

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

TESTIMONY TO THE

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JOINT STATEMENT  
OF

THE HONORABLE MICHAEL L. DOMINGUEZ  
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

GENERAL JOHN P. JUMPER  
CHIEF OF STAFF  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

17 May 2005

*10 closures*  
*62 Realignments*

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission, we are pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Air Force base closure and realignment recommendations. We look forward to working with you as you consider all Department of Defense recommendations over the next few months.

### **Overview**

Downsizing infrastructure is a difficult task, as all Air Force bases are outstanding installations. They stand as a credit to our Nation as a whole and to the exceptional communities that support them. However, we must make difficult decisions and reduce and realign our infrastructure, to posture ourselves for the security challenges we face, and to preserve our limited resources for readiness and modernization. The Air Force recommendations represent bold steps to accomplish those ends. We will move our smaller force structure into fewer, larger, and more effective combat squadrons. Air Force recommendations include 10 base closures and 62 base realignment actions. Each of these individual closure or realignment recommendations may affect multiple bases. Our 72 actions will affect 115 of the 154 installations the Air Force considered within the BRAC process.

### **Air Force Goals for BRAC**

The Air Force recommendations reaffirm the Department of Defense's commitment to defend the homeland, establish a capabilities-based defense strategy, and challenge the military departments to transform themselves to better meet new threats in a changed security

environment. Consistent with the goals outlined by the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force established four BRAC goals to support right-sizing of the force and to enhance our capabilities:

- Maximize war-fighting capability efficiently.
- Transform the Total Air Force by realigning our infrastructure to meet future defense strategy.
- Maximize operational capability by eliminating excess physical capacity.
- Capitalize on opportunities for joint activity.

We are pleased to report that the Air Force would meet its goals through these recommendations, and in turn meet the overarching goals set for the Department by the Secretary of Defense.

#### Maximizing War-Fighting Capability

The Air Force recommendations maximize our war-fighting capability by effectively consolidating older weapons systems into fewer, but larger squadrons. These more optimally sized units are more efficient and more operationally effective because of economies of scale. For example, we base weapons systems such as the F-16 fighter to allow us to leverage common support requirements for these weapons systems while reducing cost and duplication. And we consolidate like weapons systems where practical at the fewest operational locations; for example, we place the entire B-1 bomber fleet at Dyess AFB, Texas, and the entire active duty CONUS C-130 tactical airlift fleet at Little Rock AFB, Arkansas.

Our recommendations increase almost all fighter squadrons from 15 aircraft to 18 or 24 aircraft. The Air National Guard's F-15 squadron at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, is the only exception to this fighter basing strategy because of location and recruiting. Hickam's F-15 fighters are important to Homeland Defense, but Hawaii's geographic location can pose training challenges, as it is expensive to host adversarial fighter units for training. In addition, Hickam's Air National

Guard wing also flies KC-135 aircraft and will have a C-17 mission; therefore, leaving the unit sized at its current 15 fighter aircraft to recruit to these other weapons systems was the right solution.

Our recommendations also increase mobility squadrons from 8 aircraft to 12 or 16 aircraft. We made some exceptions to increasing reserve component mobility squadron sizes, either because of capacity or recruiting. We applied military judgment to size these units either to the maximum available installation capacity at no extra cost, or at the current or maximum force structure size that capitalizes on that location's recruiting demographics.

Our recommendations leverage the inherent strengths and advantages of our Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces to maximize the Air Force's capabilities. At the same time, we have maintained the balance across the active duty and reserve components, both in aircraft and in manpower. Reserve component manpower that becomes available as a result of Air Force BRAC recommendations will be reinvested into emerging Air Force missions. Our recently established Future Total Force (FTF) office on the Air Staff will work with the Reserve Component and the Adjutant Generals to determine how to distribute those emerging missions across Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces and organizations. BRAC and the FTF are fundamental, complementary elements that will reshape the Air Force for the future.

#### Meet Future Defense Strategy

The Air Force recommendations also realign Air Force force structure to better support future defense strategy. The strategic objectives of the 2005 National Defense Strategy include defending the United States homeland from direct attack, securing strategic access, and retaining global freedom of action. The Air Force recommendations help secure the homeland

by providing the required capability to meet North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) missions from our proposed constellation of bases. Our recommendations ensure we retain the right bases to support enduring missions of Global Strike, Global Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and Global Mobility, and ensure we maintain unimpeded access to space. For example, we retain C-17s near new Army Stryker brigades in Alaska and Hawaii, providing strategic mobility and response in the western Pacific. Our recommendations also retain the right bases for emerging needs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and the Joint Unmanned Combat Aerial System.

#### Eliminate Excess Physical Capacity

As mentioned earlier, we have made 10 closure and 62 realignment recommendations that will eliminate excess capacity within the Air Force. Of the 142 Air Force installations that have operational flying missions today, our recommendations reduce that number by 28 flying units, representing a 20% reduction. We reduce our excess flightline infrastructure by 37%, but still retain sufficient ramp space for surge, emerging missions, or to accommodate Air Force aircraft permanently based overseas in the event we ever have to return those forces. We also reduce excess building and facility infrastructure by 79%, yet retain sufficient square footage for surge or emerging missions. Though we eliminate this excess, we maximize operational capability and maintain the surge capacity we need.

#### Capitalize On Opportunities For Joint Activity

Finally, our recommendations, independently and in conjunction with recommendations from other Services and the Joint Cross-Service Groups, capitalize on opportunities for joint

activity by hosting sister Service combat and combat support organizations. For example, we will host the Headquarters for the Third Army--the Army's United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) supporting component command--at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, where it will be located with the Air Force's USCENTCOM component, Headquarters Ninth Air Force.

Through the Department's recommendations we will host the joint initial training location for the Joint Strike Fighter at Eglin AFB, Florida, to provide Air Force, Navy, and Marine operators and maintainers with a location that meets the needs of all -- while providing easy access to the range and airspace complexes near the Gulf of Mexico. Eglin AFB will also host the Army's Seventh Special Forces Group, pairing this combat unit with Air Force special operations forces and the robust training areas of the Eglin complex.

While we transfer ownership of Pope AFB, North Carolina, to the Army at Fort Bragg, enabling other Army recommendations that move forces to Fort Bragg, we retain an airlift squadron and an aerial port capability to continue to support the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps. In addition, our recommendations place optimally sized A-10 fighter squadrons in proximity to Fort Polk, Louisiana, and Forts Benning and Stewart, Georgia, to provide the close air support assets needed to support joint training.

### **Air Force BRAC Process**

The Air Force's BRAC analysis was grounded in the force structure plan, our physical infrastructure inventory, and the BRAC selection criteria. Our Air Force infrastructure analysis was shaped by three underlying tenets. First, military value, both quantitative and qualitative, was the predominant factor. Second, all installations were treated impartially, regardless of

whether or not they were considered for closure or realignment in the past. Third, military value was not determined solely on an installation's current mission, but also on its capacity to support other enduring Air Force missions.

The Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) developed Air Force BRAC recommendations. The BCEG was comprised of 12 general officers and civilian executives representing the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and a wide array of Headquarters Air Force functional staff areas. The Air Force Audit Agency was integrated throughout our entire process to ensure Air Force data collection and analytical processes were comprehensive and auditable.

Rather than focus on fungible attributes of an installation, such as assigned personnel or equipment and forces that could be relocated, our military value assessment stressed installation characteristics that were outside the control of the Air Force or would be difficult to replicate elsewhere without great expense or complexity. These characteristics include an installation's geographic location and proximity to other physical features or defense activities, terrain, and prevailing weather. Those installation characteristics that would be difficult to reconstitute elsewhere might include high volume military training airspace, the local transportation infrastructure, intercontinental ballistic missile silos, or basic airfield infrastructure.

The Air Force assessed the military value of its operational bases using certified data obtained from the individual installations. We not only considered the physical capacity of our installations, but also the operational capacity--to include airspace and ranges--and the natural capacity. Applying operational capability data collected through a Web-based tool to BRAC Selection Criteria 1-4, and the weighted guidance assigned by the BCEG, each of the 154

installations the Air Force considered under BRAC received a score for each of eight mission areas considered by the BCEG. These eight mission areas were: fighter, bomber, airlift, tanker, space, Special Operations Forces (SOF)/Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C2ISR), and unmanned aerial vehicles. The objective was to find an optimal long-term basing plan that, within physical and operational constraints, located the Air Force's long-term force structure at installations that had the highest overall military value.

The Air Force started the scenario development process using an optimization model developed by the Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency. We then deliberated to refine the optimization model output until we achieved a set of potential scenarios. Once an optimal basing plan was identified, the Air Force analysis teams developed a related group of potential base closure and realignment options to implement this basing plan. The BCEG reviewed these proposals and, often with refinement, selected the most promising to become scenarios and to undergo further analysis. Again, an iterative process of review and refinement continued until the BCEG approved each candidate recommendation for consideration by the Department of Defense review group, the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC).

The costs and savings for each scenario were determined through application of a costing model, the Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA). Air Force scenario analysis also considered BRAC Selection Criteria 6-8: the economic impact on the communities; the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to host missions, forces, and personnel; and the environmental impact. Unlike the first four selection criteria, which were installation-dependent, selection criteria six, seven, and eight were scenario-dependent, meaning the information

gathered for these criteria was related to a proposed action, not to the status quo. However, certain factors related to selection criteria seven and eight also were captured in military value analysis as they contributed to an installation's ability to support future and existing missions and the availability and condition of land and airspace.

During this process, scenarios from other Services that affected Air Force installations were worked through the Joint Action Scenario Team (JAST). Opportunities for joint basing were worked into Air Force scenarios and formal analysis, and were considered as part of the development of the Service's own candidate recommendations. Similarly, scenarios from the seven Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSG) that affected Air Force installations were worked in coordination with the Air Force.

#### **Anticipated Costs and Savings and Implementation Schedule**

We estimate a total savings and cost avoidance of over \$2.6 billion dollars for both *by 2011* personnel and infrastructure during the implementation years, and savings and cost avoidance of over \$1.2 billion each year thereafter. The Air Force will reinvest any reserve component manpower made available as a result of BRAC realignments or closures into other high priority Air Force missions, including emerging missions.

The Air Force has begun to develop an implementation schedule for these 2005 recommendations should they be approved, and we will work closely with the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, and our active duty major commands to further develop and refine this schedule.

In prior rounds of BRAC, the Air Force established an excellent record of closing bases

as quickly as possible. This aggressive approach provides the quickest savings to the Air Force and assists the local communities in their efforts to develop the closure and implementation plans necessary to begin economic revitalization. The Air Force will ensure that efforts are undertaken to maximize savings at these installations and to work closely with the local communities to facilitate a prompt transition and the best reuse opportunities.

### **Summary**

In conclusion, BRAC offers the Air Force the opportunity to accomplish four things. First and foremost, it transforms our smaller force structure into fewer, larger, more effective combat squadrons. Second, it ensures the transformed force and the infrastructure we retain provides the capabilities necessary to support the future defense strategy. Third, it increases overall efficiency by eliminating excess plant capacity while retaining the surge capability we need. Fourth, it supports joint basing initiatives in smart ways.

Mr. Chairman, we have looked to the future for our mission and our infrastructure requirements, and these recommendations provide for an Air Force that is and will be capable of responding to any challenge, in any theater, at any time. Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you today. Our staff will be made fully available to answer the Commission's questions as it considers the Department's recommendations.

**Suggested Questions for May 17 2005 Hearing  
Secretary of the Air Force/Chief of Staff**

**General**

1. Did the Office of the Secretary of Defense remove or add any installation closures or realignments from your recommendations to the Secretary? If so, will you please elaborate on the specifics?
2. Did the Office of the Secretary of Defense instruct your Service not to place any specific installations for closure or realignment on your listed recommendations to the Secretary? If so, will you please elaborate on the specifics?
3. The Air Force has recommended closure of 3 major bases in its Active component. The many of your BRAC recommendations are either in the Reserve Component or results in only minor closures and realignments, below threshold for actions required by BRAC. This is particularly surprising considering earlier projections of excess capacity.
  - a. Are you satisfied with the consideration of active component bases for this BRAC round?
  - b. What percent of the active component excess capacity is being reduced?
  - c. More so than in prior BRAC rounds, this year's round appears to shift various organizations and bodies of work from one base to another without closing many active component bases. How does emptying space on a base that remains open create savings in overall costs of maintaining those facilities?

**Air Force Selection Process**

4. According to the summary of the Air Force selection process, you established the four goals to support right-sizing the force and enhancing its capabilities through BRAC 2005. Those goals were: (1) Transform by maximizing the warfighting capability of each squadron, (2) Transform by realigning Air Force infrastructure with the future defense strategy, (3) Maximize operational capability by eliminating excess physical capacity, and (4) Capitalize on opportunities for joint activity.

Can you provide some examples of some of your BRAC decisions that achieved these goals?

5. According to your summary of the selection processes, the Air Force's rebasing strategy among other things "retained those Air Force bases that, by virtue of location or other difficult to reconstitute attributes, had the

- highest military value” Can you please provide some examples of these attributes which would lead to a high military value, e.g. ranges, airspace, etc.?
6. Your summary of the selection process also indicated that the Air Force’s rebasing strategy “supported joint basing initiatives where feasible”.
    - a. Can you please describe your joint basing initiatives?
    - b. What types of specific Air Force activities will be integrated with another Service, e.g. installation management, operations, etc.?
  7. According to the Air Force summary, the concept of joint operational basing will be advanced by the reassignment of the Army’s Seventh Special Forces Group to Eglin AFB, where it will collocate with the center of Air Force Special Operations. Initial graduate-level pilot training on the Joint Strike Fighter for the Navy, Marines, and Air Force will be conducted jointly at the same base.
    - a. Can you please expand on your rationale and implementation of this “joint operational basing” concept?
    - b. How much does it cost to implement?
  8. Your summary of the selection process also indicated that the Air Force’s rebasing strategy included actions that would “generated savings within a reasonable period”.
    - a. What constitutes a reasonable period?
    - b. If savings were not achieved, would an action be made for another reason? Please provide some examples?
  9. Your summary of the selection process also indicated that “Air Force flying units will be restructured into a smaller number of fully equipped squadrons to increase operational effectiveness and efficiency. In the process, aircraft of like configuration (i.e., block) will be based together. In selected cases, personnel from Reserve Component units will be transferred into blended units similar to the well-proven Reserve Associate concept that has long been common in the strategic airlift mission area.”
    - a. Can you please expand on your rationale and provide some examples of these restructurings?
    - b. What analysis was done to examine the most efficient unit size?
    - c. Please explain how effectiveness and efficiencies exist in creating a larger number of smaller squadrons?

