

U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

United States
Coast Guard




Commandant
United States Coast Guard

2100 Second Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20593-0001
Staff Symbol: G-DTM
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Email: michael.woolard@dwicgs.com

11131

JUN 15 2005

MEMORANDUM

From: 
P. M. Stillman, RADM, USCG
PEO, Integrated Deepwater System

Reply to: G-DTM
Attn of: LCDR Mike Woolard
571-218-3382

To: Commander, Navy Region Southwest

Subj: REQUEST TO BASE COAST GUARD VERTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL
VEHICLES (VUAVs) ON NAVAL BASE VENTURA COUNTY

1. We are currently in the first stage of implementation for the Coast Guard's 20-year, \$17 billion Integrated Deepwater System (IDS). This critical program replaces our aging fleet of existing cutters and aircraft with state of the art surface and air assets that are supported by a "system of systems" infrastructure with an advanced communications network. As part of this project, we intend to station a fleet of our new Eagle Eye VUAVs in southern California to support a major portion of our west coast operations. Recent trip reports and several site visits to Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) clearly show that Pt. Mugu is an ideal location to base our west coast VUAV fleet.
2. Initial liaison with NBVC facilities staff indicates that they can support this aviation fleet in Hangar PM362. We anticipate a two-stage space requirement: (1) Initial - 4 air vehicles requiring a total of approximately 11,300 square feet, including office space for 20 personnel and shop/hangar space for the air vehicles; and (2) End State - 16 air vehicles requiring a total of approximately 18,500 square feet, including office space for 85 personnel and shop/hangar space for the air vehicles. A detailed breakdown of our space requirements is attached as enclosure (1). The Regional Space Allocation Committee (RSAC) form is attached as enclosure (2).
3. All costs associated with the basing of these aircraft and support personnel will be funded from the Coast Guard's general operating expense (OE) account. Planned facility maintenance and repairs will be handled on a reimbursable basis through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) or an Inter-Service Support Agreement (ISSA) with NBVC's Public Works Department.
4. I formally request your approval to use Hangar PM362 as a home base for our west coast VUAV fleet. My point of contact is LCDR Mike Woolard; he can be reached at (571) 218-3382 or michael.woolard@dwicgs.com via e-mail.

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Enclosures: (1) Basic Facility Requirements (BFR)
(2) Space Allocation Request Questionnaire

Copy: G-O PACAREA(o)
G-S MLCPAC(s)
G-W Naval Base Ventura County

Basic Facility Requirement (BFR) to support Coast Guard VUAV Ctr

Space Type	Quantity	Allowance (NSF)		GSF
		Each	Total	Total
General Office Space				
Commanding Officer (O-4)	1	150	150	188
Executive Officer (O-3)	1	150	150	188
Supervisory (W-2 to W-4)	1	100	100	125
Open Office Space				
Supervisory (E-8)	1	75	75	94
Supervisory (E-7)	1	75	75	94
Non-supervisory (E-3 to E-6)	15	45	675	844
Open space circulation factor	1	0.25	206	258
Total Office Space			1,431	1,789
Maintenance - Aircraft				
GCS Operator Room	1	300	300	363
Maintenance Control Office	1	150	150	182
Avionics Shop	1	750	750	908
Avionics Shop Storage	1	1,000	1,000	1,090
Composite Repair Shop	1	200	200	242
Maintenance Shop	1	200	200	242
Battery Shop	1	100	100	121
Paint Shop	1	300	300	363
Propeller Shop	1	600	600	726
Tool Room/Ready Issue Parts	1	400	400	436
Welding Shop	1	200	200	242
Wheel & Tire Shop	1	220	220	266
Aviation Supply Storage	1	1,000	1,000	1,090
Engine Build-Up Storage	1	300	300	327
Ground Support Equipment Storage	1	750	750	818
Metal Storage	1	200	200	218
Oil/Paint/Flammables Storage	1	150	150	164
Hangar Deck	4	500	2,000	2,220
Total Maintenance Space			8,520	9,472
Total Requested Space				11,261

Notes:

1. The Net to Gross factor for Shop space is 1.21
2. The Net to Gross factor for Storage space is 1.09
3. The Net to Gross factor for Storage space is 1.11

SPACE ALLOCATION REQUEST QUESTIONNAIRE

COMMAND/ORGANIZATION INFORMATION	
Name of Command / Organization	U.S. Coast Guard / Commandant (G-D), Integrated Deepwater System (IDS)
Acronym	USCG / IDS
Current Address	Commandant (G-D), 2100 2nd Street, SW Washington D.C. 20593-0001
Organizational Code	N/A
Current Mission	Replace existing aging fleet of CG surface and aviation assets; specific interest in NBVC is to home base 16 UAVs there for the new surface assets homed on the west coast.
Is this mission under CNRSW? Y or N	No.
Mission Claimant	Commandant (G-DPM-2), CAPT Matt Sisson (571-218-)
Move Point of Contact (Name/Phone/e-mail)	LCDR Mike Woolard, (571) 218-3382, michael.woolard@dwicgs.com
LOADING	
Current Number of Personnel	0 (unit not created yet)
Estimated Personnel in 1 year and 5 years	1 yr - 20, 5 yr - 85
Was a BFR per NAVFAC P-80 completed? Y or N (if yes, please provide.)	No.
MOVE REQUIREMENT	
What is driving the requirement for this move?	FAA restrictions on use of controlled airspace, improved mission capabilities, and increased operational effectiveness.
Will this consolidate, increase efficiency? Y or N	Yes, by locating the Coast Guard UAV unit at NBVC, these aircraft can be tested, maintained and deployed from one central location. From this location, the Coast Guard can increase operational effectiveness and improve mission capabilities.
Is move BRAC related? Y or N	No.
REQUIREMENTS	
Amount (SF) and type of space required (Admin / Hangar / Warehouse / Lab / Industrial/Shop, etc.)	Start-Up - Admin: 1,800SF / Hangar: 2,300SF / warehouse: 0 / lab: 0 / Shop: 7,300 End State - Admin: 2,300SF / Hangar: 8,900 SF / warehouse: 0 / Shop: 7,300 SF
Parking (SF)	Vehicle parking for <u>20</u> personnel at start-up, <u>85</u> personnel at end-state; no outside aircraft storage space required.
Describe Special Requirements	None.
Laydown (SF)	None.
PROPOSAL	
Proposed Move Location, Describe why location is best.	Building 362, this small hangar is the ideal size for the Coast Guard's UAV fleet of 16 aircraft. There is adequate space for performing maintenance, conducting aircraft tests and actually deploying the aircraft to operational surface units. In addition, the restricted airspace operated by NBVC and the existing encroachment boundaries offer increased security and flexibility for UAV operations.
Permanent or Temporary (Ending date)	Permanent.
Alternatives	Other existing vacant hangar buildings that meet the minimum space requirements.
Location to be vacated. State if none.	None.
Proposed Move Date	As soon as possible after approval.

<p>The Coast Guard expects up to 16 UAV aircraft to be assigned to the California area as support aircraft to the National Security and Offshore Patrol cutters assigned to that AOR. With current FAA restrictions on operating UAVs, the Coast Guard is very limited on where it can base the UAV fleet. Based on initial site surveys and correspondence with the Navy, NBVC appears to be a logical location that will maintain the Coast Guard's mission capabilities with a potential increase in operational effectiveness. The Coast Guard is currently pursuing an in-depth facility study at NBVC to evaluate the possibility of co-locating additional aircraft there to further realize mission capabilities and improved operational effectiveness.</p>	<p>Provide additional information to help evaluate requirement and solution. If available, project plans and scope of work.</p>
<p>Original. The intent is to use existing hangar space for UAV storage, maintenance and repairs. Some minor renovations may be needed to meet specific shop and storage requirements.</p>	<p>Facility Exist Plan. State proposed facility condition at end of occupation (Ex: Original, improved, demolished after use)</p>
<p>ONE-TIME COSTS</p>	
<p>Initial renovation and outfitting, estimated at \$750K, IDS Project funds (NCGI)</p>	<p>Renovation/Alteration Cost and Funding source?</p>
<p>All costs associated with the building renovation, outfitting and actual move will be funded by the IDS project funds (NCGI).</p>	<p>Move (telephones, NMCI MAC, furniture etc.) Cost and Funding source?</p>
<p>Unknown, we were informed that the existing tenant could be relocated at no cost to the Coast Guard.</p>	<p>RELOCATION COST FOR CURRENT USER (if applicable)</p>
<p>Unknown, we were informed that the existing tenant could be relocated at no cost to the Coast Guard.</p>	<p>Funding Source for Preparation of New Site Cost and Funding source?</p>
<p>Unknown.</p>	<p>Move Cost and Funding source?</p>
<p>RECURRING COSTS</p>	
<p>The Coast Guard plans to specifically address this in an official MOU/SSA document. Typically, an agreed upon maintenance cost (\$/SF) is utilized to address any facility maintenance issues through the base's existing facility maintenance program.</p>	<p>Interior Maintenance and Repair. Cost and Funding source?</p>
<p>The Coast Guard plans to specifically address this in an official MOU/SSA document. Typically, an agreed upon maintenance cost (\$/SF) is utilized to address any facility maintenance issues through the base's existing facility maintenance program.</p>	<p>Exterior Maintenance and Repair (Shell of the building) Cost and Funding source?</p>
<p>Yes.</p>	<p>Will your command accept the Maintenance UIC Y or N</p>
<p>OTHER BASE OPERATING SUPPORT COSTS</p>	
<p>The Coast Guard plans to specifically address this in an official MOU/SSA document. Typically, either a flat monthly rate or actual charges are used to determine utility costs.</p>	<p>Annual Utilities, Telephones, Janitorial, Base Parking, Security... Etc. Cost and Funding source?</p>
<p>BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS</p>	
<p>Yes. The Coast Guard brings some mission synergy to the Navy by locating a major UAV center at NBVC. DoD and the Coast Guard can garner efficiencies by sharing valuable lessons learned and successes with the UAV program.</p>	<p>Do your services directly contribute to NBVC and the Navy? (Ex: Mission synergy, service to DOD personnel & community, efficiency, reliability, quality of service, etc.)</p>
<p>The effectiveness of the Coast Guard is often measured in tangible numbers, such as lives saved, amount of drugs interdicted, alien migrants rescued at sea, successful law enforcement boardings, vessel inspections, etc. The UAV program is an important part of the Coast Guard's operational support and will help with all of the Coast Guard's missions.</p>	<p>What are the indicators and results of the effectiveness of your services?</p>

