$)			Chg/Per
	Start	Finish	Change	Start	Finish	Change	
Moody AFB	2,033,000	0	-2,033,000	16,940,817	0	-16,940,817	-100%
Eglin AFB	6,183,000	6,305,413	122,413	64,038,015	67,235,373	3,197,358	5%
Patrick AFB	3,211,000	3,282,565	71,565	33,678,177	33,924,680	246,503	0%
Holloman AFB	5,286,000	5,311,000	25,000	22,991,027	26,812,259	3,821,232	17%
Davis-Monthan AFB	3,793,000	3,826,950	33,950	35,228,806	36,008,652	779,846	2%
BASE X (AIR FORCE)	1,597,403	1,947,403	350,000	18,380,156	18,380,156	0	0%
TOTAL	22,433,403	20,673,331	-1,760,072	221,256,999	222,361,320	1,104,322	0%

Base	Sustainment (2005\$)			Base Operations Support (2005\$)			Chg/Per
	Start	Finish	Change	Start	Finish	Change	
Moody AFB	5,589,211	0	-5,589,211	16,940,817	0	-16,940,817	-100%
Eglin AFB	6,239,531	6,307,211	67,680	64,038,015	67,235,373	3,197,358	5%
Patrick AFB	3,445,198	3,452,878	7,680	33,678,177	33,924,680	246,503	0%
Holloman AFB	19,874,389	19,845,877	-28,512	22,991,027	26,812,259	3,821,232	17%
Davis-Monthan AFB	15,176,003	15,234,973	58,970	35,228,806	36,008,652	779,846	2%
BASE X (AIR FORCE)	8,161,604	8,161,604	0	18,380,156	18,380,156	0	0%
TOTAL	58,484,936	53,155,433	-5,329,503	221,256,999	222,361,320	1,104,322	0%

* "Start" and "Finish" values for Personnel and BOS both include the Programmed Installation Population (non-BRAC) changes, so that only changes attributable to the BRAC action are reflected in the "Change" columns of this report.

DCN:11691

TOTAL COBRA REALIGNMENT DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 1/21
 Data As Of 7/14/2005 2:54:06 PM, Report Created 7/14/2005 2:55:01 PM

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : A:\COBRA USAF CT-0457 (S-150) Close Moody for Oceana.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: COBRA USAF CT-0457 Moody (USAF -150)
 Scd Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\COBRA 6.10\RRAC2005.SFF

RECURRING COSTS	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----								
O&M								
Sustainment	0	259	259	259	259	259	1,293	259
Recap	0	1,004	1,004	1,004	1,004	1,004	5,018	1,004
BOS	0	0	0	18,045	18,045	18,045	54,135	18,045
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRICARE	0	0	0	11,644	11,644	11,644	34,933	11,644
MIL PERSONNEL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	17,073	17,073	17,073	51,220	17,073
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission Activ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	1,262	1,262	48,025	48,025	48,025	146,600	48,025
TOTAL RECUR	0	1,262	1,262	48,025	48,025	48,025	146,600	48,025
TOTAL COST	14,871	115,845	116,194	80,163	48,025	48,025	325,313	48,025
ONE-TIME SAVES	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----								
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
1-Time Move	202	0	0	0	0	0	202	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	5,766	0	0	5,766	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl (contractual)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	776	50,127	1,055	2,937	0	0	54,895	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	978	50,127	1,055	8,703	0	0	60,863	0
RECURRING SAVES	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----								
FAM HOUSE OPS								
O&M								
Sustainment	0	0	0	4,750	4,750	4,750	14,250	5,588
Recap	5,994	5,994	5,994	5,994	5,994	5,994	35,965	5,994
BOS	0	0	0	16,941	16,941	16,941	50,822	16,941
Civ Salary	0	0	0	5,585	11,171	11,171	27,928	11,171
MIL PERSONNEL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Salary	0	0	0	9,748	19,496	19,496	48,739	19,496
Enl Salary	0	0	0	52,406	104,812	104,812	262,029	104,812
House Allow	0	0	0	15,110	15,110	15,110	45,330	15,110
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl (contractual)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Milcon Actlv	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	5,994	5,994	5,994	110,534	178,273	178,273	485,063	179,111
TOTAL SAVINGS	6,972	56,121	7,049	119,237	178,273	178,273	545,926	179,111

TOTAL COBRA REALIGNMENT DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 1/21
 Data As Of 7/14/2005 2:54:06 PM, Report Created 7/14/2005 2:55:01 PM

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : A:\COBRA USAF CT-0457 (S-150) Close Moody for Oceana.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: COBRA USAF CT-0457 Moody (USAF -150)
 Scd Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\COBRA 6.10\RRAC2005.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----								
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	10,028	111,418	0	0	0	0	121,446	0
O&M								
CIV SALARY	0	0	0	2,640	0	0	2,640	0
Civ RIF	0	0	0	288	0	0	288	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	498	0	0	498	0
CIV MOVING	0	0	0	20	0	0	20	0
Per Diem	0	0	0	1,081	0	0	1,081	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	445	0	0	445	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	118	0	0	118	0
RHG	0	0	0	350	0	0	350	0
Misc	0	0	0	1,207	0	0	1,207	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	579	0	0	579	0
PPP	0	0	0	205	0	0	205	0
FRYTA	0	0	0	1,518	0	0	1,518	0
FRACRG	0	0	0	296	0	0	296	0
Packing	0	0	0	205	0	0	205	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Info Tech	0	6,388	659	0	0	0	7,047	0
Prog Manage	3,475	2,606	1,954	1,466	0	0	9,501	0
Supt Contrac	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northball	0	0	0	366	0	0	366	0
1-Time Move	0	0	1,951	0	0	0	1,951	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Per Diem	0	0	0	899	0	0	899	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	531	0	0	531	0
RHG	0	0	0	5,872	0	0	5,872	0
Misc	0	0	0	3,175	0	0	3,175	0
ENL PCS	0	0	0	6,721	0	0	6,721	0
OTHER								
HAP / REE	0	0	0	3,485	0	0	3,485	0
Environmental	1,369	583	0	0	0	0	1,952	0
Misc Contract	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	5,691	0	0	0	5,691	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	14,871	114,582	16,931	32,328	0	0	178,713	0

DCN:11691

TOTAL COBRA REALIGNMENT DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 3/21
 Data As of 7/14/2005 2:54:06 PM, Report Created 7/14/2005 2:55:02 PM

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : A:\COBRA\USAF CT-0457 (S-150) Close Moody for Oceana.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: COBRA USAF CT-0457 Moody (OSAF-150)
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\COBRA 6.10\BRACZ005.SFF

ONE-TIME NET	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
CONSTRUCTION	10,028	111,418	0	0	0	0	121,446
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OKK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV RETIR/RFI	0	0	2,928	0	0	0	2,928
CIV MOVING	0	0	6,021	0	0	0	6,021
Info Tech	0	0	6,388	0	0	0	6,388
Other	3,273	2,606	2,037	0	0	0	7,916
MIL PERSONNEL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL MOVING	0	0	11,432	0	0	0	11,432
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Equipmnet	1,369	558	0	0	0	0	1,927
Misc Contract	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	-76	-50,127	0	0	0	0	-50,203
Misc	13,893	64,455	23,624	0	0	0	102,972
TOTAL ONE-TIME	13,893	64,455	23,624	0	0	0	102,972
RECURRING NET	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
CONSTRUCTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OKK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustaiment	0	259	259	-4,491	-4,491	-4,491	-12,956
Recap	-5,994	-4,990	-4,990	-4,990	-4,990	-4,990	-24,944
BOS	0	0	1,104	1,104	1,104	1,104	4,416
Civ Salary	0	0	-5,585	-11,171	-11,171	-11,171	-38,927
TRICARE	0	0	11,644	11,644	11,644	11,644	46,576
MIL PERSONNEL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL Salary	0	0	-62,154	-124,307	-124,307	-124,307	-310,768
House Allow	0	0	1,963	1,963	1,963	1,963	7,852
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission Activ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-5,994	-4,732	-62,509	-130,248	-130,248	-130,248	-463,479
IGTAL NET COST	7,899	59,724	11,114	-38,884	-130,248	-130,248	-220,514

TOTAL COBRA REALIGNMENT DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 4/21
 Data As of 7/14/2005 2:54:06 PM, Report Created 7/14/2005 2:55:02 PM

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : A:\COBRA\USAF CT-0457 (S-150) Close Moody for Oceana.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: COBRA USAF CT-0457 Moody (OSAF-150)
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\COBRA 6.10\BRACZ005.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
CONSTRUCTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OKK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV SALARY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	651	0	0	0	651
Vehicles	0	0	296	0	0	0	296
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Tech	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prog Manage	3,475	2,606	1,954	0	0	0	8,035
Supt Contract	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mechabil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTREK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Contract	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	3,475	2,606	2,901	32,328	0	0	41,310

