

BASE VISIT REPORT
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION, SEAL BEACH

July 14, 2005

LEAD COMMISSIONER: None

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER: None

COMMISSION STAFF: David Epstein/Navy, Lester Farrington/Cross-Service

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Name	Office	Phone	e-mail address
Lester C. Farrington	BRAC Commission	(703) 699-2914 (703) 699-2950	lester.farrington@wso.whs
David Epstein	BRAC/Navy	(703) 699-2947	david.epstein@wso.whs.m
John Franklin	Legislative Assistant Office of Representative Darrell Issa		john.franklin@mail.house.
Don McKinney	Office of Representative Darrell Issa	(760) 599-5000	don.mckinney@mail.house
Donald P. Schulte	Department Head Ordnance Engineering Department NSWC Crane Div	(812) 854-3418	donald.schulte@navy.mil
Phil Paule	Office of Representative Darrell Issa		phil.paule@mail.house.gov
Cass Bensberg	WPNSTA Seal Beach, CMD	(562) 626-7392	
John W. Mikel	NSWC Crane, Det. Fallbrook	(760) 731-3560	john.mikel@navy.mil
Bob Repking	Branch Head NSWC Crane, Det. Fallbrook MCPD	(760) 731-3691	robert.repking@navy.mil
Carl A. Shaver	NSWC Crane, Det. Fallbrook MCPD	(760) 731-3668	carl.shaver@navy.mil
Wayne Ventuleth	Division Head NSWC Crane, Det. Fallbrook MCPD	(760) 731-3689	wayne.ventuleth@navy.mi

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION: Provide full spectrum of ordnance life-cycle technical services, ensuring integrity and performance of weapons systems in the areas of test & evaluation and test systems support.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION:

- Close the Inland area of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment, Concord CA, except retain such property and facilities as are necessary to support operations in the Tidal area of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord. The Tidal area of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord, along with the retained portion of the Inland area, shall be transferred to the Army. (DoN-9)
- Realign Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA, as follows: relocate the depot maintenance of Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), Fire Control Systems and Components, Radar, and Radio to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA; relocate the depot maintenance of Material Handling to Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA; relocate the depot maintenance of Other Components to Anniston Army Depot, AL; and relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Missiles to Letterkenny Army Depot, PA. (Ind-4)
- Realign Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except underwater weapons and energetic materials, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA. (Tech-15)
- Realign the Fallbrook, CA, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. (Tech-19)
- The fifth part of the recommendation deals with Corona, which is now a detachment of Seal Beach. This was not further discussed. (Don-7).

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION:

- While Department of the Navy weapons stations have no excess capacity for loading and distribution of munitions, there is an excess of munitions storage capacity. Because of the departure of Fleet units from the San Francisco area in the 1990s, Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord's Inland magazine field has been in a reduced operating status since 1999. At that time, the Inland area was retained in an effort to minimize risk should a future need develop to expand storage capacity. The Explosive Safety Quantity Distance arcs in the Inland area were available to allow safe, temporary holding of railcars with munitions destined for loading by the Army-managed Marine Ocean Terminal Concord (at the Tidal area) during high tempo operations. After consultation with Combatant Commanders, the Army Material Command and the Army component of the U.S. Transportation Command, the Department of the Navy has concluded this capability is no longer necessary. The Inland area is excess to Department of

the Navy/DoD needs and is severable. The closure of the Inland area, therefore, will save money and have no impact on mission capability.

The City of Concord requested closure of both the Inland and Tidal portions of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord. Munitions loading requirements preclude closing the Tidal area but the Inland area is excess and may be closed. Because Tidal area operations are in support of the Army component of the U.S. Transportation Command, transfer of the property to the Army aligns the property holder with the property user.

- This recommendation supports depot maintenance function elimination at Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach and follows the strategy of minimizing sites using maximum capacity at 1.5 shifts. This recommendation eliminates over 243,000 square feet of depot maintenance production space with annual facility sustainment and recapitalization savings of \$1.1M. Required capacity to support workloads and Core requirements for the Department of Defense (DoD) is relocated to other DoD Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence, thereby increasing the military value of depot maintenance performed at these sites. This recommendation decreases the cost of depot maintenance operations across DoD by consolidation and elimination of 30 percent of duplicate overhead structures required to operate multiple depot maintenance activities. Additionally, this recommendation supports transformation of the Department's depot maintenance operations by increasing the utilization of existing capacity by up to 150 percent while maintaining capability to support future force structure. Another benefit of this recommendation includes utilization of DoD capacity to facilitate performance of interservice workload.
- This recommendation realigns and consolidates those facilities working in Weapons & Armaments (W&A) Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation (RDAT&E) into a Naval Integrated RDAT&E center at the Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, CA. Additional synergistic realignments for W&A was achieved at two receiver sites for specific focus. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA, is a receiver specialty site for Naval surface weapons systems integration and receives a west coast site for consolidation. This construct creates an integrated W&A RDAT&E center in China Lake, CA, energetics center at Indian Head, MD, and consolidates Navy surface weapons system integration at Dahlgren, VA. All actions relocate technical facilities with lower overall quantitative Military Value (across Research, Development & Acquisition and Test & Evaluation) into the Integrated RDAT&E center and other receiver sites with greater quantitative Military Value.

Consolidating the Navy's air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface launched missile RD&A, and T&E activities at China Lake, CA, would create an efficient integrated RDAT&E center. China Lake is able to accommodate with minor modification/addition both mission and lifecycle/ sustainment functions to create synergies between these traditionally independent communities.

During the other large scale movements of W&A capabilities noted above; Weapon System Integration was specifically addressed to preserve the synergies between large highly integrated control system developments (Weapon Systems Integration) and the weapon system developments themselves. A specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare was identified at Dahlgren, VA, that was unique to the services and a centroid for Navy surface ship developments. A satellite unit from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, San Diego Detachment will be relocated to Dahlgren.

The Integrated RDATE Center at China Lake provides a diverse set of open-air range and test environments (desert, mountain, forest) for W&A RDATE functions. Synergy will be realized in air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface launched mission areas.

This recommendation enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical and acquisition expertise with weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition that currently resides at 10 locations into the one Integrated RDATE site, one specialty site, and an energetics site.

- This recommendation realigns and consolidates those gun and ammunition facilities working in Weapons and Armaments (W&A) Research (R), Development & Acquisition (D&A). This realignment would result in a more robust joint center for gun and ammunition Research, Development & Acquisition at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. This location is already the greatest concentration of military value in gun and ammunition W&A RD&A.

Picatinny Arsenal is the center-of-mass for DoD's Research, Development & Acquisition of guns and ammunition, with a workload more than an order of magnitude greater than any other DoD facility in this area. It also is home to the DoD's Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition. Movement of all the Services' guns and ammunition work to Picatinny Arsenal will create a joint center of excellence and provide synergy in armament development for the near future and beyond, featuring a Joint Packaging, Handling, Shipping and Transportation (PHS&T) Center, particularly important in this current time of high demand for guns and ammunition by all the services. Technical facilities with lower quantitative military value are relocated to Picatinny Arsenal.

This recommendation includes Research, Development & Acquisition activities in the Army and Navy. It promotes jointness, enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise within the weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition community that currently resides at this DoD specialty location.

- The Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona performs three required missions for Department of the Navy (Independent Assessment Capability, Metrology and Calibration Laboratories, and Tactical Aircrew Combat Training System Ranges). It was analyzed under 11 Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation functions (Air Platforms Development & Acquisition; Air Platforms Test & Evaluation; Ground Vehicles Test and Evaluation; Information Systems Technology Development & Acquisition; Information Systems Technology Test & Evaluation; Sea Vehicles Development & Acquisition; Sea Vehicles Test & Evaluation; Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare Development & Acquisition; Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare Test & Evaluation; Weapons Technology Development & Acquisition; and Weapons Technology Test & Evaluation). In each functional area, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona's quantitative military value scores fell in the bottom half of facilities performing the same function, and thus were reviewed for relocation and/or consolidation with like functions. The Department of the Navy determined it would lose a critical capability if the 11 functions were relocated to a variety of locations, since this would fracture the full spectrum warfare center and independent assessment capability. Considering the overall military value and the fact that Naval Support Activity Corona was a single function facility, the Department reviewed the possibility of relocating the Naval Surface Warfare Center functions to a multi-functional location with the capability to host these functions. Relocation of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona to Naval Air Station Point Mugu collocates it with other Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation activities and with fleet assets at Naval Air Station Point Mugu. This consolidation of space will provide a more efficient organization with greater synergies and increased effectiveness.

Relocation of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation functions to Naval Air Station Point Mugu removes the primary mission from Naval Support Activity Corona and eliminates or moves the entirety of the workforce at Naval Support Activity Corona except for those personnel associated with the base operations support function. As a result, retention of Naval Support Activity Corona is no longer necessary.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED: None, other than HQ building where meeting was held.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

There were several recommendations involving Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, and its detachments at Concord, CA and Corona, CA. These comments were prepared based on reference to two handouts: "NSWC Indian Head Division: Detachment Seal Beach: BRAC Commission Visit 14 July 2005" and NWS Seal Beach: Command Brief: BRAC Commission Visit July 14, 2005," and the presentations made during our visit.

DCN: 11688

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Schonberger, James [jschonberger@egginc.com]
Sent: Friday, July 15, 2005 4:25 PM
To: 'lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil'; 'david.epstein@wso.whs.mil'
Cc: 'David Reece'; Mike Gentile
Subject: **FALLBROOK & CRANE T&E CLARIFICATION**
Attachments: T&E.doc; Picatinny clarification r1.doc

Gentlemen, we understand you have requested to see both the Fallbrook and Crane clarification issue regarding T&E for the realignment of guns and ammo to Picatinny Arsenal. Please see the attached documents.

Jim Schonberger
Business Relations Manager, EG&G Crane Operations
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane
Bldg 64, 300 Hwy 361
Crane, IN 47522
"Harnessing the Power of Technology for the Warfighter"
(812) 854-7077 x259
(812) 854-7152 (Fax)

7/17/2005

BRAC Report - Create an Integrated Weapons and Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition (Page TECH 19):

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realign the Fallbrook, CA, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Dahlgren, VA, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realign the Louisville, KY, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Indian Head, MD, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Earle, NJ, by relocating weapon and armament packaging Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Technical JCSG Analysis and Recommendations – Technical JCSG Report Vol. XII, Part IV (Page 44):

Justification: This recommendation realigns and consolidates those gun and ammunition facilities working in Weapons and Armaments (W&A) Research (R), Development & Acquisition (D&A). This realignment would result in a more robust joint center for gun and ammunition Research, Development & Acquisition at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. This location is already the greatest concentration of military value in gun and ammunition W&A RD&A.

Picatinny Arsenal is the center-of-mass for DoD's Research, Development & Acquisition of guns and ammunition, with a workload more than an order of magnitude greater than any other DoD facility in this area. It also is home to the DoD's Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition. Movement of all the Services' guns and ammunition work to Picatinny Arsenal will create a joint center of excellence and provide synergy in armament development for the near future and beyond, featuring a Joint Packaging, Handling, Shipping and Transportation (PHS&T) Center, particularly important in this current time of high demand for guns and ammunition by all the services. Technical facilities with lower quantitative military value are relocated to Picatinny Arsenal.

This recommendation includes Research, Development & Acquisition activities in the Army and Navy. It promotes jointness, enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise within the weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition community that currently resides at this DoD specialty location.

Clarification Needed on the Recommendation:

1. T&E Function and Sustainment Sub-function:

- The BRAC Recommendation in Section 2 beginning on page 19, indicates that only RD&A is associated with all 8 relocation and realignment actions. Additionally, in the "Technical Joint Cross Service Group Analyses and Recommendations (Volume XII) Part II, page 15", it states that "Weapons specialty sites at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ (small caliber gun RDAT&E); Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA (large caliber gun T&E and Ship Weapons Integration); and Indian Head, MD (energetic materials RDAT&E)." The noted exclusion of the large caliber gun T&E of Dahlgren reinforces that the BRAC Recommendation does not include T&E functions. Is this the correct intention? If so, NSWC Crane, Dahlgren, Indian Head and NSWC Det. Earle, Fallbrook and Louisville certified data for RDAT&E must be adjusted to reflect only RDA.
- On the recommendation for RDA Guns/Ammo to Picatinny appears to exclude T&E but includes Crane's certified numbers for entire RDAT&E piece of scenarios in the people relocating numbers. Fallbrook's function is T&E, yet it is listed as part of the move to Picatinny. The Range used is at Hawthorne which is listed as closing..."realigning storage and demil..." but it is silent on the test range.
- While not specifically mentioned in the recommendation, the COBRA data shows that personnel and equipment associated with Sustainment sub-function were deleted from the scenario [Per COBRA Input Data Report (Page 45), Footnotes for Screen Three - Indian Head to Picatinny reduced civilian position (less 3 sustainment) by 15% to 37.] If this is the intention, NSWC Crane, Dahlgren, Indian Head and NSWC Det. Earle, Fallbrook and Louisville certified data for Guns and Ammo must be adjusted to remove Guns and Ammo sustainment.

Guns and Ammunition Realignment to Picatinny

Scenario: Technical JCSG

Crane and Fallbrook scenario response TECH-0017 & TECH-0002D

COBRA scenario TECH-0018B

RECOMMENDATION

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realign the Fallbrook, CA, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

CLARIFICATION FOR RECORD

Note: The questions listed in this document pertain to both Crane and Fallbrook.

1. The scenarios (both TECH-0017 and TECH-0002D) included a Crane and Fallbrook response that specifically addressed the T&E component as part of this realignment action. However, the Technical JCSG recommendation did not address T&E. Request clarification as to the technical functions that are intended to be included within this recommendation. Is the recommendation intended to include RDA only, or is the recommendation intended to include, or exclude the T&E function?

COBRA MODEL REVIEW QUESTIONS

Page 2: The COBRA document states that "For complete, detailed footnotes, please check the Word File constructed from these reports". Where is this Word File located in the overall justification data?

Page 2: Under personnel reductions; this subgroup was allowed to use a standard reduction for all actions for government personnel of 15%. What is the rationale for applying a 15% reduction to realigned personnel?

Page 2: Additionally, a standard 15% reduction was used for contractor personnel. Contractor personnel reduced by the 15% were then used in the COBRA model indicating \$200K of annual recurring savings for each eliminated contractor. What is the rationale for applying a 15% reduction to contractor personnel, and what is the rationale and logic for applying a \$200K recurring savings to each of these eliminated contractors?

Page 2: Finally, no building or equipment decontamination costs were allowed if the activity was not closed. What is the rationale for requiring an activity that did not close to incur the full burden of decontamination costs after work is realigned to another activity?

Page 29: Indicates that both mission tons of equipment and support tons of equipment were reduced to 47 and 21 respectively. On page 46, the report indicates the reductions/deletions applied to Crane mission equipment ranging from 25% allowed to 33% allowed. Page 48 applies the same range of percentages allowed between 25% and 33% for support equipment. What is the basis of these percentages and what is the rationale for these reductions?

Page 35: Shows Crane cost/saving summary (page 38 for Fallbrook). Miscellaneous savings for Crane are listed as \$1.8M and are listed as \$1.0M for Fallbrook. How were these figures derived, and what is the rationale?

Page 45/46/48: Footnotes for screen three: Indicates that all moves and associated costs have been moved to 2008. Crane and Fallbrook submitted all data for realignment to Picatinny in 2009. What is the rationale for changing the year of realignment?

Page 51: Indicates that standard reductions, and or deletions, have been applied to Crane's one time unique costs, and to Fallbrook's one time unique costs. What is the rationale for these reductions and deletions? Deletions applied to these costs have a reference to "overhead offsets". What are overhead offsets, how were they derived, and what is the rationale for using them?

Page 53: Indicates reductions/deletions applied to Crane's one time moving costs. What is the rationale for these reductions and deletions?

Page 56/57: Indicates reductions/deletions applied to Crane's and to Fallbrook's miscellaneous recurring costs. What is the rationale for these reductions and deletions? Deletions within this category of costs have a reference to "overhead offsets". What are overhead offsets, how were they derived, and what is the rationale for using them?

DCN: 11688

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

FALLBROOK

From: Shaver, Carl A [carl.shaver@navy.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 5:45 PM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
Cc: david.epstein@wso.whs.mil
Subject: MCPD FALLBROOK INPUT TO BRAC ANALYSTS
Attachments: INPUT TO BRAC ANALYSTS.doc; BRAC Financial Data FY01- FY05rev31.xls

1. The attachments are provided IAW your request:

<<INPUT TO BRAC ANALYSTS.doc>> <<BRAC Financial Data FY01- FY05rev31.xls>>

7/20/2005

INPUT TO BRAC ANALYSTS

It is recommended that the BRAC-05 proposal, TECH-0018B, to realign MCPD to Picatinny be cancelled because:

- **The current ability of MCPD to support ongoing operational needs of the warfighters in the GWOT and Homeland Defense will be adversely impacted**
 - **Rapid turnaround of requests for T&E support will be reduced, thereby degrading safety and munitions performance**
 - **The existing (established in 1975) west coast testing “Synergy”, associated with MCPD’s geographic location near warfighters and west coast test ranges, will be lost**

- **The Cobra model cost savings prediction of a \$2.7M per year is misleading since the actual return on investment (ROI) will be negative**
 - **Base Operating Support (BOS) Cost Savings will not be realized because the Fallbrook Weapons Station is not being closed**
 - **A 15% relocation cost savings generated by reducing both government and contractor personnel will not be realized since MCPD is at 6.5% overhead and any lost contractors must be replaced or the work load reduced**
 - **Operating travel costs to transport testing teams from MCPD’s location to and from test sites is real and cannot be ignored (estimated \$680K to/from Picatinny and west coast ranges)**

- **The BRAC proposal ignores MCPD’s T&E role**
 - **The proposal relocates gun and ammunition RD&A to Picatinny and realigns MCPD to Picatinny (although MCPD is an organization that performs ammunition Life-Cycle management T&E and performs no RD&A work for guns and ammunition).**
 - **MCPD’s charter to perform “independent” assessment will be lost and a “conflict of interest” will be created between acquisition (the Army buys for the Marine Corps) and assessment (MCPD tests weapon systems subsequently used by the Marine Corps)**

- **Realignment will result in a “brain-Drain” of organizational experience and expertise**
 - **It is estimated that only 15% of the current 110 government and 83 contractor personnel will relocate**
 - **Currently, government employees possess 1,694 years of government T&E experience, plus 675 years of prior military experience**
 - **A reduction in MCPD personnel will degrade the valuable linkage to Active Duty forces and the understanding of Marine Corps mission, structure, and doctrine**

**Marine Corps Programs Division
FY01 - FY05
Expenditures**

Fiscal Year	Labor	Travel	Contract	Material	Miscellaneous	Total
2001	\$14,559,682	\$686,827	\$6,959,279	\$753,648	\$643,962	\$23,603,398
2002	\$14,336,014	\$885,047	\$6,840,357	\$456,730	\$647,328	\$23,165,476
2003	\$14,152,671	\$606,809	\$7,357,263	\$373,508	\$798,024	\$23,288,275
2004	\$13,907,161	\$594,390	\$7,272,741	\$226,338	\$796,416	\$22,797,046
2005*	\$13,442,453	\$684,139	\$8,251,726	\$131,264	\$663,869	\$23,173,451
Totals	\$70,397,981	\$3,457,212	\$36,681,366	\$1,941,488	\$3,549,599	\$116,027,646

Miscellaneous category includes equipment and off-station expenses.

No single equipment or miscellaneous expenditure of \$100,000 or greater.

***FY05 Costs are projected.**

DCN: 11688
DARRELL E. ISSA

49TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

SUBCOMMITTEES

ENERGY AND RESOURCES - CHAIRMAN

FEDERAL WORKFORCE & AGENCY ORGANIZATION

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEES

INTVL TERRORISM & NONPROLIFERATION - VICE-CHAIRMAN

EUROPE & EMERGING THREATS

MIDDLE EAST & CENTRAL ASIA

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

SUBCOMMITTEES

COURTS, THE INTERNET & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY & CLAIMS

HOUSE POLICY COMMITTEE



Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-0549

July 07, 2005

WASHINGTON OFFICE:

211 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515

(202) 225 - 3906

FAX: (202) 225 - 3303

DISTRICT OFFICE:

1800 THIBODO ROAD, SUITE 310

VISTA, CA 92081

(760) 599 - 5000

FAX: (760) 599 - 1178

SOUTHWEST RIVERSIDE COUNTY

(909) 693 - 2447

www.issa.house.gov

Mr. David Epstein, GAO Analyst
The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street Ste. 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Epstein:

With respect, I strongly object to the approval of the recommendation to realign the Fallbrook, CA, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, known as Marine Corps Programs Department or "MCPD" to Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. I am a strong supporter of the BRAC process, even when assets in my Congressional district are at stake, but this recommendation does not achieve a significant cost savings even before detriment to mission is considered, and the detriment to the mission of MCPD is extreme.

If this recommendation is to be seriously entertained, several important questions must be answered first:

1. Currently, MCPD utilizes ordinance ranges located at Hawthorne, NV. and Twenty-Nine Palms, CA. If MCPD moves to Picatinny Arsenal, will it be able to continue to test at these ranges? Picatinny Arsenal does not have a mortar or artillery test range suitable to the mission of MCPD. If MCPD continues to test at its current ranges, it will incur great cost in travel and transportation which must be factored into any analysis of cost savings. Utilizing these ranges would also result in major delays of material arrival at the test location, as some required materials cannot be anticipated, or must be fabricated and then transported to the test site. Implementation of the recommendation could result in routine half or single day delays becoming 3 to 8 day delays. Such delays of regular operations would be unacceptable.
2. SECDEF BRAC Recommendations indicate that MCPD is being moved to Picatinny Arsenal to combine Research, Development and Acquisition Activities. MCPD does not perform any research, development or acquisition. MCPD only tests and evaluates that which has already been researched, developed and acquired. Was MCPD even intended for inclusion in the joint Research, Development and Acquisition command?
3. MCPD currently provides a facility for independent testing and evaluation of technologies researched, developed and acquired through Picatinny Arsenal. Because its mission, facilities and employees are separate from Picatinny, there is no possibility of influence on the outcome of testing and evaluation by those seeking to validate their own work. If MCPD is moved, will it be acceptable to dispose of the independence of those who test and evaluate technology from those who research, develop and acquire that technology?
4. An enormous drain of human resources would occur if MCPD left Fallbrook. Currently, the average employee at MCPD has more than 15 years of experience, excluding prior relevant

military experience. If the department is moved, it is anticipated that workers in the middle of their careers will likely seek employment in the southern California defense industry rather than choosing to relocate to New Jersey. The loss of these experienced employees could easily reduce MCPD from almost 1,700 man years of technical experience to less than half that number within the next five years. This loss of experience would be detrimental to performance of MCPD's mission.

5. This recommendation, if approved, is slated to provide 11.3 million dollars in annual cost savings after 14 years. The recommendation assumes that the same work can be done by 15% less government and contractor workers. The rationale is that MCPD is 15% administrative in nature, and that administrative work can be done by others at Picatinny. Only 6.5% of MCPD's Fallbrook employees are administrative, and therefore potential savings are overstated.
6. MCPD was specifically co-located with Marine Corps Camp Pendleton to provide its personnel access to work with Marines who serve in the field and make actual use of the technologies being tested. The Marines at Camp Pendleton have suffered the greatest number of casualties during operation Iraqi Freedom of any U.S. military installation and therefore have significant operational expertise and knowledge to share. This location provides MCPD access to the men and women whom, through the testing and evaluation of advanced technologies, they hope to provide the best chance for operational success and survivability. Is separation of MCPD from its clients an acceptable effect of the recommendation's implementation?

In conclusion, the cost savings for this recommendation have been overstated and even if they had not been, they would still be too insignificant to offset the detriment to mission that would be suffered at Marine Corps Program Department, Fallbrook. MCPD's employees are currently highly motivated, happy and successful in their mission. This is due in no small part to their proximity to Camp Pendleton. It is my ardent recommendation that this realignment not be carried out, as it would severely damage mission capability, devastate morale, would not achieve projected or significant cost savings and would erode the department's valuable independence.

I would like to underscore the fact that I do not object to this recommendation based solely on the negative impact to the base community. Instead, I object to this recommendation on the grounds that it would not be in the best interest of the United States armed services, either financially or militarily.

Thank you for your attention to this matter and for your earnest consideration of the questions I have raised in this letter.

Sincerely,



Darrell Issa
Member of Congress

DEI:jbf

DCN: 11688

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Epstein, David, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 4:05 PM
To: Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: FW: Fallbrook, California NSWDC Crane Command, July 15th Visit
Attachments: Final Letter to Commission RE MCPD Epstein.pdf

From: Franklin, John [mailto:John.Franklin@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 2:11 PM
To: 'Epstein, David, CIV, WSO-BRAC'
Subject: RE: Fallbrook, California NSWDC Crane Command, July 15th Visit

From: Epstein, David, CIV, WSO-BRAC [mailto:David.Epstein@wso.whs.mil]
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 2:08 PM
To: Franklin, John
Subject: RE: Fallbrook, California NSWDC Crane Command, July 15th Visit

xx

From: Franklin, John [mailto:John.Franklin@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, July 06, 2005 11:59 PM
To: 'David.Epstein@wso.whs.mil'; 'lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil'; 'christine.hill@wso.whs.mil'
Cc: 'sue.webster@navy.mil'; 'gregg.smith@navy.mil'; 'Ventuleth, Wayne E'
Subject: Fallbrook, California NSWDC Crane Command, July 15th Visit
Importance: High

Dear Ms. Hill, Mr. Epstein and Mr. Fairington:

As Congressman Issa finds significant disagreement with the Secretary of Defense with regard to his recommendation to realign the Fallbrook, California NSWDC Crane Command to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ, I am submitting the attached letter on his behalf to you for your consideration of his concerns. Additionally, I hope to participate in your visit to Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, Fallbrook Detachment, pending the approval of Ms. Hill.

I think you will find the arguments set forth in the letter we are submitting to be compelling and that the questions raised demand logical answers before the commission can proceed with consideration of the recommendation in question.

With sincere appreciation for your time and consideration,

JOHN B. FRANKLIN
LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT
OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN DARRELL ISSA
FORTY-NINTH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA
☎ (202) 225-3906
📠 (202) 225-3303 FAX
✉ JOHN.FRANKLIN@MAIL.HOUSE.GOV

7/20/2005

DCN: 11688

WWW.ISSA.HOUSE.GOV

DCN: 11688

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

FALL BROOK

From: Schonberger, James [jschonberger@egginc.com]
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 4:26 PM
To: 'lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil'; 'david.epstein@wso.whs.mil'
Cc: Dave Reece (dmreece@worldnet.att.net); 'Mike Gentile'
Subject: Add'l input for Fallbrook Visit
Attachments: BRAC Financial Data FY01- FY05rev31.xls; INPUT TO BRAC ANALYSTS-mcpd.doc

Gentlemen, we understand you have requested additional information during your visit at Fallbrook last Friday. Please see the attached documents.