Describe measurable and non-measurable benefits of this move to NBVC/Navy (Ex: Cost avoidance, facility renovation, etc.)	Cost sharing for support resources (fuel, fire/crash response, maintenance, etc.); responsible facility tenants that will maintain and improve the building condition;
Describe negative impacts to NBVC (Impacts on neighboring organizations, un-reimbursed costs, increased maintenance requirements, safety, security, traffic, air, water and noise pollution.)	Loss of a hangar building for other Navy/DoD resources, increased demand for maintenance requirements, security, housing and other base amenities; additional aircraft that could increase noise pollution.
CONTRACT DETAILS (for contractors only)	
Contract Sponsor Name and Contract Number (Provide copy of contract)	N/A
Period of Performance	N/A
RSAC USE ONLY	
RECURRING COSTS	\$ AMOUNT
OBOS	\$ AMOUNT

U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

United States
Coast Guard



Commandant
United States Coast Guard

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Email: msisson@comdt.uscg.mil

11130

SEP 3 2004

MEMORANDUM

From: Terry M. Cross, VADM,
VCOMDT (C/GA)

Reply to: G-DTM
Attn of: CDR Matt Sisson
202 267 1686

To: Vice Chief, Naval Operations

Subj: LOCATION OF COAST GUARD AVIATION ASSETS AT NAVAL BASE
VENTURA COUNTY

1. I request your support to conduct preliminary Coast Guard studies regarding the utility and advantage of basing a portion of Coast Guard west coast air operations at Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC), Point Mugu, California. The studies will examine the feasibility of:

- a. Initial basing of Coast Guard Eagle Eye Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VUAVs).

Discussion: Coast Guard presently plans to eventually field 14 Eagle Eye VUAVs in California, beginning in CY07. Coast Guard Air Stations situated in California, CGAS San Diego and San Francisco have the detractor of being located under Class B airspace within the confines of major international airports. Analysis indicates unfettered operations will be difficult in that environment. NBVC, being situated in the general vicinity, emerges as an attractive alternative. NBVC's sea and shore ranges solve issues associated with VUAV ingress and egress into operational areas. The Navy has operated drones and UAVs out of Ventura County for over 40 years; the culture and learning curve associated with operation of UAVs is very mature, further facilitating a successful initial Coast Guard implementation.

- b. Initial basing of a Department of Homeland Security UAV Center of Excellence.

Discussion: The Coast Guard presently sits on the DHS UAV Working Group and UAV Executive Steering Committee. We are engaged in finding interagency synergies associated with developing a common UAV Center of Excellence. Concurrent with studies in support of Coast Guard basing Eagle Eye VUAVs would be the opportunity to see if NBVC or other Navy facilities can offer this operational capability.

- c. Re-basing of Coast Guard Air Station (CGAS) Sacramento fixed wing assets.

Discussion: The Coast Guard has a need to vacate CGAS Sacramento, co-located with McClellan Air Park and move our C130 aircraft. Our previous intent was to re-locate to Travis Air Force Base, California. However, the capital investment necessary to facilitate that move is significant and the ability to obtain the funding in our capital accounts in the near term is

Subj: LOCATION OF COAST GUARD AVIATION ASSETS 11130.
AT NAVAL BASE VENTURA COUNTY (NBVC)

unlikely. Preliminary analysis of NBVC indicates that relocation there might be achieved at a much lower capital investment.

d. Re-location of CGAS Los Angeles to NBVC.

Discussion: As part of the planning proposal process, the Coast Guard would also look into any operational or co-location efficiencies gained by relocating three HH-65B helicopters from Coast Guard Air Station Los Angeles, currently located at LA International Airport, to NBVC.

2. Should these preliminary studies point toward benefits in co-location, I contemplate following through with a request to enter into detailed analysis which, if favorable, would lead to a formal request for relocation of our activities at NBVC. We would like to start as soon as possible; funds have been allocated to conduct this study, which we hope to complete within 90 days.

3. The potentials of a partnership between the Navy, the Coast Guard, and DHS in creating a synergistic infrastructure are truly exciting. The opportunity to realize the benefits of increased jointness, operational capability, and partnering with Navy UAV programs make a study eminently worthwhile. Please call me at (202) 267-2385, or have your staff contact CDR Matthew Sisson, Deepwater Aviation Transition Manager at (202) 267-1686, if you have questions or need more information.

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Copy: COMDT (G-O)
COMDT (G-S)
COMDT (G-W)
COMDT (CG-8)
COMDT (G-ICA)
CG PACAREA (P)

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: WHonea@aol.com
Sent: Saturday, July 16, 2005 9:43 AM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
Cc: brad.gilmer@navy.mil
Subject: NSWC PHD Recommendation
Attachments: PHD BRAC RECOMMENDATIONS.doc

Mr. Farrington,

I have attached a word file of the information requested. I will be able to attend your 9:00 Tuesday meeting with Brad.

Its a pleasure to support you.

V/R

Wayne Honea
Cell 805 551-7708

7/17/2005

BRAC 2005 DOD RECOMMENDATIONS IMPACTING NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER - PORT HUENEME DIVISION

1. BRAC Report - Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center (Page TECH 15)

(Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division - Missile, Guns, or Energetics to Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake)

COMMISSION RATIONALE:

After the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division site presentation and tour, there were several observations:

A. Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division certified the relocation and realignment of Standard Missile, Extended SeaSparrow Missile (excluding launchers), and Extended Range Guided Munition Programs (identified in Question 47 of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division response) as being within the intent of the scenario.

B. The co-location of the integrated systems involved in the detect-control-engage sequence, adjacent to the Pt Mugu Sea Test Range, PHD Test Ship, and Surface Warfare Engineering Facility; combines these assets in a synergistic way that cannot be duplicated at China Lake. These Programs were certified by Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division as "Inextricable" from the weapons system integration work and are required to perform their weapon system integration mission. Therefore, we believe it is in the Navy's best interest to keep these Programs at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division.

C. There were "Other" Programs certified by NSWC PHD as not being within the scope of "Missile, Guns, or Energetics". These Programs provide no direct or indirect support to the intent of the Missile, Guns, or Energetics recommendation. There is no financial benefit in relocating/realigning these Programs and therefore should remain at Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneme Division.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION:

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division at Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons & Armaments (Missiles, Guns, or Energetics) Research Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA. Specifically excluded are those Programs that are certified as "Inextricable In-Service Engineering work from Weapon Systems Integration" and "Other non-Missile, Guns, or Energetics".

COMMISSION JUSTIFICATION COMMENTS:

The Commission Recommendation above clarifies the previously published recommendation and is consistent with the Justification previously published on page 40 of the Technical JCSG Analysis and Recommendations – Technical JCSG, Vol. XII, Part IV (attachment 1).

2. BRAC Report - Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDT&E Center (Page TECH 15)

(Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, San Diego, CA Detachment (Integrated Combat System Test Facility) - to Naval Sea Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division.)

COMMISSION RATIONALE:

The Commission concurs with the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, certified response that their San Diego Detachment, Integrated Combat System Test Facility, is within the intent of the scenario.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION:

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, San Diego, CA Detachment by relocating all Weapons & Armaments weapon system integration Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, VA.

COMMISSION JUSTIFICATION COMMENTS:

The Commission Recommendation above is consistent with the Justification previously published on page 40 of the Technical JCSG Analysis and Recommendations – Technical JCSG, Vol. XII, Part IV (attachment 1).

3. BRAC Report - Consolidate Maritime C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, T&E (Page TECH 9)

(Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division C4ISR to Space Warfare Command San Diego CA.)

COMMISSION RATIONALE:

After the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division site presentation and tour, there were several observations:

A. The Commission concurs that Naval Surface Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneme Division certified Distributed Common Ground Station – Navy and Area Air Defense Capability Programs are within the scope of this scenario.

