

DCN: 11799



August 2, 2005

Mr. David Epstein
 Mr. Les Farrington
 2005 Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
 2521 South Clark Street, Ste. 600
 Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Epstein and Mr. Farrington:

Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you this past Tuesday, July 26 and to talk with you about our concerns with two of the BRAC recommendations relative to Dahlgren.

We appreciate your graciousness and attention, especially when we know what a hectic schedule you have at this time.

At your suggestion, we will be briefing ADM Harold W. Gehman, Jr. (USN, Ret) on August 10, 2005, at 2:45 p.m. at the BRAC Commission office (large conference room). We hope that you will be able to join us for that briefing.

As requested, below are the names, email addresses, and phone numbers of our Regional team who visited you on Tuesday.

Mrs. Linda Worrell, President, Fredericksburg Regional Chamber of Commerce
 (Linda@fredericksburgchamber.org; 540-373-9526)
 Mr. Ted Hontz, Co-Chair of the Military Affairs Council, Fredericksburg
 (ted_hontz@teambci.com; 540-663-3321, ext. 132)
 Mr. Ted Williams, member of the Military Affairs Council, Fredericksburg
 (lmwilli3@aol.com; 540-371-4492)
 Mr. Paul Hirsch, President, Madison Government Affairs
 (paul@madisongov.net; 202-347-1223)
 Ms. Debbie Eubanks, Senior Manager, Madison Government Affairs
 (debbieeubanks227@aol.com; 540-220-5358)
 Mr. Cord Sterling, Defense LA, Senator John Warner's office
 (cord_sterling@Warner.senate.gov; 202-224-6295)
 Mr. Andrew Hicks, Military Affairs, Congresswoman Jo Ann Davis' office
 (Andrew.Hicks@mail.house.gov; 202-226-9878)
 Mr. Josh Cohn, Governor Mark Warner's liaison office
 (Josh.Cohn@governor.virginia.gov; 202-783-1769)

DCN: 11799

Again, thank you for your time and consideration. If we can be of further assistance or answer any other questions, please don't hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Linda Worrell". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the typed name and title.

Mrs. Linda Worrell
President

DCN: 11799

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: DebbieEubanks227@aol.com
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2005 1:45 PM
To: David.Epstein@wso.whs.mil
Cc: Lester.Farrington@wso.whs.mil; paul@madisongov.net
Subject: Re: Meeting with you concerning BRAC Recommendations for Dahlgren

Good afternoon Mr. Epstein. Thank you for getting back with us on the above. As mentioned in earlier phone call, below is what we have at this time for the meeting with you and Mr. Farrington on Tuesday, July 26

Meeting with Fredericksburg Region (community) reference BRAC recommendations - Naval District Washington, West Area, Dahlgren (NSWCDD)

Date: July 26, 2005
Time: 1:00 pm

Possible Attendees:

Linda Worrell, Pres., Fredericksburg Regional Chamber of Commerce
Mr. Ted Williams, community leader and former Deputy Technical Director and Department Head at NSWC, Dahlgren
Mr. Ted Hontz, Co-Chair of the Military Affairs Committee, Fredericksburg Regional Chamber of Commerce; former CO of AEGIS Training and Readiness at Dahlgren; and presently employed with BCI (Basic Commerce and Industries, Inc), Dahlgren
Mr. Paul Hirsch, President and CEO of Madison Government Affairs
Ms. Debbie Eubanks, Senior Manager, Madison Government Affairs
Mr. Cord Sterling, SEN John Warner's staff

As mentioned earlier, there may be a couple more attendees. I will keep you posted. Please let me know what additional information I need to furnish you and who to work with for logistics. I know you are extremely busy and I want to make sure that we provide you with assistance as necessary.

Thank you.
R/Debbie Eubanks

Debra O. Eubanks
Senior Manager
Madison Government Affairs
804-742-5064
cell: 540-220-5358
804-742-5064 (fax)
debbie@madisongov.net

VIRGINIA Governor Mark Warner (D)

**John W. Warner (R)
George F. Allen (R)**

DISTRICT 1

JO ANN DAVIS

Republican

Yorktown Weapon Support Facility
NSWCD Dahlgren
NMC Portsmouth
NSGA NW Chesapeake
Fort A. P. Hill (Reserve Command & Active Army Training)
MCCDC Quantico
FISC Williamsburg
WPNSTA Yorktown

DISTRICT 2

THELMA D. DRAKE

Republican

NSA Norfolk
NAVPHIBASE Little Creek
NAVBASE Norfolk
FISC Norfolk
DFAS Norfolk
NAS OCEANA
LANTFLT HEADSUPPACT Norfolk
COMNAVREG Mid-Atlantic
Fort Monroe (Training and Doctrine Command Hdq – TRADOC)
NSCSC Wallops Island
Fort Story (Reserve Command & Amphibious Training)
Joint Forces Staff College
Langley Air Force Base
Dam Neck FCTC
NAVADMINCMD Norfolk
NAVSTA Norfolk
NSY Norfolk

DISTRICT 3

ROBERT C. SCOTT

Democrat

NMC Portsmouth
Fort Eustis (Transportation Center and School)
NSY Norfolk

DISTRICT 4

J. RANDY FORBES

Republican

Fort Lee (Quartermaster Center and School)
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)

NAVSECFRUCT N WEST Chesapeake

BRAC 95 Action – Fort Lee

DISTRICT 5 VIRGIL GOODE, JR. *Republican*

NONE

DISTRICT 6 ROBERT W. GOODLATTE *Republican*

NONE

DISTRICT 7 ERIC I. CANTOR *Republican*

Defense Supply Center Richmond

DISTRICT 8 JAMES P. MORAN *Democrat*

Headquarters Henderson Hall
 Office of Naval Research
 Fort Myer (Administration and Logistical Support)
 Fort Belvoir (Administration and Logistical Support)
 DFAS Arlington
 HQ Defense Logistics Agency
 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
 Army Materiel Command (AMC)
 Army Test & Evaluation Command (ATEC)
 Pentagon
 Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM)

BRAC 91/93 Action – Ft. Belvoir

DISTRICT 9 RICK BOUCHER *Democrat*

Radford Army Ammunition Plant

DISTRICT 10 FRANK WOLF *Republican*

NONE

DISTRICT 11 THOMAS M. DAVIS III *Republican*

NONE

D. H. Ingram

As of: Tue May 03 12:18:20 EDT 2005


ECONOMIC IMPACT DATA

Scenario: All Selected (see title page)
Economic Region of Influence(ROI): King George County, VA
Base: All Bases
Action: All Actions

Overall Economic Impact of Proposed BRAC-05 Action:


| | |
|--|--------|
| ROI Population (2002): | 17,624 |
| ROI Employment (2002): | 14,171 |
| Authorized Manpower (2005): | 4,539 |
| Authorized Manpower(2005) / ROI Employment(2002): | 32.03% |
| Total Estimated Job Change: | -333 |
| Total Estimated Job Change / ROI Employment(2002): | -2.35% |

Cumulative Job Change (Gain/Loss) Over Time:




King George County, VA Trend Data


Employment Trend (1988-2002)



Unemployment Percentage Trend (1990-2003)



Per Capita Income x \$1,000 (1988-2002)



Deliberative Document - For Discussion Purposes Only - Do Not Release Under FOIA

**NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, KING GEORGE, VA
COMMISSION BASE VISIT
MAY 26, 2005**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAB

1. ITINERARY
2. BASE SUMMARY SHEET
3. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION
4. STATE MAP AND FACILITY PICTURES
5. COMMAND BIOGRAPHIES
6. STATE CLOSURE HISTORY LIST


**Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)
Dahlgren, VA
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
Brookmont, MD**

**Commissioner Itinerary
26 May 2005**

**David Epstein– Lead Analyst, NSWC Dahlgren, VA
Michael Delaney– Lead Analyst, NGA Brookmont, MD**

| TIME | EVENT | LOCATION | POC | ACTION |
|--------------------------|---|------------------------------|--|---|
| 26-May 6:30 AM | David Epstein picks up Mr. Battaglia | BRAC Offices Crystal City | David Epstein | |
| 6:45 | Commissioners Picked up | Arlington/ Alexandria | David Epstein | Review Briefing Book |
| 8:15 | Arrive | NSWC Dahlgren | David Epstein | |
| 8:15-11:15 | Base Visit | NSWC Dahlgren | David Epstein | |
| 11:15 | Depart NSWC Dahlgren | NSWC Dahlgren | | |
| 12:45 PM | Arrive | NGA, Brookmont | Michael Delaney and Kathleen Robertson | Meet Michael Delaney and Kathleen Robertson; David Epstein Departs for BRAC |
| 12:45-3:45 | Chairman Principi, Mr. Battaglia, Michael Delaney, and Kathleen Robertson- Base Visit | NGA, Brookmont | Michael Delaney and Kathleen Robertson | |
| 3:45 | Depart: Kathleen Robertson drives Chairman Principi and Mr. Battaglia to BRAC Offices | NGA, Brookmont | Michael Delaney and Kathleen Robertson | En route to BRAC Offices |
| 4:15 | Arrive | BRAC Offices | Michael Delaney and Kathleen Robertson | |
| 4:30 | Kathleen Robertson drives Chairman Principi home. | | Kathleen Robertson | |

**Recommendation for Realignment
Naval Surface Warfare Center Division
Dahlgren, VA**



As of: Tue May 03 12:18:20 EDT 2005


ECONOMIC IMPACT DATA

Scenario: All Selected (see title page)
Economic Region of Influence(ROI): King George County, VA
Base: All Bases
Action: All Actions

Overall Economic Impact of Proposed BRAC-05 Action:


| | |
|--|--------|
| ROI Population (2002): | 17,624 |
| ROI Employment (2002): | 14,171 |
| Authorized Manpower (2005): | 4,539 |
| Authorized Manpower(2005) / ROI Employment(2002): | 32.03% |
| Total Estimated Job Change: | -333 |
| Total Estimated Job Change / ROI Employment(2002): | -2.35% |

Cumulative Job Change (Gain/Loss) Over Time:




King George County, VA Trend Data


Employment Trend (1988-2002)



Unemployment Percentage Trend (1990-2003)



Per Capita Income x \$1,000 (1988-2002)



**NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY CORONA CA
COMMISSION BASE VISIT
July 12, 2005**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAB

1. ITINERARY
2. BASE SUMMARY SHEET
3. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION
4. STATE MAP AND FACILITY PICTURES
5. COMMAND BIOGRAPHIES
6. STATE CLOSURE HISTORY LIST
7. ECONOMIC IMPACT
8. SPYDER CHART
9. ENVIRONMENT
10. DEMOGRAPHICS

Air Platforms D&A Military Value

| Facility Name | MilVal |
|---|---------------|
| USN_8_Pax (NAS Patuxent River) | 0.6556 |
| Wright-Patterson AFB | 0.5303 |
| REDSTONE ARSENAL | 0.3901 |
| NAVAIRWARCENACDIV Lakehurst | 0.2859 |
| Hill AFB | 0.2464 |
| Tinker AFB | 0.1845 |
| Warner Robbins AFB | 0.1829 |
| Naval Research Laboratory Washington DC | 0.1621 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.1459 |
| FORT EUSTIS | 0.1452 |
| ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND | 0.1363 |
| USN_4_San Diego (NATEC) | 0.1311 |
| FORT RUCKER | 0.1273 |
| COMNAVAIRSYSCOM_PATUXENT_RIVER_MD Arlington | 0.0932 |
| USN_2_Pt Mugu | 0.0915 |
| USN_2_China Lake | 0.0585 |

| | |
|---|--------|
| Average Military Value with NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2229 |
| Average Military Value without NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2281 |

55 locations were exempted from consideration as a consequence of a TJCSG decision not to analyze locations with less than 31 full time equivalent work years in a function. It was the military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.

Air Platforms T&E Military Value

| Facility Name | MilVal |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|
| USN_8_Pax (NAS Patuxent River) | 0.6377 |
| Eglin AFB | 0.5251 |
| EDWARDS AFB | 0.5137 |
| USN_2_Pt Mugu | 0.4821 |
| USN_2_China Lake | 0.4476 |
| REDSTONE ARSENAL | 0.3550 |
| NELLIS AFB | 0.3410 |
| FORT RUCKER | 0.3119 |
| FT HOOD | 0.2521 |
| Arnold AFS | 0.1334 |
| NAVAIRWARCENACDIV Lakehurst | 0.0966 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.0698 |
| USAF_2_Alamogorgo (Holloman) | 0.0689 |
| Tucson IAP AGS | 0.0638 |
| COMOPTEVFOR_NORFOLK_VA | 0.0618 |
| Wright-Patterson AFB | 0.0584 |
| YUMA PROVING GROUND | 0.0571 |
| ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND | 0.0567 |
| Tyndall AFB | 0.0564 |
| FORT EUSTIS | 0.0497 |
| Warner Robbins AFB | 0.0305 |
| FORT MONMOUTH | 0.0291 |

Average Military Value with NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA 0.2136
Average Military Value without NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA 0.2204

34 locations were exempted from consideration as a consequence of a TJCSG decision not to analyze locations with less than 31 full time equivalent work years in a function. It was the military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.

Ground Vehicles T&E Military Value

| | |
|------------------------------|---------------|
| ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND | 0.6844 |
| YUMA PROVING GROUND | 0.4784 |
| DUGWAY PROVING GROUND | 0.4144 |
| FT HOOD | 0.3488 |
| MCB Camp Pendleton (DRPMAAA) | 0.2312 |
| WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE | 0.1010 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.0708 |
| DETROIT ARSENAL | 0.0392 |

| | |
|---|--------|
| Average Military Value with NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2960 |
| Average Military Value without NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.3282 |

9 locations were exempted from consideration as a consequence of a TJCSG decision not to analyze locations with less than 31 full time equivalent work years in a function. It was the military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.

Information Systems Technology D&A Military Value

| | |
|---|---------------|
| USN_4_San Diego | 0.5941 |
| FORT MONMOUTH | 0.4845 |
| USN_2_San Diego | 0.4742 |
| SPAWARSYSCEN_CHARLESTON_SC | 0.4502 |
| Hanscom AFB | 0.4398 |
| USN_8_Pax | 0.3108 |
| DISA Development and Acquisition | 0.3006 |
| COMNAVUNSEAWARCEN_NEWPORT_RI | 0.2956 |
| FORT MONMOUTH San Diego | 0.2933 |
| Naval Research Laboratory Washington DC | 0.2808 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_DAHLGREN_VA | 0.2552 |
| REDSTONE ARSENAL | 0.2330 |
| FORT BELVOIR | 0.2268 |
| USN_7_Norfolk | 0.2264 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2202 |
| FT HOOD | 0.2187 |
| Wright-Patterson AFB | 0.2160 |
| FT GORDON | 0.2158 |
| SPAWARSYSCEN Charleston – Little Creek | 0.2014 |
| SPAWARSYSCEN_CHARLESTON_SC Washington | 0.1989 |
| USN_4_Camp Pendleton | 0.1929 |
| COMOPTEVFOR_NORFOLK_VA | 0.1890 |
| USN_2_Pannama City(NAVSURFWARCEN COASTSYSSTA PANAMA CITY) | 0.1870 |
| USN_3_San Diego | 0.1833 |
| FORT HUACHUCA | 0.1821 |
| USN_3_Port Hueneme | 0.1810 |
| USN_3_Jacksonville | 0.1758 |
| USN_3_Penasacola | 0.1733 |
| Tinker AFB | 0.1732 |
| USN_3_Arlington | 0.1659 |
| BROOKS CITY-BASE | 0.1653 |
| Lackland AFB | 0.1544 |
| Fort Lee | 0.1389 |
| Warner Robbins AFB | 0.1301 |
| FORT MONMOUTH Los Angeles | 0.1301 |
| JPM JTRS | 0.1294 |
| USN_2_Quantico | 0.1257 |
| EDWARDS AFB | 0.1146 |
| Peterson AFB | 0.0999 |

Information Systems Technology D&A Military Value - Continued

| | |
|--------------------|--------|
| Langley AFB | 0.0994 |
| USN-2-Philadelphia | 0.0784 |
| USA_4_Arlington | 0.0733 |

| | |
|---|--------|
| Average Military Value with NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2233 |
| Average Military Value without NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2234 |

63 locations were exempted from consideration as a consequence of a TJCSG decision not to analyze locations with less than 31 full time equivalent work years in a function. It was the military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY - BRAC FOUO

Information Systems Technology T&E Military Value

| | |
|---|---------------|
| JITC Fort Huachuca | 0.4397 |
| WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE | 0.3922 |
| USN_8_Pax | 0.3812 |
| FORT HUACHUCA | 0.3629 |
| COMNAVUNSEAWARCEN_NEWPORT_RI | 0.3611 |
| USN_4_Camp Pendleton | 0.3504 |
| Eglin AFB | 0.3174 |
| FT HOOD | 0.2949 |
| SPAWARSYSCEN_CHARLESTON_SC | 0.2840 |
| USN_4_San Diego | 0.2789 |
| USN_2_San Diego | 0.2345 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2241 |
| JITC Indianhead | 0.2205 |
| USN_3_VABEACH | 0.2171 |
| FORT MONMOUTH | 0.2008 |
| Arnold AFS | 0.1960 |
| ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND | 0.1956 |
| EDWARDS AFB | 0.1833 |
| COMOPTEVFOR_NORFOLK_VA | 0.1767 |
| USN_2_Panama City(NAVSURFWARCEN COASTSYSSTA PANAMA CITY) | 0.1445 |
| FT BLISS | 0.0957 |
| | |
| Average Military Value with NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2644 |
| Average Military Value without NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2664 |

51 locations were exempted from consideration as a consequence of a TJCSG decision not to analyze locations with less than 31 full time equivalent work years in a function. It was the military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY - BRAC FOUO

Sea Vehicles D&A Military Value

| | |
|---|---------------|
| NAVSURFWARCEN_CARDEROCKDIV_BETHESDA_MD | 0.5257 |
| NAVSURFWARCENSHIPSYSSENGSTA_PHILADELPHIA_PA | 0.4983 |
| USN_3_WNY | 0.4930 |
| USN_2_Pannama City | 0.2969 |
| NAVSURFWARCEN_CARDEROCKDIV_BETHESDA_MD Bayview | 0.1795 |
| USN_2_Bremerton | 0.1755 |
| USN_3_Port Hueneme | 0.1557 |
| USN_3_VABEACH | 0.1405 |
| USN_2_Norfolk | 0.1392 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.1383 |
| DETROIT ARSENAL | 0.1029 |
| | |
| Average Military Value with NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2587 |
| Average Military Value without NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2707 |

10 locations were exempted from consideration as a consequence of a TJCSG decision not to analyze locations with less than 31 full time equivalent work years in a function. It was the military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.

Sea Vehicles T&E Military Value

| | |
|---|---------------|
| USN_2_Pannama City | 0.4177 |
| NAVSURFWARCENSHIPSYSSENGSTA_PHILADELPHIA_PA | 0.2853 |
| NAVSURFWARCEN_CARDEROCKDIV_BETHESDA_MD | 0.2437 |
| USN_8_Pax | 0.1401 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.0702 |
| COMOPTEVFOR_NORFOLK_VA | 0.0619 |

| | |
|---|--------|
| Average Military Value with NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2032 |
| Average Military Value without NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2297 |

16 locations were exempted from consideration as a consequence of a TJCSG decision not to analyze locations with less than 31 full time equivalent work years in a function. It was the military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.

Sensors, Electronics, and EW D&A Military Value

| | |
|---|---------------|
| USN_8_Pax | 0.6175 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CRANE_IN | 0.4834 |
| COMNAVUNSEAWARCEN_NEWPORT_RI | 0.4744 |
| FORT MONMOUTH | 0.4337 |
| Hanscom AFB | 0.3965 |
| USN_3_WNY | 0.3885 |
| USN_4_San Diego | 0.3811 |
| Naval Research Laboratory Washington DC | 0.3632 |
| USN_2_Pt Mugu | 0.3495 |
| REDSTONE ARSENAL | 0.3402 |
| USN_2_China Lake | 0.3267 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_DAHLGREN_VA | 0.3001 |
| SPAWARSYSCEN_CHARLESTON_SC | 0.2944 |
| USN_3_VABEACH | 0.2680 |
| USN_2_San Diego | 0.2603 |
| FORT BELVOIR | 0.2524 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2520 |
| Hill AFB | 0.2287 |
| ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND | 0.2250 |
| Warner Robbins AFB | 0.2247 |
| FORT MONMOUTH Los Angeles | 0.2247 |
| Tinker AFB | 0.2055 |
| USN_3_Jacksonville | 0.1944 |
| USN_3_Port Hueneme | 0.1878 |
| OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH | 0.1829 |
| USN_2_VABEACH. | 0.1661 |
| USN_3_Oak Harbor | 0.1654 |
| Peterson AFB | 0.0780 |

| | |
|---|--------|
| Average Military Value with NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2952 |
| Average Military Value without NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2968 |

75 locations were exempted from consideration as a consequence of a TJCSG decision not to analyze locations with less than 31 full time equivalent work years in a function. It was the military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.

Sensors, Electronics, and EW T&E Military Value

| | |
|--|---------------|
| USN_8_Pax | 0.7402 |
| USN_2_China Lake | 0.5610 |
| EDWARDS AFB | 0.5356 |
| COMNAVUNSEAWARCEN_NEWPORT_RI | 0.4009 |
| WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE | 0.3768 |
| FORT HUACHUCA | 0.3608 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CRANE_IN | 0.3355 |
| USN_2_Pt Mugu | 0.3103 |
| USAF_2_Alamogorgo | 0.2865 |
| AEGIS_TECHREP_MOORESTOWN_NJ | 0.2774 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_DAHLGREN_VA | 0.2722 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2643 |
| USN_4_Camp Pendleton | 0.2129 |
| USN_4_San Diego | 0.1944 |
| Kirtland AFB | 0.1222 |
| USA_3_Orlando | 0.1096 |
| NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV_NEWPORT_RI West Palm Beach | 0.1084 |
| COMOPTEVFOR_NORFOLK_VA | 0.1075 |
| USN_3_Port Hueneme | 0.0867 |
| FORT MONMOUTH | 0.0735 |

Average Military Value with NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA 0.2868

Average Military Value without NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA 0.2880

52 locations were exempted from consideration as a consequence of a TJCSG decision not to analyze locations with less than 31 full time equivalent work years in a function. It was the military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY - BRAC FOUO

Weapons Technology D&A Military Value

| | |
|---|---------------|
| REDSTONE ARSENAL | 0.6155 |
| PICATINNY ARSENAL | 0.5251 |
| USN_2_China Lake (NAVAIRWPNSTA CHINA LAKE) | 0.4982 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_DAHLGREN_VA | 0.4669 |
| USN_8_Pax (NAS Patuxent River) | 0.3660 |
| MDA - NCR | 0.3458 |
| Eglin AFB | 0.3110 |
| USN_3_Port Hueneme (NAVSURFWARCENDIV PORT HUENEME) | 0.3103 |
| REDSTONE ARSENAL MDA | 0.2874 |
| USN_3_Indian Head (IF NAVSURFWARCENDIV INDIAN HEAD) | 0.2782 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CRANE_IN | 0.2292 |
| USN_2_Pt Mugu (NAVBASE VENTURA CTY PT MUGU) | 0.2252 |
| MDA - Colorado | 0.2155 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.1824 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_PORT_HUENEME_CA Louisville | 0.1550 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_INDIAN_HEAD_MD Seal Beach | 0.1424 |
| WPNSTA_Earle, NJ | 0.1295 |
| USN_3_Yorktown (WPNSTA_YORKTOWN) | 0.1289 |
| ADELPHI LABORATORY CENTER | 0.1283 |
| Hill AFB | 0.1264 |
| USN_4_San Diego (NAVSTA_SAN_DIEGO_CA) | 0.1185 |
| MDA at Kirtland | 0.1055 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CRANE_IN Fallbrook | 0.0972 |

Average Military Value with NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA 0.2318

Average Military Value without NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA 0.2331

16 locations were exempted from consideration as a consequence of a TJCSG decision not to analyze locations with less than 31 full time equivalent work years in a function. It was the military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.