Jim Schonberger
Business Relations Manager, EG&G Crane Operations
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane
Bldg 64, 300 Hwy 361
Crane, IN 47522
"Harnessing the Power of Technology for the Warfighter"
(812) 854-7077 x259
(812) 854-7152 (Fax)

7/19/2005

INPUT TO BRAC ANALYSTS

It is recommended that the BRAC-05 proposal to realign MCPD to Picatinny be cancelled because:

- **The current ability of MCPD to support ongoing operational needs of the warfighters in the GWOT and Homeland Defense will be adversely impacted**
 - **Rapid turnaround of requests for T&E support will be reduced, thereby degrading safety and munitions performance**
 - **The existing (established in 1975) west coast testing “Synergy”, associated with MCPD’s geographic location near warfighters and west coast test ranges, will be lost**

- **The Cobra model cost savings prediction of a \$2.7M per year is misleading since the actual return on investment (ROI) will be negative**
 - **Base Operating Support (BOS) Cost Savings will not be realized because the Fallbrook Weapons Station is not being closed**
 - **A 15% relocation cost savings generated by reducing both government and contractor personnel will not be realized since MCPD is at 6.5% overhead and any lost contractors must be replaced or the work load reduced**
 - **Operating travel costs to transport testing teams from MCPD’s location to and from test sites is real and cannot be ignored (estimated \$680K to/from Picatinny and west coast ranges)**

- **The BRAC proposal ignores MCPD’s T&E role**
 - **The proposal relocates gun and ammunition RD&A to Picatinny and realigns MCPD to Picatinny (although MCPD is an organization that performs ammunition Life-Cycle management T&E and performs no RD&A work for guns and ammunition).**
 - **MCPD’s charter to perform “independent” assessment will be lost and a “conflict of interest” will be created between acquisition (the Army buys for the Marine Corps) and assessment (MCPD tests weapon systems subsequently used by the Marine Corps)**

- **Realignment will result in a “brain-Drain” of organizational experience and expertise**
 - **It is estimated that only 15% of the current 110 government and 83 contractor personnel will relocate**
 - **Currently, government employees possess 1,694 years of government T&E experience, plus 675 years of prior military experience**
 - **A reduction in MCPD personnel will degrade the valuable linkage to Active Duty forces and the understanding of Marine Corps mission, structure, and doctrine**

**Marine Corps Programs Division
FY01 - FY05
Expenditures**

Fiscal Year	Labor	Travel	Contract	Material	Miscellaneous	Total
2001	\$14,559,682	\$686,827	\$6,959,279	\$753,648	\$643,962	\$23,603,398
2002	\$14,336,014	\$885,047	\$6,840,357	\$456,730	\$647,328	\$23,165,476
2003	\$14,152,671	\$606,809	\$7,357,263	\$373,508	\$798,024	\$23,288,275
2004	\$13,907,161	\$594,390	\$7,272,741	\$226,338	\$796,416	\$22,797,046
2005*	\$13,442,453	\$684,139	\$8,251,726	\$131,264	\$663,869	\$23,173,451
Totals	\$70,397,981	\$3,457,212	\$36,681,366	\$1,941,488	\$3,549,599	\$116,027,646

Miscellaneous category includes equipment and off-station expenses.

No single equipment or miscellaneous expenditure of \$100,000 or greater.

***FY05 Costs are projected.**

Name	Office	Phone	e-mail address
Lester C. Farrington	BRAC Commission	(703) 699-2914 (703) 699-2950	lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
David Epstein	BRAC/Navy	(703) 699-2947	david.epstein@wso.whs.mil
John Franklin	Legislative Assistant Office of Representative Darrell Issa		john.franklin@mail.house.gov
Don McKinney	Office of Representative Darrell Issa	(760) 599-5000	don.mckinney@mail.house.gov
Donald P. Schulte	Department Head Ordnance Engineering Department NSWC Crane Div	(812) 854-3418	donald.schulte@navy.mil
Phil Paule	Office of Representative Darrell Issa		phil.paule@mail.house.gov
Cass Bensberg	WPNSTA Seal Beach, CMD	(562) 626-7392	
John W. Mikel	NSWC Crane, Detachment Fallbrook	(760) 731-3560	john.mikel@navy.mil
Bob Repking	Branch Head NSWC Crane, Detachment Fallbrook MCPD	(760) 731-3691	robert.repking@navy.mil
Carl A. Shaver	NSWC Crane, Detachment Fallbrook MCPD	(760) 731-3668	carl.shaver@navy.mil
Wayne Ventuleth (brief)	Division Head NSWC Crane, Detachment Fallbrook MCPD	(760) 731-3689	wayne.ventuleth@navy.mil

clarification letter

Financial

works

BRAC 2005
Technical Joint Cross-Service Group (TJCSG)
Meeting Minutes of 2 March 2005

Dr. Segal chaired the meeting. The agenda is enclosed in attachment 1. The list of attendees is enclosed in attachment 2. Read ahead materials for the meeting are enclosed in attachment 3. The primary objective for the meeting was to review the 4 March 2005 TJCSG briefing to the ISG, and the consolidation of MDA and Chemical Biological Defense. The agenda topics are listed below in the order in which they were covered. The key points, decisions and action items from the meeting are as follows:

4 Mar 05 ISG Briefing Review – Mr. Shaffer

Key Points:

- The TJCSG reviewed the 4 March 2005 ISG Briefing and made various changes.
- Time did not permit discussion beyond chart #6 and time only permitted discussion of a portion of chart #6.

Decisions:

- The TJCSG directed Ms. Felix to update the briefing by COB today, 2 March 2005. The TJCSG decided to continue this review at tomorrow's, 3 March 2005, TJCSG Meeting.

MDA Consolidation – Mr. Shaffer

Key Points:

- The main issue is whether or not to move the Schriever piece of MDA to Redstone.
- The Schriever workload has 115 Government personnel and 1200 on-site contractors.

Decisions:

- The TJCSG decided to exclude moving Schriever from the consolidation of MDA at Redstone.

Chemical Biological Defense – Mr. Shaffer

Key Points:

- The TJCSG reviewed the rationale for TECH-0032.

March 2, 2005

BRAC FOUO

Decisions:

- TECH-0032 will remain as approved previously by the TJCSG.

Other Information:

- The next TJCSG Meeting will take place on Thursday, 3 March 2005, from 1400-1600 hrs EST, in the Pentagon, Rm 4E987.

Action Items:

1. Ms. Felix will update the 4 March 2005 ISG briefing by COB today, 2 March 2005.

Approved: _____


Mr. Al Shaffer
Executive Director
Technical Joint Cross Service Group

Attachments:

1. Outline -Agenda
2. List of Attendees
3. Read Ahead Materials

March 2, 2005

BRAC FOUO

Attachment 2
Technical JCSG Meeting
March 2, 2005
Attendees

Members:

Dr. Sega, Chairman
Mr. Matt Mleziva, Air Force Alternate for Mr. Blaise Durante
Mr. Brian Simmons, Army
Dr. Barry Dillon, Marines
Mr. Don DeYoung, Navy Alternate for RADM Jay Cohen

Other:

Mr. Al Shaffer, CIT Chairman
BG Fred Castle, OSD
Mr. Gary Strack, OSD
Mr. Andy Porth, OSD BRAC
Mr. Jerry Schiefer, OSD BRAC
Ms. Marie Felix, OSD
COL Bob Buckstad, OSD
Dr. Jim Short, OSD



Tech-0018A: W&A RDAT&E Integrated Center at Eglin

<p>Candidate Recommendation: Realign Hill Air Force Base, UT by relocating Weapons/Armaments In-Service Engineering Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation to Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Realign Fort Belvoir, VA by relocating Defense Threat Reduction Agency National Command Region conventional armament Research to Eglin Air Force Base, FL.</p>	
<p>Justification</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhance W&A life cycle / mission-related synergies • Multiple use of equipment/ facilities/ ranges/ people • Has one of the required ranges for W&A • Facilitates 1 closure (savings not in payback) 	<p>Military Value</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eglin has a higher military value in RDAT&E than Hill & DTRA
<p>Payback</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One-time cost: \$2.8M • Net implementation savings: \$3.0M • Annual recurring savings: \$1.5M • Payback time: 2 years • NPV (Savings) \$16.2M 	<p>Impacts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criteria 6: -68 jobs (35 direct, 33 indirect); <0.1% • Criteria 7: No issues • Criteria 8: Several issues but no impediments

Strategy
 COBRA
 Capacity Analysis / Data Verification
 MDRAP/ITERATIVE DOCUMENT
 JCSG/MIDep Recommended
 De-conflicted w/JCSG-
 FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY—DO NOT RELEASE UNDER E.O. 13526



Tech-0018B: W&A RD&A Guns and Ammunition Specialty Site at Picatinny Arsenal

<p>Candidate Recommendation (summary): Realign Guns & Ammo RD&A from Adelphi, MD; Indian Head, MD; Crane, IN; Dahlgren, VA; Louisville, KY; Fallbrook, CA; & China Lake, CA to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ; realign weapons packaging from Earle, NJ to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. Retain Over Water Gun Range at Dahlgren, VA.</p>	
<p>Justification</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhance Guns & Ammo jointness and synergy • Combine weapons packaging in Army & Navy • Ensure synergy with gun production capability • Maintain Navy unique capability for large caliber gun T&E; Retain existing Army test sites and major research site • Facilitates 5 closures (savings not in COBRA) 	<p>Military Value</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Picatinny has highest MV for guns/ammo in both Research and D&A
<p>Payback</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One-time cost: \$120M • Net implementation cost: \$83.9M • Annual recurring savings: \$11.6M • Payback time: 13 years • NPV(Savings) \$28.4M 	<p>Impacts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criteria 6: -11 to 506 jobs; <0.1% to 4.9% • Criteria 7: No issues • Criteria 8: No impediments

Strategy
 COBRA
 Capacity Analysis / Data Verification
 MDRAP/ITERATIVE DOCUMENT
 JCSG/MIDep Recommended
 De-conflicted w/JCSG-
 FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY—DO NOT RELEASE UNDER E.O. 13526

DCN: 11688

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

FALL BROOK

From: Shaver, Carl A [carl.shaver@navy.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 5:45 PM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
Cc: david.epstein@wso.whs.mil
Subject: MCPD FALLBROOK INPUT TO BRAC ANALYSTS
Attachments: INPUT TO BRAC ANALYSTS.doc; BRAC Financial Data FY01- FY05rev31.xls

1. The attachments are provided IAW your request:

<<INPUT TO BRAC ANALYSTS.doc>> <<BRAC Financial Data FY01- FY05rev31.xls>>

INPUT TO BRAC ANALYSTS

It is recommended that the BRAC-05 proposal, TECH-0018B, to realign MCPD to Picatinny be cancelled because:

- The current ability of MCPD to support ongoing operational needs of the warfighters in the GWOT and Homeland Defense will be adversely impacted
 - Rapid turnaround of requests for T&E support will be reduced, thereby degrading safety and munitions performance
 - The existing (established in 1975) west coast testing "Synergy", associated with MCPD's geographic location near warfighters and west coast test ranges, will be lost

- The Cobra model cost savings prediction of a \$2.7M per year is misleading since the actual return on investment (ROI) will be negative
 - Base Operating Support (BOS) Cost Savings will not be realized because the Fallbrook Weapons Station is not being closed
 - A 15% relocation cost savings generated by reducing both government and contractor personnel will not be realized since MCPD is at 6.5% overhead and any lost contractors must be replaced or the work load reduced
 - Operating travel costs to transport testing teams from MCPD's location to and from test sites is real and cannot be ignored (estimated \$680K to/from Picatinny and west coast ranges)

- The BRAC proposal ignores MCPD's T&E role
 - The proposal relocates gun and ammunition RD&A to Picatinny and realigns MCPD to Picatinny (although MCPD is an organization that performs ammunition Life-Cycle management T&E and performs no RD&A work for guns and ammunition).
 - MCPD's charter to perform "independent" assessment will be lost and a "conflict of interest" will be created between acquisition (the Army buys for the Marine Corps) and assessment (MCPD tests weapon systems subsequently used by the Marine Corps)

- Realignment will result in a "brain-Drain" of organizational experience and expertise
 - It is estimated that only 15% of the current 110 government and 83 contractor personnel will relocate
 - Currently, government employees possess 1,694 years of government T&E experience, plus 675 years of prior military experience
 - A reduction in MCPD personnel will degrade the valuable linkage to Active Duty forces and the understanding of Marine Corps mission, structure, and doctrine

DCN: 11688

DARRELL E. ISSA
49TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

SUBCOMMITTEES

ENERGY AND RESOURCES - CHAIRMAN

FEDERAL WORKFORCE & AGENCY ORGANIZATION

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEES

INTNL TERRORISM & NONPROLIFERATION - VICE CHAIRMAN

EUROPE & EMERGING THREATS

MIDDLE EAST & CENTRAL ASIA

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

SUBCOMMITTEES

COURTS, THE INTERNET & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY & CLAIMS

HOUSE POLICY COMMITTEE



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0549

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
211 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225 - 3906
FAX: (202) 225 - 3303

DISTRICT OFFICE:
1800 THIBODO ROAD, SUITE 310
VISTA, CA 92081
(760) 599 - 5000
FAX (760) 599 - 1178
SOUTHWEST RIVERSIDE COUNTY
(909) 693 - 2447
www.issa.house.gov

Testimony of the Honorable Darrell Issa, Member of Congress

Before the

Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission, Anthony Principi, Chairman

Los Angeles, California Regional Hearing

July 14, 2005

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission: I respectfully but strongly object to the approval of the recommendation to realign the Fallbrook, California, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, Indiana, known as Marine Corps Programs Department (MCPD) to Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. I am a strong supporter of the BRAC process, even when assets in my Congressional district are at stake, but this recommendation appears to be based upon a misclassification of MCPD as a research, development and acquisition command and further, does not achieve a significant cost savings even before detriment to its mission is considered, and the detriment to the mission of MCPD is extreme.

Before the approval of this recommendation can be seriously entertained, several important questions must be answered:

1. Currently, MCPD utilizes ordinance ranges located at Hawthorne, Nevada, and Twenty-Nine Palms, California. If MCPD moves to Picatinny Arsenal, will it be able to continue to test at these ranges?

Picatinny Arsenal does not have a mortar or artillery test range suitable to the mission of MCPD. If MCPD continues to test at its current ranges, it will incur great cost in travel and transportation which must be factored into any analysis of cost savings. Utilizing these ranges would also result in major delays of material arrival at the test location, as some required materials cannot be anticipated, or must be fabricated and then transported to the test site. Implementation of the recommendation could result in routine half or single day delays becoming 3 to 8 day delays. Such delays of regular operations would be unacceptable.

2. An enormous drain of human resources would occur if MCPD left Fallbrook. Currently, the average employee at MCPD has more than 15 years of experience, excluding prior relevant military experience. If the department is moved, it is anticipated that workers in the middle of their careers will likely seek employment in the southern California defense industry rather than choosing to relocate to New Jersey. The loss of these experienced employees could easily reduce MCPD from almost 1,700 man years of technical experience to less than half that number within the next five years. This loss of experience would be detrimental to performance of MCPD's mission. Can that loss be considered acceptable?

3. SECDEF BRAC Recommendations indicate that MCPD is being moved to Picatinny Arsenal to combine Research, Development and Acquisition Activities. MCPD does not perform any research, development or acquisition. MCPD only tests and evaluates that which has already been researched, developed and acquired. Was MCPD even intended for inclusion in the joint Research, Development and Acquisition command?
4. MCPD currently provides a facility for independent testing and evaluation of technologies researched, developed and acquired through Picatinny Arsenal. Because its mission, facilities and employees are separate from Picatinny, there is no possibility of influence on the outcome of testing and evaluation by those seeking to validate their own work. If MCPD is moved, will it be acceptable to dispose of the independence of those who test and evaluate technology from those who research, develop and acquire that technology?
5. This recommendation, if approved, is slated to provide 11.3 million dollars in annual cost savings after 14 years. The recommendation assumes that the same work can be done by 15% less government and contractor workers. The rationale is that MCPD is 15% administrative in nature, and that administrative work can be done by others at Picatinny. Only 6.5% of MCPD's Fallbrook employees are administrative, and therefore potential savings are overstated. In light of this fact, is this recommendation still cost effective, or does it actually have a net cost?
6. MCPD was specifically co-located with Marine Corps Camp Pendleton to provide its personnel access to work with Marines who serve in the field and make actual use of the technologies being tested. The Marines at Camp Pendleton have suffered the greatest number of casualties during operation Iraqi Freedom of any U.S. military installation and therefore have significant operational expertise and knowledge to share. This location provides MCPD access to the men and women whom, through the testing and evaluation of advanced technologies, they hope to provide the best chance for operational success and survivability. Do we want to move MCPD away from the Marines they are working to protect, considering that their proximity to their Marine customers is a valuable asset?

Finally, the cost savings for this recommendation have been overstated, and had they not been, they would still be nominal in comparison with the detriment to mission that would be suffered at Marine Corps Program Department, Fallbrook. MCPD's employees are currently highly motivated, happy and successful in their mission. This is due in no small part to their proximity to Camp Pendleton. It is my ardent recommendation that this realignment not be carried out, as it would severely damage mission capability, devastate morale, would not achieve projected or significant cost savings and would erode the department's valuable independence.

I would like to underscore the fact that I do not object to this recommendation based solely on the negative impact to the base community. Instead, I object to this recommendation on the grounds that it would not be in the best interest of the United States armed services, either financially or militarily.

I am confident that the Commission's commitment to the objective evaluation of the questions I have raised will result in its decision to maintain the presence of MCPD at Naval Weapons Station, Fallbrook, California.



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DARRELL ISSA
49TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

July 07, 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi, Chairman
The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street Ste. 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

Touy

With respect, I strongly object to the approval of the recommendation to realign the Fallbrook, CA, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, known as Marine Corps Programs Department or "MCPD" to Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. I am a strong supporter of the BRAC process, even when assets in my Congressional district are at stake, but this recommendation does not achieve a significant cost savings even before detriment to mission is considered, and the detriment to the mission of MCPD is extreme.

If this recommendation is to be seriously entertained, several important questions must be answered first:

1. Currently, MCPD utilizes ordinance ranges located at Hawthorne, NV. and Twenty-Nine Palms, CA. If MCPD moves to Picatinny Arsenal, will it be able to continue to test at these ranges? Picatinny Arsenal does not have a mortar or artillery test range suitable to the mission of MCPD. If MCPD continues to test at its current ranges, it will incur great cost in travel and transportation which must be factored into any analysis of cost savings. Utilizing these ranges would also result in major delays of material arrival at the test location, as some required materials cannot be anticipated, or must be fabricated and then transported to the test site. Implementation of the recommendation could result in routine half or single day delays becoming 3 to 8 day delays. Such delays of regular operations would be unacceptable.
2. SECDEF BRAC Recommendations indicate that MCPD is being moved to Picatinny Arsenal to combine Research, Development and Acquisition Activities. MCPD does not perform any research, development or acquisition. MCPD only tests and evaluates that which has already been researched, developed and acquired. Was MCPD even intended for inclusion in the joint Research, Development and Acquisition command?
3. MCPD currently provides a facility for independent testing and evaluation of technologies researched, developed and acquired through Picatinny Arsenal. Because its mission, facilities and employees are separate from Picatinny, there is no possibility of influence on the outcome of testing and evaluation by those seeking to validate their own work. If MCPD is moved, will it be acceptable to dispose of the independence of those who test and evaluate technology from those who research, develop and acquire that technology?
4. An enormous drain of human resources would occur if MCPD left Fallbrook. Currently, the average employee at MCPD has more than 15 years of experience, excluding prior relevant

military experience. If the department is moved, it is anticipated that workers in the middle of their careers will likely seek employment in the southern California defense industry rather than choosing to relocate to New Jersey. The loss of these experienced employees could easily reduce MCPD from almost 1,700 man years of technical experience to less than half that number within the next five years. This loss of experience would be detrimental to performance of MCPD's mission.

5. This recommendation, if approved, is slated to provide 11.3 million dollars in annual cost savings after 14 years. The recommendation assumes that the same work can be done by 15% less government and contractor workers. The rationale is that MCPD is 15% administrative in nature, and that administrative work can be done by others at Picatinny. Only 6.5% of MCPD's Fallbrook employees are administrative, and therefore potential savings are overstated.
6. MCPD was specifically co-located with Marine Corps Camp Pendleton to provide its personnel access to work with Marines who serve in the field and make actual use of the technologies being tested. The Marines at Camp Pendleton have suffered the greatest number of casualties during operation Iraqi Freedom of any U.S. military installation and therefore have significant operational expertise and knowledge to share. This location provides MCPD access to the men and women whom, through the testing and evaluation of advanced technologies, they hope to provide the best chance for operational success and survivability. Is separation of MCPD from its clients an acceptable effect of the recommendation's implementation?

In conclusion, the cost savings for this recommendation have been overstated and even if they had not been, they would still be too insignificant to offset the detriment to mission that would be suffered at Marine Corps Program Department, Fallbrook. MCPD's employees are currently highly motivated, happy and successful in their mission. This is due in no small part to their proximity to Camp Pendleton. It is my ardent recommendation that this realignment not be carried out, as it would severely damage mission capability, devastate morale, would not achieve projected or significant cost savings and would erode the department's valuable independence.

I would like to underscore the fact that I do not object to this recommendation based solely on the negative impact to the base community. Instead, I object to this recommendation on the grounds that it would not be in the best interest of the United States armed services, either financially or militarily.

Thank you for your attention to this matter and for your earnest consideration of the questions I have raised in this letter.

Sincerely,



Darrell Issa
Member of Congress

DEI:jbf

Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Detachment Fallbrook Comment:

The BRAC Military Value analysis and scoring of NSWC Detachment Fallbrook, Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) appears technically correct based on the criteria and methods used. MCPD scored highest in Weapons Technology T&E, and lowest in Weapons Technology D&A. However, the end results do not present an accurate account of how the operating forces (in particular the Marine Corps and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM)) will be negatively affected by the proposed relocation of MCPD to Picatinny Arsenal.

Discussion:

MCPD is a rather small (118 government employees + 83 contractors) dynamic organization that provides its customers with rapid response to serious issues affecting safety, reliability, and readiness. A 24- to 72-hour response time is the norm, and not the unusual.

MCPD provides customers (Marine Corps, Army, Navy, and SOCOM) with a unique combination of technical and operational experience/knowledgeable personnel that understand and relate to the operational forces and their combat fighting techniques. Eighty-seven of MCPD employees have tactical experience with the Services, and are recognized technical experts in their commodity.

MCPD is strategically located on the West Coast to allow for an optimum relationship with the warfighter (I MEF, etc.), and to provide close proximity to the operational training and test ranges at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Training Center (Twentynine Palms, California), Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (Bridgeport, California), and the Marine Corps Lance Corporal Carter Test Range (Hawthorne, Nevada). Through this Tester/Operator relationship, MCPD is able to provide rapid turn-around of pressing issues that have an immediate affect on the Global War on Terrorism.

The facts are that relocation from NSWC Detachment Fallbrook (presently within 3 miles of Camp Pendleton and I MEF) to Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey will have a serious impact on our troops fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations in the world. This negative impact will occur because of the loss of personnel, location, relationships, and West Coast testing advantages. It is estimated that only 15% of MCPD employees will relocate to Picatinny Arsenal. Just the loss of knowledge and experience would take years to replace through a priority hiring and training process, and it still would not address the synergy associated with West Coast testing. The loss of our West Coast location near test ranges and the deterioration of our relationships with the fighting forces will result in reduced effectiveness and efficiencies if performed from an East Coast location. MCPD will become just another engineering center incapable of truly relating to the warfighting needs of our service men.

To highlight the type of combat assessment issues MCPD resolves for the warfighter, we are attaching NSWC Crane letter 5400, Ser 409/5187 of 21 June 2005, which contains five specific Point Papers across different commodities.

Bottom Line:

DoD and the operating forces would be better served if NSWC Detachment Fallbrook were not relocated to Picatinny Arsenal. This would allow MCPD to continue to provide the Services with rapid turn-around quality responses, that incorporate operational assessment needs, to their safety and reliability concerns.



11688

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

CRANE DIVISION
NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER
300 HIGHWAY 361
CRANE INDIANA 47522-5001

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5400
Ser 409/5187
21 JUN '05

From: Commander, Crane Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center
To: BRAC-05 Representatives

Subj: POINT PAPERS

Encl: (1) MCPD Point Papers

1. The Point Papers provided in enclosure (1) demonstrate how the Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) and its own controlled and operated test range are optimally positioned on the West Coast. Our West Coast location enables MCPD to provide DOD, and in particular the U.S. Marine Corps, with timely and responsive support for planning, executing, and reporting on weapon systems assessment, developmental tests, operational tests, technology demonstrations, malfunction investigations, and associated engineering.

2. A unique combination of technical and operationally experienced/knowledgeable personnel, close geographic proximity to operating test ranges and Active Duty Operational Forces, and proven history of providing satisfied customers with high quality, rapid turn-around support make MCPD a key link in providing the warfighter with weapon systems and equipment in the highest possible state of readiness needed to conduct the Global War on Terrorism and provide for homeland defense.

3. Please direct any questions to Mr. Carl Shaver at DSN 873-3668, commercial (760) 731-3668, or email carl.shaver@navy.mil. Send correspondence to Marine Corps Programs Division (Code 40), NSWC Crane, Detachment Fallbrook, and 700 Ammunition Road, Fallbrook, CA 92028-3187.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "W. E. Ventuleth".

W. E. VENTULETH
By direction

DCN: 11688

MCPD Point Papers

Support for the Linear Demolition Charge Surveillance Quality Evaluation Program

Problem

The Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) has a critical requirement to ensure the long-term safety and reliability of existing M58 and M59 Series Linear Demolition Charge (LDC) assets. This requirement is fulfilled through complex functional surveillance testing and malfunction investigations. The quantity of explosive involved severely limits where functional testing of this item can be conducted, since the LDC—a unique brute-force weapon system—contains the unusually large amount of 1,750 pounds of explosives. The West Coast-located Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Center (MAGTFTC) at Twentynine Palms, California, is designated as a primary test site. Detailed planning and specific test range scheduling to accomplish safe, reliable, and timely LDC testing is an ongoing and demanding challenge.

Discussion

The Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) is tasked to meet the LDC test and evaluation requirements, as established by MARCORSYSCOM. This task is accomplished through an involved series of periodic test evolutions, where approximately \$2,000,000.00 in ammunition assets is expended per test.

Each LDC test evolution is a complex undertaking involving a series of approved steps to include coordination, liaison, scheduling, test setup, testing, and reporting. The following key organizational elements typically participate in LDC testing.

- MCPD provides personnel and test equipment for the LDC evaluation. MCPD is located at Fallbrook, California.
- First Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) is the organization that fires the LDCs for the test. The CEB is based at Camp Pendleton, California.
- Third Assault Amphibian Battalion is the unit that provides vehicles to tow the trailer-mounted LDC to the firing position. The battalion is located at Camp Pendleton, California.
- Base Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) platoon is the organization that performs failure diagnosis on unexploded LDC assets. The unit is based at Twentynine Palms, California.

- Center Magazine Area (CMA) is the main ammunition storage site where LDC weapon systems are stored. The site is located at Twentynine Palms, California.
- Range Scheduling/Control. This test support function is provided by Twentynine Palms, California.
- Base Safety. This test support function is provided by Twentynine Palms, California.
- Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group (TTECG). The group is located at Twentynine Palms, California.
- Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs (NREA) office. This function is located at Twentynine Palms.
- First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). The I MEF headquarters and operating forces are located at Camp Pendleton, California.
- Force Service Support Group (FSSG). FSSG (part of I MEF) is located at Camp Pendleton, California.
- First Marine Division (First Mar Div). This infantry division (part of I MEF) is located at Camp Pendleton, California.

A successful LDC test must be approved, coordinated, and executed with participation from all the above organizational elements and performed within the timeframe set forth by MARCORSSYSCOM. Each participating organizational element also has its own mission-related requirements that must be satisfied and constraints that it must operate within. LDC test evolutions represent only one of those requirements. In addition, the real-world requirements of active duty units involved in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) can create significant scheduling challenges.

Although the actual test should normally require about three weeks to accomplish, the entire evolution (planning, preparation, coordination, testing, etc.) generally requires approximately nine months. MCPD is the designated Test Coordinator throughout this entire evolution.

As in any complex endeavor, mistakes and miscommunications will occur no matter how carefully the endeavor is executed. The only viable solution is the quick discovery of each error followed by an equally prompt correction. For the discovery and correction process to be effective, the Test Coordinator (MCPD) must closely observe the pertinent administrative processes and must be in close communication with all the participating organizations. Accordingly, for necessary close observation and communication, a substantial amount of formal and informal contact in all of its various forms (telephone, e-mail, face-to-face meetings, etc.) must occur.

A complex endeavor, such as LDC testing, requires the close proximity of the MCPD coordinator to the participating organizations during the entire evolution in order to achieve the necessary observation and communication that is required for success. Since the participating organizations are all located in Southern California, the LDC Test Coordinator should also be based in the same location.

As an example of the synergy generated from the close geographic location of all organizations participating in an LDC test, in FY01, MCPD was tasked to carry out the largest and most complex LDC test evolution since the beginning of the LDC test program (over \$3,000,000.00 in ammunition assets were involved). This test evolution had many problems in spite of the careful planning and preparation that went into it. There were many instances where this entire test evolution was on the brink of failure. The evolution was saved from failure and completed successfully due to the quick identification of and response to the numerous problems that were encountered. This quick reaction was only possible because MCPD and other participating personnel were either on site or in the close proximity of the test ranges. Had MCPD, functioning as LDC Test Coordinator, been located on the East Coast rather than on the West Coast, it is highly unlikely that the test would have been completed successfully.