- 10.** Your summary of the selection process also indicated that “forces across mission areas will be based to enhance their capability to provide a global response to the needs of combatant commanders around the world”.
- a. Can you please provide some examples?
  - b. How were these decisions coordinated with the combatant commanders?
- 11.** Did your community infrastructure assessments indicate that a base or community was at risk of not being able to adequately receive additional units and personnel?
- a. Please provide some examples of any “red flags” raised?
  - b. Please explain your process for these assessments?

### **Military Value**

- 12.** As this Commission begins its review and analysis of the BRAC recommendations and the supporting data, we want to have a complete understanding of your definitions of Military Value and the process used to assign a metric to Military Value. Would you please give us the definition of Military Value?

### **Cost savings**

- 13.** You have indicated that the annual recurring savings of the Air Force recommendations will be approximately \$2.6B, and the net present value of these savings over twenty years will be \$14.5B.
- a. Do these costs include environmental remediation costs?
  - b. Do these costs include the costs of rebasing of Air Force units from overseas?
  - c. Based on GAO reviews, DOD’s savings estimates are rough approximations of the likely savings. Please explain what, if anything, DOD has done this round to improve their method for determining savings or rather cost avoidances.
  - d. The base closure criteria that addresses “the cost of operations and manpower implications” are under the heading of “military value”. Roughly, how many of your recommendations will not yield savings in terms of cost of operations and manpower reductions? Why are these recommendations being made?

### **Air Force Transformation**

- 14.** The Air Force’s Transformation Flight Plan states that in order to play its part in transformation in support of the Joint Forces Commander, the Air

Force will work with other Services, the Joint Staff, other DOD agencies and allies/coalition partners to “enhance joint and coalition warfighting.”

- a. As you prepared your BRAC submissions to DOD, how specifically did you work with other Services, the Joint Staff and the others to ensure that your proposed force structure “enhanced joint and coalition warfighting?”
- b. How does your F/A-22 and Joint Strike Fighter force structure account for, and enhance the Navy’s air operations?

15. In recent Congressional testimony, General Jumper was asked what issues keep him “up at night”. One of his primary answers was “our aging aircraft fleet.” How does the Air Force intend to use savings from the base closure and realignment process to address this concern?

### **Force Structure Plan**

16. The legislation authorizing this BRAC round required that DOD develop a 20-year force structure plan to help guide BRAC recommendations. However, there appears to be much uncertainty regarding future force structure requirements.

- a. How do your BRAC recommendations relate to your force structure plan?
- b. How did you deal with the uncertainties of planning your force structure over the next 20 years? How were those uncertainties taken into consideration in developing the BRAC recommendations?
- c. What key assumptions was the Air Force’s force structure plan based on? For example, what assumption does it make regarding replacement of existing aircraft—one for one replacement, or something smaller? What assumption does it make regarding the future of unmanned aircraft (UAVs) relative to replacing other manned aircraft?
- d. Does the force structure plan submitted in March 2005 reflect the December 2004 decision by the Office of Secretary of Defense to reduce the number of F-22s to be bought?
- e. Given uncertainties regarding future force structure requirements, how can the BRAC Commission be confident that it isn’t being asked to approve reductions in installations that may be needed in the future?
- f. To what extent is the force structure likely to change as a result of the QDR and how much flexibility will the Air Force have to accommodate a different and potentially larger force structure under the proposed BRAC closing and realignment plan?

**Impact of BRAC ongoing operations**

17. As you know, there has been some resistance to BRAC given today's security environment and at a time when the U.S military is involved in two major operations.

- a. How can we ensure that BRAC decisions in CONUS do not negatively affect ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
- b. How will these potential risks be mitigated?

**Interagency/local government coordination**

18. As you know, the law requires that you consider total costs to the government in the development of your recommendations.

- a. How would you characterize the interagency coordination and consideration in the BRAC process?
- b. Are there any recommendations that could have an impact on other federal agencies?
- c. To what extent have you analyzed the financial implications for these other agencies and include their expected costs in developing your overall costs and savings estimates?

**Excess/surge capacity**

19. Base closure criterion #3 addresses the need to consider surge requirements.

- a. How did this requirement effect your determination for selecting bases for closure and or realignment?
- b. What metrics were used to measure installation surge capabilities?
- c. Are there particular areas where potential surge capacity is needed most?

20. The Overseas Basing Commission has made recommendations concerning the Department's plan to move units from overseas to the Continental United States.

- a. What effect would implementation of the Overseas Basing Commission recommendations have on the capacity of the proposed basing structure after implementation of this round of the BRAC.
- b. To what extent has the Air Force fully calculated the costs of implementing the overseas rebasing initiative, including need for new facilities overseas, new training range requirements, as well as mobility and repositioning requirements?

**Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)**

21. As we discussed at a previous hearing, the ongoing QDR and BRAC are interrelated. We are concerned that there is a possibility that decisions made as a result of the ongoing QDR may contradict some of your BRAC recommendations to the Commission.
- a. Did you attempt to integrate QDR and BRAC analyses and decisions?
  - b. How can we ensure that decisions made in the ongoing QDR do not contradict?

**Mobility Capability Study**

22. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 23 Sep 04, Secretary Rumsfeld noted that "U.S. forces in the next century must be agile...[and] readily deployable...[and] must be able to project our power over long distances, in days or weeks, rather than months."
- a. Has DOD's BRAC submission accounted for results of the recent department-wide Mobility Capabilities Study? If so, how?
  - b. If not, how can we ensure that our decisions on base closure and realignment do not conflict with these studies findings?
  - c. How can the Air Force justify the reduction of airlift and air refueling aircraft before the results of the Mobility Capabilities Study have been released?

**Environmental Issues**

23. This Commission anticipates receiving comments and recommendations from the public on environmental and encroachment issues. Would you please tell us how the Department of Defense integrated its knowledge of the environmental conditions at installations into its considerations?
24. Are there any specific environmental issues that we should carefully consider? Are there any specific actions/recommendations where environmental issues stand out? Any significant environmental impacts at receiving bases?
25. The Department of Defense is responsible for remediating contamination on its facilities whether they remain open or closed. However, contaminant remediation at closing bases is likely to be expedited using current dollars versus future dollars. Additionally, uncontaminated parcels of property could conceivably be transferred more rapidly and with greater values than contaminated parcels.

- a. Was the differential between present and future remediation costs and rapid versus delayed property transfer considered as an economic factor in deciding what bases to close?
26. Were the costs associated with improving existing infrastructure and support to satisfy environmental requirements at realigning or gaining installations included in estimates of potential savings associated with selecting bases for closure?
27. The Barry M. Goldwater Range is home to numerous threatened and endangered species. It is also the primary bombing range for Luke AFB, AZ.
- a. What impact will increased use of this range have on the management of these protected resources?
  - b. What impact will the closure of Cannon AFB, NM have on this range?

### **Homeland Defense**

28. The homeland defense mission has placed additional demands on the military. According to the Air Forces summary of its BRAC selection process, "forces will be rebased to fully support the homeland security-related air sovereignty taskings of the US Northern Command."
- a. Can you please describe how the demands of this mission were factored into your BRAC recommendations?
  - b. Can you elaborate on the coordination that occurred with the Department of Homeland Security and/or local governments as part of your BRAC deliberations?
  - c. Can you please provide some examples of some BRAC decisions that were made for the homeland security mission?

### **Air Reserve Component**

29. Are closures and major realignments fairly and evenly distributed amongst the Active Duty and Air reserve Components?
- a. How do the Air Force's previously released "Future Total Force" plans mesh with the proposed closures and realignments?
  - b. At many of the Air National Guard Bases where aircraft are being distributed to other locations, small groups are remaining in place at the losing Guard Base. What is your rationale for not closing these bases in total? Would greater savings result by closing these installations completely?

- 30.** Your recommendations include reductions in the number of Air National Guard bases and aircraft and the realignment of others.
- a. What are your plans for the Air National Guard?
  - b. What analysis was done to examine the most efficient unit size?
  - c. Given the fact that Guard units are often less expensive to operate than active units partly because they often operate at civilian or state-owned facilities, will the consolidation of Guard units achieve enough savings to justify the personnel turmoil associated with consolidating units?
- 31.** As you know, a legal issue has been raised over the role of states and their governors in approving the closure or relocations of guard units.
- a. What counsel do your legal advisors give regarding the applicability of such provisions as 10 USC 18238 (e), or Title 32, Section 104(c) to BRAC decision making or any other provisions giving governors approval authority over such decisions?
  - b. Please tell us the extent to which state governors, adjutant generals, or other state officials have been consulted in advance regarding your proposed BRAC recommendations.

#### **Cannon AFB, NM**

- 32.** DOD has made a recommendation to close Cannon Air Force Base and to distribute the 27<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing's F-16 aircraft to other bases. The projected economic impact to the Clovis, New Mexico community is substantial with an approximate loss of 20 percent of the jobs in the Clovis community. (A loss of 2,824 direct and 1,956 indirect jobs within an economic area employment of 23,348).
- a. What emphasis was given to economic impact this closure would have on the Clovis community?
  - b. How did Cannon AFB compare to other small aircraft bases?
  - c. Was the proposed New Mexico Training Range Initiative (NMTRI), which would establish expanded supersonic flight training for Cannon, considered in your decision to close Cannon? If not why not?

#### **Pope AFB, NC**

- 33.** The Air Force proposes to realign Pope Air Force Base, NC by distributing 25 C-130E aircraft to Little Rock AFB, AR and replacing them with 16 C-130H aircraft: eight from Yeager Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), WV and eight from Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station (ARS), PA. Additionally, 36 A-10 aircraft will be removed to Moody AFB, GA and not

replaced. Finally, the Army intends to increase manpower at Fort Bragg, NC by adding another airborne brigade.

- a. Could you please explain how the Air Force will be able to support a presumed increase in airlift capacity with nine fewer aircraft?
- b. Will the command and control associated with an AFRC provide sufficient joint planning capabilities for integration with rapid deploying forces within XVIII Airborne Corps?
- c. Also, what impact will moving the 36 A-10s to Moody AFB, GA have on joint services training and support?

### **Eielson AFB, AK**

**34.** The Air Force's realignment of Eielson AFB, Alaska includes leaving an Air National Guard unit in place and keeps the base open in a "warm" status.

- a. Can you explain what you mean by keeping the base open in a "warm status"? How will the base be used?
- b. Does this really present savings? Does it pass on additional installation management costs to the Air National Guard?

### **Economic Impact**

**35.** Many of the hardest hit communities as a result of BRAC recommendations are results of Air Force closures. Communities impacted by Air Force BRAC recommendations include the communities of Clovis, NM (20.5% job loss); Rapid City, SD (8.5%); Fairbanks, AK (8.6%); Grand Forks, ND (7.4%); and Mountain Home, ID (6.2). Please explain how the economic impact criteria played in your decisions?

### **Depot Maintenance**

**36.** As you know, the law requires that no more than 50 percent of the department's depot maintenance workload can be contracted out in order to retain a viable organic base to perform this work.

- a. What assurances can you provide us that implementation of your recommendations will not violate the "50/50" provision?
- b. How will the Air Force's consolidation of intermediate and depot level maintenance activities affect its ability to accurately account for depot level maintenance under 50/50 reporting requirements?

### **Technical/contractor base considerations**

**37.** The military often depends on a civilians or contractors to perform critical and highly specialized functions such as research, engineering development, and technical support.

- a.** How did you measure the impacts on mission and workforce when you considered units and installations that are highly dependent on the civilian and contractor employees?
- b.** Are there any installations where these considerations were especially prominent?

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May 3rd

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May 19th - public hearing

Commissioners drop ins

6 leg. liaisons - to set up mtgs nationwide

Travel: primarily in May & June  
2nd wk after list travel begins  
July 15 - base visits wrapped up

@ least 3 Commissioners to a hearing

Quorum = 5 7 & 9 to add a base

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May 3 hearing: Barry Helman testifying before Commissioners  
Dan Ellis, CRS

History, Process, & Regeneration

1986 - 3,100,000 employed by DoD

2003 - 2 million

1. Congress auth. → list  
list Reviewed

6 yrs. to close facilities (during which time, complete  
env. remediation, etc.)

realignment: any action that reduces / redirects personnel

2087 Title 10 Code - formed basis for BRAC

1990 BRAC Act

4 Rounds from '88 to '95

'91, '93 & '95 - Secdef req'd to submit a Force Structure Plan  
8 Criteria

BRAC '05

[www.dod.defenselink.com/BRAC](http://www.dod.defenselink.com/BRAC)

- intended to adjust infrastructure
- Secdef req'd to submit a Force Structure Plan (FSP) that extends so up instead of 6
- determine efficiency of joint use
- certification of additional BRACs
- "privatization in place" - closing and unrm. opening as a private entity - an option
- 7 of 9 Cs must support any additions to the list

Joint Service Groups - focus on business aspects of DoD

"Data call" to obtain "certified data"

COBRA - looks @ Rtn. on investment

May - list

July - GAO Report

Sept. - Report to Pres.

Oct. - Revised Comm. actions to C. if necessary

GAOResults of Prior Rounds

90% of BRAC property made available

Savings = cost avoidances

\$29 billion most from MILPERS costs & reductions in O&M

Most communities have fared well

2005 could potentially have a greater impact on communities esp. considering those returning from overseas

DOD focus/expectations:

Unneeded infrastructure, excess capacity  
 joint/cross-servicing

→ finding: difficult to project % of closures

Lessons learned

selection criteria - '05 → more focus on military value  
 privatizing function in place

limitations: cost avoidance issue in past

Reserve enclaves - greater clarity needed

Cross-servicing - could ↑ Commission workload

Principle Questions

Costs w/in 10% — ?

Diff. to estimate — in past, COBRA didn't account for Env. Restoration

Should there be net savings Related to Aq. Footage  
 (don't need to maintain)

→ Env. costs will occur regardless of closure (DOD position)

Refusing decisions - have they been made already?

→ We are to inform those decisions

25% excess infrastructure - why hasn't this changed?

→ limitations in meth. ~ diverse metrics used

→ need to examine use of facility, etc. - what do we need now?

Recs drop off list if Secdef violated Force Structure plan & selection criteria

Overseas basing Commission - incorporated into our report?

→ separate bodies but can to the extent we deem it nec.

Amendment to the law does include looking @ jointness and its efficiency

GAO Role? → actively monitoring process

will advise of any issues/concerns

Has process taken into acct overseas basing & jointness

→ BRAC to inform process

greater consideration of cross-service issues

Military Value Criteria - understandable to communities?

→ understandable but diff. to know how criteria are applied

National Guard facilities - closed or realigned in prev. BRACs?

Yes, in '95 - Do Governors have rt. to veto Comm. decisions

w/ regard to closing Guard facilities?

Privatizing in Place - DoD & IGAO position?