B. Realigning/relocating those Programs Naval Surface Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneme Division identified as “C4ISR Inextricable from Weapon Systems Integration” will significantly impact their ability to perform their mission. Therefore, we believe it is in the Navy’s best interest to keep these Programs at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION:

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division at Naval Base Ventura County, CA; Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA; and Naval Station

Newport, RI, by relocating Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA. Specifically excluded are those Programs that are certified as “Inextricable from Weapon Systems Integration”.

COMMISSION JUSTIFICATION COMMENTS:

The Commission Recommendation above is consistent with the Justification previously published on page 47 of the Technical JCSG Analysis and Recommendations – Technical JCSG, Vol. XII, Part IV (attachment 2).

4. BRAC Report - Create an Integrated Weapons and Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition (Page TECH 19)

(Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, Louisville Kentucky Guns Detachment to Picatinny Army Arsenal NJ.)

COMMISSION RATIONALE:

After the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division site presentation and tour, there were several discussions and observations:

- A. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, Louisville Detachment performs weapon systems integration on gun “systems” that are unique to Naval ships.
- B. Louisville Detachment is co-located with the respective OEMs of these Navy gun systems. The relocation/realignment of their weapon system integration functions to Picatinny Arsenal, away from their respective OEMs, does not appear to benefit the Navy.
- C. The Commission understands the benefits created by co-locating functions involved with gun and ammunition RD&A at Picatinny Arsenal, and the benefits already being accrued by being co-located with the OEMs. The SDC did not adequately separate guns and ammunition R, D&A, and T&E functions and should have excluded that work that is involved in weapon systems integration and co-located with the OEMs.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION:

Reissue a revised SDC with the functional categories as identified in the Commission Rationale item C above.

Else, modify the recommendation to the following:

Realign the Louisville, KY, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating gun and ammunition Research to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

COMMISSION JUSTIFICATION COMMENTS:

The Commission Recommendation above is consistent with the Justification previously published on page 44 of the Technical JCSG Analysis and Recommendations – Technical JCSG, Vol. XII, Part IV (attachment 3).

Attachment 1

Justification - Page 40 Of The Technical JCSG Analysis And Recommendations – Technical JCSG, Vol. XII, Part IV. Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, San Diego, CA Detachment (Integrated Combat System Test Facility) - to Naval Sea Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division.

“Justification: This recommendation realigns and consolidates those facilities working in Weapons & Armaments (W&A) Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation (RDAT&E) into a Naval Integrated RDAT&E center at the Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, CA. Additional synergistic realignments for W&A was achieved at two receiver sites for specific focus. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA, is a receiver specialty site for Naval surface weapons systems integration and receives a west coast site for consolidation. This construct creates an integrated W&A RDAT&E center in China Lake, CA, energetics center at Indian Head, MD, and consolidates Navy surface weapons system integration at Dahlgren, VA. All actions relocate technical facilities with lower overall quantitative Military Value (across Research, Development & Acquisition and Test & Evaluation) into the Integrated RDAT&E center and other receiver sites with greater quantitative Military Value.

Consolidating the Navy’s air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface launched missile RD&A, and T&E activities at China Lake, CA, would create an efficient integrated RDAT&E center. China Lake is able to accommodate with minor modification/addition both mission and life-cycle/sustainment functions to create synergies between these traditionally independent communities.

During the other large scale movements of W&A capabilities noted above, Weapon System Integration was specifically addressed to preserve the synergies between large highly integrated control system developments (Weapon Systems Integration) and the weapon system developments themselves. A specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare was identified at Dahlgren, VA, that was unique to the services and a centroid for Navy surface ship developments. A satellite unit from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, San Diego Detachment will be relocated to Dahlgren.

The Integrated RDAT&E Center at China Lake provides a diverse set of open-air range and test environments (desert, mountain, forest) for W&A RDAT&E functions. Synergy will be realized in air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface launched mission areas.

This recommendation enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical and acquisition expertise with weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition that currently resides at 10 locations into the one Integrated RDAT&E site, one specialty site, and an energetics site.”

Attachment 2

Justification - Page 47 Of The Technical JCSG Analysis And Recommendations – Technical JCSG, Vol. XII, Part IV. Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, San Diego, CA Detachment (Integrated Combat System Test Facility) - to Naval Sea Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division.

“Justification: These recommended realignments and consolidations provide for multifunctional and multidisciplinary Centers of Excellence in Maritime C4ISR. This recommendation will also reduce the number of technical facilities engaged in Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, & Electronics and Information Systems RDAT&E from twelve to five. This, in turn, will reduce overlapping infrastructure increase the efficiency of operations and support an integrated approach to RDAT&E for maritime C4ISR. Another result would also be reduced cycle time for fielding systems to the warfighter.”

Attachment 3

Justification - Page 44 Of The Technical JCSG Analysis And Recommendations – Technical JCSG, Vol. XII, Part IV. Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, Louisville Kentucky Guns Detachment to Picatinny Army Arsenal NJ.

“Justification: This recommendation realigns and consolidates those gun and ammunition facilities working in Weapons and Armaments (W&A) Research (R), Development & Acquisition (D&A). This realignment would result in a more robust joint center for gun and ammunition Research, Development & Acquisition at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. This location is already the greatest concentration of military value in gun and ammunition W&A RD&A.”

“Picatinny Arsenal is the center-of-mass for DoD’s Research, Development & Acquisition of guns and ammunition, with a workload more than an order of magnitude greater than any other DoD facility in this area. It also is home to the DoD’s Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition. Movement of all the Services’ guns and ammunition work to Picatinny Arsenal will create a joint center of excellence and provide synergy in armament development for the near future and beyond, featuring a Joint Packaging, Handling, Shipping and Transportation (PHS&T) Center, particularly important in this current time of high demand for guns and ammunition by all the services. Technical facilities with lower quantitative military value are relocated to Picatinny Arsenal. This recommendation includes Research, Development & Acquisition activities in the Army and Navy. It promotes jointness, enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise within the weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition community that currently resides at this DoD specialty location.”

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Ventura County, California, Community Position

Regarding DoD BRAC 2005 Recommendations for Realignment of Naval Base Ventura County Activities

Reference: TECHNICAL JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (VOLUME XII) 19 May 2005

1. Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 5012 jobs (2250 direct jobs and 2762 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Community Position: We understand the concept of creating a Naval Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center and agree with the recommendation to establish that Center at the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake.

However, we take great exception to the number of positions and some of the functions to be realigned from Pt. Mugu, as identified in the TJCSG report. The specific details behind our objections follow:

(1) The Technical data calls received by NAWC WD Pt. Mugu directed that personnel, equipment and facilities that were within the Weapons and Armaments category, but were an “inextricable” part of the remaining core mission of the command, would be identified and explained in what was known as “Question 47.” In response to this direction, NAWC WD Pt. Mugu reported 851 positions in the Sea Range, Targets, Logistics and G&A activities that should have been subtracted from the total W&A personnel numbers under consideration.

(2) An identical situation occurred at NSWC PHD Port Hueneme, with approximately 300 positions being identified in Question 47 as being “inextricable.”

(3) In both Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme cases, per direction, the losing activity did not include dynamic or facility costs to relocate the functions identified in Question 47.

(4) Somewhere in the TJCSG processes, however, the above Question 47 numbers identified in the original TECH2B scenario were not carried over to the eventual W&A R DAT&E scenario, called TECH18. The reasons for the broken process are not known, but could be categorized as either: (a) clerical error / inattention to detail, or (b) intentional, in disregard for the established procedures for deducting the number of "inextricable" positions. (At this date, 6/10/05, we are hearing that several other Navy facilities suffered the same error. Internal Navy questions requesting clarification have been forwarded, but resolution is not known.)

We also take exception to the recommendation to realign all VX-30 Test Squadron activities from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. This recommendation does not make operational sense and was at least partially based on an incorrect computation of savings. Specific details of our objections follow:

(1) VX-30 operates P-3, C-130 and F/A-18 aircraft. The P-3's and C-130's directly support Pt. Mugu Sea Range operations by providing surveillance, clearance, telemetry, flight termination, optics, communications, target launch and logistics support. These aircraft very rarely provide support to the Land Range at China Lake. Moving the P-3 and C-130 aircraft to China Lake would relocate them over 150 miles away from their primary operating area, thus increasing their response time to range tasking, reducing their on-range time and increasing their operating costs. Recurring costs of flying P-3's and C-130's from China Lake vice Pt. Mugu are estimated to be over \$2.3 Million per year. Additional flight hours on the aircraft would accelerate the expenditure of their fatigue lives, which would both reduce aircraft availability and increase depot level costs. Additionally, new hangar and parking apron MILCON costs would be required at China Lake, while none would be required at Pt. Mugu. Operationally, this recommendation simply does not make sense.

(2) Apparently, excessive gaining activity savings were claimed by eliminating the costs for operating and maintaining VX-30 F/A-18 aircraft. In fact, the decisions to divest the VX-30 F/A-18's and give the military billets back to the Navy were already made by Test Wing Pacific and the Naval Air Systems Command and were not BRAC decisions. Adding these savings to the BRAC analysis would be improper.