Recommendation

Retain MCPD at its current West Coast location so that the close working relationship that has been established with the West Coast operational forces and other participating DOD organizations can be maintained.

Point Paper

Optics and Non-Lethal T&E Support

Problem

The Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), Program Group Infantry Weapon Systems (PG-IWS), Program Manager Optics and Non-Lethal Systems (PG-ONS) has an identified requirement to correct existing issues with currently fielded Optics and to field a family of expanded capability Optics. These critical deficiencies were identified by Marine operational forces during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), specifically Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) I, II and III.

PM-ONS is working closely with the Marine Corps Operational Testing and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA) in order to expedite the fielding of the new Optics currently in the PM-ONS pipeline. Currently, there are over a dozen items preparing for fielding during the next year (prior to the GWOT, only one to three items were fielded per year). MCPD is involved because PM-ONS is not adequately staffed to create the detailed test plans, execute the comprehensive evaluations, execute the multiple vendor source selection Limited User Evaluations (LUE), collect the data, and prepare the evaluation reports required to conduct full fault analysis necessary for the complete fielding of a new system.

Discussion

MCPD is an irreplaceable member of the PM-ONS Optics T&E team. One of the main factors permitting MCPD to successfully support these efforts has been its ability to utilize resident organizational knowledge in Optics T&E to rapidly respond to PM-ONS emergent real world evaluation requirements dictated by the operational forces combat requirements. To support this effort, a Congressional plus-up in excess of \$800 million dollars was allocated during FY05 with additional plus-ups expected in out years.

A prime example of MCPD's Optics T&E ability was a recent emergency live-fire test on the AN/PVS-17 (nightsight) Scout Sniper Scope that PM-ONS requested in order to validate a possible solution to a known deficiency discovered during OIF II. The test was identified by BGEN Catto, Commanding General MARCORSYSCOM, as the most important MARCORSYSCOM effort at that time. MCPD was notified late on a Wednesday and executed the test on the following Tuesday. Upon notification on Wednesday evening, MCPD immediately started the planning process to support the test, and requested 20,000 rounds of ammunition, 12 night vision sights, and six M249 Machine Guns (MG).

The receipt of the six M249 MG weapons was only possible because MCPD is located within driving distance of the MCB Barstow, logistical facility. A detailed test plan was completed and vetted with PM-ONS. A temperate conditioning chamber was modified to allow firing from within the chamber at temperatures ranging from -40°F to +125°F. In addition, an automated remote firing device was modified to allow the use of the M249 MG. PM-ONS was very impressed with the MCPD professionalism that existed throughout the test.

The one factor that truly allowed this test to be a success was that MCPD has its own testing range at Hawthorne, Nevada where tests can be rapidly rescheduled in order to meet real world operational needs. Of interest, this test was originally planned to be conducted on the MARCORSSYSCOM Ordnance Test Facility (OTF) and, after 30 days of planning, it was determined that the test could still not be conducted within another 30 days. Since this AN/PVS-17 test, MCPD has been designated as PM-ONS sole field evaluation and testing agency.

A second AN/PVS-17 test was conducted during April 2005. Notification for this test was on a Friday and on the following Monday personnel were deployed to Hawthorne, Nevada to conduct the test starting on Tuesday. For this evaluation a new range was constructed and cleared because the original AN/PVS-17 test range was being used for a 120mm Mortar shoot.

Members of the PM-ONS staff have visited and participated in MCOTEA and other agency testing at other facilities around the country and consider the Hawthorne, Nevada facilities to be better suited to support Thermal weapon sight evaluation when compared to facilities at other CONUS and OCONUS locations due to its long field of views, varying terrain, and rich mix of targets.

During the next 30 days MCPD will support PM-ONS in the following efforts:

- Rifle Combat Optics (RCO) Source Selection, Hawthorne, Nevada, 27 June to 02 Jul 2005.
- Scout Sniper Day Scope (SSDS) Source Selection, MCB Quantico, Virginia, 06-11 July 2005.
- AN/PVS-17 validation firing, Hawthorne, Nevada, 13-17 July 2005.
- Medium Range Thermal Imager and Long Range Thermal Imager Source Selection, Hawthorne, Nevada, 18-29 July 2005.

The Rifle Combat Optics (RCO) AN/PVS-17 validation will be a full test consisting of over 250,000 rounds being fired from multiple weapon systems and multiple variations of the AN/PVS-17 sight. The RCO allows the Marine user to engage the enemy at much further distances than was ever possible in the past. Accordingly, the Marine Corps decided to procure one RCO for each USMC M16 and M4 in the inventory.

During May to June 2005, MCPD supported PM-ONS at three major events. During the rest of FY05, multiple other efforts are planned in support of the aggressive but manageable field plan being implemented by PM-ONS directly in support of the operational Marine Forces currently in combat.

It should be noted that during Hawthorne testing events, operational forces from MCB Pendleton, MCB Twentynine Palms, MCB Bridgeport, and Seals from the Naval Facilities at Coronado Island participate in the (LUEs) tests.

Recommendation

Retain MCPD at their current location so that the close working relationship that has been established with West Coast operational forces can be maintained. Additionally, the irreplaceable emergent and emergency use of the Hawthorne, Nevada test range is required to continue quick turnaround support of PM-ONS and Marine Operational Forces.

Point Paper

Ammunition Malfunctions

TOW IIB (Ground Version) and TOW IIA (Aviation Version)

Problem

MCPD is chartered to evaluate USMC reports of ammunition failures (malfunctions) and to provide a rapid turn around of recommended solutions.

Areas addressed are:

- Technical assessment of why the failure occurred
- Assessment of the safety and reliability of the item
- Recommended actions
- Impact to ammunition stockpile

Note: Actual firing malfunctions require immediate turn-around (a 24-hour solution is required in the event of death, serious injury, or an immediate safety concern. Otherwise a 72-hour deadline exists). Also, development of a solution generally dictates access to Active Duty Marine Units (e.g., interface with local I Marine Expeditionary Force [I MEF] expertise) in order to obtain first-hand details of problems encountered by the operators/gunners.

Discussion

TOW IIB (Ground Version)

Marine units firing the Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) IIB missiles (that down-fire when passing over the target) encountered several operational problems in-theater. While training in Kuwait, units experienced difficulty in acquiring targets (14 malfunctions out of 14 firings detonated prematurely or beyond the targets). MCPD was contacted and utilizing in-house ballistic test data and expertise (acquired on MCPD test ranges), immediate technical guidance was provided, through I MEF, on proper target engagement techniques (correcting user/operator sighting and firing techniques not previously experienced by Marines with limited TOW IIB missile training opportunities when firing this complex/expensive weapon system).

TOW IIA (Aviation Version)

Marine Air Wing units in Iraq raised concern over recent TOW IIA missiles that failed to capture (i.e., the system failed to track fired missiles in flight). Failures have occurred (rates are increasing) on missiles that have accumulated a large number of flight hours on the aircraft (i.e., exposed to extended "captive carry" time) when the missiles are subsequently fired from the COBRA helicopter "gunship" platforms.

Following repeated malfunction reports, an Engineering Investigation was initiated by NAVAIR, on behalf of the Marine Corps, to evaluate missile components that may be degrading with extended captive carry time. Missiles with high "captive carry hours" will be shipped to Twentynine Palms for assessment by MCPD.

The approach will be to perform a thorough visual inspection of the rounds, perform several non-destructive tests and diagnostics, and perform a functional firing test of the missiles. Tests will include participation by Active Force units and representatives.

The missiles will be fired from a verified ground platform or a fixed launcher (to take the aircraft out of the loop and thereby ensure that only the missiles are being evaluated). The live firings will be heavily instrumented to document missile track information, monitor wire commands, and record missile flight events. If performance concerns are identified during the firings, sample missiles may also be recommended for disassembly and component testing. Following MCPD tests, appropriate recommendations will be provided to resolve this critical weapon system performance issue.

Recommendation

Retain the MCPD capability to combine an experienced workforce in close proximity to the Operational Forces and test ranges to facilitate rapid resolution of malfunction issues directly impacting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Point Paper

Lightweight 155mm Howitzer

Problem

Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA) was chartered to conduct a Milestone C, or full rate product decision, for the Lightweight 155mm Howitzer (LW155). This high visibility program demanded timely reporting and detailed information. The duration of the test, over two months in time and firing over ten thousand rounds, resulted in the need for an automated data collection and reduction system coupled with logistic precision during execution.

Discussion

The Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) provided a turnkey operation in planning, executing, and reporting the LW155 Operational Test (OT). This included all analytical and logistical aspects of test planning and execution. MCPD used its expertise in artillery employment, and its knowledge of the OT process, to develop a firing matrix to collect all data needed to fully address the questions of Operational Effectiveness and Operational Suitability.

This firing matrix, when combined with other scheduling documents, provided the foundation for all logistical planning conducted by MCPD. The close proximity of MCPD to the ranges and Operating Forces provided for close and continuous coordination between the planning and executing agencies. This effort resulted in building working relationships that were able to adjust to unseen requirements during OT execution.

A data collection plan was overlaid on top of these documents. MCPD programmed automated data collection equipment to electronically collect the information needed to generate the report. The electronic nature of this information, coupled with databases built to reduce the data, resulted in rapid turnaround for this decision document. This effort resulted in a fielding decision for the LW155mm Howitzer, which will provide firepower for future conflicts as the fielding plan for the weapon system matures.

Recommendation

Retain the MCPD capability to combine an experienced OT workforce in close proximity to the Operation Forces and test ranges to facilitate rapid material acquisition of weapon systems supporting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Point Paper Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle

Problem

The Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA) is chartered to conduct a series of Operational Test (OT) events to support the development and acquisition of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). This high cost program is on-going and demands Department of Defense (DOD) Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) oversight. The level of planning and execution support needed to conduct this event is beyond the scope of the MCOTEA organizations to support.

Discussion

The Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) provides support to the EFV program and has co-located a planning element at MCOTEA to assist the customer in meeting the entire requirement placed on them by DOT&E to achieve an acceptable OT in terms of rigor and intensity. To date, MCPD has conducted two Operational Assessments and observed numerous small Developmental Test (DT) events. These were conducted to monitor the progress of this program and provide the program office with an independent assessment of the weapon system's growth.

The first two events focused on land mobility and gunnery. MCPD is currently working closely with the Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB) at Camp Pendleton, California to monitor the progress of the DT events. The close proximity of MCPD to the Pacific test ranges allows for smooth coordination between the DT agencies and its OT counterpart. MCPD has developed, and stores at Fallbrook Naval Weapon Station, the targets needed to complete the rigorous live-fire testing of the EFV weapon system. MCPD's location on the West Coast allows us to maintain and position targets as needed to support OT. MCPD developed the Range Safety Diagram for the EFV at its own (controlled and operated) test range in Hawthorne, Nevada. This site was selected when other DOD locations were not available due to higher precedence tests being conducted by their own service.

Recommendation

Retain the capability to combine an experienced OT workforce (MCPD) in close proximity to the Operation Forces and its own (MCPD-operated) test range to facilitate rapid material acquisition of this high visibility Acquisition Category I (ACT I) weapon system.

Point Paper

Aviation Command and Control Test and Evaluation of the Theater Battlefield Management Core System

Problem

The Marine Corps Operational Testing and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA), as part of a Joint ACT I program with DOD Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) oversight, was chartered to conduct a series of Operational Test (OT) events in support of a spiral acquisition strategy for the Theater Battlefield Management Core System (TBMCS). This demands on-going coordination with Joint and Marine Corps Operational and Testing communities.

Discussion

The Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) used resident organizational knowledge in aviation command and control to plan, execute, and provide a Marine Corps position report staffed through the MCOTEA chain of command to a Joint roll-up report. This required a continuous effort by MCPD personnel to coordinate with the Operational Force on the various employment aspects of this software to ensure their views were represented during Joint review and accreditation.

MCPD representatives were able to coordinate with local forces to communicate testing requirements and ensure the need for operational forces was clearly articulated during all phases of the planning process. These efforts have resulted in the fielding of a command and control product currently being used in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Additionally, this same expertise is forecast to support additional aviation command and control testing that will occur at Nellis AFB, NAS Fallon, NAWCWPNS China Lake, and MCAS Yuma, all of which are geographically supportable from the West Coast located MCPD.

Recommendation

Retain the capability to combine an experienced OT workforce (MCPD) in close proximity to the Operation Forces and test ranges to facilitate rapid material acquisition of weapon systems supporting the GWOT.

Point Paper C4I Support

Problem

The Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), Program Manager-Command, Control, Communications, Computers, & Intelligence (PM-C4I) has been working with the Office of Naval Research (ONR) to correct one of the critical deficiencies within the Naval Forces regarding the lack of ability to communicate effectively “On-The-Move (OTM)” and “Over-The-Horizon (OTH)”. Improvements in C4I capability directly or indirectly support all aspects of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Discussion

MCPD has established itself as an irreplaceable member of the ONR Communication evaluation team, based upon its resident organizational knowledge in Communication Systems, Command and Control, Data Collection, System Analysis and Integrated reporting. One of the main factors to MCPD success in supporting these C4I efforts has been its ability to rapidly respond to ONR’s emergent real-world evaluation requirements and effectively forge productive evaluation teams with multiple organizations. These organizations include, but are not limited to, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), the Marine Expeditionary Center (MEC), the Expeditionary Forces Development Command (EFDC), the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), and the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA).

In support of formal Milestone Decision Quality Reports, MCPD directly contributed to many C4I systems by conducting multiple system evaluations and system user surveys to gather and compile data used to assist in managing and improving various programs. These diverse programs included, but were not limited to, (1) the new USMC MARCORSYSCOM (MCSC) program of record standard Command and Control On-the-Move Network, Digital Over-the-Horizon Relay (CONDOR), (2) the MARCORSYSCOM Secure Wireless LAN (SWLAN) technology effort, and (3) the MCWL OTM Command Operations Center (OTMCOC). The majority of all ONR and MCSC formal reports on these systems were produced by MCPD.

In direct support of operational forces fighting in theater, in support of the GWOT, MCPD has developed/enhanced its already successful web-based “User Survey Tool” that allows the real-time gathering of data from the operational

forces. This enhancement, which was primarily funded by ONR, has been so highly received by its user audience (the operational customer) that there have been discussions of making it the standard automated data collection tool for the entire Marine Corps.

Supporting the GWOT at home, the MCPD web-based User Survey Tool has also allowed for the forming of an exciting Joint Industry and DOD effort to rapidly gather critical site data from priority Department of Homeland Security identified sites.

Recognizing that robots are critical to current and future weapon systems (in various applications, to include their OTM and OTH Command and Control), MCPD is involved in a joint effort with the Palos Verdes Institute of Technology (PVIT), a group that is being formed from the members of the Palos Verdes DARPA Challenge robotics competition team. Supporting members include Boeing, Honda, Toyota, UCLA, Palos Verdes High School, and many other large and easily recognizable organizations. Their DARPA Challenge robot has made it into the second round of competitors for this year's competition (reduced from 110 entries to 40 competitors). PVIT has been formed to rapidly assist in the conversion of useable combat technologies from the DARPA Challenge robotics test bed to the near-term deployment of viable weapon systems into the hands of the operational forces.

MCPD's location in Southern California is within 30 miles of MCTSSA, the Consulting and Engineering Next Generation Network (CENGEN) organization, and the Ocean Systems Engineering Corporation (OSEC). These are three of the key players (ONR communication field leads) in the development of the next generation of C4I and sensor technologies. MCPD's close geographic location to these three organizations provides a significant advantage in accomplishing timely and direct C4I-related project coordination.

Recommendation

Retain MCPD at its current location, so that the close working relationship that has been established with West Coast operational forces, industrial leaders, and other DOD organizations can be maintained.

Point Paper Special Warfare Support

Problem

Recommendations from the BRAC could reduce West Coast testing efforts, specifically Naval Special Warfare Command's (NAVSPECWARCOM, Coronado, CA), ability to quickly and adequately assess and evaluate the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) items of interest.

Discussion

NAVSPECWARCOM is in the process of being approved to act as a subordinate Operational Test Agency (OTA) under SOCOM's OTA capabilities, subject to SOCOM's review and approval. As one of SOCOM's components, NAVSPECWARCOM is concentrating their testing expertise on small arms, ammunition, Visual Augmentation Systems (VAS), and maritime capabilities. Their development and testing of the MK46 (5.56mm caliber) and MK48 (7.62mm caliber) Lightweight Machine Guns (LMG) resulted in acquiring and equipping their SEAL teams with these improved weapons. As a result of the success of SEAL units with those LMGs, the Rangers are in the process of acquiring and equipping their units with MK46s and MK48s.

NAVSPECWARCOM is the only SOCOM component located on the West Coast. There are several testing areas in the local Southern California (SoCal) area that NAVSPECWARCOM routinely uses for testing efforts: Camp Pendleton, La Posta (offers Korea like terrain), Niland (Desert Warfare Training Center), and San Clemente Island (maritime environment).

NAVSPECWARCOM has several valid reasons for testing at SoCal locations: familiarity with the area, experienced with the management practices at those locations, longer testing periods due to mild weather, and access to a supporting staff. Members of the NAVSPECWARCOM staff have visited and participated in SOCOM testing at other facilities around the country and consider SoCal facilities to be better situated than comparable facilities at other CONUS and OCONUS locations.

NAVSPECWARCOM is not adequately staffed to create the test plans, collect the data, and draft test reports. As a result, NAVSPECWARCOM contracts those services with the Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD). MCPD's first project with NAVSPECWARCOM was the operational assessment of the MK48 LMG. MCPD was chosen after NAVSPECWARCOM used another testing agency in testing the MK46 LMG and NAVSPECWARCOM was not satisfied

that adequate testing and reporting had occurred. MCPD has supported NAVSPECWARCOM with testing armor for their Ground Mobility Vehicles. The test report indicated that the armor (as tested) was better than what was currently available, yet did not meet certain key threshold conditions. The vendor has improved their product, successfully undergone further testing, and is now in the process of providing armor protection packages to SEAL and other SOCOM units currently engaged in the GWOT. Being in close proximity to NAVSPECWARCOM has facilitated MCPD's efforts to conduct joint site surveys and conduct face to face meetings in order to fully understand NAVSPECWARCOM's positions, requirements, methodologies, and determine common sense solutions.

SOCOM has also expressed a concern with the BRAC recommendation of moving MCPD to Picatinny, New Jersey. Through NAVSPECWARCOM and the MK48 LMG project, MCPD is currently working on the SOCOM Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR) project. SOCOM is pleased with the attention to detail that MCPD is providing to the SCAR project as well as the timely product submission and understanding of SOCOM's methodologies. They consider MCPD as an agency that provides timely, useful information that they can use to their benefit.

Recommendation

Retain MCPD at their current location, serving the interests of NAVSPECWARCOM and SOCOM.

Point Paper

Integrated Analytical Capability at MCPD

Problem

The realignment of MCPD according to BRAC proposal will significantly diminish the quality, efficiency and effectiveness necessary to perform integral services relating to the Service Life Prediction for the Life Cycle Management of ammunition and weapons systems. Such a movement directly impairs the gamut of MCPD customers, from the field Marine—dependent on highly reliable and safe ammunition, to the Program Manager of Ammunition (PM-AM) at Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM)—dependent on MCPD products as the fundamental building blocks to global inventory management and outyear plans and budgeting for the Marine Corps stockpile.

Discussion

MCPD analysts, comprised of statisticians and mathematicians, provide highly specialized, multi-faceted support to all engineering disciplines (functions) at MCPD, projects and final products. Successful cross-functionality between the engineers and analysts requires co-location to maintain continuity in product development with respect to test design, execution, analysis and reporting. Coupled with the cross-functional relationship between engineers and statisticians, is the readily accessible ammunition system expert advice from in-house technical teams regarding weapon design and functionality, quality control in acceptance testing, inventory management, malfunction and reclassification tasking, pre-positioning processes and multi-year corporate knowledge on the life cycle of ammunition systems. Fundamental to the accurate capture of ammunition service life for inventory, usage and budget forecasting is the application of appropriate test methods. The success of MCPD's specialized mission thrives on accessibility to testing and training facilities for the ballistic test and evaluation of ammunition and weapon systems, namely Hawthorne, Nevada; Camp Pendleton; and Twentynine Palms. These facilities provide end-user (Marine war fighter) and infrastructure (weapons and peripherals) support of live fire and user interface not afforded by laboratory environments, yet essential to the sound assessment of each ammunition and weapon system.

In effect, due to the accessibility of USMC testing and training facilities and the Hawthorne test ranges, a unique and mission critical synergy has formed with MCPD's engineering and analytical capability at Fallbrook. This synergy promotes a "hands on," interactive approach for increased reaction time to

problem-solving USMC stockpile management issues, as well as remarkable process advancements in rapid test execution, analyses and reporting. The capability to supplement and maintain vast databases of ballistic performance for benchmarking ammunition systems' reliability and quality against laboratory measurements differentiates MCPD above all other test and evaluation (T&E) facilities in the weapons assessment community. As a result, MCPD's reputation has attracted external organizations such as the Los Alamos National Laboratory and NSWC Corona for the advancement of scientific application in reliability modeling, due for journal publication in Spring 2006.

With the BRAC proposal for east coast realignment of T&E services and west coast location of operational units and ranges, the integrated analytical capability of MCPD will diminish due to the splintering of internal (engineering) services to conduct T&E with the Marine Corps Operations communities on the west coast:

- Delayed/reduced information and data transfer due to the distance barrier and inaccessibility to Marine Corps operations, proposed for west coast centralization
 - Loss of corporate expertise due to loss of key personnel on-site and with the organizational realignment
 - Reduced user-interface and Marine Corps weapons community interaction
 - Delayed product delivery due to insufficient test facilities, small and large caliber test ranges, inclement weather
 - Untimely delivery of key recommendations essential to the efficient and effective Life Cycle Management of Class V(W) ammunition and weapon systems will impair PM-AM's ability to project Marine Corps stockpile requirements for acquisition, maintenance and global positioning and formulate budgetary plans and forecasts.
-

Recommendation

Retain MCPD at NWS Fallbrook in close proximity to the Hawthorne test ranges, Camp Pendleton and Twentynine Palms to maintain the highly specialized, integrated analytical capability. Because T&E is core to MCPD's mission, proximity to the operational environment is inherent to the success of the war fighter and MCPD's ability to support the Global War on Terrorism and Homeland Defense.

Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Detachment Fallbrook Comment:

Relocating NSWC Detachment Fallbrook to Picatinny Arsenal, as proposed by BRAC Recommendation TECH-0018B, is not the optimal solution for DoD or the warfighter. Consideration should be given to either retaining MCPD at its present location (Fallbrook) and Command structure (Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane); or realigning MCPD with Naval Surface Warfare Center Corona, which performs an identical function of independent assessment across both technical and operational communities.

Discussion:

NSWC Detachment Fallbrook, known as the Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD), was set up to perform independent assessment of new/updated Marine Corps ammunition systems to ensure they meet specified operational requirements and to mitigate operational and safety risks to the warfighter. As part of this core responsibility, MCPD also provides DoD a quick response asset for independent evaluation of malfunctions or incidents dealing with munitions related issues.

BRAC Recommendation TECH-0018B proposes to "Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition" by realigning and relocating NSWC Detachment Fallbrook personnel to Picatinny Arsenal. Picatinny Arsenal is home to the Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command (ARDEC). ARDEC is the major acquisition command for both Army and Marine Corps munitions and weapon systems. Such a relocation/realignment will cause a conflict of interest between the acquisition function and the independent assessment function, which in turn, could lead to interoperability issues across DoD and a negative impact to the combat operator these munitions and weapon systems support.

MCPD is presently located within five miles of I MEF Headquarters at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton. This close proximity to the operating force allows MCPD to build synergy with the warfighter in better understanding his objectives and requirements, while at the same time providing independent assessments that streamline the acquisition process. Separation of MCPD from the operating forces will impact our ability to integrate our assessment to true battlefield conditions, increase the timeframe to respond to our customers, and negate our ability to effectively incorporate human engineering into our assessments.

MCPD is located aboard the Naval Weapons Station (NWS), Detachment Fallbrook. BRAC 2005 made no recommendations to "close" or "realign" NWS Detachment Fallbrook. The proposed relocation of MCPD to another site created no cost savings to BOS operations at NWS Detachment Fallbrook. Likewise, if MCPD were to stay located at NWS Detachment Fallbrook there would be no increase in operating costs.

Bottom Line:

DoD and the operating forces would be better served if NSWC Detachment Fallbrook was not realigned and relocated to Picatinny Arsenal. This would retain MCPD's independent assessment capability and the attendant efficiencies that go with it.

Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Detachment Fallbrook Comment:

BRAC scenarios TECH-0017 and TECH-0002D included a Fallbrook response that specifically addressed the T&E component as part of the realignment action to Picatinny Arsenal. However, the Technical JCSG recommendation did not address T&E. We are unsure if the recommendation intended to include RDA only, or if the recommendation intended to include both RDA and T&E.

Discussion:

BRAC scenarios TECH-0017 and TECH-0002D requested a response to “Realign NAVWPNSTA Fallbrook (N32893) Guns/Ammo RDA T&E and relocate to Picatinny Arsenal (ARDEC W4MKAA) and appropriate offices.” When NSWC Detachment Fallbrook responded to these BRAC scenarios, we did so knowing that all our work is classified as T&E. Nowhere in the BRAC data call was it asked to breakout the RDA work from the T&E work.

The BRAC Recommendation to “Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition” (TECH-0018B) is very specific in nature. Realignment for each identified activity states “by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.” There is no mention in the BRAC Recommendation of any T&E work being realigned to Picatinny Arsenal.

Evidence exists that suggest the BRAC Recommendation, as written without T&E, is correct. The Technical Joint Cross-Service Group Meeting Minutes of 2 March 2005 include a copy of a read ahead presentation given by the Technical JCSG Red Team on RDA T&E Facilities. In the candidate recommendation summary to realign Guns and Ammo to Picatinny, T&E is excluded, and the stated justification is to “maintain Navy unique capability for large caliber gun T&E” (at Dahlgren) and to “retain existing Army test sites.” NSWC Fallbrook performs T&E for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and SOCOM.

Our parent Command, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division has requested clarification from DoD as to whether or not T&E was included in this BRAC Recommendation. To date, we have not received a response.

Bottom Line:

NSWC Detachment Fallbrook performs T&E for the joint services and, therefore, its 118 employees should not have been included in the TECH-0018B realignment and relocation action to Picatinny Arsenal.

Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Detachment Fallbrook Comment:

BRAC 2005 Recommendations IND-0047 and IND-0053 proposed closing Hawthorne Army Ammunition Depot and relocating its' Storage and Demilitarization functions to Tooele Army Depot in Utah. No mention was made in the recommendation regarding the Marine Corps' Lance Corporal Carter Test Range which has an operating agreement with the U.S. Army and Hawthorne AAD to perform T&E for the joint Services.

Discussion:

The Lance Corporal Carter Test Range provides DoD with a full range of test capabilities that are not encumbered by encroachment, are FAA cleared, are fully environmentally compliant, and are not impeded by adverse weather. The Range supports DT, LUT, LAT ACTD, In-Service, and OT testing of weapons systems ranging from small arms through mortars, rockets, and artillery. Since FY01, the Range has averaged over 55 test events each year, and over 120,000 labor hours of testing per year.

The Lance Corporal Carter Test Range is instrumented to the point that test data can be collected by computerized equipment and analyzed the same day. Examples of instrumentation include radar tracking systems, environment condition chambers, video analysis cameras, and robotic range clearing equipment.

Because the Lance Corporal Carter Test Range is under government control, its' test priorities can be adjusted daily to support the needs of the warfighter. This could mean, an emergency Lot Acceptance Test to accept ammunition into the serviceable stockpile so that it can be flown to Iraq, or the malfunction investigation test to find the cause of a combat malfunction so as to declare the ammunition safe or unsafe for future use.

This test priority flexibility, together with the Marine Corps Programs Division's (MCPD) operational knowledge and experience, creates a team of experts capable of assessing/solving the Services most critical ammunition performance problems in a rapid fashion to maintain the highest state of combat readiness possible.

If the Lance Corporal Carter Test Range would be closed, the impact would be felt first by MCPD and then the warfighter. Without such a test capability, MCPD would be unable to provide the Services with rapid turn-around quality responses to their safety and reliability concerns. Concurrently, the warfighter would lose a valuable resource to assess the readiness of its' assets. The end result would be a higher risk of going into combat with inferior equipment.