DCN:11691

COBRA REALIGNMENT DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 6/21
 Data As Of 7/14/2005 2:54:06 PM, Report Created 7/14/2005 2:55:02 PM

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : A:\COBRA USAF CT-0457 (S-150) Close Moody for Oceana.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: COBRA USAF CT-0457 Moody (USAF -150)
 Std Fctr File : C:\COBRA\COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

Base: Moody AFB, GA (QSEB)

ONE-TIME NET	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OSM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustatment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Recap	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRICARE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL	3,273	2,606	1,954	2,037	0	0	10,274
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER	0	0	0	11,432	0	0	11,432
HAP / REE	0	0	0	3,485	0	0	3,485
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Contract	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	-776	-50,127	-1,055	-2,937	0	0	-54,895
TOTAL ONE-TIME	2,497	-47,521	1,846	23,624	0	0	-19,553
RECURRING NET							
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OSM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustatment	0	0	0	-4,750	-4,750	-4,750	-14,250
Recap	-5,994	-5,994	-5,994	-5,994	-5,994	-5,994	-35,994
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRICARE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER	0	0	0	-15,110	-15,110	-15,110	-45,330
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission Activ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-5,994	-5,994	-5,994	-106,272	-174,011	-174,011	-472,278
TOTAL NET COST	-3,497	-53,515	-4,148	-82,648	-174,011	-174,011	-491,631

COBRA REALIGNMENT DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 5/21
 Data As Of 7/14/2005 2:54:06 PM, Report Created 7/14/2005 2:55:02 PM

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : A:\COBRA USAF CT-0457 (S-150) Close Moody for Oceana.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: COBRA USAF CT-0457 Moody (USAF -150)
 Std Fctr File : C:\COBRA\COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

Base: Moody AFB, GA (QSEB)

RECURRING COSTS	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OSM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	202	0	0	0	0	0	202	0
MIL PERSONNEL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mil Moving	0	0	0	5,766	0	0	5,766	0
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	776	50,127	1,055	2,937	0	0	54,895	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	978	50,127	1,055	8,703	0	0	60,863	0
RECURRING SAVES								
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OSM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustatment	0	0	0	4,750	4,750	4,750	14,250	5,568
Recap	5,994	5,994	5,994	5,994	5,994	5,994	35,965	5,994
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRICARE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER	0	0	0	15,110	15,110	15,110	45,330	15,110
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission Activ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	5,994	5,994	5,994	110,534	178,273	178,273	485,063	179,111
TOTAL SAVINGS	6,972	56,121	7,049	119,237	178,273	178,273	545,926	179,111

DCN:11691



691

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600

Arlington, VA 22202

Telephone: 703-699-2950

July 1, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

As you are aware, before the Base Closure and Realignment Commission can even consider making a change in your recommendations that would add military installations for closure or realignment, or expand a realignment, we are required by Section 2914(d)(3) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, to seek an explanation from you as to why such actions were not included on your May 13, 2005 list. A series of issues on installations on which we seek such explanation is enclosed. No deliberation will be made on whether to include any of these installations for further study of closure or realignment until the Commission's open hearing of July 19, 2005. Therefore, we would greatly appreciate receipt of your explanation no later than July 18th.

In addition, we invite you or your representative to elaborate on these explanations at a public hearing to be held in the Washington, D.C. area at 8:30 a.m. on July 18, 2005.

If, at the July 19 hearing, seven or more Commissioners support adding an installation to your list for consideration, at least two Commissioners will visit each of the installations added to your list and public hearings will be conducted regarding them. While this is a requirement of law, the Commission's view is that such public hearings are not only mandatory, but also highly desirable.

At the Commission's final deliberations during the week of August 22, the vote of at least seven Commissioners will be required to effect any change in your recommendations that would close or realign an installation that you did not recommend for such closure or realignment, or expand a realignment that you recommended.

Your assistance in complying with this stringent timetable will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Anthony J. Principi
Chairman

Enclosure

Chairman: Anthony J. Principi

Commissioners: The Honorable James H. Bilbray, The Honorable Philip E. Coyle III, Admiral Harold W. Gehman Jr., USN (Ret), The Honorable Jim Hansen, General James T. Hill, USA (Ret), General Lloyd Newton, USAF (Ret), The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner, Brigadier General Sue Ellen Turner, USAF (Ret)

Executive Director: Charles Battaglia

DCN:11691

1. MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT SAN DIEGO, CA

ISSUE:

- Why was Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego, CA, not closed and consolidated with Marine Corps recruit training at MCRD Parris Island, SC?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- The Marine Corps operates two stand-alone recruit depots -- one on each coast. Consolidation of all recruit training to MCRD Parris Island generates training efficiencies, reduces excess capacity, and saves recurring costs due to fence-line closure of MCRD San Diego, and may generate offsetting revenues due to potential commercial development after a DoD property transfer. Consolidating recruit training at one location may theoretically increase operational risks; however, the Department of Navy and Air Force have successfully implemented similar transformational options experiencing little or no actual risk to recruit training while maintaining a surge capability. Military value of MCRD San Diego is lower than MCRD Parris Island partially due to encroachment and land constraints.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- None
-

2. NAVAL SHIPYARD PEARL HARBOR, HI

ISSUE:

- Why was the Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, HI, not closed and the ship depot repair function realigned to Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA; Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME; and Naval Shipyard Puget Sound, WA?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Four naval shipyards perform depot-level ship refueling, modernization, overhaul and repair work. There appears to be sufficient excess capacity in the aggregate across the four shipyards to close either Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor or Naval Shipyard Portsmouth. Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor is less efficient than Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, according to Department of Navy data and additional savings could be found from reduced unit costs at the receiving shipyards because of a higher volume of work. Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor has low military value compared to other shipyards according to DoD analysis supporting the recommendation to close Naval Shipyard Portsmouth.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- DON-23: Close Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME

3. NAVAL AIR STATION BRUNSWICK, ME

ISSUE:

- What considerations were given to a complete closure of Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME, and what were the driving factors in deciding on realignment?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Closure would appear to reduce excess capacity, may save approximately four times more than DoD's realignment recommendation and could open land to State or community development to offset economic impact.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- DON-18: Realign Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME
-

4. NAVY BROADWAY COMPLEX, SAN DIEGO, CA

ISSUE:

- Why was the Navy Broadway Complex, San Diego, CA, not considered for closure and realignment of existing functions to Naval Station San Diego, CA?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Consolidating Navy activities in a more secure location at the Naval Station complex at 32nd Street could improve security and allow for future commercial development.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- None
-

5. REALIGNMENT OF NAVAL MASTER JET BASE

ISSUE:

- What consideration was given to the realignment of the Master Jet Base located at NAS Oceana, VA, to Moody AFB, GA? Was movement of the assets assigned to Moody AFB, GA to Cannon AFB, NM, considered and if so, what were the driving considerations not to do so?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Realigning the Master Jet Base at NAS Oceana, VA, to Moody AFB, GA, would appear to alleviate the severe encroachment which affects NAS Oceana training and operations as well as operations at the outlying field, Fentress OLF. Moody AFB, GA, would appear to have the necessary room for expansion and suffers less encroachment. Cannon AFB, NM, would appear to have ample space and facilities to accommodate any aircraft currently operating or planned for movement to Moody AFB, NM.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- AF-6: Realign Eielson AFB
 - AF-32: Close Cannon AFB
 - AF-35: Maintenance realignment from Shaw AFB
 - E&T-14: Realignment of Undergraduate Pilot Training.
-

6. GALENA AIRPORT FORWARD OPERATING LOCATION (FOL), AK**ISSUE:**

- Was any consideration given to merging the missions of Galena FOL, AK, and Eielson AFB, AK? Why does the United States need to maintain two FOLs in Alaska, given the current national security environment and 20-year threat assessment?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Galena is one of two FOLs in Alaska that serve as alert bases for air intercept aircraft in support of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) missions. The requirement for maintaining two FOLs in Alaska may no longer be valid. The mission could be accomplished by maintaining one FOL and two Air Force bases in Alaska.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- AF-6: Eielson AFB, AK; Moody AFB, GA; and Shaw AFB, GA
 - AF-7: Kulis Air Guard Station, AK; and Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK
 - AF-18: Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID; Nellis Air Force Base, NV; and Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK
 - AF-43: Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD; and Dyess Air Force Base, TX
-