→ Doesn't reduce excess infrastructure - somewhat defeats one of BRAC premises

• Would it provide such efficiencies to offset costs

→ Can transfer facility but if Govt still paying to maintain facility

• Does it afford ability to dev. land for other economic uses?

→ diff. to get total handle on costs

? could we have saved more \$ by shifting to other govt agencies

Greatest lesson learned?

Adhere to process rigorously

May 3 hearing → National Intelligence & Security

Transition/Turnout @ end of Cold war  
→ Shaped nature

Globalization impacts

Challenge: balancing + / negatives

China & India new major global powers  
expanded military power

Total energy consumed ↑ by 50%  
increasing share provided by petroleum  
nuclear power to decline

State instability will remain a concern

Urbanization

Outside W. Europe religion > political significance

Increasing militant groups

Regional identities Politics — ↑ global divide

unfavorable demographic & econ. issues

International Terrorism will remain a threat

Informal networks will cont. to proliferate

IT → fastest threat increasingly decentralized

Rapid Tech. dev. & Proliferation

Weapons of mass des.

New capabilities developed on each end of technology

Globalization provides amenable env. for means to transfer weapons, etc.

International Criminal Activity - another of concern  
links between org. crime & terrorists

Strategic level - asymmetric actions (eg 9/11)

→ designed to Δ way we think abt world & function  
enemies likely to try leveling playing field

- 4 strategies:

- Counterwill
- Counteraccess
- Counterprecision
- Counterprotection

\* uncertain, dynamic global future

### Country Challenges

Palestinian/Israeli relations

Pakistan/India → risk of war

N. Korea - developing long range missiles

Iran - pursuit of long range ballistic missiles

supporting anti-coalition activities in Iraq

China - total military spending excessive

Russia - Putin has placed ex KGB in positions of authority  
↳ term ends in 2008

Latin America

- Hugo Chavez

Are Recs. in conformance w/ force structure plan?

International Terrorism - non-ethnic cutting?

→

macroview → not as much change as ~~expected~~ expected

10-15 yr. Rise of China will shift

in both China & India - changes ⇒ intense to those countries.

nonstate side = more complicated

highlighted China & India b/c we're strong players

What extent will U.S. military be involved in globalization?

↑ tech ~~spread~~ spread

Rising Power in Latin America

Central American Gangs → capability of destabilizing communities

to we have military capabilities necessary to meet challenges of cyberspace threats?

Delivering WMD - growing fear of capability around world

Any Holy Cow technological breakthroughs?

Not wanting to see anything right now

Progress being made? will be opps for spread of democratic institutions & basic democracies

their business is to focus on threat but should look @ other side as well.

5/4/05 Hearing

## National Defense Strategy & Force Structure

1. Strategic uncertainty  $\Rightarrow$  need for partnership
2. Defend
3. Counter ideological front
4. look @ risk across integrative framework

### Challenges we face in future:

1. Irregular  
able to support Sec. operations though not playing lead role
2. Catastrophic (eg. 9/11, pearl harbor)  
done w/ DITS
3. Traditional - trying to move from this "comfort area"
4. Disruptive

### QDR

- tasks {
1. dev. def. strategy
  2. resource strategy @ 20-yr. level

$\rightarrow$  will go up in Feb '06 BRAC will make it stronger

we are in another period of fundamental change

protect homeland

hasten demise of terrorist networks

Destroy WMD

16 Questions QDR tries to answer

- Broken out by major functions
- Strategy drives QDR

Global Defense Posture (tied to QDR)

- Flex. to contend w/ uncert
- Focus w/in & across regions
- expand alliances
- Focus on capabilities
- Develop rapidly deployed forces

Overseas posture & how we realign here  $\Rightarrow$  JOD trying to make sure there's a symbiotic relationship

Force Structure Plan

Takes into acct probable threats including ability to surge

Commission Questions

Order of things:

QDR - Capabilities mix

Force planning construct used as an input to QDR

Defense Strategy also based on force planning construct

Negotiating intl basing agreements

Working @ joint trng/education in QDR

Sequencing of when 70,000 forces will return is being determined  
 want to put people in perm. facilities  
 move in a 6-yr timeframe

2 yrs ago looked @ force - mix & balance of  
 Active, G&R, Civilian & Contract

↳ While #s aren't out, it's getting the appropriate mix of capabilities  
 believe they have enough strength right now (the right #s)

\* Capabilities & Surge accounted for in methodology behind Recs.

### Training areas

- Lg. # overseas
- a lot of work to be done in joint trng.
- Reqt. for trng. areas will likely ↑ taken into acct. in Recs

\* How did Dept. integrate studies in making the SECRET'S Recs.?  
 - all SWOT involved as well as cross-AIC groups  
 - Based on assumptions R: quality of life, etc.

Depots setup to feed Opusers  
 needs to be accurate depots to support force

Mobility Capability Study (also input to ODR)

\* Defs: Jointness = realization that whole can be > The sum of its  
 parts if done right  
 (eg. ab. for sp. ops to intermingle w/)

70,000 <sup>Net</sup> Returning Forces (w/ most being Army ~ 45-50,000)  
 AF & Navy may hv higher # of rotational forces  
 Army responds quicker the more forces are back

More costs — factors in BRAC process? — Defense posture  
 Individually programmed  
 Inputs to BRAC process — they know where returning  
 troops are going

End strength not issue — 40% of reserves haven't been called up  
 It's how they're organized

91 '93 '95 closed excess infrastructure based on a diff  
 threat assessment

↳ taken into acct for '05 BRAC

Value of speed — decisions based on ability to speedily respond

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### Suggested Commissioner Questions Base Closure and Realignment Commission

#### Department of Defense Panel I

The Honorable Michael W. Wynne, Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group;

General William L. Nyland, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps;

General T. Michael Moseley, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force; and

Admiral Robert F. Willard, Vice Chief of Naval Operations

July 18, 2005

#### General Questions

1. Both the Navy and Air Force have single site initial recruit training, yet the Marine Corps, the smallest of the four services, retained two, Marine Recruit Depot San Diego, California and Marine Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina. The Marine Corps cited cost as the reason for not pursuing closing MCRD San Diego, approximately \$540 million net implementation cost, yet those costs do not include any consideration for revenues the department might recoup for disposing of the property. Has the department done an analysis of how much the actual cost and savings might be if it closed MCRD San Diego and made that property available for reuse?
2. One of your stated goals for the BRAC 2005 round was achieving greater levels of jointness. The Navy did not recommend realigning or closing Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia, despite growing encroachment issues and some question about Oceana's viability as the Navy's east coast main jet base in the future. Yet, there is no evidence that the Navy and the Air Force went beyond preliminary data sharing to have a fuller discussion of either the Navy's moving to, or their joint use of Moody Air Force Base, Georgia and what levels of jointness they may be able to achieve. Can you tell the Commission why such considerations did not take place and why you believe retaining Naval Air Station Oceana is the best alternative for the Department.
3. Submarine Base New London, Connecticut has a long history of service to our nation. GAO itself has questioned the force structure assumptions in its July 1 report. Is it prudent for the department to close SUBASE

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New London under such uncertainty about the future force structure and given the close proximity to Electric Boat and the synergies of that location?

4. The Navy is realigning and retaining Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine, yet relocating all of the aircraft and associated personnel to Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida. The department's rationale is that the airfield may be of use in the future for homeland defense missions should other airfield not be available. The department is giving up \$600 million in savings over 20 years to retain an airfield it may only use for contingencies. Why should the Commission not change the recommendation back to its original proposal and close Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine?
5. What is the Department of Defense's response to the lawsuit brought by the state of Pennsylvania to deactivate the 111th Fighter Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard stationed at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove? Has the Department of Defense been named in any additional lawsuits concerning BRAC recommendations? How should the BRAC commission proceed with recommendations affecting the Air National Guard in light of this legal challenge?
6. The Department of Defense recommendation to close Otis Air National Guard Base will financially affect federal tenants located on the base. The GAO reported that Coast Guard officials estimated they would incur about \$17 million in additional annual operating costs to remain at Otis Air National Guard Base. The Coast Guard will be financially challenged to assume the full cost of operating the air field and other infrastructure on the installation. Has the Department met with Coast Guard officials in order to accurately assess the fiscal and operational impacts on this agency as a result of the proposed closure of Otis Air National Guard Base? What is the rationale for the Air Force to leave Otis Air National Guard Base if estimated savings are reduced by significant costs incurred by other federal agencies remaining at the base?
7. Since the release of the BRAC recommendations, many of the State ANG officials have raised concerns over their lack of involvement in the BRAC process. Could you please elaborate on how the Air Force involved the Air National Guard in their decision-making process?

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8. The State Air National Guard leaders have also raised concerns regarding the impact of the proposed actions on homeland defense. Could you explain how the Air Force considered homeland defense--both the federal air defense role and state role of providing support to civil authorities--in the BRAC process?
9. GAO has estimated the cost to implement BRAC at \$2.4 billion. In addition, the Overseas Basing Commission has stated that DoD has underestimated the cost to implement the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS). They estimate the costs to implement IGPBS between \$16 billion and \$20 billion, while DoD has estimated the costs to implement IGPBS at between \$9 billion and \$12 billion, with only about \$4 billion of this amount currently budgeted and about \$3 billion of this amount is in the BRAC account. Further, this does not even include the other competing demands on DoD's resources such as the Global War on Terrorism, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, Army modularity, Army increased end-strength, and other steady-state requirements. All of these efforts will continue to stretch the department's already strained resources.
- a. Given all of these competing demands for resources, where do you see the department getting all of the needed funds to fully implement this BRAC round?
10. We understand that the Services are conducting site surveys and other detailed analyses related to many of their BRAC recommendations. These efforts provide more detailed and up-to-date data on the BRAC actions.
- a. Can you please assure us the Department will endeavor to provide this information to the Commission in a timely manner?
- b. Have any of these efforts provided information that would make the Department reconsider its original (May 13th) recommendation?
11. As you know many States are questioning the legality of the Air Force Air National Guard recommendations.
- a. Was the legality of the Guard recommendation considered during your deliberation process? If so, how?
- b. What is the Departments General Counsel's latest view of this issue?

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12. We understand that the Air Force's BRAC staff worked Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve recommendations through the respective National Guard Bureau (NGB) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) headquarters, and did not consult directly with individual state Air National Guard (ANG) or AFRC units or Adjutants General.
- a. Did Air Force BRAC staff contact individual *Active Duty* wings/squadrons or Numbered Air Force personnel to consult with, or review specific recommendations within their respective organizations?
- b. Did Air Force BRAC staff consult with individual Major Commands to review or comment on recommendations within their respective commands?
- c. Were Headquarters Air Force directorates (other than Air Force BRAC staff given any opportunity to review or consult on any recommendations, whether Active, Guard or Reserve)?
- d. How would you characterize the manner in which Headquarters Air Force personnel were allowed to participate in the Air Force BRAC process as compared to staff from the National Guard Bureau, Air National Guard, or Air Force Reserves?
13. The Adjutants General had stated their concerns in the past with the Air Force's "Future Total Force" transformation initiative and its implications for the Air National Guard.
- a. Are the Air Force BRAC recommendations integral to the Air Force's "Future Total Force"? Can the Air Force achieve its "Future Total Force" objectives without BRAC?
- b. Was the Adjutants General reaction to the BRAC recommendations predicted? If so, why didn't the Air Force seek the consent of the TAGs?
- c. Can the Air Force and TAGs work together to develop a mutually acceptable alternative to the Air Force BRAC recommendations that meet the interests of both parties? If so, can this agreement be achieved outside of BRAC?

Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME

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- 14. What options were considered associated with NAS Brunswick?
- 15. Could P-3 mission requirements be met through detachments operating from other bases in the Northeast?
- 16. How does consolidating all P-3s to a single site on the East coast affect military value?
- 17. What forces, other than P-3s, do you anticipate supporting at the realigned base?
- 18. What level or tempo of operations can be supported at the realigned base?
- 19. How does realignment of NAS Brunswick reduce excess capacity or infrastructure?

#### Navy Broadway Complex, San Diego, CA

- 20. How does the Navy use the Broadway Complex today? How does the Broadway complex and property fit into the Navy's comprehensive regional master plan for San Diego?
- 21. Does the Navy need additional waterfront property in the San Diego region to successfully address its current mission, or implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations affecting San Diego?
- 22. Regardless of the method or process used, how many military and civilian jobs would be affected if the Navy relinquished control of the Broadway Complex?
- 23. Does the Navy lease land and an office building from the San Diego Port Authority? Is this land adjacent to the Broadway Complex? What is this land used for, and why wasn't the Navy-owned Broadway complex considered to accommodate this requirement?
- 24. Has the Navy's redevelopment plan or requirement to maintain ownership of the Broadway Complex changed dramatically over time? For example, does the Navy's current plan call for the Department to

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- maintain a headquarters or administrative presence on Broadway after disposition? If so, how large a presence? And, if not, where does the Navy believe the current Navy tenants should be relocated?
- 25. In what year did Congress first authorize the Navy to enter into a public/private venture that would permit the Department to out-lease the Broadway property in return for new Navy office space and/or cash?
- 26. Congress authorized Navy to redevelop the Broadway Complex in conjunction with local authorities. What plans or actions has the Navy taken to use this authority since that Congressional action?
- 27. Does the Navy have a current or projected shortage of headquarters and administrative office space on their facilities in the San Diego Bay area? How many of the three buildings located within the Broadway Complex are used for general purpose office space? How much of the 15 acre Broadway Complex are used for parking?
- 28. Does the Navy use the current vacant space at Broadway to accommodate Navy demand for overflow (or surge) requirements for administrative space in the San Diego waterfront area? Does the Navy continue to own the pier located adjacent to the Broadway Complex? If not, when and why was it disposed?
- 29. Would it be fair to say the City was, and continues to be, receptive to the Navy's plans for Broadway? Has the City's reaction or support of the Navy's plans substantially changed over time?
- 30. What is the significance of the Development Agreement the Navy executed with the City of San Diego in 1992? Has the Development Agreement with the City facilitated or hindered the Navy's plans to redevelop the Broadway property?
- 31. Under the terms of this agreement, will the Navy maintain the right to continue to use a portion of the property for "Navy" uses? Will the Navy continue to maintain operational access to the waterfront portions of the Broadway property? Finally, how much and what kinds of private commercial development would be permitted by the Development Agreement?

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32. What mission requirements require the current Navy tenants to be located at Broadway?
33. What internal Navy factors or changes, like personnel restructuring or decreased demand for Navy office space in the San Diego area, or external factors outside the Navy's control such as a down turn in the San Diego real estate market, have on the Navy's plans for Broadway?