BRAC 2005 Recommendations IND-0047 and IND-0053 never included the costs of moving or closing the Lance Corporal Carter Test Range. Both costs would be rather high, and would change the overall COBRA Model for payback on closing Hawthorne AAD.

Bottom Line:

A solution to maintaining the Lance Corporal Carter Test Range is needed in order to provide the necessary combat assessment support to MCPD and the warfighter.

Fallbrook

T+E activities + assessment

1/

part of Crown time -

80-85% are USMC activities
plus SOCOM

close to USMC / synergy

FALLBROOK

Most testing in Hawthorne, NV

XPG -

Hawthorne test range - rapid response force
for USMC

independent assessment for MCOTEA
rapid response
scope, gun bullet

product + commodities line in support of MCOTEA

118 people heavy

T+E ~~should~~^{is} done here ~~was part of~~ - Prentiss
does not do T+E - Rec.

110 civ
83 contractor

193

perform independent assessment for USMA

root cause analysis.

evaluate whether fix resolved problem

Procurement belongs to AT&E and doesn't do T+E

organizations under T+E

APG

XPG

need for west coast presence near USMC

USMC will suffer by some loss of intellectual capital

If part of Army Hqs ^{USMC} couldn't compete w/ Bis Open vs small USMC

M COTEA - Title 10 final acceptance.
CAT 1 programs

can't see cost savings since the detachment is leveraged off ~~the~~ Fallbrook -

rest of base still goes on Base will be here whatever happens

no cost savings — 15% of? When procurement does not have mem

15% of tests
 Quantico / Cherry Point
 80-85% of tests in West Coast
 * 50% of tests @ Hawthorne
 * * 8 people @ Hawthorne
 13 yrs payback
 2.7M per yr 2D revenues

Mountain Warfare center

lose 85% of expertise

2.7M Budget

all work that can be handled

* * draft rewording ^{of recommendations} + issue
 * total receipts over last 5 years
 (expenses)

* * "if we're going to be near warfighter,
 relevant to pentagon, Paris, etc or foreign
 will never get there"

DCN: 11688

BASE VISIT REPORT

NSWC CRANE, FALLBOOK DETACHMENT

July 15, 2005

LEAD COMMISSIONER: None

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER: None

COMMISSION STAFF: David Epstein/Navy, Lester Farrington/Cross-Service

LIST OF ATTENDEES: List Attached

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION:

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION:

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED: None, other than HQ building where meeting was held

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

- The proposed closure of the Army facility at Hawthorne, NV will make it more difficult and expensive to perform tests;
- Fallbook personnel described how they were notified that Marine Corps rifles appeared to be inaccurate. They performed tests on some rifle scopes flown in from Iraq, The testing confirmed the problem cited by the Marines, and agreed upon proposed modifications to the guns. There are currently legal proceedings against the contractor.
- Fallbrook was rated low in military value because their functions were inappropriately categorized by DOD and it was compared against organizations that were inherently different.
- Because of the mis-categorization, it was b\proposed to move Fallbrook to Picatinny despite the fact that Picatinny performs no T&E, and Fallbrook

performs no R&D, just T&E and in-service engineering. There is little or no synergy with Picatinny and Fallbrook enjoys good synergy with the warfighter.

- A principal reason for the Detachment's existence is its proximity to the Marines. Moving them to a location other than a place like Camp Pendleton or Camp LeJeune would destroy this synergy.
- The savings associated with moving Fallbrook to Picatinny was thoroughly flawed:
 - The COBRA savings associated with closing Fallbrook is greatly exaggerated because of the manner in which COBRA estimates savings associated with realignments and closures. In this case, COBRA credits the departure of the detachment's 114 employees with eliminating a sizeable portion of overhead costs because the detachment employs more than one-half of the base's approximately 200 employees. However, the primary mission of the base is the storage of hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition, so the savings would not be \$680 K per year which covers the cost of security, roads, building maintenance, etc. Rather there would be no BOS related savings. There would be a reduction at Fallbrook of a few thousand dollars to pay for similar size buildings elsewhere and a similar cost at the new location. Moving Fallbrook a few miles to the contiguous Camp Pendleton, with a comparable reduction in employment, would probably generate a larger inflated savings and would avert the brain drain.
 - The COBRA estimated savings was said to overstate actual savings, according to the Detachment, because ...
 -

INSTALLATION CONCERNS RAISED: The primary issue is brain drain (loss of intellectual capital). However, other concerns apply:

- Most of the employees will not move.
- NSWC Crane Fallbrook,

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED: There was no community meeting. See installation concerns identified during our meeting with the civilian management, described above.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT: N/A. The staff requested that

BRAC Report - Create an Integrated Weapons and Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition (Page TECH 19):

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realign the Fallbrook, CA, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Dahlgren, VA, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realign the Louisville, KY, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Indian Head, MD, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Earle, NJ, by relocating weapon and armament packaging Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Technical JCSG Analysis and Recommendations – Technical JCSG Report Vol. XII, Part IV (Page 44):

Justification: This recommendation realigns and consolidates those gun and ammunition facilities working in Weapons and Armaments (W&A) Research (R), Development & Acquisition (D&A). This realignment would result in a more robust joint center for gun and ammunition Research, Development & Acquisition at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. This location is already the greatest concentration of military value in gun and ammunition W&A RD&A.

Picatinny Arsenal is the center-of-mass for DoD's Research, Development & Acquisition of guns and ammunition, with a workload more than an order of magnitude greater than any other DoD facility in this area. It also is home to the DoD's Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition. Movement of all the Services' guns and ammunition work to Picatinny Arsenal will create a joint center of excellence and provide synergy in armament development for the near future and beyond, featuring a Joint Packaging, Handling, Shipping and Transportation (PHS&T) Center, particularly important in this current time of high demand for guns and ammunition by all the services. Technical facilities with lower quantitative military value are relocated to Picatinny Arsenal.

This recommendation includes Research, Development & Acquisition activities in the Army and Navy. It promotes jointness, enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise within the weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition community that currently resides at this DoD specialty location.

Clarification Needed on the Recommendation:

1. T&E Function and Sustainment Sub-function:

- The BRAC Recommendation in Section 2 beginning on page 19, indicates that only RD&A is associated with all 8 relocation and realignment actions. Additionally, in the "Technical Joint Cross Service Group Analyses and Recommendations (Volume XII) Part II, page 15", it states that "Weapons specialty sites at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ (small caliber gun RDAT&E); Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA (large caliber gun T&E and Ship Weapons Integration); and Indian Head, MD (energetic materials RDAT&E)." The noted exclusion of the large caliber gun T&E of Dahlgren reinforces that the BRAC Recommendation does not include T&E functions. Is this the correct intention? If so, NSWC Crane, Dahlgren, Indian Head and NSWC Det. Earle, Fallbrook and Louisville certified data for RDAT&E must be adjusted to reflect only RDA.
- On the recommendation for RDA Guns/Ammo to Picatinny appears to exclude T&E but includes Crane's certified numbers for entire RDAT&E piece of scenarios in the people relocating numbers. Fallbrook's function is T&E, yet it is listed as part of the move to Picatinny. The Range used is at Hawthorne which is listed as closing..."realigning storage and demil..." but it is silent on the test range.
- While not specifically mentioned in the recommendation, the COBRA data shows that personnel and equipment associated with Sustainment sub-function were deleted from the scenario [Per COBRA Input Data Report (Page 45), Footnotes for Screen Three - Indian Head to Picatinny reduced civilian position (less 3 sustainment) by 15% to 37.] If this is the intention, NSWC Crane, Dahlgren, Indian Head and NSWC Det. Earle, Fallbrook and Louisville certified data for Guns and Ammo must be adjusted to remove Guns and Ammo sustainment.

DARRELL E. ISSA

49TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEES

ENERGY AND RESOURCES - CHAIRMAN

FEDERAL WORKFORCE & AGENCY ORGANIZATION

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEES

INT'L TERRORISM & NONPROLIFERATION - VICE CHAIRMAN

EUROPE & EMERGING THREATS

MIDDLE EAST & CENTRAL ASIA

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

SUBCOMMITTEES

COURTS, THE INTERNET & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

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HOUSE POLICY COMMITTEE



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0549

WASHINGTON OFFICE:

211 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225 - 3906
FAX: (202) 225 - 3303

DISTRICT OFFICE:

1800 THIBODO ROAD, SUITE 310
VISTA, CA 92081
(760) 599 - 5000
FAX (760) 599 - 1178

SOUTHWEST RIVERSIDE COUNTY
(909) 693 - 2447

www.issa.house.gov

Testimony of the Honorable Darrell Issa, Member of Congress

Before the

Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission, Anthony Principi, Chairman

Los Angeles, California Regional Hearing

July 14, 2005

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission: I respectfully but strongly object to the approval of the recommendation to realign the Fallbrook, California, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, Indiana, known as Marine Corps Programs Department (MCPD) to Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. I am a strong supporter of the BRAC process, even when assets in my Congressional district are at stake, but this recommendation appears to be based upon a misclassification of MCPD as a research, development and acquisition command and further, does not achieve a significant cost savings even before detriment to its mission is considered, and the detriment to the mission of MCPD is extreme.

Before the approval of this recommendation can be seriously entertained, several important questions must be answered:

1. Currently, MCPD utilizes ordinance ranges located at Hawthorne, Nevada, and Twenty-Nine Palms, California. If MCPD moves to Picatinny Arsenal, will it be able to continue to test at these ranges?

Picatinny Arsenal does not have a mortar or artillery test range suitable to the mission of MCPD. If MCPD continues to test at its current ranges, it will incur great cost in travel and transportation which must be factored into any analysis of cost savings. Utilizing these ranges would also result in major delays of material arrival at the test location, as some required materials cannot be anticipated, or must be fabricated and then transported to the test site. Implementation of the recommendation could result in routine half or single day delays becoming 3 to 8 day delays. Such delays of regular operations would be unacceptable.

2. An enormous drain of human resources would occur if MCPD left Fallbrook. Currently, the average employee at MCPD has more than 15 years of experience, excluding prior relevant military experience. If the department is moved, it is anticipated that workers in the middle of their careers will likely seek employment in the southern California defense industry rather than choosing to relocate to New Jersey. The loss of these experienced employees could easily reduce MCPD from almost 1,700 man years of technical experience to less than half that number within the next five years. This loss of experience would be detrimental to performance of MCPD's mission. Can that loss be considered acceptable?

3. SECDEF BRAC Recommendations indicate that MCPD is being moved to Picatinny Arsenal to combine Research, Development and Acquisition Activities. MCPD does not perform any research, development or acquisition. MCPD only tests and evaluates that which has already been researched, developed and acquired. Was MCPD even intended for inclusion in the joint Research, Development and Acquisition command?
4. MCPD currently provides a facility for independent testing and evaluation of technologies researched, developed and acquired through Picatinny Arsenal. Because its mission, facilities and employees are separate from Picatinny, there is no possibility of influence on the outcome of testing and evaluation by those seeking to validate their own work. If MCPD is moved, will it be acceptable to dispose of the independence of those who test and evaluate technology from those who research, develop and acquire that technology?
5. This recommendation, if approved, is slated to provide 11.3 million dollars in annual cost savings after 14 years. The recommendation assumes that the same work can be done by 15% less government and contractor workers. The rationale is that MCPD is 15% administrative in nature, and that administrative work can be done by others at Picatinny. Only 6.5% of MCPD's Fallbrook employees are administrative, and therefore potential savings are overstated. In light of this fact, is this recommendation still cost effective, or does it actually have a net cost?
6. MCPD was specifically co-located with Marine Corps Camp Pendleton to provide its personnel access to work with Marines who serve in the field and make actual use of the technologies being tested. The Marines at Camp Pendleton have suffered the greatest number of casualties during operation Iraqi Freedom of any U.S. military installation and therefore have significant operational expertise and knowledge to share. This location provides MCPD access to the men and women whom, through the testing and evaluation of advanced technologies, they hope to provide the best chance for operational success and survivability. Do we want to move MCPD away from the Marines they are working to protect, considering that their proximity to their Marine customers is a valuable asset?

Finally, the cost savings for this recommendation have been overstated, and had they not been, they would still be nominal in comparison with the detriment to mission that would be suffered at Marine Corps Program Department, Fallbrook. MCPD's employees are currently highly motivated, happy and successful in their mission. This is due in no small part to their proximity to Camp Pendleton. It is my ardent recommendation that this realignment not be carried out, as it would severely damage mission capability, devastate morale, would not achieve projected or significant cost savings and would erode the department's valuable independence.

I would like to underscore the fact that I do not object to this recommendation based solely on the negative impact to the base community. Instead, I object to this recommendation on the grounds that it would not be in the best interest of the United States armed services, either financially or militarily.

I am confident that the Commission's commitment to the objective evaluation of the questions I have raised will result in its decision to maintain the presence of MCPD at Naval Weapons Station, Fallbrook, California.

Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Detachment Fallbrook Comment:

The BRAC Military Value analysis and scoring of NSWC Detachment Fallbrook, Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) appears technically correct based on the criteria and methods used. MCPD scored highest in Weapons Technology T&E, and lowest in Weapons Technology D&A. However, the end results do not present an accurate account of how the operating forces (in particular the Marine Corps and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM)) will be negatively affected by the proposed relocation of MCPD to Picatinny Arsenal.

Discussion:

MCPD is a rather small (118 government employees + 83 contractors) dynamic organization that provides its customers with rapid response to serious issues affecting safety, reliability, and readiness. A 24- to 72-hour response time is the norm, and not the unusual.

MCPD provides customers (Marine Corps, Army, Navy, and SOCOM) with a unique combination of technical and operational experience/knowledgeable personnel that understand and relate to the operational forces and their combat fighting techniques. Eighty-seven of MCPD employees have tactical experience with the Services, and are recognized technical experts in their commodity.

MCPD is strategically located on the West Coast to allow for an optimum relationship with the warfighter (I MEF, etc.), and to provide close proximity to the operational training and test ranges at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Training Center (Twentynine Palms, California), Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (Bridgeport, California), and the Marine Corps Lance Corporal Carter Test Range (Hawthorne, Nevada). Through this Tester/Operator relationship, MCPD is able to provide rapid turn-around of pressing issues that have an immediate affect on the Global War on Terrorism.

The facts are that relocation from NSWC Detachment Fallbrook (presently within 3 miles of Camp Pendleton and I MEF) to Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey will have a serious impact on our troops fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations in the world. This negative impact will occur because of the loss of personnel, location, relationships, and West Coast testing advantages. It is estimated that only 15% of MCPD employees will relocate to Picatinny Arsenal. Just the loss of knowledge and experience would take years to replace through a priority hiring and training process, and it still would not address the synergy associated with West Coast testing. The loss of our West Coast location near test ranges and the deterioration of our relationships with the fighting forces will result in reduced effectiveness and efficiencies if performed from an East Coast location. MCPD will become just another engineering center incapable of truly relating to the warfighting needs of our service men.

To highlight the type of combat assessment issues MCPD resolves for the warfighter, we are attaching NSWC Crane letter 5400, Ser 409/5187 of 21 June 2005, which contains five specific Point Papers across different commodities.

Bottom Line:

DoD and the operating forces would be better served if NSWC Detachment Fallbrook were not relocated to Picatinny Arsenal. This would allow MCPD to continue to provide the Services with rapid turn-around quality responses, that incorporate operational assessment needs, to their safety and reliability concerns.



SN: 11688

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

CRANE DIVISION
NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER
300 HIGHWAY 361
CRANE INDIANA 47522-5001

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5400

Ser 409/5187

21 JUN '05

From: Commander, Crane Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center
To: BRAC-05 Representatives

Subj: POINT PAPERS

Encl: (1) MCPD Point Papers

1. The Point Papers provided in enclosure (1) demonstrate how the Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) and its own controlled and operated test range are optimally positioned on the West Coast. Our West Coast location enables MCPD to provide DOD, and in particular the U.S. Marine Corps, with timely and responsive support for planning, executing, and reporting on weapon systems assessment, developmental tests, operational tests, technology demonstrations, malfunction investigations, and associated engineering.

2. A unique combination of technical and operationally experienced/knowledgeable personnel, close geographic proximity to operating test ranges and Active Duty Operational Forces, and proven history of providing satisfied customers with high quality, rapid turn-around support make MCPD a key link in providing the warfighter with weapon systems and equipment in the highest possible state of readiness needed to conduct the Global War on Terrorism and provide for homeland defense.

3. Please direct any questions to Mr. Carl Shaver at DSN 873-3668, commercial (760) 731-3668, or email carl.shaver@navy.mil. Send correspondence to Marine Corps Programs Division (Code 40), NSWC Crane, Detachment Fallbrook, and 700 Ammunition Road, Fallbrook, CA 92028-3187.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "W. E. Ventuleth".

W. E. VENTULETH
By direction

MCPD Point Papers

Support for the Linear Demolition Charge Surveillance Quality Evaluation Program

Problem

The Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) has a critical requirement to ensure the long-term safety and reliability of existing M58 and M59 Series Linear Demolition Charge (LDC) assets. This requirement is fulfilled through complex functional surveillance testing and malfunction investigations. The quantity of explosive involved severely limits where functional testing of this item can be conducted, since the LDC—a unique brute-force weapon system—contains the unusually large amount of 1,750 pounds of explosives. The West Coast-located Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Center (MAGTFTC) at Twentynine Palms, California, is designated as a primary test site. Detailed planning and specific test range scheduling to accomplish safe, reliable, and timely LDC testing is an ongoing and demanding challenge.

Discussion

The Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) is tasked to meet the LDC test and evaluation requirements, as established by MARCORSYSCOM. This task is accomplished through an involved series of periodic test evolutions, where approximately \$2,000,000.00 in ammunition assets is expended per test.

Each LDC test evolution is a complex undertaking involving a series of approved steps to include coordination, liaison, scheduling, test setup, testing, and reporting. The following key organizational elements typically participate in LDC testing.

- MCPD provides personnel and test equipment for the LDC evaluation. MCPD is located at Fallbrook, California.
- First Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) is the organization that fires the LDCs for the test. The CEB is based at Camp Pendleton, California.
- Third Assault Amphibian Battalion is the unit that provides vehicles to tow the trailer-mounted LDC to the firing position. The battalion is located at Camp Pendleton, California.
- Base Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) platoon is the organization that performs failure diagnosis on unexploded LDC assets. The unit is based at Twentynine Palms, California.

- Center Magazine Area (CMA) is the main ammunition storage site where LDC weapon systems are stored. The site is located at Twentynine Palms, California.
- Range Scheduling/Control. This test support function is provided by Twentynine Palms, California.
- Base Safety. This test support function is provided by Twentynine Palms, California.
- Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group (TTECG). The group is located at Twentynine Palms, California.
- Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs (NREA) office. This function is located at Twentynine Palms.
- First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). The I MEF headquarters and operating forces are located at Camp Pendleton, California.
- Force Service Support Group (FSSG). FSSG (part of I MEF) is located at Camp Pendleton, California.
- First Marine Division (First Mar Div). This infantry division (part of I MEF) is located at Camp Pendleton, California.

A successful LDC test must be approved, coordinated, and executed with participation from all the above organizational elements and performed within the timeframe set forth by MARCORSYSCOM. Each participating organizational element also has its own mission-related requirements that must be satisfied and constraints that it must operate within. LDC test evolutions represent only one of those requirements. In addition, the real-world requirements of active duty units involved in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) can create significant scheduling challenges.

Although the actual test should normally require about three weeks to accomplish, the entire evolution (planning, preparation, coordination, testing, etc.) generally requires approximately nine months. MCPD is the designated Test Coordinator throughout this entire evolution.

As in any complex endeavor, mistakes and miscommunications will occur no matter how carefully the endeavor is executed. The only viable solution is the quick discovery of each error followed by an equally prompt correction. For the discovery and correction process to be effective, the Test Coordinator (MCPD) must closely observe the pertinent administrative processes and must be in close communication with all the participating organizations. Accordingly, for necessary close observation and communication, a substantial amount of formal and informal contact in all of its various forms (telephone, e-mail, face-to-face meetings, etc.) must occur.

A complex endeavor, such as LDC testing, requires the close proximity of the MCPD coordinator to the participating organizations during the entire evolution in order to achieve the necessary observation and communication that is required for success. Since the participating organizations are all located in Southern California, the LDC Test Coordinator should also be based in the same location.

As an example of the synergy generated from the close geographic location of all organizations participating in an LDC test, in FY01, MCPD was tasked to carry out the largest and most complex LDC test evolution since the beginning of the LDC test program (over \$3,000,000.00 in ammunition assets were involved). This test evolution had many problems in spite of the careful planning and preparation that went into it. There were many instances where this entire test evolution was on the brink of failure. The evolution was saved from failure and completed successfully due to the quick identification of and response to the numerous problems that were encountered. This quick reaction was only possible because MCPD and other participating personnel were either on site or in the close proximity of the test ranges. Had MCPD, functioning as LDC Test Coordinator, been located on the East Coast rather than on the West Coast, it is highly unlikely that the test would have been completed successfully.

Recommendation

Retain MCPD at its current West Coast location so that the close working relationship that has been established with the West Coast operational forces and other participating DOD organizations can be maintained.

Point Paper

Optics and Non-Lethal T&E Support

Problem

The Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), Program Group Infantry Weapon Systems (PG-IWS), Program Manager Optics and Non-Lethal Systems (PG-ONS) has an identified requirement to correct existing issues with currently fielded Optics and to field a family of expanded capability Optics. These critical deficiencies were identified by Marine operational forces during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), specifically Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) I, II and III.

PM-ONS is working closely with the Marine Corps Operational Testing and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA) in order to expedite the fielding of the new Optics currently in the PM-ONS pipeline. Currently, there are over a dozen items preparing for fielding during the next year (prior to the GWOT, only one to three items were fielded per year). MCPD is involved because PM-ONS is not adequately staffed to create the detailed test plans, execute the comprehensive evaluations, execute the multiple vendor source selection Limited User Evaluations (LUE), collect the data, and prepare the evaluation reports required to conduct full fault analysis necessary for the complete fielding of a new system.

Discussion

MCPD is an irreplaceable member of the PM-ONS Optics T&E team. One of the main factors permitting MCPD to successfully support these efforts has been its ability to utilize resident organizational knowledge in Optics T&E to rapidly respond to PM-ONS emergent real world evaluation requirements dictated by the operational forces combat requirements. To support this effort, a Congressional plus-up in excess of \$800 million dollars was allocated during FY05 with additional plus-ups expected in out years.

A prime example of MCPD's Optics T&E ability was a recent emergency live-fire test on the AN/PVS-17 (nightsight) Scout Sniper Scope that PM-ONS requested in order to validate a possible solution to a known deficiency discovered during OIF II. The test was identified by BGEN Catto, Commanding General MARCORSYSCOM, as the most important MARCORSYSCOM effort at that time. MCPD was notified late on a Wednesday and executed the test on the following Tuesday. Upon notification on Wednesday evening, MCPD immediately started the planning process to support the test, and requested 20,000 rounds of ammunition, 12 night vision sights, and six M249 Machine Guns (MG).

The receipt of the six M249 MG weapons was only possible because MCPD is located within driving distance of the MCB Barstow, logistical facility. A detailed test plan was completed and vetted with PM-ONS. A temperate conditioning chamber was modified to allow firing from within the chamber at temperatures ranging from -40°F to +125°F. In addition, an automated remote firing device was modified to allow the use of the M249 MG. PM-ONS was very impressed with the MCPD professionalism that existed throughout the test.

The one factor that truly allowed this test to be a success was that MCPD has its own testing range at Hawthorne, Nevada where tests can be rapidly rescheduled in order to meet real world operational needs. Of interest, this test was originally planned to be conducted on the MARCORSSCOM Ordnance Test Facility (OTF) and, after 30 days of planning, it was determined that the test could still not be conducted within another 30 days. Since this AN/PVS-17 test, MCPD has been designated as PM-ONS sole field evaluation and testing agency.

A second AN/PVS-17 test was conducted during April 2005. Notification for this test was on a Friday and on the following Monday personnel were deployed to Hawthorne, Nevada to conduct the test starting on Tuesday. For this evaluation a new range was constructed and cleared because the original AN/PVS-17 test range was being used for a 120mm Mortar shoot.

Members of the PM-ONS staff have visited and participated in MCOTEA and other agency testing at other facilities around the country and consider the Hawthorne, Nevada facilities to be better suited to support Thermal weapon sight evaluation when compared to facilities at other CONUS and OCONUS locations due to its long field of views, varying terrain, and rich mix of targets.

During the next 30 days MCPD will support PM-ONS in the following efforts:

- Rifle Combat Optics (RCO) Source Selection, Hawthorne, Nevada, 27 June to 02 Jul 2005.
- Scout Sniper Day Scope (SSDS) Source Selection, MCB Quantico, Virginia, 06-11 July 2005.
- AN/PVS-17 validation firing, Hawthorne, Nevada, 13-17 July 2005.
- Medium Range Thermal Imager and Long Range Thermal Imager Source Selection, Hawthorne, Nevada, 18-29 July 2005.

The Rifle Combat Optics (RCO) AN/PVS-17 validation will be a full test consisting of over 250,000 rounds being fired from multiple weapon systems and multiple variations of the AN/PVS-17 sight. The RCO allows the Marine user to engage the enemy at much further distances than was ever possible in the past. Accordingly, the Marine Corps decided to procure one RCO for each USMC M16 and M4 in the inventory.

During May to June 2005, MCPD supported PM-ONS at three major events. During the rest of FY05, multiple other efforts are planned in support of the aggressive but manageable field plan being implemented by PM-ONS directly in support of the operational Marine Forces currently in combat.

It should be noted that during Hawthorne testing events, operational forces from MCB Pendleton, MCB Twentynine Palms, MCB Bridgeport, and Seals from the Naval Facilities at Coronado Island participate in the (LUEs) tests.

Recommendation

Retain MCPD at their current location so that the close working relationship that has been established with West Coast operational forces can be maintained. Additionally, the irreplaceable emergent and emergency use of the Hawthorne, Nevada test range is required to continue quick turnaround support of PM-ONS and Marine Operational Forces.

Point Paper

Ammunition Malfunctions

TOW IIB (Ground Version) and TOW IIA (Aviation Version)

Problem

MCPD is chartered to evaluate USMC reports of ammunition failures (malfunctions) and to provide a rapid turn around of recommended solutions. Areas addressed are:

- Technical assessment of why the failure occurred
- Assessment of the safety and reliability of the item
- Recommended actions
- Impact to ammunition stockpile

Note: Actual firing malfunctions require immediate turn-around (a 24-hour solution is required in the event of death, serious injury, or an immediate safety concern. Otherwise a 72-hour deadline exists). Also, development of a solution generally dictates access to Active Duty Marine Units (e.g., interface with local I Marine Expeditionary Force [I MEF] expertise) in order to obtain first-hand details of problems encountered by the operators/gunners.

Discussion

TOW IIB (Ground Version)

Marine units firing the Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) IIB missiles (that down-fire when passing over the target) encountered several operational problems in-theater. While training in Kuwait, units experienced difficulty in acquiring targets (14 malfunctions out of 14 firings detonated prematurely or beyond the targets). MCPD was contacted and utilizing in-house ballistic test data and expertise (acquired on MCPD test ranges), immediate technical guidance was provided, through I MEF, on proper target engagement techniques (correcting user/operator sighting and firing techniques not previously experienced by Marines with limited TOW IIB missile training opportunities when firing this complex/expensive weapon system).

TOW IIA (Aviation Version)

Marine Air Wing units in Iraq raised concern over recent TOW IIA missiles that failed to capture (i.e., the system failed to track fired missiles in flight). Failures have occurred (rates are increasing) on missiles that have accumulated a large number of flight hours on the aircraft (i.e., exposed to extended "captive carry" time) when the missiles are subsequently fired from the COBRA helicopter "gunship" platforms.

Following repeated malfunction reports, an Engineering Investigation was initiated by NAVAIR, on behalf of the Marine Corps, to evaluate missile components that may be degrading with extended captive carry time. Missiles with high "captive carry hours" will be shipped to Twentynine Palms for assessment by MCPD.

The approach will be to perform a thorough visual inspection of the rounds, perform several non-destructive tests and diagnostics, and perform a functional firing test of the missiles. Tests will include participation by Active Force units and representatives.