7. POPE AIR FORCE BASE, NC**ISSUE:**

- What considerations drove the recommendation to realign, rather close Pope AFB NC, under Fort Bragg, NC? Are the joint operational synergies that exist between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 43rd Airlift Wing/23rd Fighter Group able to be replicated from other locations?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- DoD appears to have determined that much of the benefits of the collocation of the joint forces that will operate together (CAS aircraft, operational planning staffs) are outweighed by the ability to schedule support as necessary through third parties.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- USA-8: Fort Gillem, GA
- USA-8: Fort McPherson, GA
- AF-35: Pope Air Force Base, NC, Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station, PA; and Yeager Air Guard Station, WV
- H&SA-35: Create Joint Mobilization Sites

8. GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, ND

ISSUE:

- What considerations drove the recommendation to realign rather than close Grand Forks AFB, ND? What is the number of UAVs planned for assignment to Grand Forks AFB, ND, and what is the timing of the potential deployment?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- While there is no “emerging mission” programmed within the BRAC timeline (2006-2011), there are indications that the Air Force is considering assigning UAVs to Grand Forks AFB, ND.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- AF-37: Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND
-

9. AIR NATIONAL GUARD

ISSUE:

- Were the Adjutants General and Governors of the States consulted in the re-allocation of aircraft, personnel, facilities and missions from their states? What impact does the realignment of the ANG have on the homeland defense and homeland security missions?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Many of the Air Force’s recommendations address Air National Guard installations. While only four of these installations will completely close, many Guard installations will lose aircraft and personnel leaving only an “expeditionary combat support” unit remaining, with several states losing their entire flying missions. Many of these aircraft will relocate to other locations, which may negatively impact personnel recruiting and retention as well as State and Homeland Security missions.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- Various
-

10. DEFENSE FINANCE ACCOUNTING SERVICE

- DFAS Buckley Annex, CO
- DFAS Columbus, OH
- DFAS Indianapolis, IN

ISSUE:

- Why were keeping DFAS Buckley Annex, CO, DFAS Columbus, OH, and DFAS Indianapolis, IN, open and closing the remaining DFAS sites the only scenario

considered? Why did DoD not consider other options, which could have avoided military construction costs and possibly produced a more cost effective option?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Closing or realigning these installations may reduce operating and sustainment costs, balance mission and strategic redundancy requirements, eliminate excess capacity and avoid closing other DFAS installations that provide a lower locality pay and have an existing infrastructure for expansion without military construction or additional leasing.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- HSA-37: Defense Finance & Accounting Service
-

11. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION

- Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA
- Defense Language Institute Monterey, CA
- Air Force Institute of Technology Wright Patterson AFB, OH

ISSUE:

- What consideration was given to the closure or realignment of the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright Patterson AFB, OH, and the Defense Language Institute at Monterey, CA, with Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, CA, to create a consolidated professional development education center?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Consolidating the Professional Development Education currently provided by the Air Force Institute of Technology, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Army's Defense Language Institute would provide significant savings and efficiencies to the Department of Defense by (1) eliminating redundant support structure for advanced education, (2) reducing infrastructure; and (3) consolidating command and instructional staff.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- None
-

12. JOINT MEDICAL COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

- Navy Bureau of Medicine, Potomac Annex, DC
- Air Force Medical Command, Bolling AFB, DC
- TRICARE Management Authority, Leased Space, VA
- Office of the Army Surgeon General, Leased Space, VA

ISSUE:

- What consideration was given to establishing a Joint Medical Command Headquarters, through collocation of disparate Department of Defense Surgeons General, at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Such a consolidation could eliminate 166,000 square feet of leased space within the National Capitol Region and enable the closure of the Potomac Annex, DC. The National Naval Medical Center, MD, has a higher military value ranking than present locations. Establishing a Joint Medical Command Headquarters would take advantage of the transformation of legacy medical infrastructure proposed in recommendation MED-4, which establishes the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda, MD.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- MED-4: Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda, MD
- TECH-5: Co-locate Extramural Research Program Managers



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

JUL 14 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi,

In your letter of July 1, 2005, you asked for the Department's comments on a number of installations in advance of the Commission's voting at your hearing on July 19, 2005, to consider these installations for closure or realignment analysis. Your July 12, 2005 letter requested witnesses to address the Commission's concern regarding recommendations impacting the Air National Guard.

The Commission's independent assessment of the Department's recommendations and the subsequent reviews by the President and the Congress are each important steps to ensure that the final recommendations are fair, consistent with the selection criteria and force structure plan and will, in fact, increase the efficiency and effectiveness of our military infrastructure. As such, while the Department stands behind its recommendations, it fully supports the Commission's analysis of alternatives. As you undertake your review, please consider that each of the Department's recommendations is part of a comprehensive, integrated, and interdependent package. The recommendations submitted by the Department of Defense strengthen national security by reshaping the domestic installations at which U.S. military forces and their associated support elements perform their assigned missions.

The Military Departments and Joint Cross-Service Groups have provided the attached responses to the issues you raise. While I appreciate the opportunity to testify on July 18, 2005, Mr. Michael Wynne, Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG), will lead a panel that will include General William Nyland, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Michael Moseley, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Admiral Robert Willard, Vice Chief of Naval Operations. They are jointly designated to discuss the issues at the hearing. Additionally, we will provide a second panel to deal exclusively with the Commission's concerns regarding recommendations concerning the Air Guard. This panel will be led by Lt Gen Stephen Wood, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Plans and Programs, and will include Maj Gen Gary Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Plans and



Programs, Maj Gen Scott Mayes, Commander, 1st Air Force, and Commander, Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, and Brig Gen Anthony Haynes, Air National Guard Assistant for BRAC.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments on these issues. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Enclosure:
As stated

DCN:11691

RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ISSUES

1. Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego, CA

Commission issue: Why was Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego, CA, not closed and consolidated with Marine Corps recruit training at MCRD Parris Island, SC?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Geo-centric recruiting/shipping/recruit training command and control would be compromised.
- Replication of facilities would require in excess of 100 years to payback.
- Recruit pipeline requirements cannot sustain a single point of failure.

DISCUSSION:

The consolidation of Marine Corps recruit training at a single site was evaluated but not recommended. After extensive analysis, the Department of the Navy (DON) concluded that single-siting recruit training would degrade recruit training command and control, limit surge capability, and require fiscally burdensome duplication of already-existing mission and modern facilities. Also, because significant reductions in overhead have already occurred outside of the BRAC process, single-siting recruit training would not produce significant billet eliminations.

DON analysis of Marine Corps recruit training went through several stages and included a thorough review of the available certified data along with consideration of input from Marine Corps leadership. The review of capacity data showed that, when allowing for surge, there is virtually no excess capacity in Marine Corps recruit training. The scenario to close MCRD San Diego and consolidate at MCRD Parris Island (DON-0066) was developed based on data that showed the availability of buildable acres at MCRD Parris Island. (See DAG Report of Deliberations of 27 Sep 2004).

During scenario analysis, the DON considered input from Marine Corps leadership, who identified a number of issues of concern with the proposed Parris Island consolidation, including creating the risk of a single point of failure and limiting the ability to handle unexpected surge requirements, or even normal requirements in the event of future growth in end-strength. These factors would have an adverse effect on an organization that is heavily committed to sourcing three Marine Expeditionary Forces worldwide and waging the Global War on Terrorism. The Marine Corps has aligned its recruiting/shipping/recruit training mission geographically under the command of each of the Recruit Depot Commanding Generals. This unity of command and control allows for the necessary detailed demographic knowledge to effectively recruit, and for the geographic proximity for recruit and follow-on training to efficiently ship new Marines

on that coast. This synergy has supported the Marine Corps' historic success in meeting recruiting mission, and becomes increasingly vital in an era of increasingly competitive recruiting and accelerated operational deployments during the Global War on Terrorism. Restructuring of this command and control relationship could be required if recruit training were single sited at Parris Island. Single-siting the training function would cause a significant increase in the span of control for the Eastern Recruiting Region commander, and likely necessitate organizational changes with increased staffing requirements. The Marine Corps also depends heavily on a sustained pipeline of trained recruits. As a predominantly single enlistment force, any disruption in the recruiting/training continuum would disrupt the pipeline to provide new Marines to the operating forces. Short perturbations can be handled because of the two recruit depot operating construct. Significant concerns were raised with the consideration of single siting, especially in a hurricane prone region. (See DAG Report of Deliberations of 18 Oct 04 and 26 Oct 04, IEG Report of Deliberations of 4 Nov 04).