**Marine Corps Recruiting Depot San Diego, CA**

34. The concerns about hurricanes affecting recruit training at Parris Island have surfaced on more than one occasion. What does the data show over the last 10 to 20 years that documents the number of times hurricanes have affected recruit training to the levels that prevent consolidating recruit training at a single site?
- Has USMC performed any evaluations on the possibility of closing Parris Island because of hurricanes? If yes, when was this analysis performed, and what were the results and options presented to USMC?
  - The response to our question on consolidation of MCRD San Diego and MCRD Parris Island noted that hurricane proof barracks would need to be constructed. Are the barracks currently at Parris Island hurricane proof? Are the barracks at San Diego earthquake proof?
35. Military Judgment has a valuable role in making decisions and developing strategies for USMC. When the decision was made not to close MCRD San Diego, was USMC's military decision strongly influenced by DOD's COBRA run which showed a 100+ year payback? If not, what was the source of information, data and analysis that brought you to this conclusion?
36. Another statement has been made about the high risk of a single site for recruit training.
- Was the conclusion based on military judgment or a comprehensive evaluation of single site recruit training?
  - What example can you provide of an instance when recruit training was interrupted for a significant period of time?

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37. Arguments have been presented today against closing MCRD and consolidating the recruit training at MCRD Parris Island. Are these arguments based on well documented evaluations that can be provided to the Commission?
- If not what is the source for making this decision, conclusion or judgment?
38. The Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team noted on 26 January 05, that BRAC 95 stated a 1-time cost of \$294.78M, a 2 year payback and a 20 year NPV savings of \$520.27M. This represents over a "billion dollar swing" in ten years.
- With this significant deviation or reversal in results, did DoN or USMC perform an assessment to determine what happened between now and then?
  - Where lessons learned from the Navy's successful consolidation of three recruit training locations into a single training site for recruits applied to this analysis?
  - Have there been any significant interruptions to Navy recruit training at a single site?

**Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, HI**

39. Volume IV of the DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission states that the revised 20 Year Force Structure Plan submitted to Congress on 15 March "amended the ship composition, reducing submarines by 21 percent and doubling the number of prepositioning ships." In the "Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan For The Construction of Naval Vessels For FY2006", submitted by the Secretary of the Navy on 23 March 2005, there is no appreciable reduction in submarines until after 2019. What is the difference in these two documents? How are these documents used in the calculation of depot maintenance capacity?
40. Should Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor close, what number of personnel would each remaining shipyard likely be required to hire annually over the next five to seven years to respond to the increased workload?
41. Is there a difference in savings between closure of one of the smaller shipyards versus realignment of workload among the four shipyards?

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42. What are the anticipated environmental costs for realignment of Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility Pearl Harbor?
43. Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is only one of two locations on the west coast with CVN dry dock capabilities that performs both fleet maintenance and major overhaul work on multiple platforms. What would be the effect on operational readiness and training for the Navy to lose this capability in the Pacific?

**Realignment of Naval Master Jet Base**

44. The COBRA analysis for a "Close NAS Oceana Scenario" indicated that moving all the Navy's jets to Moody Air Force Base would have an economic payback period of 13 years to offset the nearly \$500million in one time costs. Why didn't the Navy pursue Moody Air force Base as a suitable alternative?
45. In earlier BRAC rounds the Navy transferred F-18 squadrons from Cecil Field to Naval Air Station Oceana, Marine Corps Air Stations Cherry Point and Beaufort reportedly to avoid new construction at Cherry Point and to use excess capacity at NAS Oceana. What is the Navy's position now regarding the desire to single-site all of the east coast fighter/attack squadrons?
46. Please outline the requirements of the training ranges and assets necessary for the Navy's Master Jet Base. Provide the space requirements (land and water), proximity to the main air field, target areas and the fidelity of scoring instrumentation as well as proximity of other military assets such as ships or joint operating elements.
47. Since 1975, how many development projects have the Navy requested the City Government of Virginia Beach to disapprove because of concerns about safety, potential noise hazards and encroachment?
48. Since 1975, how many development projects were approved over the Navy's objections?

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49. Please provide the Commission with the Navy's position, including applicable documentation regarding the proposed development by the Near Post, LLC group on the site of the Seashire Inn in November 2003. What is the height of the tallest building in the planned development, and what is the approved minimum altitude at that point approximately 2.5 miles from the approach end of Runway 23? Are the Visual Flight Rules and Instrument Flight Rules minimum altitudes the same for that particular position?
50. Approximately how many aircraft per year would be expected to fly over that point (existing Seashire Inn) during day and night VFR conditions? How many IFR approaches could be expected annually?

**Moody Air Force Base, GA**

51. Navy Scenario DoN-0153 called for the closure of NAS Oceana, and the realignment of Oceana's Master Jet Base aircraft and personnel to Moody AFB, GA. This scenario, which was rejected by the Navy's Infrastructure Evaluation Group (IEG) on 27 Jan 05, estimated a one-time cost of \$490.4M, not including potential MilCon costs associated with installations receiving the displaced Air Force aircraft and personnel currently at Moody, or the A-10 aircraft and personnel recommended for realignment into Moody.
- What was the Air Force's position on realigning all the Air Force aircraft and manpower out of Moody AFB in order to allow Moody to bed down the Master Jet Base?
  - Based on our analysts' recent visit to Moody, there are only about 300 military family housing units at the base. Is that about right?
  - Also, how many unaccompanied enlisted and officer quarters are available at Moody?
  - The original Navy recommendation included MilCon costs at Moody of \$363M, of which the only housing cost included was \$59M for enlisted unaccompanied housing. Would you be able to estimate costs for additional housing at Moody to support the 10,000 total inbound personnel?
52. The Navy estimates the Master Jet Base will bring approximately 10,000 direct jobs to Moody, a 10% increase in the MSA's job base, not including indirect jobs or family members. What is your assessment of the surrounding community's ability to support and sustain that large of

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an increase, particularly with regard to housing, schools and childcare, infrastructure, and other quality of life issues?

**Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND**

53. As late as 26 Apr 05 the Air Force's Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) approved Grand Forks Air Force Base as a closure.
- Does the Air Force now wish to keep Grand Forks AFB open?
  - What has changed since then?
  - Was the staff developing the Air Force's BRAC recommendations aware of the service's intent to base Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) at Grand Forks?
  - When does OSD or the Air Force plan to put the UAV's in the budget submission to Congress?
54. In 2003, the Air Force briefed Congress about its future program for the tanker force as published in its "Tanker Roadmap." At the time, Grand Forks was to be the second of only three bases to bed down the new KC-767 tankers, getting 32 of the new jets.
- We're aware that the KC-767 lease deal was cancelled, and that the Air Force is wrapping up a "Tanker Replacement Analysis of Alternatives" now. When the Air Force does commit to procuring new tankers, would you still like to base them at Grand Forks?
  - If so, when would you envision the base getting the new tankers?
55. In a letter to BRAC Chairman Principi dated 7 Jun 05, both the Chief of Staff and Acting Secretary of the Air Force have stated the service's vision for Grand Forks AFB is "to become a home to a 'family of UAVs,' with associated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions."
- Can you tell us what specific types of UAVs will be based at Grand Forks AFB?
  - When will those UAVs begin arriving at Grand Forks?
  - How many people will be required at the base to support those missions?
  - Have any defined force structure, manpower, or other airframe related details been included in any current or planned programmatic actions?

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56. What aircraft are currently restricted from retirement by National Defense Authorization Act language?
- Has Congress specifically inserted any funds designated to repair and/or operate KC-135Es noted for retirement in the BRAC recommendations?
  - How much will it cost to repair, maintain and operate KC-135Es, C-130Es, F-117s and F-16s through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) if those aircraft are not retired as programmed and listed in the BRAC recommendations?

**Galena Airport Forward Operating Location (FOL), AK**

57. As you know, the Air Force is recommending Eielson AFB, AK to be realigned and placed in a "warm" status? Why does the Air Force need to maintain two Forward Operating Locations (Galena and King Salmon) in Alaska in addition to Eielson?
58. How would closure of the Galena Forward Operating Location impact the Air Sovereignty Alert mission? Could that mission be supported from Eielson AFB, since it would remain open in "warm" status?

**Pope Air Force Base, NC**

59. As part of its recommendation to realign Pope AFB, eight C-130H aircraft are to be relocated from Yeager Airport Air Guard Station to Pope AFB in conjunction with eight additional C-130H aircraft from Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station to form a 16 aircraft Air Force Reserve/Active Duty associate unit. Additionally, 25 C-130E's from Pope AFB's 43rd Airlift Wing are to be transferred to Little Rock AFB to consolidate the C-130 fleet there. Finally, real property accountability is to be transferred to the Army.
- How will Title 32 affect the recommendation to transfer aircraft from Yeager Airport AGS to Pope AFB?
  - What is the rationale for consolidating tactical aircraft in a single location when they need to be distributed to remote locations in order to satisfy their assigned missions?
  - Who will be responsible for maintaining the runway at Pope AFB to Air Force standards, the Army or the Air Force? How will this be accomplished?

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- d. Where will the 43rd Air Wing Headquarters be located?
- e. Doesn't reducing the Air Force presence at Pope AFB reduce jointness and operating efficiency between the Army and Air Force, especially in the areas of interservice command and control, and planning? How will this reduction be offset?

**Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS)**

- 60. Given that personnel costs represent approximately half of DFAS's budget, why wasn't locality pay given a higher weight in your military value analysis over such things as being on DOD owned installation?
- 61. Given that a DFAS site can be anywhere, why is being on a DoD owned installation of such great value? It is the second most important factor on your military analysis.
- 62. Given the fact that many of 26 DFAS operating sites were chosen in order to ameliorate the economic impact of BRAC bases in the early 1990s, what further consideration of this fact was given when choosing the current sites? Many of these sites are still in areas that have not fully recovered from the impact of these closures.

**Professional Development Education**

- 63. The Department has consistently stated that it must maintain its ability to conduct graduate education programs and retain its postgraduate education facilities because (1) professional military education is unique, (2) it is an important component of our military structure, and (3) there are long-term benefits from having dedicated facilities that attract future military leaders from other countries. Considering your stated position on the importance the Services' postgraduate programs, I have two questions.
  - a. First, why is it necessary for each service to independently operate their own postgraduate schools to achieve the Departments' goals for these education programs?
  - b. Second, what makes postgraduate education so unique for Air Force and Naval officers that these services must maintain their own schools instead of primarily relying on the public university system as the Army does for its officers?

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- 64. On May 2, the Navy in an Executive session of the IEC, moved to have all education recommendations withdrawn from the BRAC process because "...education is a core competency of the Department and relying on the private sector to fulfill that requirement is too risky." Would you please explain how relying on this nations' public university system, which seems to serve every other segment of the nation so well, is too risky for the military?

**Joint Medical Command Headquarters**

- 65. The military value criteria used by the Secretary, place specific emphasis on the impact of "joint war-fighting," when considering a recommendation to close or realign a military installation. The Secretary has demonstrated the importance of this value in his recommendation to consolidate medical health care and research activity at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, MD. Why were the Medical Command Headquarters that are spread across the National Capitol Region in disparate locations, not included by the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group in this recommendation?
- 66. The Secretary's July 14, 2005, letter to the Commission suggested that collocation of Medical Command's would not be financially viable as a stand alone recommendation. Yet, other data supplied by the Department of Defense identified annual reoccurring savings of at least \$18.14 million per year. In making his determination, did the Secretary rely on the assumption that no personnel savings could be achieved through collocation? Furthermore, did his determination presuppose that the Commission would approve his recommendation to relocation DARPA and the Office of Naval Research to Bethesda, MD.?
- 67. The Navy Bureau of Medicine Potomac Annex, Washington, D.C. has an estimated 80,700 sq. ft. of excess capacity, which works out to about 46% of the facility. This figure will be increased if the Secretary's recommendation to realign the Potomac Annex by moving the DoD Biomedical Science & Technology RDA function to Fort Detrick, MD, is approved by the Commission. Why was this excess capacity not addressed by the Secretary's recommendations through closure instead of

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realignment and could you see a benefit in reducing this excess infrastructure further?

**Questions for the Record**

**Hearing on Air Force Recommendations and Methodology**

Witnesses:

The Honorable Michael L. Dominguez, Secretary of the Air Force  
and  
General John P. Jumper, Air Force Chief of Staff  
May 17, 2005

1. The recommendation to realign Grand Forks Air Force base (Air Force - 37) entails distributing 100% of the base's KC-135R aircraft to other units, and will result in the reduction of 2,645 direct jobs. The job loss represents an 81% decrease in the Grand Forks AFB work force.
  - a. Why is this base being realigned and not closed based upon the significant reduction in personnel, and total loss of weapons systems?

*The original Air Force candidate recommendation to the IEC was to close Grand Forks. The IEC reviewed it in context with other Service and Joint Cross Service Group candidate recommendations. Part of the IEC's review examined strategic presence by region. To address an IEC concern over a continued strategic presence in the north central U.S., the Air Force presented an option to realign Grand Forks but maintain the tanker moves out of Grand Forks to support other high-value tanker realignments. The IEC adopted this recommendation.*

- b. The Air Force discussed potential plans for basing UAVs at Grand Forks. With the KC-135 realignments at Beale Air Force Base, CA (Air Force - 10) designed to consolidate the manned and unmanned high-altitude reconnaissance, how much additional ramp space in addition to Beale AFB is needed to base UAVs? When will these "emerging missions" begin at Grand Forks? If the date is not yet determined, why is the base being kept open beyond the date when the tankers leave? Is it cost effective to keep this base open with no defined future mission yet specified?

*The justification for the Grand Forks recommendation specifies that the base would be retained for an emerging mission, of which UAVs may be one. Specific future plans for UAVs (in terms of numbers and timing) are undefined in BRAC; however, we understand the post-BRAC intent of the Air Force is to dovetail an emerging mission with the departure of the old mission. The Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force have signed out to the Commission a separate letter to that effect. The judgment of the IEC and the Air Force to keep a strategic presence in*

*the north central US was the primary reason for keeping Grand Forks open. No additional cost analysis was done.*

- c. Rather than enduring the excess operating cost for this “emerging mission” please explain why you would not base such a mission at another northern tier base such as Minot, where sufficient capacity seems to exist and the military value scores are relatively close.

*The recruiting demographics of Fargo and the infrastructure of Grand Forks were key to the Department’s decision.*

- d. Forty-two bases scored higher for UAVs on Air Force COBRA runs than did Grand Forks (#43), including other tanker bases, Fairchild AFB, WA (#30) and McConnell AFB, KS (#31). Why was the #43 base on the list chosen as a potential UAV base, and not one higher ranked?

*As mentioned in our report, the MCI rankings (COBRA is a costing model) provided a starting point for the Department’s deliberations by scoring quantifiable military value factors. The selection of Grand Forks over the others flowed from the strategic presence geographical issue raised by the IEC, along with the relatively unfettered access to airspace in the North Central US.*

2. Did your community infrastructure assessments indicate that a base or community was at risk of not being able to adequately receive additional units and personnel?

