DCN 221

Mr. Eugenio Veiga
Angueises # 1770
Venus Gardens
Rio Piedras, PR 00926

25 May 1995

Mr. Edward A. Brown III
(Army Team Leader)
Defense Base Realignment &
Closure Commission
1700 North Moore St.
Arlignton, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Brown:

I am concerned that the reply from FORSCOM to the Department of the Army (see enclosure) reference your commission's request to clarify the Fort Buchanan scenario will be interpreted as an unbiased truth because the MACOM has certified it as accurate. The data is a little better than before but pays "lip service" to the real issues, which are still not clarified. I feel compelled to write to you in an open forum since, at no time, their reply was coordinated with the installation. Although lengthy, I will have to address each section separately for you to derive your own conclusions.

a. Certification Letter:

1) At paragraph 2, FORSCOM is still not able to clarify to the BRAC Commission what is the proposed action: closure or realignment. However, it points the finger at DoD for such determination. It defies common sense that our major command (MACOM) could not clarify such a simple issue; specially, after they did admit it was a de facto closure when Mr. Plunkett and his team visited Fort Buchanan on 29 Mar 95.

2) At paragraph 3, they state the need to correct the COBRA report in terms of personnel and construction. Our garrison will be undergoing a "civilianization" process during FY 96, which means that 97% of our military positions will be converted to civilian as per FORSCOM directive. In essence, the garrison will have a total of 339 civilian authorizations (this figure does not include the 235 positions on the Non-Appropriated Fund (NAF) side of the garrison). The Fort Buchanan BRAC Task Force has, on numerous occasions, informed Ms. Libette Delaney (FORSCOM's BRAC Division's point of contact) of our civilianization and its impact on their manpower reports; however, they have conciously chosen to ignore this information and decided to

"Original is forthcoming.

TRANSMITTAL	# of pages ► 8
To Edward Brown	From Mr. Eugenio Veiga
	Phone #
Fax # 696-0550	Fax # (809) 273-3331

5098-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

inaccurately certify information pertaining to FY 95 as if it were the same for FY 96.

3) The baseline manpower matrix shown on their second enclosure states that the site for 7 of our tenant activities is unknown. Sir, the tenant activities have indicated in writing their desire to stay or relocate, and such information has been faxed to FORSCOM; however, they have chosen to ignore this too.

4) The construction costs continue to be a "swag" with no definitive basis, they do not include the sustainment and infrastructure costs which are an integral part of any base operation (BASOP) cost analysis. I have queried an engineer from the private sector and he was puzzled as to how the figures were developed. As a matter of fact, DA has been told to continue to budget $68 million until the 1391 forms are completed. This valid actual data will not reach you in time to incorporate as part of the Commission's decision since, from 23-26 May, the engineers are at Fort Buchanan and Roosevelt Roads gathering the necessary information to complete the first page of these reports.

5) The certification of this information is a sin against what I know as truth and complete staff coordination. Our BRAC Task Force has constantly tried through phone conversations, electronic mail and faxes to make our MACOM realize that there are other options less expensive to the Federal taxpayer; however, they refuse to consider them since they have to follow DoD's directives of not questioning the installations included on the BRAC list. The staffer continues to drive on with blinds in front and spending money (e.g. travel expenses of high paid personnel) and disregarding any suggested alternatives.

b. Community Issues: (It is interesting to note that FORSCOM chose not to include the community issues under their certified letter).

1) A member of our BRAC Task Force queried Ms. Delaney during her current visit for a definition of "power projection platform" but she could not provide one; in essence, she does not know. In recent years, MACOM and their staff have continuously addressed Fort Buchanan as a lead mobilization station and a power projection platform in the Caribbean. As recent as 27 Mar 95, Fort Buchanan received a team of the DA Inspector General's office as they visited the Army's mobilization stations. FORSCOM has chosen to ignore our military value and again, pointed towards DA for an answer. Our MACOM is unable to assess our military and strategic value.

2) FORSCOM confirms that the data originally provided to the Commission was erroneous. Such statement makes me uneasy as to the validity of this whole process; their certified data is just not reliable.

3) As stated before, COBRA report remains incorrect and no effort has been made to correct it. If the figures are not reliable or ready for the BRAC Commission, why accelerate you in making a decision in an information vacuum?

4) The upcoming 2nd Army Commander, MG Laboa, has indicated that he wishes to keep the Readiness Group (RG) within the Metro Area. Again, FORSCOM has chosen not to disclose this information to the Commission. The MACOM insists that RG can accomplish their mission from Roosevelt Roads (RR) Naval Base, 46 miles from Fort Buchanan, but they fail to spell out all the costs involved. At present, the bulk of the supported units are within the Metro Area. Upon relocation to RR, more GSA leased vehicles will be required with an additional cost (due to GSA billings based on miles driven) and an unusual increase in temporary duty (TDY) travel costs. All of the preceding will have to be bore by the taxpayers. I will remind the Commission that RG is an OMAR funded activity that is a "free rider" within the installation; upon departure to RR, all services will have to be reimbursed including a surcharge billed by the Navy for BASOPS. I believe that RG is not aware of these facts and that the current commander is not concerned about the additional costs incurred. Last but not least, RG is **not** the major component to relocate (only 71 personnel on board), what about the AGRs that will continue to be assigned to USAR and NG units; what about personnel assigned to MEPS, Recruiting Company, ROTC?

Sabana Seca is indeed an option; however, when our local BRAC team visited the base, they made it clear that they are a Security Group and not interested in providing and sustaining any additional housing, this information has not transpired to you.

5) In the last subject regarding the impact of the base closure, FORSCOM fails to address the main issue of sending the wrong signal to the community and the surrounding countries in the Caribbean Basin; again, our MACOM is unable to assess the value of the only Army post in the Caribbean and the negative implications if it closes. Finally, I would like to add that the unethical proposition to retain the money making activities and at the same time obliterate the installation has not been questioned by the MACOM or DOD. Their press releases have failed to mention that once the active component leaves the post as a result of the BRAC, the PX and Commissary could be closed at the stroke of a pen, without any hearings. Already the construction of a new PX has been put on hold; our community deserves to know the truth.

Sir, the certification you required is not there. What you got is a waterdown accountant disclaimer opinion where fingers point at DA and DoD. In view of the facts I have just presented, this second certification, just like the original one, can provide no assurance that the information is complete and accurate. In my 20 years of civil service experience, I can attest that the further the information gets from our level, the higher the probability that it will be inaccurate.

Respectfully yours,

Eugenio Veiga

Enclosure

CF:
Mr. Alan J. Dixon
GEN J.B. Davis

AFPI-BC (DACS-TABS/undated) (5-10c) 1st End
SUBJECT: Request For Clarification of the Fort Buchanan Scenario

Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA 30330-6000 24 MAY 1995

FOR Director of Management, ATTN: DACS-TABS, 200 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0200

1. As requested, response to issues raised during the BRAC Commission hearing on 28 Apr 95 is provided at enclosure 1.

2. With regard to classification of the action as a closure or realignment, it is unclear to us. The COBRA analysis essentially eliminates the garrison workforce, thereby causing its inactivation. The number of activities and functions (i.e., AAFES, Commissary and schools) retained in enclaves is unusual for a closing installation. Although we are planning inactivation of the garrison, we refer to the action as a realignment as stated in the DoD recommendation.

3. Corrections to the COBRA input data is required in the following areas:

a. Manpower. Enclosure 2 reflects baseline manpower data. These reflect the authorized strengths for FY 96. The ASIP used by TABS contained numerous errors. Report reflected units which are located off-post and others that were previously or never located on Fort Buchanan.

c. Construction. Construction costs are considerably reduced due to fewer units relocating to Roosevelt Roads Navy Base (RRNS). Preliminary cost estimates for RRNS construction are shown below:

Administrative	$ 1.7M
Family Housing	5.9M
BEQs	.3M
Admin for Area Support	1.0M
School Bldg, Child Care, Physical Fitness	4.0M
IMA	2.0M
	$14.9M*

*These costs do not reflect required infrastructure costs.

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL # of pages ▶ 7

To Mr Vega	From Forscom BRACD
Dept/Agency Buchanan	Phone # (404) 669-6524
Fax # (809) 792-5536	Fax # 669-7040

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Encl

AFPI-BC
SUBJECT: Request For Clarification of the Fort Buchanan Scenario

4. I certify that information provided by this memorandum is correct to the best of my knowledge. Ms. Libette Delaney, DSN 367-6374, can provide additional information.

FOR THE DCS FOR PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT:

2 Encls

JOSEPH H. PLUNKETT
Chief, Base Realignment and
Closure Division, DCSPIM

RESPONSE TO FORT BUCHANAN COMMUNITY ISSUES

1. Since FORSCOM was not directly involved in installation assessments, Fort Buchanan's military value can be best addressed by the Department of the Army.

- Although many of the comments are reasonable or accurate, Fort Buchanan is not considered a power projection platform.

2. As shown by data at enclosure 2, the job loss to the community would exceed 500.

3. The COBRA cost data requires rework. Substantive errors were found in manpower data which drove construction requirements. We are still developing the one time and recurring costs. Since we were not involved in developing the TABS analysis, we cannot comment on these, except to say the construction requirements were overstated.

4. The Readiness Group is the major unit relocating to Roosevelt Roads Navy Base (RRNS). Housing will be constructed at RRNS to house these soldiers and their families. The unit's Major Command indicates that their mission can be effectively accomplished from RRNS.

- Sabana Seca has buildable lands for family housing. These are outside the superfund contaminated sites.

- The Army desires to reduce the infrastructure requirements at Fort Buchanan. To do so we are relocating the active component units to RRNS thereby reducing the need for housing at Fort Buchanan. Due to erroneous manpower data used in the TABS analysis, construction costs will be considerably reduced.

5. The President's Five Part Plan provides economic assistance to communities where a base closure action severely affects the local economy.

- More than 1200 military and civilian personnel will remain in the enclaves that will be established. Therefore, contributions to the local economy will continue, although to a lesser degree. Plans are to continue with the operation of the Army and Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES) and Commissary.

UNITMOV.XLS

			DISPOSITION OF ON-POST UNITS			
UNIT	OFF	WO	ENL	CIV	OTH	DISPOSITION
GAR HQ USA	11	1	98	293		REALIGN/INACTIVATE
HEALTH CLINIC	2	0	12	9		INACTIVATE
DENTAL CLINIC	0	0	2	1		INACTIVATE
NAF MWR FUND					235	CLOSE
FULL TIME CONTR ACT					5	CLOSE/RRNS
US POSTAL SERVICE					3	CLOSE
VET BRANCH	1	0	8	1		ENCLAVE
ANTILLES CONS SCHOOL					485	ENCLAVE
AAFES MAIN STORE					413	ENCLAVE
DEF COMMISSARY	0	0	1	88		ENCLAVE
NG USP&FO	2	1	0	7	0	ENCLAVE
RGN3RD USACIDC	0	1	1	1		MIAMI, FLORIDA
902 MI HHCGRP	1	0	1	0		ROOSEVELT ROADS
2D ARMY TM RTT(RG)	2	0	7	0		ROOSEVELT ROADS
PERS SPT ELE(RG)	8	0	10	2		ROOSEVELT ROADS
RES SPT GRP, RG	13	0	21	5		ROOSEVELT ROADS
DFAS INDIANAPOLIS	1	0	4	8		ROOSEVELT ROADS
AIR FORCE USAFLO	0	0	1	0		SITE UNKNOWN
DEPT OF JUSTICE					3	SITE UNKNOWN
US CUSTOMS	0	0	0	12		SITE UNKNOWN
CU/SATO					19	SITE UNKNOWN
INTERNAL REVENUE					1	SITE UNKNOWN
INS IMMIGR/NATUR	0	0	0	2		SITE UNKNOWN
BANCO POPULAR					10	SITE UNKNOWN
SUB TOTAL	41	3	166	425	1174	
RESERVE UNITS:						
HQ, 85TH ARCOM	20	1	29	31		ENCLAVE
6 AUG HHD BDE (FLD EX)	0	1	5	1		ENCLAVE
348 AUG BN (CS FE) 6BDE	0	0	4	1		ENCLAVE
338 FI BN FINANCE	1	0	2	1		ENCLAVE
ARPERCEN LIAISON OFC	1	0	3	2		ENCLAVE
407TH MED CO (AMB)	0	0	4	1		ENCLAVE
A CO, 448TH EN BN	0	0	5	1		ENCLAVE
HSC 448TH EN BN	1	2	5	5		ENCLAVE
B CO, 448TH EN BN CMBT	0	0	4	1		ENCLAVE
301 MP CO CBT SPT	0	0	4	1		ENCLAVE
278 MAINT CO (DS) DET 1	0	1	4	0		ENCLAVE
268 TC CO LT TRUCK 5T	0	0	5	1		ENCLAVE
973 QM CO FLD SVC GS	0	0	4	1		ENCLAVE
AMSA 161 DS/GS	0	0	0	46		ENCLAVE
SUB TOTAL	23	5	78	93	0	
GRAND TOTAL	64	8	244	518	1174	

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950530-12

FROM: CHAPMAN, Jim	TO: DIXON
TITLE: REP (TX)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

INFORMING DBCRC OF ERROR REGARDING CALCULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT IMPACT ON TEXARKANA AREA; RE: UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION.

Due Date: 950601	Routing Date: 950530	Date Originated: 950524	Mail Date:

JIM CHAPMAN
FIRST DISTRICT
TEXAS

2417 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4301
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-3035

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-4301

COMMITTEE:
APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEES:
ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT
VA, HUD, AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

May 24, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950530-12

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I want to bring to your attention an alarming mistake made by the Army in its base closure analysis. This grievous error regards the calculation of the employment impact on the Texarkana area of the recommended closure of Red River Army Depot (RRAD) and Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas (DDRT) in my Congressional District. This subject was a topic of discussion during the May 15 site visit with Commissioners Josue Robles and Wendi Steele, and I want to provide the Commission with details of my analysis.

The Army's "Total Appropriations Detail Report (COBRA v5.08)" submitted to the Commission along with the Department's base closure recommendation lists a cost of $564,000 for unemployment compensation related to RRAD. The Defense Logistics Agency claims $163,468 in unemployment compensation will be associated with DDRT's closure. I am enclosing the relevant pages of the DLA and Army reports.

The actual cost of the unemployment compensation that will be incurred should the Commission approve this closure recommendation could be $52.8 Million. The real figure is more than 72 times what the Defense Department has represented it to be to the Commission. Please allow me to explain.

The Army's recommendation to close Red River Army Depot projected the loss of 5654 jobs (2901 direct and 2753 indirect) in the Texarkana Metropolitan Statistical Area [Secretary Perry's March 1 report, page 5-15]. This figure did not include the projected loss of 1602 jobs (821 direct and 781 indirect) from the closure of co-located Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas [page 5-150].

Of the RRAD and associated tenant Army job losses, a conservatively estimated 1847 jobs will be eliminated (as opposed to others that will be transferred, retained at enclaved entities, etc.). All of the 821 Defense Logistics Agency jobs at DDRT are expected to be eliminated. Thus, direct jobs to be lost under the Department's closure recommendation total 2668.

THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE OF RECYCLED FIBERS

Using numbers provided by the Texarkana office of the Texas Employment Commission (TEC), each of these individuals will qualify for 26 weeks of unemployment compensation at $259 per week. This combined cost is $17,966,312. This figure represents the largest portion -- but by no means the total -- of unemployment costs associated with this closure recommendation.

The jobs at the Red River Defense Complex are the best jobs in the entire area. Based on the TEC's historical records, no more than 10% of these employees can be expected to find employment at comparable salary in the 26 weeks following the proposed closure action. The remaining individuals will qualify for an additional 26 weeks of unemployment compensation, significantly adding to the costs to be incurred from this recommended closure.

The subsequent 26 week period will cost $16,168,334 in unemployment compensation for 2401 people (the original group of 2668 minus the 10% that may find employment) at $259 per person.

In addition, indirect job losses will cost a great deal of money in unemployment compensation. The Army estimates that about 9 indirect jobs will be lost for each 10 direct jobs lost. While I am concerned that the actual ratio may be much higher, I will use the Army's estimate as a best-case scenario.

I have shown above that a minimum of 2668 direct jobs will be lost under the Department's recommendation. Using the Army's ratio, these direct job losses will result in 2401 indirect job losses. These individuals who lose their jobs as an indirect result of the closure of Red River will likewise qualify for unemployment compensation, albeit at a reduced weekly amount.

Using the TEC's conservative estimate of $200 a week for these 2401 individuals, unemployment costs for this group will total $12,486,240 during the first 26 weeks.

Since these jobs are generally lower-paying than the direct depot jobs, a larger percentage of these people may obtain employment in the 26-week period. If half of these workers find work within the first 26 weeks, $6,240,000 will be paid to the remaining unemployed. This figure represents 1200 (50% of 2401) people for 26 weeks at $200 per week.

Based on the above analysis, the total costs of unemployment compensation for this recommended closure comes to $52,860,886!

While virtually all base closure actions involve some job displacement and economic impact is not the primary criterion for the Commission's evaluation of the Department's recommendations, the enormity of this unavoidable cost should give the Commissioners pause. At the very least, the Pentagon should be

required to provide the Commission with factually accurate and verifiable data with which to make this statutorily required evaluation. I strongly believe that the Department's failure to account wholly and accurately for the unemployment compensation costs that will result from its recommended closure of Red River significantly bolsters my contention that the Pentagon's recommendation in this case should be rejected by the Commission.

As the Representative of the First Congressional District of Texas, I am deeply grateful to you for considering the case for Red River. Please let me know if I may provide the Commission additional information. With warm regards, I am

Sincerely,

Jim Chapman
Member of Congress

Enclosure

ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/7
Data As Of 21:02 12/23/1994, Report Created 09:17 02/10/1995

Department : DLA
Option Package : DEPOT 05
Scenario File : C:\COBRA5GR\DEPOT05.CBR
Std Factr File : C:\COBRA5GR\DEPOT8.SFF

Base: DGRT, TX
(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	512,866	
Civilian Early Retirement	230,717	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	8,887	
Unemployment	153,460	
Total - Personnel		1,006,909
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	489,278	
Mothball / Shutdown	4,492,500	
Total - Overhead		5,151,778
Moving		
Civilian Moving	7,210,340	
Civilian PPS	3,263,200	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	3,180,397	
One-Time Moving Costs	8,300,000	
Total - Moving		22,053,938
Other		
MAP / RSE	1,279,534	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	10,080,000	
Total - Other		11,359,534
Total One-Time Costs		39,580,759
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		0
Total Net One-Time Costs		39,580,759

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/15
Data As Of 18:49 01/25/1995, Report Created 08:55 02/13/1995

Department : ARMY
Option Package : DE2&3-2R
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DE2&3-2R.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS -----($K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	36	1,689	1,704	0	0	3,229
Civ Retire	0	16	575	397	0	0	989
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	82	846	0	0	0	928
POV Miles	0	6	45	0	0	0	51
Home Purch	0	253	3,369	0	0	0	3,622
HHG	0	171	2,363	0	0	0	2,534
Misc	0	17	245	0	0	0	262
House Hunt	0	68	660	0	0	0	728
PPS	0	29	7,689	8,266	0	0	15,984
RITA	0	119	1,446	0	0	0	1,565
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	97	122	0	0	0	220
Freight	0	1	6	0	0	0	7
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	6	260	297	0	0	564
OTHER							
Program Plan	4,462	3,347	2,510	1,882	0	0	12,202
Shutdown	7	1,350	5,073	3,195	0	0	9,625
New Hire	0	14	158	0	0	0	173
1-Time Move	0	0	5,000	0	0	0	5,000
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	10	0	25	39	0	0	75
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	31	1,090	755	0	0	1,876
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	4,479	5,645	32,975	16,536	0	0	59,636

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950526-20

FROM: FORD, WENDELL H. /BOND	TO: DIXON
TITLE: U.S. SEN (MO)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	DJG
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions		FYI

Subject/Remarks:

Concern that DoD recommendations could cripple ability of Reserve Components.

Due Date: 950528	Routing Date: 950526	Date Originated: 950519	Mail Date:

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 19, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950526-20

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We are writing to express our concern that the Pentagon's BRAC 95 recommendations could cripple the ability of our Reserve Components, particularly the National Guard, to perform their military missions.

Specifically, we believe the Army's evaluation of the military value of maneuver training areas was deeply flawed because it did not adequately reflect the training and readiness needs of the Guard and Reserves. Indeed, we believe some of the Army's recommendations make a mockery of the "Total Army" concept.

Several Adjutant Generals have informed us that the National Guard Bureau (NGB) did not concur with the Army's criteria for evaluating the military value of maneuver training areas because those criteria ignored National Guard Title XI training requirements. The Director of the Army National Guard told a Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearing that he is concerned that the "enclaves" the Army plans to leave at five major maneuver areas recommended for closure or realignment -- Fort Chaffee, Fort Hunter Liggett, Fort Pickett, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Fort McClellan -- are inadequate to meet the Guard's minimum training needs.

The problem is that the Reserve Components and the Army Staff have very different definitions of an enclave. The National Guard needs enclaves large enough for artillery firing and for battalion and brigade annual training. The Army Reserve Command needs enclaves large enough for land navigation courses, and in some cases large enough to station elements of FORSCOM's Regional Training Brigades. The Army Staff, however, reportedly is planning for enclaves that comprise no more than a few buildings and small arms ranges, and which have no active duty personnel.

According to the Adjutant Generals, the Army's BRAC recommendations do not recognize the need to conduct Individual Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT) at bases near the units they serve. They say the Army's plan to conduct such

training at "other installations in the region" is not practical. Most alternate training sites are hundreds of miles away, and the extra travel time would waste as much as four days of each 14-day AT period. Moreover, suitable alternate training sites are generally fully occupied by active duty units, and it is doubtful the Reserve Components will be able to get the training areas they need.

We also believe that the Army has greatly overstated the savings from closing or realigning the five bases, because the Army's COBRA model did not recognize Reserve Component training needs. The Directors of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard told the Defense Subcommittee that the savings from closing the facilities would be offset by the increased costs the National Guard will have to pay to send units longer distances for fewer days of annual training.

We understand the Reserve Components have so far failed to obtain a satisfactory commitment from the Army on the definition of an enclave. We fear that the wording of the Pentagon's recommendations may be legally interpreted to preclude implementing a resolution satisfactory to the Reserve Components. For example, some Army lawyers contend that the Pentagon's BRAC recommendations prohibit stationing of active duty personnel or conducting annual training at Reserve Component enclaves.

As you know, the Chiefs of the Reserve Components cannot volunteer to the Base Closure Commission their views on the impact that the Army recommendations will have on their forces. That is why we urge you and the Commission to thoroughly examine the Army's decision-making process in regard to this issue. Please examine the adequacy of the Army's cost analysis and whether its recommendations properly reflect the training requirements of the Reserve Components.

We hope you and your staff will ensure that the Commission's final recommendations adequately support the readiness and training needs of all our military forces.

Sincerely,

Wendell H. Ford

Christopher S. Bond

Dale Bumpers

David Pryor

Arlen Specter (BRADLEY)

Rick Santorum

Tom Bevill

Glen Browder

Barbara Boxer

Document Separator

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950530-17

FROM: MARKEY, EDWARD	TO: DIXON
TITLE: REP. (MA)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: ARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ENG. CENTER WATICK	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	b31
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING NEW ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT DATA COLLECTED BY METROWEST CHAMBER

Due Date: 950601	Routing Date: 950530	Date Originated: 950525	Mail Date:

EDWARD J. MARKEY
7TH DISTRICT, MASSACHUSETTS

COMMITTEES:
COMMERCE
RANKING MEMBER
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
FINANCE
RESOURCES
(ON LEAVE)
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515–2107

2133 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515–2107
(202) 225–2836

DISTRICT OFFICES:
5 HIGH STREET, SUITE 101
MEDFORD, MA 02155
(617) 396–2900

188 CONCORD STREET, SUITE 102
FRAMINGHAM, MA 01701
(508) 875–2900

May 25, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite H25
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number
when responding C950530-17

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am enclosing environmental impact data collected by the Metrowest Chamber of Commerce which corrects information concerning the Army Research, Development and Engineering Center in Natick, MA.

It is my understanding that the Commission received data which overestimated the environmental cost conditions at the Labs. I am forwarding the corrected BRAC 95 Summary of Environmental Impacts, which I hope will be included in the Labs' permanent file.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Markey

Edward J. Markey
Member of Congress

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

MetroWest Chamber of Commerce

May 22, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite H25
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

It was brought to our attention that the Base Closure and Realignment Commission received incomplete, and in certain cases, incorrect environmental information concerning the U. S. Army Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center.

For the purposes of updating the base file, we have enclosed a revised 1995 Summary of Environmental Impact Statement, which accurately reflects the reduced environmental cost conditions at the base.

Thank you very much for your interest in the Natick Labs. Please feel free to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

A. Theodore Welte, CCE
President

Ashland • Framingham • Holliston • Hopkinton • Natick • Sherborn • Southborough • Sudbury • Wayland
1671 Worcester Rd., Suite 201, Framingham, MA 01701 • (508) 879-5600 • Fax (508) 875-9325

ACCREDITED CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

BRAC 95 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

MACOM AMC Mission Area Commodity Oriented

Installation Natick Research, Development, & Engineering Center

I CONSIDERATIONS FOR REALIGNMENT

Significant

No Potable water constraint

Remarks Excess supply of potable water available from our drinking wells. Also have backup tie-in to local town water supply.

~~Potable water capacity near capacity may limit realignment options.~~

Partial only 4% of installation is wetlands.

~~10-20% Acreage Wetlands~~

Remarks

~~Wetlands covering 10% of the installation which may limit realignment options.~~ 96% of installation land is free of wetlands.

Possible

Non-attainment Area only for ozone

Remarks

~~Air conformity determination requirement may restrict new operations.~~ New Title 5, Clean Air Permit allows Natick Labs to emit nearly 3 times it's current air emmission levels.

II CONSIDERATIONS FOR CLOSURE

Significant

None

Remarks

Partial

None

Remarks

Possible

None

III CONSIDERATIONS FOR DISPOSAL

Significant

None

Remarks

Partial

None

Remarks

Possible

FFA/IAG/Consent Agreement OK

Remarks

NPL may have FFA/IAG/Consent agreement, which may limit disposal. OK

IV COMPLIANCE COST ISSUES

> $50 M ??

Compliance Cost - $58 M Note annual compliance cost for Environmental program averages $ 2 to 3 million.

V RESTORATION COST ISSUES

None?

Average Environmental Restoration cost $3 to $ million annually.

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950526-18

FROM: SHUSTER, BUD	TO: DIXON
TITLE: U.S. REP (PA)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	B29
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions		FYI

Subject/Remarks:

Questions forwarded regarding May 8 "BRAC 95 - IN PROGRESS REVIEW." REQUEST the Commission forward them to the Army. (ARMY DEPOT MAINTENANCE ISSUES)

Due Date: 950528	Routing Date: 950526	Date Originated: 950524	Mail Date:

Please refer to this number
when responding 950526-18

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Bud Shuster
Ninth District
Pennsylvania

May 24, 1995

The Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman of the Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

It has come to my attention that on May 8, 1995, the Department of the Army, with assistance from the Army Materiel Command briefed the Base Realignment and Closure Commission Staff on depot maintenance issues. The briefing was entitled "BRAC 95 -- In Progress Review."

Attached you will find a series of questions that correspond to the brief, and are related to the Army's military value and COBRA analysis. I would be most appreciative if you would have the appropriate individual(s) from the Department of the Army respond to these questions in a timely manner.

With kind regards, I remain

Sincerely,

BUD SHUSTER
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

QUESTIONS:

- Did **not** the Department of the Army classify Letterkenny Army Depot as the "Center of Technical Excellence for Tactical Missiles" for all of the Services?

- Were tactical missiles included in the Army Stationing Plan? If tactical missiles were not included in the Stationing Plan (**with the knowledge that some missiles are considered "core"** and some missiles are considered to be "above core") how did the Department of the Army comply with the Department of Defense Criteria #1, regarding mission requirements and operational readiness? Please explain.

- Returning to the issue of "core" and "above core" workload, what is the OSD policy on transferring "core" workload? Was this policy followed in its entirety by the Department of the Army for Letterkenny Army Depot? Please explain.

- Does the Department of the Army program depots above their capacity in peacetime as reflected on Chart #9 of the Army briefing, entitled "Army Depot End State"? If not, could you please explain this chart?

- In the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure final COBRA output for Letterkenny Army Depot, in direct labor manhours, how much of Letterkenny's "core" and "above core" funded FY 1999 workload did the Army transfer to Tobyhanna Army Depot and Anniston Army Depot?

- If all the funded "core" and funded "above core" workload was not transferred to Tobyhanna and/or Anniston Army Depots, please explain where the remaining funded workload by "core" and "above core" was transferred? How did the Department of the Army account for this in the COBRA output?

- How can realigning a depot save more money than a complete closure of a depot? Does this have anything to do with the transfer, or lack of transfer, of funded "above core" workload? Please explain.

- Letterkenny has been praised for developing the most successful partnership within the Department of Defense. Was Letterkenny considered for additional artillery/tank workload?

- On March 1, 1994 the Joint Cross-Service Working Group meeting minutes stated: "Discussion continued concerning the Public/Private partnership at Letterkenny that is an outstanding success and should be a model for future efforts that would preserve capability." The Paladin "teaming" arrangement has saved $61 million dollars, with additional savings reported to be $15 million dollars annually. Would not further expansion of this partnership, by workloading Letterkenny solve the Department of Defense's concerns regarding the issue of losing over 46% of war-time surge capability and, at the same time, generate additional savings for the Army and DoD. Would this scenario also help solve the problem of Anniston exceeding 114% of its capacity? Keeping in mind the accomplishments of the teaming arrangement already developed at Letterkenny, as well as the United Defense position as it was discussed during Commissioner Cornella's visit to Letterkenny (enclosed).

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS REGARDING COBRA RUN SCENARIOS:

- **COBRA RUN SCENARIOS:**

1.) Did the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense run any COBRA analysis on moving the electronic workload, currently being conducted at McClellan Air Logistics Center in Sacramento, CA. to Tobyhanna Army Depot, which maintains similar electronic equipment? If not, could a COBRA analysis be run in this scenario?

2.) Did the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense run any COBRA analysis on the end result of Letterkenny having transitioned in all of the 21 missile systems expected from the various services through the BRAC 93 law? Or are there presumptions being made about Letterkenny, do to the fact that Letterkenny is in transition at this point in time, with 13 of the 21 missiles systems transitioned? If not, would it be possible to do a COBRA run that would analyze Letterkenny with all 21 missile systems up and running at Letterkenny? Wouldn't this be saving the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army dollars?

PURPOSE



BRAC 95
IN PROGRESS REVIEW

DEPOT MAINTENANCE
BRAC COMMISSION

8 MAY 95

PURPOSE

- IMPACT ON MAINTENACE DEPOTS FROM PAST BRACs
- BRAC 95 ARMY PRELIMINARY DEPOT RECOMMENDATIONS
- CAPACITY ANALYSIS
- BRAC COMMISSION ADDS
- SUMMARY



PAST MAINTENANCE DEPOT CLOSURES SINCE 1988

1988 STARTING POINT	10	
CLOSED OR REALIGNED:	5	
LEXINGTON-BLUEGRASS, KY		
SACRAMENTO, CA		
MAINZ,GE		
SENECA, NY		
TOOELE, UT		
SUB TOTAL	5	(50%)
BRAC 95	2	
LETTERKENNY, PA		
RED RIVER, TX		
TOTAL	3	(70%)

PLUS BRAC 95 CLOSED 67% OF THE INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES
STRATFORD ENGINE PLANT
DETROIT TANK PLANT

BRAC 95 STRATEGY



BALANCED APPROACH THAT:

- FOCUSES ON FUTURE - FORCE XXI
- CONSISTENT WITH STATIONING STRATEGY
- MEETS OSD EXPECTATIONS (ROBUST LIST)
- MAXIMIZES SAVINGS / MINIMIZES COST

DEPOTS

OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT

- RETAIN "CORE" CAPABILITIES SIZED TO SUPPORT SUSTAINMENT NEEDS
- CONSOLIDATE FUNCTIONALLY, MAINTAINING SEPARATE ELECTRONIC-ORIENTED, GROUND, AIR DEPOTS

INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

1. (6.4) TOBYHANNA
2. (6.1) ANNISTON
3. (5.0) RED RIVER
4. (2.3) LETTERKENNY

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

TOBYHANNA
ANNISTON
RED RIVER
LETTERKENNY

STUDY CANDIDATES

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

TOBYHANNA AD
ANNISTON AD
CORPUS CHRISTI AD

LETTERKENNY AND RED RIVER ARMY DEPOTS



CLOSE RED RIVER AND LETTERKENNY

COSTS ($M)

O&M	$ 128
MILCON	$ 0
OTHER	$ 6
TOTAL	$ 134

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	IMMEDIATE
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2000
STEADY STATE ($M)	202
20 YEAR NPV ($M)	2,430

TRADE-OFFS
CLOSING 2 GROUND DEPOTS

PROs	CONs

• SUPPORTS STATIONING STRATEGY
  • RETAINS 3 CORE DEPOTS
• JSCG SUPPORTS CLOSURE
• SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL SAVINGS
  • $ 90 MILLION ANNUALLY
  • ($ 202 MILLION TOTAL)
• DOES NOT AFFECT FUNDED WORKLOAD
• MINIMAL RISK TO WARTIME SURGE
•
• WARTIME REQUIREMENTS SHORTAGE BASED ON 1-8-5, WITH SECOND SHIFT AND 7 DAY SCHEDULE - CAPACITY INCREASES 2.4 TIMES
	• 46% SHORTFALL IN WARTIME (2 MRC) RQMT FOR COMBAT VEHICLES
	• STRONG LOBBY EFFORT IN BRAC 91 DEFEATED ARMY'S RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE

CAPACITY REDUCTION

CAPACITY



33% REDUCTION IN CAPACITY

EXCESS CAPACITY



REDUCTION OF 47% IN EXCESS CAPACITY

ARMY DEPOT END STATE



U.S. ARMY DEPOTS CAPACITY AND WORKLOAD



NOTE: DLH IN MILLIONS

ARMY VERSUS COMMISSION ADD COMMUNICATIONS

	REALIGN LETTERKENNY	CLOSE TOBYHANNA
	ARMY	COMMISSION
I-TIME COST	$67 M	$154 M
STEADY STATE SAVINGS	$78 M	$33 M
NET PRESENT VALUE (20 YEARS)	$952 M	$226 M
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE ELIMINATION	1267	535
MILITARY SPACES SAVED	20	34
RETURN ON INVESTMENT (YEARS)	IMMEDIATE	4
ROI YEAR	1998	2005

ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS:

43% CHEAPER IN 1 TIME COST
2 TIMES THE STEADY STATE SAVINGS
4 YEARS EARLIER RETURN ON INVESTMENT

ARMY VERSUS COMMISSION ADD TACTICAL MISSILES

	REALIGN LETTERKENNY ARMY	CLOSE - LEAD MOVE TO HILL AFB COMMISSION	REALIGN - LEAD MOVE TO HILL AFB COMMISSION
I-TIME COST	$67 M	$471 M	$220 M
STEADY STATE SAVINGS	$78 M	$91 M	$65 M
NET PRESENT VALUE (20 YEARS)	$952 M	$673 M	$220 M
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE ELIMINATION	1267	1246	1018
MILITARY SPACES SAVED	20	23	23
RETURN ON INVESTMENT (YEARS)	IMMEDIATE	5	2
ROI YEAR	1998	2005	2002

ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS:

CHEAPER IN 1 TIME COST
FASTER STEADY STATE SAVINGS
GREATER NET PRESENT VALUE
EARLIER RETURN ON INVESTMENT

ARMY VERSUS COMMISSION ADD COMBAT VEHICLES

	CLOSE RED RIVER ARMY	REALIGN ANNISTON COMMISSION
I-TIME COST	$59 M	$128 M
STEADY STATE SAVINGS	$123 M	$33 M
NET PRESENT VALUE (20 YEARS)	$1,497 M	$234 M
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE ELIMINATION	1965	639
MILITARY SPACES SAVED	14	1
RETURN ON INVESTMENT (YEARS)	IMMEDIATE	4
ROI YEAR	1999	2005

ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS:

53 % CHEAPER IN 1 TIME COST
4 TIMES THE STEADY STATE SAVINGS
4 YEARS EARLIER RETURN ON INVESTMENT

SUMMARY

- ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS ARE SUPPORTED BY ARMY STATIONING STRATEGY
- ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS ARE SUPPORTABLE FROM AN OPERATIONAL ASPECT
- ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS ARE SUPPORTED BY JCSG-DM
- ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS ARE THE LEAST COSTLY AND MOST COST EFFECTIVE
-
- DoD IS STILL WILL REDUCE TOA BY $729 M AND REDUCING PERSONNEL (DORN MEMO)

BOTTOM LINE OF ARMY ALTERNATIVE

- CLOSES TWO DEPOTS
- MAINTAINS A DoD TACTICAL MISSILE DEPOT (TOBYHANNA)
- SAVES DoD AND THE ARMY $2,430 M OVER 20 YEARS

BASE VISIT REPORT

LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT — LETTERKENNY

24 MARCH 1995

Artillery work - Paladin

In accordance with the BRAC 1993 recommendation, Letterkenny continues to perform major overhaul and maintenance on small to medium tracked vehicles. In addition the depot refurbishes a variety of wheeled vehicles that transport Army missile systems and components. A tour of the vehicle shops disclosed that the depot recently completed construction of a new high tech painting booth costing $6.2 million. Letterkenny has one of three DOD X-ray facilities for examining the quality of steel welded products. The vehicle shops total more than 350,000 square feet of work space.

Letterkenny has established an ongoing teaming arrangement with a private sector firm, United Defense, to produce 630 upgraded M109A6 Paladin artillery systems. Under this arrangement, dubbed "Paladin Enterprise" the old gun turret is removed in Letterkenny shops. The Letterkenny shop overhauls the chassis to like new condition and returns it the contractor.

