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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

**BASE CLOSURE
AND
REALIGNMENT**

ISSUE PAPERS

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Mr. ~~Charlie Battaglia~~

*Annotated and
corrected
by the Ft. Monmouth
community.*

Fort Monmouth

Issue: Potential for the Commission to retain Fort Monmouth based upon:

- The Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) ranked Monmouth number one in military value (MV) analysis in various technical capabilities such as Information Systems and Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare (EW).
- The loss of intellectual capital and the costs associated with training a replacement workforce. There is no gain by moving these activities to Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD.
- Physically co-locating and consolidating Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation (RDAT&E) activities into Centers of Excellence impedes the healthy competition that naturally occurs when activities are dispersed at different sites/installations.

The three issues listed are true, but this section neglects the three major issues that highlight significant violations of BRAC selection criteria – costs of the move (and payback time); disruption and loss of military capability that is critical to the war effort in the field and critical to the Army transformation; and joint-ness and inter-service relevance of the activities.

Key Points:

- The DoD recommendation to close Ft Monmouth is linked to the movement of the Ordnance School from APG and makes use of vacated buildings.

This exposes one of the principal motivations behind the proposed move: APG needs a good tenant after the departure of the Ordnance School. This is insufficient reason to disrupt activity of demonstrated excellence and importance at Fort Monmouth. Furthermore, the space at APG to be vacated by the Ordnance School is residential and classroom space is not suitable for C4ISR labs. It would require much new construction.

- **The Military Value of APG is higher than Ft Monmouth as rated by the Army. Both the Technical JCSG and the Army determined the APG is the best site for the land C4ISR Center.**

APG ranks higher in military value in categories that are not relevant to C4ISR. APG's rank in C4ISR value is the lowest in the Army; Fort Monmouth is the highest in relevant categories. Army did not consider the historic/current relationship among Monmouth, Dix, and Lakehurst. When the Dix relationship is considered, Monmouth/Dix ranks with APG in installation military value.

- **The history of BRAC has taught us that intellectual capital loss is a temporary manageable problem. We have moved other activities successfully and will work closely with the commands, communities, and personnel involved to conduct this move effectively and efficiently.**

This statement about intellectual capital is directly contrary to warnings given by DoD (by Dr. Segal and others who led the T-JCSG) in testimony before Congress. There is strong historical evidence as well as an objective Harris poll survey this year and a letter from the National Defense University indicate that the loss would be severe and long-term – approximately 75 percent and approaching a decade. For example, in the '95 BRAC move of 300 positions from Fort Monmouth to Adelphi, only 40 people actually moved and the result was a reduction in the number of patents and other demonstrable reductions in capacity continues today. Furthermore, even a temporary reduction of critical C4ISR capability at the time of a war would be intolerable. The reduction would also further retard the Army's effort to catch-up in transformation.

- APG has existing research and test facilities that accommodate the consolidation of Army research at APG and the Baltimore area.

APG has no relevant "research" areas that help C4ISR. That relevant C4ISR capability (Army Research Lab) is west of Washington, D.C. (not near Baltimore or at APG) at Adelphi. There is no C4ISR "test" capacity at APG, no instrumented ranges, no suitable air facilities or airspace, and no existing or planned joint testing or experimentation capabilities in C4ISR at APG. The Army and DoD continue to make this erroneous statement. There is a T&E headquarters (administrative) and there is testing of rough road vehicles and ordnance and the like, but not instrumented testing of communication, visualization, sensing, or computer integration.

DoD Position: Transforming DoD Research, Development, Acquisition, Testing and Evaluations (RDAT&E) organizations into Joint Centers of Excellence is a high priority for both DoD and the U.S. Army. The synergy between private industry and the Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD, is yielding new technology and systems that are protecting our troops during the Global War on Terrorism. The Army needs a consolidated Command, Control, Communications and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Center of Excellence. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, has the right characteristics and capacities to support the consolidation.