*No. Manpower projections indicated there were no communities unable to adequately receive additional units and personnel.*

- a. Please provide some examples of any “red flags” raised?

*Based on the final manpower increases and information provided in data calls, no red flags were found.*

- b. Please explain your process for these assessments?

*Through data calls, 10 categories of data were collected on each base’s community. Scenario-specific tables were created to compare / contrast community data of each base involved in the scenario and national averages. The highlights of this community data analysis were summarized for each scenario and provided for review. For each recommendation, a community snapshot and a detailed 3-page narrative for each base was provided to OSD.*

3. Please list those installations that were analytically recommended for closure or realignment by the executive group, yet rejected by the Service Secretary or the Chief of Staff. Please explain why these changes were made.

*The Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force accepted all the recommendations made by the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group.*

4. You have indicated that the annual recurring savings of the Air Force recommendations will be approximately \$2.6B, and the net present value of these savings over twenty years will be \$14.5B.

*Correction: \$2.6B is the cumulative net savings by FY11. Annual recurring savings thereafter are \$1.25B.*

- a. Do these costs include environmental remediation costs?

*No, by BRAC policy, environmental restoration costs are not included in payback calculations.*

- b. Do these costs include the costs of rebasing of Air Force units from overseas?

*No Air Force units are scheduled to return from overseas at this time. However, Air Force BRAC recommendations would fully accommodate movements from overseas if necessary in the future.*

- c. Do these costs include potential costs across the federal government?

*The Air Force took into account the effect of proposed recommendations on other federal agencies, e.g. FAA, US Coast Guard. Since the BRAC law and DoD policy do not require these costs to be included in the costs of the recommendations, potential costs (or savings) to other federal agencies were not included in the Air Force recommendations.*

5. The legislation authorizing this BRAC round required that DOD develop a 20-year force structure plan to help guide BRAC recommendations. However, there appears to be much uncertainty regarding future force structure requirements.

- a. What key assumptions influenced the Air Force's force structure plan? For example, what assumption does the Air Force make regarding replacement of existing aircraft—one for one replacement, or something smaller? What assumption does it make regarding the future of unmanned aircraft (UAVs) relative to replacing other manned aircraft?

*The Air Force used the force structure plan submitted to Congress by the Joint Staff on 15 March 2005. This force structure plan included a 20-year force structure projection (the 2025 Force). Because of advances in technology and CONOPS, the Air Force will generally recapitalize its fleet at a less than 1 for 1 ratio.*

- b. Does the force structure plan submitted in March 2005 reflect the December 2004 decision by the Office of Secretary of Defense to reduce the number of F-22s to be bought?

*Yes, the force structure plan submitted in March 2005 reflected a reduced purchase of F/A-22s based on PBD-753.*

- c. How did F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter basing plans impact your BRAC recommendations?

*Air Force has announced basing plans for two operational F/A-22 locations, Langley AFB, Virginia and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, and one training location, Tyndall AFB, Florida. Air Force BRAC recommendations do not conflict with F/A-22 basing options and accommodate Joint Strike Fighter training operations at Eglin AFB as recommended by the Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group.*

6. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 23 Sep 04, Secretary Rumsfeld noted that "U.S. forces in the next century must be agile...[and] readily deployable...[and] must be able to project our power over long distances, in days or weeks, rather than months."

- a. Has DOD's BRAC submission accounted for results of the recent department-wide Mobility Capabilities Study? If so, how?

*No. The Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) was unavailable during BRAC analysis. Currently it is in coordination within the DoD.*

- b. If not, how can we ensure that our decisions on base closure and realignment do not conflict with these studies findings?

*The MCS findings will be in terms of force structure, not infrastructure. The Air Force recommendations retain sufficient surge capacity to accept any force structure that might come out of the MCS.*

- c. How can the Air Force justify the reduction of airlift and air refueling aircraft before the results of the Mobility Capabilities Study have been released?

*Force structure decisions (and their rationale) were not within the purview of BRAC. BRAC is charged with bedding down the force structure set forth in the 20-year force structure plan. The Air Force expects the Mobility Capabilities Study results to inform the Quadrennial Defense Review, which in turn will shape AF force structure requirements.*

- 7. Are there any specific environmental issues that we should carefully consider? Are there any specific actions/recommendations where environmental issues stand out? Are you aware of significant environmental impacts at receiving bases?

*While we do not expect that these recommendations will result in nonconformity, this cannot be demonstrated conclusively until a formal conformity determination is completed in coordination with the receiving states.*

- 8. Volume I of the Base Closure and Realignment Report is remarkably silent on the general topic of ranges, whether the range be used for firing, bombing, supersonic flight, electronic warfare, strafing, or other military exercises. The usefulness of a range is constrained by airspace use, the ground environment including private development, and transit time to and from the ranges.

- a. Would you please comment on the military value of the Barry M. Goldwater Range (associated with Luke AFB) and Melrose Range (associated with Cannon AFB)? Will the recommended actions improve the use of the range complex in general while continuing to allow good stewardship of the environment?

*The Air Force attributed military value to installations based (in part) on the proximity to ranges and airspace and the capabilities they provided for mission-specific training. Although both the Goldwater and Melrose range are excellent facilities, Goldwater is larger (approximately 2 million acres vs. 70,000 acres). Additionally, Goldwater is used jointly; it has adjoining USAF/USMC sections and the Western Army National Guard Aviation Training Site at Marana, Arizona, uses it extensively. Finally, Goldwater has a ground footprint that allows the use of full-scale high explosive weapons training and testing, including modern weapons like the Joint Direct Attack Munition.*

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What impact will the continued use of these two ranges have on the management of these protected resources including endangered species?

*All potential environmental impacts that result from a change in use at these ranges will be fully evaluated through an environmental impact analysis in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act and the protected resource would continued to be managed through updates to the Integrated Natural Resources Management Plan in accordance with the Sikes Act.*

- b. What impact will the closure of Cannon AFB, NM have on Melrose Range?

*Air Combat Command will determine Melrose's future use and, if required, develop new functional relationships.*

- c. What impact will the Joint Strike Fighter and Special Forces realignment have on the environment in Florida and the Gulf of Mexico?

*A review of environmental resource areas indicates that there are no known environmental impediments to implementing the recommendations.*

*The aggregate environmental impact of all Department of Defense recommendations affecting Eglin AFB are detailed in the Summary of Cumulative Environmental Impacts report for Eglin AFB.*

9. As you know, a legal issue has been raised over the role of states and their governors in approving the closure or relocations of guard units. Please tell us the extent to which state governors, adjutant generals, or other state officials have been consulted in advance regarding your proposed BRAC recommendations.

*State governors, adjutant generals, or other state officials were not involved directly in the Air Force BRAC deliberations, however an Air National Guard (ANG) Brigadier General represented the interests of the ANG as a voting member on the Air Force BCEG. Additionally, BRAC members served on Future Total Force general officer and action officer teams, which included ANG representation. These teams afforded the BCEG insight into ANG views without jeopardizing the objectivity of the BRAC analysis.*

10. General Jumper cited environmental issues with respect to the decision to close Cannon Air Force Base. Please detail these issues and how they played in the decision to close Cannon?

*General Jumper was referring to the types of issues considered when making recommendation decision about any Air Force base. In the case of Cannon, there are no environmental issues that affected the closure decision.*

11. Are there any environmental or endangered species issues that restrict the use of ranges at Mountain Home AFB? If so, how these issues factored in to the recommendation to realign Mountain Home?

*There are no endangered species that cause restrictions at the Mountain Home training areas. There are however seasonal operational restrictions due to recreation and wildlife concerns. Those constraints were reported in the Criterion 8 Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts report.*

**Surge**

As surge requirements can arise for any number of reasons, including contingency mobilizations or extended changes in force levels, it was a key consideration throughout the BRAC process. To account for surge, the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups analyzed this requirement throughout the process. During the capacity analysis phase, the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups identified potential excess capacity over known requirements that allowed them to assess what capacity was available for surge. During the military value analysis phase, DoD infrastructure was evaluated using the Final Selection Criteria. The Final Selection Criteria included eight criteria, the first four of which were focused on military value and the last four were considerations of other factors. In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department was to give priority consideration to military value, as highlighted in the first four criteria. Significantly, two of those four military value selection criteria address the surge requirement. Criterion One addresses “the current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense.” Criterion Three addresses “the ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements.” Lastly, surge was considered during the scenario analysis phase. As the Department analyzed alternative scenarios, the

20-year Force Structure Plan requirements were applied against all alternatives prior to reaching a final recommendation.

### **Homeland Defense**

An important mission considered within BRAC was homeland defense. Final Selection Criterion Two required the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups to consider, in their military value analysis, "the availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace...and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions." Additionally, all Service and Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations were reviewed by all the Combatant Commands, providing NORTHCOM and PACOM an opportunity to comment on their homeland defense requirements.

### **Conclusion**

In closing, the BRAC Force Structure Plan is a cornerstone document used as an input for conducting analysis and upon which the Secretary's recommendations will be based. It was thoroughly coordinated throughout the Department and meets all the BRAC statutory requirements.

I thank you for this opportunity and look forward to working with the Commission during the next phase of BRAC 2005.



## 2005 BRAC Commission Schedule

Base Realignment and Closure Commission  
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600 - Arlington, Virginia 22202  
Telephone: (703) 699-2950

### Schedule for May 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup>, 2005

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#### 3 May

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#### **Swearing in of Commissioners by Chairman Anthony Principi & Hearings at the Cannon House Office Building Room 334**

#### **Time: 9:30 – 12:30AM – OPEN Session**

#### **Witnesses:**

**Congressional Research Service**  
Dan Else, Specialist in National Defense  
**Government Accountability Office**  
Barry Holman - Director of Defense Capabilities and Management

#### **Subject:**

Presentation on the 2005 BRAC Schedule, Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 ( as amended thru FY 05 Authorization Act ), Review of BRAC Criteria, Lessons learned and previous BRAC results.

#### **Time: 1:30 – 4:30PM - OPEN Session**

#### **Witnesses:**

**Office of the Director of National Intelligence**  
David Gordon, Chairman of the National Intelligence Committee  
**Defense Intelligence Agency**  
Earl Scheck - Director, Analysis and Production  
**Department of State**  
Carol Rodley - Principal Deputy Asst. Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

#### **Subject:**

Current and Long Term Threat Confronting U.S. National Security

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#### 4 May

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#### **Hearings at the Cannon House Office Building Room 334**

#### **Time: 9:30 – 12:30AM - OPEN Session NOTE: Hearing will CLOSED for the classified portions of their testimony.**

#### **Witnesses:**

**Pentagon**  
Rear Admiral Evan Clark, Director of Programming Division  
**Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy**  
Honorable Ryan Henry - Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

#### **Subject:**

Force Structure Plan, Global Posture Review and SECDEF Guidance on the Quadrennial Review

9:30am May 4, 2005

A. Chairman *Principi's* opening statement

B. Introduction of Witnesses

(Commission will take a 5 minute break to clear room for  
classified session)

C. Questions

D. Adjourn for the day.

**Chairman's  
Suggested Questions for 9:30 AM, May 4, 2005 Hearing  
Force Structure Plan, Global Posture Review, Quadrennial Review  
(Testimony from the Office Secretary of Defense and Office of the  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)**

1. The President announced the return of up to 70,000 troops from overseas. Some of these movements may begin soon. Since the BRAC list is about to be released, what has the DOD done to ensure that the returning forces and their families have adequate facilities upon their arrival?
2. How can the Commission evaluate the BRAC recommendations before the 2005 QDR is completed? Will we need another BRAC after that study is completed?
3. Please discuss the significance of a force structure plan based on a 20-year vs. a 6-year period of probable threats to national security had in regards to the Departments BRAC recommendations for 2005.
4. Does the current Force Structure approach for the U. S. Army, restructuring into smaller, lighter, more mobile forces, allow greater joint cross-service basing options in this BRAC round?
5. Secretary Rumsfeld discusses "new concepts" of how the Department will align itself, including, "Troops should be located in places where they are wanted, welcomed and needed; in environments hospitable to their movements; and in places that allow them to be usable and flexible." How has DOD specifically addressed those concepts as you have prepared your recommendations to the Commission?

**Suggested Questions for 9:30 AM, May 4, 2005 Hearing  
Force Structure Plan, Global Posture Review, Quadrennial Review  
(Testimony from the Office Secretary of Defense and Office of the  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)**

1. The Department has reportedly taken a "global" look at basing this time that was not evident during the 1990s. Why have you taken this approach, and can you explain that process?
2. Since some forces are already returning from overseas prior to the release of BRAC recommendations, can you explain the imperative to accomplish this now, before the Department has decided the final destination of CONUS-bound forces?
3. Secretary Rumsfeld told the SASC, 'We do not expect our forces to fight where they are stationed. We know that our forces will need to move to the fight wherever it is.' How has the Department integrated analysis and findings from the on-going Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) to ensure our mobility forces can get our troops to the fight?
4. How has the Department prepared for the returning troops and their families in such areas as military family housing and schools? What specifically is the Department doing to ensure that it does not degrade the quality of life of the troops and their families returning to bases in the US?
5. How is the Department ensuring that overseas-based troops do not rotate to the CONUS until the receiving bases and communities are ready for them? What oversight efforts are in place?
6. No list of overseas bases to be closed has been released to date, although we anticipate an interim list will soon be available. How will the Department coordinate this with the BRAC recommendation?

7. What is the state of negotiations with the allies? Press accounts from Germany and Japan and other countries have highlighted local national impressions that information on DOD and central government intentions has been lacking. With whom within the various national governments have you been negotiating, and is it possible to identify issues that could delay or derail planned redeployments?
8. How would you characterize the interagency coordination and cooperation involved in these negotiations with foreign governments? For example, the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency, to name a few, have significant stakes in the adjustment of military bases and of US forces stationed overseas. What roles have these agencies played in planning the adjustment of the DOD footprint and in negotiations with Allied governments?
9. What is the state of planning for the redeployment of troops from overseas to the United States? Have the specific units been identified and a schedule developed? Can the schedule be made available to the BRAC Commission? Will these units be brought home individually as whole divisions, as whole brigades, or at some lower level of command?
10. How will the movement of these troops be funded? Do you expect the BRAC account to pay for this movement, or will funds come out of the defense appropriation? What is the magnitude and timing of the associated costs?
11. Will the bulk of the troops redeploy directly to the United States, or will they rotate home only after augmenting forces deploying to Iraq?