United Defense fabricates a new turret at its York, Pennsylvania plant, and sends the turret to the Letterkenny depot , where it is outfitted with new wiring, hydraulic hosing and component parts. The completed turret is then installed on a refurbished chassis received from the Letterkenny vehicle shop. Lastly, the completed system is test driven and fired on the Letterkenny test track and range. The joint project has saved the taxpayers about $15 million and is scheduled for completion in October 1998.

Discussions with Letterkenny and United Defense officials revealed that 120 more systems could be upgraded if contract options are exercised. United Defense is also looking to expand its business into other tracked vehicle systems. The company is closing its California production facility and consolidating its work at the York, Pennsylvania plant, which is located about 50 miles from Letterkenny. The company manager indicated that United Defense has produced and worked on all current tracked vehicles used by the U. S. military except the main M1 battle tank.

United Defense
FMC/BMY

May 2, 1995

The Honorable Bud Shuster
2188 Rayburn House Office Building
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Shuster:

This is in response to your letter of April 12, 1995, requesting my thoughts on further teaming arrangements that could be pursued by United Defense LP and Letterkenny Army Depot.

United Defense strongly supports the concept of public-private partnering. Indeed, we are extremely pleased with our partnership with Letterkenny for the upgrade of the Paladin howitzer system which is delivering high-quality howitzers two months ahead of schedule and below budget. Real process streamlining has been accomplished - waiving 30 regulations and saving well over $15 million. The program's success demonstrates that private industry and government depots can work as a team to provide America's fighting men and women with modernized combat equipment at affordable prices. Current Army and National Guard Budgeting activities, as well as foreign interest, lead to the expectation that Paladin production will extend beyond the current multiyear contract (October 1998) into the next century.

We continue to be interested in pursuing public-private partnering arrangements where it makes business sense and is supported by our primary customer - the Department of Defense. We will continue to explore partnering operations at government depots including the opportunity to expand our established partnership with Letterkenny - providing any agreement has the full support of the Defense Base Closure Commission and the Department of Defense leadership.

I agree that proper management of the light/medium combat vehicle industrial base should be advantageous to the soldier and the taxpayer. We would welcome the opportunity to participate in this endeavor as the industry partner.

United Defense LP World Headquarters
[illegible] Suite 700 Arlington Virginia 22209-2411 Telephone 703 312 6100

I want to assure you that once the BRAC process has been completed, United Defense will wholeheartedly work with the resulting structure to establish and strengthen business relationships that make sense and are supported by our customer.

I will be happy to meet with you to discuss this matter further.

Sincerely,

Tom Rabaut

Thomas W. Rabaut
President and Chief Executive Officer

Document Separator

FAX TRANSMITTAL **DATE:** 25 May 95

FROM: KELLY DRM
DSN: 242-1231/1166
FAX: 242-1317
COMM: (412) 777- SAME EXTENSIONS

TO: Mike Kennedy

FAX #:

 # OF PAGES: 7 **(INCLUDING COVER)**

REMARKS: Attached is a copy of the TDA changes which were agreed to by Kelly & the 99th ARCOM (FORSCOM said we had to coordinate). 14 of the 17 positions identified were warehouse/field positions. My pen & ink changes indicate 11 additional cuts which were proposed, which included five additional field positions. This won't create much additional office space for the 48 people currently working at S-63. (4 of the 48 are identified to be cut, tho) 44 do be brought back on-post.

at least 14 of the 23 w/be warehouse/field positions

Jennifer

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	GR	MOS	BR	ID	AMS	SWCC	MDEP	AUTH	FUNDED	REALIGN	REMARKS
		WOXQ06 KSF											
064	01	DEP CIV CDR	13	00340	GS	C	117096NA	BAH	QNMG	1	1	1	
064	02	SFTY/OCC H MGI	11	00018	GS	C	117096NB	CHB	QNMG	1	1	1	
064	03	SECRETARY (T)	06	00318	GS	C	117096NA	BAH	QNMG	1	1	1	
064	04	PROG ANAL OFF	12	00345	GS	C	117096NA	BAH	QNMG	1	1	~~0~~ 1	
064	05	CLK TYP	04	00322	GS	C	117096NA	BAH	QNMG	1	0	0	
										5	4	~~4~~ 3	
		WOXQ06 DRM											
065	01	SR MGT ANAL	12	00343	GS	C	117096UC	FGR	QDRM	1	0	~~0~~ 1	
065	02	MGT ANAL	09	00343	GS	C	117096UD	OBB	QDRM	1	0	0	
										2	0	~~0~~ 1	
		WOXQ06 ADJ											
066	01	CMUTY/FAM A M	09	00301	GS	C	117096GA	PUA	QPSG	1	1	1	
066	02	REC SP SUPV	07	00188	GS	C	117096SJ	QLA	QDPC	1	1	1	
066	03	MIL PRS CLK (	05	00204	GS	C	117096GD	PUA	QPSG	1	1	1	
066	04	MIL PRS CLK (	04	00204	GS	C	117096GD	PUF	QPSG	1	1	1	
066	05	CLK TYP	04	00322	GS	C	117096GD	PUF	QPSG	0	0	0	
										4	4	4	
		WOXQ06 TASC											
067	01	AUDI VIS SVC	09	01084	GS	C	11709000	DFH	MUIM	1	1	~~1~~ 0	
067	02	PHOTO	07	01060	GS	C	11709000	DFB	MUIM	1	1	0	
067	03	SECY (TYP)	04	00318	GS	C	11709000	DFH	MUIM	1	1	0	
067	04	PROJ EQ RPR	07	03364	WG	C	11709000	DFF	MUIM	1	0	0	
067	05	MAT HANDLR	04	06907	WG	C	11709000	DFF	MUIM	0	0	0	
										4	3	~~1~~ 0	
		WOXQ06 ASST !											
068	01	SUPV LOG MGT	12	00346	GS	C	117096BD	KAA	QSUP	1	1	1	
068	02	SUPV LOG MGT	09	00346	GS	C	117096BD	MCB	QSUP	1	0	0	
068	03	SECY (TYP)	05	00318	GS	C	117096BD	KAA	QSUP	1	1	1	
068	04	SUP CLK	05	02005	GS	C	117096BD	ADD	QSUP	0	1	1	
										3	3	3	
		WOXQ06 DATA											
068A	01	SUPV GEN SYS	09	02001	GS	C	117096BC	MHF	QSUP	1	1	1	
068A	02	COMP ASST	05	00335	GS	C	117096BC	MHF	QSUP	1	1	1	
068A	03	PERF EQ OPR	04	00350	GS	C	117096BC	MHF	QSUP	1	1	1	
068A	04	SUP CLK	05	02005	GS	C	117096BC	MHF	QSUP	1	1	1	
068A	05	SUP CLK (T)	04	02005	GS	C	117096BC	MHF	QSUP	1	0	~~1~~ 0	
068A	06	SUP CLK	04	02005	GS	C	117096BC	MHF	QSUP	0	1	1	
068A	07	SUP TECH	06	02005	GS	C	117096BC	MQF	QSUP	1	1	1	
										6	6	~~1~~ 6	

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION		GR	MOS	BR	ID	AMS	SVCC	MDEP	AUTH	FUNDED	REALIGN	REMARKS
		WOXQ06 STORAGI												
068B	01	WAREHOUSE WKR I		05	06907	WG	C	117096BC	MPF	QSUP	1	1	1	
068B	02	CLK TYP		03	00322	GS	C	117096BC	MPF	QSUP	1	0	0	
068B	03	MOB EQ OPR		08	05701	WG	C	117096BC	MPF	QSUP	1	1	1	
068B	04	MAT HANDLR		06	06907	WG	C	117096BC	MPF	QSUP	1	1	1	
				06	06907	WG	C	117096BC	MPF	QSUP	1	1	1	
068B	05	MAT EX AND ID	L	06	06912	WG	C	117096BC	MPF	QSUP	1	1	1	
				06	06912	WG	C	117096BC	MPF	QSUP	1	1	1	
068B	06	MAT HANDLR		05	06907	WG	C	117096BC	MPF	QSUP	1	1	1	
068B	06			05	06907	WG	C	117096BC	MPF	QSUP	1	1	1	
068B	06			05	06907	WG	C	117096BC	MPF	QSUP	2	1	1	
											11	9	9	
		WOXQ06 TISA												
068C	01	SUPV SUP CLK		06	02005	GS	C	72289210	KHA	VTSS	1	1	0	
068C	02	MAT HANDLR		05	06907		C	72289220	KHA	VTSS	1	1	0	3 ware-house workers (no offic
068C	02	MAT HANDLR	E	05	06907	WG	C	72289220	KHA	VTSS	0	1	0	
068C	02	MAT HANDLR		05	06907	WG	C	72289220	KHA	VTSS	0	1	0	
											2	4	0	
		WOXQ06 SLF S												
068D	01	SUPV SUP TECH		06	02005	GS	C	117096BC	NBA	QSUP	1	0	0	
068D	02	MAT HANDLR		05	06907	WG	C	117096BC	NBA	QSUP	1	0	0	
068D	03	MAT HANDLR		05	06907	WG	C	117096BC	NBA	QSUP	2	0	0	
											4	0	0	
068E	00	NOT USED												
		WOXQ06 TRANS												
068F	01	TRANS OFFSE C	BIER	11	02101	GS	C	1170960B	KRA	QTRN	1	1	1	
068F	02	SECY (TYP)		04	00318	GS	C	1170960B	KRA	QTRN	0	0	0	
											1	1	1	
		WOXQ06 MVMT												
068G	01	CML TFC SUPV		08	02101	GS	C	1170960B	KRA	QTRN	1	1	1	
068G	02	CLK TYP		04	00322	GS	C	1170960B	KRA	QTRN	1	0	0	
											2	1	1	
		WOXQ06 INST												
068H	01	SHPMN CLK TY		05	02134	GS	C	1170960B	LAC	QTRN	1	1	1	
		SHPMN CLK TY	S	05	02134	GS	C	1170960B	LAC	QTRN	1	1	1	
											2	2	2	

ARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION		GR	MOS	BR	ID	AMS	SWCC	MDEP	AUTH	FUNDED	REALIGN	REMARKS
		WOXQ06 PRS M\												
68I	01	TVL CLK TYP		05	02132	GS	C	117096DB	KVA	QTRN	1	1	1	
68I	01	TVL CLK TYP	IS	05	02132	GS	C	117096DB	KVA	QTRN	1	1	1	
68I	01	TVL CLK TYP		05	02132	GS	C	117096DB	KVA	QTRN	1	1	1	
											3	3	3	
		WOXQ06 PRS PR												
68J	01	SUPV SHPMT CLK		07	02134	GS	C	117096DB	KSB	QTRN	1	1	0	
68J	02	SHPMN CLK HH (		06	02134	GS	C	117096DB	KSB	QTRN	7	5	5	
		SHPMN CLK (HHG		05	02134	GS	C							
		SHPMN CLK (HHG		05	02134	GS	C							
		SHPMN CLK (HHG		05	02134	GS	C							
		SHPMN CLK (HHC		05	02134	GS	C							
		VACANT		05	02134	GS	C							
		VACANT		05	02134	GS	C							
											8	6	5	
		WOXQ06 QA CTR												
68K	01	PACK INSP FMN		05	07002	WS	C	117096DB	KSA	QTRN	1	1	~~1~~ 0	
68K	02	CLAIM CLK (t)		05	02135	GS	C	117096DB	KSA	QTRN	1	1	~~1~~ 0	
68K	03	TRANS CLK		04	02102	GS	C	117096DB	KSA	QTRN	1	1	~~1~~ 0	
68K	04	PACKING INSP		08	07002	WG	C	117096DB	KSA	QTRN	5	6	~~5~~ 0	5 Packing Inspectors work in field, no office
				08	07002	WG	C							
				08	07002	WG	C							
			HB	08	07002	WG	C							
				08	07002	WG	C							
				08	07002	WG	C							
											8	9	~~8~~ 0	
		WOXQ06 TRANS												
68L	01	MTR VEH DSPCH		04	02151	GS	C	117096DA	LBC	QTRN	1	0	0	
											1	0	0	
		WOXQ06 VEH (												
68M	01	MTR VEH OP	RELL	08	05703	WG	C	117096DA	LBD	QTRN	1	1	0	
68M	02	MTR VEH OP		05	05703	WG	C	117096DB	LBD	QTRN	1	1	0 — works in field	
											2	2	0	
68N	00	NOT USED												
		WOXQ06 CNTR												
680	01	CNTR O R (CC		11	01601	GS	C	117096CF	MAZ	QMNT	1	1	1	
680	02	MAINT COR AS	(	06	01152	GS	C	117096CF	MAZ	QMNT	1	1	~~1~~ 0	Neville Island Location no off. Kelly
680	03	ELEC EQ INSP		11	02601	WG	C	117096CF	LHN	QMNT	1	1	1	
680	04	HVY MOB EQ I		11	05803	WG	C	117096CF	LHN	QMNT	1	0	0	
											4	3	~~3~~ 2	

ARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	GR	MOS	BR	ID	AMS	SWCC	MDEP	AUTH	FUNDED	REALIGN	REMARKS
		WOXQ06 ASST DEH											
069	01	SUPV GEN ENGR	13	00801	GM	C	117096M4	JAA	QDEH	1	0	~~1~~ 0	
069	02	SECY STENO	05	00318	GS	C	117096M4	JAA	QDEH	1	1	1	
069	03	CLK TYP	03	00322	GS	C	117096M4	JAA	QDEH	0	0	0	
069	04	ENV/ENERGY TEC	11	00801	GS	C	11705690	JFA	VENC	1	1	1	
069	05	ENV/PRO T SPEC	09	00028	GS	C	11705690	JFA	VENC	0	2	2	
		ENV/PRO T SPEC	09	00028	GS	C	11705690	JFA	VENC	0	0	0	
069	06	AUTOMATION CLK	04	00326	GS	C	11705690	JFA	VENC	0	0	~~1~~ 0	
										3	4	~~6~~ 4	
069A	00	NOT USED											
		WOXQ06 RES MGT											
069B	01	PROG ANAL OFF	12	00345	GS	C	117096M4	JCE	QDEH	1	1	1	*
069B	02	BUDGET ANAL	11	00560	GS	C	117096M4	JCD	QDEH	1	1	1	
069B	03	MGT ANAL	09	00343	GS	C	117096M4	JDA	QDEH	1	1	1	
069B	04	BUD ANAL	09	00560	GS	C	117096M4	JCD	QDEH	1	1	1	
069B	05	BUD ASST	05	00561	GS	C	117096M4	JCD	QDEH	1	1	1	
069B	06	SUP TECH (PBO)	07	02005	GS	C	117096M7	NQB	QDEH	1	1	0	warehouse no office
069B	07	SUP CLK	05	02005	GS	C	117096M7	NFA	QDEH	1	1	0	
069B	08	WORK ORDER CLK	04	00303	GS	C	117096M4	JCA	QDEH	1	1	0	
069B	09	COMPUTER OPR	04	00356	GS	C	117096M4	JDA	QDEH	1	1	1	*
069B	10	ACCT TECH	04	00525	GS	C	117096M4	NFA	QDEH	1	1	1	
069B	11	SUP CLK (t)	04	02005	GS	C	117096M4	MPB	QDEH	1	0	0	
069B	12	MAT HNDLR	06	06907	WG	C	117096M7	MPB	QDEH	1	1	0	warehouse no office
069B	13	MAT HNDLR	05	06907	WG	C	117096M7	MPB	QDEH	1	1	0	
069B	14	MAINT SCHEDULR	09	04701	WD	C	117096M4	JCA	QDEH	0	1	0	
069B	15	PLANS/ESTIMATOR	08	04701	WD	C	117096M4	JCB	QDEH	1	1	1	*
										14	14	8	
		WOXQ06 EN P/S											
069C	01	SUPV GEN ENGR	12	00801	GS	C	117096M4	JDB	QDEH	1	1	1	
069C	02	GEN ENGR	11	00801	GS	C	117096M4	JDB	QDEH	1	1	1	
069C	03	CIVIL ENGR TEC	09	00801	GS	C	117096M4	JDB	QDEH	1	1	1	
069C	04	ENGR TECH	07	00802	GS	C	117096M4	JDB	QDEH	1	1	~~2~~ 1	*
069C	05	REAL PROP CLK	05	00303	GS	C	117096M4	JCC	QDEH	1	1	~~0~~ 1	
069C	06	STAT CLK TYP	05	01531	GS	C	117096M4	JDB	QDEH	0	0	0	
069C	07	CLK TYP	03	00322	GS	C	117096M4	JDB	QDEH	0	0	0	
069C	08	MECH ENGR	11	00801	GS	C	117096M4	JDB	QDEH	0	0	1	
										5	5	6	
		WOXQ06 BLD/GN											
069D	01	SUPV GEN ENGR	11	00801	GS	C	117096M4	JGA	QDEH	0	0	0	

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	GR	MOS	BR	ID	AMS	SWCC	MDEP	AUTH	FUNDED	REALIGN	REMARKS
		WOXQ06 BLD/GN											
069E	01	MAINT FMN	09	04749	WS	C	117078K2	JGA	QRPA	1	1	1	
069E	02	ENGR EQ OPR	10	05716	WG	C	117078K5	JHG	QRPA	1	1	0	warehouse no office
069E	03	MOB EQ MECH	10	05801	WG	C	117078K7	LQB	QRPA	0	1	0	
069E	04	CARPENTER	09	04607	WG	C	117078K2	JHA	QRPA	1	1	1	
		CARPENTER	09	04607	WG	C	117078K2	JHA	QRPA	0	1	1	
069E	05	MAINT TECH	09	04749	WG	C	117078K2	JHE	QRPA	3	1	1	
		MAINT TECH	09	04749	WG	C	117078K2	JHE	QRPA		1	1	
		MAINT TECH	09	04749	WG	C	117078K2	JHE	QRPA		0	0	
069E	06	BLOCK & BRACER	08	04102	WG	C	117078K7	JHA	QRPA	0	0	0	
069E	07	PAINT WKR	07	04102	WG	C	117078K2	JHD	QRPA	0	0	0	
069E	08	TRACTOR OPR	06	05705	WG	C	117078K3	JHK	QRPA	2	1	0	warehouse field no office
		TRACTOR OPR	06	05705	WG	C	117078K3	JHK	QRPA		1	0	
069E	09	CUST WORK INSP	04	03566	WG	C	117078K2	JDC	QRPA	0	0	0	
069E	10	LABORER	03	03502	WG	C	117078K3	JHK	QRPA	2	1	1	
		LABORER	03	03502	WG	C	117078K3	JHK	QRPA		1	1	
										10	11	7	
		WOXQ06 MECH S											
069F	01	UTIL FMN	10	05301	WS	C	117078K2	JGA	QRPA	1	1	0	warehouse field no office
069F	02	SHEETMTL WKR	10	03806	WG	C	117078K2	JHC	QRPA	1	1	0	
069F	03	PIPEFITTERS	10	04204	WG	C	117078K1	JJG	QRPA	1	1	1	
069F	04	PIPEFITTERS	10	04204	WG	C	117078K2	JJC	QRPA	2	1	1	
069F	05	AIR COND EQ MI	10	05306	WG	C	117078K1	JJB	QRPA	0	0	0	
069F	06	AIR COND EQ MI	10	05306	WG	C	117078J4	JJB	QUTL	0	0	0	
069F	07	BOIL PL EQ ME(	10	05309	WG	C	117078K1	JJD	QRPA	1	1	1	
069F	07	BOIL PL EQ ME(	10	05309	WG	C	117078K1	JJD	QRPA	0	1	1	
069F	08	BOIL PLANT OPI	10	05408	WG	C	117096J3	JJC	QUTL	1	0	0	
069F	09	SWGE DISP P O	09	05408	WG	C	117096J1	JJM	QUTL	1	1	0	warehouse field no office
										8	7	4	
		WOXQ06 ELEC S											
069G	01	ELEC LDR (HV)	10	02810	WL	C	117096K2	JJJ	QRPA	0	0	0	
069G	02	ELECTRICIAN	10	02805	WG	C	117096K2	JJJ	QRPA	2	1	1	
		ELECTRICIAN	10	02805	WG	C	117096K2	JJJ	QRPA		1	1	
069G	03	ELECTRICIAN	10	02805	WG	C	117096K8	JJJ	QRPA	1	0	0	
										3	2	2	
069H	00	NOT USED											
		WOXO6 HSG REF (											
069I	01	HSG PRO MGR	06	01173	GS	C	19100000	JEC	E32H	2	0	0	
										2	0	0	

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	L	MOS	BR	ID	AMS	SWCC	MDEP	AUTH	FUNDED	REALIGN	REMARKS
		WOXQ06 CNTR A											
069J	01	GEN ENGR	11	00801	GS	C	117096K4	JDC	QRPA	1	0	0	
069J	02	CONSTR INSP	07	00809	GS	C	117096K4	JDC	QRPA	1	0	1	
069J	03	JOHN FRATTO	06	04701	WD	C	117096K4	JDC	QRPA	1	1	0	
										3	1	1	
		WOXQ06 DOC											
070	01	SUPV CONTRACT S	09	01102	GS	C	117096W0	GBE	QDOC	1	1	1	
070	02	CONTRACT SP	07	01102	GS	C	117096W0	GBE	QDOC	1	1	~~1~~ 1	
070	03	PURCH AGENT	05	01105	GS	C	117096W0	GBE	QDOC	2	1	1	
		PURCH AENT	05	01105	GS	C	117096W0	GBE	QDOC		1	1	
070	04	PROC CLK (TYP)	04	01106	GS	C	117096W0	GBE	QDOC	1	1	1	
										5	5	~~4~~ 5	
071	00	NOT USED											
		WOXQ06 DOIM											
072	01	INFORMATION MANA	11	00334	GS	C	117096Y0	AMA	MXFC	1	1	1	
072	02	COMPUTER SPECIAL	09	00334	GS	C	117096Y0	AMA	MXFC	1	1	1	
072	03	ADMIN SVCS TECH	05	00303	GS	C	117096Y0	AMA	MKFC	1	0	1	
072	04	MAIL CLERK	03	00305	GS	C	117096P0	AMA	MKFC	0	1	1	
		MAIL CLERK	03	00305	GS	C	117096P0	AMA	MKFC	0	1	0	
										3	4	4	
							KELLY TOTAL			128	113	~~96~~ 81	

JOB TITLE CHANGED TO: FACIL.
JOB TITLE CHANGED TO: DATA '
JOB TITLE CHANGED TO: PLANNI
JOB TITLE CHANGED TO: ENGR '

28 ARCOM (INCL 1VAC ARCOM)
20 Kelly (INCL 2VAC KELLY)
48 TOTAL IN S-63

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950525-4

FROM: BOXER, BARBARA	TO: GENERAL
TITLE: SENATOR (CA)	TITLE:
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		Bzs
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING COPY OF HER PREPARED STATEMENT FOR MAY 25 SAN FRANCISCO REGIONAL HEARING.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950525	Date Originated: 950525	Mail Date:

Please refer to this number when responding 950525-4

Barbara Boxer

Statement of Senator Barbara Boxer
May 25, 1995

Mr. Chairman and members of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to submit testimony for the record of this regional hearing. I regret that due to Senate consideration of the budget resolution, I am unable to attend this hearing in person.

At the March 29 San Francisco regional hearing, I discussed at length the California bases recommended for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense. Since that time, the Commission has added a number of California installations for consideration for closure or realignment.

I am deeply disappointed by the Commission's decision to add additional California bases to the closure list. As I have stated on numerous occasions, California has borne more than its share of base closures. After 22 major base closures and realignment, I must say simply: enough is enough.

In the remainder of my statement, I would like to address the merits of each major base added by the Commission for consideration for closure or realignment.

McClellan Air Force Base

McClellan Air Force Base is a unique national asset that should not only be preserved, but fully utilized. For that reason, I support the Department of Defense's recommendation and urge the Commission not to close McClellan.

The Department's recommendation recognizes the high-technology capabilities and technical centers of excellence that McClellan has developed in recent years. The DoD's recommendation, supported by the analyses of the Joint Cross Service Group and the Air Force, support the contention that McClellan is the pre-eminent high-tech depot within the entire Department.

McClellan is a depot for the future. It has embraced cross-servicing, as evidenced by the high ranking it received from the Joint Cross Services Group. Had cross-servicing analyses been more widely used by the Department, I am confident that it would have directed even more workload to McClellan.

McClellan is also pioneering the way for private industry joint ventures and partnerships with non-DoD customers. McClellan has established joint ventures with the Big Three auto makers to develop cleaner casting processes; with the University of California Medical School at Davis to test and develop better and safer cancer therapy treatments; and with the California Department of Transportation to produce composite wraps to reinforce bridge supports which have prevented washouts during California's recent floods.

Finally, I urge the Commission to consider the cumulative economic impact of base closures on the Sacramento area. In 1988, nearby Mather AFB was closed, resulting in the loss of 3,000 jobs. Three years later, the 1991 BRAC Commission voted to close Sacramento Army Depot, resulting in an additional 3,000 layoffs. Closing McClellan while the Sacramento area is still reeling from earlier base closures would be devastating.

Mr. Chairman, McClellan is more than just another military base. It is a vital component of the Sacramento community. I encourage the Commission to support the recommendation of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense.

Pt. Mugu

I believe strongly that the proposed realignment of Pt. Mugu makes no sense from either a financial or military perspective.

I would remind the Commission that Pt. Mugu ranked second for military value among all Navy Technical centers. The primary cause for Pt. Mugu's high military value score is its expansive Sea Test Range.

It is widely agreed that the Sea Test Range must not be closed. Because it supports the Sea Range, the Pt. Mugu Airfield is also off-limits to further consolidation.

Aside from the Sea Range and Airfield, Pt. Mugu assets can be moved, but I believe that such moves would be prohibitively expensive and would not enhance our national security. For these and other reasons, the Department of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations oppose the realignment of Pt. Mugu.

I would also urge the Commission to base its decision with respect to Pt. Mugu solely on certified BRAC 1995 data, and not rely on outdated 1993 data calls. I am certain that when this data is made available, the desirability of maintaining Pt. Mugu will be clear.

Oakland Army Base

The Oakland Army Base is a crucial west coast port for mobilizing forces for military action in the Pacific theater. It is strategically located near three rail lines and three major highways, which link the base to military installations around the West. Compared to other military ports on the west coast, the Oakland Army Base is positioned closest to the open ocean.

Before making a decision on the final disposition of the Oakland Army Base, I would urge the Commission to carefully consider the ability of commercial ports to assume military sealift responsibilities. Indisputably, closing the Oakland Army Base would require increased reliance on the private sector. It is my view, and the view of the United States Army, that the

mobilization mission of the Oakland Army Base cannot be replicated by commercial ports. Army studies show that relying on commercial ports for mobilization would delay troop and equipment deployment by 16-50 days.

I urge the Commission to uphold the recommendations of the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense by maintaining the Oakland Army Base.

Naval Warfare Assessment Division, Corona

NWAD, Corona is a one of a kind organization. It should be evaluated based upon its unique mission of providing independent assessment of military systems and fleet readiness. NWAD should not be evaluated as a Warfare Center. Relocating its mission to a warfare center raises the possibility of conflict of interest.

In addition to military value, with the proposed closure of the Warfare Assessment Lab at NWAD, the Department of Defense would lose the ability to provide real time assessment of fleet readiness for six to ten years.

When the considerations of retaining an independent organization and the Warfare Assessment Lab are reviewed, the proposed cost savings also become questionable. For these reasons I urge the commission to retain the Naval Warfare Assessment Division, Corona at its present location.

Engineering Field Activity, San Bruno
Naval Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Oakland
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, San Francisco

These facilities, in addition to NWAD Corona, were removed from final consideration for closure by Secretary of the Navy John Dalton because of concern about the magnitude of cumulative BRAC-related job losses in California. It is my view that the decision of the Secretary of the Navy, which was approved by the Secretary of Defense, was the correct one.

Economic impact is a valid criterion for evaluating base closures under the BRAC statute. And California has clearly borne more than its share of base closures. To date, we have suffered 22 major base closures and realignments--far more than any other state.

These closures have affected every region of the state and their impact on local economies has been severe.

When these 22 closures are completed, California will have lost more than 200,000 jobs and $7 billion in economic activity. As the Commission considers additional base closures, it is essential to recognize that many of these closures, particularly those from the 1993 round, are still ongoing. Tens of thousands of Californians can anticipate receiving layoff notices from

closing bases in the coming months. As these workers lose their jobs, California's emerging economic recovery will slow.

In addition to base closures, California has been hit very hard by natural disasters including earthquakes, fires, floods, and mudslides. The defense and aerospace industry slowdown has also caused tremendous job losses.

California's economy is in a precarious position. Additional job losses from new base closures may be too much for us to bear.

I thank the Commission for its time and consideration.

Document Separator

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: 25 May 1995

TO: Mr. John Nerger

FAX #: 693-9322

FROM: Ed Brown, Army Team Leader

NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover): 4

COMMENTS: Please forward us a copy of the Secretary's response.

IF YOU HAVE TROUBLE RECEIVING THIS FAX
PLEASE CALL 703-696-0504.

Department of Community Development

County of Lassen

• PLANNING • BUILDING INSPECTION • ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT/HOUSING • LAFCO • CODE ENFORCEMENT • MINING

ROBERT K. SORVAAG, *Director*
JOSEPH J. BERTOTTI, *Assistant Director*
JIM KIRBY, *Building Official*
707 Nevada Street
Susanville, CA 96130

☎ (916) 251-8269
Fax: (916) 251-8373

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Inspection Requests
☎ (916) 257-LAND

TRANSMITTAL FORM

DATE: May 25, 1995

FAX#: 703 696-0550

# of pages including cover sheet: 3 *

TO: Defense Base Closure and Realignment Comm.
Attention: Ed Brown, Army Analysis Team

METHOD OF TRANSMITTAL:
___ Hand Carry/Courier
___ Regular Mail
___ Federal Express
___ Express Mail
X Faxed
___ United Parcel Service

Other _____

FROM: Jack Lansing, Committee to Retain Sierra Army Depot/Robert Sorvaag

SUB: Integrated Ammunition Stockpile Management Plan

*PLEASE CALL OUR OFFICE A.S.A.P., IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL INFORMATION INCLUDED IN THIS TRANSMITTAL.

MATERIAL TRANSMITTED:

Letter to Togo West, Jr. dated 5/24/95

REMARKS:

Hard copy to follow

___ Per Your Request ___ For Your Review

___ For Your Information ___ Reply Requested No. of Copies Transmitted: ___

trnsmt92

(4/92)

Lassen County Chamber of Commerce
P.O. Box 338 • 84 N. Lassen Street • Susanville, CA 96130 • (916) 257-4323

May 24, 1995

The Honorable Togo D. West, Jr.
Secretary of the Army
The Pentagon, Room 3E718
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Secretary West:

In Brigadier General William R. Holmes' March 3 response to questions submitted by Senators Boxer and Feinstein, along with Congressman Herger, he wrote:

> "The Integrated Ammunition Stockpile Management Plan is not a static plan. Changes in doctrine, threat, requirements, and international conditions may influence the feasibility of fully implementing the plan as originally written. As changes occur, the Plan will be reevaluated and updated as required."

If the plan is "a work in progress," how can the results of its subordinate analysis, the Tier Study, be inserted into a process that drives such clear finality as BRAC? The recommendations made concerning the ammunition storage installations do not seem to support an ability to reevaluate and update the implementation of the original plan. If, indeed, it's the Army's desire to have the flexibility Gen. Holmes refers to, there is no surer way of denying it than through the BRAC process. As you know, BRAC actions, once approved and passed into law, can't be altered without additional legislation. Therefore, regardless of changes which would have resulted in a decision to modify the original implementation, the Army will be statutorily prohibited from acting upon them. Would you please explain how your recommendation supports the stated goal of having a plan that can respond to the myriad uncertainties of the future?

I would appreciate your most timely response to this inquiry. My Congressional Delegation's opportunities to address the BRAC Commission are marching smartly toward me and I don't believe I have a satisfactory appreciation of how your recommendations support the flexibility ascribed to the plan for ammunition storage. A reply by June 1 is essential so I

and my Delegation can review the information and provide timely comments to the BRAC Commission. I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Jack Lensing

Jack Lensing, Chairman
Committee to Retain Sierra Army Depot

JLines

cc: The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
The Honorable Barbara Boxer
The Honorable Wally Herger
BRAC Commission (Attn: Army Analysis Team)

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950525-17

FROM: TOCCI, RONALD	TO: DIXON
TITLE: ASSEMBLYMAN	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: STATE OF NEW YORK	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: NEW YORK BASES	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR NEW YORK BASES FROM STATE VETERANS' AFFAIRS COMM.

Due Date: 950529	Routing Date: 950525	Date Originated: 950516	Mail Date:

RONALD TOCCI
85th Assembly District

THE ASSEMBLY
STATE OF NEW YORK
ALBANY

CHAIRMAN
Veterans Affairs

CHAIRMAN
Sub-Committee on Harbor and Coastal Zones

COMMITTEES
Education
Environmental Conservation
Labor
Racing and Wagering
Ways and Means

SUBCOMMITTEES
Air Quality and Nuclear Issues
Hazardous Waste Transportation
Transportation Safety

16 May 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1725 North Moore Street-Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number when responding 950525-17

Dear Chairman Dixon,

As you prepare to make final recommendations on which military bases will be closed or realigned we, the undersigned members of the New York State Assembly Veterans' Affairs Committee, hope you take into consideration the impact of your determination on the State of New York.

The following bases in New York State will be affected by the decision made by the panel: close: Fort Totten; NRC Staten Island; Rome Laboratories; Roslyn AGS; Seneca Army Depot; Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station; realign: Ft. Hamilton Reserve Center; redirect: Griffis Air Guard and disestablish: REDCAP Activity, Buffalo.

If the list is approved as it now stands, including the additions of May 10th, New York State will be left with only one major military base, Ft. Drum. Fort Drum, an Army base located in northern New York, employs 13,000 military and civilian personnel, with an annual economic impact of more than $400 million.

No region of the state, nor type of base, or branch of service has been spared since the downward trend during the last number of years. From 1969 to 1983 New York State lost 36 military installations along with 50,000 jobs. Adding this to the recent recommendations, any base closing or realignment in New York will have a profound effect on the State.

Currently, New York is trying to respond to the base closing recommendations of just two years ago and the continued downsizing of our nation's military. It has been suggested that 61,000 Armed Forces personnel will be making New York State their home upon leaving the military. Part of the State's responsibility, along with the military, is to help prepare them, to make the transition to civilian life. The recommended base closing will have a devastating effect on New York State's ability to continue to help in this transition.

Changes in the world order prompt the reexamination of our

☐ Room 841, Legislative Office Building, Albany, New York 12248, (518) 455-4897, FAX (518) 455-4861
☐ 77 Quaker Ridge Road, New Rochelle, New York 10804, (914) 235-7900, FAX (914) 654-9785

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military mission and, to be sure, we must in turn reexamine the role of our domestic military operations. However, just as surely, a State's past role must be taken into account when decisions affecting its future are being examined.

We appreciate your consideration of our view in this important matter.

Sincerely,

Document Separator

Please refer to this number
when responding _____

May 22, 1995

SUBJECT: Response to Congress Fazio's Query on Sacramento (BRAC 91) Econ

1. The MSA used is the "Sacramento MSA", same used for BRAC 91 & 95

2. BRAC 91 Employment 697,901 - derived from the 1989 BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics)
   BRAC 95 Employment 763,605 - adjusted 1993 BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics)

3. The indirect job multiplier used - 2.0 (Depots where employment is predominantly civilian)

Joseph Vallone / 46513
TABS

Dave to Joe
5/19 MA

VIC FAZIO
THIRD DISTRICT
CALIFORNIA

DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS—CHAIRMAN
DEMOCRATIC STEERING COMMITTEE
HOUSE OVERSIGHT
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE
ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT
LEGISLATIVE

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515–0503

PLEASE RESPOND TO:
2113 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-0503
(202) 225-5716

7228 MAIN STREET
WOODLAND, CA 95695-2627
(916) 666-6527

332 PINE STREET
REDBLUFF, CA 96080-4514
(916) 529-5544

May 18, 1995

Colonel Tom Reid
Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330

Dear Colonel Reid:

I would appreciate your immediate assistance in fulfilling the following request:

1. the numbers used by the Army to estimate direct and indirect job losses at Sacramento Army Depot;

2. and, the multiplier used to estimate indirect job losses at the Sacramento Army Depot.

Due to time sensitivity, I would appreciate a response to this request by the end of today if possible. If you have any questions, please contact my legislative director, Janice Morris, at 202/225-5716.

Sincerely,

Vic Fazio

VIC FAZIO
Member of Congress

VF/jm

FAX TRANSMITTAL FROM

CONGRESSMAN VIC FAZIO

CONFIDENTIAL PRIVILEGED

TO: Col. Tom Reid

FAX #: 703/693-7550

FROM: JANICE MORRIS

DATE: 5/18/95 Pages to Follow: 7

If there is difficulty with this transmission, please call: 202-225-5716

NOTE: URGENT.

TIME SENSITIVE.

****

This facsimile contains confidential, privileged information intended only for the person(s) to whom it is addressed. Do not read, copy or disseminate this information unless you are the addressee (or the person responsible for delivering it). If you have received this document in error, please call us immediately at (202) 225-5716, and return the original to Congressman Vic Fazio, 2113 Rayburn HOB, Washington, D.C. 20515, via mail. Thank you.

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950523-11

FROM: BROWN, ED	TO: JONES, MICHAEL
TITLE: ARMY TEAM LEADER	TITLE: DIRECTOR
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: ARMY BASING STUDY
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: FORT BELVOIR	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		bz3
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING COBRA RUN PERFORMED FOR PROPOSED MOVE OF THE EXECUTIVE SYSTEMS SOFTWARE DIRECTORATE TO FORT BELVOIR.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950523	Date Originated: 950523	Mail Date: 950523

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

May 23, 1995

Colonel Michael G. Jones
Director, The Army Basing Study
200 Army Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200

Please refer to this number when responding 950523-11

Dear Colonel Jones:

The Information Systems Command has requested authority to move the Executive Systems Software Directorate (ESSD) to Fort Belvoir, VA. ESSD consists of 17 military, 71 civilians and 10 contractor personnel. If this request is approved, could you please provide a revised COBRA for the Information Systems Software Command recommendation by June 2, 1995. In addition, please tell us if the contractors are being provided office space at Fort Belvoir, and identify the costs, if any, of relocating these personnel.