The COBRA analysis of the MCRD San Diego closure shows one-time costs of \$570.1M and steady state savings of \$14.2M, resulting in a Payback exceeding 100 years. This result was compared to the analysis of this scenario conducted during BRAC 1995. MILCON costs were considerably lower, and the anticipated number of eliminated personnel was significantly higher in BRAC 1995 than for scenario DON-0066. During the course of the past ten years, the Marine Corps has eliminated excess capacity and implemented initiatives to consolidate MCRD-related billets. For that reason, few billets are eliminated (with their associated cost savings) and the great majority of MCRD San Diego billets will need to be relocated to MCRD Parris Island in order to perform the recruit training function. In addition, a complete set of new recruit training facilities would have to be constructed there to accommodate the three additional Recruit Training Battalions in facilities built to hurricane-proof standards. Additional MILCON is required for non-recruit training activities located at MCRD San Diego that would have to be relocated elsewhere. MCRD consolidation on one coast will also increase recruiting related travel costs.

Based upon the cost analysis and concerns about negative impacts on the recruiting/training missions, the DON Infrastructure Evaluation Group decided not to forward DON-0066 for consideration as a candidate recommendation (See IEG Report of Deliberations of 27 Jan 05).

DCN:11691

2. Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, HI

Commission issue: Why was the Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, HI, not closed and the ship depot repair function realigned to Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA; Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME; and Naval Shipyard Puget Sound, WA?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Industrial JCSG found excess capacity sufficient to justify closure of one shipyard.
- Military judgment favors retention of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard because of its strategic location and multi-platform capabilities.

DISCUSSION:

As noted in the minutes and report of the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group, all four naval shipyards were analyzed to determine if there was sufficient capacity for any three of the shipyards to absorb the workload of the fourth based on the 20-year Force Structure Plan. That evaluation revealed that there is sufficient excess capacity to realign the workload of either Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard or Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The Industrial JCSG then reviewed military value and COBRA data to determine which closure was the preferred alternative.

The quantitative military value scores for Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard were very close. Shipyard total cost and proximity to ship homeports were evaluated as part of the quantitative military value analysis. The total cost attribute favored Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, while the homeport proximity favored Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. The Industrial JCSG also evaluated the differences in drydock and workload capabilities between the two shipyards.

The COBRA analysis indicated that realigning the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard depot function would produce greater net present value savings than realigning the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard depot function. However, the net present value savings associated with the DON fence-line closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard produces savings about the same as realigning the depot function at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard.

Although the quantitative military value score for Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard was slightly lower than that of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, it was the military judgment of the Industrial JCSG that Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard's critical geographical location, adjacent to a significant portion of the Fleet and forward positioned in the central Pacific, combined with its capability to dock a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, provided a higher overall military value to the Department. This judgment is supported by the DON, as indicated by its submission of the closure recommendation. Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is strategically located to support DoD's current and future mission capabilities in the Pacific. Loss of this critical asset will have an adverse impact on operational warfighting

capability, training and readiness. Additionally the Combatant Commander expressed operational concerns with a closure of the Pearl Harbor Shipyard in that it would result in reduced theater presence as a result of the associated increased transit times, a loss of emergent CVN drydock capability (the only option west of Washington state) and a general concern with the loss of availability of "logistics, supply and operational support services throughout the Pacific." Finally, the Navy was concerned with the personnel retention implications that would result from a closure of Pearl Harbor in that it would result in a significant increase in dockings being conducted out of homeport.

3. Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME

Commission issue: What considerations were given to a complete closure of Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME, and what were the driving factors in deciding the realignment?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Realignment versus closure was extensively debated within DON, and DON ultimately recommended closure.
- The IEC modified closure to realignment because of a desire to retain strategic presence in the Northeast U.S. and for a surge capability.

DISCUSSION:

The Department of the Navy did develop and analyze a scenario to close NAS Brunswick. When combined with other aviation recommendations, the closure of NAS Brunswick would have reduced the excess capacity for the Aviation Operations function from 19 percent to 8 percent. Such a recommendation not only allowed consolidation of Maritime Patrol Operations on the East Coast with attendant increased maintenance and training efficiencies, but it also produced significant steady-state savings of \$94.6M and a 20-year net present value of \$843.2M.

During the review of scenario analysis the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), expressed concerns that closing NAS Brunswick could result in diminished strategic flexibility, as well as impact future basing flexibility. (See DAG Reports of Deliberations of 6 Dec 04, 11 Jan 05, 17 Jan 05, and 24 Jan 05). These concerns led to review of the availability of possible detachment sites for Maritime Patrol operations and analysis of additional alternatives to closure so the leadership had full visibility of the various trade-offs in making their decisions. (See IEG Report of Deliberations of 27 Jan 05 and 17 Feb 05, DAG Reports of Deliberations of 8 Feb 05, and 15 Feb 05). After reviewing the additional analyses, the Department of the Navy decided to forward the closure scenario to the Infrastructure Executive Council as a candidate recommendation because of the significant savings associated with the closure, combined with the options available to address operational concerns.

DCN:11691

When the candidate recommendations were reviewed in final deliberations, the IEC determined that NAS Brunswick should be realigned instead of closed to retain an active presence in New England for homeland defense and surge capability. (See IEC Minutes of 2 May 05 and 4 May 05). This decision is consistent with the concerns expressed by the Fleet in that it provides strategic flexibility by maintaining an ability to rapidly position aircraft in the Northeast should an increased threat materialize.

4. Navy Broadway Complex, San Diego, CA

Commission issue: Why was the Navy Broadway Complex, San Diego, CA, not considered for closure and realignment of existing functions to Naval Station San Diego, CA?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- All activities/functions located at the Broadway Complex were evaluated by either Department of the Navy or one of the Joint Cross-Service Groups.
- DON BRAC analysis did not develop a recommendation to close Broadway Complex because none of the activities on this property were recommended for relocation.

DISCUSSION:

The Broadway Complex in San Diego is property owned by the Navy and located on slightly less than 15 acres of contiguous property in downtown San Diego with 857K square feet (SF) in three separate buildings. It houses several commands; the two largest commands are Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) San Diego and Commander, Navy Region Southwest. All of the functions located on this property were reviewed by either DON or one of the Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs). The BRAC analyses performed by DON and the appropriate JCSGs, including capacity and military value analysis, did not identify any scenarios to realign activities from the Broadway Complex.

Within the DON BRAC process, a fenceline (a distinct parcel of land that supported one or more functional activities undergoing BRAC analysis) was not considered for closure unless sufficient assets were proposed to be removed so as to effectively eliminate all missions aboard the fenceline. Since no mission activities were recommended to be relocated, DON did not issue a recommendation to close this fenceline.

Although DON recognizes the AT/FP concerns and the potential for increased development of the Broadway Complex parcel, scarcity of available DON owned waterfront property in the San Diego area suggests determination of the disposition of the Broadway complex is better addressed through ongoing negotiations between the City of San Diego, local developers and the DON outside the BRAC process.

5. Realignment of Naval Master Jet Base

5a. Commission issue: What consideration was given to the realignment of the Master Jet Base (MJB) located at NAS Oceana, VA, to Moody AFB, GA?

5a. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Navy examined several alternatives for an east coast MJB, including Moody AFB.
- While Moody is a feasible alternative to Oceana, it has a number of factors that make it less desirable than retaining Oceana, including significant one-time MILCON costs.
- While Oceana is the most suitable option of all east coast TACAIR bases considered, encroachment at Oceana presents significant challenges to long-term operational requirements.
- The best basing alternative for East Coast tactical aviation would be to build a new 21st century Master Jet Base, but such action would occur outside the BRAC window.

DISCUSSION:

The Navy has given extensive consideration to the possible realignment of the Oceana MJB out of concern over likely long-term encroachment issues. Our assessment included Moody AFB as well as a range of other feasible Defense Department air facilities. In the case of realignment to Moody AFB, while it was considered a feasible alternative, it would incur significant one-time costs (almost \$500 million) and result in a long payback period (14 years). We concluded the best long-term basing alternative for East Coast Navy tactical aviation would be to build a new 21st century naval air station able to accommodate legacy and planned high performance aircraft, but such action would optimally occur outside the BRAC window.

Selecting a location and building from the ground up is by far the preferred choice as it gives us the most flexibility to ensure we accommodate future capabilities, while allowing for sufficient "buffers" to preclude potential encroachment issues. This approach, if pursued, would allow for a truly modern air station, with commensurate energy, environmental and community consideration designed into the facility from the very beginning. By contrast, relocating to Moody (built in 1940) or another existing installation within the timeframe of this BRAC would require extensive infrastructure upgrades, take significant time and resources, and still would not attain the operational or quality of life standards expected of this century.

DCN:11691

5b. Commission issue: Was movement of the assets assigned to Moody AFB, GA to Cannon AFB, NM, considered and if so, what were the driving considerations not to do so?