12. If there was another round of base closure activity in the next few years, do you feel it will be realistic to again base the recommendations of that round on a 20-year period?
13. Did the different approach in this cycle's force planning approach regarding a greater range of conflict scenarios vs. a established number of conflicts, allow you to consider more or less joint cross-service options as in past base closure rounds? If more options, please explain, if you can, why that was the case.
14. With the expected return of a great number of troops to the United States over the next several years, do you expect the terrorist threat against United States bases will increase or decrease?
15. Are the recent Army Transformation efforts in synch with those recommendations the Department will provide to this Commission in the next two weeks?
16. Please explain the thought process in reducing the Aircraft Carriers from 12 to 11, given what appears to be a great need than ever before in world wide presence,
17. Please explain how the reduction of aircraft carriers from 12 to 11 aligns with the ongoing transformation approach as well as with the current philosophy of not to focus on specific conflicts but rather a wider range of scenarios.
18. Given that the Air Force level of Air Expeditionary Forces remains constant over at least the next six years, does that indicate a great level of success with that number over the last five years.
19. With the development of the AEFs, the Air Force CONUS basing approach has changed measurably since the last round of BRAC.

Does this arrangement increase or decrease your basing requirements.  
Does this arrangement give the Department of Defense more or less  
Joint Cross Service options?

20. Will a greater emphasis on Joint Service assignment allow the Department to reduce previously independent infrastructure like training, research and logistics?
  
21. We anticipate bold recommendations to support, encourage and instill *Jointness* through realignment of forces and training. Will the Department's plans to improve joint interoperability be matched with an equally bold and innovative approach to establishing and stressing joint training? Assuming yes, please elaborate.



**Christopher "Ryan" Henry**

**Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

Ryan Henry was appointed by President Bush, confirmed by the Senate, and has served as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy since February 2003. He is an advisor to the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Under Secretary of Defense on policy, strategy, transformation, force structure, global posture, and on the execution of deliberate and contingency plans by combatant commanders in support of the national objectives. Additionally, he provides strategy and resource guidance to senior Department officials and represents the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in a variety of fora.

Mr. Henry's professional career spans 24 years of military service, including work in government operations, leading-edge research and development, and policy analysis. He served as an aviation squadron commander, Congressional staffer, experimental test pilot, and technology/warfare architect. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1972 and from National Defense University in 1992. He also earned advanced degrees in Aeronautical Systems (University of West Florida, 1974), and Systems Management (University of Southern California, 1982).

Prior to appointment as Principal Deputy, Mr. Henry was Corporate Vice President for Technology and Business Development at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Before joining SAIC, Mr. Henry was a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, where he led the Information-based Warfare initiative and served as Director of the "Conflict in the Digital Age" Project. He also served as a Program Manager and Information Systems Architect for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

Mr. Henry co-authored The Information Revolution and International Security, has written for a variety of periodicals, and provided commentary to domestic and overseas broadcast news organizations.

## BRAC Roles and Priorities

Since we are about to receive the recommendation of the Department of Defense, most of the analysis and internal decisions by the Services have been completed and recommendations are most likely in the office of the Secretary of Defense.

Without compromising any potential decisions or preempting the Secretary of Defense, can you describe your role in the BRAC process to date?

Did you establish, and can you share any specific goals that you thought from a policy perspective, were important for the Department to consider?

### Overseas Basing Plans

The Department of Defense is in the process of negotiating U.S. military force structure moves in Europe and Asia to support recommendations in the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy released by the President in September, 2004. Some of these moves will result in a change in defense capabilities, as major units are returned to the United States and new requirements for strategic mobility emerge to meet time critical requests for forces by our Combatant commanders around the globe.

Does the force structure plan prepared as a part of the BRAC process account for the changes in the posture of our forces around the world? As an example, would the location of the homeports of our aircraft carriers world-wide affect the number of carriers we needed to meet requirements?

Quadrennial Defense Review

As required by law, the Department is in the process of initiating a quadrennial defense review (QDR) that will assess national security objectives, our national defense strategy, and then will review our military capabilities to determine what requirements should be addressed to maximize the effectiveness of our military forces. From a layman's perspective, we probably should have completed the QDR before embarking upon the BRAC process and, as part of the BRAC, a submission of a force structure report.

In your opinion will the QDR supercede the BRAC force structure report or even worse, render it obsolete?

How is the Department ensuring that a recommendation made in the BRAC process will not be undercut or affected by the QDR?

Changes in Mobility Requirements

Both the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy released in September 2004, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) currently in process will have a significant impact on the requirements and resources for our military forces to move around the world. The Joint Chiefs are now engaged in a Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) that will shift to an Analysis of Alternatives (aoA) this summer as we attempt to determine what mixes of land, air and sea mobility assets we need to meet operational requirements.

Does the force structure report, and specifically the analysis of excess capacity, account for potential new requirements for transportation hubs and new ports of embarkment for our military forces?

How would you recommend the Commission address the issue of the infrastructure required to support future force structure if the Defense Department is still in the process of determining what is needed for mobility capabilities?

## Capabilities-Based Planning

The Force structure report states that the Department's force planning framework does not focus on specific conflicts, but instead determines capabilities required for a range of scenarios. "The Department analyzes the force requirements for the most likely, the most dangerous, and the most demanding circumstances."

Can you give the Commission a brief review of the capabilities considered vital to a full range of scenarios?

Can you explain how the Department assesses force requirements over a full range of scenarios?

Does the Department apply a ratio of probability to the scenarios?

Is there a measure of risk imbedded in the final force structure recommendations and to what extent?

## Capabilities-Based Planning

It would seem counterintuitive that in an era where the Department of Defense is stressing capabilities-based planning and the increased flexibility of our force posture world-wide by establishing dozens of new forward operating installations, we would want to constrict our basing and infrastructure in the United States, effectively limiting our flexibility and ability to respond.

How will the BRAC process actually contribute to the goals set forth in the force structure plan to transform the Armed Forces to meet the threats to our national security?

In what ways will the BRAC process result in realignments that contribute to an increase in the flexibility of our forces?

Force Structure and Homeland Defense

Can you describe how the force structure report identifies and addresses requirements for homeland security?

What roles and responsibilities are assumed for military forces in scenarios centered around the protection of our population, national assets, and critical infrastructure?

Are the levels of proposed force structure proposed in the report for both the active and reserve components of our military based on an assessment or assumptions of future requirements for the protection of our borders and population?

Force Structure Planning for Traditional Challenges.

This question focuses on traditional challenges from established states employing a full range of military forces in superior numbers. The Force Structure report states that "while traditional forms of military competition remain important, trends suggest that these challenges will receive lesser priority in the planning of adversaries vis-a vis the United States."

In what way does the proposed force structure respond to the scenario of traditional challenges?

If the United States today assigns a low priority to the response to traditional challenges, are we not identifying and telegraphing a future vulnerability to the adversaries of our national interest?

Surge Requirements

One of the BRAC criteria refers to the ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and surge requirements.

Where in the force structure report is an estimate of the numbers of forces or major force units that would be considered a surge requirement?

If not specifically cited in the force structure report, how do you recommend this Commission take into consideration the planning for, and the physical plant required to support surge requirements?

Base Closure and Realignment Commission

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Security Threats to the United States



Statement of

Carol Rodley

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for  
Intelligence and Research

May 3, 2005

Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
Security Threats to the United States  
May 3, 2005

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Statement of  
Carol Rodley  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  
for Intelligence and Research

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, I am pleased to join my distinguished colleagues today in this important review of threats to our nation and the challenges they pose to our future defense and to the Intelligence Community. In addressing them, I hope to complement the judgments presented by my colleagues by focusing on the way threats appear when viewed through the lens of diplomacy.

The subject of this hearing is one on which there is broad consensus in the Intelligence Community. INR concurs with the judgment that terrorism is the single greatest threat to Americans, both at home and abroad, and that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles, and certain types of advanced conventional weapons is a close and dangerous second. We also share most of the other threat judgments presented by our colleagues. But rather than merely echoing their assessments, I will approach the subject reflecting INR's unique perspective and responsibilities as the Secretary of State's in-house intelligence unit.

As Secretary Rice has made clear in recent statements, diplomacy is critical to US efforts to contain, counter, and diminish the threats we face. On February 8 she told her audience in Paris, "We agree on the interwoven threats we face today: terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and regional conflicts, and failed states, and organized crime." She added that America stands ready to work with other countries in "building an even stronger partnership" to address these threats.

To combat the twin scourges of terrorism and proliferation requires more than just the effective collection of hard to obtain intelligence. At a minimum, it also requires deep understanding of the motivations and objectives of those who resort to terrorism and/or pursue WMD. It also takes sophisticated analysis of all-source information, informed judgments about what we do not know, and detailed knowledge of other countries, cultures, political systems, and the underlying causes of discontent and radicalization. The prerequisites for meeting all these requirements include global coverage, deep analytical expertise, and Intelligence Community commitment to providing policymakers what they need, when they need it, and in a form that they can use day in and day out.

Why are terrorism and proliferation at the top of the threat list? The short and conventional answer is that the normalization of relations with China and demise of the Soviet Union dramatically reduced the danger of nuclear war and eliminated or

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transformed fundamentally a wide array of associated threats. But the end of the Cold War also brought many changes to other aspects of international life, including the erosion of constraints on "client" states, the reemergence of long repressed political aspirations, and the rise of ethnic and religious hatreds. Former DCI Jim Woolsey described the change as the displacement of a few big dragons by lots of dangerous snakes. But it was, and is, more than that. Globalization and the information revolution have changed expectations and aspirations and made it possible for nations and non-state actors, including individuals, to do things that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago.

One of the many resultant developments has been the emergence of vast differences in coercive capabilities. This, in turn, has exacerbated the dangers of both terrorism and proliferation. The inability of all but a few nations to deter the most powerful countries (including but not limited to the United States) has reinforced the determination of states that feel threatened (whether justifiably or not) to seek asymmetric solutions to the disparity of power. For some, this means pursuit of WMD and delivery capabilities because they know they have no hope of deterring or defeating the attacks they fear with conventional armaments. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this can be found in DPRK public statements after Operation Iraqi Freedom intended to reassure its public and warn potential adversaries that, unlike Saddam, it had a (nuclear) deterrent; a claim reiterated February 10. Pakistan pursued—and obtained—nuclear weapons and delivery systems to compensate for India's vastly superior conventional military power and nuclear weapons.

Terrorism is at the other end of the spectrum of asymmetric responses. State sponsors, most notably Iran, seem implicitly to warn potential enemies that the response to any attack will include resort to terror. They seem to be saying, in effect, "You may be able to defeat us militarily, but you cannot protect all your people, everywhere, all the time." Such a porcupine defense/deterrent posture is an unfortunate but not irrational response to wide disparities of power. The situation is somewhat analogous for non-state actors frustrated by their inability to achieve their (however reprehensible) goals by other means. Terror and guerrilla warfare are long-standing measures of choice (or last resort) for weak actors confronting a much stronger adversary. The targets vary widely, from established democracies to authoritarian regimes. However, in some cases, terrorists also direct their attacks against those who are seen as responsible for—by imposition or support—the actions or existence of the regime they oppose. That appears to be one of the reasons al-Qaida has targeted the United States in Saudi Arabia and terrorists in Iraq have used suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices to attack Iraqis and others supportive of the Iraqi government. The use of terror tactics in liberal democracies is especially problematic because in open societies, self-restraint under the rule of law and commitment to respect human rights and dignity complicate the challenges of mounting an effective response.

Attacking a distant country is difficult, even in the era of globalization, and would-be assailants must choose between difficult, high profile attacks, like those on 9/11, and easier to accomplish but probably lower impact incidents (like sniper attacks on

DCN:11686

random individuals or small explosions in crowded public places). We remain vulnerable to both types of terror attack, but arguably we are now less vulnerable to relatively large-scale, high profile attacks than we were before 9/11. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to penetrate the tight-knit groups that are most capable of carrying out such attacks on our country and our people. We have achieved great success in disrupting al-Qaida but may be witnessing a repeat of the pattern found in the wars on illegal drugs and organized crime, namely, that we are fighting a "hydra" with robust capabilities of resurgence and replacement of lost operatives. The bottom line is that terrorism remains the most immediate, dangerous, and difficult security challenge facing our country and the international community and is likely to remain so for a long time. Despite the progress we have made, it would be imprudent to become complacent or to lower our guard.

The quest for WMD, missiles (or unmanned aerial vehicles), and advanced conventional arms has become more attractive to, and more feasible for, a small but significant set of state and non-state actors. This poses major challenges to the security of the United States and our friends and allies, but it is important to put this threat in perspective.

Nuclear Threats. The nuclear sword of Damocles that hung over our national existence during the Cold War remains largely a concern from a different era. Russia and China still have nuclear weapons (the number is declining in Russia and increasing only modestly in China), but the hostility of the past is no longer a pressing concern and neither threatens to use them against our country. North Korea has produced sufficient fissile material to make a small number of nuclear weapons, but, despite its February 10 statement, there is no evidence that it has produced such weapons and mated them to a missile capable of delivering them to the United States. However, if it has made such weapons, it could reach US allies, our armed forces, and large concentrations of American citizens in Northeast Asia. India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and the capability to deliver them to targets in the region, but both nations are friends and neither threatens the territory of the United States. Iran seeks but does not yet have nuclear weapons or missiles capable of reaching the United States. INR's net assessment of the threat to US territory posed by nuclear weapons controlled by nation states is that it is low and lacks immediacy. But this should not be grounds for complacency. The existence of such weapons and the means to deliver them constitutes a latent but deadly threat. Ensuring that it remains latent is a key diplomatic priority.

The so far theoretical possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists constitutes a very different type of threat. We have seen no persuasive evidence that al-Qaida has obtained fissile material or ever has had a serious and sustained program to do so. At worst, the group possesses small amounts of radiological material that could be used to fabricate a radiological dispersion device ("dirty bomb"). The only practical way for non-state actors to obtain sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon (as opposed to material for a so-called dirty bomb) would be to acquire it on the black market or to steal it from one of the current, want-to-be, or used-to-be nuclear weapons states. The "loose nukes" problem in the former Soviet Union continues to exist but is

less acute than it once was, thanks to the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program and diligent efforts by Russia to consolidate and protect stockpiles. North Korea's possession of weapons-grade fissile material adds a new layer of danger and uncertainty. There is no convincing evidence that the DPRK has ever sold, given, or even offered to transfer such material to any state or non-state actor, but we cannot assume that it would never do so.

Chemical and Biological Weapons. Despite the diffusion of know-how and dual-use capabilities to an ever-increasing number of countries, the number of states with known or suspected CW programs remains both small and stable. Most of those that possess such weapons or have the capability to produce quantities sufficient to constitute a genuine threat to the United States or Americans (civilian and military) outside our borders are not hostile to us, appreciate the significance of our nuclear and conventional arsenals, and are unlikely to transfer such weapons or capabilities to terrorists. There are nations that might use CW against invading troops, even American forces, on their own territory, but we judge it highly unlikely that nation states would use CW against the American homeland or specifically target American citizens except as an act of desperation. Terrorists, by contrast, have or could acquire the capability to produce small quantities of chemical agents for use against selected targets or random individuals. We judge the chances of their doing so as moderate to high. One or a few disgruntled individuals or a small terrorist cell could do so in a manner analogous to the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway. The severity of such an attack would be small in terms of lethality, but the psychological and political impact would be huge.