Aberdeen has none of the right characteristics for a C4ISR center: no people, no industry, no ranges, inadequate airspace, no radio-quiet ranges, no battalion-scale testing capability, no joint plans or capabilities, and buildings that are not well-suited to C4ISR labs. APG can make the claim of suitability for BioChem Defense, but not for C4ISR.

This DoD recommendation would not create RDAT&E transformation in C4ISR (much of R would be missing, there would be no T&E); it simply would move D&A from one center of excellence with current joint activity to a would-be center of excellence with no joint activity.

The synergy between private industry and APG may exist in some fields (not C4ISR), but is far from the high level of synergy that already exists in New Jersey.

Through careful analysis of the various courses of action, both the Army and the TJCSG determined Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, was the best site for the land Command, Control, Communications and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Center. While Fort Monmouth may score higher on selected technical capabilities than APG using the Technical JCSG's military value assessment, the military value of APG using the criteria contained in the Army's holistic military value assessment, is significantly higher than Fort Monmouth because it has the multi-functional qualities, and capabilities and capacity (which is lacking at Fort Monmouth) that make it the best site for the Army's C4ISR RDAT&E Center of Excellence and other activities as well.

The Army military value index is not holistic; it is a set of criteria that do not relate to R&D centers—not even to Aberdeen. Furthermore, it excludes the historic linkage/investment by Fort Monmouth in Dix; and if the military value index did include the mega-base linkage, it would find the MV index for Dix-Monmouth essentially equal to APG. There exists a rich network of linkages and networks involving computers, communication systems, and related technologies in New Jersey (both military and civilian) developed over many decades. One cannot just declare a region like eastern Maryland to be a physics and engineering center. It takes decades to build.

The loss of intellectual capital is expected in every realignment; however, it is a temporary setback which can be recovered from the local workforce. There is a nationally recognized science and technology (S&T) workforce concentrated in and around Harford County, host to the APG. Nearly half a million professionals working in the management, business, computer and mathematics, science and engineering sectors live within a 90 minute drive of APG.

This is not "every realignment" – this is the biggest movement of technical civilian workforce in BRAC. APG is hardly nationally-recognized when compared to other DoD S&T centers (NRL, Adelphi, Fort Belvoir, China Lake, Wright Pat, Kirkland, WES, Monterey, etc.). If the Eastern Maryland region is so good, why was the Army Research Lab move to Aberdeen not more successful? The lab's reputation suffered.

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According to the U.S. Department of Labor, Maryland ranks first among the states with the highest percentage (24%) of professional and technical workers in the state's labor pool. The U.S. Department of Commerce found in 2003 that Maryland is statistically tied with Massachusetts as the top state in the nation for educational attainment. Nearly 38% of Maryland's population 25 years of age and above have earned a bachelor's degree or higher. Maryland offers a high quality workforce and hosts several companies that support both current C4ISR activities at Fort Monmouth and APG-based operations. Historically, the state of Maryland and its affected communities successfully consolidated 16 geographic locations into a single integrated Research, Development, Acquisition, Technology and Evaluation (RDAT&E) center at the Patuxent River Naval Base during implementation of BRAC 1993 and 1995 recommendations.

The Maryland statistical rollout is inappropriate, since New Jersey statistics (which are equal to or better than Maryland and certainly much better than Maryland in C4ISR-related matters) were not shown. This kind of myopic analysis supports the frequent reporting of those who were part of the DoD BRAC process that the entering argument was not review of data to "create a land C4ISR center" but, rather, just "close Monmouth." Again, the most relevant evidence is that when 300 positions were moved from Fort Monmouth to Maryland following an earlier BRAC, only 1/10 of the people moved and serious loss of capability resulted, and has never been rebuilt.

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Co-locating testing and evaluation facilities with program managers and researchers is a key part of the TJCSG strategy -- to create full spectrum RDT&E centers where feasible. APG supports this strategy while Fort Monmouth does not. Three Program Executive Offices (PEOs) -- including the Joint PEO for Chemical/Biological Defense -- and their subordinate program managers also will be located at APG. It is essential to have a consolidated RDA center focused on land C4ISR bringing together the Communications-Electronics Research Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC) from Fort Monmouth, NJ, and the Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate (NVESD) from Fort Belvoir, VA, and the information systems research assets already at APG and personnel from Fort Knox, KY, who perform human systems research in networks. Leaving NVESD out of this recommendation and moving only the Fort Monmouth functions will keep the Army's sensors research and engineering functions geographically isolated from the parent command assigned this critical mission.