Weapons Technology T&E Military Value

| | |
|---|---------------|
| Eglin AFB | 0.6836 |
| USN_2_China Lake (NAVAIRWPNSTA CHINA LAKE) | 0.6391 |
| USN_2_Pt Mugu (NAVBASE VENTURA CTY PT MUGU) | 0.6238 |
| Hill AFB | 0.5123 |
| REDSTONE ARSENAL | 0.4799 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_DAHLGREN_VA | 0.4055 |
| USN_8_Pax (NAS Patuxent River) | 0.1074 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CRANE_IN | 0.0930 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.0802 |
| USN_3_Indian Head (IF NAVSURFWARCENDIV INDIAN HEAD) | 0.0787 |
| USN_3_Port Hueneme (NAVSURFWARCENDIV PORT HUENEME) | 0.0622 |
| USN_4_San Diego (NAVSTA_SAN_DIEGO_CA) | 0.0595 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CRANE_IN Fallbrook | 0.0582 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_INDIAN_HEAD_MD Seal Beach | 0.0564 |
| PICATINNY ARSENAL | 0.0564 |
| USN_3_Yorktown (WPNSTA YORKTOWN) | 0.0436 |
| WPNSTA_Earle, NJ | 0.0359 |
| MDA - Colorado | 0.0332 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV_PORT_HUENEME_CA Louisville | 0.0306 |
| ADELPHI LABORATORY CENTER | 0.0299 |

| | |
|---|--------|
| Average Military Value with NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2085 |
| Average Military Value without NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA | 0.2152 |

20 locations were exempted from consideration as a consequence of a TJCSG decision not to analyze locations with less than 31 full time equivalent work years in a function. It was the military judgment of the TJCSG that the benefit to be derived from consideration of those facilities was far outweighed by the cost of that analysis.

Physical Capacity Analysis

| Facility Name | Current Capacity SqFt | Current Usage SqFt | Max Potential Capacity SqFt | Capacity Available to Surge SqFt | Required to Surge SqFt | Excess Capacity SqFt |
|---|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND | 9,714,389 | 1,142,141 | 9,714,389 | 8,572,249 | 1,256,355 | 8,458,035 |
| ADELPHI LABORATORY CENTER | 343,645 | 204,796 | 343,645 | 138,849 | 225,276 | 118,369 |
| COMNAVUNSEAWARCEN NEWPORT RI | 478,652 | 608,633 | 478,652 | (129,981) | 669,496 | (190,844) |
| COMOPTEVFOR NORFOLK VA | 45,348 | 76,457 | 45,348 | (31,109) | 84,102 | (38,754) |
| DUGWAY PROVING GROUND | 158,408 | 148,046 | 158,408 | 10,362 | 162,851 | (4,443) |
| EDWARDS AFB | 3,545,150 | 900,260 | 3,545,150 | 2,644,890 | 990,286 | 2,554,864 |
| Eglin AFB | 3,012,538 | 969,210 | 3,012,538 | 2,043,328 | 1,066,131 | 1,946,407 |
| FT BLISS | 41,896 | 19,360 | 41,896 | 22,536 | 21,296 | 20,600 |
| Hill AFB | 784,431 | 180,174 | 784,431 | 604,258 | 198,191 | 586,240 |
| MDA - Colorado | 681,007 | 120,475 | 681,007 | 560,532 | 132,522 | 548,485 |
| MDA - NCR | 413,114 | 346,667 | 413,114 | 66,447 | 381,333 | 31,781 |
| MDA at Kirtland AFB | 3,425 | 3,680 | 3,425 | (255) | 4,048 | (623) |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV CORONA CA | 168,819 | 164,747 | 168,819 | 4,073 | 181,221 | (12,402) |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV CRANE IN | 1,387,215 | 421,058 | 1,387,215 | 966,157 | 463,164 | 924,052 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV CRANE IN Fallbrook | 28,757 | 17,887 | 28,757 | 10,870 | 19,676 | 9,081 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV DAHLGREN VA | 803,996 | 658,656 | 803,996 | 145,341 | 724,521 | 79,475 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV INDIAN HEAD MD Seal Beach | 67,362 | 9,549 | 67,362 | 57,813 | 10,504 | 56,858 |
| NAVSURFWARCENDIV PORT HUENEME CA Louisville | 50,246 | 39,670 | 50,246 | 10,576 | 43,637 | 6,609 |
| NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV KEYPORT WA Keyport | 477,383 | 150,043 | 477,383 | 327,339 | 165,048 | 312,335 |
| OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH | 227,765 | 275,507 | 227,765 | (47,742) | 303,058 | (75,293) |
| PICATINNY ARSENAL | 2,818 | 476,363 | 2,818 | (473,545) | 524,000 | (521,182) |
| REDSTONE ARSENAL | 1,817,021 | 1,843,671 | 1,817,021 | (26,650) | 2,028,038 | (211,017) |
| REDSTONE ARSENAL MDA | 150,584 | 139,627 | 150,584 | 10,957 | 153,589 | (3,005) |
| SURFCOMBATSYSCEN WALLOPS ISLAND VA | 50,820 | 30,933 | 50,820 | 19,887 | 34,027 | 16,793 |

Physical Capacity Analysis - Continued

| | | | | | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Tinker AFB | 240,944 | 55,779 | 240,944 | 185,165 | 61,357 | 179,587 |
| USN 2 China Lake (NAVAIRWPNSTA CHINA LAKE) | 2,256,738 | 796,127 | 2,256,738 | 1,460,611 | 875,740 | 1,380,998 |
| USN 2 Panama City | 282,937 | 285,446 | 282,937 | (2,510) | 313,991 | (31,054) |
| USN 2 Quantico | 7,515 | 65,069 | 7,515 | (57,554) | 71,576 | (64,061) |
| USN 3 Indian Head (IF NAVSURFWARCENDIV INDIAN HEAD) | 716,910 | 270,621 | 716,910 | 446,289 | 297,683 | 419,227 |
| USN 3 Port Hueneme (NAVSURFWARCENDIV PORT HUENEME) | 368,897 | 367,235 | 368,897 | 1,663 | 403,958 | (35,061) |
| USN 3 VABEACH | 57,082 | 67,650 | 57,082 | (10,568) | 74,415 | (17,333) |
| USN 3 WNY | 288,842 | 504,247 | 288,842 | (215,404) | 554,671 | (265,829) |
| USN 3 Yorkstown (WPNSTA YORKTOWN) | 98,528 | 8,654 | 98,528 | 89,874 | 9,519 | 89,009 |
| USN 4 San Diego (NAVSTA SAN DIEGO CA) | 1,876,406 | 603,448 | 1,876,406 | 1,272,958 | 663,793 | 1,212,614 |
| USN 8 Pax (NAS Patuxent River) | 5,065,783 | 1,940,958 | 5,065,783 | 3,124,825 | 2,135,054 | 2,930,729 |
| WATERVLIET ARSENAL | 85,941 | 40,811 | 85,941 | 45,130 | 44,892 | 41,049 |
| WPNSTA Earle, NJ | 18,200 | 12,162 | 18,200 | 6,038 | 13,378 | 4,822 |
| YUMA PROVING GROUND | 503,534 | 262,660 | 503,534 | 240,874 | 288,926 | 214,608 |
| DETROIT ARSENAL | 425,784 | 476,640 | 425,784 | (50,856) | 524,304 | (98,520) |
| WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE | 1,238,130 | 592,213 | 1,238,130 | 645,917 | 651,435 | 586,696 |
| MCB Camp Pendleton (DRPM AAA) | 17,658 | 68,102 | 17,658 | (50,444) | 74,912 | (57,254) |
| Arnold AFS | 1,529,393 | 300,347 | 1,529,393 | 1,229,046 | 330,381 | 1,199,012 |
| COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD Arlington | 38,303 | 7,680 | 38,303 | 30,623 | 8,448 | 29,855 |
| FORT EUSTIS | 142,055 | 63,231 | 142,055 | 78,824 | 69,554 | 72,501 |
| FORT MONMOUTH | 1,092,988 | 589,466 | 1,092,988 | 503,522 | 648,413 | 444,575 |
| FORT RUCKER | 167,903 | 69,531 | 167,903 | 98,372 | 76,484 | 91,419 |
| FT HOOD | 380,584 | 190,440 | 380,584 | 190,144 | 209,484 | 171,100 |
| Hanscom AFB | 811,468 | 192,285 | 811,468 | 619,184 | 211,513 | 599,955 |
| NAVAIRWARCENACDIV Lakehurst | 1,878,697 | 245,820 | 1,878,697 | 1,632,877 | 270,402 | 1,608,295 |
| Naval Research Laboratory Washington DC | 1,793,903 | 813,983 | 1,793,903 | 979,920 | 895,382 | 898,521 |

Physical Capacity Analysis - Continued

| | | | | | | |
|--|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| NELLIS AFB | 20,233 | 13,440 | 20,233 | 6,793 | 14,784 | 5,449 |
| Tucson IAP AGS | 21,349 | 7,893 | 21,349 | 13,456 | 8,683 | 12,666 |
| Tyndall AFB | 251,291 | 73,453 | 251,291 | 177,838 | 80,799 | 170,492 |
| USAF 2 Alamogorgo (Holloman) | 811,539 | 62,896 | 811,539 | 748,643 | 69,186 | 742,353 |
| USN 2 China Lake | 2,256,738 | 796,127 | 2,256,738 | 1,460,611 | 875,740 | 1,380,998 |
| USN 2 Pt Mugu | 375,543 | 384,482 | 375,543 | (8,940) | 422,931 | (47,388) |
| USN 3 Port Hueneme | 368,897 | 367,235 | 368,897 | 1,663 | 403,958 | (35,061) |
| USN 4 San Diego (NATEC) | 15,013 | 9,867 | 15,013 | 5,146 | 10,853 | 4,160 |
| Warner Robbins AFB | 113,239 | 9,556 | 113,239 | 103,683 | 10,511 | 102,728 |
| Wright-Patterson AFB | 2,759,806 | 1,244,605 | 2,759,806 | 1,515,201 | 1,369,065 | 1,390,740 |
| BROOKS CITY-BASE | 260,624 | 126,790 | 260,624 | 133,834 | 139,469 | 121,155 |
| Kirtland AFB | 449,841 | 547,628 | 449,841 | (97,787) | 602,391 | (152,550) |
| USN 8 Pax | 5,065,783 | 1,934,486 | 5,065,783 | 3,131,298 | 2,127,934 | 2,937,849 |
| FORT BELVOIR | 589,570 | 270,043 | 589,570 | 319,527 | 297,048 | 292,523 |
| USN 4 San Diego | 1,876,406 | 603,448 | 1,876,406 | 1,272,958 | 663,793 | 1,212,614 |
| USN 2 Pt Mugu (NAVBASE VENTURA CTY PT MUGU) | 375,543 | 384,482 | 375,543 | (8,940) | 422,931 | (47,388) |
| MDA - Alabama | 199,595 | 48,853 | 199,595 | 150,742 | 53,739 | 145,846 |
| NAVSURFWARCENSHIPSYSSENGSTA PHILADELPHIA PA | 710,675 | 322,727 | 710,675 | 387,948 | 354,999 | 355,676 |
| NAVSURFWARCEN CARDEROCKDIV BETHESDA MD | 780,811 | 378,147 | 780,811 | 402,665 | 415,961 | 364,850 |
| USN 2 Norfolk | 357 | 27,367 | 357 | (27,010) | 30,103 | (29,746) |
| NAVSURFWARCEN CARDEROCKDIV BETHESDA MD Bayview | 78,673 | 21,293 | 78,673 | 57,380 | 23,423 | 55,250 |
| USN 2 Bremerton | 58,535 | 11,517 | 58,535 | 47,019 | 12,668 | 45,867 |
| USA 4 Arlington | 175,669 | 21,440 | 175,669 | 154,229 | 23,584 | 152,085 |
| FT GORDON | 197,994 | 53,440 | 197,994 | 144,554 | 58,784 | 139,210 |
| USA 3 Orlando | 225,871 | 116,928 | 225,871 | 108,943 | 128,621 | 97,250 |
| FORT MONMOUTH San Diego | 441,460 | 96,693 | 441,460 | 344,767 | 106,363 | 335,097 |

Physical Capacity Analysis - Continued

| | | | | | | |
|--|---------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|
| FORT HUACHUCA | 84,321 | 86,994 | 84,321 | (2,673) | 95,693 | (11,372) |
| AEGIS TECHREP MOORESTOWN NJ | 43,982 | 46,667 | 43,982 | (2,684) | 51,333 | (7,351) |
| NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV NEWPORT RI West Palm Beach | 39,317 | 24,107 | 39,317 | 15,210 | 26,517 | 12,800 |
| SPAWARSYSCEN CHARLESTON SC | 659,750 | 368,733 | 659,750 | 291,017 | 405,607 | 254,143 |
| USN 3 Jacksonville | 19,512 | 20,373 | 19,512 | (861) | 22,411 | (2,899) |
| USN 3 Oak Harbor | 4,250 | 6,827 | 4,250 | (2,577) | 7,509 | (3,259) |
| USN 4 Camp Pendleton | 17,658 | 68,102 | 17,658 | (50,444) | 74,912 | (57,254) |
| USN-2-Philadelphia | 6,099 | 15,770 | 6,099 | (9,671) | 17,347 | (11,248) |
| Lackland AFB | 3,319 | 7,723 | 3,319 | (4,404) | 8,495 | (5,176) |
| USAF 2 Alamogorgo | 811,539 | 62,896 | 811,539 | 748,643 | 69,186 | 742,353 |
| USN 2 VABEACH. | 9,710 | 10,453 | 9,710 | (744) | 11,499 | (1,789) |
| DISA Development and Acquisition | 130,374 | 457,583 | 130,374 | (327,209) | 503,341 | (372,967) |
| Fort Lee | 40,070 | 5,480 | 40,070 | 34,590 | 6,028 | 34,042 |
| FORT MONMOUTH Los Angeles | 209,865 | 31,947 | 209,865 | 177,918 | 35,141 | 174,724 |
| JITC Fort Huachuca | 181,877 | 106,027 | 181,877 | 75,850 | 116,629 | 65,248 |
| JITC Indianhead | 65,724 | 30,720 | 65,724 | 35,004 | 33,792 | 31,932 |
| JPM JTRS | 850 | 8,480 | 850 | (7,630) | 9,328 | (8,478) |
| Langley AFB | 60 | 7,200 | 60 | (7,140) | 7,920 | (7,860) |
| Peterson AFB | 205,550 | 167,390 | 205,550 | 38,160 | 184,129 | 21,421 |
| SPAWARSYSCEN Charleston - Little Creek | 40,515 | 21,493 | 40,515 | 19,022 | 23,643 | 16,872 |
| SPAWARSYSCEN CHARLESTON SC Washington | 32,630 | 43,713 | 32,630 | (11,084) | 48,085 | (15,455) |
| USN 2 Panama City(NAVSURFWARCEN COASTSYSSTA PANAMA CITY) | 282,937 | 285,446 | 282,937 | (2,510) | 313,991 | (31,054) |
| USN 2 San Diego | 96,139 | 217,637 | 96,139 | (121,498) | 239,401 | (143,262) |
| USN 3 Arlington | 4,197 | 9,755 | 4,197 | (5,557) | 10,730 | (6,533) |
| USN 3 Penasacola | 65,942 | 16,747 | 65,942 | 49,195 | 18,421 | 47,520 |
| USN 3 San Diego | 10,557 | 26,587 | 10,557 | (16,030) | 29,245 | (18,688) |
| USN 7 Norfolk | 56,527 | 98,144 | 56,527 | (41,617) | 107,958 | (51,432) |

The United States Navy

United States Navy Biography

Vice Admiral Phillip M. Balisle Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command

A native of Idabel, Okla., Vice Admiral Phillip Balisle joined the Naval Reserve as a Seaman Recruit in January 1969 while a student at Oklahoma State University. After graduation, he attended Officer Candidate School in Newport, R.I., where he was commissioned as an Ensign on November 20, 1970.

Vice Adm. Balisle's first duty station was *USS Harwood* (DD 861), where he served as First Lieutenant and Gunnery Officer. Subsequent sea duty assignments include Communications and Electronics Warfare Officer, Destroyer Squadron FOUR; Operations Officer, *USS Brooke* (FFG 1); First Lieutenant, *USS Denver* (LPD 9); Communications Officer, *USS John F. Kennedy* (CV 67); Executive Officer, *USS King* (DDG 41); Commanding Officer *USS Kidd* (DDG 993) (3 Battle "E" Awards); Commanding Officer, *USS Anzio* (CG 68) (3 Battle "E" Awards) and Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group THREE and Commander, *USS Abraham Lincoln* Battle Group.



Shore assignments include Naval Postgraduate School where he graduated with distinction receiving the Chief of Naval Operations Award for Academic Achievement; SWO Department Head School where he graduated with distinction, receiving the Top Operator Award; Budget and Programming Officer for Navy Satellite Communications Programs, OP-094; Commanding Officer, Naval Communications Station, United Kingdom in Thurso, Scotland; Officer in Charge, Combat Systems Mobile Training Team, Atlantic Fleet; Assistant Chief of Staff for Combat Systems, Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; Director, Theater Air Warfare, N865; Deputy Director, Surface Warfare, N86B; Vice Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command; and Director, Surface Warfare on the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Other significant assignments include duty as Maritime Intercept Force Coordinator, AAW Officer, and senior U.S. Representative to the Multinational Interception Force Task Group Commanders Council while assigned to Commander, Middle East Force during *Operation Desert Shield*, and AAW/ASUW/NGFS Officer for Commander, Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command during *Operation Desert Storm*.

Vice Adm. Balisle assumed command of Naval Sea Systems Command on June 28, 2002. He heads a team of 46,000 men and women nationwide in four shipyards, the undersea and surface warfare centers, nine supervisors at major shipbuilding locations and the headquarters in Washington, D.C., responsible

for engineering, building and supporting America's Fleet of ships and combat systems.

His personal awards include the Legion of Merit (three awards), Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal (seven awards), Navy Commendation Medal (two awards), and the Navy Achievement Medal (three awards). He holds the academic degrees of Bachelor of Science in Physical Science and Master of Science in Management.

Updated: 29 July 2002



Return to the Biographies top page

The United States Navy

United States Navy Biography

Rear Admiral Anthony W. Lengerich Vice Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command

Rear Admiral Lengerich, a native of Redlands, Calif., received his commission in 1971 through the NROTC scholarship program at the University of Colorado, where he earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science. He earned a Master of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1982 and is an alumnus of the Defense Systems Management College and Cornell University's Executive Management Program.



Rear Adm. Lengerich sea assignments include service as Communications Officer aboard *USS Gurke* (DD 783); Staff Communications Officer for the Commander, Seventh Fleet aboard *USS Oklahoma City* (CLG 5); Operations Officer in *USS Badger* (FF 1071); and Operations and Combat Systems Officer for Commander Destroyer Squadron Thirteen. He also served as Assistant Surface Operations Officer and Scheduler for Commander, Carrier Group Two and briefly as Scheduler for Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Twelve. He qualified as a Surface Warfare Officer and was designated as "Qualified for Command at Sea" during these tours.

His shore assignments include Naval Communications Unit London, U.K., where he served on the staff of the Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Forces Europe as Communications Operations Officer for the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

He became an Engineering Duty Officer in 1984 and reported for duty to the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Command (NAVELEX) in Washington, D.C., as Platform Integration Officer for the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS). He later served as Project Officer for the Command and Control Processor (C2P) and the Director of Force Systems Engineering within the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR). He next served as Division Director for Afloat Mission Planning Systems within the Command and Control Program Office (PMA-281) of the Program Executive Officer Cruise Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (PEO CU).

Rear Adm. Lengerich commanded the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, Charleston, S.C., and "commissioned" the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering, East Coast Division (NISE East), also in Charleston. He then served as Commander, Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC) San Diego, Calif., with additional duty as Corporate Operations Officer and Corporate Information Officer for SPAWAR.

DCN: 11799

Following this assignment he served as Executive Assistant to the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. His Flag assignments include duty as Director of Installations and Logistics for SPAWAR followed by duty on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations as Director, Industrial Capability, Maintenance Policy and Acquisition Logistics, and most recently as Deputy Director, Fleet Readiness Division.

His personal decorations include the Legion of Merit (five awards), Meritorious Service Medal (three awards), Navy Commendation Medal (three awards). Other awards include the Combat Action Ribbon, Navy Unit Commendations, Meritorious Unit Commendations, and various expeditionary, service and campaign medals.

Updated: 20 May 2003



Return to the Biographies top page

DCN: 11799

Systems Engineer; as the Deputy Program Manager for the Navy Area Theater & Defense Program; as the Program Manager for Surface Electronic Warfare Systems & the Director for Passive Sensors and EO/IR Countermeasures; and, most recently, Major Program Manager for Integrated Combat Systems in the Program Executive Integrated Warfare Systems.

His personal awards include the Meritorious Service Medal (Fourth Award), Commendation Medal (Third Award), and the Navy Achievement Medal.

This is an official U.S. Navy web site
See our Privacy Policy and Accessibility Statement.
NSWC is a field activity of the Naval Sea Systems Command.

Navy Information: Navy Jobs | Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

DCN: 11799

[Home](#) | [Contact](#) | [Website Index](#)**Search:**

Captain Joseph L. McGettigan, USN

Captain Joseph L. McGettigan became the Commander of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) on April 23, 2004. His career spans several years of Program Management experience at the Program Executive Office level, two sea tours aboard the USS MILLER (FF 1091) and the USS BELLEAU WOOD (LHA 3), and shore assignments around the country, including Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, the Naval War College, Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode Island, and Commander, Wallops Island, Virginia.



His first assignment following graduation in 1980 from the United States Naval Academy was onboard the USS MILLER (FF 1091) where he served as both the Anti-submarine Warfare Officer and the Auxiliaries and Electrical Officer. His subsequent sea tour was onboard the USS BELLEAU WOOD (LHA 3) as the Combat Systems Officer.

Shore assignments include the Naval Postgraduate School where he graduated with distinction; Puget Sound Naval Shipyard where he served as the assistant Ship Superintendent for the USS WHALE (SSN 638) and as the Senior Ship Superintendent for the USS TAUTOG (SSN 639); Mobile Technical Unit Fifteen in Seattle WA where he was designated as the first Officer in Charge; the Naval War College; Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Newport RI where he performed duties as the Test and Evaluation Officer for the AN/BSY 2 Submarine Combat System and the AN/BQG 5 Wide Aperture Array Sonar; Cooperative Engagement Capability Program Office (PMS 465) where he served as the ACDS Block 1 Integration Manager and also as Deputy Program Manager; and the Director for International and FMS Programs within PEO IWS.


From January of 1999 until October of 2001 he was in Command of the Surface Combat Systems Center, Wallops Island, Virginia. Prior to his NSWCCD assignment, Captain McGettigan was the Project Manager for Aircraft Carrier and Large Deck Combat Systems within PEO IWS.

His academic degrees include a Bachelor of Science Degree in Naval Architecture, a Master of Science Degree in Undersea Warfare Technology and a Master of Arts Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. His personal awards include the Legion of Merit, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy Commendation Medal, and the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal. He is also the recipient of the Arleigh Burke Leadership award presented by Surface Warfare Officer's School Command.

[Home](#) | [Accessibility](#) | [Contact Us](#) | [Privacy Policy](#) | [No Fear Act](#) | [External Links](#) | [NSWCDD](#)

This is an Official U.S. Navy Web Site for NSWCCD, Dahlgren Laboratory, Dahlgren Va.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited.