If you need any clarification, please contact Mike Kennedy, the Army Team Analyst.

I appreciate your assistance and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Edward A. Brown III
Army Team Leader

EB/mk

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 95C519-5

FROM: BUMPERS, DALE	TO: DIXON
TITLE: SENATOR (AK)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

CONCERNED THE PENTAGON'S RECOMMENDATIONS COULD CRIPPLE THE ABILITY OF OUR RESEARCH COMMUNITY, PARTICULARLY NAVY LABS (WHAT?)

Due Date: 95 5 23	Routing Date: 95 5 19	Date Originated: 95 5 19	Mail Date:

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 19, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We are writing to express our concern that the Pentagon's BRAC 95 recommendations could cripple the ability of our Reserve Components, particularly the National Guard, to perform their military missions.

Specifically, we believe the Army's evaluation of the military value of maneuver training areas was deeply flawed because it did not adequately reflect the training and readiness needs of the Guard and Reserves. Indeed, we believe some of the Army's recommendations make a mockery of the "Total Army" concept.

Several Adjutant Generals have informed us that the National Guard Bureau (NGB) did not concur with the Army's criteria for evaluating the military value of maneuver training areas because those criteria ignored National Guard Title XI training requirements. The Director of the Army National Guard told a Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearing that he is concerned that the "enclaves" the Army plans to leave at five major maneuver areas recommended for closure or realignment -- Fort Chaffee, Fort Hunter Liggett, Fort Pickett, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Fort McClellan -- are inadequate to meet the Guard's minimum training needs.

The problem is that the Reserve Components and the Army Staff have very different definitions of an enclave. The National Guard needs enclaves large enough for artillery firing and for battalion and brigade annual training. The Army Reserve Command needs enclaves large enough for land navigation courses, and in some cases large enough to station elements of FORSCOM's Regional Training Brigades. The Army Staff, however, reportedly is planning for enclaves that comprise no more than a few buildings and small arms ranges, and which have no active duty personnel.

According to the Adjutant Generals, the Army's BRAC recommendations do not recognize the need to conduct Individual Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT) at bases near the units they serve. They say the Army's plan to conduct such

training at "other installations in the region" is not practical. Most alternate training sites are hundreds of miles away, and the extra travel time would waste as much as four days of each 14-day AT period. Moreover, suitable alternate training sites are generally fully occupied by active duty units, and it is doubtful the Reserve Components will be able to get the training areas they need.

We also believe that the Army has greatly overstated the savings from closing or realigning the five bases, because the Army's COBRA model did not recognize Reserve Component training needs. The Directors of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard told the Defense Subcommittee that the savings from closing the facilities would be offset by the increased costs the National Guard will have to pay to send units longer distances for fewer days of annual training.

We understand the Reserve Components have so far failed to obtain a satisfactory commitment from the Army on the definition of an enclave. We fear that the wording of the Pentagon's recommendations may be legally interpreted to preclude implementing a resolution satisfactory to the Reserve Components. For example, some Army lawyers contend that the Pentagon's BRAC recommendations prohibit stationing of active duty personnel or conducting annual training at Reserve Component enclaves.

As you know, the Chiefs of the Reserve Components cannot volunteer to the Base Closure Commission their views on the impact that the Army recommendations will have on their forces. That is why we urge you and the Commission to thoroughly examine the Army's decision-making process in regard to this issue. Please examine the adequacy of the Army's cost analysis and whether its recommendations properly reflect the training requirements of the Reserve Components.

We hope you and your staff will ensure that the Commission's final recommendations adequately support the readiness and training needs of all our military forces.

Sincerely,

Wendell H. Ford

Christopher S. Bond

Dale Bumpers

David Pryor

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950518-19

FROM: BROWN, ED	TO: JONES, MICHAEL
TITLE: ARMY TEAM LEADER	TITLE: DIRECTOR
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: ARMY BASING STUDY
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		~~bg~~
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions		FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING FAMILY HOUSING INFO ON · DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, · FORT BUCHANAN, FORT HAMILTON, FORT RITCHIE, FORT TOTTEN; CHARLES PRICE SUPPORT CENTER AND ARMY GARRISON SELFRIDGE.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950518	Date Originated: 950518	Mail Date: 950518

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
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REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

May 18, 1995

Colonel Michael G. Jones
Director, The Army Basing Study
200 Army Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200

Please refer to this number when responding 95051 3 - 19

Dear Colonel Jones:

Commission review shows seven installations with recommendations having a significant impact on family housing. These are: Dugway Proving Ground, Fort Buchanan, Fort Hamilton, Fort Ritchie, Fort Totten, Charles Price Support Center, and Army Garrison Selfridge. Request the following information, plus any additional information that you think will assist us, for each of the seven installations:

- Housing occupancy rate
- Housing turnover rate
- Deferred Maintenance
- Breakout of population in housing by grade and service
- Other costs associated with housing

In addition, request that you provide Army policy on stateside cost of-living allowances and its applicability to each of these areas.

Request that you provide the Commission with a copy of the latest Facilities Engineering and Housing Annual Summary of Operations.

Please provide your response no later than 30 May 1995. Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Edward A. Brown III
Army Team Leader

EAB/rmm

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950517-15

FROM: SHANE, JAMES	TO: DIXON
TITLE: DIRECTOR OF MANAGEMENT	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: DEPT OF ARMY	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		bs
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING LETTER EXPLAINING ARMY'S POLICY REGARDING FAMILY HOUSING.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950517	Date Originated: 950510	Mail Date:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
200 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

May 10, 1995

Please refer to this number
when responding 9505217-15

The Honorable Allen J. Dixon
Chairman Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

At a recent GAO hearing, the Commission expressed an interest in the Army's family housing policy as it relates to our recommendations which dispose of family housing. Army housing is a crucial quality of life issue that has direct impact on personnel readiness and retention. However, we do not believe that the Army should retain all current family housing. Rather, a more innovative approach is required, one which recognizes the reality of inadequate funding, cultural and demographic changes, and the availability/suitability of existing housing. To that end, the Army has established a three-pronged strategy to meet the requirements of the 21st century.

(a) Plus-up funding. Acquiring additional appropriated funds will help solve some of housing program's problems. However, we do not expect the amount of money needed to be available.

(b) Divest/Demolish. Disposing of units that are excess or uneconomically repairable is an important part of our strategy. We intend to focus on areas where market surveys indicate that affordable housing is widely available. Approximately 5,000 units are scheduled for disposal over the next five years.

(c) Transition to business operation/privatization. The Business Occupancy Program (BOP) has been implemented at 4 prototype installations and will be expanded Army-wide by 1 Oct 95. Under the BOP, funds are allocated at a rate equivalent to the BAQ/VHA of housing occupants. This funding stream will necessitate a transition to a more business-like approach to operating and maintaining housing. In addition, a DoD Housing Tiger Team is drafting legislation that will allow the Government to leverage funds by partnering with the private sector to acquire and revitalize housing.

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Each of the Army's BRAC recommendations were difficult to make. Those involving quality of life issues were even more so. Our recommendations to the Commission support the Army's policy on housing and best serve the total Army Family.

TABS point of contact for this action is Mr. Joseph Vallone, (703) 614-6513.

Very Respectfully

JAMES E. SHANE, JR.
Brigadier General, GS
Director of Management

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950509-16

FROM: CHAPMAN, Jim	TO: MILLER, BOB
TITLE: REP. (TX)	TITLE: ARMY BOD ANALYST
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: BARSTOW · MARINE CORPS LOGISTIC · BASE	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
				BOB MILLER		X	
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING PROPOSAL THAT DISCUSSES REALIGNING THE BARSTOW MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS · BASE.

ARMY TEAM

Due Date: 950511	Routing Date: 950509	Date Originated: 950505	Mail Date:

JIM CHAPMAN
FIRST DISTRICT
TEXAS

2417 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515–4301
TELEPHONE: (202) 225–3035

COMMITTEE:
APPROPRIATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEES:
ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT
VA, HUD, AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515–4301

May 5, 1995

Lt. Col. Bob Miller, Analyst
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Lt. Col. Miller:

Please find attached several charts that discuss realigning the Barstow Marine Corps Logistics Base as an alternative to the Defense Department's closure recommendations. If you judge that this proposal makes sense, I would suggest that its inclusion in the options available to the Commission may assist the Commission to maintain greater flexibility at this juncture of the BRAC process.

This proposal has the significant advantage of being based on a sound logical foundation: If the Army is going to close all but one vehicle maintenance depot to support 10 divisions, how can the Marine Corps justify keeping two depots to support three divisions? The proposal has the added advantage of reducing excess capacity and duplication while achieving interservicing. Finally, this proposal would spread the BRAC impact more evenly across each of the services than does the Defense Department's recommendation.

I appreciate the difficulty of the task before the Commission and the critical role played by the Commission staff. I hope that this proposal is helpful. With warm regards, I am

Sincerely,

Jim

Jim Chapman
Member of Congress

Enclosure

THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE OF RECYCLED FIBERS

A Proposal
To Add For Realignment

Marine Corps Logistics Base - Barstow



27 Apr 95

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

Rightsizing?

Depot Vehicle Maintenance

Army



Depot Closures

- BRAC 91 - None
- BRAC 93 - Tooele
- BRAC 95 - Letterkenny?
  Red River?

Marine Corps



Depot Closures

- BRAC 91 - None
- BRAC 93 - None
- BRAC 95 - None



Duplicate Capabilities Exists at Both Marine Corps Depots

"The Marine Corps will endeavor to single-site workloads when it makes sense to do so. *The Marine Corps maintenance philosophy of multi-commodity support on both coasts to support east and west coast Marine Corps units places restrictions on wholesale single siting of workloads."**

*Source: Defense Depot Maintenance Council, Business Plan FY95-99, 30 Jan 95



BRAC 95

Impact on Depot Capacity

DOD Plan

	FY99 Workload	Capacity Index	Utilization Index
Red River	1.493	3.233	46%
Anniston	1.763	3.200	55%
Letterkenny	1.961	2.485	79%
	5.217	8.918	58%
Less Letterkenny	5.217	6.433	81%
Letterkenny & Red River	5.217	3.200	163%

*Data Source is Defense Depot Maint Council Business Plan, FY95-99



BRAC 95

Impact on Depot Capacity

Barstow Realignment Option

	FY99 Workload	Capacity Index	Utilization Index
Red River	1.493	3.233	46%
Anniston	1.763	3.200	55%
Letterkenny	1.961	2.485	79%
Barstow	1.308	1.037	126%
	6.525	9.955	66%
Less Letterkenny	6.525	7.470	87%
Letterkenny & Barstow	6.525	6.433	101%

*Data Source is Defense Depot Maint Council Business Plan, FY95-99

P.07



Advantages

- Reduces excess capacity
- Reduces duplication
- Achieves interservicing
- Provides a more equitable interservice BRAC closure burden
- Preserves Marine Corps & Army readiness

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

Barstow Workload Realignment

	Red River	Anniston	Remarks
Combat Vehicles			
M1		X	Interserviced to Anniston
MLRS	X		Marine Corps Capability Required
Light Armored Vehicles	X		
Tactical Vehicles	X		
Construction Equipment	X		
Missiles			
Hawk Ground Support Equipment			Transfer back to Barstow from Letterkenny



Recommendation to Commission

- "Add" Marine Corps Logistics Base - Barstow for realignment consideration

- Request DOD evaluate realignment of Barstow

  Transfer workload to Red River and Anniston in lieu of closing Red River

  Realign Hawk Ground Support Equipment from Letterkenny to Barstow

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950509-6

FROM: HATHENBRUCK, JEANNIE	TO: BORDEN, BEN
TITLE: CHIEF, LOG. OPER. ARMAMENT DIV	TITLE: DIRECTOR OF R+A
ORGANIZATION: HILL AFB, UT	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: HILL AFB	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			for
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

PROVIDING COMMENTS ON HILL'S ABILITY TO ACCEPT THE TACTICAL MISSILE WORKLOAD CONSOLIDATION FOR DOD.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950509	Date Originated: 950508	Mail Date:

OO-ALC/LIW
ARMAMENT DIVISION
6033 ELM LANE
HILL AFB UT 84056-5819
DSN: 777-2099
COMM: (801) 777-5432

Please refer to this number when responding 950509-6

TO: Glen Kroeffle / Ben Borden
SUBJ: Response Army BCAC
PHONE:
FROM: OO-ALC/LIW

_____ # PAGES (INCLUDING COVER)

MESSAGE:

We review the evaluation Hill Air Force's Base ability to accept the Tactical Missile Workload Consolidation for DoD and have provided our comments. If you have any questions please call me.

Jeannie Hathenbruck

FAX NUMBER
DSN: 458-2099
COMM: (801) 777-2099

THOMAS L. SHIVELY, Colonel, USAF
Chief, Armament Division
Commodities Directorate

JEANNIE HATHENBRUCK
Chief, Logistics Operations
Armament Division

POINT PAPER
ON
ARMY BRAC 93 RE-DIRECT PROPOSAL
TACTICAL MISSILE CONSOLIDATION
FOR BRAC COMMISSION
May 8, 1995

- The BRAC Commission on Apr. 26, 1995, directed the Army to analyze consolidation of all the DoD tactical missile workload at Hill AFB.

  - Representatives from the Army and OSD with Air Force personnel conducted a quick site survey of Hill AFB and reviewed the tactical missile workload requirements.

  - The total FY 1999 workload required to transfer to Hill AFB was determined to be 1.272 M direct labor hours (DLH) plus 121K DLH (at Hill AFB) for a total of 1.393 DLH. The 1.393M DLH includes the original 677K DLH identified during the BRAC 93 decision plus 658K DLH attributed to Patriot and Hawk at Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD), and 58K DLH for Patriot and Hawk all up round (AUR) at Red River Army Depot (RRAD). The only DLH not included are those required for the AUR currently performed at LEAD, which were not provided to the Air Force. However, all costs associated with transferring the workload (e.g., facilities, equipment, etc.) were included in the Air Force proposal.

- The Air Force provided the Army Base Study Office a written cost estimate to move the identified DoD tactical missile workload to Hill AFB. The Army Base Study Office assessed the Air Force and Army data submitted, and made cost-adjustments (increases) to the Air Force proposal. The Air Force did not have an opportunity to review these increased costs prior to the Army Base Study Office incorporating them into the COBRA analysis.

- After completing the COBRA analysis, the Army provided the Air Force with the methodology used in determining the cost increases to the Air Force proposal. The Air Force has reviewed the Army's cost increases and provides the following comments:

  - **PERSONNEL**: The Army was directed by the BRAC Commission to use the DoD BRAC recommendation submitted Feb. 28, 1995. The BRAC Commission Staff provided the Army with the Hill AFB personnel increase of 237 (personnel authorizations), associated with the DoD BRAC recommendation. However, not included in the model, were the more than 1500 personnel losses (faces) from Hill AFB between FY 1996 and FY 2001 directed by the Dorn memo. This does not include the 600 personnel (faces) scheduled for RIF during September 1995. The losses will include personnel with related skills used in the full range of tasks for the repair of DoD tactical missiles and could be realigned with minimal training. Utilizing these personnel reductions avoids the need to hire direct labor or PCS personnel (faces). There will be no personnel hiring costs at Hill AFB for transferring this workload, therefore, the COBRA personnel transferring costs should be eliminated.

  - **MILCON:**

    - **ATACM's ALL-UP ROUND MAINTENANCE FACILITY (BLDG. 2214)**
      Based on information provided by the facilities engineer in the ATACM program office, Hill AFB has the depot level facilities available to support a consolidation of the ATACM's missile workload without incurring any substantial construction costs. Building 2214, the building selected for the ATACM's Full-Up Round Maintenance Facility, has been certified and approved in accordance with DoD Explosive Standards to handle 9,800 pounds of Class 1, Division 1.1 explosives. In addition to having the adequate explosive handling rating, Building 2214 meets the

floor space requirements for ATACM missile operations. Building 2214 is not scheduled for demolition. Hill AFB is prepared to expand Building 2214 based on the ATACM missile system workload in order to establish an efficient missile maintenance operation. Such changes will include: 1) Incorporating an orientation pad and test stand for the final guidance control alignment calibration for the ATACM, 2) Continue and complete the work already started on hardening the natural gas metering station located adjacent to Bldg. 2214 (current work on this issue was prompted by other facility requirements affected by the metering station, not due to Bldg. 2214 operations), 3) Adding additional security lighting to the building (even though it is in a secured, controlled access area with military police sentry's monitoring activities; the same area where the Minuteman and Peacekeepers are stored), 4) Upgrading the environmental control conditioning to the building, 5) Providing enclosed sheltering for the loading platforms, protecting personnel and munitions from inclement weather, and 6) Adding radio frequency (RF) protection around the building. Most of these modifications will be handled within Hill AFB's Civil Engineering Squadron with minimal outlay in funding. Overall the Air Force proposes renovation costs of $495K for Building 2214. This includes $295K for facility modifications and $200K for support equipment. This changes our original estimate of $287K. The structural integrity and wall construction of the building can be accounted for by the Class 1, Division 1.1 rating approved for the building. In addition, ceiling height is adequate for safe movement of the 14'x3.5'x3' missile container. The missile itself, 13' in length and 2' in diameter, easily fits into and can be handle within the existing bays of building 2214. Furthermore, the entrance and exit utility doors are 8'x10'. This allows the current sideloading munitions forklift to pick-up and position the missile, in it's container, within Building 2214. Finally, Building 2214 is fully capable of accepting the ATACM missile maintenance workload without the extensive renovation costs called out by the LEAD personnel.

••• **PATRIOT RADAR TEST SITE**: The $510K estimate for the radar test site construction was based on what we believed were similar operations. Due to short time frames, Hill AFB was unable to obtain accurate costs for equipment and construction of a radar test site. We will accept the $2M costs, but feel that with adequate time to prepare, these costs could be brought down.

••• **MISSILE STORAGE**: LEAD identified a requirement for 1M ft^2 of tactical missile explosive storage to be collocated with the maintenance facility. The Air Force requires a total of 314,975 ft^2 for AUR and explosive component storage if stacked one item high. This includes AUR, rocket motor, explosive components, and guidance and control sections. However, according to system specification, the Air Force missiles can be stored from 5 to 11 high. Using an average of three high, the Air Force storage requirements are reduced to 104,955 ft^2. Fifty percent of that requirement is for storage of the Maverick and was not considered for AUR consolidation. Deducting the Air Force requirement from the 1M ft^2 identified by LEAD leaves approximately 900K ft^2 required for Army and Marine Corps missiles. Discussions with the Navy indicate they plan to continue use of their East and West Coast repair and storage facilities and not consolidated at LEAD. Based on our analysis of Air Force requirements and Navy stated intentions, 1M ft^2 appears to be excessive.

Review of the storage requirement of 1M ft^2 of space, as called for in the BRAC Commission Analyst Notes, found that Hill has over 187K ft^2 of missiles storage space available. This 187K ft^2 was obtained by vacating 62.2K ft^2 utilized for the storage of strategic missile and 125K ft^2 used to store tactical missiles and other conventional munitions items. Available space is 87K ft^2 greater than previously reported and resulted from a more in-depth study of existing storage requirements. Costs associated are described in the Munitions Storage MILCON paragraph following.

The Air Force explosive storage regulations do not require class 1.4 explosive items be stored in igloos. Our normal procedures are to license a warehouse facility and use it to store these type of

items. An additional 50K ft^2 of 1.4 storage is available immediately to store GCS, freeing up additional 1.1 class for AUR storage.

The proposed consolidation is to consider complete collocation of the required storage at the depot maintenance location. This criteria is not consistent with present DoD procedures and is not necessary for successful, economic depot performance. Historically, Maverick Missiles have been stored at Tooele and Red River Army Depots and all up round repairs performed at Hill AFB within the GCS depot. Approximately 75% - 90% of Air Force missiles are stored at operational locations. Even more important, it is unwise both strategically and logistically to store all missiles in one location as described below. The services' System Program Managers have not been consulted about the tactical missile consolidated storage at one location.

During Desert Storm and more recently Somalia and Bosnia, we found because of collateral damage reasons, precision guided munitions were then and are now the weapon of choice. Precision guided munitions must be strategically located for outload purposes whether by air, rail or surface. Therefore, in future conflicts, it would be logistically impossible to outload all service requirements from one location. Also, from a strategic standpoint, the impacts of locating all of DoD's most expensive weapons in one location could be disastrous.

Because of this, DoD has developed a stockpile optimization plan placing critical assets in three Tier I Army storage depots, in the east (Anniston AD), west (Tooele AD) and midwest (McCallister AD). This provides optimum outload to meet critical scenarios. At this point in time, assets have not yet been moved (not yet funded) to any of the Tier I Depots, negating any relocation costs. We verified with the Army representative author of the Army Tiering concept that LEAD is a Tier II depot.

It is the Air Force's opinion that additional storage over and above that required to meet immediate repair needs, is not necessary. Tactical missiles should be stored at the three Tier I depots.

•••• **MISSILE STORAGE MILCON**: Review of the storage requirement of 1M ft^2 of space, as called for in the BRAC Commission Analyst Notes, found that Hill AFB has over 187K ft^2 of missiles storage space available. This 187K ft^2 was obtained by vacating 62.2K ft^2 utilized for the storage of strategic missiles and 125K ft^2 used to store tactical missiles and other conventional munitions items. Available space is 87K ft^2 greater than previously reported and resulted from a more in-depth study of existing storage requirements. There is an estimated cost of $300K to obtain this space. Strategic missile storage has been programmed for closing and no costs are associated with obtaining this space. The munitions storage space will be realized through demilitarization, attrition due to normal issue, and the movement of material from 30K ft^2 of storage.

With the availability of 187K ft^2 of space at Hill AFB, an additional area of 813K ft^2 is required to meet the estimated 1M ft^2 identified by LEAD. Hill AFB believes the 1M ft^2 to be excessive for several reasons previously explained, 1) strategic requirements to not locate all depot assets at one location, 2) logistical requirements for shipping during a Desert Shield/Storm scenario, and 3) vertical storage of assets in new type igloos. However, to abide by the direction received, Hill is providing cost for the stipulated large storage area.

Acreage for additional storage is available at Tooele AD or UTTR (Oasis), or a combination of these two sites. Construction costs would be $106M (813K ft^2 * $131/ ft^2). Construction of larger facilities of a more modern design, such as those being constructed at Hill AFB, could be expected to save 40% of this construction costs ($66M). This would occur due to better utilization of space with vertical walled units allowing better vertical storage.

The need for construction of an additional 460 igloos at Hawthorne, NV, or McCallister Army Ammunition Plant, OK, for storage of conventional munitions currently stored at LEAD, should not be a factor in the tactical missile workload consolidation study. This requirement is totally independent of and not associated with the 1M ft^2 of space stated as being required for tactical missile storage, and as a result Hill AFB has only calculated cost of obtaining 1M ft^2 of space.

In summary, Hill AFB's position is that the MILCON for tactical missiles storage would be $66M or less, and when the storage requirements are fully identified and analyzed, the existing 187K ft^2 available at Hill AFB plus the designated Tier I storage at Anniston, Tooele, and McCallister, would be fully adequate for all storage requirements. This is especially true from a strategic and logistic point of view. It would not be wise to store all assets at one location, as any disaster could cripple the U.S. posture. In addition, shipment of assets from one location during a Desert Shield/Storm scenario would be a logistics nightmare.

- **TIME FRAME**: In accordance with DoD and Air Force implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act, an Environmental Assessment (EA) will be completed. Only when the EA results in a finding of significant impact is an environmental impact survey (EIS) required. The workloads recommended for transfer during the first years of the plan include no known new processes, chemicals, waste streams, etc., that would impact our present environmental licensing at Hill AFB. The major systems, Patriot and Hawk, do not transfer until FY 1998-1999 providing more than enough time to complete and respond to any new environmental issues. Therefore, an EA is expected to demonstrate that no significant impact will be found, and an EIS will not be required.

- **TRAINING**. LEAD estimated training on all 21 systems to be $28.3M, of which $22M was slated for Hawk and Patriot systems, equating to 78% of the total training budget. We believe the $22M training budget for Hawk and Patriot to be excessive.

  The Dorn memo continues to drive downsizing at Hill AFB. This action will require the release of direct labor personnel, during the workload transfer schedule, with the skills to support the full scope of DoD tactical missile workload. The Air Force still believes that $17.4M is excessive for all training because of the resident skills base at Hill AFB, but will accept the $17.4M based on data from LEAD.

- **INVENTORY TRANSFER**: The inventory transfer cost is considered a "wash" for inventory not presently at LEAD. The inventory will either be shipped to Hill AFB or LEAD depending on the decision of the BRAC. The increased inventory documented in this paragraph, from the estimated $50K to the reported $3.1M, appears significant. However, our inventory cost estimates are based on the belief that the Army depots practice good supply discipline and only retain the material required to support the current year requirements. This, coupled with the projected transfer date of the first quarter of FY 1999, provides ample time to reduce the inventory to a minimum before the transfer begins. We would further expect the Army to only order mandatory material requirements for up to six months prior to workload transfer with other parts being held in the item manager's account or forwarded to the new depot. This practice will further reduce the inventory to the point we believe the cost to transfer will be more in-line with our projected $50K for Patriot and a $1.8M total.

- **OTHER COSTS:**

  - **EQUIPMENT TRANSFER**: The equipment transfer cost of $7.3M, for the Hawk and Patriot weapon systems appears to be high. The equipment transfer costs for all of the tactical missiles to LEAD is estimated to be $5M. This includes the Maverick Missile System which has more test stations and test sets than the 24 test sets currently used on the Patriot System. We believe a more conservative $2.5M should meet the equipment transfer cost for both Hawk and Patriot.

- SUNK COSTS: Sunk costs are a reality of downsizing throughout DoD. LEAD has identified $25M already spent consolidating tactical missiles. Sunk costs will be associated with any scenario, i.e., the closure of LEAD will result in a loss of funds spent implementing the 93 BRAC recommendation, or failure to obtain optimum utilization of the Hill AFB infrastructure by adding workload will require closure, disposal, or transfer of in-place facilities—a loss to DoD. This is a significant impact to the $1B infrastructure in place at Hill AFB.

- RECURRING COSTS: Even though labor costs are not included in the COBRA model, long term savings based on labor rates should be evaluated. The difficulty in comparing rates between services is due to the differences in the accounting systems, i.e., material, overhead, G&A, etc. However, consistently, Hill AFB labor rates are less than LEAD, ANAD and TOAD. The Depot Maintenance operation Indicator Report identifies Hill AFB average labor rate of $69.27 compared to the LEAD rate of $101.36. The Cost Comparability Handbook (Aug 93) identifies Hill AFB labor rate as $49.38, LEAD as $65.33, and TOAD as $58.31. A comparison using the Cost Comparison Handbook labor rates between Hill AFB and LEAD shows considerable annual savings can be achieved for GCS, launcher, and vehicle repair.

- COSTS NOT INCLUDED:

  - OTHER MILCON: Hill AFB sees the tactical missile consolidation as a civilian workload. However, the Hill AFB infrastructure is in-place to support a large contingent of military personnel. The facilities remain while the assigned contingent has decreased over the past several years. Our military personnel and their family members are provided both on-base and off-base support, including, social activities, child care, Base Exchange, hospital, theater, banking, school, housing, Commissary, Hobby shops, educational opportunities, etc. Our downsizing efforts will result in mothballing approximately 300K ft^2 of administrative area. Other MILCON concerns identified in this section should not be considered.

  - ICS: Based on the decision of the Joint Cross Service Group for Depot Maintenance (JSCG/DM), interim contractor support (ICS) is the responsibility of the owning service and will not be considered in costs to relocate workload. Like the estimated $84.5M attributed to Patriot and Hawk, the 1993 estimate for Maverick ICS was $76.5M, which if considered, would have greatly skewed the original analysis.

  - RELOCATION COSTS: Hill AFB identified 100K ft^2 for tactical missile explosive storage, 70K ft^2 immediately available and an additional 30K ft^2 available in the future. The paper made mention of existing storage of ICBMs at Navajo National Guard Depot, AZ, and possible deep storage of Air Force Munitions. However, all movement would be done through attrition requiring no relocation dollars. ICBMs planned or currently stored at Navajo were already budgeted for by the PEO and igloos would not need modification to accommodate deep storage of Air Force munitions items. An additional 87K ft^2 of explosive storage at Hill AFB would also be freed up with a relocation cost of $300K, for a total 187K ft^2. Hill AFB also has additional storage available for GCS 1.4 storage in excess of 50K ft^2.

- COST AVOIDANCE: Since all of the missile systems have not yet transferred to LEAD, it seems inappropriate to label the difference between the original BRAC 93 appropriation and what has been expended to date as "cost avoidance".

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950514-11

FROM: RIDGE, TOM	TO: COX, REBECCA
TITLE: GOVERNOR	TITLE: COMMISSIONER
ORGANIZATION: COMM. OF PEN	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	✓	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR PENNSYLVANIA BASES.

Due Date: 950516	Routing Date: 950514	Date Originated: 950505	Mail Date:

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
HARRISBURG

THE GOVERNOR

May 5, 1995

950514-11

Ms. Rebecca Cox
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Ms. Cox,

On behalf of all Pennsylvanians, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to present testimony in defense of our military bases to you and the other Commissioners at yesterday's regional hearing in Baltimore. W appreciate your time and interest.

As Governor, I an very proud of Pennsylvania's military installations. Our strategic location and world-class workers make our Commonwealth uniquely qualified to host military bases. Moreover, Pennsylvania's history of support of our nation's defense is unparalleled anywhere in the nation.

Despite these advantages, Pennsylvania is no stranger to the BRAC process. Our Commonwealth has been stung many times by the process and contributed more than its fair share in the name of down-sizing and spending reductions. In terms of net jobs lost, Pennsylvania will be second to only California if this year's recommendations are approved. When viewed proportionately, we will have the dubious honor of being hit even harder than California.

Your task is not an easy one, but it is an important and necessary one. The decisions of the next several weeks will have lasting implications for our national defense well into the next century. I wish you luck and ask that as you make your decisions you consider the tremendous burden that Pennsylvania has borne in the process.

With best regards I remain,

Yours truly,

Tom Ridge

Governor Tom Ridge
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Document Separator

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950514-1

FROM: STEVENS, TED	TO: DIXON
TITLE: SENATOR (AK)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: ALASKA BASES	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR ALASKA BASES

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950514	Date Originated: 950508	Mail Date:

MARK O. HATFIELD, OREGON, CHAIRMAN

TED STEVENS, ALASKA
THAD COCHRAN, MISSISSIPPI
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
PETE V. DOMENICI, NEW MEXICO
PHIL GRAMM, TEXAS
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI
SLADE GORTON, WASHINGTON
MITCH McCONNELL, KENTUCKY
CONNIE MACK, FLORIDA
CONRAD BURNS, MONTANA
RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA
JAMES M. JEFFORDS, VERMONT
JUDD GREGG, NEW HAMPSHIRE
ROBERT F. BENNETT, UTAH

ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
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ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, LOUISIANA
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT
DALE BUMPERS, ARKANSAS
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, NEW JERSEY
TOM HARKIN, IOWA
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND
HARRY REID, NEVADA
J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
HERB KOHL, WISCONSIN
PATTY MURRAY, WASHINGTON

J. KEITH KENNEDY, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES H. ENGLISH, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6025

May 8, 1995

950514-1

Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission
1700 North Monroe Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Alan:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Commission during your hearings in San Francisco. Lee Clune and I appreciated the chance to present the views of the Delta Junction community on the proposed realignment of Fort Greely.

During my testimony, I reflected on the broader significance of Alaska military bases to our Nation's security interests. As I know you appreciate from your tenure as a Member of the Armed Services Committee, our forces in the Asia-Pacific region are spread very thin. Alaska units provide a strategic reserve and strike capability on American soil--an irreplaceable asset.

In San Francisco, I noted the dual deployment capability of the Alaska bases--providing double the deployment flexibility of units in the lower 48 states. This translates to reduced requirements for airlift and sealift--already in short supply.

As the Commission proceeds to evaluate the addition of other bases to the list forwarded by the Department of Defense, I urge you to reject any proposals to consider closure or downsizing of the forces remaining in Alaska. Two Administrations, three Secretaries of Defense, two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and all three previous Base Closure Commissions looked closely at this issue, and rejected proposals to eliminate the five primary operating bases in Alaska.

Please feel free to call on me if you have any questions or concerns about information related to the military installations in Alaska. I will do everything I can to assist on any matter related to the bases in my State.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Ted Stevens

It was good to see you in S.F. Thanks for staying so late

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CORRECTED VERSION AS OF 8:00 PM EST

Contact: Wade Nelson
Chuck Pizer
John Earnhardt

COMMISSION ADDS 31 NEW BASES TO CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT LIST

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 10, 1995 -- The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission today voted to add 31 military installations to the list of bases it is reviewing for realignment or closure.

In a hearing in Washington, D.C., the eight-member commission also voted to evaluate for greater realignment or complete closure 4 bases that were recommended only for realignment by the Secretary of Defense when he submitted his list to the Commission February 28.

"Just because a base was added to the list today doesn't mean it will close or be realigned," said former U.S. Senator Alan J. Dixon, the commission chairman. "It means the commission believes a fuller evaluation of the base is a reasonable thing to undertake at this time.

"We do not make additions to the list lightly, but it is the responsibility of the commission to submit to the President by July 1 the best possible closure and realignment list," Dixon said.

The commission's actions today affected bases in two overall categories: those that were not on the Secretary's February list and those that were.

Those that were not on the list were added today "for realignment or closure." Those that were on the list were added "for further realignment or closure." "Further realignment" means an action that will result in greater job loss at the installation than contemplated by the Secretary's list.

Between now and June 11, the commissioners will visit bases added to the list today and conduct regional hearings at which the affected communities will be able to testify regarding the base. Members of Congress will testify before the commission June 12-13 in Washington, D.C. and a date will be set for Defense Department officials to testify regarding the added bases.

The commission will begin its final deliberations June 22 in Washington.

more

Here is the list of bases added to the list today:

BASES NEWLY ADDED FOR REALIGNMENT OR CLOSURE - 31

AIR FORCE (13)

Chicago O'Hare IAP Air Reserve Station	Chicago, ILLINOIS
Minneapolis-St. Paul IAP Air Reserve Station	Minneapolis, MINNESOTA
Columbus Air Force Base	Columbus, MISSISSIPPI
Niagara Falls IAP Air Reserve Station	Niagara Falls, NEW YORK
Youngstown-Warren MAP Air Reserve Station	Youngstown, OHIO
Vance Air Force Base	Enid, OKLAHOMA
Carswell Air Reserve Station	Fort Worth, TEXAS
Laughlin Air Force Base	Del Rio, TEXAS
General Mitchell Air Reserve Station	Milwaukee, WISCONSIN
McClellan Air Force Base	Sacramento, CALIFORNIA
Robins Air Force Base	Warner-Robins, GEORGIA
Tinker Air Force Base	Oklahoma City, OKLAHOMA
Kelly Air Force Base	San Antonio, TEXAS

ARMY (4)

Space and Strategic Defense Command (Leased Facilities)	Huntsville, ALABAMA
Oakland Army Base	Oakland, CALIFORNIA
Fort Holabird	Baltimore, MARYLAND
Tobyhanna Army Depot	Wilkes-Barre, PENNSYLVANIA

NAVY (8)

Engineering Field Activity, West	San Bruno, CALIFORNIA
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center	Oakland, CALIFORNIA
Naval Air Station Point Mugu	Oxnard, CALIFORNIA
Naval Warfare Assessment Division	Corona, CALIFORNIA
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair	San Francisco, CALIFORNIA
Naval Air Station	Atlanta, GEORGIA
Public Works Center	GUAM
Portsmouth Naval Ship Yard	Kittery, MAINE

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (6)

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan	Sacramento, CALIFORNIA
Defense Distribution Depot Warner-Robins	Warner-Robins, GEORGIA
Defense Distribution Depot Okla. City	Oklahoma City, OKLAHOMA
Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna	Wilkes-Barre, PENNSYLVANIA
Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio	San Antonio, TEXAS
Defense Distribution Depot Hill	Ogden, UTAH

BASES ON THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT LIST

ADDED TODAY BY THE COMMISSION FOR FURTHER REALIGNMENT OR CLOSURE - 4

AIR FORCE (3)

Homestead Air Reserve Station	Florida City, FLORIDA
Grand Forks Air Force Base	Grand Forks, NORTH DAKOTA
Hill Air Force Base	Ogden, Utah

ARMY (1)

Letterkenny Army Depot	Letterkenny, PENNSYLVANIA

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Document Separator

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1700

OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION

Please refer to this number when responding 950424-20
R1

April 25, 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I appreciated the opportunity to testify before you on April 17, 1995. We are committed to providing the Commission with all the assistance and support we can. Enclosed are the responses to the questions you provided me from Congressman Sam Farr.

I trust this information will be helpful to you and please let me know if there is anything else I can provide.

Sincerely,

Philip E. Coyle
Director

Enclosure

Congressional Questions for the Record

Question: Mr. Coyle, as the person responsible for operational testing in DoD, you state in your February 10, 1995 memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security (Economic Reinvestment & BRAC) that the recommendation to realign Fort Hunter-Liggett is a "showstopper."

Answer: To quote from our February 10, 1995 memorandum, our recommendation was that the "Army withdraw (its) proposal to move its test battalion from Fort Hunter-Liggett to Fort Bliss." Perhaps our use of the word "showstopper" was not the best choice. In the theater, a showstopper is applause that is so extended that it stops the show. This was not our meaning. Our memorandum was to convey our feeling that Fort Hunter-Liggett is an especially valuable asset, and that it's inclusion on the BRAC list should not be recommended to the Secretary of Defense. Subsequent to our February 10 memorandum, I discussed my concerns with the Army. The Army expressed their view that the operational considerations raised by DOT&E were, in fact, considered in the Army's test planning. In addition, they pointed out that the size of the TEC mission is small and could be realigned in the future outside of the BRAC process should the need arise. The recommendation also retains the land at Hunter-Liggett under Army control should the need arise to resume major testing there. I told the Army that I remained skeptical and concerned about the implications of this realignment for future Army testing capability.