True, co-located T&E facilities with PMs and researchers was a key part of the T-JCSG strategy, but they did not carry it out. R is not consolidated, D&A is simply moved to Aberdeen, T&E does not exist, joint experimentation was not considered, and other RDT&E functions extant at APG are hardly relevant to C4ISR. If the Army and TJCSG wanted to make this strategy work, they would have brought in the relevant parts of Huachuca, Adelphi, and Natick, too. The Army strategy is simply to fill a hole left by the Ordinance School.

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With the BRAC recommendation to close Fort Monmouth, the level of activity in research and engineering at APG will be expanded to include communications, electronics, night vision, and chemical/biological defense, in addition to the existing activities in Army Research Laboratory's Weapons and Material Research, and Human Research Engineering Directorates as well as the HQ, Army Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM).

The Test and Evaluation capabilities that exist at APG today and the BRAC 2005 recommendation to consolidate the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) Headquarters at APG are complementary and can be readily expanded to provide direct support to additional C4ISR programs while in the early development stages of acquisition.

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There is a significant difference between a set of offices that comprise a T&E administrative headquarters and the actual conduct of T&E. In the Army, actual C4ISR T&E events are not now, and will never be, at APG. C4ISR demonstrations and experimentation are conducted anywhere from labs to field events. For the Army, that is mostly at Fort Monmouth and Monmouth-Dix-Lakehurst. APG has no C4ISR capability, especially not in T&E. And never once in this DoD paper is joint C4ISR mentioned. There is no joint opportunity at APG; the joint-ness that now

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Impact To DoD: Maintaining the status quo will prevent the Army from establishing an important RDAT&E Center of Excellence sacrificing \$1.02 billion in NPV savings and retaining redundant infrastructure.

There would be loss of human capital and resulting loss of capability at a time the Army cannot afford it.

There is no NPV savings to the Army – there is a significant NPV cost. The Army and DoD fail to mention costs or to refute the Fort Monmouth corrected COBRA results as presented by the community and verified by BRAC staff. These costs are too high to ignore. Payback will not occur for a minimum of 44 years.

There would be no joint activities. And there would be no consolidation of relevant, synergistic activities. Also, with respect to costs, the APG garrison command admitted they were not consulted. If they had been consulted, it would be apparent in the documents that the buildings vacated by the Ordinance School are not really suitable for C4ISR labs. Therefore, the costs of the move should include significant construction.

INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL

Issues: Has the Department captured the impact on "intellectual capital" when personnel with special skills choose not to relocate as part of a BRAC recommendation?

There is no evidence (records, data, briefing comments) that the T-JCSG or the Army considered civilian manpower loss in any DoD BRAC deliberation. Informal indications from participants in the DoD BRAC process is that workforce moves were not considered in a structured or recorded way.

The proposed move of Fort Monmouth activities to Aberdeen betrays a complete lack of understanding of the nature and behavior of a civilian high-tech workforce.

Key Points:

- **Implementation of BRAC recommendations allows the Department to integrate relocated personnel to produce synergies and obtain new capabilities that actually enhance intellectual capital.**

With regard to the Fort Monmouth-Aberdeen move, there are no synergy opportunities at APG for a C4ISR mission. APG has an Army Research Lab component, but not the component that does C4ISR. There is T&E capability at APG but it is not in C4ISR. There is no technical synergy "outside the gate."

- While changes in installation configuration produce turmoil, the Department, no different than industry, must be allowed to balance the impact on intellectual capital with the benefits achieved through reconfiguring its infrastructure.
- Based on the experiences of prior BRAC rounds, we know of no program that has been adversely affected through the loss of intellectual capital.