Last Modified: Jan 2005



DC




Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren - DON



Installation Boundary



Range Complex Boundaries



Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren - DON



Installation Boundary



Range Complex Boundaries

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

BASE SUMMARY SHEET

NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, DAHLGREN, VA

INSTALLATION MISSION

- Provide engineering and industrial base support of weapon systems, subsystems, equipment, and components

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, VA, by relocating non-medical Chemical Biological Defense Research and Development & Acquisition to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
- Realign Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, SC as follows: relocate Surface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA; . . .
- Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA, and (others) by relocating Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, and consolidating with the Space Warfare Center to create the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.
- Realign Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, as follows: relocate Surface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA; . . .
- Realign Fleet Combat Training Center, CA (Port Hueneme Detachment, San Diego, CA), by relocating all Weapons and Armaments weapon system integration Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, VA.
- Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, VA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except guns/ammo and weapon systems integration to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.
- Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Dahlgren, VA, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.
-

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- This recommendation creates Joint Centers of Excellence for Battlefield Health and Trauma research at Fort Sam Houston, TX; Infectious Disease research at Walter Reed – Forest Glen Annex, MD; Aerospace Medicine research at Wright Patterson AFB, OH; Regulated Medical Project development & acquisition at Fort Detrick, MD; Medical Biological Defense research at Fort Detrick, MD; and Chemical Biological Defense research, development & acquisition at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. These actions will increase synergy, focus on joint needs

and efficient use of equipment and facilities by collocating Tri-Service and Defense activities performing functions in chemical-biological defense and medical RDA. . . . Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, is home to the military's most robust infrastructure supporting research utilizing hazardous chemical agents.

- These recommended realignments and consolidations provide for multifunctional and multidisciplinary Centers of Excellence in Maritime C4ISR. This recommendation will also reduce the number of technical facilities engaged in Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, & Electronics and Information Systems RDATE from twelve to five. This, in turn, will reduce overlapping infrastructure, increase the efficiency of operations and support an integrated approach to RDATE for maritime C4ISR. Another result would also be reduced cycle time for fielding systems to the war fighter.
- This recommendation realigns and consolidates those facilities working in Weapons & Armaments (W&A) Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation (RDATE) into a Naval Integrated RDATE center at the Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, CA. Additional synergistic realignments for W&A was achieved at two receiver sites for specific focus. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA, is a receiver specialty site for Naval surface weapons systems integration and receives a west coast site for consolidation. This construct . . . consolidates Navy surface weapons system integration at Dahlgren, VA. . . . A specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare was identified at Dahlgren, VA that was unique to the services and a centroid for Navy surface ship developments. A satellite unit from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, San Diego Detachment will be relocated to Dahlgren.
- This recommendation realigns and consolidates those gun and ammunition facilities working in Weapons and Armaments (W&A) Research Development & Acquisition (RD&A). This realignment would result in a more robust joint center for gun and ammunition Research, Development & Acquisition at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. This location is already the greatest concentration of military value in gun and ammunition W&A RD&A. Picatinny Arsenal is the center-of-mass for DOD's RD&A of guns and ammunition, with a workload more than an order of magnitude greater than any other DOD facility in this area. It also is home to the DOD's Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition. . . .

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

- Joint Centers of Excellence for Chemical, Biological, and Medical RD&A

- One-Time Costs: \$73.9 million
- Net Savings (Cost) during Implementation: \$45.9 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 9.2 million
- Return on Investment Year: Calendar Year (+ 7)
- Net Present Value over 20 Years: \$ 46.0 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

| | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> | <u>Students</u> |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Baseline | | | |
| Reductions | | | 559 |
| Realignments | | | |

Total

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

| | Out | | In | | Net Gain (Loss) | |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> |
| This Recommendation | | | | | | |
| Other Recommendation(s) | | | | | | |
| Total | | | | | | |

- Consolidate Maritime C4ISR RD&A, T&E

- One-Time Costs: \$ 106.1 million
- Net Savings (Cost) during Implementation: \$ 88.6 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 38.7 million
- Return on Investment Year: Calendar Year (+ 1)
- Net Present Value over 20 Years: \$ 455.1 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

| | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> | <u>Students</u> |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Baseline | | | |
| Reductions | | 630 | |
| Realignments | | | |
| Total | | | |

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

| | Out | | In | | Net Gain (Loss) | |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> |
| This Recommendation | | | | | | |
| Other Recommendation(s) | | | | | | |
| Total | | | | | | |

- Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments RD&A, T&E Center

- One-Time Costs: \$ 358.1 million
- Net Savings (Cost) during Implementation: \$ 148.7 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 59.7 million
- Return on Investment Year: Calendar Year (+ 7)
- Net Present Value over 20 Years: \$ 433.4 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

| | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> | <u>Students</u> |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Baseline | | | |
| Reductions | | 3126 | |
| Realignments | | | |
| Total | | | |

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

| | Out | | In | | Net Gain (Loss) | |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> |
| This Recommendation | | | | | | |
| Other Recommendation(s) | | | | | | |
| Total | | | | | | |

- Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition

- One-Time Costs: \$ 116.3 million
- Net Savings (Cost) during Implementation: \$81.2 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 11.3 million
- Return on Investment Year: Calendar Year (+13)
- Net Present Value over 20 Years: \$ 32.6 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

| | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> | <u>Students</u> |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Baseline | | | |
| Reductions | | 982 | |
| Realignments | | | |
| Total | | | |

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

| | Out | | In | | Net Gain (Loss) | |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> | <u>Military</u> | <u>Civilian</u> |
| This Recommendation | | | | | | |
| Other Recommendation(s) | | | | | | |
| Total | | | | | | |

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- (Include pertinent items, e.g., on NPL list)

REPRESENTATION

Governor: Mark Warner

Senators: John Warner and George Allen

Representative: Jo Ann Davis

ECONOMIC IMPACT

- Potential Employment Loss: 578 jobs (349 direct and 229 indirect)
- MSA Job Base: 14,171 jobs
- Percentage: 5.5 percent decrease
- Cumulative Economic Impact (Year-Year): ___ percent decrease

MILITARY ISSUES

- (Include pertinent items)

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES

- Dahlgren does not have expertise in some of the areas in which work is to be brought in from other sites;
- Aberdeen, an Army facility, may be more interested in chem-bio issues for land-based personnel and less on Navy-centric issues
- This is shuffling the beach chairs . . . They can accomplish many of the efficiencies by moving work rather than employees.
- By the time the MILCON is completed, many of the key employees will have retired or quit.

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

- One of the proposals has a very long payback - - 13 years;
- I think BRAC 1993 and 1995 experience will indicate major personnel losses among technical and highly educated personnel. I suggest it will be even worse because employees are older.

David Epstein/Navy/May 26

BRAC HISTORY

VIRGINIA

Base Closures and Realignment (1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995)

| | | |
|------|--|---------|
| 1988 | Cameron Station | CLOSE |
| 1988 | Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) site, Herndon | CLOSE |
| 1988 | Manassas Family Housing | CLOSE |
| 1988 | NIKE Norfolk 85 Housing | CLOSE |
| 1988 | Woodbridge Housing Site | CLOSE |
| 1991 | Army Research Institute, Alexandria | REALIGN |
| 1991 | Belvoir Research and Development Center, Ft. Belvoir | REALIGN |
| 1991 | Directed Energy and Sensors Basic and Applied Research Elements of the Center for Night Vision and Electro-Optics, Ft. Belvoir | REALIGN |
| 1991 | Harry Diamond Laboratory, Woodbridge | CLOSE |
| 1991 | Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, Yorktown | CLOSE |
| 1991 | Naval Sea Combat Systems Engineering Station, Norfolk | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Air Force Data Processing Center 7th Communications Group, Pentagon, Arlington | CLOSE |
| 1993 | Bureau of Navy Personnel, Arlington (Including the Office of Military Manpower Management, Arlington) | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Data Processing Center Naval Air Station Oceana | CLOSE |
| 1993 | Data Processing Center Naval Supply Center Norfolk | CLOSE |
| 1993 | Data Processing Center Navy Recruiting | CLOSE |
| 1993 | Defense Logistics Agency Information Processing Center, Richmond | CLOSE |
| 1993 | Fort Belvoir | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk | CLOSE |
| 1993 | Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, Portsmouth | CLOSE |

| | | |
|------|--|----------|
| 1993 | Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Alexandria | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, Yorktown (Realign to Panama City, FL vice Dam Neck, VA) | REDIRECT |
| 1993 | Naval Recruiting Command, Arlington | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Naval Reserve Center, Staunton | CLOSE |
| 1993 | Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Naval Supply Systems Command, Arlington (Including Defense Printing Office, Alexandria, VA and Food Systems Office, Arlington, VA) | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Naval Surface Warfare Center - Port Hueneme, Yorktown Detachment, Virginia Beach (Naval Mine Warfare Activity) | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Naval Undersea Warfare Center - Norfolk Detachment | DISESTAB |
| 1993 | Navy Data Processing Center Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area Master Station, Atlantic, Norfolk | CLOSE |
| 1993 | Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Driver | CLOSE |
| 1993 | Tactical Support Office, Arlington | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Vint Hill Farms | CLOSE |
| 1993 | Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations Center (Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk | DISESTAB |
| 1993 | Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center Portsmouth | CLOSE |
| 1993 | Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Office of the General Counsel (Navy) | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy) | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Office of the Secretary of the Navy (Legislative Affairs, Program Appraisal, Comptroller, Inspector General, | REALIGN |

| | | |
|------|---|----------|
| | and Information) | |
| 1993 | Office of the Chief of Naval Operations | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Office of Civilian Manpower Management (Navy) | REALIGN |
| 1993 | International Programs Office (Navy) | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Combined Civilian Personnel Office (Navy) | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Navy Regional Contracting Center | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Naval Criminal Investigative Service | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Naval Audit Agency | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Strategic Systems Programs Office (Navy) | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Office of Naval Research | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower & Reserve Affairs), U.S. Marine Corps & Logistics), U.S. Marine Corps | REALIGN |
| 1993 | Marine Corps Systems Command (Clarendon Office) | REALIGN |
| 1995 | Fort Pickett | CLOSE |
| 1995 | Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast Detachment, Norfolk | CLOSE |
| 1995 | Naval Information Systems Management Center, Arlington | REALIGN |
| 1995 | Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake | DISESTAB |
| 1995 | Fort Lee | REALIGN |
| 1995 | Information Systems Software Center (ISSC) | CLOSE |



Naval District Washington

Jeff Johnson

Acting Area Commander

NSA South Potomac

*Dahlgren Site
Economic Impact*



Employment Levels
FY '05

| | |
|--------------------|------|
| Civilian | 4031 |
| Military | 453 |
| Badged Contractors | 4016 |

TOTAL

8500

Annual Payroll FY '03

| | |
|--|-----------------|
| Total | \$242.1M |
| Fredericksburg (includes Spotsylvania and Stafford) | 99.6M |
| King George | 84.9M |
| Westmoreland (includes Colonial Beach) | 14.5M |
| Maryland | 20.6M |

Contracts and Purchases

FY '03


| | |
|---|----------|
| Total Contracting Effort (including Small Purchases) | \$490.6M |
| Construction Contracts | \$30M |
| VA Contracts | \$308.3M |
| MD Contracts | \$24.6M |

* Employment Level figures include NDWWA, NSWCDL, JWAC, NNSOC & CSCS/ATRC

Naval District Washington

DCN 11799

NDW West Area Dahlgren distance from:
Washington, DC - 53 mi. Quantico - 54 mi.
Norfolk - 156 mi.



Dahlgren Tenants



Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Site (NSWC DL): strengthen readiness and operational superiority by providing superior technical capabilities, systems engineering rigor, integrity, and leadership



Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC): effects-based precision targeting options for selected networks and nodes to the joint Staff and Unified Commands.



Naval Network and Space Operations Command (NNSOC): operate and maintain the Navy's global telecommunications, information and space systems and services to directly support operations, training and education, and to promote innovative solutions to the warfighter.



Center for Service Combat Systems/AEGIS Training and Readiness Center (CSCS/ATRC): provides AEGIS Combat System Training to the Fleet

Dahlgren Overview

Mainside



Pumpkin Neck

| LAND/AREA: | ACRES | SF | PRV |
|------------------|-------|-----------|---------|
| • Main Side | 2,677 | 3,216,863 | \$792M |
| • Pumpkin Neck | 1,641 | 32,360 | \$ 10M |
| • Other Off Site | 3 | 1,170 | \$ 767K |
| • Totals | 4,321 | 3,250,933 | \$804M |

| FACILITY TYPE: | SF | COUNT |
|----------------|-----------|-------|
| • Buildings | 3,127,442 | 631 |
| • Structures | 123,491 | 186 |
| • Utilities | | 54 |
| • Totals | 3,250,933 | 871 |

| SPACE UTILIZATION: | SF |
|--------------------|-----------|
| • RDT&E | 1,609,190 |
| • Admin | 204,384 |
| • Other | 1,437,359 |

| BQ: | UNITS |
|--------------------------|-------|
| • BQ Enlisted Perm Party | 314 |
| • BQ Enlisted Transient | 23 |
| • BQ Officer Transient | 39 |
| • Totals | 376 |

| FAMILY HOUSING: | SF | UNITS |
|-----------------|---------|-------|
| • Housing Units | 415,850 | 250 |
| • Other | 31,804 | 75 |
| • Totals | 447,654 | 325 |

1799
**+165 acres available for
Future Development**

Under Construction

POM 2008 Program

**FY 08
P306 Electromagnetic
Launch RDT&E Facility
\$9.9M**

**FY 12
P289 Magazine
Consolidation
\$5.3M**

**FY 04
P292 Naval Networks
Space Ops Ctr-NNSOC
\$21M**

**FY 08
P287 Missile Support
Replacement Facility
\$20.2M**

**FY 09
P372 Physical Fitness
Center Replacement
\$10M**

**FY 04
Bowling Center
NAF
\$2.9M**

**FY 09
P295 Electromagnetic
Research & Eng Facility
\$10M**


**FY 03
P303 Chemical Biological
Warfare Detection Addition
\$6.6M**

**FY 03
P276 Theater Warfare
Integration Center
(Phase 3); \$9.1M**

**FY 10
P305 NITMAC
\$10.1M**


**FY 11
P279 Wpns Sys
Lab Replacement
\$17M**

**FY 04
P281 Weapons Dynamics
RTD&E Center
\$3.5M**



Pumpkin Neck

11799 IDW West Dahlgren Future Growth?







**Advanced Concepts
Complex**
400,000 SF
& 2,700 People


**Warfare Systems
Complex**
300,000 SF
& 2,000 People

**Housing
Recapitalization**
116,500 SF


**Weapons Development
Complex**
190,000 SF
& 1,200 People








Surface Navy Integrated Warfare Systems



Maritime Information Systems (MIS) Relocation Assessment

DCN: 11799



BRAC Assessment (Related to MIS)



BRAC Validations

❖ *Explicit*

NSWC was Designated as a Specialty Site for Weapon System Integration...
"Weapon System Integration was Specifically Addressed to Preserve the Synergies Between Large Highly Integrated Control System Developments (Weapon Systems Integration and the Weapon System Development Themselves)

❖ *Implicit*

- Warfare System Engineering and Integration
- Surface Navy Combat System Engineering & Integration
- Integrated Fire Control System Engineering
- Warfare and Mission Analysis
- Sensor Fusion (e.g CEC)



MIS - BRAC Relocations



❖ *Relocate*



Relocate Maritime Information Systems Research, Development and Acquisition, and Test Evaluation...and Consolidate With the Space Warfare Center

❖ *Projects*

- BMC4I CINC Exercise and Wargames
- Naval Networks Space Operations Command
- Supporting Arms Coordination Center Automation (SACC-A)
- Coalition Warfare Interoperability Demonstration (CWID)
- Area Air Defense Commander (AADC)
- Navy / USMC Targeting and Planning Tech
- Tomahawk / Strike Systems Mission Planning
- Tactical Control Network (TCN)
- Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP)
- Distributed Engineering Plant (DEP)
- Battleforce Systems Engineering Requirements















Dahlgren Site Technical Department Information Age and Years of Service









NAVSEA
WARFARE CENTERS

Warfare Center Level Information

2005 BRAC COMMISSION



REQUEST FOR OFFICIAL TRAVEL

NAME OF TRAVELER _____

ORINATION CITY & STATE _____

DESTINATION CITY & STATE _____

DEPARTURE DATE _____

MODE OF TRAVEL TO DESTINATION CITY _____

DESIRED DEPARTURE TIME _____

DESIRED ARRIVAL TIME _____

RENTAL CAR PICKUP DATE AND TIME _____

RENTAL CAR DROP OFF DATE AND TIME _____

DATES OVERNIGHTING IN HOTEL _____

DATE OF RETURN TO ORINATION CITY _____

DESIRED RETURN DEPARTURE TIME _____

DESIRED RETURN ARRIVAL TIME _____

COMMISSIONER _____

BASE _____

COMMENTS/SPECIAL REQUESTS _____



**NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER
DAHLGREN, VA
REALIGNMENT ISSUES**

FOR

**ADMIRAL HAROLD W. GEHMAN, JR. USN(RET)
BRAC COMMISSION STAFF**

BY

**FREDERICKSBURG, VA REGIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE**

AUGUST 10, 2005

**PRESENTER: TED WILLIAMS
(540) 371-4492**

Objectives

To discuss 2 DoD BRAC recommendations affecting Dahlgren and gain BRAC Commission support for their reversal.

- Relocating guns and ammo RD&A from Dahlgren, VA to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ
- Relocating non-medical Chem/Bio RD&A from Dahlgren, VA to Aberdeen, MD

Issue 1: Guns and Ammo

DOD Recommendation

- Realign NSWC Dahlgren by relocating Guns and Ammo RD&A to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ
 - 1 of 8 gun and ammo realignments to Picatinny

DOD Justification

- Realigns and consolidates Gun & Ammo facilities in W&A in RD&A
- More Robust Joint Center for Guns & Ammo at Picatinny
- Picatinny – greatest concentration of military value
- Promotes Jointness, enables technical synergy
- Positions DoD to exploit Center-of-Mass Scientific, Technical, & Acquisition Expertise

Guns and Ammo

To Guide Analysis & Recommendations, Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG)

Established Two Principles:

- Provide efficiency of operations by consolidating technical facilities to enhance synergy and reduce excess capacity

- Retain at least 2 geographically separated sites, each of which would have similar combination of technologies and functions to:
 - Maintain competition of ideas, and

 - Provide continuity of operations in the event of unexpected disruption

■ DOD

- Identified Dahlgren as a specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare (Surface Ship Combat System Integration)
 - Unique to the Services
 - Centroid for Navy Surface Ship Developments

Concerns

- TJCSG did not follow their own principles
- Made conflicting recommendations
- Loss of technical and engineering capacity
- **NEGATIVE IMPACT ON MILITARY VALUE**

TJCSG Did Not Follow Their Own Principles

- Efficiency of operations diminished when Dahlgren gunnery and ammo personnel transferred to Picatinny while their test site, a unique over the water gun range, stays at Dahlgren.
- Single siting Gunnery at Picatinny fails to retain two sites for critical National Function. Sites needed to:
 - Maintain competition of ideas
 - Continuity of operations (backup)
 - Accommodate mobilization and surge requirements

DOD Made Conflicting Recommendations

- Realigning Naval gunnery and ammo at Picatinny is in conflict with identifying Dahlgren as specialty site for surface warfare (surface ship combat system integration)
 - This removes from Dahlgren and the Navy a critical element of the ship combat system to be integrated
 - Greatly increases difficulty of ship system integration task.
(Critical design tradeoffs between guns, weapons, sensors and control systems needed to meet ship performance goals)

Loss of Technical and Engineering Capacity

- Only ~20% of the Dahlgren gunnery and ammo experts identified to move to Picatinny are expected to do so
 - Cobra calculation using 75% retention is unrealistic
 - Major time and cost implications to reconstitute Navy gunnery work force
 - Anticipate major degradation in the Navy gunnery capability similar to the Navy loss of ASW capability after closure of White Oak, MD in BRAC 95

Comments

- Future of Navy Gun RDAT&E focused on electric ship applications
 - Navy going to electric ships (DDX,CGX)
 - Available electric power allows Navy to move from propellant driven to electric driven gun systems
- Requires Highly Integrated Ship System
 - Ship Electric Power Management System
- Need Gun RD&A at Integrated Ship Site (Dahlgren) to facilitate move to the future mission capability
 - Movement to electric system evolutionary

NEGATIVE IMPACT ON MILITARY VALUE

- **Moving Navy Gun and Ammo RD&A to Army, Away from Dahlgren, the ship integration site, will seriously impact ability to meet current & future mission capabilities.**
- **Ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and surge requirements are severely impacted by single siting gunnery at either Picatinny or Dahlgren.**

Recommendations

- Do not realign NSWC, Dahlgren by relocating gun and ammo RD&A to Picatinny

- Follow TJCSG stated principle and improve military value by creating two specialty sites:
 - RDATE&E for small arms and non maritime guns and ammo at Picatinny

 - RDATE&E for maritime guns and ammo at Dahlgren

Issue 2: Navy Chem/Bio Defense at Dahlgren

■ DoD Recommendation

- Realign NSWC Dahlgren by relocating Non-medical Chemical Biological Defense Research and Development and Acquisition to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD

■ DoD Justification

- Increase synergy, focus on joint needs, and efficient use of equipment and facilities by co-locating Tri-Service and Defense activities performing function in chemical-biological defense
- Military's most robust infrastructure supporting research utilizing hazardous chemical agents
- Reduces the use of leased space within the National Capital Region
- Increases the force protection posture of realigning activities

Comment

Current Chem/Bio Defense at Dahlgren has been joint since 1995 (Public Law)

- Dahlgren has joint lead for collective protection and is the Navy's major Chem/Bio RD&E location
- All RD&E Procurement funds already go through JPEO-CBD
- DL personnel currently work and coordinate extensively with Edgewood

Concerns – Loss of:

- **Connectivity to the Fleet**
 - Being relocated to Army base removes organization from Navy Ship and Fleet focused environment
- **Navy Technical Expertise**
 - Only ~20% of personnel will move
- **Unique Shipboard CB Defense Test Environment**
 - Overwater range for chemical detection only one of its kind in U.S.; shipboard environment unique; specialized expertise in Navy ship systems essential
- **Specialized Dahlgren Facilities**
 - Completed 38K sq.ft. bio-safety level 3 certified laboratory in FY 02 with 19K sq.ft. addition added in FY 05

Recommendations

- **Create Joint Center of Excellence for Chem/Bio Defense**
- **Make Dahlgren Chem/Bio Team Joint Center detachment**
- **Keep Joint Center presence at Dahlgren:**
 - Supports Virginia State First Responders when necessary
 - Create two site concept for critical functions
- **Take advantage of new Dahlgren facilities and highly specialized, effective team**

Moving Activity Will Destroy Capability When Needed Most



NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER DAHLGREN, VA REALIGNMENT ISSUES

FOR

MR. DAVID EPSTEIN

MR. LES FARRINGTON

BRAC COMMISSION STAFF

BY

FREDERICKSBURG, VA REGIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

PRESENTER: TED WILLIAMS
(540) 371-4492

JULY 26, 2005

Objectives

To discuss and gain clarification on decisions relative to:

- Relocating guns and ammo RD&A from Dahlgren, VA to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ
- Relocating non-medical Chem/Bio RD&A from Dahlgren, VA to Aberdeen, MD

Issue 1: Guns and Ammo

DOD Recommendation

- Realign NSWC Dahlgren by relocating Guns and Ammo RD&A to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ
 - 1 of 8 gun and ammo realignments to Picatinny

DOD Justification

- Realigns and consolidates Gun & Ammo facilities in W&A in RD&A
- More Robust Joint Center for Guns & Ammo at Picatinny
- Picatinny – greatest concentration of military value
- Promotes Jointness, enables technical synergy
- Positions DoD to exploit Center-of-Mass Scientific, Technical, & Acquisition Expertise

Guns and Ammo

To Guide Analysis & Recommendations, Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG)

Established Two Principles:

- Provide efficiency of operations by consolidating technical facilities to enhance synergy and reduce excess capacity

- Retain at least 2 geographically separated sites, each of which would have similar combination of technologies and functions to:
 - Maintain competition of ideas, and

 - Provide continuity of operations in the event of unexpected disruption

■ DoD

- Identified Dahlgren as a specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare (Surface Ship Combat System Integration)
 - Unique to the Services
 - Centroid for Navy Surface Ship Developments