Question: Mr. Coyle, we understand that there are conditions at Fort Hunter-Liggett which enhance it as a site for performing operational testing. These include: a varied terrain, isolation, no artificial light contamination and no radio frequency interference. Do these conditions exist at Fort Bliss? If not, could they be created?

Answer: Fort Bliss does not have the quality of terrain, weather, foliage, lack of artificial light contamination, or freedom from radio frequency interference as Fort Hunter-Liggett. It would be impractical to "create" these features at Fort Bliss. Instead the testing capabilities from other Army test assets would be used in combination to approximate the capabilities at Fort Hunter-Liggett. Also the Army proposal provides for future use of Fort Hunter-Liggett when required.

Question: Mr. Coyle, from a military value standpoint is the "laser-safe bowl" (which allows for non-eye safe laser testing in an instrumented valley) at Fort Hunter-Liggett a critical component of operational testing?

Answer: Yes, modern testing of military systems often involves firing lasers instead of actual bullets or missiles. These laser firings are "paired" with laser receptors on the intended targets to determine if a hit has taken place. Of course, this must be done with the utmost personnel safety. The natural bowl at Fort Hunter-Liggett provides an ideal setting for such tests. Laser firings are conducted at other DoD test ranges but with concomitant restrictions where natural protection is unavailable.

Question: Mr. Coyle, do you think the instrumentation suite (used to monitor and record every player's activity during a test) could be duplicated at Fort Bliss? If so, would it be as effective?

Answer: For the right amount of money, the instrumentation at Fort Hunter-Liggett could be duplicated at Fort Bliss. If as good a job were done as has been done at Fort Hunter-Liggett, it could be as effective at Fort Bliss.

Question: Mr. Coyle, from a military value standpoint, is Fort Hunter-Liggett essential to operational testing to DoD?

Answer: Military value was evaluated by the Services, not by the Joint Cross Service Groups(JCSG). Military value-as determined by the Services-was considered along with functional values-determined by the JCSG's-in the final Service recommendations. Recognizing the special value of Fort Hunter-Liggett, the Army has proposed to continue to test at Fort Hunter-Liggett on a campaign basis. My concern is that moving the test command to Fort Bliss could become a de facto closing from a testing point of view.

Just four years ago, in 1991, the Army consolidated testing activities at Fort Hunter-Liggett because of the higher costs of campaign-style operation. Accordingly, once having moved to Fort Bliss, the Army may find that it is too expensive to return to Fort Hunter-Liggett on a campaign basis.

Document Separator

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950515-12

FROM: BROWN, ED	TO: JONES, MICHAEL
TITLE: ARMY TEAM LEADER	TITLE: DIRECTOR
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: ARMY BASING
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		JG
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING MATERIAL CONCERNING PORT FACILITIES: INFO DETAILING SUPPORT TO OPERATION DESERT STORM.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950515	Date Originated: 950515	Mail Date: 950515

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

May 15, 1995

Colonel Michael G. Jones
Director, The Army Basing Study
200 Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0200

Please refer to this number when responding 950515-12

Dear Colonel Jones:

As a follow up to previously requested material concerning port facilities, the Commission would appreciate additional information detailing support to Operation Desert Storm. Please provide by military and commercial facility the number of ships handled, and the amount and general type of military cargo (i.e., armored vehicles, bulk ammunition, light infantry unit equipment) shipped in support of Operation Desert Storm. If deployment and sustainment shipments are representative of the overall effort, redeployment information may be omitted. Regardless, please specify the period for which information is compiled.

Please provide your response by May 31, 1995.

Army team point of contact for this information is Rick Brown, 696-0504, ext 197.

I appreciate your assistance and cooperation.

Sincerely,

for Clarence R. Brown, Army Team
~~Edward A. Brown~~ III
Army Team Leader

Document Separator

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950514-7

FROM: SARBANES, PAUL	TO: COX, REBECCA
TITLE: SENATOR (MD)	TITLE: COMMISSIONER
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: OBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: MARYLAND BASES	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		56
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

THANK YOU FOR HOLDING "EFFECTIVE" REGIONAL HEARING IN BALTIMORE; LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR MARYLAND BASES.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950514	Date Originated: 950509	Mail Date:

PAUL S. SARBANES
MARYLAND

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2002

May 9, 1995

9505147

Commissioner Rebecca G. Cox
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Commissioner Cox:

We are writing to thank you, your fellow Commissioners, and the Commission staff for holding an effective regional hearing at the University of Maryland at Baltimore County last week. We appreciate the opportunity afforded to each affected Maryland community and to our Congressional, State and local delegations to make our case and hope that the presentations and public comments were helpful in addressing your questions.

As was mentioned during the hearing, we believe our nation will lose not only critical military capabilities such as the Hypervelocity Wind Tunnel at White Oak, and the Deep Ocean Machinery Simulation Facility at Annapolis, but the highly dedicated and proven teams of experienced personnel associated with all these installations.

Moreover, we are concerned that DOD failed to adequately consider other opportunities for cost savings and cross servicing such as consolidating the Defense Information Systems Agency - Western Hemisphere at Fort Ritchie, the DOD-wide consolidation of the Publications Distribution mission at Baltimore and St. Louis and the Joint Spectrum Center at Annapolis. We are also concerned about the impacts of downsizing the Kimbrough Army Hospital at Fort Meade on active duty and retired military personnel.

For us, each community's testimony reaffirmed the Delegation's view that DOD's recommendations affecting Maryland installations have overestimated cost savings, underassessed military value and failed to recognize significant joint cross-service opportunities.

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

Again, our thanks to you, the other Commissioners, and the Commission staff for your time and interest during the regional hearing on May 4.

With best regards,

Sincerely

Barbara A. Mikulski
United States Senator

Paul S. Sarbanes
United States Senator

Steny H. Hoyer
Member of Congress

Benjamin L. Cardin
Member of Congress

Kweisi Mfume
Member of Congress

Constance A. Morella
Member of Congress

Wayne T. Gilchrest
Member of Congress

Roscoe G. Bartlett
Member of Congress

Albert R. Wynn
Member of Congress

Robert Ehrlich
Member of Congress

Document Separator

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

16 MAY 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Mr Frank Cirillo, Jr)

FROM: HQ USAF/RT
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1670

SUBJECT: USAF BRAC '95 ANG Information, 950412-12

The following response will answer your questions in paragraph one of your 12 April 1995 letter.

STATEMENT: Could you please confirm there will be 150 civilian authorizations to care for the minimum essential airfield, and that the Air Force intends to realign 135 civilian authorizations to Fort Drum?

RESPONSE: There will not be 150 civilian authorizations at Griffiss to care for the minimum essential airfield. There will be 15 DoD contract quality assurance civilians in place in 1997 to administer the minimum essential airfield contracts. The remaining 135 authorizations have been turned back for money to pay for contractor operation of the minimum essential airfield. Therefore, any civilians at Griffiss that are operating the minimum essential airfield beyond the programmed 15 DoD authorizations quality assurance personnel will be contractor personnel. When the economic impact was discussed for input to DoD recommendations, the question was asked how many contractor personnel would be operating the airfield. The answer was estimated at approximately 120-150 contractor personnel based on funding programmed to operate the airfield. When the recommendation was forwarded, the answer somehow got translated to 150 DoD civilians will be in place at Griffiss AFB to operate the minimum essential airfield, and the assumption was also erroneously made they would transfer to Fort Drum. That is not the case. No DoD civilian authorizations were programmed for relocation to Fort Drum. The 15 DoD civilian that administer contracts will go away as well as any contracts for Griffiss minimum essential airfield maintenance .

STATEMENT: Is there a potential savings in civilian authorizations if Fort Drum needs only 25 additional authorizations, or would this not be considered a savings because 150 authorizations required to take care of the airfield at Griffiss AFB are more than anticipated when the Air Force proposed to realign Griffiss AFB in 1993?

RT389

RESPONSE: Again, only 15 of the 150 DoD civilian authorizations exist at Griffiss AFB because 135 authorizations have been converted to dollars to administer contracts at Griffiss. Any additional personnel at the minimum essential airfield are contractor personnel and cannot be taken as savings. However, the $12M that will be paid to the contractor for maintenance of the minimum essential airfield was programmed into COBRA as a savings. In conjunction with Army, we are currently validating any additional manpower requirements that may be needed for deployment of the 10th Infantry at Fort Drum.

STATEMENT: Also, if the Air Force is paying 150 civilians to care for the minimum essential airfield, why is there an additional overhead charge of $12.0M per year?

RESPONSE: For 1997, 135 civilian authorizations of the 150 have been converted to dollars ($12M) to pay for contractor maintenance of the airfield. The minimum essential airfield will be run by a contractor and his people, as required by law. The 15 civilian authorizations difference are the contract quality assurance personnel. There is no additional $12.0M overhead charge.

I trust this information clears up any misconceptions generated by the economic report.

Jay D. Blume Jr.

JAY D. BLUME, JR., Maj Gen, USAF
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff
for Realignment and Transition

RT389

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

15 MAY 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Mr. Frank Cirillo)

FROM: AF/RT
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1670

SUBJECT: Response to Questions on 485 EIG (Reference #950412-12)

The following is the Air Force response to paragraph 2 of your enclosed April 12, 1995 request for data concerning authorizations for the 485th EIG. Paragraph 1 was answered previously.

STATEMENT: Could you please provide us with a list of authorizations from the 485 EIG, where these authorizations are going to by installation, and how many authorizations have been reduced. Could you please provide us this information broken out by officer/enlisted/civilian?

RESPONSE: If the 485 EIG, Griffiss AFB were redirected, Tinker AFB would receive a total of 402 authorized positions. As you stated, the DoD report indicated 146 military positions and 330 civilians, which added up to 476 authorized positions (Please note the DoD report failed to take into account a savings of 77 positions, and at that time, it also understated, by 3, the number of civilian authorizations going to Tinker.). Of 402 authorizations going to Tinker AFB, we have recently determined that 291 will be civilian positions and 111 will be military positions. Concerning the question of moving some of these EIG authorizations to Keesler AFB, the Air Force is not pursuing such an action.

Jay D. Blume

JAY D. BLUME, Jr.,Maj Gen, USAF
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for
Realignment and Transition

RT389

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 12, 1995

Major General Jay Blume (ATTN: Lt. Col. Mary Tripp)
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff
for Base Realignment and Transition
Headquarters USAF
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330-1670

76
Please refer to this number when responding 950412-12

Dear General Blume:

In order to assist the Commission in its review of the DoD's recommendations concerning Griffiss Air Force Base, I am requesting your assistance with respect to the following issues:

1. The DoD has recommended the closure of the minimum essential runway at Griffiss Air Force Base. In doing so, the DoD report indicates a loss of 150 civilians from Griffiss Air Force Base. The Air Force COBRA indicates only the reduction of 15 civilians from Griffiss Air Force Base. It would appear the remaining 135 will be realigned to Fort Drum. After discussions with personnel from Fort Drum, their initial indications are that they need only an additional 25 individuals to operate the Fort Drum airfield after the runway extension. Could you please confirm that there will be 150 civilians authorized to care for the minimum essential airfield, and that the Air Force intends to realign 135 civilian authorizations to Fort Drum? Is there a potential savings in civilian authorizations if Fort Drum needs only 25 additional authorizations, or would this not be considered a savings because 150 authorizations required to take care of the airfield at Griffiss AFB are more than anticipated when the Air Force proposed to realign Griffiss AFB in 1993? Also, if the Air Force is paying 150 civilians to care for the minimum essential airfield, why is there an additional annual overhead charge of $12.0M per year?

2. Following staff visits to Tinker and Griffiss Air Force Base, questions arose concerning the inactivation of the 485th Engineering Installation Group (EIG). Personnel at Tinker AFB indicated that not as many military and civilians are going from Griffiss AFB to Tinker AFB as indicated in the DoD report. (146 military and 330 civilians) This is a concern for the Tinker community because personnel departing Tinker AFB due to air logistic center base closure actions does not look as bad because there are incoming personnel from the 485th EIG. But since the number of authorizations incoming to Tinker AFB is not high as indicated in the report, Tinker AFB may be losing more authorizations than previously indicated. In addition, personnel from Griffiss AFB indicated that some of their authorizations for personnel were going to Keesler AFB, and that Keesler AFB should be added to the list of bases where 485th EIG authorizations are to be going.

RT389

Could you please provide us with a list of authorizations from the 485 EIG, where these authorizations are going to by installation, and how many authorizations have been reduced. Could you please provide us this information broken out by officer/enlisted/civilian?

Could you please provide us this information by May 15, 1995. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Francis A. Cirillo, Jr.
Air Force Team Leader

RT389

Document Separator

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

01 MAY 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Mr Frank Cirillo, Jr)

FROM: HQ USAF/RT

67
950410-5

SUBJECT: USAF BRAC '95 ANG Information

This letter is in response to your request for a review of the COBRA run redirecting minimum essential airfield operations in support of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division to Ft Drum, NY instead of remaining at Griffiss. There are some issues pertaining to BOS and RPMA increases at Ft Drum as a result of the redirect that are currently being addressed with Army.

The study done at Ft Drum contained an estimated increased annual recurring cost of $2.7 million at Ft Drum. This estimate was broken down into:

Additional Personnel for General Maintenance (5 @ $32,000* each)	$ 160,000
*$32,000 is Army's salary figure per person, the study had used $45,000	
Equipment Maintenance Contract (Airfield)	1,500,000
Increase O&M Airfield/Facilities	400,000
Additional Snow Removal Costs	250,000
Deicing (fluid/sewer charge/personnel)	400,000
Total	$2,710,000

Army, however, has indicated a need for an additional 25 people for BOS support at $801,000 per year. This would mean the annual recurring BOS increase would be $3,351,000, an increase of $641,000 per year. The issue currently being resolved between Air Force and Army is whether placing the additional people at Ft Drum on a daily basis is cost effective to DoD, or should the Air Force bring in the additional personnel when 10th Infantry is mobilized. A meeting between Air Force and Army Forscom will take place this week to finally resolve the issue.

The Army has indicated they will save per diem and transportation costs by not deploying to Griffiss when the 10th is mobilized. The following costs were the only ones we were able to obtained during the site survey.

FYC
Army

Surface Transportation (average yearly costs FY 92-FY 94)		$205,300
FY 92	$223,000	
FY 93	143,000	
FY 94	250,000	
TDY costs for Ft Drum support personnel at Griffiss		
Normal Battalion Deployment (average/year)		$144,000
Special Deployments (average yearly costs FY 92-FY 94)		81,000
Hurricane Andrew -	$ 64,000	
Somalia -	102,000	
Haiti -	77,000	
Total		$430,000

I trust this information will help the Base Closure Commission in its deliberations.

JAY D. BLUME, JR., Maj Gen, USAF
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff
for Realignment and Transition

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
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S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 8, 1995

Major General Jay D. Blume, Jr. (Lt. Col. Mary Tripp)
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff
for Base Realignment and Transition
Headquarters USAF
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330-1670

Dear General Blume:

We request you review the COBRA run redirecting Griffiss ANG Operations support for the 10th Infantry (Light) Division at Ft. Drum instead of Griffiss. The COBRA run (scenario file 10-ID.CBR) submitted to the Commission contains no increased Base Operations Support (BOS) or Real Property Maintenance Activity (RPMA) costs for operating at Ft. Drum while it does contain a reduced cost of operating at Griffiss of $12 M annually. Please comment on this observation. Additionally, we have learned from a base visit that the 10th ID expects to avoid $1.0 M per year in per diem to Griffiss to conduct exercises. Please comment on this finding as well.

In order to assist the Commission in its work, we request this information to be provided no later than May 1, 1995. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

Francis A. Cirillo, Jr., PE
Air Force Team Leader

Document Separator

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC
SECURITY

April 19, 1995

950321-2R1

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Commission on the Department's efforts to enhance the reuse process at closing bases. Enclosed are my responses to your questions for the record.

Also, at the hearing, Commissioner Robles asked me to provide the backup data associated with my chart showing BRAC costs and savings that results in $56.7 billion net savings over 20 years discounted to present value of 4.2%. The cost data for this calculation is contained in the biennial budget estimates for the three previous BRAC rounds plus the COBRA estimate for BRAC 95. The biennial budget estimates the three previous BRAC rounds are attached in response to a similar question from Commissioner Cox.

I believe the Department has made great strides in the base reuse process but, as I testified before your Commission, there is much more that needs to be done. I look forward to assisting the Commission in the weeks ahead as you explore opportunities to enhance base reuse and develop recommendations in your report to the President.

Sincerely,

Joshua Gotbaum

Enclosure

Responses to Questions for the Record
from the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

From Commissioner Davis:

Mr. Secretary, you indicated that you supported legislative changes to the current law which gives DoD little latitude when another Federal Agency claims all or part of a military base.

There is a situation now where a Federal Agency has indicated that it would like a base closed in 1993 so that it might trade that property for other property not on the base which it would like to acquire. This would leave the base in the hands of private interests and might be construed as avoiding the reuse process altogether.

Question #1a: Is this appropriate use of the military lands?

Answer: DoD is committed to promoting economic recovery and rapid job creation in the communities affected by base closure, while still ensuring that Federal resources are available for other important public uses. The law requires that Federal agencies be notified whenever excess property is available. Traditionally, this has meant that Federal agencies are given priority, even before other uses are considered. This means we must still decide whether to transfer base closure property to another Federal agency before declaring it "surplus" and making it available for community development. We need to change the law to evaluate the needs and requests of all parties at the same time, rather than sequentially, in order to make the best transfer decisions.

With respect to a transfer of property for a trade for other property, this is considered an inappropriate request and would be denied based on the criteria in the Federal Property Management Regulations (FPMR).

Question #1b: If not, do you have the authority to prevent it? If not, should the law be changed?

Answer: We have the authority we need to reject requests for indirect transfers of property for the purpose of trading.

Question #2: With regard to the chart showing that BRAC savings are greater than expected, please explain the impact on the numbers of the cuts in defense spending and/or changes in the force structure.

For example, in 1991 the Commission accepted a recommendation to close a base, a cost to close of $10 million. By the time it closed in 1994, however, cuts in defense spending or force structure changes dictated that functions on the base be

terminated. Therefore, the costs were incurred for reasons other than closure. Would that show up as less "closure costs" and therefore greater savings"?

Answer: In calculating the savings associated with base closures our policy precludes the consideration of the savings associated with force structure drawdowns. If, as cited in your example, reductions in force structure impact a base closure plan during the implementation period then closure costs would decrease and net savings would be greater than originally anticipated. This reduction in costs and commensurate increase in net savings is partially attributable to the reduced requirement for military construction needed to support reduced missions at receiving bases. Reductions in force structure probably contributed to some of the $1.4 billion increase in BRAC net savings depicted on our chart. This is understandable given the highly volatile period (1990-1995) in which substantial force structure reductions and BRAC implementation were occurring simultaneously.

From Commissioner Cox:

Question 1a: Does the BRAC savings and cost chart include the cost to the Department of Defense of the reuse efforts (for example, monies that apparently went to the Department of Labor and the Economic Development Agency for economic development and training or the Department's personnel and travel costs involved in reuse) ?

Answer: No it does not.

Question 1b: Please provide for the record all DoD costs involving base closures/reuse since 1988 that are not included as part of the costs to close a base.

Answer: In general, DOD's costs associated with closing a base are included in the DoD Base Realignment and Closure Executive Summary and Budget Justification FY 1996/1997 Biennial Budget Estimates book. This justification document highlights the total DoD cost to close or realign bases and includes funds from a variety of appropriation sources. The costs are two-fold. First, the document displays the budget request for the BRAC accounts. Secondly, in addition to discussing the BRAC budget request, the document displays the funds the Services provide from outside the BRAC accounts for related costs. Examples of these related costs include funding for environmental cleanup, operation and maintenance and the homeowner assistance program. The attachments highlight DOD's biennial budget estimates associated with the BRAC budget request and the related costs for BRACs 88, 91 and 93. They are DOD's best estimate of the costs associated with closing a base.

Base reuse costs, such as funding for DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA), are generally not included in these figures since by definition they are not costs of closing a base. However, for the period of FY 1989-1994, OEA funding totaled

$67.1 million (grants: $54.6 million; salaries and expenses: $12.5 million). DoD funding for the Economic Development Administration (EDA), for infrastructure grants, and the Department of Labor (DoL), for worker retraining and job placement assistance, was approximately $70 million and $100 million, respectively, during the period FY 1993 -FY 1994.

From Representative Horn:

Question #1: If the City of Long Beach were a state, it would rank fifth -- behind California, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Texas -- in total base closure related economic impact. Yet the Navy analysis indicates that the Long Beach Naval Shipyard closure would amount to only 0.3 percent of economic area employment. This is because the Navy economic data is based on the Los Angeles-Long Beach PMSA economic area, which has a total population of several million, instead of the City of Long Beach which has a population of 437,816. PMSA economic areas are also used in determining eligibility for federal funding related to military installation closures and Economic Development Conveyances for former military property. Due to PMSA geographic boundaries, some deserving communities are deemed to be ineligible.

Why has an arbitrary geographic criterion, rather than real world economic conditions, been established as the basis to make these decisions, which are critical to the economic well-being of our nation's most severely impacted communities?

Answer: First, let me say with regard to Representative Horn's concerns expressed in his letter to Chairman Dixon that we understand that he and the residents of Long Beach are upset about the recommended closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. We don't like closing bases, but as you well know, it is necessary.

Communities hear all sorts of stories about closure decisions. Many of them are inaccurate. So, it is important to clear the air. The Long Beach Naval Shipyard recommendation, like all others, was "by the book." The BRAC process was designed to be as objective, as public, as auditable as any process in government.

The law requires that every DoD recommendation must be made in accordance with the force structure plan. It must be made in accordance with a specific set of published criteria. All the data must be signed, certified, and made available to the public and every interested party. Finally, the entire process is audited and overseen by the General Accounting Office.

Regarding Representative Horn's first question, Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs) were used to measure economic effects because the closure of the shipyard affects communities outside Long Beach as well.

The DoD BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact established and then consistently applied standard rules to assign each military installation in the United States to an economic area. DoD assigned installations to economic areas to reflect employment and commuting patterns. Far from being "arbitrary" these assignments were made painstakingly over a period of many months, base-by-base, taking into account local commuting and economic patterns. An independent panel of government, academic, and private sector economic experts endorsed this general approach in May 1994.

In general, DoD used PMSAs as the economic areas for installations because of the close conceptual match between the standards used by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to define PMSAs and the Department's goal for defining economic areas for BRAC 95. OMB defines PMSAs based on information from the US Census on commuting patterns and population density. In some circumstances, which are clearly defined in the Joint Cross-Service Group's standard rules, DoD assigned installations to multi-county areas, rather than the PMSA defined by OMB.

In no case did the Joint Cross-Service Group assign an installation to an economic area smaller than a county. In addition to the theoretical reasons discussed above, there are practical reasons why counties are the smallest economic units used for BRAC 95. Counties are the smallest economic units for which uniform and authoritative national economic statistics are available from the Departments of Commerce and Labor. DoD analyzed economic information at the county- and PMSA-levels to provide objective, fair, and consistent comparisons of alternative realignments and closures.

Also, it should be noted that DoD considered the total potential job change as an absolute number and historic economic information, in addition to the percentage of area jobs that could be affected, in its BRAC 95 decision processes.

Finally, with regard to Economic Development Conveyances (EDC) for former military property, PMSAs are not used in determining eligibility. Any base closure community can make an EDC application.

Question #2: Was the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) in any way involved in the Department of Defense and Military Services processes which recommended base closure candidates to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission?

Answer: No. Unfortunately some parties have misrepresented the role of OEA. OEA was not in any way involved in the process that recommended base closure candidates to the Commission. OEA plays no part whatsoever in any BRAC closure decision. All of their work focuses on helping communities after the fact, for which their work is justly recognized as thoroughly professional.

Question #3: Does OEA provide funding to the National Association of Installation Developers (NAID) either directly, or through the Department of Labor?

(a): How much funding is provided?

Answer: OEA does not provide funding to NAID either directly or indirectly. Over a three-year period, the Congress directed the transfer of $225 million of DoD funding to the Department of Labor (DoL) in support of their efforts to help base closure, as well as defense industry dislocated workers. DoL has awarded two grants to NAID for a total of $700,000. As with OEA, NAID and DoL have no role in the BRAC closure recommendations.

(b): What is the purpose of this funding?

Answer: The funds are used to help pay salaries, benefits, and operating costs of the organization.

(c): Are there limitations on the use of this funding?

Answer: Yes. The limitations on the DoL/NAID funding are governed by the Grant Agreement and Common Rule implementing OMB Circular A-110.

Question #4: Does OEA influence the positions the NAID takes with regard to base closures and installation reuse issues?

Answer: No.

Question #5: Does OEA, or personnel working for the agency, ever attempt to recommend consultants to local communities which may be affected by Department of Defense closure recommendations?

Answer: No. See Question 2.

Question #6: Has OEA, or personnel working for the agency, ever attempted to recommend consultants near bases already closed under previous decisions of the BRAC?

Answer: No. Inquirers are generally referred to NAID or to other communities.

Finally, let me close by saying that it is unfortunate that such misleading and erroneous charges were made about OEA and other organizations that are trying to help communities.

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950427-8

FROM: GOUDEAUX, NOLAN	TO: BROWN, RICK
TITLE: LTC, USA COMMANDING	TITLE: ARMY SR. ANALYST
ORGANIZATION: FORT HAMILTON	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		JB
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				RICK BROWN	✓		

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions		FYI

Subject/Remarks:

PROVIDING DESCRIPTION OF SOME SPECIFICS ABOUT THE COST OF HOUSING FOR SERVICE MEN WITH DUTIES IN NEW YORK CITY.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950427	Date Originated: 950427	Mail Date:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK AREA COMMAND AND FORT HAMILTON
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 11252

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

27 April 1995

Mr. Rick Brown, Senior Analyst, Army Team
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

RE: Off-post family housing, New York City

Sir, as promised, here is a brief description of some specifics about on-the-economy housing for service men and women with military duties within the five boroughs of New York City. Admittedly, as I represented to you, this summary is rather unscientific, but I stand by each representation as quite accurate in both rental costs and quality of dwelling.

Before I offer the specifics, I must comment upon the economic climate here in NYC. Since 1946, this City has required much of its rental apartments to be controlled by a "rent control" statute -- city legislation that requires apartment building owners (landlords) to set aside a certain number of individual units for "stabilization", i.e. rent control. The stated purpose for this legislation was spurred by an emergency shortage of housing immediately after the Great War. In providing this legislation -- indeed, a noble purpose -- the unintended effect has been to artificially cause all other apartments (and other real estate) to increase in value; another effect is to reduce the overall number of apartments available to the rental market. So, unless one of our service persons came to NYC in 1946, there is virtually no opportunity for him or her to obtain a low or moderately priced apartment. Now to my information.

To apply my information below, I suggest using an E-6's quarter's allowance, with dependents, which is $474.30; and, for officers, please use 03, with dependents, $584.10.

Here are some Brooklyn Borough prices (3 bedroom):

Bay Ridge	$850
Park Slope	750
Brooklyn Hts	950
Crown Hts	700
Red Hook	700
Bensonhurst	750

The Queens borough is the site of Fort Totten (to be closed). Here are their stats:

St. Albans	$650
Bay Side	750
Kew Gardens	650

Please apply these prices to the other boroughs. Staten Island may be slightly lower, but not by much.

Home purchase is an option for any American, of course It is, in my view, not an option for a service person stationed here for only a tour. The best prices are, I gather, on Staten Island. There, such figures as 165M and up are, at least, possible. The quality of home purchase is quite drastic in variety I have never known a military member to seek to purchase a home in New York City -- it just isn't done.

In summary, Sir, the apartments priced above do not approach the average price in the area -- that figure is around $1200, and some of them are as much as...I can't write the number in this writing. Those apartments noted above are without utilities, without garage, only on-street parking, and probably requires the new tenant to install a host of security equipment. As you may expect, residing on any of the military bases in the New York area, especially the rather secure locations of Fort Hamilton and Fort Totten (each with gate guards) which have garage space for POVs gives the service person an advantage in automobile insurance rates (especially USAA for officers) Of course, this could not be factored and cannot be included, either.

Well, Sir, my information was gathered from the efforts of people who actually solicited apartment rentals (before moving onto Fort Hamilton or Fort Totten) and, I believe, present a rather accurate reflection of housing costs here in NYC.

Thank you.

NOLAN GOUDEAUX
LTC, JA
Commanding

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950410-15

FROM: FIELDS, TIMOTHY.	TO: DIXON
TITLE:	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: EPA	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR. CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR. COMMUNICATIONS	✓			REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION	✓			AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR. INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

SENDING RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM MARCH 16 HEARING.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950410	Date Originated: 950407	Mail Date:

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460

APR 07 1995

OFFICE OF
SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number
when responding 950410-15

Dear Chairman Dixon:

It was my pleasure to appear before the Commission on March 16 to address "post-closure" activities at military installations. I hope my participation in the hearing will assist you and the other Commissioners in your deliberations as you contemplate the difficult decisions you must face over the next few months.

During the hearing I was requested to submit, for the record, responses to several requests from the Commission members. The requests were as follows:

1) Provide my top three recommendations for improving the "post-closure" process.

2) Provide the cost of EPA's participation at BRAC sites from 1990 through 2000.

3) In California, the military must complete different environmental reviews under both the federal NEPA and state CEQA laws, which are more stringent than NEPA. How can environmental review of property occur expeditiously if the Department of Defense (DOD) must complete separate environmental impact analyses for state and federal programs?

I will address the requests in order. My top three recommendations for improving the "post-closure process" are: continue EPA funding for participation in Fast Track Cleanup at BRAC bases; improve the integration of environmental cleanup and the reuse and redevelopment of the bases; and, finally, I would like to recommend that the military services do everything within their power to retain the environmental staff at the closing bases throughout the BRAC cleanup process.

The first recommendation is critical. EPA receives funding from the Department of Defense for our participation in Fast Track Cleanup as members of BRAC Cleanup Teams. Without this

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infusion of additional resources, EPA would not be able to play the proactive and supportive role we have since President Clinton announced his Community Revitalization Plan. By dedicating resources to the BRAC bases, EPA has worked with the military services, state regulatory bodies, Local Reuse Authorities (LRA) and local communities to remove environmental roadblocks to reuse while providing protection to human health and the environment. We have have received universal appreciation for our contributions to the cleanup and transition process and would like to continue to build on our productive partnership with the BRAC bases.

The second recommendation is based on our experience in the field at BRAC bases. We have encountered some disconnects with the local plans for reuse and redevelopment and the environmental cleanup program at the bases. It is imperative that the BRAC Cleanup Teams and the reuse entities at the bases communicate frequently. This allows each group to incorporate the other's concerns in their short and long term planning.

The last of the three recommendations I would submit to improve the process is that military services at the closing bases work to retain the existing staff that have the most experience at the base. As the bases downsize for closure they often lose the critical personnel that have the most experience with environmental cleanup at the bases. We have found that a knowledgeable and consistent BRAC Cleanup Team is one of the keys to success in Fast Track Cleanup. Unfortunately the base environmental and public affairs staff often are lost in the downsizing shuffle. To prevent this I would suggest the military find a mechanism to keep these professionals at the bases as they close and work to retain them as the BRAC cleanup progresses.

The second request came from Commissioner Cox. She asked me to provide the costs associated with EPA activities at BRAC bases from Fiscal Year 1990 through 2000.

The DOD, starting in FY 1994, provided EPA via an interagency funding agreement, with reimbursable resources to fund EPA's activities in the Fast Track Cleanup. DOD, EPA and OMB worked together to develop the details of this agreement, which included 100 additional workyears for EPA and $7 million beginning in FY 1994. The FY 1995 budget was 100 workyears and $8.4 million. Of the 100 positions, 93 workyears are located in EPA's Regional offices and 7 workyears at Headquarters. The current interagency funding agreement is for FY 1994-1998.

The figures provided below are the actual site costs for FY 1990 - FY 1994, and the budgeted amount for FY 1995 for EPA work involving BRAC Rounds I, II and III. The figures from FY 1990 - FY 1993 does not include "indirect costs" (e.g., rent, equipment, non-site policy work, etc.). At this point, it is difficult to estimate resource needs for BRAC IV until the list is final. However, we have begun to review the proposed list and

will continue to work with DOD to determine which proposed BRAC IV bases will require "Fast Track" support. However, until a new agreement is reached with DOD on funding BRAC IV work, we believe it would be inappropriate to project our resource needs. Once EPA and DOD reach agreement on the BRAC IV sites needing assistance we would be pleased to provide these figures to the Commission.

For the period covering FY 1996-1998 EPA projections assume that, excluding the BRAC IV funding issue, the FY 1995 level of $8.4 million will be maintained adjusting for inflation. Using "OMB inflation factors for FY 1996-2000" included in the President's FY 1996 budget, we can extrapolate the $8.4 million funding level for FY 1996-1998. Implicit in the estimates is that the current interagency funding agreement will end in FY 1998. Figures beyond this timeframe become highly speculative and may not provide much useful information to the Commission, so I feel it is inappropriate to provide figures for FY 1999 and FY 2000.

EPA BRAC Resource Obligations FY 1990-95

YEAR	$$ IN MILLIONS *
FY 1990	$0.9
FY 1991	$3.1
FY 1992	$3.8
FY 1993	$3.3
FY 1994	$8.0
FY 1995	$8.4
Total	$27.5

EPA BRAC Resource Estimates FY 1996-1998

YEAR	$$ IN MILLIONS **
FY 1996	$8.8
FY 1997	$9.2
FY 1998	$9.6
Total	$27.4

The third request came from Commissioner Montoya in the form of a question regarding NEPA and the California CEQA law. States can, and do, have environmental programs which are stricter than federal programs. However, states such as California are easing the regulatory burden of completing different federal and state environmental review requirements by encouraging the completion of a joint federal Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and state EIR (Environmental Impact Report) as a single document, a joint EIS/EIR. The state has further facilitated this process by issuing guidance on the subject ("CEQA, NEPA, and Base Closure:

Recipes for Streamlining Environmental Review," Governor's Office of Planning and Research, August, 1994). EPA will assist with any such effort to complete joint documentation so long as the final environmental review document satisfies NEPA.

I hope that I have sufficiently covered the subjects the Commission requested information on. My staff and I stand ready to assist you in any way that you may need. Should you, or any of the Commissioners, need to contact me I can be reached at (202) 260-4610.

Sincerely,

Timothy Fields, Jr.

Timothy Fields, Jr

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950307-2

FROM: COSTELLO, JERRY	TO: GENERAL
TITLE: REP. (IL)	TITLE:
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

QUESTIONS FOR MARCH 7 HEARING.

Due Date: 950309	Routing Date: 950307	Date Originated: 950306	Mail Date:

JERRY F. COSTELLO
12TH DISTRICT, ILLINOIS

PLEASE RESPOND TO THE OFFICE CHECKED BELOW:

COMMITTEES:
BUDGET
PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION
SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
(ON LEAVE)

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-1312

Please refer to this number when responding 950307-2

March 6, 1995

Hon. Alan Dixon
Chairman
Base Rlgmt. and Closure Comm.
1700 N. Moore St.
Arlington, Virginia 22002

Dear Chairman Dixon:

As you begin your hearings on the 1995 base closure round, I would ask that the Commissioners ask the following questions during your March 7 hearing regarding the U.S. Army and the Charles Melvin Price Support Center.

1. Given the active force down-sizing and greater reliance on the Reserve components, wouldn't it make sense to use the Price Support Center, which is so ideally located, as a major reserve force support base?

2. The Army has said they must close the military family housing at Price because of the ATCOM move, yet only 17% of that housing is occupied by ATCOM personnel and there is a waiting list of over one year. Why do the soldiers in the commands at St. Louis not deserve equal housing consideration?

3. The Army has said that Price will close "except for a small reserve enclave and storage area." What consideration was given to the activities of the Navy, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency? Why aren't the costs of relocating those activities included in the cost data supplied by the Army?

4. The Army does not mention the DLA Strategic Stockpile material at the Price Support Center in their narrative. What disposition will be made of the more than 700,000 tons of material there, and at what cost? Why isn't that cost reflected in the Army's analysis?

Chairman Dixon, thank you again for your cooperation for incorporating these questions into your March 7 hearing.

Sincerely,

JERRY F. COSTELLO
Member of Congress

JFC/bhl

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☐ 327 W. MAIN ST BELLEVILLE, IL 62220 TEL: (618) 233-8026 FAX: (618) 233-8765
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☐ 1330 SWANWICK ST. CHESTER, IL 62233 TEL: (618) 826-3043

Document Separator

United States House of Representatives
Democratic Policy Committee

FAX TRANSMISSION

TO: Mike Kennedy

FROM: Brett O'Brien

FAX #:

DATE:

PAGES TO FOLLOW: 3

MESSAGE: If you revise the Army's COBRA report on SSDC with the attached milcon data, the following cost savings are generated: ROI - Immediate

NPV - $2.29 million in savings

One time cost - $1.2 million

Telephone: (202) 225-6760 Fax: (202) 226-0938
H-301 The Capitol

This fax contains confidential, priveleged information intended only for the addressee. Do not read, copy or disseminate it unless you are the addressee. If you have received this fax in error, please call us at (202) 225-0100.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION COSTS FOR THE ARMY'S SSDC RELOCATION SCENARIO

The Army's COBRA report for SSDC asserts that the relocation of SSDC personnel to Redstone Arsenal would require construction of new facilities at a cost of $21,476,119. This is inconsistent with: (1) memoranda from the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management and AMC headquarters, which state that adequate space exists at Redstone to accommodate 1,500 personnel; (2) data in the Army's COBRA report for ATCOM, which states that 243,000 sq.ft. of space is available at Redstone Arsenal to accommodate personnel after renovations are implemented; and (3) information obtained by the BRAC Commission staff during a site visit to Redstone Arsenal.