Moving a hundred or so positions is one thing; completely shutting down the Army's two biggest and best C4ISR entities at once during a war is dangerous. The so-called, but yet to be made public, Army configuration plans do not consider the civilian technical workforce crisis that DoD has been describing over the past several years in testimony.

While the statement reflects a view from "30,000 feet" and is uninformed at the program level, previous BRAC moves did not occur during war or when a service (Army) needed desperately to catch up to the other services in transformation. Prior BRACs did not need to contend with the current civilian technical workforce crisis touted by DoD.

DoD Position: The implementation of BRAC recommendations allows the Department to integrate relocated personnel to produce synergies and obtain new capabilities that actually enhance intellectual capital. While changes in installation configuration produce turmoil, the Department, no different than industry, must be allowed to balance the impact on intellectual capital with the benefits achieved through reconfiguring its infrastructure. Based on the experiences of prior BRAC rounds, we know of no program that has been adversely affected through the loss of intellectual capital. The Department has six years to implement BRAC recommendations, providing ample time for managers to mitigate the impact of personnel turmoil.

The Department deals routinely with personnel changeover and will have programs in place to mitigate personnel impacts during implementation. Relevant examples from prior BRAC rounds include the movement of the Naval Air Systems Command from Crystal City, VA to southern Maryland and the relocation of the Space and Warfare Systems Command from Crystal City, VA, to San Diego, CA.

The examples given are not relevant. In the overused NAVAIR to Pax River scenario, one notes that many people did in fact live within commuting distance of Pax. (In some cases, their commutes were improved.) In the Monmouth case, 80 percent of the workforce lives at least 2.5 hours from Aberdeen (5 hours roundtrip daily) and the trip from Northern Virginia (Belvoir) to Northwest Maryland (APG) across two metro beltways is not much better. In each case, the relocated people were able to "fall in" on an established and related technical workforce. That is not the case at Aberdeen, where 5,000 C4ISR workers—most of them new hires—would fall in on about 25 C4ISR workers.

Impact on DoD: If BRAC recommendations are eliminated based on the fear that DOD would lose a specific intellectual baseline, the Department will waste resources by retaining redundant facilities and will lose the new intellectual capability that will result from collocating or consolidating similar functions.

There is no redundancy today to be removed in the case of Fort Monmouth and Aberdeen. Monmouth and APG are like apples and oranges; there is no redundancy and no synergy of activities or capabilities. There is no collocation or consolidation of similar functions, as DoD states, when one considers moving C4ISR to APG. Joint C4ISR opportunity is lost. These violate Criterion 1.

DOD avoids discussing the mission disruption in the next 5 to 10 years even if the workforce could be reconstituted. This also violates Criterion 1.

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Questions to be posed to the Secretary of the Army by the BRAC Commission on August 20, 2005

Intellectual Capital - Commissioner Bilbray

- On May 18th, during your initial testimony before the Commission, I asked you a question regarding the impact of a loss of intellectual capital upon the Army's ability to effectively execute its C4ISR mission. You stated that re-locating the C4ISR functions from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground (Aberdeen) could be managed, since those functions were "R&D" and "Strategic" in nature, and that accordingly, any disruption would have no tactical impact, even though you anticipated that only 26% of the affected employees would actually choose to move. On June 6th, we transmitted a written inquiry to DoD asking how the potential impact of the loss of intellectual capital was taken into consideration in formulating this recommendation. Inexplicably, the answer that we received on July 12th was "TBD" and we have *never* been provided with a response to that question, despite the fact that understanding the full impact of the intellectual capital issue upon the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth is absolutely essential. In fact, it is unclear to the Commission how DoD could have arrived at the conclusion to close Fort Monmouth and re-locate to Aberdeen without fully considering this issue. Why wasn't an answer provided to the Commission previously, in accordance with our request?
- The National Defense University (NDU) is the premier academic institution in DoD. It is NDU's opinion that this proposed move can be expected to result in the loss of about 75% of the affected technical personnel. It goes on to say that, since Aberdeen has no C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) expertise or culture, re-constituting the organization will take years, and that productivity in this key area will suffer, particularly during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Are you aware of this opinion .
- A previous BRAC move of the Electronic Test and Devices Laboratory from Fort Monmouth to Maryland resulted in only 10% of the personnel re-locating. Additionally, a similar move of a C4ISR activity from Vint Hill Farms Station, VA, when that post closed, to Fort Monmouth, resulted in even fewer personnel re-locating. A recently completed Harris poll of Fort Monmouth personnel indicates that a similarly small number will re-locate should this recommendation be approved. In your judgment, is there *any* percentage of personnel loss that would pose a significant risk of mission failure and loss of Warfighter lives?
- With regard to your testimony that the functions performed at Fort Monmouth are "R&D" and "Strategic" in nature, the Commission has learned that more than half of the Army's National Stock Numbered items in the field are sustained and managed by Fort Monmouth; that uninterrupted DoD satellite communications are dependant on the facilities there; and that they are meeting urgent requirements for C4ISR technology in the field (such as Firefinder, counter-