5b. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Need for Battlefield Airmen Training works at Moody AFB
- Cannon AFB has no significant joint training opportunities within operational proximity
- Cannon AFB Military Capacity Index (MCI) was lower than Moody AFB

DISCUSSION:

Early in the process the Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) and the Air Force analyzed scenarios to realign Moody AFB. The JCSG scenario distributed the Moody training aircraft to other Air Education and Training Command (AETC) bases. The Air Force scenario distributed the Special Operations Forces/Combat Search and Rescue (SOF/CSAR) aircraft to Davis Monthan AFB, AZ. Transferring the SOF/CSAR aircraft from Moody to Cannon was not considered because Cannon's SAF/CSAR MCI was lower than Moody.

During the BRAC process, the Air Force identified an emerging need for a Battlefield Airmen Training Campus for the Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) family of specialties such as Combat Rescue, Combat Control, Terminal Attack Control and Special Operations Weather. Moody was identified as a potential site for this purpose. Of all Air Force bases, Moody had the right infrastructure/range complex and proximity to other areas such as the Gulf Range Complex at Eglin and Tyndall. The Air Force decided to leave the CSAR aircraft at Moody and place A-10 aircraft there also (Moody scored 8 points higher than Davis-Monthan for SOF/CSAR). Also, as a part of the BRAC process, the Army proposed the realignment of the Armor Center/School to Fort Benning, GA and the 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin (to be in close proximity with the Air Force Special Operations Command). Therefore, the establishment of a Battlefield Airmen Training Campus at Moody can provide a center of excellence for airmen in expeditionary combat support fields and also provide Air Force and joint training opportunities within operational proximity of Moody AFB. A-10/CSAR aircraft collocated at Moody AFB will provide an east coast CSAR training efficiency similar to Davis-Monthan AFB. Moody AFB is rated 11 of 154 in the SOF/CSAR MCI and is also in the top ten of all installations in 4 of the other 7 MCIs. It remains one of the Air Force's most valuable installations.

Cannon AFB has no significant joint training opportunities within operational proximity to the base, and for the A-10 aircraft, that is mandatory. Cannon AFB did not rank well within the SOF/CSAR MCI and therefore, the Air Force did not consider Cannon AFB to beddown the active duty A-10 mission.

6. Galena Airport Forward Operating Location (FOL), AK

Commission issue: Was any consideration given to merging the missions of Galena FOL, AK, and Eielson AFB, AK? Why does the United States need to maintain two FOLs in Alaska, given the current national security environment and 20-year threat assessment?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Air Force BRAC analysis did not develop a scenario.
- No force structure to move.

DISCUSSION:

The Air Force did not consider moving the operational support mission from Galena Airport to Eielson AFB, which is over 300 miles from Galena. Consistent with the requirement to consider the impact on homeland defense, the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) left Galena open primarily because of its operational role and because it had no day-to-day force structure assigned. Initial BRAC inputs made by the Combatant Commander through the Joint Staff did not include Galena or other FOLs to be considered for closure. However, based on the Commission's July 1, 2005 letter, the Joint Staff contacted the Combatant Commands for their comments concerning the potential operational impact if the Galena FOL is closed and closing the Galena, AK, FOL and moving its missions to Eielson, AFB, AK will not create unacceptable risk to North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)/U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) mission accomplishment.

7. Pope Air Force Base, NC

7a. Commission issue: What considerations drove the recommendation to realign, rather than close Pope AFB, NC under Fort Bragg, NC?

7a. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Supports Army plan for relocation of FORSCOM.
- Maintains airfield capability for Army presence and Air Force force structure.
- Allows efficient consolidation of installation management functions.

DISCUSSION:

The Air Force recommendation to realign, rather than close Pope AFB, was made to support the Army recommendation to relocate U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army Reserve Command and allows for closure of Fort McPherson, GA and Atlanta leased space. All Air Force property and facilities will be administratively transferred to the Army. The financial analysis included expected recurring expenses paid by the Air Force to the Army as a result of the Air Force presence that will remain. This

DCN:11691

coordination on installation management builds upon and subsumes the H&SA candidate recommendation (H&SA-0009) to combine Installation Management of Fort Bragg and Pope AFB, NC.

7b. Commission issue: Are the joint operational synergies that exist between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 43rd Airlift Wing/23rd Fighter Group able to be replicated from other locations?

7b. Response:
KEY POINTS:

- Existing operational relationships will continue.
- Additional operational and training synergies will emerge from new relationships.

DISCUSSION:

As a part of the coordination between the Army regarding a tenant Air Force presence on an expanded Fort Bragg, the Army indicated that it would allow a tenant C-130 unit with a maximum size of 16 PAA (911th Airlift Wing, AFRC). Other Air Force functions that currently exist at Pope AFB, will remain at Fort Bragg to continue the present operational relationships, they include: 3rd Aerial Port Squadron; 18th Air Support Operations Group; 14th Air Support Operations Squadron; Det 1 of the 373rd Training Squadron; and 43rd Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron. Additionally, new opportunities for on-going joint operations at Fort Bragg will continue with planned deployment of air assets to Fort Bragg/Pope for joint training with the Army.

The Pope recommendation also includes the transfer of A-10s to Moody AFB, GA. Operational and training synergies will occur with new relationships between the A-10 unit at Moody and Army units at Ft. Benning, GA, the recommended location of the Army's Maneuver Training Center (consolidation of Infantry and Armor schools). Locating Air Force A-10s near this consolidated Army training will lead to new opportunities of realistic close air support training for the Army and the Air Force and potential joint training between the Battlefield Airmen at Moody, the Maneuver Center of Excellence and east coast CSAR training capability with CSAR helicopters and A-10s.

8. Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND

Commission issue: What considerations drove the recommendation to realign rather than close Grand Forks AFB, ND? What is the number of UAVs planned for assignment to Grand Forks AFB, ND, and what is the timing of the potential deployment?

Response:
KEY POINTS:

- Ensures continued strategic presence in the North Central U. S.
- Positioned to accept emerging Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) mission.

DISCUSSION:

The original Air Force candidate recommendation to the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) was to close Grand Forks, AFB. The IEC reviewed it in context with other Service and Joint Cross-Service Group candidate recommendations. To address an IEC concern over a continued strategic presence in the north central U.S., the Air Force presented an option to realign Grand Forks AFB but maintain the tanker moves out of Grand Forks to support other high-value tanker realignments. The IEC adopted this recommendation.

The justification for the Grand Forks AFB recommendation specifies that the base would be retained for an emerging mission, of which UAVs may be one (in addition to continuing support of the 10th Space Warning Squadron). Specific future plans for UAVs (in terms of numbers and timing) are undefined in BRAC; however, the post-BRAC intent of the Air Force is to dovetail an emerging mission with the departure of the old mission.. The Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force have signed out to the Commission a separate letter to that effect (Reference: Department of Defense recommendation to realign Eielson AFB, AK, and Grand Forks AFB, ND, 7 Jun 05). A portion of that background paper on Grand Forks stated"...Specifically, the Air Force strategic vision for Grand Forks AFB is to become a home to a "family of UAVs," with associated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance support functions. In cooperation with the North Dakota Air National Guard (ANG), the Air Force would establish a Predator MQ-1 ANG unit with an Active Duty Associate unit to backfill F-16 retirements at Fargo's Hector Field. Growth of this mission will include transition to the Predator MQ-9, eventually add the Global Hawk UAV with the Grand Forks Tanker realignment and FTF emerging mission and associations at both locations."

9. Air National Guard

9a. Commission issue: Were the Adjutants General and Governors of the States consulted in the re-allocation of aircraft, personnel, facilities and missions from their states?

9a. Response:
KEY POINTS:

- The State Adjutants General were provided significant briefing during the BRAC process.

DISCUSSION:

Adjutants General (TAGs) were briefed on the force structure, organizational, and military value factors that formed the foundation of the Air Force BRAC analysis. Senior Air Force staff, Guard and active, briefed the TAGs in December 2003 at the TAG meeting in Baltimore. That session included a discussion of the force structure and squadron size assumptions that were eventually included as part of BRAC later that winter. The senior BRAC staff, Guard and active, appeared before the TAGs again in

DCN:11691

July 2004 to give them feedback into the senior military value discussion (which included the Director, Air National Guard (ANG) and the Chief, Air Force Reserve) that formed the foundation for the MCI (mission compatibility index) weightings. The BRAC staff did this well prior to the completion of the MCIs and the release of the capacity and military value data calls to the installations. These MCIs provided the starting point for Air Force BRAC deliberations. The Guard representative to the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) later provided a comprehensive, personal briefing to the Chief, National Guard Bureau in April 2005 when the Air Force deliberations were entering their final phase.