The missiles will be fired from a verified ground platform or a fixed launcher (to take the aircraft out of the loop and thereby ensure that only the missiles are being evaluated). The live firings will be heavily instrumented to document missile track information, monitor wire commands, and record missile flight events. If performance concerns are identified during the firings, sample missiles may also be recommended for disassembly and component testing. Following MCPD tests, appropriate recommendations will be provided to resolve this critical weapon system performance issue.

Recommendation

Retain the MCPD capability to combine an experienced workforce in close proximity to the Operational Forces and test ranges to facilitate rapid resolution of malfunction issues directly impacting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Point Paper Lightweight 155mm Howitzer

Problem

Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA) was chartered to conduct a Milestone C, or full rate product decision, for the Lightweight 155mm Howitzer (LW155). This high visibility program demanded timely reporting and detailed information. The duration of the test, over two months in time and firing over ten thousand rounds, resulted in the need for an automated data collection and reduction system coupled with logistic precision during execution.

Discussion

The Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) provided a turnkey operation in planning, executing, and reporting the LW155 Operational Test (OT). This included all analytical and logistical aspects of test planning and execution. MCPD used its expertise in artillery employment, and its knowledge of the OT process, to develop a firing matrix to collect all data needed to fully address the questions of Operational Effectiveness and Operational Suitability.

This firing matrix, when combined with other scheduling documents, provided the foundation for all logistical planning conducted by MCPD. The close proximity of MCPD to the ranges and Operating Forces provided for close and continuous coordination between the planning and executing agencies. This effort resulted in building working relationships that were able to adjust to unseen requirements during OT execution.

A data collection plan was overlaid on top of these documents. MCPD programmed automated data collection equipment to electronically collect the information needed to generate the report. The electronic nature of this information, coupled with databases built to reduce the data, resulted in rapid turnaround for this decision document. This effort resulted in a fielding decision for the LW155mm Howitzer, which will provide firepower for future conflicts as the fielding plan for the weapon system matures.

Recommendation

Retain the MCPD capability to combine an experienced OT workforce in close proximity to the Operation Forces and test ranges to facilitate rapid material acquisition of weapon systems supporting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Point Paper Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle

Problem

The Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA) is chartered to conduct a series of Operational Test (OT) events to support the development and acquisition of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). This high cost program is on-going and demands Department of Defense (DOD) Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) oversight. The level of planning and execution support needed to conduct this event is beyond the scope of the MCOTEA organizations to support.

Discussion

The Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) provides support to the EFV program and has co-located a planning element at MCOTEA to assist the customer in meeting the entire requirement placed on them by DOT&E to achieve an acceptable OT in terms of rigor and intensity. To date, MCPD has conducted two Operational Assessments and observed numerous small Developmental Test (DT) events. These were conducted to monitor the progress of this program and provide the program office with an independent assessment of the weapon system's growth.

The first two events focused on land mobility and gunnery. MCPD is currently working closely with the Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB) at Camp Pendleton, California to monitor the progress of the DT events. The close proximity of MCPD to the Pacific test ranges allows for smooth coordination between the DT agencies and its OT counterpart. MCPD has developed, and stores at Fallbrook Naval Weapon Station, the targets needed to complete the rigorous live-fire testing of the EFV weapon system. MCPD's location on the West Coast allows us to maintain and position targets as needed to support OT. MCPD developed the Range Safety Diagram for the EFV at its own (controlled and operated) test range in Hawthorne, Nevada. This site was selected when other DOD locations were not available due to higher precedence tests being conducted by their own service.

Recommendation

Retain the capability to combine an experienced OT workforce (MCPD) in close proximity to the Operation Forces and its own (MCPD-operated) test range to facilitate rapid material acquisition of this high visibility Acquisition Category I (ACT I) weapon system.

Point Paper

Aviation Command and Control Test and Evaluation of the Theater Battlefield Management Core System

Problem

The Marine Corps Operational Testing and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA), as part of a Joint ACT I program with DOD Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) oversight, was chartered to conduct a series of Operational Test (OT) events in support of a spiral acquisition strategy for the Theater Battlefield Management Core System (TBMCS). This demands on-going coordination with Joint and Marine Corps Operational and Testing communities.

Discussion

The Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) used resident organizational knowledge in aviation command and control to plan, execute, and provide a Marine Corps position report staffed through the MCOTEA chain of command to a Joint roll-up report. This required a continuous effort by MCPD personnel to coordinate with the Operational Force on the various employment aspects of this software to ensure their views were represented during Joint review and accreditation.

MCPD representatives were able to coordinate with local forces to communicate testing requirements and ensure the need for operational forces was clearly articulated during all phases of the planning process. These efforts have resulted in the fielding of a command and control product currently being used in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Additionally, this same expertise is forecast to support additional aviation command and control testing that will occur at Nellis AFB, NAS Fallon, NAWCWPNS China Lake, and MCAS Yuma, all of which are geographically supportable from the West Coast located MCPD.

Recommendation

Retain the capability to combine an experienced OT workforce (MCPD) in close proximity to the Operation Forces and test ranges to facilitate rapid material acquisition of weapon systems supporting the GWOT.

Point Paper C4I Support

Problem

The Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), Program Manager-Command, Control, Communications, Computers, & Intelligence (PM-C4I) has been working with the Office of Naval Research (ONR) to correct one of the critical deficiencies within the Naval Forces regarding the lack of ability to communicate effectively "On-The-Move (OTM)" and "Over-The-Horizon (OTH)". Improvements in C4I capability directly or indirectly support all aspects of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Discussion

MCPD has established itself as an irreplaceable member of the ONR Communication evaluation team, based upon its resident organizational knowledge in Communication Systems, Command and Control, Data Collection, System Analysis and Integrated reporting. One of the main factors to MCPD success in supporting these C4I efforts has been its ability to rapidly respond to ONR's emergent real-world evaluation requirements and effectively forge productive evaluation teams with multiple organizations. These organizations include, but are not limited to, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), the Marine Expeditionary Center (MEC), the Expeditionary Forces Development Command (EFDC), the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), and the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA).

In support of formal Milestone Decision Quality Reports, MCPD directly contributed to many C4I systems by conducting multiple system evaluations and system user surveys to gather and compile data used to assist in managing and improving various programs. These diverse programs included, but were not limited to, (1) the new USMC MARCORSYSCOM (MCSC) program of record standard Command and Control On-the-Move Network, Digital Over-the-Horizon Relay (CONDOR), (2) the MARCORSYSCOM Secure Wireless LAN (SWLAN) technology effort, and (3) the MCWL OTM Command Operations Center (OTMCOC). The majority of all ONR and MCSC formal reports on these systems were produced by MCPD.

In direct support of operational forces fighting in theater, in support of the GWOT, MCPD has developed/enhanced its already successful web-based "User Survey Tool" that allows the real-time gathering of data from the operational

forces. This enhancement, which was primarily funded by ONR, has been so highly received by its user audience (the operational customer) that there have been discussions of making it the standard automated data collection tool for the entire Marine Corps.

Supporting the GWOT at home, the MCPD web-based User Survey Tool has also allowed for the forming of an exciting Joint Industry and DOD effort to rapidly gather critical site data from priority Department of Homeland Security identified sites.

Recognizing that robots are critical to current and future weapon systems (in various applications, to include their OTM and OTH Command and Control), MCPD is involved in a joint effort with the Palos Verdes Institute of Technology (PVIT), a group that is being formed from the members of the Palos Verdes DARPA Challenge robotics competition team. Supporting members include Boeing, Honda, Toyota, UCLA, Palos Verdes High School, and many other large and easily recognizable organizations. Their DARPA Challenge robot has made it into the second round of competitors for this year's competition (reduced from 110 entries to 40 competitors). PVIT has been formed to rapidly assist in the conversion of useable combat technologies from the DARPA Challenge robotics test bed to the near-term deployment of viable weapon systems into the hands of the operational forces.

MCPD's location in Southern California is within 30 miles of MCTSSA, the Consulting and Engineering Next Generation Network (CENGEN) organization, and the Ocean Systems Engineering Corporation (OSEC). These are three of the key players (ONR communication field leads) in the development of the next generation of C4I and sensor technologies. MCPD's close geographic location to these three organizations provides a significant advantage in accomplishing timely and direct C4I-related project coordination.

Recommendation

Retain MCPD at its current location, so that the close working relationship that has been established with West Coast operational forces, industrial leaders, and other DOD organizations can be maintained.

Point Paper Special Warfare Support

Problem

Recommendations from the BRAC could reduce West Coast testing efforts, specifically Naval Special Warfare Command's (NAVSPECWARCOM, Coronado, CA), ability to quickly and adequately assess and evaluate the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) items of interest.

Discussion

NAVSPECWARCOM is in the process of being approved to act as a subordinate Operational Test Agency (OTA) under SOCOM's OTA capabilities, subject to SOCOM's review and approval. As one of SOCOM's components, NAVSPECWARCOM is concentrating their testing expertise on small arms, ammunition, Visual Augmentation Systems (VAS), and maritime capabilities. Their development and testing of the MK46 (5.56mm caliber) and MK48 (7.62mm caliber) Lightweight Machine Guns (LMG) resulted in acquiring and equipping their SEAL teams with these improved weapons. As a result of the success of SEAL units with those LMGs, the Rangers are in the process of acquiring and equipping their units with MK46s and MK48s.

NAVSPECWARCOM is the only SOCOM component located on the West Coast. There are several testing areas in the local Southern California (SoCal) area that NAVSPECWARCOM routinely uses for testing efforts: Camp Pendleton, La Posta (offers Korea like terrain), Niland (Desert Warfare Training Center), and San Clemente Island (maritime environment).

NAVSPECWARCOM has several valid reasons for testing at SoCal locations: familiarity with the area, experienced with the management practices at those locations, longer testing periods due to mild weather, and access to a supporting staff. Members of the NAVSPECWARCOM staff have visited and participated in SOCOM testing at other facilities around the country and consider SoCal facilities to be better situated than comparable facilities at other CONUS and OCONUS locations.

NAVSPECWARCOM is not adequately staffed to create the test plans, collect the data, and draft test reports. As a result, NAVSPECWARCOM contracts those services with the Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD). MCPD's first project with NAVSPECWARCOM was the operational assessment of the MK48 LMG. MCPD was chosen after NAVSPECWARCOM used another testing agency in testing the MK46 LMG and NAVSPECWARCOM was not satisfied

that adequate testing and reporting had occurred. MCPD has supported NAVSPECWARCOM with testing armor for their Ground Mobility Vehicles. The test report indicated that the armor (as tested) was better than what was currently available, yet did not meet certain key threshold conditions. The vendor has improved their product, successfully undergone further testing, and is now in the process of providing armor protection packages to SEAL and other SOCOM units currently engaged in the GWOT. Being in close proximity to NAVSPECWARCOM has facilitated MCPD's efforts to conduct joint site surveys and conduct face to face meetings in order to fully understand NAVSPECWARCOM's positions, requirements, methodologies, and determine common sense solutions.

SOCOM has also expressed a concern with the BRAC recommendation of moving MCPD to Picatinny, New Jersey. Through NAVSPECWARCOM and the MK48 LMG project, MCPD is currently working on the SOCOM Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR) project. SOCOM is pleased with the attention to detail that MCPD is providing to the SCAR project as well as the timely product submission and understanding of SOCOM's methodologies. They consider MCPD as an agency that provides timely, useful information that they can use to their benefit.

Recommendation

Retain MCPD at their current location, serving the interests of NAVSPECWARCOM and SOCOM.

Point Paper

Integrated Analytical Capability at MCPD

Problem

The realignment of MCPD according to BRAC proposal will significantly diminish the quality, efficiency and effectiveness necessary to perform integral services relating to the Service Life Prediction for the Life Cycle Management of ammunition and weapons systems. Such a movement directly impairs the gamut of MCPD customers, from the field Marine—dependent on highly reliable and safe ammunition, to the Program Manager of Ammunition (PM-AM) at Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM)—dependent on MCPD products as the fundamental building blocks to global inventory management and outyear plans and budgeting for the Marine Corps stockpile.

Discussion

MCPD analysts, comprised of statisticians and mathematicians, provide highly specialized, multi-faceted support to all engineering disciplines (functions) at MCPD, projects and final products. Successful cross-functionality between the engineers and analysts requires co-location to maintain continuity in product development with respect to test design, execution, analysis and reporting. Coupled with the cross-functional relationship between engineers and statisticians, is the readily accessible ammunition system expert advice from in-house technical teams regarding weapon design and functionality, quality control in acceptance testing, inventory management, malfunction and reclassification tasking, pre-positioning processes and multi-year corporate knowledge on the life cycle of ammunition systems. Fundamental to the accurate capture of ammunition service life for inventory, usage and budget forecasting is the application of appropriate test methods. The success of MCPD's specialized mission thrives on accessibility to testing and training facilities for the ballistic test and evaluation of ammunition and weapon systems, namely Hawthorne, Nevada; Camp Pendleton; and Twentynine Palms. These facilities provide end-user (Marine war fighter) and infrastructure (weapons and peripherals) support of live fire and user interface not afforded by laboratory environments, yet essential to the sound assessment of each ammunition and weapon system.

In effect, due to the accessibility of USMC testing and training facilities and the Hawthorne test ranges, a unique and mission critical synergy has formed with MCPD's engineering and analytical capability at Fallbrook. This synergy promotes a "hands on," interactive approach for increased reaction time to

problem-solving USMC stockpile management issues, as well as remarkable process advancements in rapid test execution, analyses and reporting. The capability to supplement and maintain vast databases of ballistic performance for benchmarking ammunition systems' reliability and quality against laboratory measurements differentiates MCPD above all other test and evaluation (T&E) facilities in the weapons assessment community. As a result, MCPD's reputation has attracted external organizations such as the Los Alamos National Laboratory and NSWC Corona for the advancement of scientific application in reliability modeling, due for journal publication in Spring 2006.

With the BRAC proposal for east coast realignment of T&E services and west coast location of operational units and ranges, the integrated analytical capability of MCPD will diminish due to the splintering of internal (engineering) services to conduct T&E with the Marine Corps Operations communities on the west coast:

- Delayed/reduced information and data transfer due to the distance barrier and inaccessibility to Marine Corps operations, proposed for west coast centralization
 - Loss of corporate expertise due to loss of key personnel on-site and with the organizational realignment
 - Reduced user-interface and Marine Corps weapons community interaction
 - Delayed product delivery due to insufficient test facilities, small and large caliber test ranges, inclement weather
 - Untimely delivery of key recommendations essential to the efficient and effective Life Cycle Management of Class V(W) ammunition and weapon systems will impair PM-AM's ability to project Marine Corps stockpile requirements for acquisition, maintenance and global positioning and formulate budgetary plans and forecasts.
-

Recommendation

Retain MCPD at NWS Fallbrook in close proximity to the Hawthorne test ranges, Camp Pendleton and Twentynine Palms to maintain the highly specialized, integrated analytical capability. Because T&E is core to MCPD's mission, proximity to the operational environment is inherent to the success of the war fighter and MCPD's ability to support the Global War on Terrorism and Homeland Defense.

Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Detachment Fallbrook Comment:

Relocating NSWC Detachment Fallbrook to Picatinny Arsenal, as proposed by BRAC Recommendation TECH-0018B, is not the optimal solution for DoD or the warfighter. Consideration should be given to either retaining MCPD at its present location (Fallbrook) and Command structure (Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane); or realigning MCPD with Naval Surface Warfare Center Corona, which performs an identical function of independent assessment across both technical and operational communities.

Discussion:

NSWC Detachment Fallbrook, known as the Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD), was set up to perform independent assessment of new/updated Marine Corps ammunition systems to ensure they meet specified operational requirements and to mitigate operational and safety risks to the warfighter. As part of this core responsibility, MCPD also provides DoD a quick response asset for independent evaluation of malfunctions or incidents dealing with munitions related issues.

BRAC Recommendation TECH-0018B proposes to "Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition" by realigning and relocating NSWC Detachment Fallbrook personnel to Picatinny Arsenal. Picatinny Arsenal is home to the Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command (ARDEC). ARDEC is the major acquisition command for both Army and Marine Corps munitions and weapon systems. Such a relocation/realignment will cause a conflict of interest between the acquisition function and the independent assessment function, which in turn, could lead to interoperability issues across DoD and a negative impact to the combat operator these munitions and weapon systems support.

MCPD is presently located within five miles of I MEF Headquarters at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton. This close proximity to the operating force allows MCPD to build synergy with the warfighter in better understanding his objectives and requirements, while at the same time providing independent assessments that streamline the acquisition process. Separation of MCPD from the operating forces will impact our ability to integrate our assessment to true battlefield conditions, increase the timeframe to respond to our customers, and negate our ability to effectively incorporate human engineering into our assessments.

MCPD is located aboard the Naval Weapons Station (NWS), Detachment Fallbrook. BRAC 2005 made no recommendations to "close" or "realign" NWS Detachment Fallbrook. The proposed relocation of MCPD to another site created no cost savings to BOS operations at NWS Detachment Fallbrook. Likewise, if MCPD were to stay located at NWS Detachment Fallbrook there would be no increase in operating costs.

Bottom Line:

DoD and the operating forces would be better served if NSWC Detachment Fallbrook was not realigned and relocated to Picatinny Arsenal. This would retain MCPD's independent assessment capability and the attendant efficiencies that go with it.

Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Detachment Fallbrook Comment:

BRAC scenarios TECH-0017 and TECH-0002D included a Fallbrook response that specifically addressed the T&E component as part of the realignment action to Picatinny Arsenal. However, the Technical JCSG recommendation did not address T&E. We are unsure if the recommendation intended to include RDA only, or if the recommendation intended to include both RDA and T&E.

Discussion:

BRAC scenarios TECH-0017 and TECH-0002D requested a response to “Realign NAVWPNSTA Fallbrook (N32893) Guns/Ammo RDAT&E and relocate to Picatinny Arsenal (ARDEC W4MKAA) and appropriate offices.” When NSWC Detachment Fallbrook responded to these BRAC scenarios, we did so knowing that all our work is classified as T&E. Nowhere in the BRAC data call was it asked to breakout the RD&A work from the T&E work.

The BRAC Recommendation to “Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition” (TECH-0018B) is very specific in nature. Realignment for each identified activity states “by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.” There is no mention in the BRAC Recommendation of any T&E work being realigned to Picatinny Arsenal.

Evidence exists that suggest the BRAC Recommendation, as written without T&E, is correct. The Technical Joint Cross-Service Group Meeting Minutes of 2 March 2005 include a copy of a read ahead presentation given by the Technical JCSG Red Team on RDAT&E Facilities. In the candidate recommendation summary to realign Guns and Ammo to Picatinny, T&E is excluded, and the stated justification is to “maintain Navy unique capability for large caliber gun T&E” (at Dahlgren) and to “retain existing Army test sites.” NSWC Fallbrook performs T&E for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and SOCOM.

Our parent Command, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division has requested clarification from DoD as to whether or not T&E was included in this BRAC Recommendation. To date, we have not received a response.

Bottom Line:

NSWC Detachment Fallbrook performs T&E for the joint services and, therefore, its 118 employees should not have been included in the TECH-0018B realignment and relocation action to Picatinny Arsenal.

Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Detachment Fallbrook Comment:

BRAC 2005 Recommendations IND-0047 and IND-0053 proposed closing Hawthorne Army Ammunition Depot and relocating its' Storage and Demilitarization functions to Tooele Army Depot in Utah. No mention was made in the recommendation regarding the Marine Corps' Lance Corporal Carter Test Range which has an operating agreement with the U.S. Army and Hawthorne AAD to perform T&E for the joint Services.

Discussion:

The Lance Corporal Carter Test Range provides DoD with a full range of test capabilities that are not encumbered by encroachment, are FAA cleared, are fully environmentally compliant, and are not impeded by adverse weather. The Range supports DT, LUT, LAT ACTD, In-Service, and OT testing of weapons systems ranging from small arms through mortars, rockets, and artillery. Since FY01, the Range has averaged over 55 test events each year, and over 120,000 labor hours of testing per year.

The Lance Corporal Carter Test Range is instrumented to the point that test data can be collected by computerized equipment and analyzed the same day. Examples of instrumentation include radar tracking systems, environment condition chambers, video analysis cameras, and robotic range clearing equipment.

Because the Lance Corporal Carter Test Range is under government control, its' test priorities can be adjusted daily to support the needs of the warfighter. This could mean, an emergency Lot Acceptance Test to accept ammunition into the serviceable stockpile so that it can be flown to Iraq, or the malfunction investigation test to find the cause of a combat malfunction so as to declare the ammunition safe or unsafe for future use.

This test priority flexibility, together with the Marine Corps Programs Division's (MCPD) operational knowledge and experience, creates a team of experts capable of assessing/solving the Services most critical ammunition performance problems in a rapid fashion to maintain the highest state of combat readiness possible.

If the Lance Corporal Carter Test Range would be closed, the impact would be felt first by MCPD and then the warfighter. Without such a test capability, MCPD would be unable to provide the Services with rapid turn-around quality responses to their safety and reliability concerns. Concurrently, the warfighter would lose a valuable resource to assess the readiness of its' assets. The end result would be a higher risk of going into combat with inferior equipment.

BRAC 2005 Recommendations IND-0047 and IND-0053 never included the costs of moving or closing the Lance Corporal Carter Test Range. Both costs would be rather high, and would change the overall COBRA Model for payback on closing Hawthorne AAD.

Bottom Line:

A solution to maintaining the Lance Corporal Carter Test Range is needed in order to provide the necessary combat assessment support to MCPD and the warfighter.



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DARRELL ISSA
49TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

July 07, 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi, Chairman
The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street Ste. 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

Touy

With respect, I strongly object to the approval of the recommendation to realign the Fallbrook, CA, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, known as Marine Corps Programs Department or "MCPD" to Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. I am a strong supporter of the BRAC process, even when assets in my Congressional district are at stake, but this recommendation does not achieve a significant cost savings even before detriment to mission is considered, and the detriment to the mission of MCPD is extreme.

If this recommendation is to be seriously entertained, several important questions must be answered first:

1. Currently, MCPD utilizes ordinance ranges located at Hawthorne, NV. and Twenty-Nine Palms, CA. If MCPD moves to Picatinny Arsenal, will it be able to continue to test at these ranges? Picatinny Arsenal does not have a mortar or artillery test range suitable to the mission of MCPD. If MCPD continues to test at its current ranges, it will incur great cost in travel and transportation which must be factored into any analysis of cost savings. Utilizing these ranges would also result in major delays of material arrival at the test location, as some required materials cannot be anticipated, or must be fabricated and then transported to the test site. Implementation of the recommendation could result in routine half or single day delays becoming 3 to 8 day delays. Such delays of regular operations would be unacceptable.
2. SECDEF BRAC Recommendations indicate that MCPD is being moved to Picatinny Arsenal to combine Research, Development and Acquisition Activities. MCPD does not perform any research, development or acquisition. MCPD only tests and evaluates that which has already been researched, developed and acquired. Was MCPD even intended for inclusion in the joint Research, Development and Acquisition command?
3. MCPD currently provides a facility for independent testing and evaluation of technologies researched, developed and acquired through Picatinny Arsenal. Because its mission, facilities and employees are separate from Picatinny, there is no possibility of influence on the outcome of testing and evaluation by those seeking to validate their own work. If MCPD is moved, will it be acceptable to dispose of the independence of those who test and evaluate technology from those who research, develop and acquire that technology?
4. An enormous drain of human resources would occur if MCPD left Fallbrook. Currently, the average employee at MCPD has more than 15 years of experience, excluding prior relevant

military experience. If the department is moved, it is anticipated that workers in the middle of their careers will likely seek employment in the southern California defense industry rather than choosing to relocate to New Jersey. The loss of these experienced employees could easily reduce MCPD from almost 1,700 man years of technical experience to less than half that number within the next five years. This loss of experience would be detrimental to performance of MCPD's mission.

5. This recommendation, if approved, is slated to provide 11.3 million dollars in annual cost savings after 14 years. The recommendation assumes that the same work can be done by 15% less government and contractor workers. The rationale is that MCPD is 15% administrative in nature, and that administrative work can be done by others at Picatinny. Only 6.5% of MCPD's Fallbrook employees are administrative, and therefore potential savings are overstated.
6. MCPD was specifically co-located with Marine Corps Camp Pendleton to provide its personnel access to work with Marines who serve in the field and make actual use of the technologies being tested. The Marines at Camp Pendleton have suffered the greatest number of casualties during operation Iraqi Freedom of any U.S. military installation and therefore have significant operational expertise and knowledge to share. This location provides MCPD access to the men and women whom, through the testing and evaluation of advanced technologies, they hope to provide the best chance for operational success and survivability. Is separation of MCPD from its clients an acceptable effect of the recommendation's implementation?

In conclusion, the cost savings for this recommendation have been overstated and even if they had not been, they would still be too insignificant to offset the detriment to mission that would be suffered at Marine Corps Program Department, Fallbrook. MCPD's employees are currently highly motivated, happy and successful in their mission. This is due in no small part to their proximity to Camp Pendleton. It is my ardent recommendation that this realignment not be carried out, as it would severely damage mission capability, devastate morale, would not achieve projected or significant cost savings and would erode the department's valuable independence.

I would like to underscore the fact that I do not object to this recommendation based solely on the negative impact to the base community. Instead, I object to this recommendation on the grounds that it would not be in the best interest of the United States armed services, either financially or militarily.

Thank you for your attention to this matter and for your earnest consideration of the questions I have raised in this letter.

Sincerely,



Darrell Issa
Member of Congress

DEI:jbf

Name	Office	Phone	e-mail address
Lester C. Farrington	BRAC Commission	(703) 699-2914 (703) 699-2950	lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
David Epstein	BRAC/Navy	(703) 699-2947	david.epstein@wso.whs.mil
John Franklin	Legislative Assistant Office of Representative Darrell Issa		john.franklin@mail.house.gov
Don McKinney	Office of Representative Darrell Issa	(760) 599-5000	don.mckinney@mail.house.gov
Donald P. Schulte	Department Head Ordnance Engineering Department NSWC Crane Div	(812) 854-3418	donald.schulte@navy.mil
Phil Paule	Office of Representative Darrell Issa		phil.paule@mail.house.gov
Cass Bensberg	WPNSTA Seal Beach, CMD	(562) 626-7392	
John W. Mikel	NSWC Crane, Detachment Fallbrook	(760) 731-3560	john.mikel@navy.mil
Bob Repking	Branch Head NSWC Crane, Detachment Fallbrook MCPD	(760) 731-3691	robert.repking@navy.mil
Carl A. Shaver	NSWC Crane, Detachment Fallbrook MCPD	(760) 731-3668	carl.shaver@navy.mil
Wayne Ventuleth	Division Head NSWC Crane, Detachment Fallbrook MCPD	(760) 731-3689	wayne.ventuleth@navy.mil

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Lester C. Farrington	BRAC Commission	(703) 699-2914 (703) 699-2950	lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
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John Franklin	Legislative Assistant Office of Representative Darrell Issa		john.franklin@mail.house.gov
Don McKinney	Office of Representative Darrell Issa	(760) 599-5000	don.mckinney@mail.house.gov
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Marine Corps Programs Division



NSWC Crane Division

Detachment Fallbrook

DIVISION

BRIEF



Marine Corps Programs Division



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Introduction to MCPD

- Civil Service organization aligned with Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Division Crane
- Located, as a tenant, aboard Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach, Detachment Fallbrook, CA
- Provides Life-cycle Weapon Systems Assessment and Engineering Support for DoD (*since assessment was not an available option in Commercial Activity (CA) studies, we have been coded as a Test & Evaluation (T&E) Activity*)
- A Naval Working Capital Fund Activity
- Operates with centralized control, decentralized management, and cross-functional teaming



Marine Corps Programs Division



NSWC Crane Division

Detachment Fallbrook

Mission Overview

- **Mission:** The Marine Corps Programs Division performs weapon systems assessment and engineering for our customers to enhance combat systems readiness.
- **Focus:** MCPD is helping Joint Forces prevail on 21st century battlefields by optimizing military resources through continuous assessment and engineering so that our munitions and weapon systems will be at the highest possible state of readiness.