Community Recommendations:

(1) Reduce the number of Range, Targets, Anechoic Chamber, Logistics and G&A positions to be realigned from Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu by the number defined as being inextricable to the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

(2) Reduce the number of Weapons and Armament positions to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to

the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

(3) Reject the recommendation to move the VX-30 test squadron from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. Retain the Test Squadron Range Support Aircraft base of operations at Pt. Mugu.

2. Consolidate Maritime C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

***DoD Recommendation:** Realign Naval Base Ventura County, CA, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA, and Naval Station Newport, RI, by relocating Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, and consolidating with the Space Warfare Center to create the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.*

***Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 286 jobs (127 direct jobs and 159 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.*

Community Position: In a manner identical to that discussed in Weapons and Armaments, above, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, identified a number of C4ISR positions as being inextricable to the core command mission. These positions and the rationale for identifying them were provided in a Question 47 data call response. Similar to W&A, these reduced numbers were apparently omitted from the final TJCSG roll-up in the reference document. Internal Navy questions requesting clarification have been forwarded, but resolution is not known.

Community Recommendation: Reduce the number of C4ISR jobs to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

3. Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

***DoD Recommendation:** Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.*

***Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1075 jobs (479 direct*

jobs and 596 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area economic area.

Community Position: This recommended realignment of Electronic Warfare from Pt. Mugu to China Lake makes absolutely no sense. Rather than adding military value, such a move would put our Warfighters in harm's way. The specific details behind our objections follow:

(1) Pt. Mugu is the existing, recognized Center of Excellence (COE) for EW. A 2004 Naval Air Systems Command study was conducted to assess the abilities of both Pt. Mugu and China Lake to serve as a Joint EW COE. Due to the "black art" nature of the capability, which would be difficult to reconstitute at China Lake, Pt. Mugu was judged LOW risk and China Lake as HIGH risk. The NAVAIR recommendation was to support establishment of a Joint EW COE at Pt. Mugu.

(2) The Electronic Warfare activities at Point Mugu directly support the combat capability of the Navy and Air Force Warfighters. EW operates on a 24/7/365 basis. Engineers and analysts track the electronic signatures of potential threats gathered from the intelligence community, evaluate those electronic threats, develop solutions and issue hardware designs, data and software updates to operating forces on a response cycle often measured in hours. This capability has supported operational forces since the 1960's. EW personnel and laboratories reside in a state of the art secure facility at Point Mugu. The capability of this enterprise lies more in the expertise developed in the engineering cadre than in the facilities and equipment that are resident there. The EW workforce is very specialized, and while they do work with their aircraft software development counterparts at China Lake, they possess greatly different skills and experience. Quite simply, the majority of the existing Pt. Mugu EW workforce will not relocate to China Lake. Their "intellectual capital" will be lost and the ability of our Warfighters to counter threat systems will be significantly diminished.

(3) In response to the initial EW data call, the Pt. Mugu EW personnel estimated the costs to replicate their facility at China Lake, then dismantle the existing facility at Pt. Mugu. This approach was deemed to be the most practical in order to reduce the risk to operating forces. However, they were subsequently directed by their chain-of-command to reduce their BRAC costs by dismantling their existing facility, then moving it and re-establishing it at China Lake. The risk to the Warfighter is considered to be high in that the assumptions made for this revised submittal: (a) allow for no unforeseen costs nor schedule impacts, (b) disregard all ongoing program work, (c) assume all personnel will be readily available to assist in the move, and (d) assume that all current personnel will move to the new location. None of these assumptions are viewed to be justifiable or supported by historical data. In fact, it is believed that this approach will result in a significant negative impact to the Warfighter's electronic warfare capabilities in that emergency response capacity and time to respond will be degraded by an estimated 80% for a period of time during the transition (12 to 18 months), and at least 50% for the next decade with the loss of the talent base (which takes 8 to 10 years to develop) that would occur as a result of this action. At the very least, this impact would be measured in

hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, and at the worst it will be measured in lost lives of our Warfighters. The community assumes that the rationale for adopting the latter approach centered solely on making the proposed realignment satisfy target cost savings. In reality, it results in significant negative impact to the Warfighter.

(4) The cognizant weapons systems program managers played no significant part in the process. For example, Point Mugu is the primary organization for the in-house development of electronic countermeasures for the Navy and the Air Force. It is currently developing in house jamming technology in support of the Army to defeat improvised explosive devices in Iraq. Yet key DoD program managers in electronic warfare played no real part in the decision to destroy the intellectual capital at Point Mugu and move empty positions to China Lake. Similarly, Point Mugu is developing a countermeasure to hand-held anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADS), which will be disrupted by moving. The program managers, with the best view of EW systems requirements and the responsibility for EW systems development, do not concur with the DoD recommendation to move EW from Pt. Mugu to China Lake.

(5) The justification for this realignment, as stated in the reference document, is not supported by the facts. There is no "redundant infrastructure." The approximately 480 Pt. Mugu EW personnel and approximately 30 China Lake EW personnel work in the same organizational structure with common management. The recommended realignment would not make "more efficient use" of the Electronic Combat Range at China Lake. The EW system development process makes little use of the ECR. In fact, the EW systems in the new EA-6B ICAP III are now so sophisticated, they can tell that the threat emitters on the ECR are not "real." All significant testing is now performed in the laboratory environment.

Community Recommendations:

(1) Reject DoD's recommendation. Retain Electronic Warfare RDATE&E functions at Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Pt. Mugu.

(2) Consider realigning the far lesser number of China Lake positions to Pt. Mugu to enhance the existing Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence at Pt. Mugu.

**Ventura County, California
Community Report to the
BRAC Commission
Relevant to Naval Base Ventura County
July 14, 2005**

I. Introduction

The Department of Defense (DoD) significantly deviated from Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law and from their own internal departmental guidance in performing their analysis and making certain realignment recommendations that affect Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) and two of its primary tenant commands: Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Pt. Mugu (NAWC WD) and Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD).

The deviations in the DoD analysis processes deal with the following Selection Criteria:

- Military Value (Criteria #1 & #2)
- Costs and Savings (Criteria #5)
- Receiving Community Infrastructure (Criteria #7)

Additionally, deviations from Department guidance to enhance Jointness and Transformation, and specific areas of poor execution of basic data analysis and management have been identified.

Several of DoD's realignment recommendations, including those affecting NAWC WD Sea Range, Targets, Range Support Aircraft and Weapons functions and NSWC PHD Weapons and C⁴ISR functions, deviate from BRAC law and DoD guidance and demonstrate poor DoD data analysis and management. Therefore, the discussions of these functions and the imperative to reject/modify the respective DoD recommendations are provided in two different sections of this paper.

This position paper will clearly identify and discuss DoD's deviations and will provide recommendations to the BRAC Commission on changes that should be made prior to the Commission forwarding its report to the President.

DoD's realignment recommendations which apply to NBVC were all originated, staffed and reported by the Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG). These recommendations, with their respective impacts on the Ventura County community are provided below:

Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center

DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.”

DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.”

Economic Impact on Communities: “Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 5012 jobs (2250 direct jobs and 2762 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.”

Consolidate Maritime C⁴ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Base Ventura County, CA, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA, and Naval Station Newport, RI, by relocating Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, and consolidating with the Space Warfare Center to create the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.”

Economic Impact on Communities: “Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 286 jobs (127 direct jobs and 159 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.”

Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.”

Economic Impact on Communities: “Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1075 jobs (479 direct jobs and 596 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area economic area.”

The total maximum potential impact to Ventura County would be a reduction of 6373 jobs (2856 direct and 3517 indirect), with 6087 of these jobs slated to move to China Lake.

II. Deviation from Selection Criteria

A. Military Value Criteria

The Department of Defense (DoD) significantly deviated from Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law by not adequately considering Military Value criteria. A discussion of these deviations is provided below.

1. Final Selection Criteria Number 1: “The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.”

Military Value Criteria Number 1 means that no BRAC recommendations should be forwarded that would degrade the operational readiness of our joint warfighters. In recommending that the Pt. Mugu Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence be realigned to China Lake, the TJCSG significantly deviated from BRAC law. A discussion of these deviations is provided below.

a. Electronic Warfare

The Electronic Warfare (EW) Center of Excellence (COE) at Point Mugu includes the Electronic Combat Simulation and Evaluation Laboratory (ECSEL), the EA-6B laboratory, the EA-18G laboratory, the Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Planning and Exploitation System (TERPES) laboratory, the Threat Simulation group and the Electronic Warfare Software Support Activity (EWSSA). These EW labs provide a wide range of synergistic support to Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and FMS tactical airborne electronic attack (AEA), threat simulation and electronic threat intelligence customers.

Pt. Mugu has been the Navy’s EW COE for over 50 years. The 368 civilian and 11 military personnel located at Pt. Mugu possess over 4500 collective years of specialized EW experience, with an average of over 15 years per person of EA-6B, AEA and threat analysis engineering experience.

The Pt. Mugu EA-6B Weapons System Support Laboratory provides real-time operational support to the warfighter. This capability is maintained 24/7/365. When a crisis occurs in the world, the lab responds to the urgent needs of the warfighter. Examples of recent support include pushing reprogrammed user data files to all deployed EA-6B squadrons on 9/11/2001 and providing 100% responses to over 31,900 data requests in the June 2003 to June 2004 timeframe.