In light of the above, the following is an accurate calculation of the military construction/renovation costs required to relocate SSDC personnel at Redstone Arsenal:

1. Number of SSDC personnel (source: Army COBRA report for SSDC)	950
2. Subtract SSDC force structure reductions (source: Army ASIP report for SSDC)	-109
3. Subtract number of spaces made available at Redstone Arsenal due to Redstone force structure reductions (source: Army COBRA report for SSDC)	-144
Total number of new personnel spaces needed at Redstone Arsenal	697

4. Space is available at Redstone Arsenal to accommodate 1,600 personnel, with the following renovation requirements:

400 personnel in first building	--	no renovation required
500 personnel in second building	--	renovation cost of $20 per sq.ft.
700 personnel in third building	--	renovation cost per COBRA formula

(source: BRAC staff)

5. The following is the most cost-effective manner in which to obtain the 697 new personnel spaces required to accommodate SSDC personnel:

Place 400 SSDC personnel in first vacant building:	No renovation cost
Place 297 SSDC personnel in second vacant building: 297 personnel X 162 sq.ft./personnel X $20/sq.ft. =	$962,280 renovation cost

TOTAL MILITARY CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION COSTS: $962,280

NOTE: While only 697 new personnel spaces are required to accommodate SSDC personnel, a total of 841 SSDC personnel must be accommodated. Therefore, it is impossible to place all SSDC personnel in a single building at Redstone Arsenal given the capacity of its available facilities.

The TABS 10/11/94 briefing to the Undersecretary of the Army states that the operational impact of relocating SSDC personnel would result in "synergy with major PMs and Missile Command at Redstone" (see attached). However, the Army's COBRA report for SSDC failed to include any SSDC personnel reductions made possible by such synergy. While the above methodology also does not include SSDC personnel reductions that may be achievable due to synergy with similar functions currently performed at Redstone Arsenal, it is likely that such reductions are possible.

IMPACT SUMMARY
SPACE & STRATEGIC DEFENSE COMMAND, HUNTSVILLE, AL

OPERATIONAL: - none, local move
- synergy with major PMs and Missile Command at Redstone

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS		
REALIGNMENTS	35	915

ENVIRONMENTAL: No significant limitations

ECONOMIC: None

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED None

04-25-1995 15:38

Document Separator

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC SECURITY

April 10, 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number when responding 950308-1R1

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on March 1, 1995, regarding the Department's closure and realignment recommendations and process. In response to your request, enclosed are answers to your questions for the record.

I trust this information will be helpful, please let me know if there is anything else we can provide.

Sincerely,

Josh Gotbaum

Joshua Gotbaum

Enclosure

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 1: What is the annual cost of the excess infrastructure in the Joint Cross-Service areas remaining after the 1995 round?

Answer: I have asked the Comptroller to gather the data necessary to estimate the cost of maintaining excess infrastructure remaining after BRAC 95. I will forward a response as soon as we have been able to assimilate the data.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 2: The Defense Science Board (DSB) recommended a 20 percent cut in the laboratories' Civil Service personnel, in addition to the 4 percent per annum cut directed by Defense Policy Guidance 1995 through 1999. According to a senior DoD official, these cuts will result in a 35 percent reduction in these personnel by the turn of the century.

How much of a reduction in DoD laboratory infrastructure is contained in your recommendations?

How and when is DoD going to eliminate the excess infrastructure?

Answer: Most laboratory reductions -- the 35 percent you mention -- will come from the allocation of workload reductions rather than from BRAC actions.

The DoD recommendations for laboratory closures and realignments eliminate a relatively small amount of our excess capacity. However, there were noteworthy laboratory reductions including Naval Air Warfare Center Divisions at Lakehurst, NJ, and Indianapolis, IN, among others.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 3: The Joint Cross-Service Review Team provided two options, both resulting in the closure of 8 depots. These options would eliminate between 30 million to 35 million excess hours from a total excess capacity of about 40 million hours.

The final DoD recommendation would close 3 depots and realign 7 others. How many hours of excess capacity will be eliminated if these recommendations are approved?

Answer: If the DoD recommendations are adopted, excess capacity will be reduced by just over 20 million direct labor hours, or by about 50 percent of the total excess capacity. The Department believes this to be a significant accomplishment.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 4: What are the bases that were not recommended for closure by the Navy to the Secretary of Defense for economic reasons?

Which, if any, installations were substituted for these omitted closures?

Answer: Because of a concern over total job losses in the State of California and Territory of Guam, the Department of the Navy did not close the following activities, even though it otherwise, through its analytical process, could have arrived at a conclusion to recommend closure:

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Oakland, CA

Western Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, San Bruno, CA

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Construction and Repair, San Francisco, CA

Naval Warfare Assessment Division, Corona, CA, and Public Works Center, Guam

These actions reflect stand-alone decisions; there were no substitutions for these activities.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 5: What do your recommendations do to merge medical facilities across the Services in each region?

What possibilities were analyzed (cover by region)?

Answer: The Medical Joint Cross-Service Group looked at overlapping catchment areas in their analysis of the Medical Health Services System infrastructure. The group aggressively sought out opportunities for consolidation of inpatient services. Six of sixteen of the alternatives were based on the evaluation of potential mergers across the Services. These included Fort Meade and Fort Belvoir in the National Capital Region, USAF Academy Hospital in the Academy/Fort Carson area, Shaw AFB Hospital in the Shaw/Fort Jackson area, Langley AFB Hospital in the Tidewater area, and Wilford Hall Medical Center in the San Antonio area.

Of these alternatives, the hospital at Ft. Meade was recommended for downsizing by the Secretary of the Army, as was the hospital at Ft. Lee, Virginia. The Army also recommended the closure of Fitzsimmons Medical Center in Colorado, and both the Army and Air Force have agreed to realign their respective hospitals at Ft. Carson and the Air Force Academy to ensure adequate and cost efficient health care services remain to serve beneficiaries in the area. The Ft. Carson and Air Force Academy actions, along with the elimination of duplicate health care services in the San Antonio, Texas, Shaw AFB/Ft. Jackson, South Carolina, and the Virginia Tidewater areas will take place outside of the BRAC process. The Department is also implementing TRICARE, a congressionally-mandated regional health care program. TRICARE is designed to increase access, improve quality and curb the rising cost of health care, while providing a uniform benefit for eligible beneficiaries. TRICARE will also serve as an incentive to further reduce duplicate services and share resources across Service lines.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 6: How did DoD view the benefits of regional (medical) complexes?

Answer: The Department believes there are significant benefits to pursuing and evaluating consolidation of medical services and training. Through the base closure and Defense Health Program processes, the Department will continue to aggressively pursue these benefits. At the same time, the Department is implementing TRICARE, our congressionally-mandated regional managed health care program. TRICARE is designed to increase access, improve quality and curb the rising cost of health care, while providing a uniform benefit for eligible beneficiaries.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 7: NAS Meridian received two looks -- one at the service level and the second look at the joint level. If the joint ranking was higher, why didn't DoD take action based on the joint ranking, rather than accepting the Service recommendation?

Answer: The two "looks" are not the same. The Joint Cross-Service Groups were established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide a DoD-wide evaluation of their respective areas - undergraduate pilot training (UPT) in this case. They were further empowered to provide alternatives for subsequent analysis by the Military Departments which would reduce capacity and associated functional infrastructure. While the analyses conducted by the JCSG on UPT established a site value for each function (e.g., strike, helicopter, airlift/tanker, etc.), it did not rank sites by an overall average functional value. In producing its alternatives, the JCSG analyses utilized military values, functional values, and capacity resources. The Military Departments looked at the military value of installations based on all of their missions. Therefore, the evaluation conducted by the JCSGs was not a substitute for, but rather a component of, the Military Department analysis. In the case of Meridian, the Navy decided, and the Secretary of Defense agreed, that it did not need the training capability at NAS Meridian.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 8: If implemented, will the Department's recommendations to the Commission reduce a major portion of the excess capacity in any or all of the five cross-service functional areas? Please discuss those areas in detail where large amounts of excess capacity remain?

Answer: With the exception of Laboratories and Test & Evaluation, the DoD recommendations contain significant cross-service actions which generally achieve overall cross-service and excess capacity goals. In the Laboratories and Test & Evaluation areas, we will continue programmatic efforts to deal with remaining excess capacity, such as downsizing in place.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 9: In May 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that "Core is the capability maintained within organic Defense depots to meet readiness and sustainability requirements...Core depot maintenance capabilities will comprise only the ***minimum facilities, equipment and skilled personnel necessary*** to ensure a ready and controlled source of required competence." (emphasis added)

If DoD's recommendations are implemented, will any of the Services retain capacity above their core level?

If so, what are the reasons for retaining this capacity?

Answer: Although we have achieved a substantial depot maintenance capacity reduction all of the Services will retain some capacity above the core level. Further reductions will require developing a better sense of cross-service and private sector capabilities.

Question: Will DoD's base closure list result in the minimum number of facilities to ensure readiness and sustainability?

Answer: No. The goal is to reduce capacity, not merely the number of facilities. With regard to depots, the goal was to reduce excess capacity in a cost effective manner while retaining sufficient capability to meet critical readiness capabilities and requirements.

Question: If not, what means will the Department use to implement the Deputy Secretary's direction?

Answer: The definition and quantification of core requirements must be separated from the sizing of the infrastructure to support those requirements. It is impossible and undesirable to attempt to exactly match capacity and requirements. With that in mind, the Department believes that the proposed closure and realignments achieve the objectives set forth by the Deputy Secretary.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 10: In 1993, the Defense Base Closure Commission realigned part of the Defense Information Service Agency (DISA) into 16 information processing megacenters. At that time, all officials concluded there would be excess capacity even within these megacenters. Some have suggested that DISA actually requires only 5 megacenters. To realign, DISA would have to come to the Commission to change the 1993 recommendation.

Given that there is excess capacity within DISA, why are there not recommendations for further consolidation?

Answer: The current megacenter migration resulting from BRAC 93 began in FY 94 and is scheduled for completion through FY 98. Due to the ongoing establishment of these megacenters and their changing workload, meaningful capacity requirements are extremely difficult if not impossible to determine at this time. Before major changes can be made, the operating environment of this relatively new organization needs to stabilize.

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950414-13

FROM: MORELLA, CONSTANCE	TO: DIXON
TITLE: REP. (MD)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR. CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR. COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		BS
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR. INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING LETTERS ON CONCERN FROM CONSTITUENTS.

Due Date: 950418	Routing Date: 950414	Date Originated: 950412	Mail Date:

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA
8TH DISTRICT, MARYLAND

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
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WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-5341
FAX: (202) 225-1389

DISTRICT OFFICE:
51 MONROE STREET
SUITE 507
ROCKVILLE, MD 20850
(301) 424-3501
FAX: (301) 424-5992

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
SUBCOMMITTEES:
CHAIR, TECHNOLOGY
BASIC RESEARCH

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
SUBCOMMITTEES:
CIVIL SERVICE
HUMAN RESOURCES

CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUS FOR WOMEN'S ISSUES
CO-CHAIR

April 12, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore St, #1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing on behalf of several constituents who have contacted me to express their concerns regarding several proposed closures and realignments.

Copies of their correspondence to me are enclosed for your review and consideration. I appreciate your attention to the views of my constituents.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

Connie Morella

Constance A. Morella
Member of Congress

CAM:csp

THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE OF RECYCLED FIBERS

668190
230597

The Honorable Constance Morella
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congresswoman Morella,

I am writing this letter concerning DOD's proposal to shift Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) from Arlington, Va. (Crystal City) to San Diego, California, some 3000 miles away. The basis for this decision, as I can determine it, is that DOD could save close to 250 civilian billets and 50 military billets by combining NCCOSC, San Diego and SPAWAR. Additionally, this move would free up government owned space at the Washington Navy Yard to move Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), a command of over 4000 employees, to the Washington Navy Yard.

In examining DOD's rationale as contained in the recommendations to the BRAC, some significant inconsistencies and lack of thorough analysis appear. First, the DOD report indicates that the move of 666 civilian billets and 154 military billets and the other associated move costs would cost $24 million. A more realistic calculation indicates a much higher number. Assuming the 666 civilian personnel either move or accept severance pay, the cost to the government alone is over $33 million, at an average $50 thousand move cost per employee. Adding the military move costs increases the $33 million by $7 million for a total of $40 million. This calculation doesn't include the cost of moving the contents of SPAWAR to San Diego, or the facility improvements which must be made at the receiving facility in San Diego. It is evident, just from this simple analysis, that the cost of the move is at least double DOD's estimate. An additional point to be made about the inconsistency of DOD's position is the fact that a move of NAVSEA to the Washington Navy Yard is estimated to cost $160 million while a move of an entire command cross country is only projected to cost $24 million. Does this sound like consistency to you?

DOD analysis is also questionable. The reason for the move is to merge SPAWAR headquarters with it's NCCOSC operation in San Diego to provide an integrated product team for Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I). This move, DOD says, will save some 250 civilian billets and 50 military billets per year through elimination of duplicative work. What is missing from this analysis is the fact that the same billet saving could be realized by merging NAVSEA and SPAWAR to provide an integrated ship building team. SPAWAR has only 2 major product organizations (PD 70 and PD 80) whereas NAVSEA and NAVAIR each have a minimum of 10 product lines, which makes it highly questionable as to whether or not SPAWAR should even be a separate command. Supporting these two product organizations are 200+ overhead personnel which could be eliminated by a more cost effective merger with NAVSEA. Additionally, over 10% of product line and remaining functional organization billets could be eliminated by reduction of the duplication of efforts which currently exist. The Integrated Ship Product Team would not need to perform these functions.

As 90% of SPAWAR's work is in direct support of NAVSEA or OPNAV

sponsors in the Pentagon, it makes more sense to integrate the ship team here in the metropolitan area than to integrate the C4I team in San Diego, 3000 miles away from it's primary customers. This ship team merger would also save the estimated $40M+ moving cost to San Diego ($24M by DOD estimate). Additionally, with all the movements at White Oak, Naval Annex, Navy Yard, there should be enough government owned space to move SPAWAR within the metropolitan area vice moving it 3000 miles to find unoccupied government owned space in San Diego. Savings would be immediate and would amount to at least the same as the $360 million as cited in DOD's recommendation to the BRAC.

By keeping SPAWAR in the D.C. metropolitan area, no matter where physically located, over 1100 government families and over 2800 contractor support families will continue to exercise their purchasing power in this region. Notice the 2800 contractor personnel referred to in the prior sentence. That is the estimate of the number of private jobs which will be lost with the SPAWAR move to California. Not considered in the aforementioned job loss is spousal job loss of SPAWAR employees which could well be in excess of 600 positions. So, the total job loss to the area would be 3900+ jobs, not the 1100 referred to in DOD's recommendation to the BRAC. This move could also disproportionately impact female and minority employees who make up the bulk of lower paying positions and hence, probably would be unable to move with their positions to San Diego.

I ask for your assistance in getting this information to the BRAC for their consideration. Thank you for your time in this matter.

David N. Sivilla
1 Hyacinth Ct
Gaithersburg MD 20878
301-9770732

14106 Heathfield Court
Rockville, MD 20853
H-(301)460-8155; W-(301)295-5897

March 23, 1995

The Honorable C. A. Morella
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

668189
230596

Dear Congresswoman Morella:

I am a constituent of your district, and I am concerned about the consequences of certain proposals contained within the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 95) recommendations. Specifically, I feel it would be a serious mistake to split the diving medical research program currently at the Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI).

As a civilian employee research scientist in the diving department at NMRI, I am aware of the unique capabilities of this program. We have an integrated system of research which ranges from basic, cutting-edge diving medical research to applied research directly benefitting people in the field. The reason for having these research areas integrated is that it accelerates the transition of putting new knowledge to work in useful ways. Interactive feedback helps guide the research process at both ends. This wide range of research provides a synergistic atmosphere of complementary capabilities. This program greatly enhances Navy military readiness.

BRAC 95 proposes that NMRI be closed, with the underlying programs being combined with Army and Air Force research into a tri-service organization. This is a reasonable proposal. However, BRAC 95 also states that the NMRI manned diving unit will be moved Panama City, Florida. As it now stands, basic diving research will be moved to Forest Glen, Maryland. This will split a unique and well-integrated program in two.

The NMRI diving program is currently located in a fairly modern building separate from the rest of NMRI. This facility contains several hyperbaric chambers, which are large, complicated and heavy equipment, for small and large animals as well as for humans. Unique gas-handling capabilities are also operating in this facility. It would be extremely difficult and expensive to attempt to reproduce these capabilities a few miles away at the Forest Glen facility.

The BRAC 95 proposal to split the NMRI diving program will be expensive and wasteful, and it will diminish research capabilities as well as Navy military readiness. I respectfully suggest that this program be allowed to remain in its current facility and continue to produce high quality diving research.

Sincerely,

Milton J. Axley

668192
230599

March 2, 1995

Representative Constance Morella
223 CHOB
Washington D.C. 20515-2008

Dear Connie:

I have lived in your distict for 16 years and have voted for you in every election. Now I would like you to do something for me. The recent Base Realignment and Closue (BRAC) recommendations announced last week, includes a relocation of my agency, the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) to Fort Belvoir, VA. CAA is located at 8120 Woodmont Avenue in Bethesda (not far from your home). There are approximately 200 people employed here and I don't have to tell you that this relocation is another addition to the loss of jobs in Maryland with the compounding negative economic impact on our district's economy. While the rationale of the move out of a leased building to a government owned facility at Ft. Belvoir, as part of the Army's consolidation effort, is a great concept which will generate cost savings in the outyears, a more thoughtful analysis of this proposal will show it's not such a hot idea.

First of all there are many Army organizations in Virginia that are in leased facilities that could be relocated without the same disruption and with the similar cost savings. Most employees at CAA reside in Maryland (over one-third in Montgomery County mostly in your district). CAA is the highest analytical entity in the Army, and it is clear that many employees will opt to retire or seek employment elsewhere. rather than commute 2 to 4 hours a day. As the Army's "think tank", a large turnover of employees for the type of work we do at CAA (combat simulation, value added analysis etc...) would, in my personal opinion, degrade the vital analysis provided to the Army given the importance of institutional knowledge in this line of work.

I would appreciate your efforts to block the relocation of CAA to Ft. Belvoir, at least until all eligble sites in Virginia have been consolidated there. With the proposed closing of the White Oak Naval Weapons Center, Montgomery County is losing an inequitable amount of jobs. This proposal places an unnecessary disruption on CAA when more Virginia Army organizations could be relocated without as much disruption, similiar cost savings and a better result for the Army.

Please Help.

Sincerely,

Joe Gordon

Joe Gordon
7401 Westlake Terrace
Bethesda, Maryland 20817

(301)295-0450
Fax (301)469-4964

668188
230595

27 March 1995

The Honorable Constance Morella
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congresswoman Morella,

I am writing this letter concerning DOD's proposal to shift Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) from Arlington, Va. (Crystal City) to San Diego, California, some 3000 miles away. The basis for this decision, as I can determine it, is that DOD could save close to 250 civilian billets and 50 military billets by combining NCCOSC, San Diego and SPAWAR. Additionally, this move would free up government owned space at the Washington Navy Yard to move Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), a command of over 4000 employees, to the Washington Navy Yard.

In examining DOD's rationale as contained in the recommendations to the BRAC, some significant inconsistencies and lack of thorough analysis appear. First, the DOD report indicates that the move of 666 civilian billets and 154 military billets and the other associated move costs would cost $24 million. A more realistic calculation indicates a much higher number. Assuming the 666 civilian personnel either move or accept severance pay, the cost to the government alone is over $33 million, at an average $50 thousand move cost per employee. Adding the military move costs increases the $33 million by $7 million for a total of $40 million. This calculation doesn't include the cost of moving the contents of SPAWAR to San Diego, or the facility improvements which must be made at the receiving facility in San Diego. It is evident, just from this simple analysis, that the cost of the move is at least double DOD's estimate. An additional point to be made about the inconsistency of DOD's position is the fact that a move of NAVSEA to the Washington Navy Yard is estimated to cost $160 million while a move of an entire command cross country is only projected to cost $24 million. Does this sound like consistency to you?

DOD analysis is also questionable. The reason for the move is to merge SPAWAR headquarters with it's NCCOSC operation in San Diego to provide an integrated product team for Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I). This move, DOD says, will save some 250 civilian billets and 50 military billets per year through elimination of duplicative work. What is missing from this analysis is the fact that the same billet saving could be realized by merging NAVSEA and SPAWAR to provide an integrated ship building team. SPAWAR has only 2 major product organizations (PD 70 and PD 80) whereas NAVSEA and NAVAIR each have a minimum of 10 product lines, which makes it highly questionable as to whether or not SPAWAR should even be a separate command. Supporting these two product organizations are 200+ overhead personnel which could be eliminated by a more cost effective merger with NAVSEA. Additionally, over 10% of product line and remaining functional organization billets could be eliminated by reduction of the duplication of efforts which currently exist. The Integrated Ship Product Team would not need to perform these functions.

As 90% of SPAWAR's work is in direct support of NAVSEA or OPNAV

MAR 29 1995

sponsors in the Pentagon, it makes more sense to integrate the ship team here in the metropolitan area than to integrate the C4I team in San Diego, 3000 miles away from it's primary customers. This ship team merger would also save the estimated $40M+ moving cost to San Diego ($24M by DOD estimate). Additionally, with all the movements at White Oak, Naval Annex, Navy Yard, there should be enough government owned space to move SPAWAR within the metropolitan area vice moving it 3000 miles to find unoccupied government owned space in San Diego. Savings would be immediate and would amount to at least the same $360 million as cited in DOD's recommendation to the BRAC.

By keeping SPAWAR in the D.C. metropolitan area, no matter where physically located, over 1100 government families and over 2800 contractor support families will continue to exercise their purchasing power in this region. Notice the 2800 contractor personnel referred to in the prior sentence. That is the estimate of the number of private jobs which will be lost with the SPAWAR move to California. Not considered in the aforementioned job loss is spousal job loss of SPAWAR employees which could well be in excess of 600 positions. So, the total job loss to the area would be 3900+ jobs, not the 1100 referred to in DOD's recommendation to the BRAC. This move could also disproportionately impact female and minority employees who make up the bulk of lower paying positions and hence, probably would be unable to move with their positions to San Diego.

I ask for your assistance in getting this information to the BRAC for their consideration. Thank you for your time in this matter.

Jerry D Phaps

Document Separator

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

April 12, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950412-17

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you prepare for your April 17th hearing on the Joint Cross-Service Working Groups' involvement in the Pentagon's base closure and realignment recommendations, we would be most appreciative if you would raise a number of issues with regard to the consolidation of undergraduate pilot training. Enclosed are a number of questions that you and the commissioners may want to put before the witnesses.

We applaud the addition of the joint cross-service working groups into the base closure process. They provided a new and important analysis that considered jointness and the consolidation of roles and missions. Unfortunately, in the case of undergraduate pilot training, the Pentagon acted on only half of the mission. While they agreed that introductory fixed wing training operations could be consolidated between the Air Force and the Navy, the Pentagon chose not to act on the recommendation to consolidate primary helicopter training between the Navy and the Army. We believe that this is a grave mistake, and a missed opportunity to provide the American taxpayer with significant cost savings.

Mr. Chairman, we can no longer afford unnecessary duplications in the military when more efficient and equally effective training arrangements are available. The consolidation of primary helicopter training is long overdue, and we hope that you and the other commissioners will consider this opportunity during your deliberations of the 1995 base closure process.

With best regards, we are

Sincerely yours,

Terry Everett
TERRY EVERETT, MC

Richard Shelby
RICHARD SHELBY, USS

Howell Heflin
HOWELL HEFLIN, USS

Proposed Questions

BRAC 95 HEARING ON JOINT CROSS-SERVICE RECOMMENDATIONS

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

17 APRIL 1995

In November of 1994, the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training submitted three different alternatives for consideration by the military departments and Secretary Perry. According to documents submitted to the BRAC, each alternative reduced excess capacity while maintaining high military value. **Each of the three alternatives consistently recommended consolidating all military undergraduate helicopter pilot training at Fort Rucker.**

However, these recommendations were not adhered to in there entirety. Secretary Perry chose not to consolidate UHPT at Fort Rucker as recommended due to high MILCON costs associated with closing Whiting NAS. He then directed consolidating all Navy initial fixed wing training at Whiting NAS.

- Why is it that consolidation of UHPT at Rucker was not adopted?
- Since the Navy is moving all of its initial fixed wing training to Whiting NAS, wouldn't limited space be freed-up if UHPT was moved to Ft. Rucker?
- From an efficiency, doesn't it make sense to have all initial rotary wing training deducted at one location?

On March 30, 1993 General Colin Powell stated at the House Armed Services Committee Army Posture Hearing that, "I believe the proper place to do the centralization (of UHPT) and where it can be done very well is at Fort Rucker, Alabama". He went on to say, "I am committed to push this as hard as possible because there are real savings here and this is where we ought to find the savings."

The cost to transfer the UHPT operation at Whiting Field to Fort Rucker is less than $18 million dollars. In 1992 the DoD IG reported that relocation of UHPT to Fort Rucker would save at least $79 million dollars over 5 years.

- Is this savings estimate still valid today?

In a proposal to the Roles & Missions Commission, the Army has stated that by consolidating all primary DoD rotary wing training, integration and standardization among the services would be enhanced to truly support jointness. Each of the services would continue to provide advanced training for their own unique aspects of rotary wing aviation.

The Army has the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements without any need for expansion or new construction.

- From an efficiency and interoperability standpoint, doesn't it make sense for all introductory helicopter pilot training to be conducted by the Army?

During the BRAC 95 Navy hearing earlier this year, General Mundy commented that in the 1970's the Army was training Marine helicopter pilots, and that this arrangement worked very well.

- Is there any reason why the Marine Corps couldn't return to this arrangement?

In 1992, the JCS report on Roles & Missions recommended consolidation of all primary helicopter training with the Army. A team led by the Navy was tasked by Secretary of Defense Aspin to review this recommendation. Their findings concluded that consolidation would need to be put on hold until primary training for both fixed wing and rotary wing could be evaluated together, the service and operating costs of the new TH-67 trainer had been determined, and that the decision would be made with the context of a base closure round.

- Each of these points has been satisfied, yet DoD only adopted the fixed wing portion of the Cross-Service Group recommendation. Why was rotary wing training ignored?

Earlier this year, the Navy testified before the BRAC 95 commission that the consolidation of Navy helicopter training with the Army was not feasible because it was a "people" issue, or a quality of life issue and that Navy Pilots fly in more extreme weather conditions at sea than the Army does. If that in fact is the case, why does the Pentagon continue to request Army helicopters and pilots to support naval missions?

A number of Army missions in support of Naval operations:

<u>1983: Operation Urgent Fury</u>
•• Shipboard operations involving the Army's 18th Airborne Corps; UH-60's, OH-58A/C's, AH-1's

<u>1987: Operation Prime Chance</u>
•• Shipboard and overwater operations involving the Army's 4/17th CAV (now 4/2) with OH-58D's
•• valid CONOPS mission today

<u>1994: Operation Uphold Democracy - Haiti</u>
•• 10th Mountain Division operated from the USS Eisenhower
•• OH-58D's had extensive missions prior to invasion
•• UH-60's, CH-47's, OH-58A/C's and AH-1's transported troops and equipment to the AO for several days, followed by command & control missions

Each Army Aviation unit has a task for shipboard operations incorporated in their mission essential list of tasks. The Army trains for shipboard operations and performs shipboard operations.

In 1992, MGen. Dave Robbins, then-Commander of the Army Aviation Center, noted that one of the main reasons the Navy was opposed to consolidating this training with the Army was because the Navy used initial fixed-wing training as a "cutting" tool for students.

- Do you believe this to be the case, and is there any legitimate reason why the Navy needs this extra "cutting" tool?

- Could the Navy use the Army's training syllabus that places student pilots directly into the rotary wing pipeline?

According to the DoD IG, "Relocating the Navy's primary helicopter training to Fort Rucker would relieve ground and air traffic congestion at Whiting Field NAS."

- Is there a problem with congestion at Whiting Field, both in the air and on the ground? If so, would relocation of the Navy's Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training program free up space at Whiting Field?

- How does Fort Rucker compare with Whiting with regard to available space?

- Since the Army already owns nearly 80% of all DoD helicopters, does Fort Rucker have the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements?

CONSOLIDATION
of
UNDERGRADUATE HELICOPTER PILOT TRAINING
at
FORT RUCKER

To make the most of each defense dollar we need to work more efficiently by eliminating redundancies within DoD. This will involve closing bases as well as consolidating training operations, all while maintaining a strong military peacetime readiness with the capability to meet national security contingencies.

Fort Rucker is the "home" to Helicopter or Rotary Winged aircraft pilot training for all U.S. Military Services and allies except the U.S. Navy and the Coast Guard. Consolidation would mean that all services would be taught in a basic core curriculum followed by service unique tracks. This would standardize DoD operations across the fleet, while establishing jointness and produce long-term infrastructure savings and interoperability. The Navy however, has resisted consolidating Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training (UHPT) for more than 20 years. Their argument against consolidation is fraught with inconsistencies. The Army Aviation leadership understands the requirements of interservice missions having supported naval operations from ships in the Persian Gulf and more recently shipboard operations off Haiti.

Consolidation of primary helicopter training is long overdue. The army aviation center at Fort Rucker, Alabama has proven to be an ideal place to train rotary wing pilots from all the services and can easily absorb the expanded mission.

•• On November 23, 1994, by direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training submitted three different alternatives for consideration by the military departments and Secretary Perry. Each alternative reduced excess capacity while maintaining high military value. **Each alternative recommended consolidating all military undergraduate helicopter pilot training at Fort Rucker.**

•• On March 30, 1993 General Colin Powell stated at the House Armed Services Committee Army Posture Hearing that, "I believe the proper place to do the centralization (of UHPT) and where it can be done very well is at Fort Rucker, Alabama". He went on to say, "I am committed to push this as hard as possible because there are real savings here and this is where we ought to find the savings."

•• Relocation of the Navy's UHPT program would free up space at Whiting field that could facilitate the potential closure or realignment of that naval aviation training base in the future.

•• The cost to close the UHPT operation at Whiting Field is less than $18 million dollars. The DoD IG reported the relocation of UHPT to Fort Rucker will save at least $79 million dollars over 5 years.

•• According to the DoD IG, "Relocating the Navy's primary helicopter training to Fort Rucker would relieve ground and air traffic congestion at Whiting Field NAS, and eliminate inefficiencies associated with maintaining separate Army and Navy facilities."

•• The Army owns 79% of all DoD helicopters and does 85% of all DoD rotary wing acquisitions. The Army is recognized as the World Leader in helicopter pilot training.

•• The Army's decision to buy Bell Rangers (TH-67 Creek) as its new training helicopter means all services use virtually the same helicopter trainer.

•• At the March 1995 BRAC hearing on Navy issues, General Carl Mundy said, "pilot training worked well for the Marine Corps when the Army was training our pilots in the 1970's."

•• The 1992 Joint Chiefs of Staff report to Congress on Roles and Missions recommended the consolidation of all UHPT at Fort Rucker.

•• Since 1970, nine studies by the Pentagon and the GAO have shown the consolidation of Navy UHPT from Whiting Field, Florida to Fort Rucker, Alabama would save money.

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950327-5

FROM: NEMFAKOS, CHARLES	TO: DIXON
TITLE: EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	
ORGANIZATION: BASE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS	
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

Response to "Navy" Data

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT		FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR. CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR. COMMUNICATIONS	✓			REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		528
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION	✓			AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR. INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

ANSWERS TO "QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD" FROM THE MARCH 6 HEARING.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950327	Date Originated: 950324	Mail Date:

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-0650-F13
BSAT/CD
24 March 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number
when responding 950327-5

Dear Chairman Dixon:

In response to your letter of March 10, 1995, I am forwarding the responses to the questions for the record contained therein. The remainder of the response to the Commission question number 10 and responses to questions 1 through 4 with respect to NUWC New London from Senator Christopher Dodd will be answered in separate correspondence. In accordance with Section 2903(c)(5) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, I certify the information provided to you in this transmittal is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I have provided two identical copies of this information to the United States Congress and these can be found in the Reading Rooms established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Room B15 in the Russell Senate Office Building and Room G2L2 in the Rayburn House Office Building, respectively.

Sincerely,

Charles P. Nemfakos
Vice Chairman
Base Structure Evaluation Committee/
Executive Director
Base Structure Analysis Team

NAVY QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD RESULTING FROM THE 06 MARCH NAVY HEARINGS

1. Question: Has the Navy provided to the Commission all of the information used in its decision-making process? If not, please provide it within the next five days.

Answer: Yes. The Base Structure Data Base, which contains the certified data used for analysis, and the minutes and deliberative reports, which contain the decision-making record, were transmitted to the Commission on March 1, 1995. Copies of the analytical tool outputs for each subcategory (including capacity analysis summaries, military value matrices, and configuration analysis summaries) were transmitted on March 9, 1995. Revisions to the certified data, which were received by the Navy after transmittal of the Base Structure Data Base, were forwarded on March 14, 1995. Final certified data for several COBRA scenarios was transmitted on March 20, 1995.

2. Question: Secretary Gotbaum described the method used by the Services to create a military value ranking for each base in a category which was used to determine closure or realignment choices. Are there any circumstances where the Navy closed or realigned bases which ranked higher than bases not included on the Navy list? If so, please explain the reason for not following the military value rankings.

Answer: There are a number of instances where the Department of the Navy's recommendations close or realign bases with higher relative military value scores than bases which were not affected by recommendations. The reason for these results is inherent in the process followed by the DON, which was identical to that used and validated by the Commission in BRAC-93.

As described in our report on pages 21 to 25, military value analysis was conducted of each subcategory of activities to arrive at a relative score which represented how each activity in a subcategory related to a series of questions which portrayed the characteristics of the subcategory. The results of the military value analysis and the capacity analysis for each subcategory were then used as inputs to the linear programming model used for configuration analysis. For the Department of the Navy, configuration analysis sought to identify that set of installations for each subcategory that both would satisfy the future force structure requirements and would allow the retention of installations whose overall military value average was at least equal to the average of the current set of existing installations. This methodology was developed because of the nature of naval installations, which tend to be multi-functional activities (as opposed to one unit/mission = one base) with locational limitations (e.g., support to the fleet in the Atlantic and Pacific). The restriction on average military value derives from the philosophy that the Department, after base closure, should be in at least as "good" a position as it is now vis-a-vis the installations it retains. The operational flexibility that is central to naval forces depends on operational and forward deployment requirements. As these requirements change, the nature of and requirements for our bases change. As a result, although we use individual activities to arrive at a perspective on the military value of a particular subcategory, the overall value to the Department is

oriented on the aggregate. Configuration analysis allowed us to seek the best installations which would satisfy our future requirements in an operationally feasible manner.

The use of this methodology and the resultant closure scenarios developed do lead to results where installations are recommended for closure as a function of satisfaction of force structure requirements rather than absolute military value. An example of this result, as noted during our testimony before the Commission on March 6, 1995, is Long Beach Naval Shipyard. While Long Beach's military value is about .02 points higher than the military value of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Long Beach was selected for closure to eliminate excess shipyard capacity. Portsmouth was considered for closure but not recommended because of concerns over future nuclear force requirements. Another example may be found in training air stations, where NAS Meridian was recommended for closure and NAS Corpus Christi was recommended for realignment. Both have higher military value scores than NAS Whiting Field, which is to be retained. The two recommendations are the result of the various installations' ability to satisfy pilot training requirements, rather than an arbitrary military value cut-off. Given the diverse nature of the activities in the Technical Center subcategory, the Administrative Activities subcategory, and the Reserve Activities subcategory, while military value was helpful in arraying the capabilities of these activities, satisfaction of future capacity requirements was key to the scenarios which were considered and which resulted in the Department's final base closure recommendations.

In summary, the nature of naval bases is such that they do not have equal capacity to support the force structure. In determining which bases to close, we need to be able to retain bases with the best collection of military value that also satisfy capacity requirements. If this analytical approach was not followed, we would either have to keep more excess capacity than we need or to close more base structure than we can operationally afford, resulting in a requirement to build additional capacity at the remaining bases.

3. Question: Some communities have expressed concern about inconsistent levels of cooperation from base commanders in preparing their rebuttals to the DoD proposals. What guidance did the Navy give its base commanders regarding cooperation with local communities during the BRAC process?

Answer: The primary guidance to commanders regarding conduct of the BRAC process was contained in public affairs messages issued on April 15, 1994; January 18, 1995; February 3, 1995; February 15, 1995; February 23, 1995; and February 24, 1995. Key points relating to dealings with local communities are as follows:

- The importance of maintaining open lines of communication between base commanders and local communities cannot be overemphasized. Uninterrupted base participation in face-to-face meetings with community leaders/neighbors is important to reinforce longstanding community partnerships, to address possible rumors and misinformation, and to make sure all our neighbors are getting the big picture. All commands can and should continue to pursue all current and planned community

relations and partnership/outreach activities, but should remain mindful of longstanding Navy policy to remain impartial.

- Prior to the Secretary of Defense's forwarding of the BRAC-95 recommendations to the Commission, no public release of the Navy recommendations, or data or analysis compiled in support of those recommendations, was authorized. However, commands were authorized to respond to inquiries using normally releasable, unclassified information, such as number of employees, military population, payroll, command and tenants' missions, current base contracts, etc.

- Following submission of the DoD recommendations, inquiries received by local commands relating to factual information upon which naval installations were recommended for closure or realignment can be answered to the extent that factual and accurate information is on hand, properly coordinated, and cleared for release by the local command's chain-of-command. Details concerning an installation's mission, size, number of personnel, payroll, and other local information normally releasable may continue to be released. However, commanders were advised to avoid speculation about whether the Commission will approve or disapprove the list of recommendations, what impact closure of a specific installation would have upon local areas or military capabilities, and what savings may be gained.

- There are no restrictions on hosting informational briefings or tours of base facilities for community group representatives. The decisions to accept such visit requests may be made at the command level. With regard to Congressional visits, commanders were advised that members of Congress should be given access to installations for the purpose of learning about base operations and missions and about community relations-related topics, such as the impact of the base on the local community. Further, base commanders should be prepared to provide this type of information to anyone seeking it. The only limitation is that commanders must avoid speculation on whether their installation should or should not be approved for closure or realignment.

- In their official capacities, naval personnel must remain neutral and should avoid the appearance of taking sides relating to a decision to close or realign a certain base. Command officials must exercise discretion in hosting on-base activities, accepting invitations to speak, or attending public functions in their official capacity which could be considered inconsistent with DoD standards of conduct policy or misconstrued as support for any particular cause vis-a-vis BRAC. In their capacities as private citizens, however, DON personnel are permitted to attend hearings, while not in uniform and during off-duty hours.