Improvised Explosive Device systems, Blue Force Tracking, etc.) and, most importantly, that those actions are saving Warfighters' lives *every day*. In fact, Fort Monmouth has a major tactical mission as well as a strategic one. In light of the fact that DA/DoD was evidently not aware of the significant tactical role played by Fort Monmouth, do you now agree that the proposed re-location would have an immediate tactical impact that will be exacerbated by the loss of intellectual capital cited by NDU and confirmed by both historical data and a recently completed survey of the affected workforce?

Unique Features at Fort Monmouth - Commissioner Bilbray

- We also submitted a written inquiry asking about unique features related to the Fort Monmouth installation that need to be considered in conjunction with this recommendation in order to fully assess the advantages and disadvantages of such a re-location. This question was prompted, among other things, by the extensive satellite communications facilities that we toured while visiting the installation. That question was also answered "TBD" and again, we have *never* been provided with a response. Are you prepared to answer that question today? Why wasn't an answer provided to the Commission previously, in accordance with our request?

Inaccurate Data - Commissioner Coyle

- Revised COBRA information has been developed indicating that the projected "pay back" period for recovering the DoD investment in this proposed re-location would extend for 44 years rather than the 6 years estimated by DoD. One portion of that DoD estimate was the \$21M identified as the costs of re-locating the United States Military Academy Preparatory School to West Point. We have since been provided with the military construction request generated by West Point in anticipation of the move, and it is clear that the costs, in fact, are at least 10 times higher than DoD projected. Please explain how DoD miscalculated that estimate so seriously.
- We have been informed that when Fort Monmouth reviewed the published DoD BRAC data, it noticed that the cost data associated with operating the post was significantly in error, and submitted revised certified data on July 12th. Although that data was received by DA, it was never forwarded to the Commission regardless of the fact that it resulted in a \$40M reduction in the previously calculated Fort Monmouth annual operating costs. Do you have any knowledge of this? If so, why was that information, or the impact thereof on the DoD recommendations, never provided to the Commission?
- The "Criteria 7 Evaluation Tool" used by DoD to assess the relative community infrastructures involved in the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth, shows a "Risk Evaluation" rating of "Low" for the proposed re-location. However, the Commission noted that, in the DoD demographics analysis underlying that tool, the population of Monmouth and Ocean Counties, NJ is listed as 11,262,127. In

fact, the population of those two counties is exactly 1/10th of that, and it appears, incredibly, that the DoD evaluators placed the decimal point in the wrong place. The result was that a key analytical data point was inflated by a factor of 10, and had the correct population figure been used, the entire risk evaluation rating would have been significantly changed. The Commission is also aware of another instance in this analysis where the same type of problem occurred (i.e., the student/teacher ratio in the Aberdeen region being identified as 1 teacher to every 1.2 students), leading to the inescapable conclusion that *all* of the data in this area is suspect. Accordingly, why shouldn't this recommendation be reconsidered?