Marine Corps Programs Division



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Location





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MCPD Historic Lineage

- 1941 - U.S. Government decision to construct a Naval Ammunition Depot (NAD) at Fallbrook, CA
- 1942 - U.S. Government condemns 9147.55 acres of Old Santa Margarita Ranch (original Spanish land grant); Naval Ammunition Depot (NAD), Fallbrook, commissioned; commenced operations 2 Feb 42
- 1944 - Fallbrook Ammunition Quality Evaluation (AQE) Lab; established to improve weapons reliability in support of the Pacific and European allied forces in WWII
- 1946 - After WWII, AQE Lab retitled Quality Control Lab (QCL)
- 1948 - QCL renamed Quality Evaluation Lab (QEL) to reflect evaluation of war reserve stocks
- 1958 - Fallbrook Depot annexed to the Naval Ammunition and Net Depot (NAND), Seal Beach, CA
- 1962 - Fallbrook Annex under command of U.S. Naval Weapons Station (NWS), Seal Beach, CA
- 1969 - Responsibilities expanded to include USMC Missile, Air Launched Missile and Weapons Calibration functions



Marine Corps Programs Division



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MCPD Historic Lineage (contd)

- 1971 - Renamed Quality Evaluation and Engineering Lab (QEEL) with increased emphasis on engineering
- 1974 - Retitled Weapons Quality Engineering Center (WQEC); evaluating weapon systems performance, readiness, and effectiveness
- 1975 - Marine Corps Programs Branch (MCPB) established at Fallbrook; emphasis on Marine Corps Ammunition Surveillance Testing & Evaluation.
- 1985 - Marine Corps Programs Branch (MCPB) under Naval Warfare Assessment Center (NWAC), Corona, CA.
- 1989 - Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) retitled, remained at Fallbrook Annex
- 1990 - Marine Corps Programs Department retitled, remained at Fallbrook Annex, under NWS Seal Beach
- 1993 - MCPD under command of Naval Ordnance Center, Pacific Division, (NOCPACDIV) Seal Beach, CA
- 1997 - MCPD retitled a Directorate, under Naval Warfare Assessment Division(NWAD), Corona, CA
- 1998 - MCPD retitled a Department, transitioned to Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Crane Division, Crane, IN
- 2003 – MCPD retitled a Division, under Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane



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MCPD Personnel & Facilities

• Personnel

- 193 (110 civilian, 83 contractors)*
- Breakdown (capabilities)
 - Engineers (36%)
 - Mathematicians/Statisticians/Operational Research Analysts (10%)
 - Technical Specialists (34%)
 - Other (Administrative Personnel/Analysts) (20%)

• Facilities

- Fallbrook (located in close proximity) (i.e. 2 mile radius)
 - 4 occupied buildings
 - 9 unoccupied (production, storage, etc.) buildings
- Hawthorne Test Facility (test ranges not identified in BRAC recommended Hawthorne closure)
 - 49,000 acres (Northwest Nevada) (test mortars, gun, pyro, rocket systems)
 - Instrumented state-of-the-art ranges operated by MCPD personnel
 - 50,000 sq. ft. of admin and range support buildings/trailers
- Offsite locations (Rock Island, IL; Mechanicsburg, PA; Camp LeJeune, NC; Quantico, VA)

** Includes 92 employees with military experience*



Marine Corps Programs Division



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MCPD Core Functions (Joint Support)

- **Ammunition Assessment and Engineering**
 - Test and Evaluation
 - Life Cycle Management
 - Service Life Prediction Process
 - Prepositioned Ammunition Support
- **Operational Testing (OT) and Assessment; other Test and Evaluation (DT / LUT / ACTD / In Service)**
- **Weapon Systems Engineering/Analysis in Support of T&E**
 - Integrated Engineering, Modernization, Re-engineering, and Combat Enhancement
 - Modeling and Simulation
 - Safety Engineering
 - ILS Engineering
- **Quality Audits, Evaluations, Assessments, and Management Support**
- **Malfunction Investigations, Failure Analysis, and Fault Isolation**
- **Maintain Marine Corps Class V(W) (Ground) ammunition data base; supports Knowledge Management Portal (KMP)**



Marine Corps Programs Division



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BRAC 05 Technical Joint Cross Service Group Intent

Section 10 Recommendation:

Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition

Justification:

This recommendation realigns and consolidates those gun and ammunition facilities working in Weapons and Armaments (W&A) Research (R), Development & Acquisition (D&A)



Marine Corps Programs Division



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Detachment Fallbrook

BRAC 05 Fallbrook Recommendation

- Realign the Fallbrook, CA Detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ

Note: Fallbrook, CA Detachment, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN performs NO Research, Development and Acquisition work for guns and ammunition



Marine Corps Programs Division



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Discussion Points for Review with BRAC Analysts

- Review BRAC 05 Recommendation to Realign and Relocate MCPD to Picatinny Arsenal
- Review COBRA Model Economical Analysis for TECH-0018B
- Discuss impact to MCPD's Human Capital once BRAC Recommendation is implemented
- Discuss impact to MCPD's Independent Analysis Function once BRAC Recommendation is implemented
- Discuss Short/Long Term Impact to the Warfighter once BRAC Recommendation is implemented



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Review BRAC 05 Recommendation to Realign and Relocate MCPD to Picatinny Arsenal

- The Fallbrook recommendation makes no mention of gun and ammunition Test & Evaluation (T&E) work, as we have been coded
- We would therefore conclude that no employees would be relocated from Fallbrook to Picatinny
- However, an inconsistency exists in the BRAC Report, since it identifies 118 civilians leaving Fallbrook
- At this point in time, we are unsure if Fallbrook's T&E work is to relocate to Picatinny or stay with the Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane
- Evidence exists that suggests the BRAC Recommendation, as written without T&E, is correct. (See *Technical Joint Cross-Service Group meeting minutes of 2 March 2005.*)
- Our parent Command, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division has requested clarification of DoD as to whether or not T&E was included in this BRAC Recommendation. To date, we have not received a response



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Review COBRA Model Economical Analysis for TECH-0018B

- COBRA Model identifies savings in five areas (Sustainment, Recap, BOS, Civ Salary, and Misc Recur), and failed to accept our Misc Recur costs
 - Sustainment, Recap, and BOS savings (\$457K/yr) appear to be acceptable
 - Civ Salary savings (\$1,254K/yr) are based on a 15% reduction in personnel. MCPD is only 6.5% overhead with one third of this being employee training. At the most, relocation/consolation of administrative/ overhead function would reduce 4.6% of our personnel



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Review COBRA Model Economical Analysis for TECH-0018B (Cont.)

- Misc Recur savings (\$1,000K/yr) are based on a 15% reduction in contractor personnel. A 15% reduction of contractors equates to a 15% loss in productivity which will need to be addressed by an increase in government personnel to maintain the same level of customer support. Therefore, the “misc recur savings” of \$1,000k/yr identified by the COBRA Model is an inaccurate cost savings assumption
- Misc Recur costs were reduced from \$680K/yr to zero dollars based on “overhead offsets”. These costs are real operating costs associated with performing our T&E function from Picatinny Arsenal. The costs reflect the increase in travel and shipping expenses we will incur being located in NJ and testing at DoD T&E ranges on the west coast



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Discuss Impact to MCPD's Human Capital Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

- As of 30 June 2005, MCPD government workforce included 110 employees that had a cumulative total of 1,694 years experience working Marine Corps Test & Evaluation
- Forty-five of these government employees also possess 675 years of prior military experience. This military experience provides MCPD with a valuable linkage to Marine Corps Active Duty forces and an understanding of the Marine Corps' mission, structure, and doctrine
- At best, 15% of MCPD's personnel will move to Picatinny Arsenal. This brain drain will result in the human capital loss of approximately 94 employees with over 2000 years of experience in Marine Corps' T&E/military. For each employee lost, it will take 3-5 years of training to develop new employees with a working level knowledge of Marine Corps T&E. This is true even if the new employee has been working in the government on other Service's T&E



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Discuss Impact to MCPD's Independent Analysis Function Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

- MCPD was established to perform independent assessment of Marine Corps weapon systems to ensure they meet specified operational requirements and to mitigate operational and safety risks to the warfighter. Independent assessment requires a chain of command free of any conflict of interest. That is, those responsible for research, development, and acquisition should not be likewise responsible for the assessment of their work/performance
- Realignment of MCPD with the Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command (ARDEC) at Picatinny Arsenal will create a serious conflict of interest between the Army acquisition priorities (they buy for the Marine Corps), and MCPD's role of assessing ARDEC's products for the Marine Corps



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Discuss Impact to MCPD's Independent Analysis Function Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented (Cont.)

- BRAC Recommendation TECH-0018B does not address the command structure of the new Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition. Without this knowledge, we cannot determine the seriousness of any conflict of interest between the Army and MCPD



Marine Corps Programs Division



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Detachment Fallbrook

Discuss Short/Long Term Impact to the Warfighter Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

BACKGROUND:

- The BRAC Military Value analysis and scoring of NSWC Detachment Fallbrook, Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) appears technically correct based on the criteria and methods used, however:
 - MCPD scored highest in Weapons Technology T&E, and lowest in Weapons Technology D&A.
 - BRAC Military Value analysis does not present an accurate account of how the operating forces will be negatively affected by the proposed relocation of MCPD to Picatinny Arsenal
 - MCPD is strategically located on the west coast to allow for an optimum relationship with the warfighter (I MEF, etc.), and to provide close proximity to the west coast operational training and test ranges



Marine Corps Programs Division



PCN: 18

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Discuss Short/Long Term Impact to the Warfighter Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

SHORT TERM IMPACT TO WARFIGHTER (3-5 YEARS):

- MCPD will lose approximately 85% of its technical experts. This equates to a like amount of knowledge and experience in assessing Marine Corps weapon systems, leaving MCPD's service
- MCPD will hire and train new employees to replace those that would not relocate. There will be a 3-5 year timeframe required to regain the knowledge and a portion of the experience lost during the relocation
- MCPD's close relationship with the Marine Corps warfighter will change. We will no longer be within 3 miles of Camp Pendleton and I MEF. Communication will now be via phone and email instead of in person at either site (efficiencies and effectiveness gained through face-to-face liaison and the participation of local active duty personnel in all aspects of planning and conducting of weapon systems testing will be degraded)



Marine Corps Programs Division



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Discuss Short/Long Term Impact to the Warfighter Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

SHORT TERM IMPACT TO WARFIGHTER (3-5 YEARS) (Cont.):

- During this period of hiring and training a new workforce, and re-establishing a new working relationship with the warfighter, MCPD's services and products will be of less quality, cost more, and take longer to provide
- The fighting forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations will not have rapid turn-around of pressing issues affecting the safety and performance of their munitions
- Implementation of this move would adversely impact the ability of MCPD to support the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) and homeland defense



Marine Corps Programs Division



MCN: 1

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Detachment Fallbrook

Discuss Short/Long Term Impact to the Warfighter Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

LONG TERM IMPACT TO WARFIGHTER (6 YEARS AND BEYOND):

- The loss of synergy associated with MCPD's geographic location, near warfighters and west coast test ranges, will make it difficult for MCPD to fully re-establish its knowledge and experience base in Marine Corps related T&E and munitions assessment
- Operating remotely (geographically) may cause MCPD, as an organization (other than traveling test teams), to become detached from and less acceptable to the warfighters



Marine Corps Programs Division



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Discuss Short/Long Term Impact to the Warfighter Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

**LONG TERM IMPACT TO WARFIGHTER (6 YEARS AND BEYOND)
(Cont.):**

- The ability for MCPD to provide rapid turn-around of pressing issues affecting the safety and performance of munitions/ weapon systems will never return to the same level prior to BRAC. The simplest explanation for this is that the Marine Corps warfighters are not located in Picatinny NJ. They are at Marine Corps Bases, and train at Marine Corps training ranges. To position MCPD hundreds to thousands of miles from the warfighter will adversely impact MCPD's ability to respond to requests for support and/or even be asked to respond

DCN: 11688

SCENARIO DATA CALL

05 NOV 2004

REV 1

Reference #DON001: ***SCENARIO DESCRIPTION*******

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - ALL

Question: THE SCENARIO ACTIONS ENUMERATED HERE ARE CRITICAL TO ANSWERING ALL OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS (FIRST COLUMN IN MANY OF THE RESPONSES REFERS TO THE INDIVIDUAL ACTION NUMBER LISTED BELOW). ONCE YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, SELECT "YES" AND PROCEED. THROUGHOUT THIS DATA CALL THERE ARE REFERENCES WITHIN THE QUESTIONS TO "DATA CALL 2: CRITERION FIVE, 17 JUNE." THIS DATA CALL WAS COMPLETED FOR GEOGRAPHIC SPECIFIC LOCATIONS, GENERALLY RESPONDED TO BY INSTALLATION COMMANDERS OR EQUIVALENT, FOR ALL ACTIVITIES AT THAT LOCATION. INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES THAT DID NOT COMPLETE RESPONSES FOR DATA CALL 2: CRITERION FIVE MUST COORDINATE WITH THE BRAC OFFICE AT THEIR RESPECTIVE INSTALLATION COMMANDER TO ENSURE CONSISTENCY WITH THESE ANSWERS WHERE APPLICABLE.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: ONCE YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, SELECT "YES" AND PROCEED.

This question requires a single answer with units of List and a data type of multiple choice.

The answer should be one of the following: YES.

Answer:

Reference #DON002: Movement of Personnel - Officers

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity as identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, provide, by year, the number of OFFICER billets being RELOCATED to each Receiving Activity. Utilize the "Rationale" column to give a brief explanation for your rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Ensure you consider space available and/or MilCon completion timing at the receiving site when providing personnel movement information by FY. Provide a complete answer row for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 3.2 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Officer Billets - The total number of officer and warrant officer billets moving from one base to the other base in each year of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 30,000 officers).

Drilling reservists will not be included in officer billet fields. Non-DON officers must also be reviewed and a determination made as to whether they will be relocated. Relocating non-DON officers must be included in the number of billets identified as being transferred (and manpower totals adjusted accordingly).

Data provided MUST BE CONSISTENT with personnel information provided by host installations in questions DoD1505 and DoD1506 of Data Call 2: Criterion Five, 17June. Do not include Force Structure changes previously reported.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FY 2006 (Pers) numeric	FY 2007 (Pers) numeric	FY 2008 (Pers) numeric	FY 2009 (Pers) numeric	FY 2010 (Pers) numeric	FY 2011 (Pers) numeric	Rationale (Text) string2000
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	We have no Officers.

Reference #DON003: Movement of Personnel - Enlisted

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity as identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, provide, by year, the number of ENLISTED billets being RELOCATED to each Receiving Activity. Utilize the "Rationale" column to give a brief explanation of your rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs. Ensure you consider space available and/or MilCon completion timing at the receiving site when providing personnel movement information by FY. Provide a complete answer row for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 3.2 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Enlisted Billets - The total number of enlisted billets moving from one base to the other base in each year of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 30,000 enlisted). Drilling reservists will not be included in enlisted billet fields. Non-DON enlisted personnel must also be reviewed and a determination made as to whether they will be relocated. Relocating non-DON enlisted personnel must be included in the number of billets identified as being transferred (and manpower totals adjusted accordingly).

Data provided MUST BE CONSISTENT with personnel information provided by host installations in questions DoD1505 and DoD1506 of Data Call 2: Criterion Five, 17June. Do not include Force Structure changes previously reported.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FY 2006 (Pers) numeric	FY 2007 (Pers) numeric	FY 2008 (Pers) numeric	FY 2009 (Pers) numeric	FY 2010 (Pers) numeric	FY 2011 (Pers) numeric	Rationale (Text) string2000
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	We have no Enlisted personnel.

Reference #DON004: Movement of Personnel - DoD Civilians

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity as identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, provide, by year, the number of DoD CIVILIAN positions being RELOCATED to each Receiving Activity. Utilize the "Rationale" column to give a brief explanation of your rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs. Ensure you consider space available and/or MilCon completion timing at the receiving site when providing personnel movement information by FY. Provide a complete answer row for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 3.2 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Civilian Positions - The total number of civilian government employee positions (not contractors) moving from one base to the other base in each year of the scenario. (Allowed entries 0 to 30,000 civilians).

Data provided **MUST BE CONSISTENT** with personnel information provided by host installations in questions DoD1505 and DoD1506 of Data Call 2: Criterion Five, 17June. Do not include Force Structure changes previously reported.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FY 2006 (Pers) numeric	FY 2007 (Pers) numeric	FY 2008 (Pers) numeric	FY 2009 (Pers) numeric	FY 2010 (Pers) numeric	FY 2011 (Pers) numeric	Rationale (Text) string2000
17	0	0	0	107	0	0	Assumption is that adequate facilities will be available in FY 2009.

Reference #DON005: Movement of Personnel - Military Students

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity as identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, provide, by year, the number of MILITARY STUDENT SCHOOL SEATS being RELOCATED to each Receiving Activity. Utilize the "Rationale" column to give a brief explanation of your rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs. Ensure you consider space available and/or MilCon completion timing at the receiving site when providing personnel movement information by FY. Provide a complete answer row for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 3.2 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Military Students - The annual average on-board student population (PCS and TDY) moving from one base to the other base in each year of the scenario. The intent of this question is to identify the number and phasing of the transfer of student load or school seats. It does not necessarily mean the transfer of an actual human student since in most cases transfer of mission will not occur during the actual instructional period of a course. (Allowed entries 0 to 30,000 students)

Data provided **MUST BE CONSISTENT** with personnel information provided by host installations in questions DoD1505 and DoD1506 of Data Call 2: Criterion Five, 17June. Do not include Force Structure changes previously reported.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FY 2006 (Pers) numeric	FY 2007 (Pers) numeric	FY 2008 (Pers) numeric	FY 2009 (Pers) numeric	FY 2010 (Pers) numeric	FY 2011 (Pers) numeric	Rationale (Text) string2000
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	We have no military students.

Reference #DON006: Elimination of Personnel - Officers

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity as identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, provide, by year, the number of OFFICER billets which would be ELIMINATED. Utilize the "Rationale" column to give a brief explanation of your rationale, to include the FY chosen for elimination . Provide a complete answer row for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 3.2 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: The entries in this section are NOT for personnel being realigned (moved). The entries here are for authorized personnel billets being eliminated at the base as a result of the BRAC action. Generally, these will be personnel involved in base operations and efficiencies.

Data provided MUST BE CONSISTENT with personnel information provided by host installations in questions DoD1505 and DoD1506 of Data Call 2: Criterion Five, 17June. Do not include Force Structure changes previously reported. For a total closure/realignment scenario (i.e. the entire activity is closing/moving, not just a functional subset of the activity), the total number of billets moved plus those eliminated must equal the entire workforce as reported in questions DoD1505 and DoD1506 of Data Call 2: Criterion Five, 17June. Numbers entered here should reflect a thorough review of staffing requirements at both the losing and receiving sites, and include all potential job eliminations which would result from consolidation efficiencies, economies of scale, etc. Reductions should reflect both overhead/support eliminations and direct labor eliminations, as appropriate. Eliminations should be entered in the year(s) in which they are expected to occur. For example, if 80 officer billets will be eliminated in FY 2010 and an additional 50 billets will be eliminated in FY 2011, then enter the data as follows: FY 2006-2009 = 0, FY 2010 = 80, FY 2011 = 50. Do not identify any of the following as eliminated billets/positions in the table:

- Planned Force Structure Reductions (FY 2006 – FY 2011)
- Military Students
- Non-DDN Tenants

Drilling reservists should also not be included in numbers of eliminated billets.

Officer Billets - The total number of officer and warrant officer positions added or eliminated at the base in each year as a direct result of the closure/realignment action. Savings resulting from positions eliminated are included in BOS and other calculations. (Allowed entries -30,000 to 30,000 officers)

Take into consideration all planned force structure changes over the time period and maintain supporting documentation .

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FY 2006 (Pers) numeric	FY 2007 (Pers) numeric	FY 2008 (Pers) numeric	FY 2009 (Pers) numeric	FY 2010 (Pers) numeric	FY 2011 (Pers) numeric	Rationale (Text) string2000
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	We have no Officers.

Reference #DON007: Elimination of Personnel - Enlisted

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity as identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, provide, by year, the number of ENLISTED billets which would be ELIMINATED. Utilize the "Rationale" column to give a brief explanation of your rationale, to include the FY chosen for elimination. Provide a complete answer row for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 3.2 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: The entries in this section are NOT for personnel being realigned (moved). The entries here are for authorized personnel billets being eliminated at the base as a result of the BRAC action. Generally, these will be personnel involved in base operations and efficiencies.

Data provided MUST BE CONSISTENT with personnel information provided by host installations in questions DoD1505 and DoD1506 of Data Call 2: Criterion Five, 17June. For a total closure/realignment scenario (i.e. the entire activity is closing/moving, not just a functional subset of the activity), the total number of billets moved plus those eliminated must equal the entire workforce as reported in questions DoD1505 and DoD1506 of Data Call 2: Criterion Five, 17June. Do not include Force Structure changes previously reported. Numbers entered here should reflect a thorough review of staffing requirements at both the losing and receiving sites, and include all potential job eliminations which would result from consolidation efficiencies, economies of scale, etc. Reductions should reflect both overhead/support eliminations and direct labor eliminations, as appropriate. Eliminations should be entered in the year(s) in which they are expected to occur. For example, if 80 billets will be eliminated in FY 2010 and an additional 50 billets will be eliminated in FY 2011, then enter the data as follows: FY 2006-2009 = 0, FY 2010 = 80, FY 2011 = 50. Do not identify any of the following as eliminated billets/positions in the table:

- Planned Force Structure Reductions (FY 2006 – FY 2011)
- Military Students
- Non-DDN Tenants

Drilling reservists should also not be included in numbers of eliminated billets.

Enlisted Billets - The total number of enlisted positions added or eliminated at the base in each year as a direct result of the closure/realignment action. Savings resulting from positions eliminated are included in BOS and other calculations. (Allowed entries - 30,000 to 30,000 enlisted)

Take into consideration all planned force structure changes over the time period and maintain supporting documentation.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FY 2006 (Pers) numeric	FY 2007 (Pers) numeric	FY 2008 (Pers) numeric	FY 2009 (Pers) numeric	FY 2010 (Pers) numeric	FY 2011 (Pers) numeric	Rationale (Text) string2000
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	We have no Enlisted personnel.

Reference #DON008: Elimination of Personnel - DoD Civilians

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity as identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, provide, by year, the number of DoD Civilian positions which would be ELIMINATED. Utilize the "Rationale" column to give a brief explanation of your rationale, to include the FY chosen for elimination. Provide a complete answer row for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 3.2 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: The entries in this section are NOT for personnel being realigned (moved). The entries here are for authorized personnel billets being eliminated at the base as a result of the BRAC action. Generally, these will be personnel involved in base operations and efficiencies.

Data provided MUST BE CONSISTENT with personnel information provided by host installations in questions DoD1505 and DoD1506 of Data Call 2: Criterion Five, 17June. Do not include Force Structure changes previously reported. For a total closure/realignment scenario (i.e. the entire activity is closing/moving, not just a functional subset of the activity), the total number of billets moved plus those eliminated must equal the entire workforce as reported in questions DoD1505 and DoD1506 of Data Call 2: Criterion Five, 17June. Numbers entered here should reflect a thorough review of staffing requirements at both the losing and receiving sites, and include all potential job eliminations which would result from consolidation efficiencies, economies of scale, etc. Reductions should reflect both overhead/support eliminations and direct labor eliminations, as appropriate. Eliminations should be entered in the year(s) in which they are expected to occur. For example, if 80 billets will be eliminated in FY 2010 and an additional 50 billets will be eliminated in FY 2011, then enter the data as follows: FY 2006-2009 = 0, FY 2010 = 80, FY 2011 = 50. Do not identify any of the following as eliminated billets/positions in the table:

- Planned Force Structure Reductions (FY 2006 – FY 2011)
- Military Students
- Non-DDN Tenants

Drilling reservists should also not be included in numbers of eliminated billets.

DoD Civilian Positions - The total number of DoD civilian positions eliminated at the base in each year as a direct result of the closure/realignment action. Savings resulting from positions eliminated are included in BOS and other calculations. (Allowed entries - 30,000 to 30,000 civilians)

Take into consideration all planned force structure changes over the time period and maintain supporting documentation .

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FY 2006 (Pers) numeric	FY 2007 (Pers) numeric	FY 2008 (Pers) numeric	FY 2009 (Pers) numeric	FY 2010 (Pers) numeric	FY 2011 (Pers) numeric	Rationale (Text) string2000
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	All civilian personnel will be relocated.

Reference #DON009: Movement of Mission Equipment

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, provide, by year, the tonnage of Mission Equipment being RELOCATED to each Receiving Activity. Provide a complete answer row for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 1 (in BRAC Library); activity's Table of Equipment

Amplification: Mission Equipment - This is the total weight in tons (2,000 pounds/ton) of mission equipment moving from one base to the other base in each year of the scenario. Mission equipment is defined as all of the equipment on a unit's Table of Equipment less vehicles. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999)

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FY 2006 (Tons) numeric	FY 2007 (Tons) numeric	FY 2008 (Tons) numeric	FY 2009 (Tons) numeric	FY 2010 (Tons) numeric	FY 2011 (Tons) numeric
17	0	0	0	91	0	0

Reference #DON010: Movement of Mission Equipment - Supporting Data

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, list the Mission Equipment to be RELOCATED and the rationale for relocating this equipment, to include the FY chosen for relocation.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 1 (in BRAC Library); activity's Table of Equipment

Amplification: This list must directly correlate to the aggregate Mission Equipment tonnage reported in this data call.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Equipment Type (Text) string200	Tonnage (Tons) numeric	Rationale for Relocating (Text) string4000
17	Field and Laboratory equipment required to evaluate Marine Corps Class V(W) assets.	91	Equipment is required for the collection, reduction, and analysis of test and evaluation data. Data feeds to analytical reports to address Marine Corps readiness.

Reference #DON011: Movement of Military Light Vehicles

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, provide, by year, the number of Military Light Vehicles being RELOCATED to each Receiving Activity. Provide a complete answer row for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 1 (in BRAC Library); activity's Table of Equipment; TEA-PAM 55-19

Amplification: Military Light Vehicles - A light vehicle is defined as a vehicle that can share a rail car (nominally 60 feet in length, 70 ton max) with one other light vehicle.

This includes trailers and other non-prime movers. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999 vehicles)

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FY 2006 (Vehicles) numeric	FY 2007 (Vehicles) numeric	FY 2008 (Vehicles) numeric	FY 2009 (Vehicles) numeric	FY 2010 (Vehicles) numeric	Fy 2011 (Vehicles) numeric
17	0	0	0	0	0	0

Reference #DON012: Movement of Military Light Vehicles - Supporting Data

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, list the Military Light Vehicles to be RELOCATED and the rationale for relocating this equipment. This list should directly correlate to the Military Light Vehicles previously reported. Provide a complete answer row for each Action in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 1 (in BRAC Library); activity's Table of Equipment

Amplification: This list must directly correlate to the aggregate Military Light Vehicles reported in this data call.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Vehicle Type (Text) string200	Count (Count) numeric	Rationale for Relocating (Text) string4000
17	NA	NA	We have no military light vehicles.

Reference #DON013: Movement of Military Heavy Vehicles**JCSG: Navy/USMC****Function(s):** DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, provide, by year, the number of Military Heavy Vehicles being RELOCATED to each Receiving Activity. Provide a complete answer row for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 1 (in BRAC Library); activity's Table of Equipment; TEA-PAM 55-19

Amplification: Military Heavy/Special Vehicles - A heavy vehicle is defined as a vehicle that requires its own rail car (nominally 60 feet in length, 70 ton max) (one vehicle per rail car). (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999 vehicles)

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FY 2006 (Vehicles) numeric	FY 2007 (Vehicles) numeric	FY 2008 (Vehicles) numeric	FY 2009 (Vehicles) numeric	FY 2010 (Vehicles) numeric	FY 2011 (Vehicles) numeric
17	0	0	0	0	0	0

Reference #DON014: Movement of Military Heavy Vehicles - Supporting Data

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, list the Military Heavy Vehicles to be RELOCATED and the rationale for relocating this equipment. This list should directly correlate to the Military Heavy Vehicles previously reported. Provide a complete answer row for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 1 (in BRAC Library); activity's Table of Equipment

Amplification: This list must directly correlate to the aggregate Military Heavy Vehicles reported in this data call.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Vehicle Type (Text) string200	Count (Count) numeric	Rationale for Relocating (Text) string4000
17	NA	NA	We have no military heavy vehicles.