Concerns

- TJCSG did not follow their own principles
- Made conflicting recommendations
- Loss of technical and engineering capacity
- **NEGATIVE IMPACT ON MILITARY VALUE**

TJCSG Did Not Follow Their Own Principles

- Efficiency of operations diminished when Dahlgren gunnery and ammo personnel transferred to Picatinny while their test site, a unique over the water gun range, stays at Dahlgren
- Single siting Gunnery at Picatinny fails to retain two sites for critical National Function. Sites needed to:
 - Maintain competition of ideas
 - Continuity of operations (backup)
- Accommodate mobilization and surge requirements

*No Range @ Picatinny,
gun + ammo (propellant, etc)*

DoD Made Conflicting Recommendations

- Realigning Naval gunnery and ammo at Picatinny is in conflict with identifying Dahlgren as specialty site for surface warfare (surface ship combat system integration)
 - This removes from Dahlgren a critical element of the combat system to be integrated
 - Greatly increases difficulty of ship system integration task
(Critical design tradeoffs between guns, weapons, sensors and control systems needed to meet ship performance goals)

Loss of Technical and Engineering Capacity

- Only ~20% of the Dahlgren gunnery and ammo experts identified to move to Picatinny are expected to do so
11% moved from WhiteC
- Cobra calculation using 75% retention is unrealistic
- Major time and cost implications to reconstitute Navy gunnery work force
- Anticipate major degradation in the Navy gunnery capability similar to the Navy loss of ASW capability after closure of White Oak, MD in BRAC 95

Comments

- Future of Navy Gun RDAT&E focused on electric ship applications
 - Navy going to electric ships (DDX,CGX)
 - Available electric power allows Navy to move from propellant driven to electric driven gun systems
- Requires Highly Integrated Ship System
 - Ship Electric Power Management System
- Need Gun RD&A at Integrated Ship Site (Dahlgren) to facilitate move to the future mission capability
 - Movement to electric system evolutionary

lighter rounds

NEGATIVE IMPACT ON MILITARY VALUE

- **Moving Navy Gun and Ammo RD&A to Army, Away from Dahlgren, the ship integration site, will seriously impact ability to meet current & future mission capabilities**

*Picatinny
MV*

- **Ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and surge requirements are severely impacted by single siting gunnery at either Picatinny or Dahlgren**

work will end up being divided between Dahlgren others + the remainder of guns/Picatinny

cost of building

Recommendations

- Do not realign NSWC, Dahlgren by relocating gun and ammo RD&A to Picatinny
- Follow TJCSG stated principle and improve military value by creating two specialty sites:
 - RDAT&E for small arms and non maritime guns and ammo at Picatinny
 - RDAT&E for maritime guns and ammo at Dahlgren

*Fully integrated
ships - ODX*

Issue 2: Navy Chem/Bio Defense at Dahlgren

■ **DOD Recommendation**

- Realign NSWC Dahlgren by relocating Non-medical Chemical Biological Defense Research and Development and Acquisition to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD

■ **DOD Justification**

- Increase synergy, focus on joint needs, and efficient use of equipment and facilities by co-locating Tri-Service and Defense activities performing function in chemical-biological defense
- Military's most robust infrastructure supporting research utilizing hazardous chemical agents
- Reduces the use of leased space within the National Capital Region
- Increases the force protection posture of realigning activities

Comment

Current Chem/Bio Defense at Dahlgren has been joint since 1995 (Public Law)

- Dahlgren has joint lead for collective protection and is the Navy's major Chem/Bio RD&E location
- All RD&E Procurement funds already go through JPEO-CBD
- DL personnel currently work and coordinate extensively with Edgewood

Concerns – Loss of:

- **Connectivity to the Fleet**
 - Being relocated to Army base removes organization from Navy Ship and Fleet focused environment

- **Navy Technical Expertise**
 - Only ~20% of personnel will move

- **Unique Shipboard CB Defense Test Environment**
 - Overwater range for chemical detection only one of its kind in U.S.; shipboard environment unique; specialized expertise in Navy ship systems essential

- **Specialized Dahlgren Facilities**
 - Completed 38K sq.ft. bio-safety level 3 certified laboratory in FY 02 with 19K sq.ft. addition added in FY 05

detection over water

Recommendations

- Create Joint Center of Excellence for Chem/Bio Defense
- Make Dahlgren Chem/Bio Team Joint Center detachment
- Keep Joint Center presence at Dahlgren:
 - Supports Virginia State First Responders when necessary
 - Create two site concept for critical functions
- Take advantage of new Dahlgren facilities and highly specialized, effective team

Moving Activity Will Destroy Capability When Needed Most

*DCM-11499
vs. system
Mary Detachment
Joint*

*BI people
involved
Chem
& biology
15/9*

*Integrated labs
Joint Analysis
Warfare Center*

DCN: 11799



Fredericksburg Regional

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

The voice of the business community

DAHLGREN

August 2, 2005

Mr. David Epstein
 Mr. Les Farrington
 2005 Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
 2521 South Clark Street, Ste. 600
 Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Epstein and Mr. Farrington:

Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you this past Tuesday, July 26 and to talk with you about our concerns with two of the BRAC recommendations relative to Dahlgren.

We appreciate your graciousness and attention, especially when we know what a hectic schedule you have at this time.

At your suggestion, we will be briefing ADM Harold W. Gehman, Jr. (USN, Ret) on August 10, 2005, at 2:45 p.m. at the BRAC Commission office (large conference room). We hope that you will be able to join us for that briefing.

As requested, below are the names, email addresses, and phone numbers of our Regional team who visited you on Tuesday.

Mrs. Linda Worrell, President, Fredericksburg Regional Chamber of Commerce
 (Linda@fredericksburgchamber.org; 540-373-9526)

Mr. Ted Hontz, Co-Chair of the Military Affairs Council, Fredericksburg
 (ted_hontz@teambci.com; 540-663-3321, ext. 132)

Mr. Ted Williams, member of the Military Affairs Council, Fredericksburg
 (lmwilli3@aol.com; 540-371-4492)

Mr. Paul Hirsch, President, Madison Government Affairs
 (paul@madisongov.net; 202-347-1223)

Ms. Debbie Eubanks, Senior Manager, Madison Government Affairs
 (debbieeubanks227@aol.com; 540-220-5358)

Mr. Cord Sterling, Defense LA, Senator John Warner's office
 (cord_sterling@Warner.senate.gov; 202-224-6295)

Mr. Andrew Hicks, Military Affairs, Congresswoman Jo Ann Davis' office
 (Andrew.Hicks@mail.house.gov; 202-226-9878)

Mr. Josh Cohn, Governor Mark Warner's liaison office
 (Josh.Cohn@governor.virginia.gov; 202-783-1769)

DCN: 11799

Again, thank you for your time and consideration. If we can be of further assistance or answer any other questions, please don't hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Linda Worrell". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the typed name.

Mrs. Linda Worrell
President

DCN: 11799

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: debbieeubanks227@aol.com
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2005 10:11 AM
To: david.epstein@wso.whs.mil; Lester.Farrington@wso.whs.mil
Subject: Proposed BRAC recommendation language in electronic form - Dahlgren

Attachments: BRAC2005CHEMBIONEWRECOMMENDATION.doc;
BRAC2005GUNSANDAMMORECOMMENDATION.doc



BRAC2005CHEMBI BRAC2005GUNSAN
IEWRECOMMENDATMMORECOMMENDA

Mr. Epstein and Mr. Farrington.

Attached in electronic format the recommendations that we presented to you on Tuesday, July 26 during our visit and briefing from the Fredericksburg community. Thank you.
r/debbie

Debra O. Eubanks
Senior Manager
Madison Government Affairs
804-742-5064
804-742-5064 (fax)
cell: 540-220-5358

Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition

Category: Technical Joint Cross Service Group

Mission: RDT&E for Weapons & Armaments

One Time Cost: \$116.3million

Savings: 2006-2011 = \$81.2 million

Return on Investment: 13 years

Annual Recurring Savings: \$11.3 million

Final Action: Remain Open

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Dahlgren, VA by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal NJ

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation realigns and consolidates those gun and ammunition facilities working in Weapons and Armaments (W&A) Research , Development & Acquisition (D&A). This realignment would result in a more robust joint center for gun and ammunition Research, Development & Acquisition at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. This location is already the great concentration of military value in gun and ammunition W&A RD&A. Movement of all the Services' guns and ammunition work to Picatinny Arsenal will create a joint center of excellence and provide synergy in armament development for the near future and beyond, featuring a Joint Packaging, Handling, Shipping and Transportation (PHS&T) Center, particularly important in this current time of high demand for guns and ammunition by all the services. This recommendation promotes jointness, enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise within the weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition community that currently resides at this DoD specialty location.

Community Concerns

The recommendation is in conflict with the recommendation to establish Dahlgren as a specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare. This is unique to the services and centroid for Navy Surface Ship developments to preserve the synergies between large highly integrated control systems developments and the weapon system development themselves. Full consolidation at Picatinny will result in the reduction of the Navy's ability to engineer and integrate its shipboard combat systems. System integration is best done, for both engineering and cost purposes, when those elements being integrated are co-located. Single siting gunnery fails to retain two sites, which was one of the guiding principals of the TJCSG. The Department of Defense recommendation will result in a reduction in military value and potentially negatively impact the warfighting

capability of the Navy. Additionally, based on BRAC 95 experience approximately less than 20% of the educated, trained, and experienced engineering and technical workforce will move from the region.

Commission Findings

The Commission agrees with the Community that moving the gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal does not improve nor enhance military value and that it is in conflict with the recommendation to establish Dahlgren as a specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare. The Commission found that the Department of Defense over-valued the integration of guns and ammunition in W&A RD&A and this realignment, if left as proposed by the Secretary, would actually diminish military value, readiness, and operational capabilities of the Navy.

Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1,3, and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Create two specialty sites for guns and ammunition within the Department of Defense - a RDAT&E for small arms and non-maritime guns and ammo at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ and a RDAT&E for maritime guns and ammo at Naval District Washington, West Area, Dahlgren.

DEFENSE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION
2521 S. CLARK STREET, SUITE 600
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
(703) 699-2950

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: July 26, 2005

TIME: 1:00 pm

MEETING WITH: Dahlgren Community (Congressional staff, retirees, etc.)

OBJECTIVE: To discuss BRAC actions affecting Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, VA

JCSG STAFF: David Epstein/Navy
Lester Farrington/Cross Service

OTHER COMMISSION PARTICIPANTS:

NA

NON-COMMISSION PARTICIPANT(S):

Name/Title/Phone Number

Linda Worrell/ President Fredericksburg Regional Chamber of Commerce/

Ted Williams/community leader and former deputy technical director and department head at NSWC Dahlgren

Ted Hontz/Co-chair of Military Affairs Committee, Fredericksburg Regional Chamber of Commerce; former CO of AEGIS Training and Readiness at Dahlgren

Paul Hirsch/President and CEO of Madison Government Affairs

Debbie Eubanks/Senior Manager, Madison Government Affairs/804 742-5064

Cord Sterling/SEN John Warner's staff

MEETING RESULTS/FOLLOW-UP ACTION:

Ted Williams, the presenter closely followed the handout that he provided which discusses realignment issues. He and the other meeting participants were sharply critical of the DOD recommendations dealing with relocating guns and ammo to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ, and of the recommendation involving moving non-medical Chem/Bio RD&A from Dahlgren, VA to Aberdeen, MD.

Among the most significant issues were:

1. Guns and Ammo

- **TJCSG did not follow their own principles (dual siting for critical functions, efficiency is adversely affected, and specialty site is harmed)**
- **Navy and Army guns are very different for a variety of reasons;**
- **Dahlgren personnel will not move to Aberdeen and expertise will be lost;**
- **Personnel will still have to travel to Dahlgren to conduct testing;**
- **Unlike Army guns, Navy guns are part of a complex system and work to integrate the relationships of the entire system are critical (example was surface nuclear cruisers, which was fraught with problems) .**

2. Non-medical Chem/Bio

- **Chem/Bio is already joint and Dahlgren personnel work and coordinate with Edgewood;**
- **Navy chem./bio issues are significantly different than Army's and USAF's;**
- **Dahlgren has world-class Level-3 facilities.**

Dahlgren

1918 - 20 yr range

guns
How often is ~~gun~~ Dahlgren used

ends needs to
guns + ammo closely linked
w/ ship system for fuses

< R+D to Arm Base >
173 billets in gunner
will move

integrated
into @ Dahlgren

COBRA
expects 13 yr payback
(no fun reason)

projectiles fuses
perform differently over water

combat system
one integrated laboratory
for integrated system

Chem bio

Navy chem bio
should be done
at ships 15% are
chem bio

131 billets
10 have moved on
Counter terrorism
Joint Warfare
Analysis Center

detachment

aberdeen detachment
?

Pic detach at
Dahlgren

Edgewood detach
@ Dahlgren

ICSB looked at
gun w/ ship systems

gun
↓
mount
↓
ship
↓
entry weapon sys

Army
gun

Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition

Category: Technical Joint Cross Service Group

Mission: RDT&E for Weapons & Armaments

One Time Cost: \$116.3million

Savings: 2006-2011 = \$81.2 million

Return on Investment: 13 years

Annual Recurring Savings: \$11.3 million

Final Action: Remain Open

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Dahlgren, VA by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal NJ

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation realigns and consolidates those gun and ammunition facilities working in Weapons and Armaments (W&A) Research , Development & Acquisition (D&A). This realignment would result in a more robust joint center for gun and ammunition Research, Development & Acquisition at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. This location is already the great concentration of military value in gun and ammunition W&A RD&A. Movement of all the Services' guns and ammunition work to Picatinny Arsenal will create a joint center of excellence and provide synergy in armament development for the near future and beyond, featuring a Joint Packaging, Handling, Shipping and Transportation (PHS&T) Center, particularly important in this current time of high demand for guns and ammunition by all the services. This recommendation promotes jointness, enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise within the weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition community that currently resides at this DoD specialty location.

Community Concerns

The recommendation is in conflict with the recommendation to establish Dahlgren as a specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare. This is unique to the services and centroid for Navy Surface Ship developments to preserve the synergies between large highly integrated control systems developments and the weapon system development themselves. Full consolidation at Picatinny will result in the reduction of the Navy's ability to engineer and integrate its shipboard combat systems. System integration is best done, for both engineering and cost purposes, when those elements being integrated are co-located. Single siting gunnery fails to retain two sites, which was one of the guiding principals of the TJCSG. The Department of Defense recommendation will result in a reduction in military value and potentially negatively impact the warfighting

capability of the Navy. Additionally, based on BRAC 95 experience approximately less than 20% of the educated, trained, and experienced engineering and technical workforce will move from the region.

Commission Findings

The Commission agrees with the Community that moving the gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal does not improve nor enhance military value and that it is in conflict with the recommendation to establish Dahlgren as a specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare. The Commission found that the Department of Defense over-valued the integration of guns and ammunition in W&A RD&A and this realignment, if left as proposed by the Secretary, would actually diminish military value, readiness, and operational capabilities of the Navy.

Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1,3, and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Create two specialty sites for guns and ammunition within the Department of Defense - a RDAT&E for small arms and non-maritime guns and ammo at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ and a RDAT&E for maritime guns and ammo at Naval District Washington, West Area, Dahlgren.

small arms &
non machine guns to
Picatinny

**QUESTIONS REGARDING NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE
CENTER DAHLGREN:**

1. What is the starting point of NSWC Dahlgren in terms of officers, enlisted, and civilian billets and on-board strength? Please provide the organization chart and the number of military and civilian personnel in each part of the organization.
2. List each recommendation involving NSWC Dahlgren, breaking out each piece of each recommendation and display the number of military and civilians reporting to or departing from Dahlgren with respect to each part of the organization as presented in question #1.
3. Discuss the net change in the organization. If all of the civilians moving into or out of Dahlgren were to move on the same day, what would be the net effect for by civil service series – that is, how many Operations Research Analysts (1515) would come or go, how many Management Analysts (334) would come or go, etc. Are the GS levels fairly consistent when one compares the current employment, by Series, to the future employment by Series?
4. To what extent is the work interchangeable – that is, will an Operations Research Analyst working in one Dahlgren office today going to be able to find work after the reorganization with no more than a few months of formal training plus some on-the-job training?
5. Discuss the timing of the moves in terms of the ability of employees affected by an early move out of Dahlgren. What percentage of the employees will be able to continue employment in an office being augmented by incoming workforce? Discuss the expectation that the affected personnel will be able to find work at Dahlgren in another incoming move as part of another one of the recommendations. Please ignore “bumping and retreating rights for now.”
6. Will employees with the right skills for the “new” Dahlgren be able to stay employed for a few months which they are waiting for one of the other scheduled moves that is scheduled?
7. There are a lot of changes involved in these recommendations. How much disruption does Dahlgren expect to experience as a result of bumping and retreating associated with RIFs and reorganization-driven retirements?
8. What is the cost of the disruption caused by the moves, including additional training and other things associated with the moves, NOT included in the COBRA? What is the impact on the workload, but monetary and military?
9. Can the changes be accomplished with reasonable levels of training, but moving few if any employees – just changing the nature of the work that is to be performed?
10. King George County experiences one of the most severe (5.5%) job losses relative to current MSA employment. What was the total job loss across the facilities that do work similar to that performed by Dahlgren? Could the impact on Dahlgren have been reduced by redefining the types of work being left there?
11. Is any portion of the base being closed and turned over to a reuse authority? If so, what types of facilities and what are the likely reuses of the facilities?
12. Are there currently a commissary, a dispensary, and/or an exchange at Dahlgren? Which, if any close? What is the impact on the retired community in the area?

Are any jobs associated with these functions reflected in the COBRA and if so, how?

13. Does the COBRA include differences in housing allowances and other aspects of compensation?
14. Are there any environmental issues associated with closing parts of Dahlgren, if any, and if so, what and how much are these? Are they included in the NSWC Dahlgren COBRA?
15. What is the condition of excess military housing, if any, at NSWC Dahlgren? What about at the bases to which military personnel will be moved? Will the Navy have to build new housing at any receiving commands? Are the increased costs reflected in the COBRA?
16. In BRACs 1993 and 1995, what percentage of technician employees moved to keep their jobs? What percentage of the technical employees? What percentage of the people with Masters or PhDs?

**QUESTIONS REGARDING NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER,
DAHLGREN:**Technical Joint Cross-Service Group Recommendations**A. Consolidate Maritime C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test and Evaluation (Tech-9)**

1. How many people are affected (mil, civ, contractors) at Dahlgren in the proposed move to Point Loma where the new Space Warfare Systems Command-Pacific is to be created?
2. What C4ISR functions are performed at Dahlgren and are there any concerns over the movement of this function to Point Loma?
3. To what extent will there be a loss of technical expertise if technicians do not move? Is this considered to be a major problem?
4. Does this proposed consolidation make sense and will it result in greater economy and efficiency of maritime C4ISR research, development & acquisition, and test and evaluation functions?
5. Another part of this realignment calls for relocation of Point Loma surface maritime sensors, electronic warfare and electronics research, development & acquisition and test and evaluation work to Dahlgren. What savings are anticipated from this move and how many military and civilian positions are affected?
6. Was consideration given to combining both the C4ISR and sensor functions at a single location thus negating the need for a move?

B. Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center (Tech-15)

1. Part of this proposed recommendation calls for relocation of all Weapons and armaments and test and evaluation functions from Dahlgren to China Lake. Does China Lake have the capacity and infrastructure to accommodate this move? Is there sufficient technical expertise at China Lake in the event that Dahlgren employees do not move? What specific savings are anticipated?
2. From a military value standpoint, does Dahlgren believe this move is the most appropriate for future conflicts?
3. What consideration was given to creating a joint center that would include all military services in performing the weapons armaments, research, development and test and evaluation functions? Was Eglin considered in any of the scenarios as a candidate for such a joint center?

C. Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition

1. Part of this proposed realignment calls for relocating Dahlgren's research, development and acquisition work to Picatinny Arsenal. Does Dahlgren anticipate any difficulties in moving these functions to an Army facility?
2. What is the magnitude of Dahlgren's gun and ammunition work? Will Dahlgren continue to test gun tubes and proof new ammunition or will these functions also transfer to Picatinny?
3. If the sensor work envisioned to be received at Dahlgren did not Materialize (Tech rec. 9), what capabilities would remain at Dahlgren after the movement out of functions envisioned by Tech recommendations 15 and 19?
4. What issues does Dahlgren envision by implementation of Tech Recommendations 9, 15, and 19? Do these proposed actions rank high in military value? Is Navy's "right-sizing" the functions associated With the three recommendations being done at the right locations?



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
3040 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3040

06302005

JUN 22 2005

RECEIVED

Mr. Frank Cirillo
Director, Review & Analysis
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Cirillo:

Thank you for your recent inquiry concerning the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure recommendations. You asked four questions numbered 12, 13, 14, and 15.

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group (TJCSG) answered questions 12 and 14. See the attached. The TJCSG will provide responses to questions 13 and 15 within 2 work days.

Thank you for the opportunity to address your questions.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Alan R. Shaffer", with some additional scribbles and initials to the right.

Alan R. Shaffer
Executive Director
Technical Joint Cross-Service Group

Attachment:
As stated.



Technical Joint Cross-Service Group Responses to
BRAC 2005 Commission Inquiries
DSE Numbers 12 and 14
June 22, 2005

DSE Number 12

Was the intent of TECH 15 to consolidate Navy's air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface launched missile RD&A [research, development, and acquisition], and T&E [test and evaluation] activities at China Lake, CA? What does that imply in terms of its impact on Dahlgren and other commands that are slated to transfer personnel and capability to China Lake in accordance with this recommendation?

The intent of TECH 15 was to consolidate weapons and armaments, except Guns and Ammo, into an integrated R, D&A, T&E at one of three sites that rated high in military value in all of these three functions. In this case, Navy's air-to-air, air-to-ground and surface launched missile RD&A and T&E are recommended to move to China Lake, with the exception of surface ship weapons system integration which would remain at Dahlgren. The impact on Dahlgren and other commands would be that personnel and capability in weapons subsystem and weapons would move to China Lake.

DSE Number 14

Regarding the recommendation Tech 19, is the intent to retain large caliber naval gun RDA at Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren VA? It would appear that this recommendation would then separate the Guns and Ammo programs being moved to Picatinny from the Open Air (Over water Gun) Range and associated gun systems. Was this intentional? If not, you might want to rewrite the recommendation to read "Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Dahlgren, VA, by relocating small caliber Naval and Marine Corps gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ."

The intent of Tech 19 was to move guns and ammo RDA functions, including large caliber naval guns, to Picatinny.

The large caliber naval gun T&E function will remain at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren VA, including the Open Air Over Water gun range. Supporting analysis reflects this intent.



11799

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
3040 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3040

06302005
RECEIVED

JUN 23 2005

Mr. Frank Cirillo
Director, Review & Analysis
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Cirillo:

Thank you for your recent inquiry concerning the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure recommendations.

You asked four questions numbered 12, 13, 14, and 15. Questions 12 and 14 were answered yesterday. Questions 13 and 15 required additional research because each contained quantitative data from unspecified sources. Responses to questions 13 and 15 are attached.

Please let me know if you have any additional questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

Alan R. Shaffer
Executive Director
Technical Joint Cross-Service Group

Attachment:
As stated.



Technical Joint Cross-Service Group Responses to
BRAC 2005 Commission Inquiries
DSE Numbers 13 and 15
June 22, 2005

DSE Number 13

Does the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Weapons Systems Integration (WSI) Specialty Site Designation further support Dahlgren's certified position that 58 of the 173 workyears are "inextricable" from their WSI efforts? Therefore, should I conclude that you are agreeing that to reduce the number of relocating personnel from 173 to 115? If so, please run a revised COBRA for Tech 15. Would you agree that it would be appropriate to rewrite this piece of the Tech 15 recommendation to read, "Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, VA, by relocating surface launched missile Weapons & Armaments activities Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon systems integration to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA?"