Based on its resident EW expertise, including its extensive EA-6B experience, Pt. Mugu was chosen by the Navy program manager as the optimum site for the EA-18G Software Support Activity laboratory. This laboratory is currently in development. When complete, Pt. Mugu EW specialists, working in a coordinated technical environment with the F/A-

18 mission systems software specialists at China Lake, will develop the EA-18G EW systems.

The TERPES was developed, tested and is maintained at Pt. Mugu. It depends on the utilization of electronic support measures instrumentation in the EA-6B to capture the electronic signals from a threat. These signals are processed by the TERPES to present the electronic order of battle of enemy forces. The TERPES lab provides operational support to Marine Corps combat operations on a 24 hour a day basis in order to capture, analyze and distribute signals information deployed operational forces.

The Threat Simulation group at Pt. Mugu uses electronic intelligence and research into foreign electronic capabilities to develop systems that stimulate U.S. weapons and sensors in the same manner as the threat. The systems developed in this program have proven invaluable in past conflicts when the enemy employed weapons and sensors that were not countered by our embedded countermeasures in tactical aircraft (TACAIR). These Threat Simulators can be rapidly deployed to our operating forces and have been used tactically in hostile environments.

The EWSSA provides direct new system software builds for U.S. jamming and receiving systems. When new enemy threat systems are introduced, the EWSSA is responsible for developing the new software for existing fleet receiving and jamming systems to counter this threat. This effort entails a highly trained engineering staff to analyze the threat, develop techniques to defeat the threat system and incorporate the new capability into the jamming system software. The EWSSA provides direct support to a wide variety of Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Army platforms and EW receiver and jammer systems.

The TJCSG deviated from the Military Value criteria by recommending that the Pt. Mugu Electronic Warfare capability be realigned to China Lake. This recommendation was made in spite of the following facts:

Pt. Mugu is the current EW Center of Excellence. The intellectual center of mass is at Pt. Mugu. Pt. Mugu employs approximately 400 Electronic Warfare personnel, while China Lake employs only about 30 personnel in the same EW disciplines.

Execution of the proposed EW realignment would cause significant disruption to the warfighting capabilities of our deployed forces. By forcing the tear-down, transition and reconstruction of the EW labs, services currently provided 24/7 would be interrupted for months, if not years. Combined with the loss of intellectual capital described below, the down-time would severely impact the nation's ability to counter enemy weapons and electronic warfare systems. As a result, our warfighters would be placed in harm's way.

The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) recognizes the value of the existing EW COE to the warfighter and the difficulty in reconstituting this capability at another location, and as a result, has recommended establishment of a Joint EW COE at

Pt. Mugu. NAVAIRSYSCOM leadership, service EW program managers and the operational EA-6B wing commander are all opposed to this proposed realignment.

Realignment of EW to China Lake would result in a significant loss in expert personnel and intellectual capital. This intellectual capital has evolved over decades at Point Mugu and cannot be moved without disruption to mission effectiveness. The time period required to train an Electronics Engineer to become a functional EW systems engineer is estimated to be 7-10 years.

As opposed to the DoD justification contained in their recommendations to the Commission, there is no redundant infrastructure between Pt. Mugu and China Lake. Movement of EW to China Lake would not make more efficient use of the Electronic Combat Range. The ECSEL and other Pt. Mugu indoor range facilities provide the preferred methodology for testing, at significantly lower cost and greater fidelity. If the Pt. Mugu EW labs were relocated to China Lake, they would not result in increased use of the ECR.

The proposed realignment decreases Military Value. It would negatively impact warfighter capabilities, it would unnecessarily cost the taxpayers millions of dollars and it would not result in any increased synergy with China Lake. Due to the fact that the TJCSG significantly deviated from the defined selection criteria, the DoD recommendation to realign the Electronic Warfare from Pt. Mugu to China Lake should be rejected.

2. Final Selection Criteria Number 2: "The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations."

In his September 3, 2004 Memorandum to DoD leadership, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz providing further guidance on "BRAC 2005 Military Value Principles." His guidance included direction that the Military Departments and the Joint Cross-Service Groups should use a number of principles when applying military judgment in their deliberative processes. These principles included:

"The Department needs research, development, acquisition, test, and evaluation capabilities that efficiently and effectively place superior technology in the hands of the warfighter to meet current and future threats and facilitate knowledge-enabled and net-centric warfare."

The combination of Military Value Criteria Number 2 and Mr. Wolfowitz's implementing guidance should have sent a very clear message to the JCSG's. That message was, in order to enhance military value, no BRAC recommendations should be forwarded that would degrade the efficiency or effectiveness of DoD's test and training ranges or their supporting functions.

In recommending that Sea Range, Targets and Range Support Aircraft be realigned from Pt. Mugu to China Lake, the TJCSG significantly deviated from BRAC law and from the above DoD implementing guidance. A discussion of those deviations is provided below.

a. Sea Range

The Pt. Mugu Sea Range, encompassing 36,000 square miles of controlled airspace is DoD's largest and most heavily instrumented sea range. The Sea Range is national range and is designated as a Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB). The Sea Range operates range instrumentation located on coastal mountains and on off-shore islands, including the Navy-owned San Nicolas Island, located 60 miles from the coastline. The Range supports open-ocean and littoral testing of tactical, strategic and missile defense weapons, weapons systems and aircraft systems; Fleet training and joint experimentation. The Pt. Mugu Sea Range provides services to a large number of test and training customers. For example, its FY-04 customer base was 33% Air Force, 26% Navy, 19% Missile Defense Agency, 9% Other DoD, 8% Foreign Military Sales, 3% Commercial and 2% NASA. The Sea Range is one of four open-air ranges operated under a single NAVAIRSYSCOM Ranges Department.

The TJCSG deviated from the Military Value criteria by recommending that the Pt. Mugu Sea Range be realigned to China Lake as part of the Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center. This recommendation was made in spite of the fact that:

- (1) Over 10 years of internal reorganizations and restructuring have eliminated all duplicative capabilities and management layers between the Pt. Mugu and China Lake ranges
- (2) Movement of Sea Range jobs from Pt. Mugu to China Lake would result in significant loss in intellectual capital
- (3) The Sea Range provides support to a large number of non-Weapons and Armaments customers
- (4) Operation of the Sea Range is inextricably linked to the geography
- (5) No synergy would be gained by realigning the Sea Range to China Lake
- (6) Significant unnecessary non-recurring and recurring costs would be incurred by both the Range and its customers
- (7) The efficiency and effectiveness of the Sea Range would be decreased, and
- (8) Safety risk to both participating and non-participating personnel would be increased by moving control of developmental weapons testing to a location more than 150 miles away from the test venue.

From senior DoD officials involved in both Technical and Education & Training JCSG's, we learned that, since Open Air Ranges and their supporting functions, were under the purview of the E&T JCSG, the TJCSG should not have made realignment recommendations regarding the Pt. Mugu Sea Range. TJCSG personnel exceeded their authority by recommending that Sea Range and associated Targets and Range Support Aircraft personnel be realigned to China Lake.

The proposed realignment decreases Military Value. It would not result in any increased synergy with China Lake W&A programs, but it would negatively impact cost, safety and operational efficiency of Sea Range operations. Due to the fact that the TJCSG significantly deviated from the defined selection criteria and exceeded its authority in making OAR recommendations, the DoD recommendation to realign the Sea Range from Pt. Mugu to China Lake should be rejected.

b. Targets

Pt. Mugu has served for over sixty years as the Navy's premiere aerial and seaborne targets engineering, operations and logistics site. It is the only site that operates all of the Navy's air and surface launched target systems and is the only Center of Excellence for target systems within the Navy. The Pt. Mugu target capability originated as, and remains a natural and necessary extension of the Sea Range.

Aerial targets, maintained, operated and refurbished at Pt. Mugu, are comprised of subscale subsonic targets and full-scale missile targets capable of remote operation by an air or ground-based controller. The seaborne targets, maintained, operated and refurbished at Port Hueneme, consist of a full array of small high speed attack boats, full-sized remotely operated ships and sea-going target launch platforms.

The TJCSG deviated from the Military Value criteria by recommending that Pt. Mugu's targets personnel be realigned to China Lake as part of the Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center. This recommendation was made in spite of the fact that an average of 92% of aerial target operations are conducted at the Pt. Mugu Sea Range, while an average of only 8% are conducted at China Lake. 100% of seaborne target operations are conducted at the Sea Range. Moving all target operations from the Sea Range to China Lake and then transporting the people and equipment back to Point Mugu on a daily basis to conduct operations on the Sea Range would result in significant increases in operating and maintenance costs.

The proposed realignment decreases Military Value. It would not result in any increased synergy with any China Lake W&A program, but it would negatively impact Sea Range operations. By degrading the efficiency and effectiveness of Sea Range operations and imposing unnecessary non-recurring and recurring costs, this recommendation significantly deviates from the defined selection criteria. The DoD recommendation to realign the targets organization from Pt. Mugu to China Lake should be rejected.

c. Range Support Aircraft

Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Three Zero (VX-30), a NAVAIRSYSCOM command based at NAS Pt. Mugu, operates P-3, C-130 and F/A-18 aircraft in support of both T&E and Fleet training activities. The P-3 and C-130 aircraft, known as Range Support Aircraft (RSA), perform an average of 86% of their sorties on the Pt. Mugu Sea Range, 13% of their sorties off-range (primarily in support of world-wide MDA and NASA

operations) and only 1% of their sorties on the China Lake land range. The VX-30 aircrew, Sea Range and targets personnel, flying in the RSA, perform range surveillance, clearance, telemetry, flight termination, optics, targets launch and logistics support functions for the Sea Range.