4. Question: Will the Navy have excess capacity in any major categories or installation groupings if the Secretary of Defense's recommendations are accepted by this Commission? Please elaborate.

Answer: Some excess capacity will remain in virtually every subcategory of activity evaluated by the Department. The nature and extent of the excess varies from subcategory to subcategory. In some cases, elimination of this excess was infeasible due to the configurations of particular types of installations or to the nature of the excess capacity. For instance, in the Training and Education subcategory, significant excess capacity will remain in fleet training activities. While various closure scenarios were considered by the Department for eliminating this excess, given a requirement for fleet training to be located proximate to the fleet and given that most of this excess capacity represents individual classrooms, no obvious, cost-effective solutions could be developed which would eliminate this excess. Likewise, analysis of the Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair demonstrated that, while there is excess capacity, execution of the workload of these activities is strictly tied to the locations of the private sector contractors to whom ship work has been awarded. Closure of any of these activities with more than nominal future workload requires considerable travel and remote support and offers no appreciable savings.

In other cases, the Department determined that retention of the excess capacity was prudent to protect future flexibility. For instance, in naval stations, the Department determined that it was unwilling to recommend closure of homeporting operations at several installations because of future uncertainty in operational tempo and the size of the active force. While closure of additional naval stations was possible, it is critical to understand that the excess capacity that was calculated based on requirements to have significant portions of the fleet forward deployed at all times. In fact, the capacity that will remain in naval stations and air stations, if the Secretary of Defense's recommendations are accepted by this Commission, will be insufficient to house all of the ships and aircraft that are in the FY 2001 force structure than would be the case if the naval forces were to be viewed as static and in a garrison status. Similarly, in the case of Ordnance Activities, we calculated significant excess capacity. However, no recommendations were issued due to concern over long-term storage requirements (based on the uncertainty of overseas rollbacks, removal of fleet assets, and the ability to demilitarize our existing inventories) and the deficiency identified in outload capacity to transfer ordnance during wartime contingencies.

5. Question: The Navy recommendations include a long list of redirects. What is the value of the military construction costs eliminated by the redirects? Are these costs based on the 1993 COBRA analyses or on the more detailed assessments performed during implementation planning?

Answer: Department of the Navy BRAC-95 redirects would result in construction cost avoidances of $1,305 million. Construction cost avoidance estimates included in our return on investment analyses are a reflection of our most recent assessment of actual implementation requirements.

6. Question: Have the Navy and the Air Force agreed to a fully integrated Undergraduate Pilot Training program? How did this affect the Navy's recommendations to close or realign pilot training bases?

Answer: No. The Deputy Secretary of Defense in an October 24, 1994 memorandum, with the concurrence of the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy, approved Air Force and Navy plans to implement joint fixed-wing flight training programs and additional joint training initiatives. Today, these consist of a consolidated initial fixed-wing aircraft training program and three joint NFO programs (advanced navigator, electronic warfare officer, and weapons system officer training). Navy helicopter and carrier aviation training (strike and advanced E2/C2) will not be integrated.

In developing its recommendations, during configuration analysis, the Navy accounted for Air Force training that is projected, under current agreements, to be conducted at naval air stations. Likewise, the Navy adjusted its PTR to reflect training that is scheduled to go to Air Force facilities.

7. Question: The Navy has requested significant changes in the plan for basing aircraft that resulted from the 1993 decision to close Marine Corps Air Station El Toro in California and Naval Air Station Cecil Field in Florida. Please explain what has changed since 1993 that caused the Navy to require such a dramatic change?

Answer: Since BRAC-93 there have been significant reductions in Naval Aviation Forces. For instance, we have retired the A-6 attack aircraft series, reduced the maritime patrol aircraft inventory by about one-third, and eliminated approximately fifty percent of the Navy's F-14 inventory with further reductions forthcoming. After reviewing several options for reducing this excess, we concluded that utilizing existing excess air station capacity and avoiding unnecessary new construction were both more cost-effective and operationally responsive. In the process we were able to avoid incurring about three-quarters of a billion dollars in new construction costs, a clear savings to the taxpayer.

8. Question: When considering the redirect involving Marine Corps Air Stations Tustin and El Toro, did the Navy consider redirecting any aviation assets to March AFB, California? If so, why wasn't the option to use excess capacity at March acceptable to the DON?

Answer: Yes, we did discuss the possible use of March AFB during deliberations. However, since March AFB was previously closed as an operational base, this alternative would have involved the reopening of a previously closed base, which is not consistent with the Department's policy. Additionally, because the Air Force is eliminating the hospital, commissary, exchange and all other quality of life support infrastructure, as part of reopening this facility, we would have been faced with the task of recreating and replicating facilities that already exist at the base to which the Marine Corps aircraft units are currently scheduled to relocate.

9. Question: It appears that the Navy ran a consolidated Cost of Base Realignment Actions, or COBRA, on Naval Air Warfare Center Indianapolis and Naval Surface Warfare Center Louisville. Were closure decisions based on the combined COBRA and not on individual assessments? What are the specific costs to close and the twenty year Net Present

Value for the separate recommendations affecting Indianapolis and Louisville? Please provide separated COBRA information for any other consolidated COBRA analyses.

Answer: Our assessment of the potential closure/realignment of technical centers began with individual activity assessments. During our analysis, we looked at a series of closure alternatives involving Indianapolis, Louisville and NSWC Crane, activities with some similar functions and facilities. Our final decision was to close Indianapolis and Louisville, and as a result, transfer some functions from both activities to a common receiving site, NSWC Crane. Combining these two actions into a single COBRA analysis allowed us to most accurately portray changes in costs associated with this consolidation at NSWC Crane.

The costs and savings associated with the separate Indianapolis and Louisville recommendations are as follows: NAWC Indianapolis: One-Time Costs - $77.6 M, 20 Year NPV (Savings) - $392.1 M; NSWC Louisville: One-Time Costs - $103.9 M, 20 Year NPV (Savings) - $243.7 M.

In two cases, our analysis resulted in a single COBRA run for physically separated installations. In both cases, the analysis was consolidated to more accurately and completely portray an interrelated set of closure/realignment actions, as follows:

a. Indianapolis/Louisville. As noted above, in our final deliberations on technical centers, the closures of NAWC Indianapolis and NSWC Louisville were combined into a single COBRA analysis to most accurately portray changes in costs associated with consolidation at NSWC Crane. As requested, we have broken this analysis into two separate COBRA runs, one for Indianapolis (see Tab 1) and one for Louisville (see Tab 2). The "stand-alone" Indianapolis scenario also includes a revision to the construction cost avoidances shown at Indianapolis (to reflect final certified data). The "stand-alone" Louisville scenario also includes minor revisions to both one-time moving costs and the identification of workload transferred to Watervliet (to reflect final certified data). A revised version of the consolidated Indianapolis/Louisville run, incorporating these revisions, is also provided (see Tab 3).

b. Undergraduate Pilot Training. In the area of Undergraduate Pilot Training, we conducted a single COBRA analysis that comprised two separate installations: (1) closure of Meridian and (2) closure of the training air station at Corpus Christi and subsequent establishment of Naval Air Facility Corpus Christi (to include the redirect of mine warfare helicopters to Corpus Christi). These actions were interrelated, and consequently, more accurate and complete cost and savings estimates were obtained by considering these actions in a single COBRA analysis. For example, the closure of Meridian results in the need to use Corpus Christi for primary flight operations necessary for advanced strike training. Similarly, the consolidation of mine warfare assets is facilitated by the realignment of the training air station mission at Corpus Christi. As requested, we have broken this COBRA analysis into two COBRA runs, one for each of the two separate installations involved in the scenario (Meridian (see Tab 4)

and Corpus Christi (see Tab 5)). The "stand-alone" Corpus Christi scenario also includes a refinement to our estimation of changes in base operating support associated with consolidation of mine warfare assets at NAF Corpus Christi. A revised version of the consolidated Corpus/Meridian COBRA run, incorporating this revision, is also provided (see Tab 6).

In two cases (NAS Cecil Field redirect and MCASs El Toro/Tustin redirect), a single DON recommendation incorporated more than one COBRA run. Based on discussions with your staff, to assist in your evaluation of these recommendations, we have also provided a consolidated COBRA run for each of these two recommendations (see Tab 7 for the East Coast redirect and Tab 8 for the West Coast redirect).

10. Question: Did the 60%-40% depot workload split between public and private facilities required under current law have any effect on the Navy's recommendations? At the present time what are the Navy's public-private depot workload percentages?

Answer: No, the 60/40 requirement did not impact our recommendations. The cumulative effect of all of our recommendations, if approved, will not inhibit our ability to comply with the law. We do not have certified data on the current public-private depot workload percentages, but will obtain such data. The response to this part of the question will be forwarded separately.

11. Question: Minutes from the Navy's Base Structure Evaluation Committee deliberations during the 1993 round state that the Committee was "concerned that there was insufficient capacity on the West Coast for dry-docking carriers and other large ships." Therefore, they agreed not to consider Long Beach Naval Shipyard for closure. What has changed since 1993 that allows you to recommend the shipyard for closure?

Answer: The force structure that drives requirements declined by almost 20% overall since the 1993 BRAC analysis. These reductions are reflected in the 1995 BRAC capacity analysis, which supports the closure of Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

12. Question: According to the Navy's COBRA analysis, the closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard results in an immediate return on investment and a 20 year Net Present Value of more than $2 billion and ongoing savings of $150 million per year. Was this level of savings compared to the projected costs of improving the 688-class submarine work capabilities at other shipyards? What is the capability of the private sector submarine builders to do non-refueling submarine overhaul work? Did you consider the use of this capacity in your analysis?

Answer: Our BRAC-95 analysis was based on programmed workload scheduled to be performed in organic naval shipyards. Private sector capability was not considered, and, as specified in the BRAC law, only certified data was utilized. Our analysis identified different combinations of potential naval shipyard closures, some of which included moving

Portsmouth's workload to other naval shipyards. At the conclusion of the analysis process, it was the BSEC's military judgment to remove Portsmouth from further consideration for closure. Future decisions to refuel, defuel and inactivate SSN Class 688 submarines make the precise determination of nuclear requirements difficult, and Portsmouth has a unique role as the center of excellence for the 688 submarine.

13. Question: Based on our staff's preliminary review of the Navy's information, it appears that nuclear shipyard capacity is approximately 40% in excess of needs, yet the Navy is only closing the only shipyard with no nuclear capacity. Please explain why this excess capacity is being carried?

Answer: In analyzing Naval Shipyards, the relevant measure to determine excess capacity was the aggregate capacity of all of the shipyards. Nuclear and non-nuclear capacity were calculated only to see if there were individual capacity limitations. Force structure downsizing has reduced the overall numbers of nuclear ships/submarines, which could support the closure of an additional shipyard. However, in the Department's military judgment with respect to the uncertainty of future nuclear workload (refueling versus inactivation), it was prudent to maintain sufficient organic capability to meet unanticipated nuclear work requirements.

14. Question: Did the Navy consider the alternative of moving Naval Air Warfare Center Point Mugu test and evaluation missions to Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake or Eglin Air Force Base as suggested by the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group?

Answer: The DON did not examine the Point Mugu-China Lake alternative, since Pt. Mugu is already part of China Lake. While physically separate, the missions of these activities are interdependent, and both the sea range at Point Mugu and the land ranges at China Lake are required by the Department.

The DON did request a gaining service COBRA response from the Air Force for movement of Point Mugu T&E missions to Eglin AFB. Data was not received, so no further analysis could be performed.

15. Question: The Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in a 13 February 1995 memo, stated, "The laboratories retain significant duplication and excess capacity..." To reduce this excess, the Joint Cross-Service Group recommended the consolidation of C-4I acquisition and R&D at Fort Monmouth and explosives to Picatinny Arsenal and the Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake. The Navy did not accept these alternatives and decided to move C-4I to San Diego and to maintain explosives at Indian Head. Why did the Navy not adopt the alternatives recommended by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

Answer: The alternatives of moving C^4I to either Fort Monmouth or Hanscom AFB were considered, as was a DON alternative of combining Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command with its subordinate element, Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance

Center (NCCOSC), at San Diego. The consolidation at San Diego produced five times as great an annual savings and a 20 year net present value of over $300 M more than either of the two cross-service alternatives.

Regarding movement of explosives to Picatinny and China Lake, COBRA analysis was performed on completely closing Indian Head and moving all functions to China Lake. Our analysis showed that up front costs were very large, both in absolute terms and in relation to potential savings. This fact, coupled with the lengthy payback period, made this alternative unacceptable. The DON requirement for Insensitive Munitions aboard ships is unique within DoD for both explosives and propellants. The replication costs for duplicate Energetics-Explosive facilities at Picatinny, while retaining the facilities at Indian Head required for Propellant efforts, were not cost-effective.

16. Question: Regarding the Navy's decision not to close the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), Philadelphia, the Navy report states: "the gap between attributed costs and savings was most likely to narrow under the realities of implementation, resulting in an even narrower benefit between costs and savings." This implies an inaccuracy in the data. Please explain this comment.

Answer: The return on investment for the COBRA scenario which closed ASO and consolidated functions at SPCC was viewed as marginal because of limited savings. In the context of the COBRA analysis, the BSEC recognized that savings were slight because ongoing consolidation efforts between ASO and SPCC are leading to a more efficient organization by reducing the overall cost of operations and that COBRA costs and savings were being measured at a point in time before those consolidation efforts were complete. Once all planned "in-place" management initiatives have been completed, it was likely that fewer savings would accrue than as calculated by the COBRA algorithms for the relocation to SPCC. Additionally, the BSEC felt that the costs and potential inefficiencies of disrupting these consolidation efforts could outweigh the relatively small benefits of the COBRA savings estimates.

17. Question: The Defense Logistics Agency plans to move some of the Defense Industrial Supply Center's mission out of Philadelphia. Did the Navy's analysis relative to the two inventory control points in Philadelphia and Mechanicsburg consider the DLA recommendation and excess office space that it will make available in Philadelphia?

Answer: No. The Navy's analysis focussed on the capacities at the two inventory control points. We were unaware of the DLA recommendation relating to the Defense Industrial Supply Center until after SECNAV's recommendations were forwarded to SECDEF.

18. Question: With regard to closing the facilities on Guam, please explain how operational commanders in the Pacific provided input and participated in the decision?

Answer: As directed by the Secretary of the Navy, the BSEC actively interacted with the major owners/operators of Navy and Marine Corps installations on matters concerning fleet operations, support and readiness. Accordingly, there were a series of BSEC deliberative sessions with the Fleet CINCs, Fleet Marine Force Commanders, Systems Commanders, the Navy and Marine Corps personnel chiefs, and the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Force Commanders. During these meetings, the BSEC provided information on all aspects of the DON BRAC-95 process including data collection, analytical approaches, capacity and military value analyses, and the development of alternative closure and/or realignment scenarios. These meeting provided CINCPACFLT a direct forum to address the potential operational impacts of BSEC recommendations. Additionally, the CINCs and other major claimants provided the direct responses to COBRA scenario data calls including such information as functions which could be eliminated and/or transferred and the identification of potential receiver sites. The deliberative session discussions and the COBRA scenario responses provided the basis for a clearer understanding of the need to only maintain access to Guam rather than continued presence.

19. Question: The Navy's Detailed Analysis states that the Navy intends to retain the waterfront assets on Guam for contingencies and to support the afloat tender. If the Navy were guaranteed access to necessary facilities in the event of hostilities, would it consider allowing the Government of Guam access to the waterfront? What Navy property on Guam will be disposed of after implementation of the recommendations?

Answer: Decisions regarding the retention of specific waterfront and other property at Naval Activities Guam will not be finalized until the BRAC recommendations are approved. The Navy is, however, committed to closing bases right. Our goal is to empower local communities to play a principal role in determining what happens to a base when it closes. In the case of the facilities in Guam, since our recommendation is clear that we need to maintain access to this strategic location, a careful balance will be struck between community reuse and the retention of the necessary facilities for potential operational contingencies.

20. Question: The Navy's justification for recommending the closure of the Naval Air Facility, Adak in Alaska is that the Navy's anti-submarine warfare surveillance mission no longer requires the facility to base or support its aircraft. According to documents submitted to the Commission, the air facility at Adak has already been drawn down to meet Congressionally-mandated budget reductions and the Navy's overall downsizing initiatives. Does this mean that there has been a decrease in the threat since 1993, or has the mission of anti-submarine warfare that was carried out at Adak been transferred elsewhere?

Answer: The decision on the mission of NAF Adak had already been appropriately made by CINCPACFLT. In fact, certified data relating to capacity and military value indicated that continuous maritime patrol aircraft deployments to NAF Adak were discontinued in FY 1994. The base closure process is not the process by which the DON makes operational decisions. Our decision on Adak was, in part, predicated on the fact that there was no operational need for Adak.

21. Question: As the Navy made its closure and realignment decisions, what role did environmental compliance play in its analysis? For example, did the fact that a base's expansion potential is limited by environmental restrictions play a major role in the analysis? Were bases in Clean Air Act or other non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?

Answer: The Navy issued a comprehensive environmental data call that captured the full range of environmental issues on each base. The presence of environmental management issues, their impact on operations, and any limitations they presented were characterized for each environmental area including endangered/threatened species, cultural/historic resources, wetlands, environmental facilities, air quality, pollution control, hazardous materials, installation restoration sites, Air Installation Compatible Use Zones, and land use. The current and past impact of these environmental issues on base operations and development was included, as appropriate, in the military value analysis. Once closure/realignment alternatives were identified, an environmental summary for each scenario was prepared which noted the anticipated air quality impacts and other anticipated environmental impacts resulting from the action for both closing and receiving bases. In no case did the environmental condition of a base, or the anticipated impact and/or the expansion potential of a receiving base, necessarily preclude a recommendation. Many of the recommendations resulted in a positive environmental impact.

Bases in non-attainment areas were not viewed differently from those in attainment areas. While the air quality status of the area in which a base was located was reviewed as part of the environmental analysis, in no case did air quality impact the process of selection or determination of closure or realignment sites.

22. Question: How many installations recommended for closure in this or prior rounds are expected to have substantial portions of land placed into caretaker status due to unique contamination problems?

Answer: For the installations identified for closure under BRAC-95, no contamination sites have been identified for which recognized/accepted remediation processes are unavailable. Installation restoration site characterization and clean up will continue after operational closure, if not yet completed.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Senator Christopher J. Dodd (Connecticut)

With respect to the Navy recommendation to relocate the Nuclear Training Commands (NTC) from Orlando to Charleston:

1. Question: How will BRACC Appropriations already committed and spent for planned relocation of NTC at New London, be recouped in this redirection action?

Answer: The 1993 Commission recommended, and Congress and the President concurred in, the closure of Naval Training Center (NTC) Orlando. This recommendation directed the move of a tenant of NTC Orlando, Naval Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center (NNPPTC), to Submarine Base New London. The Department of the Navy, in accordance with the base closure law, has begun the planning and budgeting process to move this school. The DON will not know what appropriations are able to be recouped until the BRAC-95 recommendations are finalized.

2. Question: How have savings promised in 1993 been recouped in the 1995 recommendations to redirect the NTCs? Are these savings lost permanently?

Answer: The savings calculated in BRAC-93 result from the closure of NTC Orlando, which will still occur. The recommended redirect for NNPPTC does not affect those savings.

3. Question: If the proposed savings and return on investment (ROI) from the redirect of the NTCs are so substantial as to require the 1995 BRACC to overturn the 1993 BRACC decision, why were the savings not recognized in 1993? Was Charleston considered for relocation in 1993?

Answer: The 1993 Commission overturned the DON's recommendation relating to closure of the piers at Submarine Base, New London, making the move of NNPPTC unacceptable because classroom and berthing facilities at New London anticipated to be used for this relocation were no longer available.

Charleston was not considered as a receiving site in 1993. In selecting a receiving site in BRAC-93 for this tenant of NTC Orlando, it was determined that the movement of NNPPTC to Submarine Base New London would create a training center of excellence by locating the NNPPTC with the Submarine School, taking advantage of the infrastructure vacated by the relocation of fleet operational units. In the absence of these facilities, a similar center of excellence will be created by locating the NNPPTC with the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Training Unit and the follow-on training with the moored training ships at Charleston.

4. Question: What methodology was applied to identify Charleston as the new location of the NTCs? What other sites were examined? What were the associated military values and cost?

Answer: During BRAC-95 deliberations, the BSEC recognized that the 1993 Commission's decision to retain the piers at New London had significantly increased military construction (MILCON) costs for relocating NNPPTC to New London, making this receiving site much less attractive. Accordingly, Weapons Station Charleston was introduced as an alternative which will achieve similar expected training synergies and greater savings from reduced MILCON and PCS costs. No other sites were examined. The one-time cost associated with the redirect to Charleston is $147.9 million; the one-time savings is $162.5 million; and the annual recurring savings is $5.3 million.

5. Question: What are the specific flaws in the 1993 BRACC decision that require the proposed redirection at this time?

Answer: The 1993 Commission did not accept the Department of the Navy's recommendation to close the piers at New London, resulting in unavailability of facilities for the NNPPTC move upon the closure of NTC Orlando.

With respect to the Navy decision to close the Naval Underwater Warfare Center (NUWC) in New London, Connecticut:

1. Question: Total estimated costs for BRACC implementation: a detailed (by line item) of cost expenditures to date comparing costs spent or obligated to date vs. costs to complete the redirection as proposed.

Answer: A data call has been issued to obtain certified data to respond to this question. The response will be forwarded separately.

2. Question: A complete accounting of billets and actual personnel transferred from Norfolk, VA to Newport, RI as of this date.

Answer: A data call has been issued to obtain certified data to respond to this question. The response will be forwarded separately.

3. Question: A complete accounting of billets and actual personnel transferred from New London, CT to Newport, RI as of this date.

Answer: A data call has been issued to obtain certified data to respond to this question. The response will be forwarded separately.

4. Question: Savings in personnel and operating costs achieved per year to date at New London.

Answer: A data call has been issued to obtain certified data to respond to this question. The response will be forwarded separately.

5. Question: What would be the impact upon laboratory military value and cost analysis to co-locate all Navy acoustic research and development and system engineering at New London, Connecticut?

Answer: The BSEC did not evaluate such a scenario. The BRAC-95 recommendations relating to acoustic R&D and system engineering complete the steps taken in earlier rounds of base closure to concentrate these functions at NUWC Newport, NUWC Keyport, and NSWC Crane. Appropriate functions from four technical centers (NRL Det Orlando, NAWC Oreland, NAWC Det Warminster, and NUWC New London) will be relocated to NUWC Newport.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Senator Wendell Ford (Kentucky)

1. Question: In regard to Naval Surface Warfare Center, Louisville, Kentucky would you comment on the data used by the Base Structure Executive Committee to make the decision to place that facility on the list? I have heard the data call information forwarded to the Department of the Navy, by Crane Division and NAVSEA, indicated the cost of moving the Phalanx work, currently being done at Louisville, to Crane, Indiana would be less than official originally determined. I also understand the discrepancies in those figures were brought to the attention of the Inspector General who conducted an audit and verified that indeed the figures submitted were not correct, and the cost of moving the work to Crane, Indiana would be higher than the figures given to the Navy's Base Structure Executive Committee. Please comment on this information. I request that a copy of the Inspector General's audit be provided to this commission.

Answer: The data used by the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) is contained in the Base Structure Data Base. The BSEC did not use any data other than that provided through the DON certification process to make a decision. Costs which are provided by the major claimants to the BSEC as part of scenario development data calls were subject to review by the BSEC, which applied military judgment to the inclusion of costs in the COBRA analysis.

With regard to the audit being conducted on the data supplied for the Louisville scenario, although the investigation is not yet complete, it is our understanding that the focus of the audit is primarily on process (data flow up and down the chain of command).

2. Question: Also in the case of Naval Surface Warfare Center, Louisville, how do you evaluate and justify splintering the current work being done by the Louisville workforce of engineers and machinists - those places being Norfolk, Virginia, Port Hueneme, California, and Crane, Indiana? Was not it the determination of an early BRAC Commission to not close the Louisville facility in order to keep the Navy's 5-inch gun work, and now Phalanx work, consolidated and centrally located to ship ports on both coasts of the United States?

Answer: The workload being performed at Louisville is an amalgam of work similar to that being accomplished at a number of other Navy depot and technical activities. Our recommendation consolidates the Louisville workload with other similar depot and engineering efforts at other sites and achieves savings by closing an entire installation.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Senator Rick Santorum (Pennsylvania)

1. Question: Machinery systems engineering has been migrating to the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)-Philadelphia for several decades. The BRAC 95 proposal to continue this migration by moving all machinery Research and Development to NSWC-Philadelphia consolidates a majority of machinery systems responsibility in Philadelphia (approx. 2000 people and $800 M worth of machinery facilities) and is a logical progression in reducing infrastructure and improving overall machinery development and performance. In order to provide further reduction in infrastructure, have you considered consolidating the entire function of machinery systems in NSWC-Philadelphia, some of which is still being performed in NAVSEA headquarters?

Answer: No. The BRAC effort is concerned with closing and realigning bases. Workload allocation is a management prerogative that can be accomplished at any time.

2. Question: BRAC 93 decisions included moving the Naval Sea Systems Command from Crystal City to White Oak. The BRAC 95 proposes closing White Oak and moving NAVSEA to the Washington Navy Yard. Was there any consideration given to relocating NAVSEA to the Philadelphia Naval Base?

Answer: No. Given the requirement of Naval Reactors (NAVSEA-08) to be located in the Washington, D.C. area to satisfy responsibilities to the Department of Energy, and the Navy's desire not to fragment NAVSEA Headquarters, relocation options were restricted to the Washington metropolitan area in both the 1993 and 1995 round of base closures.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Representative Robert A. Borksi (Pennsylvania)

1. Question: In your proposal to close and relocate the Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF) to North Island, CA, you appear to achieve most of your savings by eliminating 52 positions. How is this more cost effective than keeping NATSF in Philadelphia and eliminating those same positions?

Answer: The savings are attendant to the command elimination, the subsuming of regional offices and detachments, and the integration into another NAVAIR organization. This cannot be accomplished in place.

2. Question: In 1993, the Base Closure Commission overturned your recommendation to close and relocate NATSF. In its report, the Commission "found compelling the potential cost savings and reduction in workload" of establishing a central DoD technical publications organization under the auspices of NATSF. To what extent did the Navy work with other services to explore this possibility? Why did the Navy choose not to recommend this idea in its 1995 BRAC recommendations?

Answer: None of the Joint Cross-Service Groups suggested this as an alternative to consider. The Navy felt its decision to send the function to NADEP North Island was sound, fostered proper internal synergies, helped to reduce capacity at the critical NADEP site, and demonstrated good cost savings.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Representative Stephen Horn (California)

1. Question: The purpose of the base closure process is to reduce as much excess capacity as possible and to save the greatest amount of money. However, the recommended closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard closes the least amount of excess capacity, and does nothing to reduce capacity in the nuclear category, where the excess is greatest. Moreover, according to the COBRA data, closure of Long Beach would save less money over the next 20 years than, for example, Portsmouth. Why has the Navy targeted the one shipyard for closure whose closure would do the least in meeting the goals of the BRAC process?

Answer: The Department's process analyzed excess capacity for the entire NSYD/SRF community and then sought solutions to eliminate that excess. Non-nuclear workload can be accomplished in a nuclear shipyard, but nuclear workload cannot be accomplished in a non-nuclear shipyard. While our analysis considered Portsmouth for closure, it was removed from consideration for closure based on the BSEC's military judgment. Future decisions to refuel, defuel and inactivate SSN Class 688 submarines make the precise determination of nuclear requirements difficult, and Portsmouth has a unique role as the center of excellence for the 688 submarine. The Navy is satisfied that its recommendations to close Long Beach Naval Shipyard and SRF Guam result in a significant overall reduction of excess shipyard capacity, with a collective annual savings of $168.4M and a 20 year net present value savings of $2477.6M.

2. Question: In 1991 and 1993, the Long Beach Naval Shipyard was the third highest ranked naval shipyard, behind only Puget Sound and Norfolk. Curiously, the Navy's new military value matrix now ranks Long Beach as below Pearl Harbor in military value and only slightly above the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Why has this ranking changed from the two previous base closure rounds?

Answer: In response to constructive criticism by, among others, the Commission and Members of Congress, for BRAC-95, the DON shipyard military value matrix was adjusted where appropriate to be more reflective of the nature and scope of work being conducted at these activities. While this causes the absolute scores for the activities to change, the results are consistent with those of previous rounds. Consistent with the relationships demonstrated in BRAC-93, these industrial activities fall into three distinct groups. As in BRAC-93, Long Beach Naval Shipyard is in the middle group whose military value scores are tightly grouped and which falls below the two large shipyards at Puget Sound and Norfolk. Because the scores are so close, the relative placement of the shipyards in this middle group is affected by changes that were made not only to respond to criticism but also to portray as accurately as possible the characteristics of these activities.

3. Question: From an examination of the Navy's base closure deliberations minutes, it seems as if the Navy only really considered closing two shipyards--Portsmouth or Long Beach--and decided to not recommend Portsmouth for closure because of a desire to retain nuclear repair capability. Were other scenarios actively considered? For instance, was a closure option for Norfolk Naval Shipyard considered, and scenarios run? If not, why not? Was Pearl Harbor considered for closure, or considered for realignment along with Long Beach?

Answer: Every activity within the shipyard subcategory was equally considered. Capacity and military value analyses was conducted on all activities. Using the results of these analyses, possible closure candidates were identified during configuration analysis. In various combinations, the potential candidates were Long Beach, Portsmouth, Pearl Harbor, and SRF Guam. The configuration analysis demonstrated that the Puget Sound and Norfolk shipyards had to be retained to satisfy capacity and military value requirements. The BSEC eliminated Pearl Harbor from further consideration due to its unique strategic location and full service capability. Closure scenario data calls were sent to Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Ship Repair Facility Guam, Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Surge Dry Docks at Philadelphia, and several technical centers that perform depot level work.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Representative G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery (Mississippi)

1. Question: I am concerned about how the Navy determines such factors as the pilot training rate (PTR). The certified data which the commission will receive appears to be, quite frankly, a compilation of conclusions rather than a trail of hard facts leading to a conclusion. Is the Navy going to give the Commissioners and the communities access to the critical data used to determine such conclusions as the daytime operations necessary to generate one new pilot? Moreover, will commissioners and communities have access to base operational data? I hope you will provide any requested data directly to Commissioners and affected communities.

Answer: The Navy has provided the Commission and Congress with all the data used in its analysis. If there is any additional information that may be required after a review of the basic data, it will be provided upon request by the appropriate level within the DON. As we have already related in a separate response to a question for the record from the Commission, the Secretary of the Navy has issued specific public affairs guidance to all activities of the Department that provides for their release of unclassified base information.

Specific information on the number of daylight flight operations required per student (for each type and level of undergraduate pilot training) can be found in the Data Call Two (Capacity for Training Air Stations) responses from each training air station under Section: Mission Requirements, Subsection: b. Flight Training, questions 3 and 4. These questions instructed the fleet to base requirements on historic flight operations. The certified responses to these questions were the input for the calculations used in the Navy analysis.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Representative Robert Underwood (Guam)

Naval Base Guam, Fleet Ind. Supply Center and Ship Repair Facility

1. Question: Mr. Secretary, in your recommendations for BRAC 95, you recommend closing the Ship Repair Facility and disestablishing the Fleet Industrial Supply Center and you recommend reducing and the "mothballing" the waterfront activities of the Naval Base. This eliminates a large source of income for the citizens of Guam, but is does not allow these valuable industrial and port facilities to be used as economic recovery tools for Guam to help replace their lost revenues. Isn't it true that these facilities could be turned over to the Government of Guam for economic development with the proviso that they could be used for military contingency operations at the request of the Federal Government?

Answer: We are committed to working with the local community and the DoD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) in the development of a reuse plan to focus the community's intentions and ideas concerning how it desires excess property/facilities to be utilized. In the case of the facilities in Guam, since our recommendation is clear that we need to maintain access to this strategic location, a careful balance will be struck between community reuse and the retention of the necessary facilities for potential operational contingencies. Decisions regarding the retention of specific property on Guam will not be finalized until the BRAC recommendations are approved.

NAS Agana

2. Question: Mr. Secretary, last year this Commission recommended that the Navy consolidate the air operations at NAS Agana with the Air Force operations 10 miles away at Anderson AFB. During the last two years, however, you have disestablished one of the three fixed wing squadrons on Guam and moved the other two to bases on the West Coast. In spite of the Navy's rhetoric two years ago, you have also agreed to return all of the enlisted administrative buildings and the officer housing on a piece of land that is essential for the development of an expanded international aviation complex on Guam. You are also in the process of building 300 brand new family housing units. Isn't it true that with all of these reductions this year you should have quite a bit of excess Navy housing? Isn't it also true that the retention of this one isolated section of family housing has more to do with the view than the need for military housing island-wide?

Answer: The final determination of what facilities will be deemed in excess will not be made until after the BRAC-95 recommendations are approved. As you are aware, even if all of all of our recommendations regarding naval activities on Guam are approved, we will continue to have a significant number of naval personnel on Guam. We are committed to maintaining the highest quality of life possible for those personnel. Retention of necessary

critical married family housing units will be one of our principal objectives. Where excesses may exist, however, you can be assured that we will work with the local community and the DoD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to develop a sound community reuse plan.

Fena Reservoir

3. Question: Mr. Secretary, in your report, you did not mention the large watershed and reservoir at Fena that currently sits outside the Naval Magazine on Guam. It is no longer needed as a "buffer" for Naval Magazine, Guam, and the magazine no longer contains special weapons. In view of the economic hardships these closures will impose of the citizens of Guam, why couldn't this watershed be returned to the Government of Guam for use in its water system and as a "low environmental impact" recreation area?

Answer: Our recommendations did not affect the Naval Magazine on Guam. This facility will continue to execute its full function and mission. Accordingly, all of the current infrastructure and supporting buffers, including the reservoir at Fena, must be maintained.

Navy Water System on Guam

4. Question: Mr. Secretary, I am amazed to hear that the Navy maintains an island-wide water distribution system on Guam that duplicates one maintained by GovGuam. With the disestablishment of most of the Navy activities on Guam, it seems inefficient and expensive for the Navy to maintain a separate system. Are there any other locations in the United States or its Territories where the Navy does not procure water from the local government and maintains its own water system? In light of the huge reductions in the Navy presence and the dichotomy this issue seems to raise, doesn't it make more sense for the Navy to turn its water system over to the Public Utility Agency on Guam, assist Guam financially in consolidating the two systems, and then satisfy its water needs from the Public Utility Agency, as it does in most other locations?

Answer: There are a number of naval installations which operate water treatment and distribution systems, such as China Lake, Roosevelt Roads, and others. With respect to the system in Guam, the continued operation of that system will be evaluated, if necessary, after a final determination is made regarding the retention of naval facilities on the island.

Island-wide Navy Housing on Guam

5. Question: Mr. Secretary, as can be seen from the above points, most of the current Navy activities on Guam that remain from previous closures or reductions are recommended for closure, disestablishment or realignment. No mention is made, however, of the disposal of the large amounts of housing that served those units. Guam has always had a deficit of housing for its civilian population and this housing could be used to provide housing for the citizens of Guam, provide an income stream for GovGuam through lease payments, and provide the Navy with a source of properly maintained military housing in the event of a

Western Pacific military contingency. Wouldn't it seem reasonable to seek the transfer to GovGuam of all Navy housing that does not serve the needs of the few remaining Navy activities? Doesn't it also make economic sense to then combine the remaining Navy housing and the existing Air Force housing under one Federal/DoD housing authority and maintain the transferred Navy housing under rules that permit it to be leased back to the Navy during extended military contingencies?

Answer: The final determination of what facilities will be deemed in excess will not be made until after the BRAC-95 recommendations are approved. As you are aware, even if all of all of our recommendations regarding naval activities on Guam are approved, we will continue to have a significant number of naval personnel on Guam. We are committed to maintaining the highest quality of life possible for those personnel. Retention of necessary critical married family housing units will be one of our principal objectives. Where excesses may exist, however, you can be assured that we will work with the local community and the DoD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to develop a sound community reuse plan.

Navy Command Structure

6. Question: Mr. Secretary, with the disappearance of most Navy facilities on Guam, there does not seem to be a great need for a Navy Admiral command on Guam. Could you not move the remaining overall island-wide Navy Commander and his staff to joint spaces at Anderson AFB on the northern end of Guam and then transfer all the remaining command assets, including the housing area on Nimitz Hill to GovGuam for their economic development?

Answer: Our recommendations do not address the location of the headquarters for the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas, nor does the DON use the BRAC process to address flag officer billet requirements. Even if all of all of our recommendations regarding naval activities on Guam are approved, we will continue to have a significant number of naval personnel on Guam. It should be noted that the issue of the amount of presence left on Guam does not detract from the importance that the Department places on access to Guam for purposes of support to operations in that part of the Pacific.

Long-term Economic Impact (Section 30 of the Guam Organic Act)

7. Question: Mr. Secretary, Guam receives quite a bit of funding under section 30 of the Guam Organic Act. Have you included those revenues in your economic impact studies?

Answer: The Office of the Secretary of Defense required that all DoD Components analyze the economic impact on communities through the use of the DoD Economic Impact Data Base (see OSD Policy Memorandum Three). This data base is used to calculate the total potential direct and indirect job change (both as a total number of jobs and as a percentage of economic area employment) which will result from a closure or realignment action. Review of the economic impact methodology by the Joint Cross-Service Group on

Economic Impact confirmed that changes in employment, as calculated by the data base, provided a reasonable proxy for levels of impact associated with other aspects of the economy. These other impacts could include, for example, changes in expenditures, population, number of school age children, local government revenues and expenses, and, in this specific case, revenues to Guam resulting from the provisions of the Guam Organic Act.

8. Question: Mr. Secretary, in light of the closings, realignments and reductions on Guam that you are recommending, there seem to be services that could be provided more efficiently to the remaining Navy personnel and the Air Force through more consolidated activities, now that both are essentially in a caretaker status. Could you not provide some of these services more efficiently by combining such activities as Recreation, Public Works, Housing Management, Medical and Dental?