The work year numbers the TJCSG used for analysis was based on certified data provided to the TJCSG. The different work year estimates in question 13 are not part of the certified data provided to the TJCSG. The analysis, based on the certified data, supports all actions in the recommendation. The certified data available to the TJCSG does not support revising scenario or COBRA analysis.

DSE Number 15

Regarding the recommendation Tech 9, does the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Weapons Systems Integration Specialty Site Designation apply to this recommendation (i.e. to consolidate C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition Test and Evaluation?) Does this mean that since 86 of the 116 workyears in this area are "inextricably" linked to Dahlgren, as they documented in their BRAC input, that only 30 positions should be transferred to Naval Station? Please run a corrected COBRA if appropriate. Consider rewriting the recommendation to read "Realign Naval Base Ventura County, CA, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA, and Naval Station Newport, RI, by relocating Maritime Information, Systems, except for Weapons Systems Integration, Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA."

The TJCSG made a deliberative decision to move the referenced Dahlgren activity to San Diego. The decision to give preference to (a) a common capability

or (b) tailored capabilities relies on judgment. In the case of the Dahlgren technical activity, professional military judgment concluded that a common capability, interoperable with the remaining Maritime Information Systems community products had priority for the future and hence the recommendation to consolidate the activity at Point Loma. Therefore, a revised COBRA run is not required.

*Task 295
part 2
20 Jun 01*

Joint Centers of Excellence for Chemical, Biological, and Medical RD & A

Category: Medical Activities

Mission: RD&A for Chemical & Biological Research

One Time Cost: \$73.9 million

Savings: 2006-2011 = \$45.9million

Return on Investment: 7 years

Annual Recurring Savings: \$9.2 million

Final Action: Remain Open

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, VA by relocating Non-medical Chemical Biological Defense Research and Development & Acquisition to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Secretary of Defense Justification

Creates Joint Centers of Excellence for Chemical Biological Defense research, development, and acquisition at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Actions will increase synergy, focus on joint needs, and efficient use of equipment and facilities by co-locating Tri-Service and Defense activities performing functions in chemical-biological defense and medical RDA. Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, is home to the military's most robust infrastructure supporting research utilizing hazardous chemical agents.

Community Concerns

Relocating this capability to Aberdeen will require construction of new facilities and the predicted loss of team members and technical expertise would destroy a national capability at the very time it is most necessary. Specialized and environmentally approved facilities already exist at Dahlgren, with the newest technical facility slated to be operational in September 2005. It is estimated that approximately 20% of personnel would move. In addition, the over-water testing capability which is critical to the Navy and that now exists at Dahlgren can not be duplicated. The over-water testing and training range for chemical detection is the only one of its kind in the U.S. The Shipboard Chemical and Biological Defense Test Environment is unique and the specialized expertise in Navy ship systems is essential. Relocating this capability at a single site would create a major vulnerability as the Nation works to fight the GWOT. As a final note, the current Chemical/Biological Defense mission at Dahlgren has been joint since 1995 with all RDT&E procurement funds already going through JPEO-CBD. Relationships with other activities including Edgewood already exist at Dahlgren. To relocate this mission would not make the program any more joint.

Commission Findings

The Commission agreed with the Community that relocating the Chemical and Biological Defense mission from Dahlgren to Aberdeen, MD would not provide more jointness and synergy, but in fact would destroy the critical Navy testing and training capability. The Commission found that the Department of Defense over-valued the creation of a joint center of excellence for Chem-Bio RD&A. If this realignment was left as proposed by the Secretary it would actually diminish fleet readiness, and operational capabilities of the Navy.

Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1,3, and 4 and therefore recommends the following: Create a Joint Center of Excellence for Chemical/Biological Defense and make the Naval District Washington, West Area, Dahlgren Team a Joint Center detachment.

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
28 July 2004

NOTIONAL SCENARIOS Issue #07-28-04-01

Issue: On 23 July 2004, the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) directed the Joint Cross Service Groups to provide notional scenarios for discussion at its next meeting. Fulfilling this request is inadvisable due to the risk of consequential perceptions that the Department created the answers before the data was in. Any doubts among the Commission and communities that “a fair process”¹ was conducted will jeopardize the scenarios of the Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) that are eventually derived through its ongoing analytical process.

Point of Contact: Don DeYoung, Capabilities Integration Team (Alternate), U.S. Navy

Issue Summary:

1. *The TJCSG's Dilemma.*

The TJCSG is being asked to consider closure scenarios *before the analytical work has been completed on the critical precursor stages*. The stages yet to be completed include: (a) collecting the data; (b) establishing whether there is excess capacity within the DoD in-house system of labs, centers, and test ranges (and if so, to what extent); and (c) determining the military value of each site.

2. *Scenarios Should Not Be Generated Before Excess Capacity Has Been Determined.*

Conventional wisdom after the last closure round in 1995 held that substantial excess capacity remained. However, the circumstances supporting that contention were profoundly altered by a foreign attack on our homeland. As a result, (a) the nation's defense budget has risen steadily (with an accompanying increase in DoD lab/center workload)², (b) serious Congressional consideration is being given to *increasing* the size of the force structure, and (c) major technical challenges exist that require extensive levels of RDT&E, such as finding reliable means for the remote sensing of everything from conventional explosives, to bio-agents, to nuclear material.

3. *Excess Capacity Estimates in the March 04 Report to Congress Were Very Likely Overstated.*

Some will say that the DoD's March 2004 report to Congress already established the existing levels of excess RDT&E capacity.³ That argument is weak.

First, the report's findings of excess capacity are inexact and merely met a Congressional milestone that allowed the Department to proceed with the more rigorous analytical standards of a base closure round. In fact, the report itself states,

“Only a comprehensive BRAC analysis can determine the exact nature or location of potential excess. In preparing a list of realignment and closure recommendations in May 2005, the Department will conduct a thorough review of its existing infrastructure in accordance with the

¹ Public Law 101-510, as amended through the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, SEC. 2901. (b)

² Navy Laboratory Community Coordinating Group data show a 10% increase in the one year from FY01 to FY02 in reimbursable funding, and direct cites (including non-Navy funding sources).

³ Department of Defense, “Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,” (March 2004), p.47 and 52.

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
28 July 2004

law and Department of Defense BRAC 2005 guiding procedures, *ensuring that all military installations are treated equally and evaluated on their continuing military value to our nation.*⁴

Second, solid evidence suggests that the report's estimates are much overstated. The report estimated that the FY09 excess capacity for Army and Air Force labs/T&E sites would be 62 percent (or 825 square feet per person) and 18 percent (or 750 square feet per person), respectively.⁵ Looking more closely one finds that these estimates are ratios where the "acquisition workforce" divides total square footage. But what is that workforce? Is it both contractor and in-house personnel, *or is it a partial picture that uses just government employees?* Evidence suggests the latter.⁶ This matters a lot. Since 1996 (a year after the last BRAC round) the Services have been complying with ambitious outsourcing goals levied by the DoD. Many of the positions formerly filled by government workers are now performed on-base by private sector employees. Assuming that 50 percent of the on-site population is comprised of contractors (an underestimate at many sites), then both the Army and Air Force have instead about 400 square feet per person. But what does that really mean? Is that a lot? Is it too much? An historical example might be useful here.

In 1876, Thomas Edison opened what has been called the first R&D laboratory, as well as one of the most productive, at Menlo Park, New Jersey. The lab building was a 100-foot by 25-foot structure with two floors (5,000 square feet).⁷ Edison's staff numbered 25, which amounted to 200 square feet per person. When one factors in facility requirements dictated by equipment that is far more powerful and dependent on carefully controlled environments than Edison's 19th century equipment, maybe 400-sq ft per "acquisition worker" is to be expected.

Third, if ever there were a seductive capacity metric for physical infrastructure, it is square footage. It promises simplicity, clarity, and accuracy, but delivers none. The above discussion reveals some of the challenges posed by DoD's use of this problematic "physical infrastructure metric." Using the example of the Air Force's McKinley Climatic Chamber shows another. The 6-chamber facility is huge, with its main chamber being 65,520 square feet.⁸ Assume the site downsized its workforce by 18 percent. I doubt anyone would argue that this unique, state-of-the-art facility would then have a correlating excess capacity of nearly 12,000 sq. ft (i.e., 18% of 65,520). All 65,000-plus sq. ft. would still be necessary whether 1000 persons, or 1 person, worked there. *The key metric for capacity is work-years, not the amount of space available.*

4. *Notional Does Not Mean Acceptable.*

Some will argue that early scenario generation is acceptable because they are only notional, general, and do not specify names. The idea here is that the less they represent reality, the more acceptable they become. This rationale will not reassure a skeptical audience. This situation is also a "Catch-22". *If these scenarios are truly so general as to be safe from prejudicing the*

⁴ Ibid., p.3.

⁵ Unlike these estimates using square footage, Navy estimates were based on in-house work-years.

⁶ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology), "Right-Sizing the Department of Defense Acquisition Workforce", (28 January 1997). In this report to Congress, the Department's total acquisition workforce (i.e., all Services, plus Defense Agencies) was stated to be 617,000 employees in FY89.⁶ It happens that the March 2004 report identifies 158,000 in the Army acquisition workforce for that same year — FY89. At the risk of being simplistic, assume an equal share of the acquisition workforce among the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Agencies. An equal share of 158,000 among the four would yield about 632,000, which is very close to the number of employees cited in the 1997 report. It appears then that the 158,000-person Army workforce is made up of government employees, and therefore the estimate does not include the on-site contractors who also use base infrastructure.

⁷ <http://www.edisonnj.org/menlopark/taemenlo.asp>

⁸ <http://www.eplin.af.mil/TS/climlab/main.html>

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
28 July 2004

process, then they will also be useless for any of the current tasks at hand. And, anything more than useless compromises the integrity of the process. It will not be difficult for a clever community consultant to show how the general features of a notional scenario resemble that of a base proposed for closure.

5. *The Private Sector is Not Responsible for Either the Analysis or a Fair Process.*

Some will argue that ideas for “transformational scenario options” were requested and received from the private sector (e.g., Business Executives for National Security) a year ago, so this request is merely gathering additional information. This argument does not recognize the fundamental objectivity and analytical integrity that must be preserved within the TJCSG. It is one thing for the private sector to offer its preferred solutions to the Department’s perceived excess of infrastructure. And, it is another thing to ask the TJCSG for ideas before the data is in, excess capacity is verified and measured, and the sites are fairly evaluated on their military value.

6. *Do Not Deviate From the Established Analytical Process.*

When discussing the objective standards to be used by the Commission for evaluating DoD BRAC recommendations, the law provides that,

“the Commission may make changes in any of the recommendations made by the Secretary if the Commission determines that the Secretary *deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria* (emphasis added) referred to in subsection (c)(1) in making recommendations.”⁹

This means that the DoD’s recommendations to close and/or realign laboratories, centers, and test ranges are theoretically the easiest of all BRAC proposals to defend before the Commission because there is (a) no clear relationship between RDT&E infrastructure and the force-structure plan (for 2025), and (b) no mention of RDT&E in the BRAC Final Criteria.

Why is there no clear relationship between RDT&E and the force-structure plan?

- First, over time, “the threat” shapes the force structure. Sometimes the threat is predictable, and sometimes it is not. For example, the DoD’s concepts for future force structure after September 11 are different than they were before that date.
- Second, S&T’s impact on the force structure 20 years hence is unknowable, especially given that basic research is unpredictable and often produces unexpected benefits. Moreover, many of the most revolutionary technologies born in DoD S&T, like radar and GPS, will take as many as 20 years to reach operational use.
- Third, the impact of current D&A is less speculative than for S&T, but it is guesswork nonetheless. For example, during the first BRAC round in 1988 the Navy’s experts might have said that the DoN’s 1998 force structure (i.e., only 10 years later, *not 20*) would have had more than 850 A-12 Avengers streaming off the Fleet’s carriers.¹⁰ Things happen.

As for the BRAC Final Criteria, they do not address RDT&E (although the criteria speak directly to other facets of national defense, like joint warfighting, training, and readiness). Last year the TJCSG requested that the criteria also address RDT&E, but the BRAC Office chose to “preserve flexibility.”

⁹ Public Law 101-510, as amended through the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, SEC. 2903. (d)

¹⁰ <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-12.htm>

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
28 July 2004

That flexibility may well harden if we deviate from the established analytical process. Notions that we marshaled data to support preexisting, or preferred, solutions will be difficult, if not impossible to dispel if the scenarios precede analysis.

Recommendation: The TJCSG should urge the ISG to reconsider its request to generate notional closure scenarios before our analytical work on capacity and military value is accomplished. While beyond our charter, it may also be advisable to suggest that the other JCSGs also refrain from generating notional scenarios. Many of the above arguments pertain to them as well.

Army Position: _____
AF Position: _____
Navy Position: _____
Marine Corps Position: _____
JCS Position: _____

| | |
|--|-----------------------|
| Final Resolution: <i>No Vote / No Action</i> | |
| POC Signature: _____ | Date: <i>11/11/04</i> |
| CIT Chair: _____ | Date: _____ |

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
4 August 2004

PROPOSED CONTINGENCY PLAN
Issue #08-06-04-02

Issue: As requested by the CIT, the Sub-Groups spent great time and effort during the week of 19 July developing a timeline to get the TJCSG's BRAC analysis on track for success. Subsequent to that effort, a contingency plan was also requested by the CIT to mitigate risks should the incoming data for calculating excess capacity and military value prove unusable. The proposed contingency plan places a premium on: (1) scenario development *prior* to runs of the Linear Optimization Model (LOM), and (2) military judgment. An undefined "trigger event" for implementing the contingency plan occurs on 10 August. Issues of defensibility argue for rejecting the proposal. On the other hand, the valid need for mitigating risk argues simplifying our approach to calculating excess capacity.

Point of Contact: Don DeYoung, Capabilities Integration Team (Alternate), U.S. Navy

Issue Summary:

1. *Unanswered Questions*

- **Question #1.** What happens, or does not happen, by 10 August that requires implementation of the plan?
- **Question #2.** How do the milestones of the contingency plan map against the approved timeline developed by the Sub-Groups?
- **Question #3.** Given that the contingency plan is the same analytical model (according to Mr. A. Goldstajn, Air Force CIT Principal) used by the Air Force during BRAC-95, how do we avoid the criticism made of that approach by the General Accounting Office which found that, "the Air Force's process made it difficult to easily track resulting recommendations."¹? GAO's report went on to say,

"...the process was not sufficiently documented to substantiate the extent of deliberations and analyses leading to decisions to close or realign individual bases. This was especially problematic for bases where deliberations occurred and decisions were made that bases could not be closed or realigned."²

2. *Scenario Development Cannot be the Front-End of the Analytical Process*

- To preserve the integrity of BRAC-05, scenario development *cannot* be the front-end of the analytical process. Issues of defensibility will almost certainly arise if scenario development is performed prior to the quantitative analyses. *Notions that we marshaled data to support preexisting, or preferred, solutions will be difficult, if not impossible to dispel.*
- Before scenarios are developed, we need to ensure that our analytical process follows the objective sequence of precursor stages: (a) collecting the data; (b) establishing whether there is excess capacity within the DoD in-house system of labs, centers, and test ranges (and if so, to what extent and where); and (c) determining the military value of each site.

¹ GAO, *Report to the Congress and the Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission*, "Military Bases: Analysis of DoD's 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment," (GAO/NSIAD-95-133), April 1995, p.51.

² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
4 August 2004

3. *Military Judgment is No Substitute for Capacity and Military Value Data*

- Military judgment is a critical adjunct to our analyses. It is the essential filter through which all proposed BRAC actions must pass. An extreme hypothetical example would be if a scenario generated by the LOM, or transformational option proposed by the private sector, led to closing Pearl Harbor. Military judgment would doubtless reject it on the solid ground of strategic and tactical military interests.
- Military judgment cannot, however, substitute for the objective quantitative data necessary for deriving excess capacity and military value. The uncomfortable reality of our situation is that *the data must be useful*.
- Capacity data must allow us to “determine the exact nature or location of potential excess,” and military value data must be accurate, thus “ensuring that all military installations are treated equally and evaluated on their continuing military value to our nation.”³
- If the data is unusable, then we have failed. If we fail, then there will be no quantitative means by which to make fair, objective, and defensible assessments. Replacing quantitative data with the subjective military judgment of a small number of individuals will not pass the scrutiny of the Commission and the communities.
- The law is clear on the point that “military value is the primary consideration in the making of recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations”,⁴ and on the requirement “to provide a fair process.”⁵ When it comes to collecting solid data for informed decision-making that meets those two goals, failure is not an option.

4. *Useful Capacity Data By Simplification*

- The root problem with our capacity data is complexity. We are making the job harder than it needs to be. The following is based on Service-specific experience, but it could help us sort things out. As a former member of the BRAC-95 Navy Base Structure Analysis Team, I can say that the capacity unit for *all* RDT&E — including the acquisition function — was the work-year. The Navy’s report to the BRAC Commission stated that,

“Budgeted work-years were used as a measuring tool for capacity because of its commonality within the functionally diverse Technical Centers whose products range from published scientific papers to the installation of a new piece of shipboard equipment to the live testing of a new warhead or airframe.”⁶
- Although the metric was flawed in that it counted only government personnel (therefore missing the sizeable use of infrastructure by the on-site contractor workforce),⁷ this approach was successful. In BRAC-95, the GAO examined the closure process and decisions of each Service, including their capacity and military value analyses. It found that “the Navy’s

³ Department of Defense, “Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,” (March 2004), p.3.

⁴ Public Law 101-510, as amended through the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, SEC. 2913. (b)

⁵ Public Law 101-510, SEC. 2901. (b)

⁶ Report to the Commission: Department of the Navy Analyses and Recommendations, Vol. IV (March 1995), p. X-5, [<http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/navy.htm>].

⁷ D.J. DeYoung, “The Silence of the Labs,” *Defense Horizons*, No. 21 (January 2003), p.6.

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
4 August 2004

process and recommendations were sound.”⁸ The same GAO report stated about the Navy process that, “The configuration analysis for this subcategory (Technical Centers) involved complicated assessments of the existing capabilities and requirements for 29 functional categories, such as undersea and surface ship platforms, *across four phases of work: RDT&E, acquisition, lifetime support, and general.*”⁹ This shows that the work-year even satisfied requirements of functions beyond RDT&E and acquisition. In the end, the Navy recommended 21 lab/center closure or realignment actions, and was successful with all but a few. The process for analyzing capacity stood up to the inevitable challenges by being both defensible and equitable. *In short, work-years did the job — for S&T, D&A, and T&E.*

- By deciding to count on-site contractor work-years, the TJCSG has fixed the Navy BRAC-95 problem cited above. There is, of course, the downside of verifying the numbers of on-site contractors, but this metric stands the best chance of producing an accurate estimate of a site’s true capacity.
- We can improve our odds for success by: eliminating two metrics (i.e., ACATs and Extramural Funding); firmly defining Force Structure Adjustment; and deferring square footage to the “feasibility-fit” phase of COBRA (Cost of Base Realignment Actions). For more detail on the square footage metric, see the issue paper, “Notional Scenarios.”
 - ACATs: The use of ACATs (count and funding) is analytically unsound and will be hard to defend. ACAT programs exhibit large ranges in cost and have great variances in complexity. This leads to considerable differences in personnel, funding, and infrastructure requirements between programs — even at the same ACAT level. ACATs have some use in measuring military value, but as a capacity unit they are much too imprecise. Finally, this approach fails to capture non-ACAT development programs (e.g., see “Major Navy Non-ACAT Programs”¹⁰). We will compromise the whole process if we miss counting substantial D&A workload at some sites.
 - Extramural Funding. To be blunt, this unit is absurd. First, dollars provided to external organizations (either to the private sector or to other government (DoD and non-DoD) agencies), is not a measure of on-site capacity. By this rationale DARPA, with nearly \$2.7 billion in FY03, should have a sprawling infrastructure, but it occupies merely an office building.¹¹ Second, this unit introduces private sector infrastructure into an analysis of the public sector. BRAC is about closing, reducing, and/or realigning government, *not private sector*, infrastructure. Third, by using dollars sent to other DoD organizations, we are ensuring double-counting (or worse) of the same dollar as it passes from sponsor, to program manager, to performer, and to sub-contractor. Lastly, the unit is based the faulty assumption that the level of dollars is directly related to the workload level of a contract manager; i.e., a one-to-one correspondence between number of dollars and number of contract managers.
 - The Force Structure Adjustment (FSA). This metric is supposed to identify any of today’s capacity that may not be necessary in 2025 given what we believe the force structure will have in place 20 years from now. The plan is to use the expert military judgment resident in the TJCSG sub-groups for such determinations, and the idea is to adjust the estimated required capacity, up or down, by what they think will happen. It is unclear how we will be able to defend a quantitative value based on such speculative judgments. We need to firmly define a defensible and valid manner for the use of this metric so that FSA does not instead

⁸ GAO, “Military Bases: Analysis of DoD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment”, p.87.

⁹ Report to the Commission: Department of the Navy Analyses and Recommendations, p. 96-7.

¹⁰ <http://www.abm.rda.hq.navy.mil/navyaos/content/view/full/2876>

¹¹ <http://www.darpa.mil/body/pdf/FY03BudEst.pdf>

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
4 August 2004

become known as a “Favored Scenario Adjustment.” Moreover, the judgments leading to each FSA will be subject to the following significant limitations.

- First, over time, “the threat” shapes the force structure. Sometimes the threat is predictable, and sometimes it is not. For example, the DoD’s concepts for future force structure after September 11 are different than they were before that date.
- Second, S&T’s impact on the force structure 20 years hence is unknowable, especially given that basic research is unpredictable and often produces unexpected benefits. Moreover, the most revolutionary technologies born in DoD S&T, like radar and GPS, can take as many as 20 years to reach operational use.
- Third, the impact of current D&A is less speculative than for S&T, but it is guesswork nonetheless. For example, during the first BRAC round in 1988 the Navy’s experts might have said that the DoN’s 1998 force structure (i.e., only 10 years later, *not 20*) would have had more than 850 A-12 Avengers streaming off the Fleet’s carriers.¹² Things happen.

5. *BRAC Mistakes Cannot be Undone by the Private Sector*

- The DoD laboratories and centers are responsible for performing three roles: *performer* of long-term, high-risk projects; *quick responder* in crises; and *yardstick*,¹³ a term referring to the standard that it sets by providing authoritative, objective advice to governmental decisionmakers. This latter role is critical to good government. The Federal Government must be able to choose among competing options offered by industrial producers. The need for profit makes each company an advocate of its own product, so, given those natural tendencies, the Government “requires internal technical capability of sufficient breadth, depth, and continuity to assure that the public interest is served.”¹⁴
- Industry will not take on the full range of necessary work because many areas hold limited opportunities for profit. Specialized defense technologies often have little or no applicability to commercial products. Unlike the situation during World War II, or even the Vietnam era, the DOD market is now often too small to justify a significant investment of scarce capital. In addition, R&D is expensive, the time to achieve success is long, the work is often very risky, and the payoff (especially from research) is usually not immediate.
- A healthy in-house system is a vital partner to a healthy industrial sector, and both are indispensable to our nation’s defense. Given the different roles that each play, *major damage done to the in-house system cannot be compensated by a mere increased investment in the private sector.*
- In all BRAC actions, America depends on our ability to cut fat while avoiding muscle. To show the high cost of failure, a short timeline may be useful. Over the years, the in-house system invented:
 - *the first modern U.S. radar*, fielded in time for duty in the great Pacific naval battles of World War II where it contributed to crucial victories at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal

¹² <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-12.htm>

¹³ H. L. Nieburg, *In the Name of Science* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966).

¹⁴ William J. Perry, *Required In-House Capabilities for Department of Defense Research, Development, Test and Evaluation* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1980).