The TJCSG deviated from the Military Value criteria by recommending that VX-30 be realigned to China Lake as part of the Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center. This recommendation was made in spite of the fact that VX-30 does not test weapons and armaments, but does support a wide variety of non-weapons customers on the Sea Range. The TJCSG also made this recommendation in spite of the significant additional costs that would have to borne, by both BRAC appropriations and Sea Range customers, as a result. The non-recurring costs to build a new hangar and ramp space at China Lake are estimated at over \$25M. The recurring costs of operations would increase by approximately \$6.8M per year in order to pay for the additional flight time to/from China Lake and the costs of the required maintenance detachments from China Lake. Other unknown costs would accrue as a result of decreased on-station time, higher total flight time, decreased aircraft fatigue life, more frequent depot-level repairs, and loss of Sea Range operational efficiency due to the RSA being based over 150 miles away from the Sea Range.

The proposed realignment decreases Military Value. If VX-30 were realigned from Pt. Mugu to China Lake, the quality of support to the Sea Range would be significantly degraded while increasing the cost to the taxpayer by several millions of dollars per year. By degrading the efficiency and effectiveness of Sea Range operations and imposing unnecessary non-recurring and recurring costs, this recommendation significantly deviates from the defined selection criteria. The DoD recommendation to realign VX-30 from Pt. Mugu to China Lake should be rejected.

B. Other Criteria

DoD significantly deviated from Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law by not adequately considering other mandated Selection Criteria. A discussion of these deviations to Criteria #5 (Costs and Savings) and Criteria #7 (Receiving community infrastructure) is provided below.

1. Final Selection Criteria Number 5: “The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.”

The TJCSG did not perform a proper analysis of the costs and savings associated with their recommended realignments. Specifically, extremely poor analyses were performed on the TECH 18 (Weapons and Armaments) and TECH 54 (Electronic Warfare) scenarios. A detailed discussion and a summary of more accurate costs and savings are provided below.

a. Basic TECH 18 Scenario as Submitted in the DoD Recommendations to the BRAC Commission

This scenario realigns all W&A RDAT&E billets from NBVC (and other locations) primarily to China Lake. It fails to include the costs of moving the Range and Targets Functions (facilities and equipment) to China Lake and does not include the additional recurring costs of conducting Range and Target Operations from China Lake vice NBVC. It also assumes an across the board (military, civilian, and contractor) reduction in required billets of 15%.

Summary Results:

Payback Year	:	2015 (7 years)
NPV in 2025 (\$K)	:	-433,404 (negative number = savings, positive = loss)
1-Time Cost (\$K)	:	358,142

b. Basic TECH 18 Scenario Modified to Include Anticipated Actual Costs

The true cost of TECH 18 must include the anticipated actual costs of moving the Range and Target functions from NBVC to China Lake. Additionally, due to over 12 years of consolidation of technical, administrative, and management functions across the single NAWC WD organization, the assumed 15% savings would not occur. The July 2005 GAO report found fault with this 15% savings number used by the TJCSG and stated that a 5.5% savings would be more accurate. Due to the complete lack of redundancy in technical, administrative and management personnel between the NAWC Pt. Mugu and China Lake sites, a more accurate estimate would be zero savings. Using the data taken from the certified responses of NBVC and China Lake to Scenario Data Call DON-0162, January 11, 2005, and making the above two changes to the TECH 18, COBRA analysis results in dramatic changes to the bottom line numbers.

Payback Year	:	100+ Years
NPV in 2025 (\$K)	:	249,094 (loss)
1-Time Cost (\$K)	:	440,497

c. Basic TECH 18 Scenario Modified to Exclude Sea Range, Targets and VX-30 Personnel and Facilities

As discussed in paragraph II.A.2 above, Sea Range, Targets and VX-30 Range Support Aircraft should not be moved to China Lake. By running the COBRA model without the associated MILCON and moving expenses associated with the Sea Range, Targets and VX-30, and eliminating the 15% savings, as discussed above, yields the following bottom line numbers:

Payback Year	:	2037 (29 Years)
NVP in 2025 (\$K)	:	77,811 (loss)
1-Time Cost (\$K)	:	269,727

In summary, the TJCSG can not have it both ways. It should have either included the range and targets costs and incurred a 20 year NPV of +\$249,094,000 or left the Range, Targets and VX-30 activities at Pt. Mugu (the most sensible solution) and incurred a 20 year NPV of +\$77,811,000.

d. Basic TECH 54 Scenario as Submitted in the DoD Recommendations to the BRAC Commission

This scenario relocates the entire Pt. Mugu Electronic Warfare (EW) Center of Excellence from NBVC to China Lake.

Summary Results:

Payback Year	:	2021 (12 Years)
NPV in 2025 (\$K)	:	-16,888 (savings)
1-Time Cost (\$K)	:	72,699

e. Basic TECH 54 Scenario with Unjustified Personnel Savings Removed

The Basic Scenario shows 11 military, 368 civilian, and 100 contractor positions being realigned from NBVC to China Lake with no reductions. However, the Receiving Activity (China Lake) claimed a Miscellaneous Recurring Savings of \$3,010,000 per year. The data call footnote states “Identifies savings attributed to a calculated payroll savings for reduced Technical and Admin personnel. Justification is an un-itemized value. Details in Source file 1.” A review of the source file, and the documentation preceding that source file, revealed that this \$3M/year number was an un-itemized value with no justification. The results of the COBRA model run without this unjustified recurring savings are shown below:

Payback Year	:	2040 (31 Years)
NPV in 2025 (\$K)	:	24,961 (loss)
1-Time Cost (\$K)	:	72,699

f. In summary, both the Weapons and Armaments (TECH 18) and the Electronic Warfare (TECH 54) scenarios recommended by the TJCSG will result in high one-time costs and unacceptable long-term costs to the taxpayer. By not considering these costs in its analysis, DoD significantly deviated from BRAC law.

2. Final Selection Criteria Number 7: “The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.”

The TJCSG significantly deviated from this Selection Criteria by accepting the Bakersfield Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as being an accurate representation of Ridgecrest’s ability to support the potential realignment of personnel.

Bakersfield, located approximately 115 miles west of China Lake, is over two hours away, with almost nothing in between the two cities except mountains and desert. The

only city of any size within 60 miles of Ridgecrest is California City, 35 miles away with a population of 8400.

The relocation of nearly over 6300 positions to Ridgecrest (population approximately 25,000) from all activities would represent a total influx of about 22,000 people (at a 3.5 to 1 ratio) in the 2007-2008 timeframe. This would require essentially doubling the size of the city of Ridgecrest in the next two years.

The June 16, 2005, Multiple Listing Service for available homes, showed 12 houses for sale in the city of Ridgecrest. The MSA data shows 22,912 vacant housing units, but the majority of those are in Bakersfield, 115 miles from China Lake. Housing for an additional 22,000 people could ultimately be constructed in the Ridgecrest area, but it is not likely that this could be accomplished by 2008.

Doubling of the size of Ridgecrest by developing an additional 21 square miles of real estate, raises serious environmental concerns, also. This large influx of people would definitely affect the delicate environmental balance found in the Mojave Desert, including the habitat of the Mojave Ground Squirrel, the Desert Tortoise and the Kangaroo Rat.

The statistics for medical providers are misleading. The Bakersfield MSA shows 1,231 beds, and 937 physicians, but the Ridgecrest Regional hospital only has 80 beds and 65 physicians. When Ridgecrest residents are faced with any significant medical challenges, they invariably leave town to find solutions. This problem would only be exacerbated by the addition of another 22,000 residents.

The city of Ridgecrest could expand its utility services, including power, water, sewage and refuse, but it is doubtful that it could obtain the funding and establish the infrastructure in time for the 2007-2008 influx.

The availability of schools is another serious issue to be considered. With the known extended timeframes associated with passing school bond initiatives, the known state education funding problems and the normal lengths of time required to design, obtain approvals and build new schools, it is unlikely that adequate educational facilities could be available by 2007-2008.

The TJCSG scenario data calls asked China Lake if the Bakersfield MSA could accommodate a number of separate realignment actions. Taken in pieces, perhaps they could be done. But taken in total, especially with the short timeframe in which to accomplish all actions, it is unlikely that Ridgecrest could accommodate the recommended realignments.

DoD deviated from the Selection Criteria guidance by not adequately assessing the total impact of all realignment actions on the city of Ridgecrest and by accepting the Bakersfield MSA as being representative of Ridgecrest.

III. Deviation from Departmental Guidance to Enhance Jointness and Transformation

The TJCSG significantly deviated from Departmental guidance to enhance Jointness and Transformation. A discussion of these deviations is provided below.

In a November 15, 2002 memorandum to his DoD leadership, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld provided the following guidance: “A primary objective of BRAC 2005, in addition to realigning our base structure to meet our post-Cold War force structure, is to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity...I am confident we can produce BRAC recommendations that will advance transformation, combat effectiveness, and the efficient use of the taxpayer’s money.”