Reference #DON015: Movement of Support Equipment

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, provide, by year, the tonnage of Support Equipment being RELOCATED to each Receiving Activity. Provide a complete answer row for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 1 (in BRAC Library); activity's Table of Equipment

Amplification: Support Equipment - This is the total weight in tons (2,000 pounds/ton) of support equipment moving from one base to the other base in each year of the scenario. Support equipment is defined as all other equipment not included in mission equipment or vehicles that is required by the unit to perform its mission. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999 tons)

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FY 2006 (Tons) numeric	FY 2007 (Tons) numeric	FY 2008 (Tons) numeric	FY 2009 (Tons) numeric	FY 2010 (Tons) numeric	FY 2011 (Tons) numeric
17	0	0	0	0	0	0

Reference #DON016: Movement of Support Equipment - Supporting Data

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, list the Support Equipment to be RELOCATED and the rationale for relocating this equipment, to include the FY chosen for relocation.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 1 (in BRAC Library); activity's Table of Equipment

Amplification: This list must directly correlate to the aggregate Support Equipment tonnage reported in this data call.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Equipment Type (Text) string200	Tonnage (Tons) numeric	Rationale for Relocating (Text) string4000
17	NA	NA	We have not identified any support equipment requiring relocation.

Reference #DON017: Closure/Realignment Cost Considerations - Losing Activity (Aggregate)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity as identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, complete the table below to identify aggregate costs and savings with regards to RELOCATION (losing activity). Provide a complete answer row for each Cost/Savings category for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity. SEE AMPLIFICATION FOR CATEGORY CLARIFICATION.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 4 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Do not allow double counting of costs or savings captured by the losing activity's data call.

One-Time Unique Costs:

Identify one-time unique costs at the losing activity that will not be calculated elsewhere. Examples: temporary office space, lease termination costs, etc. Only costs directly attributable to the BRAC action should be identified. This area should not be used to identify routine moving or personnel costs, nor should it be used to identify one-time unique moving costs.

One-Time Unique Savings:

Identify any other one-time unique savings. Examples include net proceeds to DoD resulting from a cost avoidance not otherwise covered. This area should not be used to identify routine moving or personnel savings. Do not include Construction Cost Avoidances or Procurement Cost Avoidances (which are both covered separately). For each savings, identify the amount, the year in which it will occur, and describe the nature of the saving. Only savings directly attributable to the proposed BRAC action should be identified.

One-Time Moving Costs:

Identify only those unique moving costs associated with movements from your activity that would be incurred in addition to standard packing and shipping costs associated with tonnage and vehicles. Examples of unique moving costs include packing, special handling or recalibration of specialized laboratory or industrial equipment; movement of special materials, etc. If unique costs identified here include packing and shipping costs, ensure tonnage for this "unique" equipment is not included under the Mission and Support Equipment previously identified.

One-Time Moving Savings:

Identify only those unique moving savings associated with movements out of the losing activities that would be incurred.

Mission Costs and Savings:

Identify those changes in mission costs or savings that result from the BRAC action, but are not counted elsewhere in this data call response. For example, do not include changes in non-payroll Base Operating Support (BOS), Family Housing Operations, housing allowances, TRICARE costs/savings, or salary savings for eliminated positions/billets, all of which are calculated elsewhere. See BRAC Reference Library for further amplification.

Mission Contract Termination Costs:

Identify contract terminations cost related to a mission activity. This includes such costs as early termination penalties and restoration costs for leases.

Support Contract Termination Costs:

Identify contract terminations cost related to a support function of the activity's mission. This includes such costs as early termination penalties for administrative support contracts.

Miscellaneous Recurring Costs:

Identify any other recurring costs associated with the BRAC action at the losing activity, e.g., new leases of facilities or equipment, etc.

Miscellaneous Recurring Savings:

Identify any other recurring savings associated with the BRAC action at the losing activity, e.g., termination of leases for facilities or equipment, etc. If lease costs were included in response to DOD#1504 of Data Call 2: Criterion Five, 17June do NOT include them here (savings will be calculated by COBRA).

Procurement Cost Avoidances:

Identify any procurement cost avoidance resulting from this BRAC action. Do not include any funds, regardless of appropriation, identified as BOS costs. An example is a planned "Other Procurement Account" for a new computer system that is no longer required.

Military Construction Cost Avoidances:

See BRAC Reference Library for further amplification.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Costs/Savings (List) multiple choice ¹	FY 2006 (\$K) numeric	FY 2007 (\$K) numeric	FY 2008 (\$K) numeric	FY 2009 (\$K) numeric	FY 2010 (\$K) numeric	FY 2011 (\$K) numeric
17	One-Time Unique Costs				\$294.6		

¹ Choose a value from this list: One-Time Unique Costs, One-Time Unique Savings, One-Time Moving Costs, One-Time Moving Savings, Mission Costs, Mission Savings, Mission Contract Termination Costs, Support Contract Termination Costs, Miscellaneous Recurring Costs, Miscellaneous Recurring Savings, Procurement Cost Avoidances, Military Construction Cost Avoidances

17	Miscellaneous Recurring Costs				\$680.5	\$680.5	\$680.5
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Reference #DON018: One-Time Unique Costs - Losing (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for One-Time Unique Costs, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 4 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: One-Time Unique Costs: Identify one-time unique costs at the losing activity that will not be calculated elsewhere. Examples: temporary office space, lease termination costs, etc. Only costs directly attributable to the BRAC action should be identified. This area should not be used to identify routine moving or personnel costs, nor should it be used to identify one-time unique moving costs.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	One-Time Unique Cost Item (Text) string200	Cost (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000
17	Professional installation of laboratory equipment at receiver. Includes leveling and certification of test sets.	\$66	In order to obtain the measurement tolerances we require. Estimate is \$30K for material, and \$36K for labor.
17	Transition of Marine Corps Class V(W) Test and Evaluation Operations	\$228.6	Labor and travel cost in FY09 for the technical transition team to gather and transfer all necessary programmatic and technical documentation, and to disassemble and prepare equipment for shipment. This team will also reassemble and setup/calibrate mission equipment at the receiving activity.

DoN 018: one-time Unique Costs

Transition of Marine Corps Class V (W)
Test and Evaluation operations

1. Prepare Test Equipment for shipment

$$10 \text{ people} \times 4 \text{ wks} \times 40 \text{ hrs/wk} \times \$54.67/\text{hr} = \$87,472$$

2. Install Equipment at Receiving site

$$\text{TDY} = \$53,684$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Labor} &= 10 \text{ people} \times 4 \text{ wks} \times 40 \text{ hrs/wk} \times \$54.67/\text{hr} \\ &= \$87,472 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Total} &= \$87,472 + \$53,684 + \$87,472 \\ &= \$228,628 \end{aligned}$$

DCN: 11688
Ventuleth, Wayne E

From: Knighten, Gary V
Sent: Friday, December 10, 2004 1:49 PM
To: Ventuleth, Wayne E
Subject: RE: Fallbrook Test Equipment Estimates

This our cost estimate for special set up requirements for our equipment:

Prototype shop: materials - \$20,000, labor 6 work-weeks to install and level equipment, electrical service requirement - 3 phase 208 VAC 225 amps and 3 phase 240 VAC 400 amps

Environmental Conditioning Chambers: materials - \$10,000, labor 3 work-weeks, electrical service requirement - 3 phase 208 VAC 400 amps

Gary Knighten, Marine Corps Programs Division
Crane Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC Crane)
Harnessing the Power of Technology for the Warfighter
Code 4091, Bldg 103, Fallbrook Det., Fallbrook CA 92028-3187
Ph: 760.731.3474, DSN 873, Fax: 760.731.3710
E-mail: Gary.Knighten@navy.mil

-----Original Message-----

From: Ventuleth, Wayne E
Sent: Friday, December 10, 2004 10:15
To: Knighten, Gary V
Cc: Franco, Wilfredo B; Anderson, Greg P
Subject: RE: Fallbrook Test Equipment Estimates

Gentlemen, thank you very much. This is exactly what I needed. Please also thank those in 307 that helped put this together. R/Wayne

-----Original Message-----

From: Knighten, Gary V
Sent: Friday, December 10, 2004 8:06
To: Ventuleth, Wayne E
Cc: Franco, Wilfredo B; Anderson, Greg P
Subject: Fallbrook Test Equipment Estimates

We went through our equipment list and estimated the weight of each item. Attached is a spreadsheet that has the entire list. Total estimated weight 90,800 pounds.

Also, we estimated the weight of our test equipment support trailers and ISO storage containers. I have attached a list of these at the end of the test equipment list. The estimate for this weight is 91,000 pounds.

We are still looking for estimates of the special cost issues associated with setting up the machine shop and the explosive test Environmental Conditioning Chambers from buildings 308 and 364 respectively. We will provide these later today.

Please review what I am sending and see if this will meet your request.

<< File: TE estimates.xls >>

Gary Knighten, Marine Corps Programs Division
Crane Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC Crane)

Harnessing the Power of Technology for the Warfighter
Code 4091, Bldg 103, Fallbrook Det., Fallbrook CA 92028-3187
Ph: 760.731.3474, DSN 873, Fax: 760.731.3710
E-mail: Gary.Knighten@navy.mil

Reference #DON019: One-Time Unique Savings - Losing (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for One-Time Unique Savings, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 4 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: One-Time Unique Savings: Identify any other one-time unique savings. Examples include net proceeds to DoD resulting from an avoidance, etc. This area should not be used to identify routine moving or personnel savings. Do not include Construction Cost Avoidances or Procurement Cost Avoidances (which are both covered separately). For each savings, identify the amount, the year in which it will occur, and describe the nature of the saving. Only savings directly attributable to the proposed BRAC action should be identified.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	One-Time Unique Savings Item (Text) string200	Savings (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000
17	NA	NA	NA

Reference #DON020: One-Time Moving Cost - Losing (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for One Time Moving Costs, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 4 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: One-Time Moving Costs: Identify only those unique moving costs associated with movements from your activity that would be incurred in addition to standard packing and shipping costs associated with tonnage and handling or recalibration of specialized laboratory or industrial equipment; movement of special materials, etc. If unique costs identified here include packing and shipping costs, ensure tonnage for this “unique” equipment is not included under the Mission and Support Equipment previously identified.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	One-Time Moving Cost Item (Text) string200	Cost (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000
17	NA	NA	NA

Reference #DON021: One-Time Moving Savings - Losing (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for One-Time Moving Savings, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 4 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: One-Time Moving Savings: Identify only those unique moving savings associated with movements out of the losing base that would be incurred.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	One-Time Moving Savings Item (Text) string200	Savings (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000
17	NA	NA	NA

Reference #DON022: Mission Costs - Losing (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for Mission Costs, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 4 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Mission Cost: Identify those changes in mission costs that result from the BRAC action, but are not counted elsewhere in this data call response. For example, do not include changes in non-payroll Base Operating Support (BOS), Family Housing Operations, housing allowances, TRICARE costs/savings, or salary savings for eliminated positions/billets, all of which are calculated elsewhere.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Mission Costs Item (Text) string200	Cost (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000
17	NA	0	NA

Reference #DON023: Mission Savings - Losing (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for Mission Savings, provide the list of items considered, individual savings, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 4 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Mission Savings: Identify those changes in mission savings that result from the BRAC action, but are not counted elsewhere in this data call response. For example, do not include changes in non-payroll Base Operating Support (BOS), Family Housing Operations, housing allowances, TRICARE costs/savings, or salary savings for eliminated positions/billets, all of which are calculated elsewhere.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Mission Savings Item (Text) string200	Savings (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000
17	NA	0	NA

Reference #DON024: Mission Contract Termination Costs - Losing (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for Mission Contract Termination Costs, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 4 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Mission Contract Termination Costs: Contract terminations costs related to a mission activity. This includes such costs as early termination penalties and restoration costs for leases.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Mission Contract Termination Costs Item (Text) string200	Cost (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000
17	NA	0	NA

Reference #DON025: Support Contract Termination Costs - Losing (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for Support Contract Termination Costs, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 4 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Support Contract Termination Costs: Contract terminations costs related to a support function of the activity's mission. This includes such costs as early termination penalties for administrative support contracts.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Support Contract Termination Costs Item (Text) string200	Cost (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000
17	NA	0	NA

Reference #DON026: Miscellaneous Recurring Costs - Losing (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for Miscellaneous Recurring Costs, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 4 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Miscellaneous Recurring Costs: Identify other recurring costs, e.g., termination of leases for facilities or equipment, etc. Identify only costs attributable to the BRAC action. Do not count changes in mission costs or savings provided elsewhere. If lease costs were included in response to DOD#1504 of Data Call 2: Criterion Five, 17June do NOT include them here (savings will be calculated by COBRA).

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Miscellaneous Recurring Costs Item (Text) string200	Cost (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000
17	The cost of transporting personnel and equipment from Picatinny to West coast Test Ranges at Hawthorne, NV, Las Vegas, NV, Camp Pendleton, CA, and Twentynine Palms, CA. Estimate is for 350 personnel movements and the shipping of 630 tons of test equipment each fiscal year.	\$680.5	Our RDT&E work involves the support/inter-action of Marine Corps troops in the field environment. Presently, on average, we support 35 test events on the West coast each year. These events occur at desert training centers, or in littoral scenarios. With this relocation, we will now have to fly from the East coast to the West coast and ship our equipment from the East coast to the West coast and return..

35 events East to West Coast (round trip)

9 tons per trip

$$\frac{18,000}{4,500} = 4 \text{ ISO Containers per trip}$$

($20 \times 8 \times 8 = 1280 \text{ cu ft each}$)

2 ISO Containers per 48' truck

Need Two Trucks @ \$3775.75 (one way)

Total Cost per year

$$35 \text{ one way} \times 2 \times 2 \text{ trucks} \times \$3775.75 = \$528,605$$

350 Airline tickets at \$434.00 round trip
 = \$151,900

151,900

528,605

Total = \$680,505

DCN: 11688

For Air-ride Van

Commodity	Cost
Electronic Equip.	\$5044.40

For Enclosed Van

Commodity	Cost
Electronic Equip.	\$3775.75

*20x8x8 = 1280 cu ft
↓
4,500 lbs
↓
2 trucks*

Material shipped from Picatinny Arsenal NJ to Camp Pendleton CA

Carrier costs were based on actual award screen information from ETA (electronic transportation acquisition)

Carrier costs for categorized material was selected based on middle cost carriers to off-set low cost versus high cost.

CUFT per truck: 1870 (48' truck = 576"Lx102"Wx55"H=3,231,360=1870)

Total cuft figured on half the height of the truck due to most material not able to stack two high.

To figure total number of trucks required, take the cuft by commodity divide by 1870 which will give you total amount of trucks.

Take total amount of trucks for commodity and multiply by the above applicable cost

Total cuft per truck: 3740 (48' truck-576"Lx102"Wx110"H=6,462,720 divided by 1728 = 3740)

Prepared by Lisa Divine 12/13/2004.

DCN: 11688

Ventuleth, Wayne E

From: Melton, Judy CIV NAVSURFWARCENDIV Crane, Code 113, Bldg.41SE
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 7:27 AM
To: Ventuleth, Wayne E
Cc: Schulte, Donald CIV NAVSURFWARCEN CRANE, 40, BLDG. 3284; Matthews, Robert CIV NAVSURFWARCENDIV Crane, Code 05SP; Webster, Henry III NAVSEA
Subject: RE: BRAC Data Call

Since the material is not on supply's records, I have attached the file that will provide you the information for you to calculate your costs.

Judy

-----Original Message-----

From: Ventuleth, Wayne E
Sent: Saturday, December 11, 2004 13:18
To: Melton, Judy CIV NAVSURFWARCENDIV Crane, Code 113, Bldg.41SE
Cc: Schulte, Donald CIV NAVSURFWARCEN CRANE, 40, BLDG. 3284; Matthews, Robert CIV NAVSURFWARCENDIV Crane, Code 05SP; Webster, Henry III NAVSEA
Subject: FW: BRAC Data Call

Judy,

Can you please provide me with a cost estimate to ship 540 tons of test equipment from Picatinny, NJ to Camp Pendleton, CA. This estimate is required to determine recurring costs associated with performing tests at West coast Test Ranges when our equipment is being maintained at Picatinny.

Thanks,
Wayne

-----Original Message-----

From: Ellis, Deborah J (NAVSEA)
Sent: Saturday, December 11, 2004 7:12
To: Ventuleth, Wayne E
Cc: Webster, Henry III NAVSEA; Matthews, Robert CIV NAVSURFWARCENDIV Crane, Code 05SP; Schulte, Donald CIV NAVSURFWARCEN CRANE, 40, BLDG. 3284; Mace, Edrie (NAVSEA)
Subject: RE: BRAC Data Call

Hi Wayne,

Per our conversation of earlier, the attached information is provided. Based on 2 teams of 5 people 2 trips each (total of 4 trips), and sharing rental cars as we discussed, total cost is \$26,842.00 (backup attached). Note, we also discussed that the cost of one round-trip airline ticket from Fallbrook to Picatinny is \$434.00 each.

Let me know if we can do anything else. Thanks, Debbie

-----Original Message-----

From: Schulte, Donald CIV NAVSURFWARCEN CRANE, 40, BLDG. 3284
Sent: Friday, December 10, 2004 21:29
To: Ellis, Deborah J (NAVSEA); Matthews, Robert CIV NAVSURFWARCENDIV Crane, Code 05SP

12/13/2004

DCN: 11688

Cc: Ventuleth, Wayne E; Webster, Henry III NAVSEA
Subject: RE: BRAC Data Call

WE ARE SUPPOSE TO USE JUDY MELTON AS POC FOR SUPPLY TO CALCULATE TRANSPORTATION COST. MAKE SURE YOU TELL HE THAT IT IS FOR ACTIVE SCENARIO.

DPS347

-----Original Message-----

From: Ellis, Deborah J (NAVSEA)
Sent: Friday, December 10, 2004 21:22
To: Matthews, Robert CIV NAVSURFWARCENDIV Crane, Code 05SP
Cc: Ventuleth, Wayne E; Schulte, Donald CIV NAVSURFWARCEN CRANE, 40, BLDG. 3284
Subject: RE: BRAC Data Call

All,

I believe we need just a little more info to be able to make the travel calculations.

cost of 300 airline tickets; I assume we would calculate airline tickets, per diem, and rental car?

If so, need the length of stay (# of days) and number of people traveling (I assume 300). Should we also include a rental car? I would think so. If you could please provide this info, we can do the calculations for you.

Also, is supply calculating the shipment of the test equipment? Thanks, should be easy to get the travel estimate once we get the above info. Let me know who has the lead on calculation of the shipment of equipment.

-----Original Message-----

From: Matthews, Robert CIV NAVSURFWARCENDIV Crane, Code 05SP
Sent: Fri 12/10/2004 6:19 PM
To: Ellis, Deborah J (NAVSEA)
Cc:
Subject: FW: BRAC Data Call

Debbie,

Please do these calculations and email to Wayne Venteluth.

bob

-----Original Message-----

From: Ventuleth, Wayne E
Sent: Friday, December 10, 2004 18:17
To: Matthews, Robert CIV NAVSURFWARCENDIV Crane, Code 05SP
Cc: Schulte, Donald CIV NAVSURFWARCEN CRANE, 40, BLDG. 3284
Subject: BRAC Data Call

Bob,

I need the Comptroller/Supply Department to give me a cost estimate for

12/13/2004

DCN: 11688

shipping 540 tons of test equipment from the West Coast to the East Coast, and the cost of 300 round trip airline tickets from East Coast to West Coast and return.

Thanks,
Wayne

Reference #DON027: Miscellaneous Recurring Savings - Losing (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for Miscellaneous Recurring Savings, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 4 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Miscellaneous Recurring Savings: Identify other recurring savings, e.g., new leases of facilities or equipment, etc. Identify only savings attributable to the BRAC action. Do not count changes in mission savings provided elsewhere.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-)) numeric	Miscellaneous Recurring Savings Item (Text) string200	Savings (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000
17	NA	0	NA

Reference #DON028: Procurement Cost Avoidances - Losing (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for Procurement Avoidances, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 4 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Procurement Cost Avoidances: Identify any procurement cost avoidance resulting from this BRAC action. Do not include any funds, regardless of appropriation, identified as BOS costs. An example of what could be reported is a planned "Other Procurement Account" for a new computer system that is no longer required.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Procurement Cost Avoidance and Savings Item (Text) string200	Cost Avoidance/Savings (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000
17	NA	0	NA

Reference #DON029: Military Construction Cost Avoidances - Losing (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for Military Construction Cost Avoidances, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 4 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: When a scenario affects a losing installation at which there is programmed recapitalization of an existing facility, the savings associated with this facility are already captured by the model's recapitalization calculation. Therefore, scenario data call respondents will not enter any construction cost avoidances (savings) for this type of military construction.

When a scenario affects an installation at which there is a military construction project, authorized and appropriated in Fiscal Year 2005 or earlier, for a new facility that creates a new footprint or supports new missions, such that the project is no longer required due to the BRAC action, scenario data call respondents must enter the construction costs avoidance (savings) associated with that project.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Mission MILCON Cost Avoidance Item (Text) string200	Cost Avoidance/Savings (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000
17	NA	0	NA

Reference #DON030: Facilities Shutdown

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, complete the table below to identify the number of square feet (in thousands) of space vacated in the Action, as applicable. If the Action you are addressing is a closure, leave Facility Shutdown blank (total square footage data for entire installations is already maintained at the IAT).

Additionally, provide the Percentage of Family Housing Shutdown which would result from the individual Action (as applicable). Determine the Percentage of Family Housing Shutdown by:

$\%FHS = \# \text{ of Units Shutdown} / \text{Total \# of Units}$

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Identify the number of square feet of Class 2 real property (buildings), excluding family housing, which will be shut down at the losing site.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Facility Shutdown (KSF) numeric	Percent Family Housing Shutdown (%FHS) (%) numeric

Reference #DON031: Enclave Requirement (AS REQUIRED)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity identified as relocating in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, provide enclave requirement (if any) information in the table below for each applicable FAC code. Ensure you provide an answer row for each individual facility (in the case of multiple facilities for same FAC code).

Source / Reference: OSD Facility Pricing Guide (Version 6 March 2004); Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 3 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Enclaves are sections of the military base that remain operational after the base is deactivated. The enclave will continue with its current role and functions subject to specific modifications. Enclave manning is established by the number of authorized personnel left on the installation after deactivation.

FAC - The FAC code from the OSD FPG. The FAC code identifies the type of facility to be constructed or rehabilitated.

UM - The Unit of Measure (SF for Square Feet, SY for Square Yards, etc.) for the FAC is displayed automatically once a valid FAC code has been entered.

Quantity - The size of the facility required, in the appropriate unit of measure, for the FAC selected. As an example, for FAC 6000 enter 10,000 as the amount of square feet of administrative facility needed. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999,999 of the unit of measure)

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FAC CODE (-) numeric	FAC DESCRIPTION (Text) string50	Unit of Measure (Text) string50	QTY (based on UM) (#) numeric

Reference #DON032: AFFECTED TENANTS - Losing Activity

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity as identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, identify Tenant Commands affected by the action and give a brief description of the effect. For affected Tenant Commands with greater than 100 personnel (aggregate military and DoD civilian) that are not SPECIFICALLY identified in any Action of this Scenario Data Call, provide a recommended disposition for that tenant ("closure"/disestablishment or Receiving Activity).

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	TENANT (Text) string50	Describe Effect (Text) string4000	Military Personnel (Pers) numeric	DoD Civilians (Pers) numeric	Closure (Yes/No) Yes/No	Recommended Receiving Activity (As Applicable) (Text) string200
17	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Reference #DON033: Military Construction Requirements - Receiving

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DON Scenario - Receiving Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action identified as relocating in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION applicable to your activity, provide military construction requirement information in the table below for each applicable FAC code. Ensure you provide an answer row for each individual facility required (in the case of multiple facilities for same FAC code). Use the "Rationale" column to give a brief explanation of your rationale for listing each MilCon entry.

NOTE: In ALL CASES, FAC Codes and Description with QTY or REHAB values (as applicable) is required. The costing model utilized for BRAC will calculate construction cost and future sustainment and modernization cost from this data. For individual projects which include special considerations that would not be reflected in the current DoD Facilities Pricing Guide, provide a TOTAL COST value for the MilCon in FY05 dollars in the methodology of the DoD Facility Pricing Guide as modified by your added requirements and EXPLAIN these requirements in your Rationale (otherwise, leave Total Cost column BLANK).

When considering MilCon requirements include supporting infrastructure such as roads, utilities, parking lots/garages, etc.

NOTE: Activities should consider facility rehabilitation prior to MILCON as current structures allow, particularly where space has been previously reported as being available. Close coordination between losing and receiving activities to determine requirement and facility availability is required.

Source / Reference: OSD Facility Pricing Guide (Version 6 March, 2004); Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 6 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: FAC - The FAC code from the OSD FPG. The FAC code identifies the type of facility to be constructed or rehabilitated.

UM - The Unit of Measure (SF for Square Feet, SY for Square Yards, etc.)

Quantity - The size of the facility required, in the appropriate unit of measure, for the FAC selected. As an example, for FAC 6000 enter 10,000 as the amount of square feet of administrative facility needed. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999,999 of the unit of measure).

Rehab - The size of the usable facility available that requires REHABILITATION, in the appropriate unit of measure, for the FAC selected. As an example, for FAC 6000 where 25,000 square feet of administrative facility is required and 10,000 square feet of space is available for rehabilitation, enter 10,000 for Rehab and 15,000 for QTY as the amount of square feet needed. (Allowed entries 0 to 99,999,999 of the unit of measure).

Rehabilitation Type - The rehabilitation factor is a percentage of the new construction cost that a rehabilitation effort would cost. Rehabilitation includes conversion from one facility type to another. When converting a facility from one type to another the user should use the FAC to which the building is being converted. The user can select from one of the three values. The value selected should reflect the condition of the facility being rehabilitated as follows:

- A "red" facility has adequate substructure, superstructure, and exterior closure. All other parts of the building need to be replaced.
- An "amber" facility has adequate substructure, superstructure, exterior closure, roofing, plumbing, HVAC, and basic electrical systems.
- If the condition of the facility is not known, the "default" value should be used. This represents a facility whose condition is somewhere between "red" and "amber".

Rationale: Text field to provide explanations for the required items.

Total Cost*: The total cost, for the requirement where it is listed, for new construction and/or rehabilitation project scope to be executed. This field should only be used when the Activity knows that a project includes special considerations that are not accounted for in the DoD Facilities Pricing Guide.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FAC CODE (-) string50	FAC DESCRIPTION (Text) string50	Unit of Measure (Text) string50	QTY (based on UM) (#) numeric	Rehab (based on UM) (#) numeric	Type (List) multiple choice ²	Rationale (Text) string4000	Total Cost* (\$K) numeric

² Choose a value from this list: Default, Red, Amber

Reference #DON034: Closure/Realignment Cost Considerations - Receiving Activity (Aggregate)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DON Scenario - Receiving Activities

Question: For each closure/realignment action applicable to your activity as identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, complete the table below to identify aggregate costs and savings with regards to RELOCATION (receiving activity). Provide a complete answer row for each Cost/Savings category for each Action listed in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION as it applies to your activity. SEE AMPLIFICATION FOR CATEGORY CLARIFICATION.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 5 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: SCENARIO DATA CALL COORDINATORS: Do not allow double counting of costs or savings captured by the losing/receiving activity's data call.

One-Time Unique Costs:

Identify any cost impacts on receiving activities that would result from a BRAC action. Only costs directly attributable to the BRAC action should be identified. Examples include use of temporary office space, etc. This area should not be used to identify routine moving or personnel costs nor should it be used to identify one-time unique moving costs, which will be addressed in the losing activity's data call.

One-Time Unique Savings:

Identify any other one-time unique savings at the receiving activities. This area should not be used to identify routine moving or personnel savings. Do not include Construction Cost Avoidances or Procurement Cost Avoidances (which are covered in the losing site data call). Only savings directly attributable to the BRAC action should be identified.

Environmental Non-MILCON Costs:

Identify any non-Military Construction environmental costs which will be incurred as a result of this BRAC action. Examples of environmental costs which could be incurred at receiving activities as the result of a BRAC action include environmental compliance, waste management, wetland mitigation, environmental impact statements at receiving activities, new permits, etc. NOTE: Environmental cleanup costs at closing sites are not considered in Scenario Data Calls since these costs will be incurred regardless of whether the activity is closed or remains opened.