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
4 August 2004

- o the critical *synthetic lubricants* needed for the new gas-turbine engines of high-performance jet aircraft, warplanes that dominated the skies in the *Korean War*
- o the *world's first intelligence satellite*, launched at the height of the *Cold War*, which reestablished surveillance of the Soviet Union less than two months after an American U-2 spy plane was downed
- o the *anti-corrosion coating* that solved the new M-16's tendency to corrode and jam in the hot, humid conditions of the *Vietnam War*, helping to restore the infantry's faith in its primary weapon
- o the first four satellite prototypes (and the first operational satellite) for what became *NAVSTAR GPS*, the revolutionary navigation system that played a pivotal role in the *Gulf War*
- o the *night-vision technologies* and lethal "*Silver Bullet*" ammunition that made the tank battles of the *Gulf War* a "turkey shoot"
- o the *ALE-50* that protected combat aircraft over *the Balkans*, a decoy so effective it earned the nickname "Little Buddy" from U.S. pilots
- o the *thermobaric warhead* used for defeating the Taliban and terrorists in the mountain caves and tunnels of *Afghanistan*, and
- o the *F/A-18 SHARP reconnaissance system* that provided real-time digital imagery (vice the 3-9 day norm) and was credited with saving lives in *Operation Iraqi Freedom*.

The calculus of BRAC is not difficult. Every dollar spent on unnecessary infrastructure robs our treasury and burdens our armed forces. Our first task is to determine whether that excess exists, and if it does, where it is and how much there is of it. Our second task is to assess the military value of the Services' corporate laboratories and warfare/product centers. Both tasks must be accomplished *objectively* and *accurately*, and they must be done *prior* to the generation of any closure scenarios. Lack of objectivity damages the defensibility of the work, which in turn jeopardizes any potential savings that can be used for our troops. Lack of accuracy damages the DoD's ability to provide new warfighting technologies, which in turn jeopardizes national security and the lives of tomorrows' troops.

Much rides on our decisions and actions, even more so than ten years ago. Our country is engaged in a prolonged struggle with an opportunistic, fanatical enemy who has unlimited apocalyptic goals and is not deterred by traditional means. We need to identify and collect any potential savings — and we need all of the technical options we can get.

Recommendation: The TJCSG should (1) reject the proposed contingency plan on the basis of its threat to the defensibility of our analytical process, and (2) simplify our approach to calculating excess capacity.

Army Position: _____
 AF Position: _____
 Navy Position: _____
 Marine Corps Position: _____
 JCS Position: _____

| | |
|---|-----------------------|
| Final Resolution: <i>No Vote / No Action</i> | |
| POC Signature:  | Date: <i>12/11/04</i> |
| CIT Chair: _____ | Date: _____ |

DECISION CRITERIA FOR SCENARIO PROPOSALS

Issue # 07-30-04-05

Issue: Scenario proposals will be developed from: (1) ideas proposed by OSD,¹ the MILDEPs, and the TJCSG, and (2) options generated by the Linear Optimization Model. To become closure / realignment scenarios, all options must be systematically evaluated for effectiveness and feasibility. This paper proposes some criteria to assist in that evaluation process and to help provide an “audit trail” to support each decision. Candidate scenarios that pass through this decision filter are eligible to become, with ISG approval, scenarios for COBRA (Cost of Base Realignment Actions) analysis.

Point of Contact: Don DeYoung, Capabilities Integration Team (Alternate), U.S. Navy

Issue Summary:

(a) *Background*

- Options generated by the Linear Optimization Model (LOM) are filtered by quantitative parameters, such as excess capacity and military value. The LOM has two advantages. The first is that a limited number of options are produced from a large universe of potential options. For example, given 10 sites, there are 175 alternatives that close 1, 2, or 3 sites.² The second advantage is that *it provides an objective means by which to defend the selected set of scenarios*. The disadvantage is that it does not provide “answers”, but instead serves as a decision aid.
- Transformational options (i.e., those developed by the military judgment of the OSD, MILDEPs, and TJCSG) are limited only by imagination, which is appropriate for an innovative endeavor. *The advantage of deriving options in this manner is the potential for transformational payoff. The disadvantage lies in the difficulty we will have justifying our selected set of candidate recommendations when a much larger universe of potential options was not considered.*
- The above problem is compounded by the ISG’s request for notional scenarios (for which some JCSGs have identified “winners” and “losers”)³, and its requirement that the JCSGs begin to register recommendations in September. Unfortunately, the TJCSG’s actions to develop candidate scenarios began well before the military value data was received from the sites, and before the excess capacity and military value of each site was calculated.

(b) *The Decision Metrics*

- Keeping in mind the requirement “to provide a fair process”⁴, both the LOM-generated and transformational options must be evaluated by the same decision criteria. Each option, however it is derived, can be evaluated by decision criteria grouped in two sets: those for *effectiveness* and for *feasibility*.

¹ Along with the closure scenarios that it formulates independent of the TJCSG process, OSD also solicited transformation options from the private sector (e.g., Business Executives for National Security) in August 2003.

² DON IAT Briefing, “Proposed Optimization Methodology: Generating Alternatives.”

³ Briefing to the Infrastructure Steering Group, 27 August 2004

⁴ Public Law 101-510, as amended through the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, SEC. 2901. (b)

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
8 September 2004

- Decision criteria for effectiveness are:
 - Do the components of the option possess the required workforce skill set and expertise?
 - Do the components of the option possess the required physical plant and scientific / engineering equipment?
 - Do the components of the option have an established track record of success? If not, does the gaining site have adequate technical and acquisition talent in a related technical area?
 - Do the components of the option possess an average military value equal to or greater than that of the original configuration? If not, is the decrease justifiable in military and economic terms?
 - Can the components of the option satisfy DoD required capacity (based upon their demonstrated historical peak capacity)?
 - Does the option increase or decrease synergy?
 - Does the option have the potential to increase interoperability or “jointness” of systems delivered to the warfighter?
 - Does the option decrease unwarranted duplication, or does it diminish a needed capability?
 - Does the option degrade or improve Life Cycle Management?
 - Does the option conform or conflict with any finding(s) or proposal(s) of the Defense Science Board, Service Science Board, Tri-Service RDT&E Panel, or any other DoD/Federal board of scientific and engineering experts? (See note⁵)
 - Does the option increase average intellectual capital? (See note⁶)
- Decision criteria for feasibility are:
 - Does the installation proposed for a consolidated mission have sufficient FTEs to perform the work or can sufficient FTEs be obtained from local industry or academic partners?
 - Does the installation proposed for a consolidation mission provide all of the essential physical conditions (e.g., weather, geography) essential to the conduct of the new mission element?
 - Does the installation proposed for a consolidated mission possess sufficient physical space (i.e., available square footage) and/or buildable acres to accommodate the workload? If not, is leased space an option?
- The above decision criteria are not “go/no-go” litmus tests. Instead, they are intended to be an objective and uniform way for us to make informed judgments about which of the potentially many candidate recommendations become COBRA data calls. Further, the criteria will not require exact answers, just some preliminary thought and judgment. Some of the required data will be more accurately derived by the COBRA data calls.

(c) *The Decision Metrics and COBRA*

- Some will argue that many, if not all, of the above criteria are unnecessary because (1) military judgment (unbounded by objective criteria) is sufficient to select the best COBRA data calls, and (2) those data calls will provide much of the above information. There are three problems with this argument.

⁵ The TJCSG does not have a monopoly on expert military judgment. It would therefore be difficult to explain why we chose not to address the findings and proposals of other high-level expert panels — *especially those that, unlike our study, actually examined and evaluated the work of the sites.*

⁶ This criterion is particularly critical. Exceptional talent is an indicator of the other important parameters. For example, the best talent does not choose to work with lousy facilities. It does not choose to work for an organization with no record of success and no chance to make a difference. It does not choose to work with mediocre colleagues and poor leadership. And, it does not choose to work on yesterday's problems. *If we can find exceptional talent, we will find state-of-the-art facilities, capable leadership, top colleagues, a record of impact on the nation's security, a powerful desire for success, and a staff working on tomorrow's challenges. Find the best talent, and the rest falls into place.*

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
8 September 2004

- o Problem #1: COBRA calls are expensive. Based on the cost of one real-life BRAC-95 COBRA call, the estimated cost of the average BRAC-05 TJCSG COBRA call might be roughly \$495,000.⁷ That estimate is likely conservative. Assuming 20-40 COBRA data calls, which is the range most often mentioned, and the total price tag would range between 10 and 20 million dollars.
- o Problem #2: COBRA calls are labor intensive. Based on the real-life BRAC-95 COBRA call, an average BRAC-05 TJCSG data call may well generate 375 pages of data.⁸ Again, assuming 20-40 COBRA data calls, the sub-groups may be swamped with between 7,500 and 15,000 pages of data that will need to be analyzed, addressed, and adjudicated (see Issue Paper #07-16-04-05 titled “Scenario Conflict Adjudication”). Sorting through this information will take time that is in very short supply.
- o Problem #3: Supportable BRAC actions require analytical rigor. A failure to show how we objectively selected the relatively few COBRA data calls, among all the various options possible, will place our efforts at risk during the review by the Commission and communities.

Conclusion: We do not have the luxury of abundant time — nor do the labs and centers have the massive level of resources necessary — to entertain an ineffective and inefficient “ready-fire-aim” approach to developing an optimal set of COBRA scenarios. We need to apply analytical rigor to a phase in scenario development that might otherwise become a “black box” without them.

Recommendation: Evaluate all options — LOM-generated, transformational, and any others — by the effectiveness and feasibility criteria identified above.

Army Position: _____
 AF Position: _____
 Navy Position: _____
 Marine Corps Position: _____
 JCS Position: _____

| | |
|---|-----------------------|
| Final Resolution: <i>No Vote / Superseded by Delphi</i> | |
| Session Held 9 September 2004 | |
| POC Signature: _____ | Date: <i>11/11/04</i> |
| CIT Chair: _____ | Date: _____ |

⁷ The BRAC-95 COBRA call expended 1-2 WYs of effort in 48 hours (plus a weekend) at the “losing” site. Assuming the level to be 1.5 WYs, at a fully-burdened compensation rate of a GS-13, and the “losing” site spent approximately \$225K to respond. Then assume the “gaining” site expended 1/5 the effort, which is probably conservative, and the cost for that site was roughly \$45 K, making the total for the real-life COBRA data call approximately \$270 K. And that was a scenario that involved only 2 sites. Currently, our three “training” scenarios would affect 7, 9, and 9 sites respectively. Let us assume that our COBRA calls affect an average of 7 sites, with a conservative ratio of 1 “loser” and 6 “gainers” for each. By applying the response costs of \$225 K for the “loser” and \$45 K for each “gainer”, the estimated BRAC-05 cost for each scenario might be \$495 K.

⁸ The BRAC-95 COBRA call generated 165 pages of data from the “losing” site. Again, assuming the “gaining” site expended 1/5 of the effort, about 35 pages may have been produced for a total data call response of 200 pages. Again, assuming the TJCSG data calls affect an average of 7 sites, with a ratio of 1 “loser” to 6 “gainers”, and the total amount of information might be roughly 375 pages.

SCENARIO CONFLICT ADJUDICATION
Issue #07-16-04-05

Issue: Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA) data calls will produce inevitable conflicts over what capabilities (in terms of people and physical infrastructure) *must* be moved from a “losing site” to a “gaining site.” An effective and objective means to resolve the probable inter-service stalemates is required.

Point of Contact: Don DeYoung, Capabilities Integration Team (Alternate), U.S. Navy

Issue Summary:

- Losing sites have a strong incentive to argue that more capability (i.e., people and physical infrastructure) than necessary must be moved to the gaining site. In BRAC-speak, this is called “busting COBRA”, where excessively long Return-on-Investment (ROI) periods are achieved by feeding the model a large number of unnecessary and expensive-to-move items.
- Gaining sites have an equally strong incentive to argue that they already possess most, if not all, the required capability (i.e., “just send us the money”). By “gaming COBRA”, artificially short ROI periods are achieved, thus increasing the odds that the scenario will be accepted by the DoD.
- Identifying those capabilities that *must* be moved is difficult without very strong leverage on the sites, as well as a detailed technical understanding of the scope and nature of the sites’ capabilities. Such leverage and understanding is usually present when each Service performs its own internal closure actions. However, where will the leverage come from for inter-service COBRA disputes?
- Failure to adequately resolve the potential stalemates will bear high costs to the DoD and the country. Successfully “busting COBRA” places a potentially beneficial closure action at risk, and “gaming COBRA” potentially jeopardizes national security by giving critical work to a site unable to perform it with resident personnel and / or facilities.

Recommendation: CIT propose to the TJCSG principals that a formal arbitration board be established — ahead of time — to resolve any COBRA stalemate(s). The DDR&E and the Service Vice-Chiefs would be the principal voting members, with the TJCSG principals serving as action officers who provide certified technical information on the disputed items.

Army Position: _____
 AF Position: _____
 Navy Position: _____
 Marine Corps Position: _____
 JCS Position: _____

| | |
|---|-----------------------|
| Final Resolution: <i>No Vote / No Action</i> | |
| POC Signature:  | Date: <i>11/11/04</i> |
| CIT Chair: _____ | Date: _____ |

Date: 4 November 2004

To: Roger Florence, DoD IG


From: Don DeYoung, CIT Alternate

Subj: Decision to Abstain from Scenario Prioritization

Encl. (1) Scenario List and DEPSECDEF Policy Memo

1. On 3 November 2004, the Capabilities Integration Team (CIT) of the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group (TJCSG) met to prioritize 31 proposed scenarios.
2. I abstained from the CIT's voting for the reason noted on enclosure (1).

vr/



Don DeYoung

CIT Alternate, U.S. Navy
Technical Joint Cross-Service Group



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



SEP 3 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR INFRASTRUCTURE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS
INFRASTRUCTURE STEERING GROUP MEMBERS
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

SUBJECT: BRAC 2005 Military Value Principles

The Department has determined that the most appropriate way to ensure that military value is the primary consideration in making closure and realignment recommendations is to determine military value through the exercise of military judgment built upon a quantitative analytical foundation. By applying the BRAC selection criteria to rank the facilities for which they have responsibility, the Joint Cross-Service Groups and the Military Departments build the quantitative analytical foundation. The exercise of military judgment occurs through the application of the attached principles. Limited in number and written broadly, the principles enumerate the essential elements of military judgment to be applied in the BRAC process. The Military Departments and the Joint Cross-Service Groups shall use the principles when applying military judgment in their deliberative processes.

Attachment:
As Stated

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Paul A. Wolfowitz".

OSD 13369-04

Per DEPSECDEF memo subj: "BRAC 2005 Military Value Principles" (3 Sept 04), which states: "the most appropriate way to ensure that military value is the primary consideration in making closure and realignment recommendations is to determine military value through the exercise of military ~~value~~ judgment built upon a quantitative analytic evaluation."

TJCSG Scenarios

- 001 - Establish Joint Centers for Air Platforms Centers
- 002 - Relocate W&A RDAT&E to 3 Primary & 4 Specialty Sites + Imperative Value Principles (3 Sept 04), which states: "the most appropriate way to ensure that military value is the primary consideration in making closure and realignment recommendations is to determine military value through the exercise of military ~~value~~ judgment built upon a quantitative analytic evaluation."
- 003 - Relocate DoD Directed Energy Research to One Location (Kirtland)
- 004 - Relocate DoD Directed Energy T&E and Selected Weapon T&E to One Location - WSMR to determine military value through the exercise of military ~~value~~ judgment built upon a quantitative analytic evaluation."
- 005 - Consolidate Rotary Wing RDAT&E into 2 Core Sites
- 006 - Establish Joint Centers for Fixed Wing Platform RDAT&E
- 007 - Relocate Ground Vehicle RDAT&E at Detroit Arsenal to Selfridge ANG Base
- 008 - C4ISR Cross DTAP & Function
- 009 - Defense Research Service Led Laboratories
- 010 - Consolidate Extramural Research Program Managers
- 011 - Joint Training Systems RD&A from AFRL-Mesa, ARL- Ft. Rucker, SPAWAR - San Diego, NAVAIR - PMA 205, WPAFB AFN-ASC/YW, Hill AFB - ASC/YW, PM-Joint National Training Center (JNTC) Suffolk, VA
- 012 - Deleted
- 013 - Consolidate Ground Platform RDAT&E into 2 Core Sites
- 014 - Establish Joint Centers for Space RDAT&E
- 015 - Establish a Joint Center for Space Research into One Core Site
- 016 - Establish a Joint Center(s) for Space D&A into One Core Site
- 017 - Relocate Guns & Ammo RD&A at One Location (Picatinny)
- 018 - Relocate W&A RDAT&E to 3 Primary & 4 Specialty; Retain/Relocate Energetics at Indian Head
- 019 - Relocate RD&A Energetic Capability from Crane, Aberdeen, and Yorktown to Indian Head
- 020 - Co-locate Battlespace Environments R, D&A, T&E to a single military installation (NRL Detachment Stennis Space Center)
- 021 - Co-locate "Medical" Chem-Defense Research and "Non-Medical" Chem and Bio-Defense RD&A to One Military Installation (Aberdeen, Edgewood Area MD)
- 022 - Co-locate Human Systems Training RD&A to a Single Military Installation (Joint Forces Command - Bridgeway, Suffolk VA (co-locate with JFCOM - Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center)
- 023 - Co-locate All Medical Bio Defense RD&A to One Military Installation (Ft. Detrick, Frederick, MD)
- 024 - Co-locate All Chem-Bio Defense T&E to One Military Installation (Dugway Proving Ground, UT)
- 025 - Co-locate All Biomedical D&A to One Military Installation (Ft. Detrick, MD)
- 026 - Co-locate All Biomedical Research at 7 Military Installations (Ft. Detrick, Ft. Sam Houston, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Forest Glenn Annex, Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, Soldier Systems Center, Navy Experimental Diving Unit, Panama City, FL)
- 027 - Combine Shipboard Integration at Dahlgren
- 028 - Combine Underwater Weapons Integration at Newport
- 029 - Establish Joint Land Network C4ISR Center
- 030 - Establish Joint Land Warfare Center (Remanded to Army for analysis)
- 031 - Combine Air Force Human Effectiveness R with Air Platforms R (Remanded to Air Force for Analysis)

And given that all 31 scenarios were generated by judgment alone, without the required foundation of quantitative analysis - therefore I believe constitutes a material violation of the BRAC process, integrity.

[Signature]
3 Nov 04
CIT Alameda, U.S. Navy

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
23 December 2004

SCENARIO INCONSISTENCIES

Issue # 12-28-04-01

Issue: In late-November, Military Value (MV) scores became available for assessing the judgment-driven scenarios of the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group (TJCSG). On 24 November, the TJCSG's Chair of the Capabilities Integration Team (CIT) requested identification of any scenario found to be "inconsistent with the Mil value scores," (i.e., where an action realigns workload from a site with a higher score to a lower one).¹ Instances of inconsistencies were subsequently reviewed by the Sub-Groups and declared justified because they were found to be congruent with underpinning strategies. However, while the MV scoring inconsistencies were judged to be justified by strategy, a number of the strategies themselves appear to contradict each other within one of the more important scenarios, TECH-0008.

Point of Contact: Don DeYoung, Capabilities Integration Team (Alternate), U.S. Navy

Issue Summary

1. *Four Categories of Scenarios*

For each scenario, there are four possible categories of outcomes: (A) *Data-Driven / Judgment-Validated* (no TJCSG scenario qualifies for this category for reasons explained in Issue Paper #11-15-04-01), (B) *Judgment-Driven / Data-Validated*, (C) *Judgment-Driven / Strategy-Validated*, and (D) *Judgment-Driven / Strategy-Rationalized*. The definition for rationalized is a "rational but specious explanation" [Oxford Dictionary], so Category D would not portend viable scenarios.

2. *Very Few Scenarios Are Inconsistent*

The great majority of the TJCSG's scenarios were validated by the MV scores, which means they belong in Category B: *Judgment-Driven / Data-Validated*. A strong correlation between the selected "gainers" and their higher MV scores is not surprising given that the scenario "gainers" and "losers" were, with few exceptions, chosen by workload, and because MV scores are strongly determined by that workload (i.e., gross numbers of people and dollars).

The few actions that do, in fact, move workload from a site with a higher MV score to one with a lower score will receive close attention by the Commission and communities. Therefore, to be viable, these *must* fall into Category C: *Judgment-Driven / Strategy-Validated*. The Sub-Groups reviewed the MV inconsistencies and declared the proposed actions to be consistent with strategies formulated by their expert judgment. Unfortunately, strategies within scenario TECH-0008 contradict each other; one is built upon a false premise; and the overarching strategy is applied inconsistently across sites.

3. *Analysis of the Strategies in TECH-0008*

- **Strategy #1: Consolidate Missions at Sites with Higher Military Value:** The C4ISR Sub-Group's overarching strategy for the 40 individual actions within TECH-0008, is "mission consolidation," where improved synergies are gained by greater masses of workload at the gaining sites.² Of those 40 actions, three are "inconsistent" by realigning work from higher ranked sites to lower ranked sites. The following discussions analyze each action and its enabling strategy.

¹ Al Shaffer, Subj. "Mil Value Posting", 24 November 2004.

² The strategy was explained at the 8 December CIT session when scenarios were filtered and scored by the "decision factors."

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
23 December 2004

- Strategy #2: Sensors Research Outweighs Info-Systems Research: Action 19 would realign both Ground *Sensors* and *Information Systems (IS) Research* from the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) Ft. Monmouth to the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Adelphi.

Data: Ft. Monmouth (Loser) has a higher score than ARL Adelphi (Gainer) in *IS Research* (0.4582 vs. 0.2563). In addition to its higher MV score, Ft. Monmouth has a substantially greater workload as measured by FTEs and dollars (380 FTE vs. 114 FTE, and \$96,000 K vs. \$36,000 K). ARL, on the other hand, has a higher MV score in *Sensors Research* (0.5018 vs. 0.3397) and a larger workload (446 FTE vs. 238 FTE, \$147,000 K vs. \$65,000 K).

In explaining its enabling strategy, the C4ISR Sub-Group stated that:

“preference was given to the more infrastructure intensive Sensors work...hence the Activity with the highest Military Value in Ground Sensors (Adelphi) was selected to host the consolidated activity.”³

By applying a preference to *Sensors*, Ft. Monmouth’s lower score in *Sensors Research* (0.3397 vs. 0.5018) causes it to lose *both* its *IS* and *Sensors Research*. When asked about the significant disparity in IS MV scores (where Ft. Monmouth has the higher score), the Sub-Group pointed out that it used a “cross-binning” technique where ARL’s *Sensors Research* score, not its *IS Research* score, is the decisive metric based on the infrastructure intensive nature of Sensors work.⁴

The Sub-Group’s use of a cross-binning technique for MV scoring — across two technical capabilities — is significant. Up to this point in the TJCSG’s deliberations, the very idea of aggregating and / or weighting scores across functions (i.e., Research, D&A, T&E), or across capability areas (i.e., IS and Sensors), has been a “third-rail” issue. In fact, it was difficult to reach agreement on “rolling-up” the scores by zip code (i.e., where individual respondents, from the *same Service*, at the *same installation*, and within the *same bin*, are combined into one score).⁵

In summary, this proposed action realigns *IS Research* from higher-ranked Ft. Monmouth to lower-ranked ARL Adelphi based upon an underpinning strategy that *Sensors Research* is of higher value due to its more infrastructure intensive. Therefore, both *IS* and *Sensors Research* are realigned from Ft. Monmouth to ARL Adelphi.

It should be noted that the cross-binning technique is used again in Action 40, which realigns both Air *IS* and *Sensors T&E* from NAWC-Pax River to Edwards AFB. The Sub-Group again states that “preference was given to the more infrastructure intensive Sensors work.”⁶ But, it also claims Edwards has the higher Sensors T&E MV score, which the MV data does not show. In fact, Pax River has a significantly higher MV score in *both* *IS* and *Sensors T&E*. This apparent discrepancy needs to be resolved, or the strategy statement needs to be better articulated.

- Strategy #3: Info-Systems Acquisition Outweighs Sensors Research: Action 29 would realign Rome’s *Sensors Research* to Wright-Patterson AFB (WPAFB). Action 32 would realign Air *IS Research* from Rome Laboratory to Hanscom AFB.