The risk posed by nation states with biological weapons is similar to that for CW; many nations have the capability, but few have programs and even fewer would be tempted to use them against the United States. The danger of acquisition and use by terrorists, however, is far greater. Though hard to handle safely and even harder to deliver effectively, BW agents have the potential to overwhelm response capabilities in specific locations, induce widespread panic, and disrupt ordinary life for a protracted period, with resulting economic and social consequences of uncertain magnitude.

Conventional Attack. INR considers the danger of a conventional military attack on the United States or American military, diplomatic, or business facilities abroad to be very low for the simple reason that no state hostile to the United States has the military capability to attack the US with any hope of avoiding massive retaliation and ultimate, probably rapid, annihilation. The only way to reach a different conclusion, it seems to us, is to posit an irrational actor model in which either all key decision makers in a hostile country are irrational or there are no systemic constraints on a totally irrational dictator. We judge that such conditions exist nowhere at present and hence that US military might is, and will be, able to deter any such suicidal adventure for the foreseeable future. Here again, ensuring that this situation continues is a major goal of American diplomacy.

A far more dangerous threat is the possibility, even the likelihood, that advanced conventional weapons will be obtained—and used—by terrorists. For example, the danger that groups or individuals antithetical to the United States will obtain MANPADS

or advanced explosives is both high and immediate. The number of Americans likely to be killed or maimed in such an attack would be small in comparison with the casualties in a conventional war or nuclear attack, but would be unacceptably large no matter how small the number of casualties and could have a major economic and psychological impact. Attacks on American nationals, whether they are aimed at workers in an American city, American tourists abroad, US diplomatic facilities, US businesses at home or abroad, or US military facilities at home or abroad, are possible and unacceptable. The fact that State Department personnel, family members, and facilities have been frequent targets of attack makes us acutely aware of this danger and determined to do everything possible to thwart it. This determination is magnified several-fold by the fact that it is an important part of the State Department's mission, and the Secretary of State's responsibility, to protect American citizens everywhere around the globe. We take this responsibility very seriously, and an important part of INR's support to diplomacy involves providing information and insights that contribute directly to the success of this mission.

States of Concern. It has become something of a convention in threat testimony to list a number of countries that, for one reason or another, are judged to warrant special attention from the Intelligence Community. A few countries on this list engage in activities that directly or indirectly threaten American lives (e.g., North Korea's deployment of massive military power close enough to Seoul to put at risk our ally as well as American troops and tens of thousands of American civilians). Most countries on the list do not threaten the United States militarily but are important to the success of policies to protect and promote other American interests.

Rather than enumerate a long list of countries, I will simply provide a series of generic examples to illustrate the kinds of conditions and concerns germane to diplomatic efforts to protect and advance American interests. The State Department needs good intelligence on some countries primarily because their actions could lead to internal instability that could, in turn, threaten other American interests. Others belong on the list because they do not or cannot prevent the growth and export of narcotics, harbor or assist terrorist groups, have leaders who make anti-American pronouncements, or have conditions conducive to the rise of extremist movements. Still others illicitly traffic in persons, weapons, conflict diamonds, or other commodities; control critical energy resources; or have fragile political institutions, large and dynamic economies, or any of myriad other attributes.

What states on this long and varied list have in common is the capacity to affect American interests and the efficacy of US foreign, economic, and security policy. Most do not and will not "threaten" the United States in the way that we were once threatened by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, but something, or many things, about them pose challenges and/or opportunities for American diplomacy. The problems of failing states and the tremendous drain on resources in developing countries from AIDS and other pandemics, environmental stress, and corruption affect our ability to partner with allies and friends to meet humanitarian needs in the interest of promoting stability and democracy. This, in turn, poses challenges and requirements for the Intelligence

DCN:11686

Community that extend far beyond the collection and analysis of information germane to the suppression of terrorism and limiting the spread of WMD, delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons. Meeting these challenges requires global coverage, deep expertise, extensive collaboration, and, above all, acceptance of the idea that the mission of the Intelligence Community demands and entails more than collecting and interpreting covertly acquired information on a relatively small number of narrowly defined threats. Focusing on known threats and concerns is necessary but could prove to be very dangerous if we are not equally vigilant in trying to anticipate unknowns and surprises.

Intelligence is, or should be, about more than addressing "threats". The Intelligence Community has been justifiably criticized for serious failings and shortcomings, but we should not lose sight of what we do well and must continue to do well. For example, America's unrivaled military preeminence, demonstrated so dramatically in our elimination of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the destruction of Saddam's regime in Iraq, is inextricably linked to the capabilities and accomplishments of our Intelligence Community. Intelligence collection, analytic tradecraft, insights gained through years of experience, and close ties among collectors, analysts, weapons designers, military planners, and troops on the ground are all and equally critical to the military successes we have achieved, the predominance we enjoy, and the fact that conventional military threats to our nation and our citizens are low and almost certain to remain so for many years. Preserving this state of affairs will be neither automatic nor easy, but our efforts and the allocation of resources to do so must not foreclose equally committed efforts to address other threats and challenges.

Terrorism and proliferation are at the top of every agency's list of threats, and the Intelligence Community is committing substantial effort and resources to provide the intelligence support required to contain and reduce those dangers. In part, this requires and involves penetration of highly restricted and suspicious organizations and secure systems of communication, including sophisticated measures to hide financial transactions, obscure relationships, and deceive human and technical collectors. But collection is only one of many essential factors in the equation. To place the intelligence we collect in context, to distinguish between what is true and useful and what is not, and to develop strategies to detect and disrupt activities inimical to American interests requires expert analysts and information on a very wide array of critical variables. Stated another way, it is not possible to identify, anticipate, understand, and disrupt terrorists and proliferators without broad and deep understanding of the countries, cultures, contexts, social networks, economic systems, and political arenas in which they spawn, develop, and operate. Without broad and deep expertise and information that goes far beyond what we can or should collect through clandestine means, we will not be able to judge accurately the information we collect, and will ultimately be reduced to reliance on lucky guesses and chance discoveries. That isn't good enough. We can and must do better.

**Base Realignment and Closure Commission**

**Hearing of the Commission**

**9:30 am**

**May 4, 2005**

**Index**

**A. Chairman Principi's opening statement**

**B. Biography and Testimony:**

**Vice Admiral Evan Chanik, Director for Force**

**Joint Staff, Pentagon**

**Structure, Resource & Assessment**

**C. Biography and Testimony:**

**Honorable Ryan Henry**

**Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy**

**D. Questions for witnesses**

**May 4th, 2005  
9:30 AM Hearing**



**Base Realignment and Closure  
Commission**

**Statement  
of  
Chairman Anthony J. Principi**

**Hearing  
of the  
2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission**

**May 4, 2005**

**Washington, D.C.**

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**Good Morning,**

**And welcome to the second day of hearings of the 2005 BRAC Commission. Today's hearing, like yesterday's two hearings, will help provide the Commission with the foundation we need to provide an independent assessment of the DoD's 2005 base realignment and closure proposal when it is released in less than two weeks.**

**I also want to express the Commission's appreciation to the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs for making their hearing room available for yesterday's and today's hearing.**

**Yesterday morning, we were briefed on the statute guiding our decisions and the criteria we must apply in evaluating the Defense Department proposal, the issues we are likely to face in the months to come as well as the lessons learned from prior BRACs. In the afternoon, we were briefed by representatives of the intelligence community on the threats to our national security we can anticipate over the two decades to come.**

**The Department of Defense is called upon to develop and field the forces needed to deter or defeat those threats. In turn, it must maintain the bases needed to support those forces; without diverting scarce resources to the maintenance of bases which are not needed.**

**The future force structure of our armed forces is, therefore, a driving force in determining the base structure our nation will need to support in the decades to come.**

**This Commission must, therefore, have a good understanding of that force structure if we are to meet our obligations to the Congress, to the President, to the men and women who embody our armed forces, and to the American people.**

**Today, we will hear from Mr. Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Defense Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Vice Admiral Martin Chanik, Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessments on the Joint Staff. They will speak to the anticipated force structure of our armed forces, their anticipated global posture and strategy of our armed forces and to the Secretary's guidance for conducting the Quadrennial Defense Review, now underway.**

**As you might expect, this information can be very sensitive and while we begin in open session I anticipate that we will move to closed session at an early point in this hearing to protect classified information. I expect our witnesses will signal when our questioning is moving into the classified area so that we can go to a closed session.**

**Mr. Henry, please proceed.**



**TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR  
VICE ADMIRAL EVAN MARTIN CHANIK, JR.  
U.S. NAVY**

27 MAY 1951 Born in Newport, Rhode Island  
 30 JUN 1969 Midshipman, U.S. Naval Academy  
 06 JUN 1973 Ensign  
 06 JUN 1975 Lieutenant (junior grade)  
 01 JUL 1977 Lieutenant  
 01 JUN 1982 Lieutenant Commander  
 01 SEP 1988 Commander  
 01 OCT 1993 Captain  
 09 MAR 2000 Designated Rear Admiral (lower half) while  
 serving in billets commensurate with that grade  
 01 JUL 2000 Rear Admiral (lower half)  
 19 SEP 2002 Designated Rear Admiral while serving in billets  
 commensurate with that grade  
 01 SEP 2003 Rear Admiral  
 18 MAR 2005 Vice Admiral, Service continuous to date



<u>ASSIGNMENTS AND DUTIES</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL (DUINS)	JUN 1973	AUG 1973
Training Squadron ONE, NAS Saufley Field, Pensacola, FL (DUINS)	AUG 1973	SEP 1973
Training Squadron TWO THREE, NAS Kingsville, TX (DUINS)	SEP 1973	SEP 1974
Commander, Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Ready Replacement Pilot)	SEP 1974	AUG 1975
Commander, Fighter Squadron ONE (Division Officer)	AUG 1975	FEB 1978
Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN Training Officer)	MAR 1978	OCT 1980
Commander, Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Replacement Pilot)	OCT 1980	MAY 1981
Commander, Fighter Squadron TWO FOUR (Operations Officer)	MAY 1981	OCT 1984
Commanding Officer, Air Test and Evaluation Squadron FOUR (Quality Assurance Officer)	OCT 1984	JUL 1985
Commander, Airborne Early Warning Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet/Navy Fighter Weapons School/ 4477 <sup>th</sup> U.S. Air Force Test and Evaluation Squadron (Evaluation Officer)	AUG 1985	MAR 1988

**TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR  
VICE ADMIRAL EVAN MARTIN CHANIK, JR.  
U.S. NAVY**

<u>ASSIGNMENTS AND DUTIES (CONT'D)</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Commander, Fighter Squadron ONE ZERO ONE (Replacement Pilot)	MAR 1988	SEP 1988
XO, Fighter Squadron EIGHT FOUR	SEP 1988	MAR 1990
CO, Fighter Squadron EIGHT FOUR	MAR 1990	JUL 1991
Naval Nuclear Power School, Orlando, FL (DUINS)	SEP 1991	OCT 1991
Commander, Naval Nuclear Power Unit, Charleston, SC (DUINS)	MAY 1992	OCT 1992
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)/ Commander, Fighter Wing ONE (TEM DU)	NOV 1992	OCT 1993
XO, USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70)	OCT 1993	AUG 1995
CO, USS CAMDEN (AOE 2)	OCT 1995	JUN 1997
CO, USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65)	SEP 1997	JUL 2000
Office of the CNO (Director, Aviation Plans and Requirements Branch) (N780)	JUL 2000	APR 2002
Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force, Southwest Asia, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (TEM DU)	MAY 2002	AUG 2002
Commander, Carrier Group THREE	APR 2002	AUG 2004
Office of the CNO (Director, Programming Division) (N80)	AUG 2004	MAR 2005
Joint Staff (Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment) (J-8)	MAR 2005	TO DATE

MEDALS AND AWARDS

Legion of Merit	Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
Bronze Star Medal	Navy "E" Ribbon with three "E's"
Meritorious Service Medal with two Gold Stars	National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Air Medal (fourth strike/flight award)	Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with Combat "V" and two Gold Stars	Vietnam Service Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal	Southwest Asia Service Medal with three Bronze Stars
Joint Meritorious Unit Award with Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster	Kuwait Liberation Medal (Saudi Arabia)
Navy Unit Commendation	Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kuwait)
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award	Expert Pistol Shot Medal

TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR  
VICE ADMIRAL EVAN MARTIN CHANIK, JR.  
U.S. NAVY

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

BS (Operations Analysis), U.S. Naval Academy, 1973  
MA (Business Administration), 1987  
Designated Naval Aviator, 1974  
Designated Joint Specialty Officer, 1989

PERSONAL DATA

Wife: Kathleen M. Foster, La Crescenta, California  
Children: None.

SUMMARY OF JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Rank</u>
4477 <sup>th</sup> U.S. Air Force Test and Evaluation Squadron	AUG 85 - MAR 88	LCDR
Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force, Southwest Asia, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	MAY 02 - AUG 02	RDML
Joint Staff (Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment) (J-8)	MAR 05 - TO DATE	VADM

INTENSE COMBAT

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Fighter Squadron EIGHT FOUR	JAN 91	CDR

Thanks you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission for the opportunity to testify today about the BRAC Force Structure Plan. As you are aware, the Secretary will present his BRAC recommendations to you not later than 16 May. The recommendations are the result of intense analysis performed by the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups that began over two years ago. Per the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, these recommendations will be based on the BRAC 2005 Final Selection Criteria, certified data, and the Force Structure Plan.

The BRAC statute required the Secretary to submit to Congress a force structure plan for the Armed Forces. The legislation directed that the plan be based on an assessment of the probable threats to US national security during the 20-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005, the probable end-strength levels and major force units needed to meet the threats, and the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during that period.

Upon completion, the Secretary submitted the Force Structure Plan to Congress in March 2004, along with his certification for the need for BRAC. The statute also provided the Secretary the opportunity to submit a revised plan. This revision was submitted to Congress on March 15, 2005.

### **How the Force Structure Plan was used**

Recommendations to the BRAC Commission were developed by the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups based on the Selection Criteria, certified data, and the Force Structure Plan. To facilitate their efforts, the completed Force Structure Plan was provided to the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups for inclusion into their analysis. Utilizing the Force Structure Plan in their analysis, the Services and Joint Cross-Service Groups ensured that post-BRAC infrastructure would be sufficient to support current and future force structure and requirements to surge.