In his September 8, 2004 memorandum for DoD leadership, including the Chairmen of the Joint Cross Service Groups, Under Secretary of Defense Michael Wynne recommended several “Transformational Options” for approval, including: “Establish regional Cross-Service and Cross-Functional ranges that will support Service collective, interoperability and joint training as well as test and evaluation of weapons systems.”

In spite of Mr. Rumsfeld’s and Mr. Wynne’s guidance, it appears that very few DoD recommendations actually enhance jointness and transformation. Most of the recommendations, including those directly affecting NBVC, are service centric, vice joint. This lack of jointness and transformation has been noted by others, also.

In his April 6, 2005 weekly update to SECDEF, Under Secretary Wynne stated that the Navy’s approach “can limit BRAC’s transformational potential.” He further noted that the Navy “Worked closely with joint cross-service groups, but leaned toward service centric rather than joint solutions.”

During Dr. Ronald Sega’s testimony before the BRAC Commission on May 19, 2005, Commissioner Coyle noted: “But from what I can see, you recommended very little in the way of cross servicing or jointness that would bring services together in a technical way. And my question is: Why didn’t you?” Dr. Sega’s response included: “It is our hope that in these areas that are largely co-locating, consolidating at the service level will evolve to more of a joint character.”

In its July 2005 “Analysis of DOD’s 2005 selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignment,” the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that “Some proposed actions represent some progress in emphasizing transformation and jointness, but progress in these efforts varied without clear agreement on transformational options to be considered, and many recommendations tended to foster jointness by consolidating functions within rather than across military services.” In comments directly aimed at the TJCSG recommendations, GAO stated: “Limited progress was made to foster greater jointness and transformation.”

The TJCSG's deviations from Departmental guidance resulted in recommendations which adversely affect Naval Base Ventura County. These deviations are discussed below.

As discussed above, the Pt. Mugu Sea Range is a national range providing joint services to a large number of test and training customers. For example, its FY-04 customer base was 33% Air Force, 26% Navy, 19% Missile Defense Agency, and 9% Other DoD. In spite of Under Secretary Wynne's recommendation to establish cross-service ranges and a clear opportunity to expand the Sea Range's joint mission, the TJCSG recommended moving all Pt. Mugu Range, Targets and Range Support Aircraft personnel to China Lake as part of a service-centric Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center.

As described above, the EA-6B laboratory directly supports the joint airborne electronic attack missions of the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. This capability is an integral part of the larger EW Center of Excellence at Pt. Mugu. Instead of making recommendations that would enhance the value of the joint EA-6B laboratory at Pt. Mugu, the TJCSG recommended tearing it down and moving it to a service-centric Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics RDAT&E center at China Lake.

The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) laboratory at Pt. Mugu provides direct support to the AMRAAM joint program office. This is the only AMRAAM HIL in operation and supports both Air Force and Navy RDAT&E and Raytheon, the system contractor. Rather than enhancing the value of this joint laboratory, the TJCSG recommended tearing it down and moving it to China Lake as part of a service-centric Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center.

The Radar Reflectivity Laboratory (RRL) at Pt. Mugu is the only one of its kind in the world. The RRL provides monostatic and bistatic radar cross-section characterization services to a wide variety of joint customers, including Navy and Air Force aircraft programs, UAV and weapons programs, Navy ship and submarine programs, the Missile Defense Agency and DoD sponsored R&D programs. Rather than enhancing the value of this joint laboratory, the TJCSG recommended abandoning and moving the RRL to China Lake as part of a service-centric Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center.

Co-Location \neq Transformation. While the TJCSG made many recommendations which resulted in co-location of similar functions, co-location is not transformational. In fact it is just the opposite. In the business world, the transformation is to more distributed organizations. In this regard, Naval Air Systems Command leadership exhibited great foresight in 1992 by establishing the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, with the two campuses at Pt. Mugu and China Lake. NAWC WD was established as, and remains an integrated command with a single management and financial structure. In the recent words of the first NAWC Commander, RADM George Strohsahl (ret): "The technical work at Pt. Mugu since the creation of the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) and the introduction of a competency aligned organization within the Naval Air Systems

Command (NAVAIR) has been totally integrated with related work at other NAWC locations. Management layering and duplicative work has been eliminated. If the work is relocated (realigned in BRAC parlance) little savings will accrue through elimination of jobs. The move will simply attempt to pick up the people and place them in different buildings some 150 miles away.”

RADM Strohsahl goes on to say: “Modern internet, video teleconferences, and other communications capability seamlessly link these physically separated elements to form effective teams. The NAWC and the current NAVAIR management concept were founded on this modern reality. It has worked well for them for over a decade. This proposed costly relocation is a giant step back in time without any tangible benefit. The BRAC recommendation in this instance is attempting to fix something that simply isn’t broken” and summarizes his feelings about the proposed realignment actions by saying: “The BRAC commission must understand the terrible error that has been made and remove this realignment from the final BRAC list.”

Practical examples of the transformational distributed connectivity referenced by RADM Strohsahl can be seen in both the EA-18G and AMRAAM laboratories at Pt. Mugu. The EA-18G airborne electronic attack systems (“EA-18G backseat”), being developed and tested at Pt. Mugu, are electronically linked to the EA-18G mission systems (“EA-18G frontseat”) being developed and tested at China Lake. The AMRAAM systems being developed and tested at Pt. Mugu are electronically linked with the F/A-18 systems being developed and tested at China Lake. None of these labs have to be in the same room, or even on the same base to operate effectively. Both are examples of transformational ways of doing business. The DoD recommendations would result in a big transformational step backwards, while interrupting critical service to the warfighter, unnecessarily spending millions of tax dollars and disintegrating a skilled and motivated workforce.

The TJCSG significantly deviated from Department guidance to enhance jointness and transformation. Instead, it recommended two specific service-centric realignments (W&A and EW) that would significantly damage joint value and would set Weapons and EW transformation back 15 years. At the same time, these DoD recommendations would while result in loss of valuable intellectual capital, would adversely affect our warfighters and would impose significant unnecessary expenses on the taxpayer.

IV. Poor Execution of Basic Data Analysis and Management Functions

The Technical Joint Cross Service Group did an extremely poor job of analyzing and managing the data which was submitted by both NAWC WD and NSWC PHD. The most egregious example of this poor execution was in the TJCSG handling of what has become known as the “Question 47” data. A description of the Question 47 issue is provided below.

Both sites of Naval Base Ventura County responded to scenario data call TECH 2, but TECH 2 was not the implementing action. TECH 2 was translated into TECH 18, which

was used by the TJCSG in its analysis. The TJCSG analyzed TECH 18 without any input from the Point Mugu or Port Hueneme sites.

The COBRA data indicates that the TJCSG analysis used incorrect numbers. Apparently, the TJCSG made the same mistake across the board for all TECH 18 losing activities. This error is particularly significant for Naval Base Ventura County since it is by far the largest contributor to the TECH 18 scenario. The most significant results are that costs associated with this action were grossly understated, and that the savings associated with this action are extremely overstated

When TECH 2 was issued, guidance included “Report FTEs, equipment and facilities that are within this scenario category (W&A) but are an inextricable part of a specific effort performed by your activity that is not Weapons; however, identify and explain in #USN0047 those areas of conflict.”

NBVC personnel argued that it would not be appropriate to include NAWC Sea Range, Targets and NSWC Weapons Systems Integration personnel in this data call response. In particular, the Sea Range personnel spread their work across all Defense Technical Areas, including Air Platforms and Space Systems. Additionally, these personnel do not work on weapons and armaments; they work on range and target systems. In prior scenarios this inseparable work was not included in the personnel and equipment movement, dynamic costing or military construction requirements as they were never intended to be moved by either the gaining or losing activities.

After much discussion between Navy principals, NAWC WD and NSWC PHD were directed to include the higher numbers of personnel, but to describe these “inextricable” personnel in Question 47. The NAWC WD Question 47 wording submitted was:

“The following areas would require a reduction in the number of personnel, equipment, and facilities to be relocated to the receiving site: (1) F-14 weapons system support has been terminated, a reduction of 132 civilians and 24 contractors; (2) An error of 33 civilians performing EW support; (3) personnel, mission equipment, and facilities performing outdoor air range operations. These are an integrated, fixed base capability that must remain at the Point Mugu site to continue sea range operations, net reduction of 505 civilians, 153 contractors, 2667 tons of mission equipment, and 1022.4 KSFT of facility space; (4) Retaining the 3 anechoic chambers whose primary customer is the targets range complex, a net reduction of 14 civilians, 3 contractors, 90 tons of support equipment, and 44.2 KSF; (5) Keeping logistical support for targets with the targets hardware, a net reduction of 24 civilians,; and (6) Not moving the general and administrative support that currently services both China Lake and Point Mugu, a net reduction of 143 civilians and 22 contractors.”

This statement was inclusive of mission equipment and facilities performing outdoor air range operations include both range and target operations.

In the SECDEF recommendation coming from TECH 18 the impact on the community is shown as a total of 2250 direct jobs. It is clear none of the question 47 reductions were applied in the recommendation.