Answer: Following approval of the BRAC-95 recommendations, we will carefully determine what specific facilities need to be retained at Naval Activities and FISC Guam. We will then revise our infrastructure support requirements, as appropriate, taking into account operational requirements, quality of life, and potential community reuse/dual use. Our goal is the retention of those facilities that are both cost-effective and operationally responsive, which could encompass consolidation with the Air Force support infrastructure.

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-14

FROM: ARCARI, PAUL W.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: CO-CHAIRMAN	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: THE MILITARY COALITION	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			BJA
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

SUBMITTING TESTIMONY FOR THE RECORD TO BE INCLUDED WITH APRIL 17 - HEARING.

Due Date: 950428	Routing Date: 950421	Date Originated: 950420	Mail Date:

THE MILITARY COALITION

201 North Washington Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Please refer to this number when responding 950421-14

April 20, 1995

Chairman Alan J. Dixon
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore St., Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

By letter, dated March 9th, The Military Coalition, which represents approximately 3.75 million members of the seven uniformed services, officer and enlisted, active, reserve and retired plus their families and survivors, requested permission to testify before the Commission when it held hearings on this round of base closures.

We were advised by Chip Walgren on April 12th that due to the tight schedule of the Commission our request could not be accommodated, but that we could submit written testimony. Enclosed is The Military Coalition's written testimony which is submitted for the Commission's review and for the record.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing us to present our views on this critically important matter.

Sincerely,

Paul W. Arcari
Colonel, USAF (Ret)
The Retired Officers Assn
Co-Chairman
(703) 838-8103

Michael Ouellette
Sergeant Major, USA (Ret)
Non Commissioned Officers Assn
Co-Chairman
(703) 549-0311

Enclosure

THE MILITARY COALITION

201 North Washington Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

STATEMENT OF

THE MILITARY COALITION

provided to the

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION

Presented by

Colonel Frank G. Rohrbough, USAF (Ret.)
The Retired Officers Association

YNC Ed Huylebroeck, Jr., USN (Ret)
Fleet Reserve Association

APRIL 20, 1995

MISTER CHAIRMAN AND DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION:

The Military Coalition would like to express its appreciation to the Chairman and distinguished members of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission for holding these important hearings. The written testimony provided here represents the collective views of the following military and veterans organizations known as The Military Coalition which represent approximately 3.75 million members of the seven uniformed services, officer and enlisted, active, reserve and retired plus their families and survivors.

- Air Force Association
- Air Force Sergeants Association
- Association of Military Surgeons of the United States
- Association of the United States Army
- Chief Warrant Officer and Warrant Officer Association, United States Coast Guard
- Commissioned Officers Association of the United States Public Health Service, Inc.
- Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States
- Fleet Reserve Association
- Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America
- Marine Corps League
- Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association
- Military Chaplains Association of the United States of America
- National Association for Uniformed Services
- National Guard Association of the United States
- National Military Family Association
- Naval Enlisted Reserve Association
- Naval Reserve Association
- Navy League of the United States
- Non Commissioned Officers Association
- Reserve Officers Association
- The Retired Enlisted Association
- The Retired Officers Association

- United Armed Forces Association
- United States Army Warrant Officers Association
- USCG Chief Petty Officers Association
- The National Order of Battlefield Commissions (Associate Member)
- Army Aviation Association of America (Associate Member)

INTRODUCTION

The Military Coalition's overall goal is to advance the national security interests of the United States by maintaining a strong national defense. The most vital elements of the nation's defense establishment are its men and women. As the nation draws down from the Cold War victory and bases close around the country, hundreds of thousands of military personnel and their families are affected. This turbulence adversely impacts on the morale and esprit-de-corps of the military community, particularly the retired component.

THE ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE

While the Coalition recognizes that one of the main reasons for base closures and realignments is to reduce the cost of defense, countless military retirees consider base closings to be a significant threat to their way of life. Many military retirees have selected their retirement homes based on proximity to military health care, commissary, exchange and recreational activities. Defense reports reveal that almost 70 percent of retirees locate near military installations upon their retirement from active duty to avail themselves of military health care services. While retirees were never guaranteed that bases would remain open indefinitely, most retirees can cite "chapter and verse" of how commanders and retention counselors guaranteed them lifetime care in military treatment facilities (MTFs) as an inducement to serve another "hitch" or extend their service obligations. It's no wonder that so many consider each wave of base closures as both a threat to their future

security and a lack of leadership's resolve to honor previous commitments.

The Coalition is deeply concerned over the severe morale and financial impacts base closures have had, and will continue to have, on retirees, their families and survivors, unless planning adjustments are made. The issues related to base closures are not new to us. We have first-hand knowledge of the medical problems retirees have experienced when trying to find alternative health care when bases began to close in 1990.

In earlier rounds of base closures, Coalition members asked the Commission to carefully assess the impact that increased healthcare costs would have on predicted base closure savings before deciding to close a base. We strongly recommend that such critically important information be obtained from DoD and that it become a part of this Commission's deliberations.

CONGRESSIONAL ADMONITION

We're not alone in our concern. The conference report on The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 incorporated the concerns of the House - Senate conferees by mandating that the "Department of Defense have well-developed plans for each base closure location..." Specifically, the Act went on to say "the conferees expect such plans to include: 1) consideration of joint use or preferred care provider services which utilize rather than abandon the existing facility; and 2) consideration of the comparison of the cost both to the government and to beneficiaries for standard CHAMPUS (Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services) versus alternative health care options for each base closure location...". We enthusiastically supported these recommendations and believe they are on the right track for meeting the needs of those impacted by MTF closures. Further, with DoD's new Tricare Program, which Congress directed DoD to have fully implemented by December 1997, alternative arrangements for

CHAMPUS-eligible beneficiaries will most likely be in place in most regions of the country before this round of base closures begins.

IMPACT OF CLOSURES

With the closure of MTFs, CHAMPUS-eligible retirees, who previously had access to MTFs, are forced to turn to CHAMPUS where they will incur high "out-of-pocket" costs (retirees pay a 25 percent co-pay plus an annual outpatient deductible of $150 per member or $300 per family), as their only alternative. The government is a "loser" as well because health care delivery through the private sector would be about twice as expensive as it is in an MTF, according to the U.S. General Accounting Office (Report B-240715, September 1990). Based on a review of six hospitals, GAO estimated savings ranging from $18 million to $21 million in CHAMPUS funds. If Medicare-eligible beneficiaries were included, the savings to the Government would have been substantially greater. Such potential savings were further substantiated in DoD's "Section 733 Study of the Military Medical Care System" released in May 1994, which found that care could be delivered 10 to 24 percent less expensively in military treatment facilities. Whatever the savings, DoD's health care delivery cost should be less after Tricare managed care support contracts are fully operational.

The situation is different for military Medicare-eligible beneficiaries because they would be forced to turn to Medicare as their only source of care. Not only would these beneficiaries incur significant "out-of-pocket" expenses (20 percent co-pay plus an annual outpatient deductible of $100 per member), but the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) would begin picking up the tab for care now provided by the MTF to Medicare-eligible military beneficiaries at no cost to HCFA. As with CHAMPUS costs, these ancillary government costs should be included in the base closure cost equation.

During the first three rounds of base closures in 1988, 1991 and 1993, thirty-four (34) MTFs were tapped for closure impacting an estimated 520,000 beneficiaries. BRAC IV taps another six MTFs for closure impacting an estimated 177,000 retired beneficiaries. These are significant numbers of retirees and survivors who feel abandoned by the leaders of the system they served so well.

ALTERNATIVE HEALTH CARE SERVICES

One of the most valued health benefits for retirees is the use of military pharmacy services within the military treatment facility (MTF). Therefore, when an MTF closes, it results in an immediate financial strain on their limited incomes. It is not infrequent that we hear from our members that medications, such as maintenance drugs for heart conditions, cost them $200 to $300 per month. In response, the Coalition urged members of Congress to address this need by pioneering a DoD mail-order pharmacy service. Congress demonstrated its compassion by including a requirement in the FY 93 Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts, for DoD to conduct mail service pharmacy demonstration to provide "multi-state mail-order service" for all CHAMPUS-eligible members. Further, retirees 65 years or older who are Medicare-eligible may access this service, but <u>only</u> if they reside in catchment areas of facilities that are closing. The demonstration program began in November 1994 in six states within the United States -- Southeast and Mid-Atlantic. It is being well received by beneficiaries.

This innovative approach will accommodate the majority of beneficiaries who lose access to military pharmacies. It should result in lower cost of drugs for the government and lower out-of-pocket co-payments for beneficiaries than if they had to rely solely on standard CHAMPUS. We are greatly heartened by this Congressional initiative to help those adversely impacted by base closings, but would hasten to add that it represents only the critical first step in the overall solution.

The Coalition has worked with members of Congress, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and the Surgeons General of the Military Departments to create an awareness of the need for alternative health care programs at base closure sites. We remain convinced that the most pressing requirement is for DoD to have an alternative solution, such as a managed care plan (MCP), in place before a base closure is effected.

There are many viable solutions to the voids created by base closure. In the final analysis, they will be driven by what is the most cost-effective. Where small hospitals or clinics are closing, the solution may be a plan which provides a limited range of services, such as a pharmacy service and advisory services through the use of Health Benefits Advisors to assist in processing CHAMPUS claims and Health Care Finders for locating participating CHAMPUS/Medicare providers. When major medical centers serving thousands of beneficiaries close, like Fitzsimons Army Medical Center in Denver, Colorado, the impact is great and the optimum solution may be a joint venture facility operated by Veterans Affairs and DoD, like Las Vegas, Nevada at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), or a managed care network under Tricare.

Our efforts were rewarded with the passage of the FY 93 Defense Authorization Act and Appropriations Act. As an alternative to standard CHAMPUS, authorization and funding was provided for a managed care alternative at three locations - Carswell AFB in Ft. Worth/Dallas, Texas, Bergstrom AFB in Austin, Texas and England AFB in Alexandria, Louisiana. Services began on May 1, 1993. The FY 94 Defense Authorization Act added Homestead AFB, Florida and services began in August 1994. The Coalition enthusiastically endorses these initiatives.

A review of the current list of base closures presents some awesome health care challenges to DoD. For example, DoD will have to determine how inpatient care services will be provided to remaining 43,200 retired beneficiaries in Denver, Colorado and the 18,000

retired beneficiaries in Albuquerque, New Mexico. At both of these locations, active duty members and their families obtain inpatient care, respectively, through the Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (AMC) in Denver, Colorado and the 377 Medical Group at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. When these facilities close there will be no adequate military inpatient facility within a reasonable distance. To avoid hardships upon retirees and their families, aggressive planning must be undertaken by DoD to resolve the impact these mission changes will have on the residual population.

The closure of Fitzsimons creates a unique organizational problem for DoD and a health care access problem for military beneficiaries. Because Fitzsimons AMC also has a regional mission serving 12 mid-western states (Region 8), its loss will mean major changes in the delivery of regional medical care for the 732,000 beneficiaries who rely on it for specialized health care services. Over 425,000 retired beneficiaries will have to rely on civilian sources using the CHAMPUS or Medicare as their primary source for health care services. Of these, over 75,000 Medicare-eligible military beneficiaries in the Fitzsimons regional service area will be impacted. Looking at the Denver area alone, 2,700 active duty members plus approximately 5,000 family members will remain in the area without the availability of an MTF. They will have to use civilian sources for their care. Over 10,500 Medicare-eligible military beneficiaries will be shifted on to Medicare. The cost could be as high as $50 million if they enroll in local Medicare HMOs. When adding the increased Medicare costs to the cost of shifting CHAMPUS-eligible beneficiaries to the civilian sector, the cost to the government of closing Fitzsimons may be greater. Given these costs, **we believe the Commission should seriously consider retaining Fitzsimons AMC.**

One final issue that deserves comment relates to retirees who settled near a military base, but did not enroll in Medicare Part B when they were eligible to do so because they believed that the base military hospitals would always be there for their health care needs. Many of these individuals will be forced to use Medicare as their only source of

health care. Many are unaware of the penalties for late enrollment (ten percent per year of the monthly premium) they will incur if they use their Medicare entitlement (Part A) and enroll in Medicare's Part B coverage. To overcome this problem, **the Coalition strongly recommends that Part B late enrollment penalties be waived for Medicare-eligible military retirees** who are now forced to take Part B in order to enroll in Medicare. We understand that the Health Care Financing Administration is reluctant to waive these penalty fees because it would be precedent setting. Therefore, **if these penalties must be paid, the Coalition recommends that DoD pay them from funds provided for base closure actions**. Under no circumstances should the beneficiaries be required to pay these penalties or should funds from DoD's military pay account or medical budget be used.

CLOSING REMARKS

The Coalition recognizes the very difficult task this Commission has in deciding what is best for the Department of Defense, the people adversely affected and the fiscal security of this country. It is a complex matter where the choices are not easy. Your decisions will greatly impact the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans directly and indirectly. The Commission's recommendations and Congress' likely approval will place untold stress on the affected communities. Accordingly, **we ask this Commission to consider all the factors associated with base closures, to include DoD and Medicare health care services and its cost to the government and the thousands of DoD beneficiaries who are impacted.** Finally, we believe base closure planning must include alternative arrangements for health care where health care services are to be terminated.

The Coalition thanks the Chairman and the members of the Commission for this opportunity to present our views and our concerns. Any questions regarding our position, we can be contacted at (703)803-8164.

Document Separator

THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318

17 April 1995

950407-21R1

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for your letter regarding the proposed closure of Fort Ritchie, MD, and the possible impact on the National Military Command Center, Site R.

This facility is self-contained and largely self-sufficient, designed to operate without external support during crisis conditions. The guard force can seal the installation behind impenetrable blast doors within seconds of an alarm to maintain security. Fire protection is provided by installed fire suppression systems and full-time firefighters with two fire engines inside the facility. To ensure continuous operations, high reliability and redundancy are built into all vital equipment. While the installation depends on the Army's external support services, all time-sensitive, mission-essential capabilities are necessarily provided for on-site.

The Army has not yet submitted detailed plans for the proposed transfer of the Site R operational support mission from Fort Ritchie to Fort Detrick. If, as expected, the response time is extended by only 45 minutes to 1 hour, it will effectively meet all operational support requirements for the facility.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide the Joint Staff views prior to the regional hearing and final decision.

Sincerely,

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950406-2

FROM: MALLOT, MARK M.	TO: KENNEDY, MIKE
TITLE: DEPUTY. FOR INFO. TECH.	TITLE: ARMY GAO ANALYST
ORGANIZATION: SIMA - ST LOUIS	ORGANIZATION:
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: SIMA - ST LOUIS	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING COPY OF THE 1992 REPORT BY THE ARMY'S MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING ACTIVITY ON THE COST OF MOVING SIMA ST LOUIS.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950406	Date Originated: 950405	Mail Date:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. AMC SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY
1222 SPRUCE STREET
ST. LOUIS, MO 63103-2834

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

Please refer to this number
when responding 950406-2

April 5, 1995

Mr. Kennedy,

Enclosed is a copy of the 1992 report by the Army's Management Engineering Activity on the cost of moving SIMA from its present location at 1222 Spruce in downtown St. Louis to the Federal Center at 4300 Goodfellow Boulevard in St. Louis. The costs to relocate furniture and computers are probably still valid. Costs that are not included are the lost productivity during actual moving (estimate of $120,000 per day, 3 to 6 days) and the cost of the planning and moving activities of the SIMA staff ($850,000). The costs to renovate for us at the Federal Center were based on moving us to a building that has not been used for some time. If we were to move after ATCOM did further downsizing, there could possibly be space that was better suited to our needs and could be outfitted for us at a lesser cost.

If you require any further information on this or any other matter from SIMA, feel free to call me at (314) 331-4254.

Sincerely,

Mary M. Mallott

Mary M. Mallott
Deputy for Information Technology
SIMA-St. Louis

FINAL REPORT
PROPOSED MOVE OF SIMA ST. LOUIS
COST ANALYSIS AND SPACE UTILIZATION STUDY

SEPTEMBER 1992

SIMA COST STUDY

OF PROPOSED MOVE AND SPACE UTILIZATION

PREPARED FOR:
LOUANN ELLEDGE
DIRECTOR, SIMA

PREPARED BY:
LINDA DARWIN
ERNEST W. WEIR
ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND
MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING ACTIVITY
SEPTEMBER 1992

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PART I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PART I - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In early 1992, LTG Hilmes, Director of Information Systems Command chartered a Task Force to conduct an (AMC) Automation Assessment for the AMC Commander. This Task Force was directed by BG Wynn, Commander 7th Signal Command. This assessment addressed several issues pertaining to AMC's Systems Integration and Management Activity (SIMA). All findings and recommendations of this group were staffed with AMC's organizations for review and comment. The Director, SIMA, was tasked with management of this review and subsequent implementation of accepted recommendations.

To preclude any hint of a conflict-of-interest, the Director, SIMA, asked that the U.S. Army Materiel Command Management Engineering Activity (AMCMEA) conduct an independent analysis of this proposal and also asked that the results of this analysis be used as the basis for making a decision concerning relocation of SIMA. This tasking evolved and grew to include an assessment of possible savings which might be gained by more efficiently and correctly utilizing RAY Building space.

In seeking answers to these two questions - relocation of SIMA to the Federal Center and correct space utilization at the RAY Building - other questions pertaining to issues such as personnel turbulence, effect of Civilian Personnel and Equal Employment regulations, and involvement of Union officials and/or political figures were not addressed because of lack of time and because they were considered to be outside the parameters of cost analysis and space utilization. However, if one were speaking of a definitive move instead of a proposed move, these issues could not be overlooked and would have some bearing on all decisions.

The Task Force report stated that this move would save $3,100,000.00 in GSA lease costs. The savings indicated by this analysis so differed from the Task Force report that one must assume that the originator of this statement believed the Federal Center to be Army property and, thus, rent free, which could possibly account for some of the difference. The MEA analysis indicated that total savings would be only $542,617 or approximately $2,500,000.00 less than originally thought.

There was such a discrepancy between these two figures that the SIMA Director asked the MEA Analysts and the SIMA Facilities Manager to conduct an initial review of SIMA's use of space within the RAY Building to determine if a more cost-effective use of space could be effected.

This effort was undertaken 4 through 7 August 1992. Because time was paramount only the areas that appeared obvious were addressed. Our review revealed that there is considerable unused space; space which is not used for the intended purpose; space which is being billed at a higher rate than it should be; and

space which contractors and other Defense personnel are provided rent-free. If SIMA only leased from General Services Administration (GSA) the minimum square footage needed to accomplish its mission; used available space only for its intended purpose; paid rental rates commensurate with that use; and required contractors and other Defense personnel to reimburse SIMA for space; these measures alone would result in an annual savings of $757,682.

These suggestions could be implemented immediately with a minimum affect on SIMA's staff and mission; however, no move or consolidation was considered which might involve the specific power or communications requirements.

It is quite possible that additional savings could be identified if time and other resources permitted an indepth analysis. An assessment of each potential move is needed in order to evaluate its feasibility by determining if cost savings would be sufficient to justify the lost productivity caused by personnel and mission turbulence.

Based on our study of this activity, we do not recommend that SIMA Saint Louis be moved from the RAY Building to the Federal Center. The following facts support this recommendation:

a. RAY Building was renovated, at a cost of $61,300,000, prior to SIMA moving into it in 1990.

b. Facilities at the Federal Center will require major renovation prior to SIMA moving in, to accomodate handicapped personnel, and to bring it up to the standards of their present facility.

c. GSA has estimated that moving to the Federal Center will cost between $8,950,000 and $11,950,000.

d. With an approximate savings of $542,617 annually, the payback period would be approximately 20 years.

e. The SIMA can save approximately $757,682 by taking those internal actions addressed in detail in Part IV of this report.

PART II

INTRODUCTION

PART II - INTRODUCTION

1. BACKGROUND:

In early 1992, the Director of Information Systems Command, LTG Hilmes, established a Task Force for the purpose of conducting an (AMC) Automation Assessment for the AMC Commander. This Task Force was under the direction of the Commander, 7th Signal Command, BG Wynn. The report prepared by this Task Force in June 1992 addressed several issues that were of concern to AMC's Systems Integration and Management Activity (SIMA). The report was staffed to AMC's Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) for review and comment. The Director, SIMA, was given the responsibility for managing this review and subsequent implementation of accepted recommendations.

One Task Force recommendation indicated that a substantial cost savings could be effected by relocating SIMA from the RAY Building in downtown Saint Louis, Missouri to the Federal Center located on Goodfellow Boulevard in Saint Louis, Missouri.

2. TASKING AUTHORITY:

To avoid any hint of a conflict-of-interest, the Director, SIMA, asked that the U.S. Army Materiel Command Management Engineering Activity (AMCMEA) conduct an independent analysis of this proposal and also asked that the results of that analysis be used as the basis for making a decision concerning relocation of SIMA.

3. PURPOSE AND SCOPE:

The objective of MEA's efforts were to ascertain the validity of the Task Force statement that relocating SIMA would result in an annual savings of $3,100,000 in General Services Administration (GSA) lease costs. This effort evolved to include an assessment of the cost savings which could be gained by a revamp of SIMA square footage in the RAY Building. In seeking answers to each of these questions - relocation of SIMA to the Federal Center and better space utilization at the present location - consideration of related questions such as personnel turbulence, involvement of Union officials and political figures were not investigated because these questions were considered to be outside the parameters of a cost analysis or space utilization assessment.

4. METHODOLOGY AND TECHNIQUES:

The first and fundamental task of the MEA Team was to become familiar with the Task Force Report, GSA procedures and requirements concerning leased space and/or relocation of government agencies, applicable regulations and governing policies, historical data and all other factors which pertain to relocation of a governmental agency. This knowledge was obtained

by studying governing policies and related documents. The study techniques included review of historical data but all conclusions are based upon cost data which was accurate during the period from June to September 1992.

5. PARTICIPANTS:

The MEA Team visited SIMA on several occasions, and also visited with representatives of the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) and Information Systems Command (ISC) employed at the Federal Center. Needed information was obtained from GSA by correspondence and telephonically. An alphabetical list of all individuals who participated in this study can be found at Appendix B. This listing includes organizational affiliation, name,job title, and Defense System Network (DSN) number.

PART III-ISSUES ADDRESSED

1. ONE TIME COSTS
2. RECURRING COSTS
3. SPACE ALLOCATION
4. SUITABILITY OF FACILITIES
5. QUALITY OF LIFE
6. COMPUTER ROOM
7. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. ONE TIME COSTS

ISSUE:

To determine one time costs associated with moving SIMA Saint Louis from their current location in the RAY Building on Spruce Street to the Federal Center on Goodfellow Boulevard.

DISCUSSION:

All referenced cost data was obtained from representatives of the General Services Administration (GSA) either telephonically or via correspondence. All cost data was accepted as provided. For example, GSA estimated that renovation cost at the Federal Center would range from $8,000,000 to $10,000,000. No effort was undertaken to ascertain if this is the current industry rate for renovation or if a lower cost could be negotiated.

Possibly, members of the Task Force assumed that the Federal Center is Army property; and, therefore, the cost of housing SIMA would be considerably less at the Federal Center than at the RAY Building. Currently the RAY Building rental cost is $3,100,000 annually. A savings of this amount suggests that by moving to the Federal Center total rental costs could be avoided. However, both locations are GSA property so rental cost will be substantial regardless of the location.

The GSA recently renovated the RAY Building for $61,300,000 and objects to the proposed move of SIMA because of this outlay plus other political considerations which are addressed in another Section of this Report. SIMA moved into the renovated RAY Building in 1990, and as the largest tenant serves as the Host Organization.

The following figures represent our best estimates based upon analysis of all available data.

	GSA COSTS	SIMA COSTS
Backfill RAY Building	$4,000,000	0
Federal Center Renovation		$8,000.000 to $10,000,000
Relocate Furniture		$200,000 to $300,000
Relocate Computers and Special Equipment*		$500,000
Determine Extent of Repairs or Renovation		$250,000
Total Cost	$4,000,000	$8,950,000 to $11,950,000

* Telephone cost is discussed in Issue 4, Suitability of Facilities.

The GSA emphatically stated that all expenses must be borne by SIMA because this is not a forced move and any move will be at SIMA's discretion. An expenditure of over $1,525,000 is known as a Prospectus Level Project and requires Congressional approval - GSA made it equally clear that it would not support Army in any such request.

RECOMMENDATION:

- Consideration should be given to GSA's position and concerns.

2. RECURRING COSTS

ISSUE:

To determine current costs to occupy the RAY Building and future costs if SIMA Saint Louis were to move to the Federal Center.

DISCUSSION:

All numerical data pertaining to recurring costs was furnished by the General Services Administration (GSA) or Systems Integration and Management Activity (SIMA). The Management Engineering Activity (MEA) Team accepted these numbers without question.

Currently, there is a lower rental rate per square foot at the Federal Center than that charged for the RAY Building; but it is logical to assume that even minor repairs or simple alternations to the Federal Center Buildings would result in a rate increase. The GSA implied that this was indeed a correct assumption and that SIMA can expect to be charged at a higher rate than the U.S. Army Aviation System Command (AVSCOM) is currently charged. All documents and conversations imply that within prescribed parameters GSA, as the landlord, can charge whatever it feels is fair and reasonable for that property and category of use.

The following figures were current as of August 1992. The assumption was made that the cost for Overtime Utilities would remain the same regardless of the location but if this is untrue, the Overtime Utility Rate would have a bearing on the Annual Savings.

RAY BUILDING

Rent	Overtime Utilities	Total Cost
$2,607.710	$151,704	$2,759,414

FEDERAL CENTER

Rent	Overtime Utilities	Total Cost
$2,065,093	$151,704	$2,216,797

ANNUAL SAVINGS $542,617

The GSA estimates that if a directive to move were issued tomorrow that it could take up to seven years to conduct a site survey, award contracts and make approved improvements. Therefore, the figures shown here depict the current picture and in no way can be considered definitive. These numbers serve merely to indicate that savings would be much less than the original estimate of $3,100,000. This Cost Analysis revolved around a theoretical question and, therefore, was answered by estimates.

RECOMMENDATION:

- None, data provided for information only.

3. SPACE ALLOCATION

ISSUE:

To determine adequacy of amount and location of space allocated to SIMA Saint Louis at the Federal Center.

DISCUSSION:

U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) is responsible for space allocation at the Federal Center, 4300 Goodfellow Boulevard, Saint Louis, Missouri. AVSCOM made a tentative offer to assign Building 101 and a portion of the basement in Building 110 to SIMA in the event SIMA relocates to the Federal Center. 75,511 square feet in Building 101 and 17,000 in Building 110 were earmarked for SIMA's use for a total of 92,511 square feet. This square footage equals approximately half the square feet which SIMA currently occupies in the Robert A Young (RAY) Building; therefore, 92,511 square feet would most likely be inadequate. Presently, it is unknown how SIMA could tolerate a space allocation reduction of approximately 50 percent. Additional space can be made available at another location, but an additional location would cause SIMA's operation to become even more fragmented than it would be in Building 101 and Building 110.

SIMA has systems furniture that, because of design, its size (6 feet x 9 feet) and limited layout possibilities, requires more space than AVSCOM has allocated. The Federal Center buildings have posts, doorways, and exits which contribute significantly to useless space when trying to accommodate existing systems furniture and equipment.

The basement of Building 110 should be vacated by February or March 1993. Building 101 should be vacated in October 1993, but this vacancy is contingent upon the completion of a new Computer Room in Building 103. All schedules are tentative, and subject to change, due to the numerous tenants who must relocate in the near future.

Under current proposals, it appears that the AVSCOM facilities will not meet the needs of SIMA.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Determine the exact square footage which AVSCOM-TROSCOM is able, or willing, to vacate at the Federal Center.

- Determine the exact square footage which SIMA needs whether located at the RAY Building or the Federal Center.

- Compare these two figures in order to ascertain if the available square footage at the Federal Center will fulfill SIMA's space requirements.

- Also, compare the type of space to insure that space is compatible. (For instance, office space cannot be used for Computer space without extensive modification and upgrade; therefore, square footage alone is meaningless.)

4. SUITABILITY OF FACILITIES

ISSUE:

To determine suitability of space allocated to SIMA St. Louis at the Federal Center.

DISCUSSION:

Federal Center Building 101 and Building 110 both need repair. The minimum upgrade will necessitate a fresh coat of paint and new carpet for Building 101. Building 110 needs a new floor, paint and carpet. Again, we stress that these repairs are minimal and will not upgrade these facilities to the level of the RAY Building. Building 110 has an overpowering odor which may be caused by dampness and/or mold.

These buildings lack adequate handicapped facilities. For example:

- Building 101 lacks ramps and has only one elevator. All bathrooms visited have narrow doors and only one stall to accommodate handicapped personnel. Sinks and urinals have not been modified to accommodate handicapped personnel. Entrance doors are manually operated and there are no facilities for the hearing-impaired.

- Building 110 has one ramp and one elevator. Narrow bathroom doors are unsuitable for handicapped personnel. Entrance doors are manually operated and there are no facilities for the hearing-impaired.

Because of the layout and close quarters of these buildings, it would be extremely difficult to accommodate the sight-impaired.

Parking and public transportation are covered in Issue 5, Quality of Life.

Adequacy of power supply for Buildings 101 and 103 cannot be determined without technical inspection and testing by qualified personnel. Telephone service could prove to be a problem because SIMA currently owns a NEC NEAX 2400 system which was installed and is maintained by GTE Telecom Incorporated. All equipment and instruments are covered by a lifetime warranty. This expensive and complex telecommunication system cannot be transported because it is incompatible with the Federal Center telephone equipment. SIMA insists that a comparable system be provided, at any location, so the current communication capability can be maintained. Procurement of a new system capable of fulfilling SIMA's needs could exceed $500,000. If SIMA were required to accept a communication system compatible with systems in operation at the Federal Center, it is estimated that telephone costs would increase by at least $50,000 yearly.

Facilities at the Federal Center are below the acceptable standard for the RAY Building, even though both are GSA owned and operated facilities. Certainly, the Federal Center is not as aesthetically pleasing as the RAY Building, but the major .MT4 shortcomings are the unknown electrical power capabilities; the inadequate facilities for the handicapped personnel; and the compatibility of telephone systems. Upgrading these facilities to comply with state and federal laws which govern safely and public access for handicapped personnel, and to meet SIMA's stringent requirement for precise electrical and telephonic services will require a large expenditure of funds.

RECOMMENDATION:

- If it is decided that a move to the Federal Center is desirable, determine by the least expensive method what is needed to upgrade Federal Center Buildings 101 and 110. This would include, but not be limited to, improvements in electrical and telephonic capabilities; new carpet and fresh paint, and modification of all facilities to accommodate handicapped personnel. (GSA estimates that it will exceed $250,000 to ascertain what improvements and/or modification are required.)

5. QUALITY OF LIFE

ISSUE:

To determine Quality of Life issues to be considered in making a decision to move SIMA Saint Louis.

DISCUSSION:

The SIMA in Saint Louis currently calls the Robert A. Young Building in the center of downtown home. This building is commonly referred to as the RAY Building. It is one of the older historic buildings and the General Services Administration (GSA) recently renovated the lower ten floors at a cost of approximately $60,300,000, transforming it into a pleasing and modern high-rise office building. Some of the historic features on the ground floor were restored and preserved which makes for an imposing entrance. However, renovations on the upper floors did not retain any historical features but instead transformed the space into a bright, airy modern office complex. The renovations were not excessive and any interior feature can be found in a recently constructed office complex.

Conversations, official and unofficial, with SIMA personnel reflect a workforce which is happy with its surroundings and downtown location. There were no negative comments concerning the workplace, the location, or any facilities or services such as parking, cafeteria, day-care, banking and so on. These same individuals expressed dismay at any prospect of moving and mentioned all of the issues which will be addressed in this Section. Most of their fears were supported by our inquiries.

Perhaps the major concern is the lack of adequate parking available at the Federal Center located on Goodfellow Boulevard. We made two on-site visits to the Federal Center and learned that parking is indeed cause for concern. For instance, there is limited parking near Building 101 and Building 110 which is usually reserved for management officials, handicapped employees and carpools. All other individuals must park outside the Federal Center in a parking facility located across a main thoroughfare from the buildings. There is an overhead walkway at one location, but the distance from building to parking lot is considerable and could be a problem to some individuals, particularly in bad weather. Also, this remote parking lot is fenced, but not enclosed, and is patrolled for security reasons. This too could pose a problem to those individuals who might be required to work late. After normal duty hours all parking is open, but to leave the building, go to the remote parking lot, drive one's car inside the Federal Center, find a closer parking space, park and return to one's work location would be an imposition on the individual and certainly a potential loss of productive time. All parking at the Federal Center is governed by AVSCOM Regulation No. 210-1, Personnel Parking Facilities Program and Ridesharing Program, dated 19 September 1991. To further compound the parking

situation at the Federal Center, it is conceivable that SIMA's move to that location would add an additional 400 to 500 vehicles to an already strained parking facility.

The parking problems cannot be alleviated by use of public transportation. Some service is provided by the Bi-State Bus Company but the routes are infrequent and inadequate to accomodate the needs of employees who live some distance away, those who work nights, overtime or an alternate work schedule. Also the bus schedule is not compatible with the schedule of those who must drop children at school, Day-Care facilities, or related activities.

A Childcare Center named UNCLE SAM'S KIDS opened at the Federal Center on 6 July 1992. This facility is not presently filled to capacity but is expected to have a full compliment of 120 by Fall 1992. This facility most likely would adequately serve the needs of the RAINBOW CASTLE (the RAY Building childcare facility) clientele but we did not entertain any comparison between the two facilities nor did we attempt to address any problems which might be created by moving a child from one facility to another. These problems could range from emotional problems for the affected child, to conflicts in schedules with siblings, carpools and so on. Childcare policy at the Federal Center is governed by GSA who has granted a license to the operator in accordance with the Federal Property Management Regulation (FPMR). The facility must conform to all regulatory guidance issued by the state of Missouri.

Building 101 has a Cafeteria and there are several other dining facilities at the Federal Center. There is also a fully equipped Fitness Center. However, this study did not address the burden, if any, that an additional 400 to 500 individual might place on any of these facilities. This question should be addressed in order to be properly evaluated in any future discussion of a proposed move.

Handicapped facilities are barely adequate (lack of ramps, handrails, few restrooms designed for handicapped individuals, narrow doorways, entrance doors are manual, no facilities for the hearing-impaired) but these concerns are only noted here since they are discussed fully in another Section of this report.

SIMA and its forerunners, Central System Design Activity (CSDA) and Automated Logistics Management Systems Activity (ALMSA), have been in the downtown area for more than twenty years. It is conceivable that a move to the Federal Center would disrupt households, carpools, schooling, community involvement, and various other social activities.

While none of the above concerns have a direct nor tangible bearing on the cost-savings of any move, they could combine to have an extremely grave effect on the overall morale of SIMA and, consequently, the productivity of the organization. This morale

problem and possible decreased productivity could continue for a long time because of the timeframe needed to accomplish a move of this magnitude; therefore, these issues should be weighted properly in any decision affecting SIMA's future location.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Ascertain if additional and/or more suitable parking facilities can be obtained.

- Contact the Bi-State Bus Company to ascertain if additional routes can be added with hours to accommodate SIMA personnel if there are adequate riders to make this profitable for the Bus Company.

- Determine if the Childcare Center located at the Federal Center can accommodate the additional children from SIMA. If not, determine if Childcare facilities at the Federal Center can be expanded.

- Determine needed handicapped facilities and feasibility of upgrading existing facilities and/or constructing additional facilities. Upgrading would include modification to restrooms, construction of ramps and installation of aids to accommodate the blind and hearing-impaired.

- Ascertain extent of personal disruption and take measures to lessen the turmoil to the maximum extent possible.

6. COMPUTER ROOM

ISSUE:

To determine adequacy of computer facilities to house SIMA's computers and ancillary equipment.

DISCUSSION:

Presently, the future location of SIMA's mainframe computer plus ancillary equipment is unknown. Originally, it was proposed that SIMA's mainframe computer and ancillary equipment be moved to the Streamlining Information Service Operations Consolidation System (SISOCS) Center located at Huntsville, Alabama. The published schedule reflected that this move transpire in 1994. However, the latest information indicates that if a SISOCS Center is established in Saint Louis, Missouri, at the Federal Center (Information Systems Command AVSCOM-TROSCOM) then the SIMA equipment will become a part of that SISOCS in 1993, and will be physically located in the Computer Room of Building 103. This Computer Room is under construction with an expected completion date of October 1993. Today, the mainframe computer is owned by ISC and 19 ISC employees work in SIMA's Computer Room on the mainframe computer.

The remainder of SIMA's computer equipment will be relocated in the Computer Rooms of Building 101 and Building 103. The Building 101 Computer Room is quite small; therefore, SIMA must select from several options. For instance, SIMA can locate all computer equipment in Building 103 if space is available; put some in Building 101 with the remainder in Building 103; or enlarge the Computer Room in Building 101. It is unkown if space will be available in Building 103 for any equipment other than SIMA's mainframe. Based on available data, it seems the best solution will be to expand the existing Computer Room in Building 101 in order to accommodate all SIMA computer equipment.

RECOMMENDATION:

- Enlarge the computer room in Building 101, in order to accommodate SIMA's total computer equipment plus all ancillary equipment if the Federal Center is selected as the SISOCS facility.

7. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

ISSUE:

To determine political factors to be considered when deciding to move SIMA Saint Louis to the Federal Center.

DISCUSSION:

The U.S. Army Materiel Command Management Engineering Activity (AMCMEA) was tasked to perform a cost analysis study pertaining to a proposed move of SIMA from its downtown location in the RAY Building to the Federal Center, 4300 Goodfellow Boulevard, Saint Louis, Missouri. (These two locations are approximately 10 miles apart.) As the first step in this cost analysis, we contacted the Real Estate Division, General Services Administration (GSA), 1500 East Bannister Road, Kansas City, Missouri, by letter, dated 1 July 1992. The GSA reply to our letter is dated 6 July 1992. The GSA's reply raised several questions which may have important political implications. First, GSA stated that a move of this magnitude would "be a Prospectus level project and would require Congressional approval." (We later learned that a Prospectus level project is any project which costs over $1,525,000.) Secondly, GSA continued by writing that "It is doubtful that this project would be favorably received as a benefit to the taxpayers." Thirdly and perhaps even more serious was GSA comment that "It would also be construed as having a significant adverse impact on continuing redevelopment of downtown St. Louis." GSA readily discussed cost, including responsibility for each category of cost, and concluded by estimating that the overall governmental cost could exceed $16,000,000.00. GSA concluded by stating that "this does not appear to be a fiscally prudent project." The tone of the letter implied that GSA <u>does</u> <u>not</u> and <u>will</u> <u>not</u> support the proposed move.