### **What the Plan Provides**

The plan begins with a discussion of the Department's capabilities-based approach for matching strategy-to-force structure. While the Department is shifting to a capabilities-based, vice threat-based approach, assessment of probable threats is prudent and included, as directed by legislation. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps force structure tables, probable end-strength levels and anticipated funding levels complete the document and represent the capabilities the Department estimates are required to meet the probable threats, including the capability to surge.

**Good Afternoon,**

**And welcome to the second hearing of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission.**

**As I noted this morning, in less than two weeks the Secretary of Defense will publish his proposal for realigning or closing the military bases he believes are no longer needed to support the men and women of our armed forces. The Congress established this Commission to provide an independent assessment of that DoD proposal.**

**The Defense Department proposal will lay out a roadmap defining the infrastructure it believes the services will need over decades to come.**

**But, bases are not an ends, they are a means.**

**Bases support the divisions, wings, fleets, and expeditionary forces, and their supporting elements, fielded to meet threats to our security. And those formations must in turn be tailored to deter or defeat the threats they are expected to face.**

**Since it's difficult to know when you've arrived if you don't know where you are going, this Commission must have an understanding of the anticipated future threats to our Nation if we are to intelligently evaluate the appropriateness of the base establishment the Department of Defense proposes for supporting the force structure we anticipate to field in order to meet those threats.**

**This afternoon, Mr. David Gordon, from the new Office of the Director of National Intelligence, will testify. Mr. Gordon is Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, the senior analyst position in the Intelligence Community. He is accompanied by Mr. Earl Sheck from the Defense Intelligence Agency and by Ms. Carol Rodley from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. They will provide the Commission with the foundation for an independent assessment of the threats to our national security over the next twenty years.**

DCN:11686

**This assessment should serve as the basis for Defense Department's Force Structure and the infrastructure to support that structure.**

**Mr. Gordon, I understand that you will make an opening statement and that Mr. Sheck and Ms. Rodley will assist you in responding to our questions.**

**Mr. Gordon.**

Statement to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission

Ryan Henry  
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

May 4, 2005

Mr. Chairman and members of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, I am pleased to appear before you today and grateful for the work you are doing for our nation.

Today I will discuss with you our National Defense Strategy, the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review, and our Global Defense Posture changes - all of which provide the strategic foundation for the Department's BRAC recommendations.

National Defense Strategy

Mr. Chairman, our National Defense Strategy outlines an active, layered approach to the defense of the nation and its interests. We seek to create conditions conducive to respect for the sovereignty of nations and a secure international order favorable to freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity.

Our National Defense Strategy identifies four strategic objectives:

- **Secure the United States from direct attack.** We make it our top priority to dissuade, deter, and defeat those who seek to harm the United States directly, especially extremist enemies with weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
- **Strengthen alliances and partnerships.** We will expand the community of nations that share principles and interests with us. This includes helping partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests;
- **Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.** We will promote the security, prosperity, and freedom of action of the United States and its partners by securing access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons; and
- **Establish favorable security conditions.** Working with others in the U.S. Government, we will create conditions for a favorable international system

by honoring our security commitments and working with other nations to bring about a common appreciation of threats; a broad, secure, and lasting peace; and the steps required to protect against these threats.

We accomplish these objectives through assuring, dissuading, deterring, and when necessary defeating adversaries:

- **assuring allies and friends** by demonstrating our resolve to fulfill our alliance and other defense commitments and help protect common interests;
- **dissuading potential adversaries** from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions, particularly by developing our own key military advantages;
- **deterring aggression and countering coercion** by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the will to resolve conflicts decisively on favorable terms; and
- at the direction of the President, **defeating adversaries** at the time, place and in the manner of our choosing—setting the conditions for future security.

Mr. Chairman, four guidelines structure our strategic planning and decision-making:

- We will focus our military planning, posture, operations, and capabilities on the **active, forward, and layered defense** of our nation, our interests, and our partners;
- We will **continually transform** how we approach and confront challenges, conduct business, and work with others;
- We will use a **capabilities-based approach** to operationalize this strategy by setting priorities among competing capabilities to address mature and emerging challenges; and
- We will **manage risks** across the Department associated with resources and operations. We will consider the full range of such risks and manage clear tradeoffs.

## Quadrennial Defense Review

Mr. Chairman, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will operationalize our new National Defense Strategy and shape the future force. The Department launched the formal review in March 2005, and the QDR Report will be submitted to Congress with the FY07 budget request.

The QDR will take a 20-year outlook. It will examine the capabilities that the Department and the nation need to contend with challenges in four focus areas:

- Building partnerships to hasten the demise of terrorist extremist networks;
- Defending the homeland in depth;
- Shaping the choices of key nations at strategic crossroads; and
- Preventing the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile state or non-state actors for when classic deterrence is ineffective.

A theme cutting across all of these focus areas – and a central element of the National Defense Strategy – is how we might help our allies and partners to develop their own capacities to confront security challenges that we have in common.

Mr. Chairman, rather than looking solely at weapons systems and force structure, the QDR will look at all aspects of the Department of Defense through the lens of the four focus areas, employing six separate, but complimentary lines of approach:

- The needed mix of warfighting capabilities;
- Joint enablers, such as logistics, space, and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance;
- Roles, missions, and organizations for the next two decades;
- Manning and balancing the force for a 21<sup>st</sup>-century “human capital strategy”;

- Business practices and processes, such as financial dealings, fiscal planning, corporate governance, supply chain management, and strategic planning; and
- Requisite DOD authorities in areas such as Title 5, Title 10, and Title 32, and internal directives needed for a transformed department.

The 2005 QDR differs significantly from past QDRs in that it recognizes that the United States is a nation at war. It will build upon lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that we live in an environment of uncertainty—we cannot adequately predict when, where, or how we might need to next use our forces.

To avoid “stovepiping” of issues and resource priorities, the Department’s senior leaders are the driving force managing all aspects of the QDR. This QDR also will be inclusive: in addition to close consultations with Congress, we will solicit ideas from other government agencies, defense industry, and our international partners to benefit from their strategic thinking.

Finally, during this QDR, the force sizing construct will be treated as an output, not an input to the process. Past QDRs spent much time discussing the proper “size” of the force. This time we will first determine the right mix of capabilities that we need to face our uncertain future, and then we will address any necessary force construct changes that may be needed.

### Global Defense Posture Strategy

Mr. Chairman, the Administration’s efforts to strengthen America’s global defense posture will result in the most profound re-ordering of U.S. military forces overseas since the Cold War.

We are redefining our military’s forward presence by strengthening our ability to meet our security commitments in the midst of a dynamic and uncertain geopolitical landscape. Transforming our global defense posture is an important part of our broader effort to transform the Department to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Similar to the National Defense Strategy and the ongoing QDR, we conducted our global defense posture review thoroughly and deliberately. We collaborated with our interagency partners – particularly the State Department – early in the process. We made an intensive effort to consult with our allies and partners to incorporate their views, with trips to 20 capitals, ambassadorial discussions, and 20 Hill visits for briefings and testimony. The results were

gratifying: within 24 hours of President Bush's speech last August announcing his intention to move forward with our global posture plans, officials of key allies and partners made strong statements of support for our strategy and our proposals. Because we had kept our Russian and Chinese counterparts apprised of our proposed changes, there was no negative reaction from these countries. This helped assure our European and Asian allies.

Mr. Chairman, we also have regularly briefed Members of Congress and their personal and committee staffs throughout our review, with over 40 such briefings to date. We provided a detailed Report to Congress in the fall of 2004. We also have worked closely with the Overseas Basing Commission in its efforts to provide Congress with its assessment of our global presence, basing, and infrastructure needs.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate some of the strategic principles of the global posture changes; summarize some of the most prominent changes; and address the BRAC process in more detail.

First, let me clarify what we have aimed to achieve:

- We are not aiming at retrenchment, curtailing U.S. commitments, isolationism or unilateralism. Instead, we want to strengthen our ability to fulfill our international commitments;
- We want to ensure our future alliances are capable, affordable, sustainable, and relevant;
- We are not narrowly focused on numbers of troops overseas; instead we are focusing on the effective capabilities of our forces and those of our allies;
- We are not talking about fighting in place, but about our ability to rapidly get to the fight; and
- We are not only talking about basing, we are talking about relationships and activities and the ability to move forces when and where they are needed.

Some historical context may be useful. The September 11th attacks clarified our understanding of the key security issues that we will face in the 21<sup>st</sup>-century. These include:

- the nexus among terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

- ungoverned areas within states, which can serve as both a breeding ground and a sanctuary for terrorists; and
- the adoption of asymmetric approaches – including irregular warfare – that adversaries could use to counter U.S. conventional military superiority.

Mr. Chairman, just as we have updated our National Defense Strategy and worked to transform our alliances to meet these security challenges, we also recognized the importance of transforming our global posture. Much of our in-place posture still reflects a Cold War structure – forward stationed forces configured to fight near where they were based.

Now, nearly 15 years after the end of the Cold War, we know that the premises underlying our posture have changed fundamentally: we no longer expect our forces to fight in place; our forces need to be able to rapidly project power into theaters that may be far from where they are based.

#### Global Defense Posture Themes

Mr. Chairman, five key strategy themes guide our Global Defense Posture changes:

*First is the need to improve flexibility to contend with uncertainty.* Much of our existing overseas posture was established during the Cold War, when we knew, or thought we knew, where we would fight. Today, however, we often fight in places that few, if any, had predicted. Thus, we should recognize the limits of our intelligence. We need to plan to counteract surprise. Our goal is to have forces positioned forward on a continual basis in areas with access and facilities that enable them to reach any potential crisis spots quickly.

*Second is creating the capacity to act both within and across regions.* During the Cold War, we focused on threats to specific regions and tailored our military presence to those regions. Now we are dealing with challenges that are global in nature. We need to improve our ability to project power from one region to another and to manage forces on a global basis.

*Third is the requirement to strengthen allied roles and build new partnerships.* We want to ensure that our allies and friends recognize that we are actually strengthening our commitment to secure our common interests. Changes to our global posture aim to help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, strategies, and doctrines. We are exploring ways in which we and they together can transform our partnership to best enhance our collective defense capabilities. At the same time, we seek to tailor our military's overseas "footprint" to suit local conditions, to reduce friction with host nations, and to respect local sensitivities.

*Fourth, we must develop rapidly deployable capabilities.* Our forces need to be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations, which puts a premium on establishing flexible legal and support arrangements with our allies and partners.

*Finally, we have to focus on effective military capabilities, not numbers of personnel, units, or equipment.* Our key purpose is to push relevant capabilities forward. We now can have far greater capabilities forward than in the past, with smaller numbers of permanently stationed forces. In the Cold War, “bean counting” numbers of personnel in administrative regions was perceived to have a direct relationship to our ability to succeed in anticipated conflicts. But this is no longer the case. Capabilities matter, not numbers.

### Building Blocks of our Global Defense Posture

Mr. Chairman, let me make clear what we mean by the word “posture.” Many think only of our footprint of facilities, but posture also includes presence, force management, surge capability, and prepositioning.

First, our posture includes the **facilities** that make up our overseas **footprint** where our forces live, train, and operate. We will retain and consolidate many of our main operating bases in places like Germany, Italy, the U.K., Japan, and Korea, but we also will rely on forward operating sites with rotational presence and pre-positioned equipment. We also will need access to a broader range of facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence, but with periodic service or contractor support, which we call cooperative security locations.

Second, our posture includes our **presence**, the permanent and rotational forces that conduct military activities worldwide, from security cooperation to crisis response. Their activities include training, exercises, and operations. They involve both small units working together in a wide range of capacities and major formations conducting elaborate exercises to achieve proficiency in joint and combined operations.

Third, our posture supports our new approach to **force management** which seeks both to relieve the stresses on our military forces and their families and to manage our forces on a global rather than a regional basis. Accompanied tours that were designed in an era of static deployments have become more of a hardship for families as service members deploy more frequently from forward locations. Accompanying dependents more often find themselves in a state of double separation: separated both from their loved ones and extended support networks back in the United States. The planned changes to our posture support Service initiatives designed to facilitate personnel management, provide predictability in scheduling, and offer more stability at home. Also, we are now managing our

forces globally, rather than tying forces and their training only to particular regions. Combatant Commanders no longer “own” forces in their theaters.

Fourth, managing our military forces globally also allows us to **surge** a greater percentage of the force where and when it is needed anywhere in the world. Forces are apportioned as needed and sourced from anywhere in the world.

Finally, our posture changes involve a greater use of **prepositioned equipment**, strategically located and globally managed, to support training with our allies and partners and to facilitate the rapid deployment of forces where and when they are needed.

### Key Changes and Continuities

Mr. Chairman, these changes in footprint, presence, force management, surge, and prepositioning are reshaping our ability to support diplomacy and project necessary military power in all theaters.

In Asia, we are building upon our traditional ground, air, and naval access in Northeast Asia to operate effectively despite the vast distances in the theater. This will require additional naval and air capabilities forward in the region. We are consolidating facilities and headquarters in Japan and Korea to gain efficiencies and to enable regional and global action. We will have a more frequent presence of special operations forces throughout the region.

Our future posture in Europe will be characterized by lighter and more deployable ground capabilities, leading-edge air and naval power and advanced training facilities. The center of gravity of our presence in Europe will shift south and east, allowing for more rapid deployment to the Middle East, Africa, and other potential hot spots. A major change will be the return of the two legacy maneuver divisions from Europe to the United States, replacing them with our transformational Stryker capability. We also are retaining our advanced mobility infrastructure in places like Ramstein in Germany.

In the Middle East, our goal is presence without permanence. We are maintaining what we call “warm” facilities for rotational forces and contingency purposes, building on cooperation and access provided by host nations during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

In Africa and the Western Hemisphere, we require an array of smaller cooperative security locations for contingency access in some remote areas, but we will not be building new bases.

Linkage to Base Realignment and Closure

Mr. Chairman, the National Defense Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, Global Defense Posture changes and domestic BRAC round are key, interlinked elements that support transformation. A well supported, capabilities-based force structure should have infrastructure that is best sized and placed to support national security needs and emerging mission requirements. The revised *BRAC Force Structure Plan* and the *Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing Infrastructure Requirements at Overseas Facilities*, both recently transmitted to Congress, align with our National Defense Strategy.

Since some overseas personnel will return to the United States, global posture changes will influence BRAC recommendations designed to support the warfighter more effectively and efficiently. The linkage to BRAC ensures that our forces returning to the U.S. will relocate not merely where they best fit, but rather where they are best postured. The Secretary will provide his recommendations for domestic closures and realignments to the Commission and Congress by May 16th as required by the BRAC 2005 statute.

Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by commending this commission as it works to implement necessary, far-reaching, and enduring changes to strengthen America's defense infrastructure.