The Air Force BRAC charge was to accommodate a shrinking force structure in order to ensure we placed right-sized squadrons at the best combination of bases to achieve both homeland and overseas defense objectives. Effectively organized flying squadrons were key to future warfighting effectiveness. To achieve this, we restored our operational squadrons to sizes that would result in more effective and efficient use of a shrinking force structure. Over the past 10 years, the AF reduced the number of squadrons in its active component to ensure effective sized squadrons in an era of declining total force structure. During the same period, the AF retained essentially the same number of squadrons in the reserve component and reduced the number of aircraft in each squadron to 'maintain flags.' Consequently, although the Air Force BRAC process maintained the proportionality of the active, Guard, and Reserve components, the combination of a further reduced force structure and the need to restore Guard and Reserve units to effective sizes resulted in a greater reduction in the number of squadron flags in the reserve component than the active duty.

Initially the Air Force considered closing the bases losing flying missions. Following deliberation, however, the Air Force concluded that the expeditionary combat support (ECS) forces that remained after we effectively sized the flyers were themselves quite effective both for Title 10 expeditionary missions and Title 32 state missions. Some believe that these bases should be closed, however, the Air Force strongly believes these ECS forces provide viable expeditionary and state support and their base of operations should not be moved. Any adjustment to the lay down of the ECS forces will need to be re-evaluated for impact on the support to civil authorities.

9b. Commission issue: What impact does the realignment of the ANG have on the homeland defense and homeland security missions?

9b. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Homeland Security, Air Sovereignty, and Civil Support are adequately addressed.

DISCUSSION:

Balancing the Air Force to meet both the homeland and expeditionary defense needs of the Nation was another key consideration. This was most acute in the C-130 force, where the current average Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) for active crews is 150 days per year TDY with the Guard and Reserve activated. When the 2-year reserve component activation is complete, Air Mobility Command estimates the average active PERSTEMPO will rise above 200 days per year without the BRAC recommendations. To assist with the assessment of homeland defense, the Air Force consulted with US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and also with the most senior staff members of the Director, Air National Guard (ANG) during the AF BRAC process. The USNORTHCOM favorably reviewed our recommendations and the ANG staff was completely involved as full partners in the BCEG throughout the process. The BCEG focused its Homeland Security deliberations on comprehensive air sovereignty requirements and not on the specific mission of any single unit or location. The support to civil authorities' roles and missions of airlift units in times of crisis are borne by the airlift/transportation system as a whole. For Civil Support missions, the Air Force requires the ability both to proactively plan with civil agencies as well as rapidly respond to man made or natural disasters when tasked. Important capabilities to enable these types of missions include: 1) Crisis Management to prevent and protect (law enforcement support and safeguarding the supply chain), 2) Consequence Management to respond locally (CBRNE/WMD and natural disaster mitigation), and 3) Providing Agile Combat Support (ACS) or Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) infrastructure to assist civil authorities in the areas of medical support, food deliveries, protection from the elements, etc. at both local and national levels. In an effort to balance warfighting and civil support requirements the AF recommendations retain ECS units in twenty "Enclaves" to continue support of local authorities. We believe both aspects of homeland security, air sovereignty and civil support, are adequately addressed within the Air Force recommendations.

In his letter dated May 4, 2005, Admiral Keating, Commander US NORTHCOM, agreed stating, "Following a thorough review, we find that they (the draft 2005 BRAC recommendations) do not create an unacceptable risk to the accomplishment of our homeland defense or defense support of civil authorities."

DCN:11691

10. Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS)

Commission issue: Why were keeping DFAS Buckley Annex, CO, DFAS Columbus, OH, and DFAS Indianapolis, IN, open and closing the remaining DFAS sites the only scenario considered? Why did DoD not consider other options, which could have avoided military construction costs and possibly produced a more cost effective option?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Optimization Model was used to develop Best Value solution.
- No Military Construction involved.

DISCUSSION:

The Headquarters and Support Activities (H&SA) JCSG followed an iterative process that reviewed all DFAS locations as potential gaining locations. The process considered options and concluded the three-location combination, DFAS-Denver, DFAS-Columbus and DFAS-Indianapolis, represented the best value solution for DFAS by maximizing military value. The Optimization Model was used to develop the best value solution for DFAS, from both facilities and business operations perspectives. Within the optimization model the following constraints were applied against the 26 DFAS locations: (i) Maximize military value, (ii) Minimize number of locations, (iii) Minimum of two locations – to support strategic redundancy, (iv) Minimize military construction, and (v) Retain anchor locations for business operations integrity. The model resulted in the best value solution, and the economics (cost/savings) of the solution were then developed using the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model.

The DFAS recommendation does not include costs for new construction. It does include costs associated with the possible reactivation of part of building #11, at Defense Supply Center-Columbus (DSC-C), OH. Because of the lack of detailed costing information associated with a reactivation, renovation equal to 29% of construction costs was used. The cost in COBRA is thus a conservative estimate, as the DSC-C reported that building #11 is in good condition and should only require a lesser expense for reactivation.

11. Professional Development Education

Commission issue: What consideration was given to the closure and realignment of the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) at Wright Patterson AFB, OH, and the Defense Language Institute (DLI) at Monterey, CA, with Naval Postgraduate School (NPGS) at Monterey, CA, to create a consolidated professional development education center?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Consolidation of the Naval Postgraduate School and Air Force Institute of Technology was considered but did not include the Defense Language Institute (DLI).
- Maintaining graduate education is a core competency of the Department.

DISCUSSION:

The Education & Training (E&T) JCSG analyzed a full set of scenarios for all three institutions, including closure (privatize the functions), consolidations, and realignments. One of the scenarios (E&T-0022) consolidated NPGS and AFIT at Monterey, CA but did not include DLI in that consolidation. This scenario was not recommended in favor of E&T-0003 (the privatization of NPGS and AFIT), which was later integrated with DON-0070 (the closure of the installation housing NPGS). The Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) later also deleted this candidate recommendation in recognition of the value provided by having military postgraduate education facilities that (1) recognize the uniqueness of professional military education, (2) acknowledge the importance of sustaining a world class educational facility as a component of our military structure, and (3) recognize the long-term benefits achieved from having a dedicated military campus that attracts future military leaders from other countries.

12. Joint Medical Command Headquarters

Commission issue: What consideration was given to establishing a Joint Medical Command Headquarters, through collocation of disparate Department of Defense Surgeons General, at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD?

Response:

KEY ISSUES:

- Joint Medical Command was not considered but co-location was.
- Co-location not cost effective.

DISCUSSION:

The Medical Joint Cross-Service Group determined that consideration of a Joint Medical Command, with its complex command and control ramifications, was outside the scope

DCN:11691

of their charter. The Medical JCSG approach, approved by the Infrastructure Steering Group, was to focus on medical capacity and efficiencies. The Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group addressed collocation of the Medical Headquarters functions in the National Capital Region. Due to the complexities of instituting Joint Command and Control structures, no recommendations instituting a Joint Command Structure was developed.

The H&SA JCSG developed several scenarios for collocation of medical headquarters functions with in the National Capitol Region. These scenarios included collocation into space made available by the candidate recommendation to close the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences (USUHS), as well as building space at Ft Belvoir, VA, and Bethesda, MD. The financial analysis of these scenarios is detailed below. The IEC decision to retain USUHS, the only financially viable receiving location, eliminated further discussion on the collocation of medical headquarters in the National Capitol Region.