AVSCOM personnel told us that AVSCOM supports the move because buildings will shortly be vacant and AVSCOM wishes to have a voice in selecting its neighbors. AVSCOM readily admitted that it prefers to have another Army Activity as a tenant. AVSCOM's rationale is that it feels an Army Activity would be a more compatible tenant than would another Department of Defense element or a civilian organization. If SIMA were to move to the Federal Center, SIMA would become a tenant of AVSCOM and, therefore, it is likely there would be a SIMA personnel loss. This loss would be the results of receiving certain support services from AVSCOM. This support might include, but not be limited to, such functions as Personnel, Protocol, Courier, Graphics, and Printing. Any personnel loss would involve the Civilian Personnel Community and the Union. Thus, before any move, the socio-economic impact of this action should be addressed and a plan formulated which would outline how best to affect these changes with the least possible internal turmoil; but more importantly, with the least possible outside intervention by the Union and/or public officials.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Before a final decision is made concerning this move, GSA's concerns should be studied more closely with measures taken to mitigate these concerns whenever possible.

- Ascertain if GSA will oppose this move officially by initiating actions to oppose at higher levels - perhaps at the city, state and/or congressional level.

- Determine extent of personnel losses and acertain the political impact of these reductions.

- Ascertain the degree of involvement in any move at the city, state, and national level.

- Ascertain the involvement by Equal Employment Opportunity Office, Civilian Personnel Office, the Union, and other interested agencies or individuals.

- Address socio-economic impact and develop procedures which will lessen this impact to the greatest degree.

PART IV

SPACE UTILIZATION

PART IV - SPACE UTILIZATION

ISSUE:

To determine if SIMA Saint Louis can realize cost savings in their current location by proper use of space.

DISCUSSION:

A report, entitled AMC Automation Assessment, prepared for the Army Materiel Commander suggested that savings of $3,100,000 would be possible by moving Systems Integration Management Activity (SIMA) from the Raymond A. Young (RAY) Building to buildings at the Federal Center. From the beginning there was some doubts that savings of this magnitude were possible; therefore, the Management Engineering Activity (MEA) was asked to conduct an independent cost analysis based upon all available data in order to ascertain precisely the cost of or savings from such a move.

The MEA Team obtained needed data by a review of all pertinent documents and via personnel interviews. Based upon this information gathering and analysis process, it was concluded that any savings would fall short of the original estimate but would most likely be somewhere near $542,617 yearly. Managers at SIMA were startled by the difference between the estimated and actual yearly cost savings which would be realized by moving SIMA, but after some discussion the Managers concluded that proper use of current space would afford savings equal to, or near, $542,617 yearly. The MEA Team was asked to help with the task of determining if current space could be better utilized. In order to answer this question, the MEA Analysts and SIMA personnel, particularly the SIMA Facilities Manager, worked as one to review all historical cost data and facilities layout for floors six, seven, and eight of the RAY Building which SIMA currently leases from GSA. All conclusions are the result of a coordinated effort and based solely upon this review conducted from 4 through 7 August 1992.

Perhaps the first and most important fact we learned is that GSA has different categories of usage and charges a different rate for each type of usage. Therefore, it is critical that all leased space be corrrectly defined and billed for the purpose it is intended and if not used for that purpose then the tenant (SIMA) and the owner(GSA) should negotiate a rental rate based upon the current use. There are many different categories of use but SIMA only uses the following five:

CODE AND DEFINITION		RATE PER SQUARE FOOT
SP-1	Office Space	$14.25
SP-2	Food Service	$22.96
SP-4	Automated Data Processing (ADP)	$23.07
SP-5	Conference and Training Room	$16.66
SP-6	Light Industrial	$11.39

A review of cost documents, review of floor layout with placement of furniture and equipment, and an onsite survey of all SIMA facilities revealed that more effective use of existing square footage, will result in a significant savings through the implementation of the following suggestions:

I. Renegotiation of Current Space Charges. Some areas which are being charged at a higher rate than appropriate for that type space should be renegotiated with General Services Administration (GSA).

a. Telephone and Break Room. This area is charged at the Food Service Rate (SP-2), but should be charged at the Conference and Training Rate (SP-5). In actuality, this room is an extension of the Command Conference Room.

(1) Square feet: 322

(2) New versus old cost per square foot: $16.66 versus $22.96.

(3) Dollar savings: $2,029

b. Computer Rooms. Some rooms are charged at the Automated Data Processing (ADP) Rate (SP-4), but should be changed to the Office Space Rate (SP-1), because these rooms do not meet the standards of an ADP environment.

(1) Square feet: 2674

(2) New versus old cost per square foot: $14.25 versus $23.07.

(3) Dollar savings: $23,424

II. Identification of Reimburseable Space: Some areas are provided free of charge to the user but the cost should be reimburseable to SIMA.

a. Joint Logistics Service Center (JLSC). This area is presently or will be occupied by JLSC personnel. An area large enough to accomodate 217 personnel, is set aside and will be needed in the foreseeable future. The JLSC has agreed to reimburse SIMA for this space.

(1) Square feet: 29,346

(2) Cost per square foot: $14.25

(3) Dollars reimburseable: $418,181

b. The SIMA Contractors. This free-of-charge space is provided to contractors who are working on various SIMA projects.

In the future, contractors should reimburse the government for this space.

(1) Square feet: 3306

(2) Cost per square foot: $14.25

(3) Dollars reimburseable: $47,111

c. Defense Information Technology Service Office (DITSO). This area will accomodate approximately 40 SIMA personnel assigned to the Financial Management Systems Branch. These people are scheduled for reassignment (in place) to DITSO, then this space should become reimburseable.

(1) Square feet: 6720

(2) Cost per square foot: $14.25

(3) Dollars reimburseable: $95,760

d. Navy Quick Copy. The Navy is the contractor for all Department of Defense printing; therefore, SIMA should be reimbursed for the cost of this space.

(1) Square feet: 548

(2) Cost per square foot: $11.39

(3) Dollars reimburseable: $6,242

III. Space Reductions. These are areas that can be returned to GSA because current occupants can easily move to another area.

a. Conference and Training Rooms. Some conference rooms are occupied by Artificial Intelligence and the Information Systems Command (ISC) Training Room. We suggest moving Artificial Intelligence into the computer room. Most ISC personnel support the AMDAHL Computer and will vacate RAY Building when the AMDAHL is moved. Meanwhile, ISC personnel can use excess space in the computer room for training.

(1) Square feet: 2415

(2) Cost per square foot: $16.66

(3) Dollar savings: $40,234

b. Vacant Floor Space. Some areas are currently unoccupied and can be returned to GSA.

(1) Square feet: 5670

(2) Cost per square foot: $14.25

(3) Dollar savings: $80,798

IV. Miscellaneous Savings.

a. The AMDAHL Support (Customer Engineering). This area is currently occupied and used by contractors providing support for the AMDAHL Computer. This support will be moved with the AMDAHL Computer.

(1) Square feet: 1296

(2) Cost per square foot: $14.25

(3) Dollar savings: $18,468

b. Smoking Rooms. Plans call for GSA to provide smoking areas in conjunction with vending rooms and/or break areas on each floor. These areas are expected to be available by December 1992; thus, SIMA will not be required to provide smoking rooms after that date.

(1) Square feet: 1571

(2) Cost per square foot: $23.07, $16.66 and $11.39

(3) Dollar savings: $25,445

NOTE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE SIX SUGGESTIONS WOULD RESULT IN ANNUAL SAVINGS OF $757,692. THIS EXCEEDS THE ESTIMATED ANNUAL SAVINGS OF $542,617 GENERATED BY MOVING SIMA TO THE FEDERAL CENTER BY $215,075.

The MEA Analysts plus the SIMA Facilities Manager feel that changes I through VI could be executed with minimal upheaval. The recommended space savings were based on a quick review which lacks sufficient detail to calculate other costs (e.g., changes in telephones, electrical, and computer wiring; or reconfiguration of workstations). Also, other areas of potential savings were not investigated due to time constraints. However, the savings revealed during this review indicates a strong potential for additional savings if an indepth continuation of this study were permitted.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Implement the six recommendations.

- Suggest that a detailed review of space usage and need be undertaken in order to ascertain all potential savings.

PART V

APPENDICES

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING ACTIVITY
4940-B RESEARCH DRIVE
HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA 35805-5906

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

JUL 1992

AMXME-MP (5-4b)

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND, SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY (SIMA), LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT, PA 17201-4180

SUBJECT: Plan of Action for Cost Study of Proposed Move of SIMA (St. Louis)

1. Reference conversation between the Deputy Director for Resource Management, SIMA (Chambersburg) and the Chief of the Production and Engineering Division, U.S. Army Materiel Command Management Engineering Activity (AMCMEA).

2. Objectives:

a. Determine the cost to move SIMA (St. Louis) from present location in the Robert A. Young Building, 1222 Spruce Street, St. Louis, MO, to facilities at the Federal Center, Goodfellow Boulevard, St. Louis, MO.

b. Determine adequacy of proposed facilities to house SIMA (St. Louis).

c. Determine the cost to move SIMA's mainframe computer.

d. Provide SIMA Director a written report and briefing.

3. Study Scope: The study scope includes interviews with personnel at SIMA, Chambersburg, PA and SIMA, St. Louis, MO, U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command, and General Services Administration.

4. Study Location: SIMA (St. Louis).

5. Designation of Project Team:

a. The following are designated as team members:

(1) Mr. Ernest W. Weir, Team Leader, DSN 788-1934.

(2) Ms. Linda Darwin, Team Member, DSN 788-1422.

b. The electronic mailing address for the above is as follows: eweir@redstone-emh2.army.mil.

AMXME-MP 1 JUL 1992

SUBJECT: Plan of Action for Cost Study of Proposed Move of SIMA (St. Louis)

6. Reports: AMCMEA will provide a final report and briefing.

7. Study Schedule:

Preliminary Planning	24 Jun - 5 Jul
Onsite Visit to SIMA (St. Louis)	6 - 24 Jul
Analysis	25 - 31 Jul
Report Preparation	1 - 10 Aug

8. AMC -- America's Arsenal for the Brave.

for HARRIETT GEE TRIBBLE
Director

STUDY PARTICIPANTS

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WILLIAMS, FRANKLIN D.	Chief, Administration Division	DSN 555-4166

ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

AMC	Army Materiel Command
ALMSA	Army Logistics Management Systems Activity (a forerunner of SIMA)
AMDAHL	SIMA's Mainframe Computer
AVSCOM	U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command
CSDA	Central Systems Design Activity (a forerunner to ALSMA)
DISC	Director of Information System Command
DSN	Defense System Network
FPMR	Federal Property Management Regulation
GSA	General Services Administration
ISC	Information Systems Command
MEA	Management Engineering Activity
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
NEC NEAX 2400 SYSTEM	Telephone Used by SIMA St. Louis
PROSPECTUS LEVEL PROJECT	Any construction project in excess of $1,525,000.00 and one which requires Congressional approval
RAY BUILDING	Robert A. Young Building
SIMA	Systems Integration and Management Activity
SISOCS	Streamlining Information Service Operations Consolidation System

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING ACTIVITY
4940-B RESEARCH DRIVE
HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA 35805-5906

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

1 JUL 1992

AMXME-MP (5-4b)

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, MR. JIM ODGEN, REAL ESTATE DIVISION, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 1500 E. BANNISTER ROAD, KANSAS CITY, MO 64131

SUBJECT: Proposed Move of Systems Integration and Management Activity (SIMA) St. Louis, MO

1. The U.S. Army Materiel Command Management Engineering Activity (AMCMEA) has been tasked to perform a cost analysis study on the proposed move of SIMA from its present location in the Robert A. Young (RAY) Building at 1222 Spruce Street, St Louis, to the Federal Center (Buildings 101 and 110), St. Louis.

2. The proposed move is not a new issue. It has been in the discussion phase for some time and was recently briefed to the Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), as a cost saving measure.

3. Our charter is to determine the cost savings to be gained from this move and the adequacy of the facilities at the Federal Center to effectively contain personnel and equipment.

4. There are several preliminary questions we need answered as we begin our study:

a. Would it be in General Services Administration's (GSA) best interest if SIMA were to move to the Federal Center?

b. Would SIMA be required to bear all costs for renovation of Federal Center facilities, configuration of the RAY Building for new tenants, upgrade of electrical and telephone capability and actual move of furniture, equipment, files, etc.?

c. Would this move require approval by GSA?

5. Request cost data on the following:

a. Renovation of facilities at the Federal Center to accommodate SIMA.

b. Cost to upgrade electrical and telephone capabilities at the Federal Center.

AMXME-MP
SUBJECT: Proposed Move of Systems Integration and Management Activity (SIMA) St. Louis, MO

c. Cost to configure facilities at the RAY Building for new tenants.

d. Cost to move furniture, files, personnel equipment, etc., from RAY Building to the Federal Center.

e. Cost to move computers and specialized equipment.

6. The above costs are not necessarily all inclusive and may change as the study evolves.

7. Mr. Ernie Weir and Ms. Linda Darwin will be in St. Louis beginning 6 Jul 92 and will be available to meet with you and/or your people either there or in Kansas City. They can be reached through Mr. Frank Williams, (314) 331-4166. Prior to 6 Jul 92 they may be reached at (205) 722-1934 or 722-1422.

8. Our target to complete this study is 31 Jul 92. We would appreciate your support and assistance in this effort. As we will be required to present our findings to the Headquarters AMC, Commander, we would appreciate your efforts in providing data in writing, where possible.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

DAVID HENDERSON
Chief, Production and
Engineering Division

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)
FAX TRANSMITTAL # of pages ▶ 2

To Linda Darwin	From John Benson
Dept./Agency U.S. Army	Phone # (816) 926-7507
Fax # (314) 331-8927	Fax # (816) 926-1659

NSN 7540-01-317-7368 5099-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

[redacted]

Mr. David Henderson
Chief, Production and
Engineering Division (AMXME-MP)
U.S. Army Material Command
Management Engineering Activity
4940-B Research Drive
Huntsville, AL 35805-5906

Dear Mr. Henderson:

This is in response to your letter AMXME-MP(5-46) concerning a proposed move of Systems Integration and Management Activity (SIMA), St. Louis, Missouri. You requested answers to the following questions:

QUESTION: Would it be in General Services Administration's (GSA) best interest if SIMA were to move to the Federal Center?

RESPONSE: As the largest Federal agency tenant in the Robert A. Young (RAY) Federal Building, SIMA occupies over 170,000 square feet of space. The cost for Initial Space Alterations (ISA) for other tenant agencies to backfill this space is estimated in excess of $4 million. This would be a Prospectus level project and would require Congressional approval. It is doubtful that this project would be favorably received as a benefit to the taxpayers. It would also be construed as having a significant adverse impact on continuing redevelopment of downtown St. Louis. Consequently, the proposed move would not be in the best interest of GSA.

QUESTION: Would SIMA be required to bear all costs for renovation of Federal Center facilities, configuration of the RAY Building for new tenants, upgrade of electrical and telephone capability, and actual move of furniture, equipments, files, etc...?

RESPONSE: Since this would not be a forced move by GSA, SIMA would be required to fund all costs of renovating facilities at the Federal Center.

The cost for ISA's in backfilling the RAY Building would be the responsibility of GSA.

The cost to upgrade any electrical and telephone capabilities at the Federal Center would be the responsibility of SIMA. Additionally, SIMA would be responsible for the costs for the actual move of furniture, equipment, files, etc..., since this is ot a forced move.

QUESTION: Would this move require approval by GSA?

RESPONSE: A move from one GSA-controlled location to another GSA-controlled location would require the approval of GSA. In reviewing the excessive amount of funding required for the proposed relocation, with the limited benefits to be realized, GSA would not support such a move.

QUESTION: Request cost data on the renovation of facilities (including costs to upgrade electrical and telephone capability) at the Federal Center to accommodate SIMA.

RESPONSE: It is not possible to give a detailed estimate of the requested costs without development of the full scope of your requirements. However, based on previous experience with projects of this magnitude, an initial, planning estimate would range from $8 million to $10 million. This would also require Congressional approval of a Prospectus.

QUESTION: Cost to move furniture, files, personnel equipment, etc..., from the Ray Building to the Federal Center.

RESPONSE: Your agency would be responsible for costs estimated to be in the $200,000 to $300,000 range.

QUESTION: Cost to disassemble, move, and reassemble computers and specialized equipment.

RESPONSE: Your agency would be responsible for costs estimated to be in the $500,000 range.

The above data is not all inclusive and is subject to change. However, it is to be noted that the overall cost to the Government could exceed $16 million. This does not appear to be a fiscally prudent project.

Members of my staff and I will be available, for a meeting in my office in Kansas City, during the week of July 6, 1992. Please contact me at your earliest convenience to establish a specific date and time. My telephone number is (816) 926-7507.

Sincerely,

/s/ JAMES D. OGDEN

James D. Ogden
Chief, Eastern Branch
Real Estate Division
Public Buildings Service (6PEE)

FAX TRANSMITTAL # of pages ▶ 2

To Linda Darwin	From John Benson
Dept./Agency [redacted] U.S. Army	Phone # (816) 926-7507
Fax # (314) 331-8927	Fax # (816) 926-1659

NSN 7540-01-317-7368 5099-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

DATE: JULY 20, 1992

TO: LINDA DARWIN, MEA

FROM: JOHN A. BENSON
CHIEF, ST. LOUIS SECTION
EASTERN BRANCH
REAL ESTATE DIVISION
REGION 6, PBS, GSA

This is in response to your informal request for additional information concerning the evaluation of the feasibility for a move of SIMA from the Robert A. Young Building to 4300 Goodfellow.

It is estimated that an A/E design contract would take six month from request to award. It is further estimated that the completed design would take another six months.

This would be a Prospectus level project and would require Congressional approval. This approval would be requested after the scope of work and the project costs are determined by the Design A/E contractor. This Congressional approval could take up to three years. Once the Prospectus is approved, it could take up to a year to market the construction contract. After that award, it is estimated that actual construction could take 18 to 24 months. Given the above estimates, it could take up to seven years from the receipt of the original space request to actually have the space ready for occupancy at 4300 Goodfellow.

The Prospectus threshold for Federal Construction is currently $1,525,000.

See the attached sheet for comparison of current and short range projected rental costs for SIMA at the RAY Bldg. and projected occupancy at 4300 Goodfellow.

Relocation, removal, or disposal costs for SIMA systems and other furniture would be the responsibility of SIMA.

It is not possible to give you detailed costs for minimum versus maximum space/building upgrade alterations for 4300 Goodfellow without knowing the exact scope of work to be accomplished. However, the alterations cost is estimated to range from $8,000,000 to $10,000,000. Since this would not be a forced relocation, SIMA would be responsible for funding all building and building systems upgrades and all space alterations.

Mr. James Ogden is the Chief, Eastern Branch, Real Estate Division, Public Buildings Service, Region 6, GSA. Madelynn Cunningham is a Realty Specialist on my staff.

If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me at 816-926-7507.

SIMA
Robert A. Young Federal Building
St. Louis, Missouri

July 15, 1992

Amt. of Space		RAY now	Ray 10/92	G'fellow now	G'fellow 10/92
Ofc	121,375	$1,729,594	$1,818,198	$1,369,110	$1,446,790
SP-2	1,412	32,420	34,255	25,981	27,463
SP-3A	2,256	56,332	59,491	44,940	47,489
SP-4	21,160	488,161	514,188	388,286	410,292
SP-5A	12,942	215,614	227,779	172,776	182,612
SP-6	6,935	78,990	83,359	62,692	66,229
Pkg. spaces	11	6,600	6,981	1,309	1,385
TOTAL		$2,607,710	$2,744,251	$2,065,093	$2,182,260

BILLING RATES

Type of Space	Ray 7/92 rent	Ray 10/92 rent	G'F 7/92 rent	G'F 10/92 rent
Ofc	$14.25	$14.98	$11.28	$11.92
SP-2	22.96	24.26	18.40	19.45
SP-3A	24.97	26.37	19.92	21.05
SP-4	23.07	24.30	18.35	19.39
SP-5A	16.66	17.60	13.35	14.11
SP-6	11.39	12.02	9.04	9.55
Pkg. spaces cost per year	600.00	634.64	119.00	125.87

Prospectus for Federal Construction is $1,525,000.00 as of July 1992.

SIMA occupies 24% of the Young Building. Construction for the Young Building was $61,300,000.00. 24% of $61.3 million is $14,712,000.00

Document Separator

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
200 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

April 14, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, The Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Ste. 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

Thank you for providing us with a copy of the attached letter from the Missouri Congressional Delegation (the "MCD Letter"), which suggests that the Secretary of Defense improperly recommended to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission the closure of Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM). I would like to respond on behalf of the Army, and I appreciate this opportunity to present the Army's views on the several issues that the MCD Letter raises, and to explain why these issues should not lead the 1995 Commission to reject the ATCOM recommendation.

Because we believe that many of these issues stem from a misunderstanding of the way in which the Army's closure and realignment recommendations were formulated, we feel it is useful to provide a brief description of the Army's Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process before turning to the particular issues raised by the MCD Letter.

I. THE ARMY'S BRAC PROCESS AND ITS STATIONING STRATEGY

As you are aware, the BRAC process is designed to facilitate objective, fair, and open decisions with respect to necessary reductions in military infrastructure. Accordingly, each recommended closure or realignment is arrived at through uniform application of the eight, published Department of Defense (DoD) Selection Criteria. Through evenhanded application of these Selection Criteria within categories, the military value of each particular facility or installation is assessed separately, after which the effects associated with any potential closure or realignment--including the costs to the military, and the implications for affected local communities and the environment--are determined.

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A. The Stationing Strategy

Although the BRAC law establishes a process by which closure and realignment recommendations are to be made, it does not provide any specific objectives with respect to the type, number, and magnitude of the necessary reductions. Accordingly, before the Army could begin its BRAC process, it had to articulate its generalized, strategic and operational basing requirements. The Army elected to do this in a comprehensive planning document: the Army Stationing Strategy.

The Army's Stationing Strategy does not outline specific stationing decisions, nor does it recommend the closure or realignment of any particular installations or facilities. Indeed, the Army elected, wholly apart from any BRAC legal requirement to do so, to develop this Stationing Strategy because of its independent planning utility. Thus, the Army's Stationing Strategy provides an operational foundation upon which BRAC planning and analysis can proceed. It is both antecedent to the BRAC process, insofar as it establishes the parameters within which BRAC decisionmaking takes place, and it is integral to the process, insofar as an assessment of the military value of any particular Army installation or facility must be determined with reference to the objectives set forth in its Stationing Strategy.

B. The BRAC Process

After developing its Stationing Strategy, the Army began its formal BRAC process with a comprehensive review and inventory of all of its installations. To facilitate fair comparisons, and consistent with Department of Defense policy, the Army assigned each installation or facility to one of 14 categories, each of which contained installations or facilities with similar characteristics. Pursuant to a 1993 BRAC Commission recommendation, and consistent with DoD policy guidance, the Army established a separate, Leased Facilities Category ("LFC") within which leased facilities could be compared to one another.[1]

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[1]See, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission: 1993 Report to the President, 1 July 1993, p. 2-3 ("The Commission suggests DoD direct the services to include a separate category for leased

(continued...)

(1) Military Value Assessments

The Army then applied the Military Value Criteria ("MVC)--i.e., the first four of the published DoD Selection Criteria--to each installation or facility within a category.[2] Like all the published criteria, the MVC were applied uniformly within each category so that, consistent with BRAC law, all installations or facilities would be considered equally, and the military value of each such installation or facility would be assessed separately. Uniform application of the MVC within each category yielded a Military Value Assessment ("MVA") for each particular installation or facility within that category. This MVA was a combination of both quantitative and qualitative assessments of the worth of a particular installation or facility.

In most instances, the quantitative component of the MVA was developed according to the Army's BRAC 95 Installation Assessment Program (IAP), a decision pad

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[1](...continued)
facilities during the 1995 process to ensure a bottom-up review of all leased space."). DoD's policy guidance subsequently left to each of the services the decision as to whether to create a separate category for the review of leased facilities. Although the other military departments chose not to create a separate LFC, the Army nonetheless concurred with the 1993 Commission and believed that a separate LFC would yield better analysis of leased facilities.

[2]Consistent with DoD policy guidance and applicable legal requirements, only those activities that were performed in leased space and which share a common mission, have permanently authorized personnel, have a separate support structure, and cost more than $200K annually were considered in the LFC. As directed by DoD's policy guidance, "[c]ivilian personnel authorizations of organizations in leased space, which are part of an organization [that is either located] on a nearby military installation or . . . [is located] within the same metropolitan statistical area, shall be considered part of the civilian personnel authorizations of that installation." See, "1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- Policy Memorandum Three," 29 December 1994, pp. 1-2. Accordingly, these adjunct leases were assessed as part of their host installations.

computer model that was designed to assist in the comparison of installations according to a common set of weighted attributes, each of which related to one of the MVC. Thus, certified data were collected for each of these attributes. This data was then entered into the IAP, which in turn produced an Installation Assessment--i.e., a quantitative ranking of installations within a particular category.

With respect to the LFC, however, the IAP was not employed, because its list of weighted attributes was designed to assist in the comparison of particula *installations*, rather than in the comparison of particular (leased) *facilities*.[3] In other words, installations and leased facilities are fundament different, and thus they cannot be evaluated acco to the same list of attributes. For example, com leased facilities based on things such as each le facility's aviation maintenance facilities, range hard surface staging areas, and other such attrib incorporated in the IAP model would not have been instructive as to the relative merit of each such facility: no leased facilities possess these attributes, and thus all would have received equally low scores in these areas.

but -- couldn't attributes applicable to leases be established so that MV of leases could be determined?

Accordingly, an Installation Assessment was not prepared for facilities within the LFC, and, perhaps in this limited respect, the Army's BRAC process for leased facilities might be said to have differed slightly from its process for other types of installations. In lieu of an Installation Assessm however, the Army did, as described more fully bel undertake a quantitative assessment of each leased facility according to consideration of empirical attributes that were more directly relevant to comparisons of leased facilities.

"slightly" is an understatement

Once these quantitative assessments were completed--either through the IAP or, in the LFC, through consideration of other relevant empirical attributes--the qualitative portion of the MVA was undertaken. These qualitative assessments sought to ascertain the consistency of the quantitative assessments with the objectives outlined in the Army's Stationing Strategy. Thus, the Stationing Strategy

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[3]Groups of leases in the same headquarters and same geographical area were deemed a single facility for the purposes of the Military Value Assessment.

served as a qualitative template against which the quantitative assessments could be measured and revised accordingly.

Therefore, as with other categories, the MVA for each leased facility within the LFC was determinec separately. Each such MVA was a combination of bc quantitative assessments, which were arrived at tl comparisons of relevant empirical data, and qualit assessments, which were provided by the Army's Stationing Strategy. Although the Army determined separately the Military Value of each leased facil without reference to an Installation Assessment, t MVA of each leased facility was nonetheless compos a similar quantitative assessment tempered by the qualitative guidance provided by the Stationing Strategy. In no instance did the Army assess the military value of a leased facility solely according to the qualitative guidance provided by the Army's Stationing Strategy.

If there is an MVA where are they?

(2) Identification of Study Candidates

After completing the aforementioned quantitative and qualitative assessments, each installation or facility within a category received a Military Value Assessment relative to other installations of facilities within that category. In turn, those installations or facilities that were deemed to possess relatively low military value within the category were designated as candidates for further study for possible closure or realignment. With respect to the LFC, all facilities within the category were deemed to be of relatively low military value, especially with respect to MVC two and four, and thus all facilities were designated as candidates for further study.

(3) Development of Alternatives and Application of DoD Selection Criteria Four through Eight

Once the Study Candidates were identified for each category, the Army developed between one and six specific base closure and realignment alternatives for each such candidate. These alternatives were derived from force structure decisions, the Stationing Strategy, previous BRAC reviews, Major Army Command recommendations, staff proposals, and Joint Cross-Service Group alternatives. Each of these competing alternatives was then assessed and refined according to affordability, economic and environmental analyses.

More particularly, the fifth DoD Selection Criterion--"[t]he extent and timing of potential cost savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs"--was applied uniformly to all study candidates within a category through use of The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) Model, DoD's model for resource analysis and measurement of the affordability of each potential closure or realignment. Thus once relevant data was plugged in for each of the alternatives, the COBRA analysis indicated the likely costs and savings associated with each potential closure or realignment.

The sixth and seventh DoD Selection Criteria--"[t]he economic impact on communities[,]" and "[t]he ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel[,]" respectively--were applied uniformly to all study candidates within a category through use of DoD's standard model for the calculation of economic impacts. Thus, once relevant data for each of the alternatives was plugged in, this model indicated the likely economic and infrastructure impacts associated with the potential closure or realignment.

Finally, the eighth DoD Selection Criteria--"[t]he environmental impact"--was applied uniformly to all study candidates within a category by an Environmental Review Committee, which collected and analyzed Environmental Baseline Summaries and produced an initial assessment for each installation or facility. Subsequent analysis then refined these assessments, and they were factored into analysis of each of the alternatives.

II. THE ARMY DID, ACCORDING TO CRITERIA ONE THROUGH FOUR, ASSESS MILITARY VALUE IN THE FORMULATION OF ITS ATCOM RECOMMENDATION.

The charge that the Army failed to assess military value in the formulation of its ATCOM recommendation is without foundation. MVAs were fundamental to all of the Army's BRAC analysis--including its analysis of leased facilities at ATCOM and elsewhere. Although, for the reasons identified above, facilities within the leasing category were not ranked pursuant to an *Installation Assessment*, a *Military Value Assessment* was nonetheless prepared for each facility within this

category.[4]

The quantitative component of these MVAs took the form of assessments of lease costs, space, features, and other common attributes of leased facilities. The qualitative component of these MVAs consisted of evaluating the utility of each facility in light of both the Stationing Strategy's general operational objectives--i.e., "[e]liminate excess capacity[,] . . . [m]inimize use of leased space[,] . . . [and] [c]ollocate tenants from different major commands where functional synergy can be obtained and facility support is available"--and its more particular operational objectives with respect to commodity-oriented commands such as ATCOM--i.e., achieve "[e]fficiency . . . through collocation and integration of research, engineering, acquisition and logistics functions, as well as reduce[] overhead[.]"

Just as with other categories of installations, *MVAs* for each facility within the LFC category were arrived at through uniform application of each of the four Military Value Criteria. With respect to the ATCOM leases, each of the four criteria was applied to arrive at a MVA for the facility.

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[4]It appears that in part, the MCD Letter may have mistaken an "Installation Assessment" for a "Military Value Assessment", and the MCD therefore concluded that since the former was not prepared for facilities within the leasing category, no Military Value Assessments were undertaken for facilities within the category. As noted above, the two are not the same. An Installation Assessment is merely a discretionary, quantitative ranking of installations within a category according to a decision pad computer model. It may form the quantitative component of a Military Value Assessment, but it alone does not comprise the Military Value Assessment. Conversely, a Military Value Assessment in a mandatory determination, consisting of both quantitative and qualitative measures of the worth of each installation or facility within a category. Thus a Military Value Assessment may depend in part upon an Installation Assessment--if such an assessment is appropriate for facilities or installations within a particular category--but it need not be based upon such an Installation Assessment.

A. Application of the First Criterion: "current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of DoD's total force."

The Army considered, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, ATCOM's current and future mission requirements and their impact on the operational readiness of the armed forces. Quantitatively, it considered the attributes of leased facilities that bore on such requirements and readiness, such as the size of the facilities according to their type, the population housed, the costs of the lease, and the penalties to terminate the lease. Qualitatively, the Army assessed existing ATCOM leased facilities in light of the aforementioned general and more particularized objectives of the Stationing Strategy.

B. Application of the Second Criterion: "availability and condition of land and facilities at both the existing and potential receiving locations."

The Army considered, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, the availability and condition of land and facilities at ATCOM's existing leased sites and at potential receiving sites such as Redstone Arsenal, Corpus Christi Army Depot, Rock Island Arsenal, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Detroit Arsenal, Fort Monmouth, and Natick Research, Development, Engineering Center. Quantitatively, it considered the attributes of leased facilities that bore on such matters, collecting information on such things as the percent of permanent facilitates at an existing leased site and potential receiving sites, the average age of facilities at each location, and the features and size of such facilities accordingly to their type. As part of this analysis, the Army used its corporate facility data base to determine whether facilities were available at potential receiving locations, and, if so, whether they required renovation to accommodate a relocating function. If facilities were not available, then the data base was used to determine what facilities would have to be constructed to accommodate such relocations. Qualitatively, the Army once again assessed its quantitative analysis in light of the aforementioned general and more particularized objectives of its Stationing Strategy.

C. Application of the Third Criterion: "ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations."

The Army considered, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, ATCOM's ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future requirements at both its present location and at other potential locations. Quantitatively, the Army considered the attributes of leased facilities and potential receiving locations that bore on such abilities, examining things such as buildable acres or unused space or buildings, the ability of information systems at both locations to accommodate expansions, the sites' proximity to or possession of an airport. Qualitatively, the Army again reviewed its quantitative findings in light of the general and more particularized objectives set forth in its stationing strategy.

D. Application of the Fourth Criterion: "cost and manpower implications."

The Army considered, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, the manpower and cost implications of retaining ATCOM at its existing leased sites or relocating functions to several other installations. Quantitatively, it considered the attributes that bore on such manpower and cost factors, collecting data on things such as the square footage requirements at existing and potential receiving sites, the costs per square foot of existing leased space and space elsewhere, the manpower-to-square-footage requirements of ATCOM at its existing and potential receiving locations. Qualitatively, and as with the other criteria, the Army assessed its quantitative assessments with reference to the general and more particularized objectives outlined in its Stationing Strategy.

III. THE ARMY COMPLIED WITH ITS STATIONING STRATEGY IN THE FORMULATION OF ITS ATCOM RECOMMENDATION.

The charge that the Army has not complied with its Stationing Strategy in the formulation of its ATCOM recommendation is incorrect. As explained above, the Army's Stationing Strategy is a planning document that provides guidance to its managers with respect to future operational requirements. This operational blueprint does, as noted above, encourage increased efficiency and reductions in overhead. It also, however, encourages the Army to minimize the use of

leased space, eliminate excess capacity, and collocate activities where functional synergy can be achieved and facility support is available.

The ATCOM recommendation complies fully with all of the Army's Stationing Strategy's objectives and guidance. This recommendation increases efficiency through collocation, integration, or relocation of discrete research, engineering, acquisition, and logistics functions at several installations. In turn, the synergies achieved through such collocations, integrations, and relocations assist in reducing overhead costs--in large part because once they are relocated, fewer personnel are required to accomplish the same functions. Moreover, the ATCOM recommendation is fully consist with the Stationing Strategy's other objectives insofar as it minimizes the use of leased space, eliminates excess capacity at receiving locations, and, as noted above, achieves a number of functional synergies.

IV. THE ARMY DID NOT OVERSTATE THE SAVINGS IT WOULD EXPECT TO REALIZE FROM THE CLOSURE OF ATCOM.

The allegation that the Army has overstated the savings it expects to realize from the closure of ATCOM is without merit. The Army would save nearly $50 million annually as a result of the synergies, efficiencies, and consolidations it expects to realize from the closure of ATCOM.

Contrary to the suggestion in the MCD Letter, the DoD COBRA model does not consider, or take credit for, any savings that might result from any previously planned personnel reductions or reductions that are otherwise independent of the BRAC process; only those savings associated with personnel reductions generated by a proposed closure or realignment are considered. Moreover, the DoD COBRA model is designed to assess only the potential savings that DoD likely would realize from the closure or realignment of any particular installation or facility. Whether the Federal Government would also likely save money as a result of any particular closure or realignment is a broader question that the current process was simply not designed to address. Nonetheless, we note that if the Army vacates GSA leased space, then GSA could make such space available to another Federal agency, or it could dispose of the property entirely--either of which could result in savings to the Federal Government.

Finally, the Army did conclude in its 1993 BRAC analysis that the relocation of ATCOM to a *single* installation would be too expensive. However, the 1995 recommendation, by relocating functions to *several* installations, avoids many of the significant construction costs, that, in large part, were responsible for the high costs associated with relocation in 1993. Indeed, if the Army had considered disestablishing ATCOM and relocating its functions to several installations during its 1993 BRAC process, then it likely would have forwarded such a recommendation to the 1993 Commission.

V. THE ARMY CONSIDERED ALL PRACTICABLE ALTERNATIVES IN THE FORMULATION OF ITS RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE ATCOM.

The suggestion that the Army failed to consider more cost-effective alternatives to the closure of ATCOM is inaccurate. As explained above, BRAC analysis necessarily considers feasible, competing alternatives, and the recommended closure of ATCOM was the best of these alternatives. The Army did consider alternatives to the ATCOM recommendation, such as relocating Headquarters, Strategic Space and Defense Command ("SSDC") from a leased facility to Redstone Arsenal. However, the COBRA analysis performed for this alternative indicated that it would cost more and save less. Moreover, this alternative was less consistent with the Army's Stationing Strategy, since relocation of SSDC to Redstone Arsenal would not increase efficiency, reduce overhead, or create any functional synergies.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

In summary, we do not believe that any of the issues raised by the MCD Letter can withstand close scrutiny. Through uniform application of the Military Value Criteria within each category, the Army developed a separate Military Value Assessment for each installation and facility--including those in the Leased Facility Category. The ATCOM recommendation is fully consistent with the Stationing Strategy's guidance, and the Army did not overstate or improperly calculate the savings that would be realized from the recommended closure of ATCOM. Lastly, the Army's BRAC process ensured that all practicable and feasible alternatives were considered.

Thank you again for allowing us to address these issues. We hope that this letter will assist the Commission in understanding the Army's BRAC processes in general, and its recommendation respecting ATCOM in particular.

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Attachment