³ C4ISR Sub-Group, “Scenario Description & Rationale,” 14 December 2004 [DRAFT].

⁴ CIT Meeting, 8 December 2004.

⁵ MV “roll-up” by zip code, an analytically sound and common-sense approach took until 9 December to be approved.

⁶ C4ISR Sub-Group, “Scenario Description & Rationale.”

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
23 December 2004

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
23 December 2004

Data: In Action 32, Rome (Loser) has a far higher score than Hanscom AFB (Gainer) in *IS Research* (0.6053 vs. 0.0421). In addition, Rome's workload as measured by both FTEs and dollars shows a huge difference (1,119 FTE vs. 0 FTE, and \$535,000 K vs. \$3,000 K). In Action 29, Rome has a lower score in *Sensors Research* than WPAFB (0.2345 vs. 0.5405).

These two actions are identical to the Ft. Monmouth proposal in the sense that together they remove both *Sensors* and *IS Research* from the "loser", which in this case is Rome Laboratory. Given the Sub-Group's expert judgment in the previous action (i.e., Strategy #2) that the *Sensors* MV score is decisive, one would think that Rome's *IS Research* program would be realigned along with its *Sensors Research* to WPAFB, which has the #2-ranked *Sensors Research* program. But, that is not the Sub-Group's proposal.

Recall that ARL Adelphi received both Ft. Monmouth's *Sensors* and *IS Research* programs. ARL had a higher score in *Sensors* and a lower one in *IS*, just as WPAFB has with regards to Rome. However, in the case of Rome Laboratory, the Sub-Group does not invoke Strategy #2's "cross-binning" technique to realign Rome's higher-ranked *IS Research* work to WPAFB. Instead, the Sub-Group would send it to Hanscom AFB. Essentially, Action 32 sends work from a site that does *Research*, and no *D&A*, to a site that does *D&A*, and almost no *Research*. In explaining its proposal, the Sub-Group states that:

"...preference was given to the significantly larger *Development & Acquisition* workload; hence the activity with the highest Military Value in *Air Information Systems Development & Acquisition* (Hanscom AFB) was selected to host the consolidated activity."⁷

Apparently, the synergistic gains that may accrue to Air Force C4ISR by realigning Rome's #2-ranked *IS Research* to the #2-ranked *Sensors Research* site at WPAFB are not judged to be as valuable as those that might accrue from collocation with Hanscom's *D&A* expertise. So, in this action, the expert judgment behind Strategy #3 is that *Info-Systems Acquisition* outweighs *Sensors Research*. But, Strategy #3 contradicts Strategy #2.

If Strategy #3 was used in the previous case, then Ft. Monmouth would have kept its *IS Research* because ARL Adelphi has no *D&A* and Ft. Monmouth has the highest MV score for Army *IS D&A*. But the Sub-Group found it more important to instead break Ft. Monmouth's *IS Research* away from high ranked *IS D&A* work, and consolidate it with ARL Adelphi's *Sensors Research*.

The Rome realignment to Hanscom may be founded on a desire to move the *IS Research* closer to Rt. 128, a center of commercial *IS* expertise. However, in the case of Ft. Monmouth, the Northern New Jersey area is not an *IS* backwater with local firms like Lucent and Honeywell / AlliedSignal. So, despite the similar circumstances, the Sub-Group proposes that Ft. Monmouth's work be moved away from that center of expertise and from the Army's highest ranked site for *IS D&A*.

To highlight the contradiction further, use of Strategy #3 would reverse the outcome in the previous case by sending ARL Adelphi's *IS Research* program to Ft. Monmouth where the Army's *IS D&A* function is located and there is a center of industrial *IS* expertise. This also has the advantage of being consistent with the MV scores for Ft. Monmouth and ARL Adelphi (0.4582 vs. 0.2563).

- Strategy #4: Coastal Sensors Integration Outweighs Inland Sensors Development: Action 1 would realign NRL's Maritime *Sensors D&A* to NSWC Dahlgren.

⁷ C4ISR Sub-Group, "Scenario Description & Rationale."

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
23 December 2004

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
23 December 2004

Data: NRL (Loser) has a higher score than NSWC Dahlgren (Gainer) in *Sensors D&A* (0.3633 vs. 0.3007). In addition to a higher MV score, NRL has a greater workload measured both by FTEs and dollars (280 vs. 245, and \$79,000 K vs. \$60,000 K).

The C4ISR Sub-Group explains the strategy that underpins Action 1 in the following way:

“...preference was given to where the Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare and Electronics were integrated with their host maritime platforms; hence the surface warfare center located near the coast with the Highest Military value (NSWC Dahlgren) was selected...”⁸

Strategy #4 gives preference to coastal proximity and sensors integration over MV scores. The Sub-Group asserts that NRL’s mission is Research, therefore its “non-mission” Sensors D&A should be consolidated at a “*surface warfare center*.”⁹ This premise, upon which Strategy #4 is built, is false. NRL’s mission is, in fact, broader in some technology areas than that of the Air Force and Army corporate laboratories, which focus on 6.1 through 6.3, and 6.1 through 6.2, respectively. This is why NRL has a sizeable workload in Sensors D&A and a substantial MV score — one that ranks higher than the selected warfare center, NSWC Dahlgren. The following evidence is provided to show that the strategic premise is false.

NRL has performed sensors development from its pioneering of the first U.S. radar, more than 80 years ago, to its development of Dragon Eye, a portable, hand-launched sensor system based on expendable countermeasures technology. Dragon Eye was mentioned in a *New York Times* front-page article about the U.S. Marines’ fight for Falluja.¹⁰ Another recent example is Specific Emitter Identification technology, which identifies any radar by its unique characteristics with accuracy enough to “fingerprint” it. The National Security Agency selected it as the national standard.¹¹ With the Coast Guard, naval warships, and aircraft using it to monitor the movement of materials used in weapons of mass destruction, its value to the nation’s war on terrorism is obvious.

Finally, expert judgment from ADM Hal Gehman (ret.) also refutes the Sub-Group’s premise. ADM Gehman was appointed Chair of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board shortly after he made this comment about NRL’s sensors program, which he and other defense experts reviewed in September 2001.

“What we saw was a Category A+ laboratory... its forté is sensors. What they showed us was impressive, relevant, and capable of being turned into fielded products... *nearly everything they develop they build a prototype on site and test it* (emphasis added), sometimes in an operational environment, sometimes not...they see the path to turning basic research into useful products.”¹²

The harmful result of the Sub-Group’s false premise is a proposed action that would sever the connectivity within an acknowledged center of excellence in sensors R&D. NRL’s record of success is the product of the synergy achieved between its sensors systems development and its sensors research, which *ranks #1 in MV*.

⁸ C4ISR Sub-Group, “Scenario Description & Rationale,” 14 December 2004 [DRAFT].

⁹ CIT Meeting, 8 December 2004.

¹⁰ Dexter Filkins, “In Falluja, Young Marines Saw the Savagery of an Urban War”, *New York Times*, 21 November 2004, p. 1.

¹¹ “Accordingly, NSA has selected the Naval Research Laboratory processor (L-MISPE) to be the standard for conducting SEI/UMOP collection operations...” [NSA Message DTG 011440Z, June 1995]

¹² Section 913 Report #1: *Sensors Science and Technology and the Department of Defense Laboratories*, (National Defense University: March 2002), p. 31.

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA
23 December 2004

4. *Strategy #1 is Applied Inconsistently*

As mentioned earlier, the C4ISR Sub-Group's overarching approach for the actions within the TECH-0008 scenario is "mission consolidation," where improved synergies are gained by creating greater masses of workload at the gaining sites. For example, while Ft. Monmouth loses Research workload in Action 19 to ARL Adelphi under Strategy #2, it gains D&A workload by virtue of its top-ranked Army D&A score in Actions 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25.

The problem is that Strategy #1 is applied inconsistently. For example, while NRL's *Sensors D&A* is to be realigned to NSWC Dahlgren — Dahlgren's *Sensors Research* is not being sent to NRL, which has the #1-ranked *Sensors Research* program out of all sites evaluated by the TJCSG (66 sites). NRL's MV score in relation to NSWC Dahlgren is 0.8037 vs. 0.3009. Even if one were to accept the false premise that NRL's mission is confined to Research, why is the *Sensors Research* mission not being consolidated at NRL?

Furthermore, in Action 8, NRL's *IS D&A* is being realigned to the SPAWAR Systems Center (SSC), the site selected as the location for Maritime *IS D&A* consolidation. However, SSC's *IS Research* is not being realigned to NRL, whose Research program has a much higher MV score than SSC's (0.6059 vs. 0.3671). Like its *Sensors Research* program, NRL's *IS Research* is also rated #1 out of all sites evaluated by the TJCSG (68 sites).

When asked about this inconsistency, a Sub-Group member responded that TECH-0008 defers Research consolidation to TECH-0009, "Defense Research Service-Led Laboratories." But the explanation does not hold up under scrutiny. As seen earlier, AFRL-Wright-Patterson and ARL Adelphi gain Research workload — and both are part of TECH-0009.

Since NRL is ranked #1 in both *Sensors* and *IS Research*, these inconsistencies can be readily fixed. Actions can be added where NRL gains NSWC Dahlgren's lower-ranked *Sensors* (ranked #10) and *IS* (#10) Research programs (78 FTEs and \$18 M), as well as SSC's lower-ranked *Sensors* (#21) and *IS* (#6) Research programs (436 FTEs, and \$170 M).

Conclusion: TECH-0008 contains: several actions whose enabling strategies contradict each other; one action based on a false premise; and an overarching strategy that is applied inconsistently. These problems require resolution. Correcting problems and errors and before going "prime-time" with our proposals will serve us, and the country, well.

Recommendations: Ensure that all actions within TECH-0008 qualify for Category (C) *Judgment-Driven / Strategy-Validated* by resolving identified problems, or by canceling the proposed actions if they cannot be validated by sound strategy.

Army Position: _____
AF Position: _____
Navy Position: _____
Marine Corps Position: _____
JCS Position: _____

| | |
|---|--------------|
| Final Resolution: CIT Chair required that all approved TJCSG proposals be reviewed by an independent team | |
| POC Signature: _____ | Date: 3/1/05 |
| CIT Chair: _____ | Date: _____ |

Comments on Issue Paper # 12-28-04-01
(Scenario Inconsistencies)

Contrary to the assertion in the issue paper, scenario TECH-0008 is internally consistent.

The TJCSG directed the C4ISR subgroup to cross-bin activities so as to minimize the number of installations. In order to do that, the C4ISR subgroup adopted a minimum set of cross-bin guidelines, such as giving preference to Sensors work when combining Sensors and Information Systems Research (cross-DTAP, same Function) or giving preference to D&A when combining Information Systems Research and D&A (cross-Function, same DTAP). Military Value (or early on, its surrogate – quantity of professional FTEs) was used to rank the Technical facilities in a “bin” and then the cross-bin guidelines were applied consistently. So in the issue paper, *Strategy #2* (Issue Paper terminology) is an application of the cross-DTAP, same Function guideline. Similarly, *Strategy #3* is an application of the cross-Function, same DTAP guideline. *Strategy #2* and *#3* are not at odds with each other – they simply apply to different cross-bin situations.

Regarding the Issue Paper assertion that a corporate Laboratory should continue to work outside the Research area because of its track record, numerous organizations have and will continue to field great products. The single greatest challenge in the C4ISR world today is delivery of non-interoperable systems to the warfighter. Consolidating maritime C4ISR D&A under one Center provides the opportunity to address that #1 problem, and hence the C4ISR subgroup scenario proposes consolidation to achieve Jointness, economy and efficiency (the BRAC objectives). Status quo just perpetuates the problem of multiple “hobby shops”.

Regarding the Issue Paper assertion that Applied Research activities should go to Corporate Laboratories, that is not what the TJCSG set about to achieve. The Framework is constructed to consolidate Basic Research into a DOD managed activity, but Applied Research is to be linked more closely with its D&A counterpart in Centers to the degree possible. This is especially true in C4ISR where one can go from Applied Research to D&A, T&E and electronic fielding in a matter of days, not years. Recognition of this reality is reflected in the C4ISR scenarios approved by the TJCSG.

As the C4ISR subgroup performs scenario analysis, we will revalidate the underlying assumptions before we offer draft Candidate Recommendations for TJCSG consideration. The TJCSG will have that additional opportunity to review the proposed actions with the insight gained from the analysis of the Scenario Data Call responses.

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA

Date: 3 January 2005

To: Matt Mleziva (Lead, C4ISR Sub-Group),

I have read your comments on Issue Paper #12-28-04-01, "Scenario Inconsistencies," and remain concerned that the strategies in question (i.e., those that drive TECH-0008's realignment of work from sites with higher military value scores to sites with a lower scores) are not analytically sound. Some key questions remain for me regarding the reasons why, and when, different strategies are applied to proposed actions that have very similar circumstances. The success of TECH-0008 relies on the credibility of these strategies, especially when our process is not data-driven and the subject actions at issue here ignore the Military Value (MV) scores that we derived for these sites. There is no rule that prevents lower scoring sites from becoming "gainers" at the expense of higher scoring sites, but at a minimum, I believe the Sub-Group's strategies need a much more thorough justification and greater clarity in their supporting rationale.

In paragraph #2 of your response to the issue paper, you mention that the Sub-Group developed:

"cross-bin guidelines, such as giving preference to Sensors work when combining Sensors and Information Systems Research or giving preference to D&A when combining Information Systems Research & D&A."

As you know, the above guidelines are called Strategy #2 and #3, respectively, by the issue paper. That paper may not have made its point clearly, so in the interests of clarity, its key question stated a different way is: "What is the rationale for the Sub-Group's decision to invoke Strategy #2 in one case, and to invoke #3 in another?" Just saying that the rationale was to optimize Sensors Research for one, and to optimize IS D&A for the other, and that these "guidelines were applied consistently," does not reveal *why* IS Research is realigned by different strategies in two actions with very similar circumstances.

Specifically, the first two actions analyzed in the issue paper involve realigning IS Research; one action realigns Ground IS Research, and the other realigns Air IS Research — and the strategies dictate where the realigned work is sent. In the Ground case, Strategy #2 sends the work from a site that performs both IS Research and D&A, to a site with a higher score in Sensors Research. But, if #3 was invoked to optimize IS D&A, the "loser" would instead become the "gainer" by gaining IS Research — *from the "gainer" under Strategy #2, who becomes the "loser" under Strategy #3*. In other words, the direction of the realigned work actually reverses by virtue of the strategy selected. Similarly, the destination of the Air IS Research is determined by the strategy selected. So, the key issue is *why*, in two cases involving IS Research, the C4ISR Sub-Group gives preference to optimizing D&A in the Air Force case, while in the Army case, it gives preference to optimizing Sensors work? Why was Strategy #2 not used in both cases? Or, why was Strategy #3 not used in both?

In paragraph #3 of your response, you raise the third case analyzed by the issue paper, where Maritime Sensors Research is realigned from a site with a higher MV score to a warfare center closer to the shore in order to optimize systems integration. You mention that the Sub-Group makes this proposal to:

"achieve Jointness, economy and efficiency (the BRAC objectives)."

These are indeed BRAC objectives, but they do not support your case. TECH-0008 has 40 individual actions, of which 16 are Navy-to-Navy, 10 are Army-to-Army, and 9 are Air Force-to-Air Force. It is hard to defend this scenario as one that forges a significant degree of "jointness." Moreover, *none of the actions analyzed by the issue paper involve the few, and rather minor, "joint actions."* And, as far as the objectives of "economy and efficiency" are concerned, it is more likely that the proposed Maritime Sensors action will range anywhere from cost-neutral to very costly. By optimizing D&A (for systems integration purposes) at one site, we are sub-optimizing R&D at the losing site. The case for savings would be stronger if the losing site was being closed by the action.

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA

In the end, the only relevant BRAC objective for this scenario — especially with our nation at war — is *mission effectiveness*, as measured by military value. In fact, the law is clear on the point that “military value is the primary consideration in the making of recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations” [Public Law 101-510]. The primacy of mission effectiveness is why the track record of the “losing” site was addressed in the issue paper. The expert judgment of ADM Gehman that the site is a “Category A+ laboratory... its forté is sensors” was reported to show compelling, documented evidence for the high military value of the sensors development work at that site. Other experts on the panel with ADM Gehman included a former DDR&E and Secretary of the Air Force, a former CINC for Central Command who was later selected by the President as a diplomatic envoy to the Middle East, and a former NSC advisor to the President. The Sub-Group’s expert judgment is at stark odds with that panel’s assessment when it places the “losing” site, as you do in paragraph #3, in the class of a “hobby shop.”

On the other hand, as a technical expert from Hanscom AFB, you and your Service-lead colleagues from ARL Adelphi and SPAWAR San Diego, possess expert judgment that is significant and valid in its own right. But your expert judgment that the site’s sensors development program is a “hobby shop” must nonetheless be documented and justified in some manner. That justification should also account for the fact that the purported “hobby shop” has a higher MV score and a larger workload than the “gainer.”

Finally, paragraph #4 of your response makes a point of differentiating “Basic Research” and “Applied Research” in order to explain an apparent inconsistency in mission consolidation (i.e., Strategy #1) that the issue paper describes as a “one-way street” with regard to the Navy’s corporate laboratory. Your response is that the TJCSG’s intent has been to realign Applied Research to “its D&A counterpart in Centers” instead of Corporate Laboratories. There are two problems with this explanation.

First, our analytical convention does not distinguish Basic (6.1) from Applied Research (6.2), and there is therefore *no data to make such distinctions*. In fact, both are combined with Advanced Technology Development (6.3) under our Technical Function called “Research.” Second, the corporate laboratories in the Air Force and Army gain Sensors and IS Research (6.1-6.3), *which means they gain Applied Research*. This appears to contradict your assertion regarding the TJCSG’s intent. The point made in the issue paper is that the Navy’s corporate laboratory, despite being ranked by MV as #1 in IS Research and #1 in Sensors Research, does not gain any Research — even though it qualifies as a “gainer” under Strategy #1 (Mission Consolidation of IS and Sensors) and Strategy #2 (Optimize Sensors).

I offer these observations and arguments to help ensure that our product is ready for the close scrutiny it will receive in a matter of months. I hope my response to your comments, as well as the clarifications of issue paper #12-28-04-01, are helpful.

vr/

Don DeYoung
CIT Alternate, U.S. Navy
TJCSG

Senior Research Fellow
Center for Technology and National Security Policy
National Defense University

deyoungd@ndu.edu
202-528-9687

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA

Comments on DeYoung 3 Jan 2005 Paper

A facility's Military Value (MV) is a function of the other facilities in the bin the way we developed the MV scoring; hence MV is only a relative goodness within a bin and cannot be used across bins. The C4ISR subgroup used MV within the bins and when asked by the TJCSG to consolidate cross bins, used professional military judgment to determine the receiving facility from amongst the leaders in the bins.

The objective was to develop scenarios that implemented the TJCSG adopted Framework. The Air and Ground domain scenarios do involve more than one MILDEP, hence are Joint. The Maritime domain scenarios only involve the Navy as they were the only MILDEP known to be reporting maritime C4ISR RDAT&E. The strategies were selected to achieve the BRAC objectives of Jointness, Efficiency and Effectiveness.

In the C4ISR world, the potentially short timelines from applied research to operational capability led to the Warfare/Product Center construct. With respect to NRL, its high MV, the DRL concept, and its not being a Warfare center led to no recommended change to its Basic Research activities. Also, no C4ISR Maritime Basic Research activities outside of NRL were identified to realign to NRL. NRL is one of the organizations that has demonstrated the ability to rapidly field combat capability. Feedback from the field is that capability deployed by non-acquisition organizations tends not to interoperate with the rest of their equipment (provided by the traditional acquisition organizations) and tends not to have a supportability tail. The C4ISR subgroup developed scenarios which consolidated the Maritime C4ISR Applied Research and D&A activities in a domain (per the Framework) to address these issues rather than let them persist.

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA

Date: 13 January 2005

To: Matt Mleziva (Lead, C4ISR Sub-Group)

In its 4 January meeting, the TJCSG decided that each candidate recommendation must have a thorough justification and sufficient clarity in its supporting rationale, especially those that realign workload from sites with a higher military value (MV) score to sites with lower scores (i.e., an “inconsistent scenario”). In issue paper #12-28-04-01, “Scenario Inconsistencies,” I identified several inconsistent scenario actions, but missed one that needs to be marked for attention in the event it becomes a candidate recommendation.

Scenario TECH-0008 (Action 7) realigns Maritime (surface and above work only) Sensors RDAT&E from NUWC Newport to NSWC Dahlgren. NUWC Newport has a substantially higher MV score than NSWC Dahlgren *in all three technical functions*. Newport’s across-the-board superiority to the gaining site in MV scores, from Research to T&E, makes this action unique among the other “inconsistent scenarios” identified in the issue paper.

Like Action 1, where NRL loses its higher-ranked Sensors D&A work to NSWC Dahlgren, Newport’s higher-ranked RDAT&E work is also realigned to Dahlgren based on Strategy #4 where:

“...preference was given to where the Maritime (surface and above) Sensors, Electronic Warfare and Electronics were integrated with their host maritime platforms; hence the surface warfare center located near the coast with the Highest Military value (NSWC Dahlgren) was selected...”¹

Action 7, like Action 1, will almost certainly degrade the synergy of the site with the higher MV score. Parsing out Newport’s “surface and above” sensors work from its undersea sensors work will likely shred innovative connectivity within a Sensors program that is integrated (with indistinct demarcations between “surface and above” work and “undersea” work) and holistic (where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts). Therefore, the rationale we provide must make a convincing statement as to why, and how, the risks are outweighed by the benefits perceived by the Sub-Group.

Also, your last paper (dated 4 January) discusses the DoD’s problem getting interoperable C4ISR capabilities into service quickly, and it states that “NRL is one of the organizations that has demonstrated the ability to rapidly field combat capability.” While this comment resolves an issue raised in my previous response, it also now begs a question. How will the Sub-Group defend two actions affecting NRL (i.e., Action 1 for Sensors, and Action 8 for Information Systems), which would sever innovative R&D connectivity at a site that is not part of the problem your Sub-Group is trying to solve? More to the point, what will be the justification for risking damage to a site that *is* rapidly fielding new C4ISR capabilities for the warfighter?

Almost a year ago, in a paper that Al Shaffer distributed among the TJCSG’s Sub-Groups, I expressed some concern that our 39-bin (or 39-“technical facility”) analytical approach would result in damaged synergies. The paper observed that,

“While past closure rounds are not the focus here, there is an important feature that our process shares with BRAC-95 — pushing highly interconnected work through technical and functional stovepipes... *This will sever the connectivity of critical multidisciplinary projects and vertically integrated programs, as well as decapitate top talent from any realigned work.*”

¹ C4ISR Sub-Group, “Scenario Description & Rationale,” 14 December 2004 [DRAFT].

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA

Date: 13 January 2005

To: Matt Mleziva (Lead, C4ISR Sub-Group)

In its 4 January meeting, the TJCSG decided that each candidate recommendation must have a thorough justification and sufficient clarity in its supporting rationale, especially those that realign workload from sites with a higher military value (MV) score to sites with lower scores (i.e., an “inconsistent scenario”). In issue paper #12-28-04-01, “Scenario Inconsistencies,” I identified several inconsistent scenario actions, but missed one that needs to be marked for attention in the event it becomes a candidate recommendation.

Scenario TECH-0008 (Action 7) realigns Maritime (surface and above work only) Sensors RDAT&E from NUWC Newport to NSWC Dahlgren. NUWC Newport has a substantially higher MV score than NSWC Dahlgren *in all three technical functions*. Newport’s across-the-board superiority to the gaining site in MV scores, from Research to T&E, makes this action unique among the other “inconsistent scenarios” identified in the issue paper.