	To Ft Belvoir	To Bethesda	To USUHS
One Time Costs	\$94.3M	\$107.3M	\$51.5M
Net Implementation Costs	\$77.1M	\$89.0M	\$29.4M
Annual Recurring Savings	\$6.2M	\$6.6M	\$8.0M
Payback Period	19 Years	20 Years	6 Years
NPV at 2025	\$10.2M (Cost)	\$17.0M (Cost)	\$47.4M (Savings)

DCN:11691

**Internal Working Document
Draft Only**

Base Closure & Realignment Commission

Potential addition installations for closure or realignment:

ARMY

Fort Eustis, VA

Army – 8
Army – 19
E&T – 5
E&T – 6
H&SA – 31
H&SA – 35
H&SA – 41
Med - 12

NAVY

Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, CA

Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, HI

Navy - 23

Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME

Navy – 18

Naval Air Station Oceana, VA

E&T – 10
Ind - 19

AIR FORCE

Galena Air Force Base, AK

Air Force - 6

King Salmon Air Force Base, AK

Air Force - 6

Luke Air Force Base, AZ

Air Force – 9
Air Force – 47
Air Force – 53
E&T - 10

Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AZ

Tyndall Air Force Base, FL

Air Force – 49
Air Force – 55
Med - 15

DCN:11691

**Internal Working Document
Draft Only**

Moody Air Force Base, GA

Air Force - 6
Air Force 35
E&T - 14

Pope Air Force Base, NC

Army - 6
Army - 8
Air Force - 35
Air Force - 52

Nellis Air Force Base, NV

Air Force - 6
Air Force - 18
Air Force - 22
Air Force - 25
Air Force - 32
Air Force - 47

Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport Reserve Station, OH

Air Force - 35

Dyess Air Force Base, TX

Air Force - 43

JOINT CROSS SERVICES GROUP

Headquarters & Support Activity

Defense Finance Accounting Service
DFAS Buckley Annex, CO
DFAS Indianapolis, IN
DFAS Columbus, OH

H&SA - 37

Technology Cross Service Group

Natick Labs, MA

H&SA - 5
S&S - 7

Rome Research Corporation, NY

Tech - 22

Education & Training Cross Service Group

Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA

DCN:11691

**Internal Working Document
Draft Only**

Medical Cross Service Group

Joint Medical Headquarters Command

Med – 4

BUMED Potomac Annex, DC

Air Force Medical Command Bolling AFB, DC

TRICARE Management Authority Leased Space, VA

USUHS Bethesda, MD

DCN:11691

INSTALLATIONS RECOMMENDED FOR ADDITION TO THE SECDEF LIST

RECOMMENDED INSTALLATION: Luke Air Force Base, AZ

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Close Luke Air Force Base

Minus the 48 aircraft distributed under DoD's USAF-9 recommendation, 155 aircraft would be left (6.5 squadrons) at Luke AFB. If Cannon were to remain open but its aircraft and personnel were distributed as currently proposed, it would be a viable option to take on Luke AFB's current training mission (Cannon AFB is ranked 35th for the Range and Collective Training Subgroup Training mission). Per the capacity analysis DoD conducted, Cannon AFB can accommodate 5.4 squadrons or 129 planes. The remaining 26 aircraft could be distributed as determined by the Air Force.

RATIONALE FOR RECOMMENDATION:

Luke is ranked 12th for the Fighter mission and 26th (out of 135) for the Range and Collective Training Subgroup for the Training function.

Despite these rankings, Luke AFB has been plagued by increasing encroachment for several years. Given the encroachment issue, Luke AFB's ability to expand and accommodate any necessary future missions is questionable. Luke ranked 12th for the Fighter mission and it scored the lowest in the Contingency, Mobilization, and Future Forces Criterion which is given a weight of 10 percent. Though the base did not lose any points on the Fighter MCI for Level of Mission Encroachment, this issue merits a closer look. If Luke AFB were to close, there would be 3,037,000 square feet of land and facilities that could be used by the community in some capacity.

Under the Air Force recommendation (USAF-9) to realign Luke outlined below, 48 aircraft would be distributed elsewhere. According to the DoD's cost/savings estimates, this recommendation alone would result in a one-time cost of approximately \$6 million and recurring savings of approximately \$18 million. Following this logic, redistributing the rest of Luke AFB's aircraft and personnel would likely produce even greater savings.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATION: (IF APPLICABLE)

Air Force Logistics Support Centers

USAF - 53

- Realign Altus Air Force Base, OK; Hickam Air Force Base, HI; Hurlburt Field, FL; Langley Air Force Base, VA; Little Rock Air Force Base, AR; Luke Air Force Base, AZ; and Scott Air Force Base, IL. Establish Air Force Logistics Support Centers (LSCs) at Langley Air Force Base and Scott Air Force Base by combining five major command (MAJCOM) Regional Supply Squadrons (RSS) into two LSCs.

Fort Smith Air Guard Station, AR and Luke Air Force Base, AZ,

USAF - 9

- Realign Luke Air Force Base, AZ. The 56th Fighter Wing, Luke Air Force Base, AZ, distributes its F-16 Block 25s (13 aircraft) and F-16 Block 42s (24 aircraft) to retirement. The 944th Fighter Wing distributes its F-16s to the 144th Fighter Wing at Fresno (11 aircraft).

DCN:11691

Hill Air Force Base, UT, Edwards Air Force Base, CA, Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID, Luke Air Force Base, AZ, and Nellis Air Force Base, NV

USAF - 47

- Realign Edwards Air Force Base, CA; Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID; and Luke Air Force Base, AZ, by relocating base-level LANTIRN intermediate maintenance to Hill, establishing a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) for Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) pods at Hill.

Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site

E&T - 10

- Realign Luke Air Force Base, AZ, by relocating to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, a sufficient number of instructor pilots and operations support personnel to stand up the Air Force's portion of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Initial Joint Training Site, hereby established at Eglin Air Force Base, FL.

RELEVANT COST DATA: (COBRA DATA OR DATA REQUESTED

None – Cost data pending

**DID DOD EXPLORE THIS SCENARIO: (Y/N) - BRIEF EXPLANATION
CHECK WITH KARL GINGRICH OR TYLER OBORN FOR COBRA RUNS**

No

OTHER FACTORS:


DCN:11691

ADD SPIDER CHARTS IF AVAILABLE – IF NOT AVAILABLE, CHECK WITH ED BROWN TO SEE IF ONE CAN BE GENERATED

**AF-47
LUKE AIR FORCE BASE, AZ**

REALIGN

Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
(29)	(1)	0	0	(29)	(1)	0	(30)




DCN:11691

**AF-53
LUKE AIR FORCE BASE, AZ**

REALIGN

Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
(16)	0	0	0	(16)	0	0	(16)




DCN:11691

**AF-9
LUKE AIR FORCE BASE, AZ**

REALIGN

Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
(101)	(177)	0	0	(101)	(177)	0	(278)



DCN:11691

**Internal Working Document
Draft Only**

Joint Cross Service Group

Close Defense Finance Accounting Service locations at Buckley Annex, CO; DFAS Indianapolis, IN; and Columbus, OH to improve force protection, reduce costs and optimize DFAS business lines.

Close Natick Labs, MA to consolidate Army RTD&E organizations at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD and Ft. Belvoir, VA.

Close Rome Research site to align sensors to aircraft capabilities at Wright Patterson AFB, OH.

Realign Naval Postgraduate School, CA with the Air Force Institute of Technology, OH.

Close BUMED Potomac Annex, DC; AF Medical Support Agency Bolling AFB, DC; and TMA leased space, VA to collocate medical headquarters commands at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda.

Close USUHS, MD.

DCN:11691

Base

NUEX *Luke AFB*

ScenarioID E&T-0009 **Title** Establish Western T&E OAR Complex **Status** Deleted

Description Consolidate T&E capabilities and workload requiring open-air ranges for T&E a western U.S. complex of ranges for air, sea, and, space, armament/munitions, C4ISR, EW, and CB Defense.
 Gaining Activities: Edwards AFB, China Lake, Pt Mugu, PMRF, Vandenberg AFB, Nellis AFB, UTTR, DPG, YPG, Ft. Huachuca, WSMR
 Losing Activities: Patuxent River NAS, Eglin AFB, Redstone Arsenal, Ft. Rucker, APG, Ellsworth AFB, Shaw AFB, McConnell AFB, Buckley AFB, Luke AFB, Selfridge ANGB, Tucson IAP AGS, Ft. A.P.Hill, Ft. Belvoir, Ft. Bragg, Ft. Eustis, Ft. Hood, Ft. Knox, Ft. Leonard Wood, and Ft. Sill.

ReasonInactive

ReasonDeleted Per guidance from E&T JCSG, 18 Nov 04, this Scenario was deleted because certified data did not support this strategy-driven Scenario.

ScenarioID E&T-0052 **Title** JSF Initial Joint Training Site **Status** Active

Description Realign Luke AFB, Sheppard AFB, MCAS Miramar, NAS Oceana, and NAS Pensacola by relocating instructor pilots, operations support personnel, maintenance instructors, maintenance technicians, and other associated personnel and equipment to Eglin AFB to establish the Initial Joint Training Site for the joint USAF, USN, and USMC Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) training organizations to train aviators and maintenance technicians how to properly operate and maintain this new weapon system.