Testing Capabilities and Facilities - Commissioner Coyle

- One of the stated principal rationales for this proposal was the perceived advantage of having RDA activities co-located with test and evaluation facilities. However, we have learned that there are few C4ISR test facilities at Aberdeen, and that the majority of the C4ISR test facilities used by Fort Monmouth activities are on the installation itself, nearby, at the Joint Base (Fort Dix, McGuire Air Force Base and Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station), or at other locations throughout the U.S., including the designated test site for the testing of electronic equipment, in Arizona. In light of that fact, how would the perceived advantage of co-locating RDA activities with their test facilities be achieved by re-locating the C4ISR activities from Fort Monmouth and Fort Belvoir to Aberdeen?
- When DoD made the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth and re-locate the C4ISR activities resident there to Aberdeen, were you aware that they maintained extensive test and evaluation facilities at the Joint Base engaged in Airborne Electronic Warfare/Unmanned Aerial Vehicle programs as well as the acclaimed "On-the-Move-Testbed", among others? Our understanding is that neither Fort Monmouth nor the Joint Base was ever asked about such presence in any data calls.

Inconsistencies in the BRAC Recommendations - Commissioner Coyle

- The C4ISR activities at Fort Monmouth seem to be unique among major DA RDA activities, in that all others appear to be remaining at their present "limited use" locations. Only the activities at Fort Monmouth and Fort Belvoir were targeted for re-location. Given that the site identified for that re-location has minimal C4ISR activities resident there, can you explain why these RDA activities were treated differently?
- DoD informed the Commission that the proposed re-locations of the Soldier Systems Center (SSC) from Natick, MA and the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) from Adelphi, MD to Aberdeen were rejected as being "too costly" and for unspecified "political reasons". Accordingly, it would appear that if the proposed re-location of the C4ISR activities from Fort Monmouth is, in fact, even more costly than that for SSC or ARL, that it would be DoD's position that that action

should similarly be rejected. What were the "political reasons" for the rejection of the recommendations involving ARL and SSC?

FORT MONMOUTH---BRAC FACT MATRIX

POINT	ARMY	ACTUAL FACTS	ANALYSIS
Intellectual Capital	Can live with losses; only R&D	80% loss anticipated; 10 year reconstitution unacceptable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Based on past BRAC moves Supported By NDU Analysis Harris Survey Confirms
Support for Operational Readiness (current war)	Not Considered	Critical current war and sustainment mission not recognized	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> War support impacted Readiness and Sustainment heavily impacted Modularity of current Army Force impacted
Program Disruption	Not Considered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> \$Billions in disruption of current & future force Disruption ripples to Army/Joint Systems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Critical programs analyzed Loss of expertise in BRAC window Disruption of any one program impacts others
Cost To Relocate	\$822M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> \$ 1.5B \$1.8B with/workforce reconstruction. Ft. Monmouth & BRAC data used 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> USMAPS Cost \$ 220M Lab Facilities Omitted Aviation Facilities Omitted
Recurring Savings	\$143M	\$74M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Used Incorrect Ft. Monmouth data Didn't consider reimbursable tenant & regional support costs
Payback	6 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 33 years 44 years w/workforce reconstitution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Validated By COBRA
Military Value	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Highest Mission Ranking from TJSCG Installation Ranking 50 of 97 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disregarded mission value of C4ISR Disregarded Installation Value of Joint Base and existing experiments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ft. Monmouth with Joint base equal to APG Highest C4ISR Mission Technical Military Value (undisputed)
Jointness	None	Current alignment with Joint Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Breaks Existing Joint Experiments Cannot be done at APG Opportunity to expand Joint Experimentation lost
RDA Consolidation	Accomplish at Aberdeen	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Already Exists at Ft. Monmouth No C4ISR Infrastructure & people at Aberdeen 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Considerable MILCON required R still at Adelphi Move bulk of RDA to location with no capability
RDAT&E Consolidation	Gain efficiencies at Aberdeen	C4ISR testing done at other Army designated sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> C4ISR testing done at Ft. Huachuca, Yuma Proving Grd, and Ft. Hood etc No capability for C4ISR testing at Aberdeen
Enclave Savings	N/A	Save \$20M/year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Avoid all closure costs and save BOS by consolidating with Joint Base