Mission Contract Start Costs:

Identify any contract start-up costs related to a mission activity. This would include such costs as bridging contracts, one-time initial fees, or increased contract costs.

Miscellaneous Recurring Costs:

Identify any other recurring costs associated with the BRAC action at the receiving activities, e.g., new leases of facilities or equipment, etc.

Miscellaneous Recurring Savings:

Identify any other recurring savings associated with the BRAC action at the receiving activities, e.g., elimination of new leases of facilities or equipment, etc.

One-Time IT Costs:

Identify any One-Time IT costs incurred as a result of the BRAC action (e.g. NMCI bandwidth, DISA Switch)(Do not include MAC costs).

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Costs/Savings (List) multiple choice ³	FY 2006 (\$K) numeric	FY 2007 (\$K) numeric	FY 2008 (\$K) numeric	FY 2009 (\$K) numeric	FY 2010 (\$K) numeric	FY 2011 (\$K) numeric

³ Choose a value from this list: One-Time Unique Costs, One-Time Unique Savings, Environmental Non-MilCon Costs, Mission Contract Start Costs, Miscellaneous Recurring Costs, Miscellaneous Recurring Savings, One-Time IT Costs

Reference #DON035: One-Time Unique Costs - Receiving (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DON Scenario - Receiving Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for One Time Unique Costs, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 5 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: One-Time Unique Costs:

Identify any cost impacts on gaining activities that would result from a BRAC action. Only costs directly attributable to the BRAC action should be identified. Examples include use of temporary office space, etc. This area should not be used to identify routine moving or personnel costs nor should it be used to identify one-time unique moving costs, which will be addressed in the losing activity's data call.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	One-Time Unique Cost Item (Text) string200	Cost (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000

Reference #DON036: One Time Unique Savings - Receiving (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DON Scenario - Receiving Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for One Time Unique Savings, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 5 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: One-Time Unique Savings:

Identify any other one-time unique savings at the gaining activities. This area should not be used to identify routine moving or personnel savings, which are calculated automatically by the COBRA algorithms. Do not include Construction Cost Avoidances or Procurement Cost Avoidances (which are covered in the losing site data call). Only savings directly attributable to the BRAC action should be identified.

Examples include net proceeds to DoD resulting from a cost avoidance not otherwise covered. For each savings, identify the amount, the year in which it will occur, and describe the nature of the saving. Only savings directly attributable to the proposed BRAC action should be identified.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	One-Time Unique Savings Item (Text) string200	Savings (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000

Reference #DON037: Environmental Non-MILCON Costs - Receiving (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DON Scenario - Receiving Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for Environmental Non-MILCON Costs, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 5 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Environmental Non-MILCON Costs:

Identify any non-Military Construction environmental costs which will be incurred as a result of this BRAC action. Examples of environmental costs which could be incurred at receiving activities as the result of a BRAC action include environmental compliance, waste management, wetland mitigation, environmental impact statements at gaining sites, new permits, etc. NOTE: Environmental cleanup costs at closing sites are not considered in Scenario Data Calls since these costs will be incurred regardless of whether the activity is closed or remains opened.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-)) numeric	Environmental Non-MILCON Costs Item (Text) string200	Cost (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000

Reference #DON038: Mission Contract Start Costs - Receiving (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DON Scenario - Receiving Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for Mission Contract Start Costs, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 5 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Mission Contract Start Costs:

Identify any contract start-up costs related to a mission activity. This would include such costs as bridging contracts, one-time initial fees or increased contract costs.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Mission Contract Start Costs Item (Text) string200	Cost (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000

Reference #DON039: Miscellaneous Recurring Costs - Receiving (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DON Scenario - Receiving Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for Miscellaneous Recurring Costs, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 5 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Miscellaneous Recurring Costs:

Identify any other recurring costs associated with the BRAC action at the receiving activities, e.g., new leases of facilities or equipment, etc.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Miscellaneous Recurring Costs Item (Text) string200	Cost (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000

Reference #DON040: Miscellaneous Recurring Savings - Receiving (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DON Scenario - Receiving Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for Miscellaneous Recurring Savings, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 5 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: Miscellaneous Recurring Savings:

Identify any other recurring savings associated with the BRAC action at the receiving activities, e..g., elimination of new leases of facilities or equipment, etc.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	Miscellaneous Recurring Savings Item (Text) string200	Savings (\$K) string4000	Rationale (Text) string4000

Reference #DON041: One Time IT Costs - Receiving (Supporting Data)

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DON Scenario - Receiving Activities

Question: Based on the aggregate information provided for One Time IT Costs, provide the list of items considered, individual costs, and rationale for both numbers and FY on which relocation occurs.

Source / Reference: Scenario Data Call Introductory Instruction, Section 5 (in BRAC Library)

Amplification: One-Time IT Costs:

Identify any One-Time IT costs incurred as a result of the BRAC action (e.g. NMCI bandwidth, DISA Switch)(Do not include MAC costs).

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	One Time IT Costs Item (Text) string200	Cost (\$K) numeric	Rationale (Text) string4000

Reference #DON042: Additional Environmental Impact Information

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing and Receiving Activities ONLY

Question: Identify any environmental impacts at either the losing or receiving activity which may result from this scenario that warrant further consideration or haven't been included in the costs associated with this response as it applies to your activity.

This question requires a single answer with units of Text and a data type of string4000.

Answer:

At the Receiving Activity we need to have access to a Hazmat Program that includes a procurement agent, inventory control point, and disposition for spent residue. This Hazmat Program must also meet Federal, State, and Navy requirements.

In addition, the Receiving Activity needs to have a Federal/State certified environmental cleanup resource that can be called upon if we create an incident. This environmental resource must also meet the requirements of Title V.

Reference #DON043: Additional Community Impact

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing and Receiving Activities ONLY

Question: Identify any infrastructure impact on the community at the losing or receiving activity that may result from this scenario that warrant further consideration or haven't been included in the costs associated with this response as it applies to your activity. This question requires a single answer with units of Text and a data type of string4000.

Answer:

Reference #DON044: Non-DoD Federal Agency Impact

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing and Receiving Activities ONLY

Question: Identify all non-DoD Federal Agencies affected by closure/realignment action applicable to your activity as identified in the SCENARIO DESCRIPTION. Provide an estimate of the economic impact of each non-DoD Federal Agency and a description of the impact in the table provided.

Amplification: This question will require coordination with affected Federal Agency using non-disclosure arrangements in order to develop cost estimates. NOTE: An overall potential savings should be identified as a negative (-) cost.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-)) numeric	Non-DoD Federal Agency Impacted (Text) string200	Estimated Cost (\$K) numeric	Description (Text) string4000
17	NA	NA	NA

Reference #DON045: Alternative Receivers

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Primary Quarterback

Question: The Lead Major Claimant (Primary Quarterback) may submit a separate additional Scenario Data Call response, which, while not changing the activities identified as being closed or realigned, does identify alternative receiving activities. (Data for alternate sites may not be provided in lieu of the original proposed sites.) The template available for providing alternate receiving sites is located in the Scenario Reference Library under "Alternate Receiving Site Template". Refer to this template for instructions.

FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS QUESTION, SELECT "YES" IF AN ALTERNATE RECEIVING SITE TEMPLATE WILL BE UPLOADED IN THE SCENARIO SPECIFIC REFERENCE LIBRARY.

Source / Reference: Alternate Receiving Site Template (BRAC Reference Library)

This question requires a single answer with units of Yes/No and a data type of Yes/No.

Answer:

Reference #DON046: Contractor Mission Support Employees

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - Losing and Receiving Activities ONLY

Question: Report the net number of contractor mission support employees that would be directly affected by the proposed BRAC action. Use positive numbers (+) for net gains and negative numbers (-) for net losses.

Amplification: “Contractor mission support employees” are contractor employees who perform one or more of the military missions on the base or activity, and whose work tasks are virtually identical to government civil servants or military personnel. Such mission support contractors provide direct support to the installation mission. Such mission support contractors include intelligence analysts, technicians, aircraft, ship, vehicle, or weapon system maintenance staff and information technology specialists; the key factor must be that mission support contractors perform the same missions tasks as military personnel or civilian employees.

When counting mission support contractors, determine the number of full time equivalents (FTE). FTE is defined by 8 hours of work per working day.

DO NOT INCLUDE: Following types of contractor personnel should not be included because they do not fit the definition of contractor mission support employees: Contractors for Base Sustainment or Base Operation Support (BOS), such as grounds keeping, facilities maintenance, plumbing, and general purpose utility work, and non-appropriated fund employees. (These personnel do not perform military missions. Their economic impact will be estimated separately as part of the BRAC 2005 economic impact methodology.)

This data will NOT be used in COBRA for estimating costs. It will be used in the Economic Impact Tool (EIT) to estimate job losses in the local community. Only the total of all the columns will be used for the estimate, but the accompanying EIT graphical display will show losses by year and will provide a better display if the contractor job losses are phased in the same manner as the military and civilian moves/loses. If yearly estimates cannot be provided, enter the total number in the most appropriate year as determined by the scenario.

Please fill in the following table(s), adding rows as necessary

Action # (-) numeric	FY 2006 Number of Contractors (#) numeric	FY 2007 Number of Contractors (#) numeric	FY 2008 Number of Contractors (#) numeric	FY 2009 Number of Contractors (#) numeric	FY 2010 Number of Contractors (#) numeric	FY 2011 Number of Contractors (#) numeric
17				-33		

Reference #DON047: Other Unidentified Issues

JCSG: Navy/USMC

Function(s): DoN Scenario - ALL

Question: Previous questions in this data call may not fully capture all of the issues associated with this scenario. To that end, provide any critical information that clearly describes any tangible mission impact not costed or considered in other responses to this data call that directly impacts ability of losing or receiving activity to implement the scenario as described.

Amplification: Information provided here must be additive to information requested elsewhere in the data call. Answers must be specific and supported by reference to statute, regulation, or specific unique infrastructure that will provide essential information to the evaluation of this scenario.

This question requires a single answer with units of Text and a data type of string2000.

Answer:

A tangible mission impact exists with execution of this scenario, relating to the current geographical (west coast) location of MCPD near major Marine Corps (e.g. I MEF, etc.) and Navy (e.g. Naval Base Coronado, etc.) commands/organizations. MCPD interfaces with these local Navy and Marine Corps commands on a frequent and reoccurring basis during the planning and execution of weapon systems Test and Evaluation. In many cases, local active duty military personnel are actually integrated into MCPD live-fire field testing teams, providing real advantages to all concerned (i.e. MCPD utilizes qualified/certified military personnel and local military units gain additional weapon systems training). In addition, MCPD is currently located near key training/operational environments (i.e. sea, littoral, and desert) and has access to major, nearby, operational testing ranges/facilities (e.g. 29 Palms and Yuma, California plus Nellis and Hawthorne, Nevada, etc.). The movement of MCPD from this geographical area would adversely impact its ability to help ensure the highest possible state of readiness of weapon systems supporting DoD, and in particular the U.S. Marine Corps.

SCENARIO DATA CALL: INFORMATION REQUIRED FROM MOVING ACTIVITY			
			DATE
Fill in Spaces marked in yellow			12/11/2004
TECH - 002D, Action #17 Relocate Fallbrook Guns/Ammo RDAT&E to Picatinny Arsenal			
	Activity Name	Crane Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center	
	UIC		
ATTACH COPY OF APPROVED BFR IF AVAILABLE			
Number of Personnel Moving to New Installation			
Officers - Billets Authorized (BA)	0	Pers	
Enlisted - Billets Authorized (BA)	0	Pers	
Civilian, Appropriated - Billets Authorized (BA)	107	Pers	
Civilian, Non-Appropriated Billets Authorized (BA)	0	Pers	
Contractor Personnel (not moving; require office space in new location)	33	Pers	
location)	0	Pers	
new location)	0	Pers	
Total expected personnel at new location	140		
Unique Facility/Equipment Requirements			
<i>(add rows if needed)</i>			
		Type	Quantity
Facilities Required (Requirement reflects total space requirement including offices)			Total Cost
			0
Fallbrook			
Administrative Facilities (B-5, 103, & 365)		SF	24,397
Non Explosive Test Facilities (307 & 308)		SF	8,078

3 Phase 208 VAC 500 Amp Circuit			
150 psi Compressed Air (100 gallon tank)	HP	10	
Title 5 vent hood (B-308)	EA	4	
Fire Sprinkler System			
20' high ceiling			
Loading dock (B-307)			
Overhead traveling crane	LBS	5,000	
Floor to accommodate heavy equipment with provision for leveling			
Explosive Test Facility (B-364)	SF	7,228	
Must meet NAVFAC Explosive Facility Requirements			
3 Phase 208 VAC 500 Amp Circuit			
150 psi Air Supply (100 gallon tank)	HP	10	
35,000 NEW			
10 Explosive Proof Test Cells 10' x 10' x 10'			
Air Driven Explosive Door for each test cell			
Fire Sprinkler System			
Intrusion Detection System			
Floor to accommodate heavy equipment with provision for leveling			
Title 5 vent hood	EA	1	
12' high ceiling			
Overhead traveling crane	LBS	5,000	
Loading dock			
Inert Storage Facility	SF	3,500	
Explosive Storage Magazines (30,360 NEW)	SF	1,800	
3 Keyport magazines (due to compatibility issues) and three different magazines each with a minimum capability of 10,000 pounds NEW Class/Div. 1.1)	NEW	30,360	

0027 (Application Server Connections)	1		
3005AA (Network Printer)	10		
3013AAA (Personal Scanner)	0		
3021AA (Personal Printer)	0		
3026AA (Network Plotter)	0		
4000AA (Frontpage)	0		
4001AA (Visio)	0		
4002AA (Project)	0		
4006AA (Publisher)	0		
4011AA (AutoCAD)	0		
6000AA (BlackBerry)	0		
<i>(add rows if needed)</i>			

DCN: 11688
Ventuleth, Wayne E

From: Stuffle, Gary NAVSEA
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 2:36 PM
To: Schulte, Donald CIV NAVSURFWARCEN CRANE, 40, BLDG. 3284; Webster, Henry III NAVSEA; Ventuleth, Wayne E; Hendrix, Melinda CIV NAVSURFWARCENDIV 403; Turpen, Steve NAVSEA; Karcher, Robert CIV NAVSURFWARCENDIV Crane, Code 404; Whorrall, Karen CIV NAVSEA 402; Scott, James CIV NAVSEA 408; Hunsicker, James NAVSEA
Cc: Matthews, Robert CIV NAVSURFWARCENDIV Crane, Code 05SP; Stapp, Timothy CIV NAVSURFWARCENDIV Crane, Code 054
Subject: QUESTIONS 30 AND 42 ON TECH-002C and 002D
Signed By: gary.stuffle@navy.mil

The following information will be provided for the subject questions.
Please review and let me know if you agree with information provided.

Scenario/Action Square Feet (KSF)	Facility Shutdown
002C-5 308.8 KSF	Yes (3347,3348, 3346, 143, 3252 8, 466, 99, 100, 363, 8002 198, 3338, 3233, 2508, 3054,366, 2869, 3108, 2947, 3087, 3342,3115,
002C-6 0 KSF	2932, 2935, 74 mags. No
002C-7 3.2 KSF	Yes (8)
002D-13 72.5 KSF	Yes (3212, 1820, 2989, 30 mags)
002D-15 0 KSF	No
002D-17 Storage Bldg.	Yes (5, 103, 365, 307,308,364, Inert 43.2 KSF

All remaining facilities are dual use and can not be shutdown. In addition, there are no known environmental matters that require further consideration.

V/R

Gary Stuffle

Crane Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC Crane)
Harnessing the Power of Technology for the Warfighter
Code 054GS, Bldg. 1
300 Highway 361
Crane, IN 47522-5001
Ph: 812.854.3558
Fax: 812.854.5923
Email: gary.stuffle@navy.mil

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NAVSEA
WARFARE CENTERS
CRANE

Marine Corps Programs Division



NSWC Crane Division

Detachment Fallbrook

DIVISION

BRIEF



Introduction to MCPD

- Civil Service organization aligned with Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Division Crane
- Located, as a tenant, aboard Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach, Detachment Fallbrook, CA
- Provides Life-cycle Weapon Systems Assessment and Engineering Support for DoD (since assessment was not an available option in Commercial Activity (CA) studies, we have been coded as a Test & Evaluation (T&E) Activity)
- A Naval Working Capital Fund Activity
- Operates with centralized control, decentralized management, and cross-functional teaming



Mission Overview

- **Mission:** The Marine Corps Programs Division performs weapon systems assessment and engineering for our customers to enhance combat systems readiness.
- **Focus:** MCPD is helping Joint Forces prevail on 21st century battlefields by optimizing military resources through continuous assessment and engineering so that our munitions and weapon systems will be at the highest possible state of readiness.


Marine Corps Programs Division



NSWC Crane Division

Detachment Fallbrook

Location





Marine Corps Programs Division



NSWC Crane Division

Detachment Fallbrook

MCPD Historic Lineage

- 1941 - U.S. Government decision to construct a Naval Ammunition Depot (NAD) at Fallbrook, CA
- 1942 - U.S. Government condemns 9147.55 acres of Old Santa Margarita Ranch (original Spanish land grant); Naval Ammunition Depot (NAD), Fallbrook, commissioned; commenced operations 2 Feb 42
- 1944 - Fallbrook Ammunition Quality Evaluation (AQE) Lab; established to improve weapons reliability in support of the Pacific and European allied forces in WWII
- 1946 - After WWII, AQE Lab retitled Quality Control Lab (QCL)
- 1948 - QCL renamed Quality Evaluation Lab (QEL) to reflect evaluation of war reserve stocks
- 1958 - Fallbrook Depot annexed to the Naval Ammunition and Net Depot (NAND), Seal Beach, CA
- 1962 - Fallbrook Annex under command of U.S. Naval Weapons Station (NWS), Seal Beach, CA
- 1969 - Responsibilities expanded to include USMC Missile, Air Launched Missile and Weapons Calibration functions



MCPD Historic Lineage (contd)

- 1971 - Renamed Quality Evaluation and Engineering Lab (QEEL) with increased emphasis on engineering
- 1974 - Retitled Weapons Quality Engineering Center (WQEC); evaluating weapon systems performance, readiness, and effectiveness
- 1975 - Marine Corps Programs Branch (MCPB) established at Fallbrook; emphasis on Marine Corps Ammunition Surveillance Testing & Evaluation.
- 1985 - Marine Corps Programs Branch (MCPB) under Naval Warfare Assessment Center (NWAC), Corona, CA.
- 1989 - Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) retitled, remained at Fallbrook Annex
- 1990 - Marine Corps Programs Department retitled, remained at Fallbrook Annex, under NWS Seal Beach
- 1993 - MCPD under command of Naval Ordnance Center, Pacific Division, (NOCPACDIV) Seal Beach, CA
- 1997 - MCPD retitled a Directorate, under Naval Warfare Assessment Division(NWAD), Corona, CA
- 1998 - MCPD retitled a Department, transitioned to Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Crane Division, Crane, IN
- 2003 – MCPD retitled a Division, under Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane

Marine Corps Programs Division



Detachment Fallbrook

NSWC Crane Division

MCPD Personnel & Facilities

- Personnel
 - 193 (110 civilian, 83 contractors)*
 - Breakdown (capabilities)
 - Engineers (36%)
 - Mathematicians/Statisticians/Operational Research Analysts (10%)
 - Technical Specialists (34%)
 - Other (Administrative Personnel/Analysts) (20%)
- Facilities
 - Fallbrook (located in close proximity) (i.e. 2 mile radius)
 - 4 occupied buildings
 - 9 unoccupied (production, storage, etc.) buildings
 - Hawthorne Test Facility (test ranges not identified in BRAC recommended Hawthorne closure)
 - 49,000 acres (Northwest Nevada) (test mortars, gun, pyro, rocket systems)
 - Instrumented state-of-the-art ranges operated by MCPD personnel
 - 50,000 sq. ft. of admin and range support buildings/trailers
 - Offsite locations (Rock Island, IL; Mechanicsburg, PA; Camp LeJeune, NC; Quantico, VA)

* Includes 92 employees with military experience



MCPD Core Functions (Joint Support)

- Ammunition Assessment and Engineering
 - Test and Evaluation
 - Life Cycle Management
 - Service Life Prediction Process
 - Prepositioned Ammunition Support
- Operational Testing (OT) and Assessment; other Test and Evaluation (DT / LUT / ACTD / In Service)
- Weapon Systems Engineering/Analysis in Support of T&E
 - Integrated Engineering, Modernization, Re-engineering, and Combat Enhancement
 - Modeling and Simulation
 - Safety Engineering
 - ILS Engineering
- Quality Audits, Evaluations, Assessments, and Management Support
- Malfunction Investigations, Failure Analysis, and Fault Isolation
- Maintain Marine Corps Class V(W) (Ground) ammunition data base; supports Knowledge Management Portal (KMP)



BRAC 05 Technical Joint Cross Service Group Intent

Section 10 Recommendation:

Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition

Justification:

This recommendation realigns and consolidates those gun and ammunition facilities working in Weapons and Armaments (W&A) Research (R), Development & Acquisition (D&A)



BRAC 05 Fallbrook Recommendation

- Realign the Fallbrook, CA Detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ

Note: Fallbrook, CA Detachment, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN performs NO Research, Development and Acquisition work for guns and ammunition



Discussion Points for Review with BRAC Analysts

- Review BRAC 05 Recommendation to Realign and Relocate MCPD to Picatinny Arsenal
- Review COBRA Model Economical Analysis for TECH-0018B
- Discuss impact to MCPD's Human Capital once BRAC Recommendation is implemented
- Discuss impact to MCPD's Independent Analysis Function once BRAC Recommendation is implemented
- Discuss Short/Long Term Impact to the Warfighter once BRAC Recommendation is implemented



Review BRAC 05 Recommendation to Realign and Relocate MCPD to Picatinny Arsenal

- The Fallbrook recommendation makes no mention of gun and ammunition Test & Evaluation (T&E) work, as we have been coded
- We would therefore conclude that no employees would be relocated from Fallbrook to Picatinny
- However, an inconsistency exists in the BRAC Report, since it identifies 118 civilians leaving Fallbrook
- At this point in time, we are unsure if Fallbrook's T&E work is to relocate to Picatinny or stay with the Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane
- Evidence exists that suggests the BRAC Recommendation, as written without T&E, is correct. (See *Technical Joint Cross-Service Group meeting minutes of 2 March 2005.*)
- Our parent Command, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division has requested clarification of DoD as to whether or not T&E was included in this BRAC Recommendation. To date, we have not received a response



Review COBRA Model Economical Analysis for TECH-0018B

- COBRA Model identifies savings in five areas (Sustainment, Recap, BOS, Civ Salary, and Misc Recur), and failed to accept our Misc Recur costs
 - Sustainment, Recap, and BOS savings (\$457K/yr) appear to be acceptable
 - Civ Salary savings (\$1,254K/yr) are based on a 15% reduction in personnel. MCPD is only 6.5% overhead with one third of this being employee training. At the most, relocation/consolation of administrative/ overhead function would reduce 4.6% of our personnel



Review COBRA Model Economical Analysis for TECH-0018B (Cont.)

- Misc Recur savings (\$1,000K/yr) are based on a 15% reduction in contractor personnel. A 15% reduction of contractors equates to a 15% loss in productivity which will need to be addressed by an increase in government personnel to maintain the same level of customer support. Therefore, the “misc recur savings” of \$1,000K/yr identified by the COBRA Model is an inaccurate cost savings assumption
- Misc Recur costs were reduced from \$680K/yr to zero dollars based on “overhead offsets”. These costs are real operating costs associated with performing our T&E function from Picatinny Arsenal. The costs reflect the increase in travel and shipping expenses we will incur being located in NJ and testing at DoD T&E ranges on the west coast



Discuss Impact to MCPD's Human Capital Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

- As of 30 June 2005, MCPD government workforce included 110 employees that had a cumulative total of 1,694 years experience working Marine Corps Test & Evaluation
- Forty-five of these government employees also possess 675 years of prior military experience. This military experience provides MCPD with a valuable linkage to Marine Corps Active Duty forces and an understanding of the Marine Corps' mission, structure, and doctrine
- At best, 15% of MCPD's personnel will move to Picatinny Arsenal. This brain drain will result in the human capital loss of approximately 94 employees with over 2000 years of experience in Marine Corps' T&E/military. For each employee lost, it will take 3-5 years of training to develop new employees with a working level knowledge of Marine Corps T&E. This is true even if the new employee has been working in the government on other Service's T&E



Discuss Impact to MCPD's Independent Analysis Function Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

- MCPD was established to perform independent assessment of Marine Corps weapon systems to ensure they meet specified operational requirements and to mitigate operational and safety risks to the warfighter. Independent assessment requires a chain of command free of any conflict of interest. That is, those responsible for research, development, and acquisition should not be likewise responsible for the assessment of their work/performance
- Realignment of MCPD with the Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command (ARDEC) at Picatinny Arsenal will create a serious conflict of interest between the Army acquisition priorities (they buy for the Marine Corps), and MCPD's role of assessing ARDEC's products for the Marine Corps



Discuss Impact to MCPD's Independent Analysis Function Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented (Cont.)

- BRAC Recommendation TECH-0018B does not address the command structure of the new Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition. Without this knowledge, we cannot determine the seriousness of any conflict of interest between the Army and MCPD



Discuss Short/Long Term Impact to the Warfighter Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

BACKGROUND:

- The BRAC Military Value analysis and scoring of NSWC Detachment Fallbrook, Marine Corps Programs Division (MCPD) appears technically correct based on the criteria and methods used, however:
 - MCPD scored highest in Weapons Technology T&E, and lowest in Weapons Technology D&A.
 - BRAC Military Value analysis does not present an accurate account of how the operating forces will be negatively affected by the proposed relocation of MCPD to Picatinny Arsenal
 - MCPD is strategically located on the west coast to allow for an optimum relationship with the warfighter (I MEF, etc.), and to provide close proximity to the west coast operational training and test ranges



Discuss Short/Long Term Impact to the Warfighter Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

SHORT TERM IMPACT TO WARFIGHTER (3-5 YEARS):

- MCPD will lose approximately 85% of its technical experts. This equates to a like amount of knowledge and experience in assessing Marine Corps weapon systems, leaving MCPD's service
- MCPD will hire and train new employees to replace those that would not relocate. There will be a 3-5 year timeframe required to regain the knowledge and a portion of the experience lost during the relocation
- MCPD's close relationship with the Marine Corps warfighter will change. We will no longer be within 3 miles of Camp Pendleton and I MEF. Communication will now be via phone and email instead of in person at either site (efficiencies and effectiveness gained through face-to-face liaison and the participation of local active duty personnel in all aspects of planning and conducting of weapon systems testing will be degraded)



Discuss Short/Long Term Impact to the Warfighter Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

SHORT TERM IMPACT TO WARFIGHTER (3-5 YEARS) (Cont.):

- During this period of hiring and training a new workforce, and re-establishing a new working relationship with the warfighter, MCPD's services and products will be of less quality, cost more, and take longer to provide
- The fighting forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations will not have rapid turn-around of pressing issues affecting the safety and performance of their munitions
- Implementation of this move would adversely impact the ability of MCPD to support the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) and homeland defense



Discuss Short/Long Term Impact to the Warfighter Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

LONG TERM IMPACT TO WARFIGHTER (6 YEARS AND BEYOND):

- The loss of synergy associated with MCPD's geographic location, near warfighters and west coast test ranges, will make it difficult for MCPD to fully re-establish its knowledge and experience base in Marine Corps related T&E and munitions assessment
- Operating remotely (geographically) may cause MCPD, as an organization (other than traveling test teams), to become detached from and less acceptable to the warfighters



Discuss Short/Long Term Impact to the Warfighter Once BRAC Recommendation is Implemented

LONG TERM IMPACT TO WARFIGHTER (6 YEARS AND BEYOND) (Cont.):

- The ability for MCPD to provide rapid turn-around of pressing issues affecting the safety and performance of munitions/ weapon systems will never return to the same level prior to BRAC. The simplest explanation for this is that the Marine Corps warfighters are not located in Picatinny NJ. They are at Marine Corps Bases, and train at Marine Corps training ranges. To position MCPD hundreds to thousands of miles from the warfighter will adversely impact MCPD's ability to respond to requests for support and/or even be asked to respond