ReasonInactive

ReasonDeleted

DCN:11691

ScenarioID USAF-0102 *Title* Realign Logistics Support Centers (S904c1) *Status* Active

Description Combine five MAJCOM Regional Supply Squadrons (RSSs) into 2 Logistics Support Centers (LSCs); Combat Air Force (CAF) and Mobility Air Force (MAF) LSCs

Consolidated LSCs will:

- Provide seamless transition from peace to war for 2,764 aircraft and weapon systems
- Provide a single face the warfighter at home and deployed
- Align with eLog21 initiatives
- Standardize AF materiel management C2

Manpower realignments will:

- Reduce RSS manpower positions from 3 installations
- Reduce LRS manpower positions from 3 active duty bases
 - Plus-up LSC manpower positions at the two proposed LSC locations
- Save 51 manpower positions

ReasonInactive

ReasonDeleted

ScenarioID USAF-0108 *Title* Realign LANTIRN Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities (CIRF), 5 to 3 bases (S91) *Status* Deleted

Description Realign CIRF for Low Altitude Targeting and Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) navigation and targeting pods from 5 to 3 AF Bases

CIRF for the LANTIRN pods will increase maintenance productivity by consolidating and smoothing dispersed random workflows; improve in-shop training and reliability-centered maintenance; enable supported and supporting units to "train like we fight," i.e., operate in CONUS as we do during contingencies; and leverage the strengths of the Future Total Force

Manpower realignments will:

- Reduce intermediate pod repair personnel slots from 5 installations
- Increase intermediate pod repair personnel slots at the 2 proposed CIRF locations
- Provide personnel slot(s) at the Logistics Support Center (LSC) CIRF Command and Control (C2) Cell

Each LANTIRN pod CIRF activity will require Pod Shop space specified in AFH 32-1084 (FAC 2116; AF Cat Code 211-157)

ReasonInactive

ReasonDeleted Deleted by AF BCEG, 18 Mar. Scenario requirements to be blended into USAF 0113.

DCN:11691

Headquarters & Support Activity Group**13. DEFENSE FINANCE ACCOUNTING SERVICE**

- a. DFAS Buckley Annex, CO
- b. DFAS Columbus, OH
- c. DFAS Indianapolis, IN

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

- Close or realign DFAS Buckley Annex, CO and/or
- Close or realign DFAS Columbus, OH and/or
- Close or realign DFAS Indianapolis, IN

RATIONALE FOR RECOMMENDATION

- Evaluate all options to find the most cost effective option.
- Reduce number of locations to the maximum extent possible.
- Reduce operating and sustainment costs.
- Balance mission and strategic redundancy requirements.
- Eliminate excess capacity.
- Avoid closures that do not have significant payback.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATION

- HSA-18

RELEVANT COST DATA**HSA-18 COBRA data:**

- One Time Cost: \$282M
- Net Implementation Cost: \$158M
- Annual Recurring Costs/Savings: \$120M
- Payback Period/Year Immediate
- NPV at 2025: -\$1,314M
- A COBRA model for alternative scenarios is being prepared.

DID DOD EXPLORE THIS SCENARIO

No. DFAS only ran one certified COBRA run for the scenario they proposed. They did not look at closing these installations even though other DFAS sites have a higher military value and lower operating costs. During an Infrastructure Steering Group meeting on January 14, 2005, there was concern regarding, "the appropriateness of Buckley Annex as a receiving location, instead of assessing DFAS's relocation to an active base in order to enable a total closure of the Annex."¹ Also, the cost of living in DFAS Colorado is higher than in other closed locations that have the excess capacity to handle more work.

OTHER ISSUES

DFAS did not look at the productivity of their sites and overestimated force protection savings on leased space. Only by placing all DFAS locations up for potential closure can these issues be fully examined.

¹ BRAC 2005 Infrastructure Steering Group, Meeting Minutes of Jan. 14, 2005.

DCN:11691

Alternative Scenarios

NAS Oceana F/A-18s to Seymour AFB and Seymour AFB to Cannon AFB

Pros:

- Retains three installations with high military value, but better leverages their value to DoD for training and the readiness of future forces.
- Reduces programmed increases in operations at a current, severely encroached installation.
- Reduces growing pressure from local citizens advocating the complete closure of NAS Oceana "Master Jet Base" based on concern for the increased noise and environmental consequences of bedding down the F/A-18 "Super Hornet."
- Increases the operational capability of NAS Oceana to support the F-14 "Tomcat" and other remaining aircraft. Retains credible "operational placeholder" at NAS Oceana for the replacement of the *Tomcat*.
- Relieves imperative for the Navy to obtain property and construct an additional Outlying Landing Field (OLF) for Carrier Landing Practice in Virginia or Northern North Carolina.
- Retains Seymour AFB as a DoD installation and leverages its air-to-air and air-to-ground training venues to support fleet requirements on the East Coast.
- Allows the Air Force to maximize the value of air-to-air, air-to-ground and joint regional training venues/opportunities of Cannon AFB based on assignment of longer range F-15E "Strike Eagle."
- Retains an installation currently unencroached – and protected from encroachment for more than the 20-year BRAC 2005 planning window.
- Retains ability of units to use the Goldwater Range Complex.
- Reduces operational costs at a base in a far more expensive area.

Cons:

- No installation is closed so savings can not be maximized.
- Relocation of personnel and operations from Virginia to North Carolina and from North Carolina to New Mexico will reduce savings.

DCN:11691



ON:11691

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600

Arlington, VA 22202

Telephone: 703-699-2950

Date: June 22, 2005**To:** Commissioners, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission**From:** Chairman Anthony J. Principi *ajp***RE:** Commission Prodecures and Schedule

As we approach the voting phase of the Base Closure and Realignment process I have found it useful to review our current situation regarding recusals and voting requirements. A discussion of the results of my review follows.

Matters as they now stand are that four commissioners have recused themselves from participation in matters relating to installations in their home states. Commissioners Coyle and Gehman recused themselves, in accordance with ethics agreements they signed during the nomination process, because of BRAC-related activity in California and Virginia respectively. Commissioner Bilbray recused himself because of his long-time representation of Nevada in the Congress and other public offices. Commissioner Hansen recused himself with regard to Utah for the same reason.

Each of the commissioners made his recusal publicly at a Commission hearing held on May 19, 2005. As a result of these recusals, the commissioners cannot deliberate or vote on matters relating to installations in their home states or to installations in other states that are substantially affected by closures and realignments or installations in their home states. To avoid controversy and possible litigation "substantially affected" will be interpreted very conservatively.

The procedural rules adopted by the Commission at an open hearing on May 19, 2005, are, with one significant exception, the same as the rules that guided the previous three BRAC Commissions. Unlike in the past, however, a super majority of seven of nine commissioners is now required to add, realign, or increase the realignment of a base not included on the Secretary of Defense's list of bases to be closed or realigned.

With the exception of the seven-of-nine vote requirement, no guidance is provided in the BRAC statute for voting, such as what constitutes a quorum and majority. The Commission rules describe three situations in which **a majority of the commissioners serving** is required to conduct business. Only issues such as motions to extend meetings and adjourn are resolved by a simple **majority of commissioners present**. A majority of commissioners serving is therefore always five unless by resignation or other loss without replacement the total number of commissioners serving is reduced below nine.

The majority of the votes anticipated during Commission hearings to consider additions to the Secretary's list and conduct final deliberations will not be affected by recusals. All commissioners will be qualified to deliberate and vote.

DCN:11691

Only one commissioner will be recused from most of the remaining votes. In only a very limited number of actions will two or three Commissioners be disqualified from deliberating and voting?

In a related matter, I have determined as a matter of policy that we will make the greatest reasonable effort to minimize the number of conflicts but permit recused commissioners as necessary to participate in regional hearings. Participation will be allowed even though the recused commissioners will be unable to deliberate and vote on all of the installations discussed at the hearings and site visits. Their direct exposure to as much information and as many concerned citizens as possible is recognized as being vitally important to the completion of the Commission task of open, fair, and comprehensive consideration of the final selection criteria, force-structure plan, and worldwide infrastructure inventory. Other commissioners and staff at the hearings and site visits will also gather data, so there is no real possibility that the recused commissioner could be seen as filtering the Commission's view of an installation.

I know that we are of like mind that the Commission and its individual members must be above reproach and free from any real or perceived bias. The actions of Commissioners Bilbray, Coyle, Gehman, and Hansen in limiting their participation in certain Commission actions reflect the importance they place on their personal integrity and the public trust. Their actions can only serve to enhance the reality and perception of the Commission as independent, open, and honest.

I know that you share my enthusiasm for this undertaking, but I also am confident that we all look forward to the successful completion of our work. We have conducted more than half of our initial site visits and public hearings, but two full months of focused effort remain. Hearings to receive testimony from the Department of Defense, Government Accountability Office, and others are scheduled for July 18 and 19. We will conduct our "adds" hearing on July 19. We will receive Congressional testimony on July 28 and 29, and testimony from the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff during the week of August 15. Final deliberations commence the week of August 22. At this point, we remain on schedule to deliver the Commission report to the President on September 8. Thanks to you all for your remarkable service.

DCN:11691