Like Action 1, where NRL loses its higher-ranked Sensors D&A work to NSWC Dahlgren, Newport’s higher-ranked RDAT&E work is also realigned to Dahlgren based on Strategy #4 where:

“...preference was given to where the Maritime (surface and above) Sensors, Electronic Warfare and Electronics were integrated with their host maritime platforms; hence the surface warfare center located near the coast with the Highest Military value (NSWC Dahlgren) was selected...”¹

Action 7, like Action 1, will almost certainly degrade the synergy of the site with the higher MV score. Parsing out Newport’s “surface and above” sensors work from its undersea sensors work will likely shred innovative connectivity within a Sensors program that is integrated (with indistinct demarcations between “surface and above” work and “undersea” work) and holistic (where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts). Therefore, the rationale we provide must make a convincing statement as to why, and how, the risks are outweighed by the benefits perceived by the Sub-Group.

Also, your last paper (dated 4 January) discusses the DoD’s problem getting interoperable C4ISR capabilities into service quickly, and it states that “NRL is one of the organizations that has demonstrated the ability to rapidly field combat capability.” While this comment resolves an issue raised in my previous response, it also now begs a question. How will the Sub-Group defend two actions affecting NRL (i.e., Action 1 for Sensors, and Action 8 for Information Systems), which would sever innovative R&D connectivity at a site that is not part of the problem your Sub-Group is trying to solve? More to the point, what will be the justification for risking damage to a site that *is* rapidly fielding new C4ISR capabilities for the warfighter?

Almost a year ago, in a paper that Al Shaffer distributed among the TJCSG’s Sub-Groups, I expressed some concern that our 39-bin (or 39-“technical facility”) analytical approach would result in damaged synergies. The paper observed that,

“While past closure rounds are not the focus here, there is an important feature that our process shares with BRAC-95 — pushing highly interconnected work through technical and functional stovepipes... *This will sever the connectivity of critical multidisciplinary projects and vertically integrated programs, as well as decapitate top talent from any realigned work.*”

¹ C4ISR Sub-Group, “Scenario Description & Rationale,” 14 December 2004 [DRAFT].

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY - DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA

And, the paper proposed a solution that called for:

... "assigning Military Value at a higher level, such as at the command / installation level, and not to the Rubik's Cube "facilities." ²

The proposal that MV be assigned at a meaningful level of aggregation was made again in issue paper #11-15-04-01, "Military Judgment: *Necessary — But Not Sufficient*" (14 November 2004).

Now that the C4ISR Sub-Group is at the point of evaluating the monetary costs for actions that will, in all likelihood, sever innovative connectivity at the "losing sites" (some with higher military value than the "gaining sites"), the development of sound justifications become more than a requirement of the TJCSG. They become critical to the goals of BRAC-05 and an obligation to national security.

vr/

Don DeYoung
CIT Alternate, U.S. Navy
TJCSG

Senior Research Fellow
Center for Technology and National Security Policy
National Defense University

deyoungd@ndu.edu
202-528-9687

² D.J. DeYoung, "Shadows on the Wall: The Problem with Military Value Metrics," 17 February 2004, p. 12-13 (Version 1).

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY - DO NOT RELEASE UNDER FOIA

Why Did the BRAC Process Shortchange NSA Crane?

General

The Department of Defense had the primary goals in the 2005 BRAC round of reducing excess capacity and increasing military value in consonance with the Department's Transformation Goals. Guidelines included emphasis on joint operations, multi-disciplinary capability, and mitigation of encroachment and environmental issues.

The Naval Support Activity Crane hosts the Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane and the Crane Army Ammunition Activity; co-located mission commands that perform multi-functional and multi-disciplinary tasking across ordnance, electronics and electronic warfare products and systems. These two commands have jointly built a cross service capability leveraging shared world class facilities and human intellectual capital that focuses on development, acquisition, sustainment, maintenance and distribution. In-depth integrated technical and industrial capabilities provide extremely agile and responsive complete support to Warfighters of all services. This integration has proven to help reduce costs and support rapid deployment of ever changing needs to the Warfighter today, tomorrow and for the future.

NSA Crane, located in under populated southern Indiana has 63,000 acres: completely encroachment free; with no environmental issues; remote from potential terrorist threat; in close proximity to excellent road, rail and air transportation; with abundant power and water utilities; with extraordinary facilities; and, an almost unlimited technical workforce recruitment ability. NSA Crane has tremendous State and Community support, and critical economic impact on its surrounding counties. *NSA Crane seems to be a model installation with regard to matching DOD's BRAC goals.*

Yet, the BRAC process recommendations had no scenarios that took advantage of Crane's high military value and model installation attributes. In fact, if the Pentagon's BRAC recommendations remain, the existing joint capabilities will be fragmented across the country and will negatively impact the existing synergy. Some of the functions will be moved to installations with single service, single platform capabilities of lower military value and, that, almost certainly, have encroachment and environmental issues. The recommendations will also place a disproportional economic impact on the counties surrounding NSA Crane. In fact, according to the Pentagon's report, Martin County has the 2nd largest economic impact of any economic area at 11.4%. The 11.4% is, in fact, understated. The impact including support contractors positions approaches 14%.

The Recommendations:

1 & 2: *Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research Development & Acquisition, Test and Evaluation Center at China Lake, California. Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition at Picatinny Army Arsenal, New Jersey.*

These two recommendations move some 225 Crane positions to China Lake and 235 to Picatinny. The 460 positions include some 300 engineers and technicians.

These two recommendations disassemble integrated technical and industrial support provided to Crane clients, particularly Special Operating Forces who depend on extremely responsive total technological solutions to ever changing threats. After implementation of the recommendations, they will have to get

In summary, this action moves a function from a high military value to a lower one at a tremendous expense, and violates the BRAC precepts of striving for joint operations, and moving functions to higher military value and capacity installations.

In addition, since Crane clearly is the DOD Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence, with the highest military value, why aren't Electronic Warfare functions in closing or realigned activities moving to Crane?

4: Create joint Centers of Excellence for Chemical, Biological, and Medical Research Development and Acquisition.

This recommendation moves Crane's Development, Acquisition and Support of Chemical and Biological detection devices to Edgewood at Aberdeen, Maryland. Some 57 positions, including 16 engineering and 15 technician, move.

This action separates the Chemical and Biological detection technical capability which moves, from the industrial depot repair which stays. This causes duplication of knowledge and facilities.

The BRAC criteria include intention to provide Homeland Defense capability improvement. Crane and the State of Indiana, including the Purdue Institute for Homeland Security, are working together to increase Homeland Security capability in the State and Nationally. This action will fracture that alliance and, therefore, be detrimental to the State and region. ***It would seem that some dispersion of Homeland security expertise throughout the Nation might be more important than the slight efficiency gains of clustering it in one location.***

Again here Crane's labor rates are lower than Edgewood's, and, there are no closures involved so the payback will be marginal at best.

Conclusion:

With Crane such an obvious choice to realign functions into, why did all the recommendations move functions out and seemingly, for the most part, violate either BRAC guidance or common sense? Perhaps some reasons are:

- Crane is so diverse that its capabilities are not well understood by the DOD and Navy decision makers. Crane works at the product level so is not known for key systems like a shipyard, or an Arsenal like Picatinny that focuses on one commodity, guns.

- Crane was analyzed in the BRAC process by several "stove-piped" teams: Navy; Army; Industrial Cross Service; and, Technical Cross Service. This tended to fragment its evaluation and not recognize its integrated military value. For example, Crane's Electronic Warfare capability was evaluated by the Industrial and Technical Cross service teams separately. Yet its value to its client lies in the integration of the industrial and technical capabilities. Another example, Crane's pyrotechnic and munitions military value lies in the joint Army/Navy capability yet the analysis was done by each service separately and by the technical and industrial cross service teams separately.

- Crane is a joint activity with the Navy ownership and yet some 80% of the area is used by the Army for munitions operations and storage, even though the Navy has 85% of the employees. Perhaps this results in neither service having a really strong sense of ownership of the installation. Then jointness hurts rather than helps as it is supposed to.

Why Did the BRAC Process Shortchange NSA Crane?

General

The Department of Defense had the primary goals in the 2005 BRAC round of reducing excess capacity and increasing military value in consonance with the Department's Transformation Goals. Guidelines included emphasis on joint operations, multi-disciplinary capability, and mitigation of encroachment and environmental issues.

The Naval Support Activity Crane hosts the Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane and the Crane Army Ammunition Activity; co-located mission commands that perform multi-functional and multi-disciplinary tasking across ordnance, electronics and electronic warfare products and systems. These two commands have jointly built a cross service capability leveraging shared world class facilities and human intellectual capital that focuses on development, acquisition, sustainment, maintenance and distribution. In-depth integrated technical and industrial capabilities provide extremely agile and responsive complete support to Warfighters of all services. This integration has proven to help reduce costs and support rapid deployment of ever changing needs to the Warfighter today, tomorrow and for the future.

NSA Crane, located in under populated southern Indiana has 63,000 acres: completely encroachment free; with no environmental issues; remote from potential terrorist threat; in close proximity to excellent road, rail and air transportation; with abundant power and water utilities; with extraordinary facilities; and, an almost unlimited technical workforce recruitment ability. NSA Crane has tremendous State and Community support, and critical economic impact on its surrounding counties. *NSA Crane seems to be a model installation with regard to matching DOD's BRAC goals.*

Yet, the BRAC process recommendations had no scenarios that took advantage of Crane's high military value and model installation attributes. In fact, if the Pentagon's BRAC recommendations remain, the existing joint capabilities will be fragmented across the country and will negatively impact the existing synergy. Some of the functions will be moved to installations with single service, single platform capabilities of lower military value and, that, almost certainly, have encroachment and environmental issues. The recommendations will also place a disproportional economic impact on the counties surrounding NSA Crane. In fact, according to the Pentagon's report, Martin County has the 2nd largest economic impact of any economic area at 11.4%. The 11.4% is, in fact, understated. The impact including support contractors positions approaches 14%.

The Recommendations:

1 & 2: *Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research Development & Acquisition, Test and Evaluation Center at China Lake, California. Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition at Picatinny Army Arsenal, New Jersey.*

These two recommendations move some 225 Crane positions to China Lake and 235 to Picatinny. The 460 positions include some 300 engineers and technicians.

These two recommendations disassemble integrated technical and industrial support provided to Crane clients, particularly Special Operating Forces who depend on extremely responsive total technological solutions to ever changing threats. After implementation of the recommendations, they will have to get

In summary, this action moves a function from a high military value to a lower one at a tremendous expense, and violates the BRAC precepts of striving for joint operations, and moving functions to higher military value and capacity installations.

In addition, since Crane clearly is the DOD Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence, with the highest military value, why aren't Electronic Warfare functions in closing or realigned activities moving to Crane?

4: *Create joint Centers of Excellence for Chemical, Biological, and Medical Research Development and Acquisition.*

This recommendation moves Crane's Development, Acquisition and Support of Chemical and Biological detection devices to Edgewood at Aberdeen, Maryland. Some 57 positions, including 16 engineering and 15 technician, move.

This action separates the Chemical and Biological detection technical capability which moves, from the industrial depot repair which stays. This causes duplication of knowledge and facilities.

The BRAC criteria include intention to provide Homeland Defense capability improvement. Crane and the State of Indiana, including the Purdue Institute for Homeland Security, are working together to increase Homeland Security capability in the State and Nationally. This action will fracture that alliance and, therefore, be detrimental to the State and region. ***It would seem that some dispersion of Homeland security expertise throughout the Nation might be more important than the slight efficiency gains of clustering it in one location.***

Again here Crane's labor rates are lower than Edgewood's, and, there are no closures involved so the payback will be marginal at best.

Conclusion:

With Crane such an obvious choice to realign functions into, why did all the recommendations move functions out and seemingly, for the most part, violate either BRAC guidance or common sense? Perhaps some reasons are:

- Crane is so diverse that its capabilities are not well understood by the DOD and Navy decision makers. Crane works at the product level so is not known for key systems like a shipyard, or an Arsenal like Picatinny that focuses on one commodity, guns.

- Crane was analyzed in the BRAC process by several "stove-piped" teams: Navy; Army; Industrial Cross Service; and, Technical Cross Service. This tended to fragment its evaluation and not recognize its integrated military value. For example, Crane's Electronic Warfare capability was evaluated by the Industrial and Technical Cross service teams separately. Yet its value to its client lies in the integration of the industrial and technical capabilities. Another example, Crane's pyrotechnic and munitions military value lies in the joint Army/Navy capability yet the analysis was done by each service separately and by the technical and industrial cross service teams separately.

- Crane is a joint activity with the Navy ownership and yet some 80% of the area is used by the Army for munitions operations and storage, even though the Navy has 85% of the employees. Perhaps this results in neither service having a really strong sense of ownership of the installation. Then jointness hurts rather than helps as it is supposed to.

spending approximately \$0.1M for National Environmental Policy Act documentation at the receiving installation. This cost was included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the cost of environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the bases in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.

Consolidate Maritime C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

Recommendation: Realign Washington Navy Yard, DC, by disestablishing the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Washington Navy Yard and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.

Realign Naval Station, Norfolk, VA, by disestablishing the Space Warfare Systems Center Norfolk, VA, and the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Norfolk, VA, and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.

Realign Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, as follows: relocate Surface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA; relocate Subsurface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Station Newport, RI; and relocate the Command Structure of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, and consolidate it with billets from Space Warfare Systems Command San Diego to create the Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA. The remaining Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation functions at Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, are assigned to Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.

Realign Naval Base Ventura County, CA, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA, and Naval Station Newport, RI, by relocating Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, and consolidating with the Space Warfare Center to create the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.

Realign Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, as follows: relocate Surface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA; relocate Subsurface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Station Newport, RI; disestablish Space Warfare Systems Center Norfolk, VA, detachment San Diego, CA, and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA; disestablish Naval Center for

Tactical Systems Interoperability, San Diego, CA, and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA; and disestablish Space Warfare Systems Command San Diego, CA, detachment Norfolk, VA, and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.

Realign Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, by relocating Subsurface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division to Naval Station Newport, RI.

Realign Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL, by disestablishing the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Jacksonville, FL.

Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, by relocating the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Pensacola, FL, to Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC.

Realign Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, VA, by relocating the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Yorktown, VA, to Naval Station Norfolk, VA, and consolidating it into the new Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic detachment, Naval Station Norfolk, VA.

Justification: These recommended realignments and consolidations provide for multifunctional and multidisciplinary Centers of Excellence in Maritime C4ISR. This recommendation will also reduce the number of technical facilities engaged in Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, & Electronics and Information Systems RDAT&E from twelve to five. This, in turn, will reduce overlapping infrastructure increase the efficiency of operations and support an integrated approach to RDAT&E for maritime C4ISR. Another result would also be reduced cycle time for fielding systems to the warfighter.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$106.1M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of \$88.6M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$38.7M with a payback expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$455.1M.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 74 jobs (28 direct jobs and 46 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in Charleston-North Charleston, SC, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 81 jobs (34 direct jobs and 47 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in Jacksonville, FL, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 78 jobs (34 direct jobs and 44 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Lexington Park, MD, Micropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.2 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 286 jobs (127 direct jobs and 159 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 278 jobs (102 direct jobs and 176 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 4 jobs (2 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 88 jobs (44 direct jobs and 44 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 211 jobs (87 direct jobs and 124 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 302 jobs (172 direct jobs and 130 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, Metropolitan Division, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure Assessment: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport is in serious non-attainment for Ozone (1hr) and proposed to be in serious non-attainment for Ozone (8hr). San Diego is in attainment for all criteria pollutants. Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA, is in

attainment for all criteria pollutants with the exception of 8 hour and 1 hour O₃ and Pb, which are Unclassifiable. Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, VA, Naval Station Norfolk, VA, and Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, are in attainment for all Criteria Pollutants. It is in a proposed non-attainment for Ozone (1 hour). Archeological and historical sites have been identified on Dahlgren that may impact current construction or current operations. Norfolk has potential archeological restrictions to future construction. Threatened and endangered species are present at Newport and have delayed or diverted testing. There is a potential impact regarding the bald eagle at Dahlgren. This recommendation has the potential to impact the hazardous waste and solid waste program at Dahlgren. Newport, Dahlgren, Little Creek, Charleston, Norfolk, and San Diego all discharge to impaired waterways, and groundwater and surface water contamination are reported. This recommendation has no impact on dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation will require spending approximately \$0.1M for waste management and environmental compliance activities. This cost was included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the bases in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.

Consolidate Navy Strategic Test & Evaluation

Recommendation: Realign Patrick Air Force Base, Cape Canaveral, FL, by relocating Nuclear Test and Evaluation at the Naval Ordnance Test Unit to Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Kings Bay, GA.

Justification: This recommendation realigns the stand-alone east coast facility working in full-scale Nuclear Test & Evaluation at Cape Canaveral into a fully supported Navy nuclear operational site at Kings Bay to gain synergy in security (Anti-Terrorism Force Protection-ATFP), Fleet operational support and mission support infrastructure. Since 1956, the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Program, in support of the TRIDENT (D-Series) Missile, has executed land-based (pad) as well as sea-based (SSBN) test launches supported by the Naval Ordnance Test Unit (NOTU) at Cape Canaveral, FL. This facility provided both the launch support infrastructure as well as docking for sea-based pre- and post-launch events. Recent changes in ATFP requirements, the recent establishment of the Western Test Range in the Pacific, and the programmatic decision to no longer require land based (pad) launches at Cape Canaveral all lead to the realignment/relocation of this function to Kings Bay. This action aligns nicely with the overall Weapons and Armaments strategy to move smaller activities at remote sites into larger facilities to realize a significant synergy in support functions and costs while maintaining mission capability.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$86.4M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of \$76.7M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after

Surface Maritime Sensors
Electronic Warfare & Electronic Defense
ROA A ~~FE~~ of Spec Warfare Center

NSWC Dahlgren

Surface Maritime Sensor
Electronic Warfare
Electronics ROA NZ
Surface Warfare Center
NAWEPSTA Charleston

NSWC
Dahlgren

172 jobs
lost DC
J40

Ventura Naval Base Maritime
NSWC Dahlgren ~~Mar Info~~ ~~Systems~~ ROA
NAUSTA Newport Sub Base Pt Loma

Space Warfare Center
Space Warfare System Command P AC
Sub Base Point Loma

DCN: 10799
NSWC #314

Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center

Recommendation: Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane, IN, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except gun/ammo, combat system security, and energetic materials to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head, MD, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except gun/ammo, underwater weapons, and energetic materials, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except the Program Executive Office and Program Management Offices in Naval Air Systems Command, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except underwater weapons and energetic materials, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center, Yorktown, VA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head, MD.

Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Fleet Combat Training Center, CA (Port Hueneme Detachment, San Diego, CA), by relocating all Weapons and Armaments weapon system integration Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, VA.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, VA, by relocating all Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except guns/ammo and weapon systems integration to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Justification: This recommendation realigns and consolidates those facilities working in Weapons & Armaments (W&A) Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation (RDAT&E) into a Naval Integrated RDAT&E center at the Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, CA. Additional synergistic realignments for W&A was achieved at two receiver sites for specific focus. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA, is a receiver specialty site for

Naval surface weapons systems integration and receives a west coast site for consolidation. This construct creates an integrated W&A RDAT&E center in China Lake, CA, energetics center at Indian Head, MD, and consolidates Navy surface weapons system integration at Dahlgren, VA. All actions relocate technical facilities with lower overall quantitative Military Value (across Research, Development & Acquisition and Test & Evaluation) into the Integrated RDAT&E center and other receiver sites with greater quantitative Military Value.

Consolidating the Navy's air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface launched missile RD&A, and T&E activities at China Lake, CA, would create an efficient integrated RDAT&E center. China Lake is able to accommodate with minor modification/addition both mission and life-cycle/sustainment functions to create synergies between these traditionally independent communities.

During the other large scale movements of W&A capabilities noted above, Weapon System Integration was specifically addressed to preserve the synergies between large highly integrated control system developments (Weapon Systems Integration) and the weapon system developments themselves. A specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare was identified at Dahlgren, VA, that was unique to the services and a centroid for Navy surface ship developments. A satellite unit from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, San Diego Detachment will be relocated to Dahlgren.

The Integrated RDAT&E Center at China Lake provides a diverse set of open-air range and test environments (desert, mountain, forest) for W&A RDAT&E functions. Synergy will be realized in air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface launched mission areas.

This recommendation enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical and acquisition expertise with weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition that currently resides at 10 locations into the one Integrated RDAT&E site, one specialty site, and an energetics site.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$358.1M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of \$148.7M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$59.7M with a payback expected in 7 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$433.4M.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 375 jobs (258 direct jobs and 117 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Martin County, IN, economic area, which is 4.4 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 543 jobs (258 direct jobs and 285 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Lexington Park, MD, Micropolitan Statistical Area, which is 1.0 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 5,012 jobs (2,250 direct jobs and 2,762 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 1.2 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 97 jobs (47 direct jobs and 50 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 76 jobs (45 direct jobs and 31 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA, Metropolitan Division, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 142 jobs (61 direct jobs and 81 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 91 jobs (52 direct jobs and 39 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, Metropolitan Division, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 333 jobs (155 direct jobs and 178 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the King George County, VA, economic area, which is 2.4 percent of economic area employment.

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure Assessment: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: This recommendation has the potential to impact air quality at Indian Head and China Lake. Archeological and historical sites exist on NSWC Dahlgren, which may impact current construction and operations. This recommendation has the potential to impact land use constraints or sensitive resource areas at Indian Head and China Lake. This recommendation has no impact on dredging; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation will require spending approximately \$0.2M for waste management activities and \$1.1M for environmental compliance activities. These costs were included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs

of environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the bases in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.

Create an Air Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center

Recommendation: Realign Hill Air Force Base, UT, by relocating Weapons and Armaments In-Service Engineering Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation to Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Realign Fort Belvoir, VA, by relocating Defense Threat Reduction Agency National Command Region conventional armament Research to Eglin Air Force Base, FL.

Justification: Eglin is one of three core integrated weapons and armaments RDAT&E centers (with China Lake, CA, and Redstone Arsenal, AL) with high MV and the largest concentration of integrated technical facilities across all three functional areas. Eglin AFB has a full spectrum array of Weapons & Armaments (W&A) Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) capabilities. Accordingly, relocation of Hill AFB and DTRA NCR W&A capabilities will further complement and strengthen Eglin as a full spectrum W&A RDAT&E Center.

The overall impact of this recommendation will be to: increase W&A life cycle and mission related synergies/integration; increase efficiency; reduce operational costs; retain the required diversity of test environments; and facilitate multiple uses of equipment, facilities, ranges, and people. Hill AFB and DTRA NCR technical facilities recommended for relocation have lower quantitative MV than Eglin AFB in all functional areas.

This recommendation includes Research, D&A, and T&E conventional armament capabilities in the Air Force and DTRA NCR. It consolidates armament activities within the Air Force and promotes jointness with DTRA NCR. It also enables technical synergy, and positions the DoD to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise within the RDAT&E community that currently resides as DoD specialty locations. This recommendation directly supports the Department's strategy for transformation by moving and consolidating smaller W&A efforts into high military value integrated centers, and by leveraging synergy among RD&A, and T&E activities. Capacity and military value data established that Eglin AFB is already a full-service, integrated W&A RDAT&E center. Relocation of W&A D&A In-Service Engineering (ISE) from Hill AFB to Eglin AFB will increase life cycle synergy and integration. ISE encompasses those engineering activities that provide for an "increase in capability" of a system/sub-system/component after Full Operational Capability has been declared. ISE activities mesh directly with on-going RDAT&E at Eglin AFB.

Relocation of DTRA NCR W&A technical capabilities will increase life cycle synergy and integration at Eglin AFB. Conventional armament capabilities possessed by DTRA NCR directly complement on-going RDAT&E at Eglin AFB. Cost savings from the relocation of DTRA NCR to Eglin AFB will accrue largely through the elimination of the need for leased

Dahlgren #3

Flect Combat Training Center
Port Huachuca Det, San Diego → NSWC
Dahlgren

Weapons + Armaments
R D JA, TAE
except guns/amm
↓ weapon systems
integration → China
Lake