This impact of the ignoring the question 47 reduction in TECH 18 is significant. None of the cost of the mission equipment nor operational considerations to make a mission capable range were included but all of the personnel would be moved to China Lake. Neither the losing nor receiving sites included dynamic or facility costs to relocate the functions identified in question 47. Since the analysis used the full personnel movements without the accompanying costs, the return on investment calculation is incorrect.

A similar problem occurred with the NSWC Port Hueneme in TECH 2A. Mission critical inextricable functions with personnel counts were included in the certified question 47 response but were excluded from the TECH 18 analysis. The certified data indicated a total of approximately 432 direct jobs in the movement tables but indicated only 134 were movable due to the inextricable functions being performed at the Hueneme site. Subsequently, the recommendations stemming from TECH 18 included all the personnel in the move without regard to the input from the site experts.

Since the DoD recommendations were published on May 13th, both the Navy personnel at NBVC and personnel outside the base, including elected officials, have been trying to find out what the TJCSG did with the Question 47 inputs. Answers have included:

From the Lead of the W&A subgroup of the TJCSG: "I don't know."

From the GAO inquiry: "A Navy official said that most Navy activities asked to exclude large numbers of personnel from consideration in recommendations and the technical group was consistent in disregarding these exclusions." (In a telephone conversation with the GAO personnel who researched this subject, we were told that their DoD point of contact told them that the TJCSG analysts did not understand the Question 47 exclusions, so they ignored them.)

In a response to Congressman Gallegly's question on why the TJCSG ignored the Question 47 exclusions, Mr. Alan R. Shaffer, Executive Director of the TJCSG, responded: "Naval Base Ventura County information was reviewed but not included in the final analysis due to expert military judgment."

A summary of the timeline of what we think happened is provided below:

- (1) NBVC personnel who prepared the data call responses identified the inconsistencies and confusion that would result if they lumped all personnel into "W&A" or "C⁴ISR" categories.
- (2) NBVC personnel were directed to include all of the W&A and C⁴ISR personnel, but were told to identify areas of conflict for those personnel considered to be an inextricable part of their activity's mission in their Question 47 inputs.

(3) NBVC operated in good faith by identifying all positions in each category, and also specifically identified those positions considered inextricable in their Question 47 responses.

(4) TJCSG personnel did not understand the Question 47 exclusions, did not ask NBVC personnel for clarification and ignored the data.

(5) DoD rolled up all of the realignment numbers, including those from the TJCSG, and published a recommendation to realign 2250 NBVC personnel, when the correct number, subtracting the Question 47 exclusions, should have been 803.

Bottom line position: Improperly realigning the 1447 inextricable NBVC personnel, with the resulting loss of intellectual capital, adverse effects on the warfighter and unnecessary expense to the taxpayer, due to TJCSG staff incompetence / inattention to detail is an egregious error which should be corrected by the Commission.

VI. Conclusions

The Technical Joint Cross Service Group significantly deviated from BRAC law, specifically in not complying with the defined Selection Criteria.

These deviations resulted in faulty realignment recommendations regarding Electronic Warfare; Range, Targets and Range Support Aircraft; Weapons and Armaments; and C⁴ISR functions at NBVC.

The Technical Joint Cross Service Group significantly deviated from internal DoD guidance to enhance Jointness and Transformation.

These deviations resulted in faulty realignment recommendations regarding Electronic Warfare and Weapons and Armaments functions at NBVC.

The Technical Joint Cross Service Group did a very poor job of basic data analysis and management.

These errors resulted in faulty realignment recommendations regarding Range and Targets, Weapons and Armaments, and C⁴ISR functions at NBVC.

The bottom line is that the Technical Joint Cross Service Group did an extremely poor job of judging military value, considering Jointness and Transformation and analyzing and managing the data. A majority of their realignment recommendations simply do not make sense. Most of the affected positions are not synergistic with the Weapons and Armaments and Electronics Warfare work at China Lake, nor with the C⁴ISR work at Pt. Loma. These jobs are integral to the existing NAWC WD Sea Range and EW Center of Excellence and to the NSWC PHD shipboard combat systems integration laboratory. Realigning these positions to China Lake would result in significant losses of intellectual capital, would adversely affect our warfighting capabilities and would waste hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayers' money.

VII. Recommendations

Detailed recommendations for changes to be made to the DoD recommendations are provided below:

Modify the DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.”

Reduce the number of Range, Targets, Anechoic Chamber, Logistics and G&A positions to be realigned from Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu by the number defined as being inextricable to the command’s core mission. Specifically, reduce the number of positions to be realigned by 851 civilian and 202 contractor positions.

Reject the recommendation to move the VX-30 test squadron from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. Retain the Test Squadron Range Support Aircraft base of operations at Pt. Mugu. Specifically, reduce the number of positions to be realigned by 32 civilian and 214 military positions.

Modify the DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.”

Reduce the number of Weapons and Armament positions to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to the command’s core mission. Specifically, reduce the number of positions to by 291 civilian and 6 military positions.

Modify the DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Base Ventura County, CA, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA, and Naval Station Newport, RI, by relocating Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, and consolidating with the Space Warfare Center to create the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.”

Specifically reduce the number of C⁴ISR jobs to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to the command’s core mission. Reduce the number of positions to be realigned by 96 civilian and 1 military positions.

Reject the DoD Recommendation: “Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.” Retain

Electronic Warfare RDAT&E functions at Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division,
Pt. Mugu.

Ventura County, California, Community Position

Regarding DoD BRAC 2005 Recommendations for Realignment of Naval Base Ventura County Activities

Reference: TECHNICAL JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (VOLUME XII) 19 May 2005

1. Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 5012 jobs (2250 direct jobs and 2762 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Community Position: We understand the concept of creating a Naval Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center and agree with the recommendation to establish that Center at the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake.

However, we take great exception to the number of positions and some of the functions to be realigned from Pt. Mugu, as identified in the TJCSG report. The specific details behind our objections follow:

(1) The Technical data calls received by NAWC WD Pt. Mugu directed that personnel, equipment and facilities that were within the Weapons and Armaments category, but were an “inextricable” part of the remaining core mission of the command, would be identified and explained in what was known as “Question 47.” In response to this direction, NAWC WD Pt. Mugu reported 851 positions in the Sea Range, Targets, Logistics and G&A activities that should have been subtracted from the total W&A personnel numbers under consideration.

(2) An identical situation occurred at NSWC PHD Port Hueneme, with approximately 300 positions being identified in Question 47 as being “inextricable.”

(3) In both Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme cases, per direction, the losing activity did not include dynamic or facility costs to relocate the functions identified in Question 47.

(4) Somewhere in the TJCSG processes, however, the above Question 47 numbers identified in the original TECH2B scenario were not carried over to the eventual W&A RDAT&E scenario, called TECH18. The reasons for the broken process are not known, but could be categorized as either: (a) clerical error / inattention to detail, or (b) intentional, in disregard for the established procedures for deducting the number of "inextricable" positions. (At this date, 6/10/05, we are hearing that several other Navy facilities suffered the same error. Internal Navy questions requesting clarification have been forwarded, but resolution is not known.)

We also take exception to the recommendation to realign all VX-30 Test Squadron activities from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. This recommendation does not make operational sense and was at least partially based on an incorrect computation of savings. Specific details of our objections follow:

(1) VX-30 operates P-3, C-130 and F/A-18 aircraft. The P-3's and C-130's directly support Pt. Mugu Sea Range operations by providing surveillance, clearance, telemetry, flight termination, optics, communications, target launch and logistics support. These aircraft very rarely provide support to the Land Range at China Lake. Moving the P-3 and C-130 aircraft to China Lake would relocate them over 150 miles away from their primary operating area, thus increasing their response time to range tasking, reducing their on-range time and increasing their operating costs. Recurring costs of flying P-3's and C-130's from China Lake vice Pt. Mugu are estimated to be over \$2.3 Million per year. Additional flight hours on the aircraft would accelerate the expenditure of their fatigue lives, which would both reduce aircraft availability and increase depot level costs. Additionally, new hangar and parking apron MILCON costs would be required at China Lake, while none would be required at Pt. Mugu. Operationally, this recommendation simply does not make sense.

(2) Apparently, excessive gaining activity savings were claimed by eliminating the costs for operating and maintaining VX-30 F/A-18 aircraft. In fact, the decisions to divest the VX-30 F/A-18's and give the military billets back to the Navy were already made by Test Wing Pacific and the Naval Air Systems Command and were not BRAC decisions. Adding these savings to the BRAC analysis would be improper.

Community Recommendations:

(1) Reduce the number of Range, Targets, Anechoic Chamber, Logistics and G&A positions to be realigned from Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu by the number defined as being inextricable to the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

(2) Reduce the number of Weapons and Armament positions to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to

the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

(3) Reject the recommendation to move the VX-30 test squadron from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. Retain the Test Squadron Range Support Aircraft base of operations at Pt. Mugu.

2. Consolidate Maritime C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

***DoD Recommendation:** Realign Naval Base Ventura County, CA, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA, and Naval Station Newport, RI, by relocating Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, and consolidating with the Space Warfare Center to create the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.*

***Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 286 jobs (127 direct jobs and 159 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.*

Community Position: In a manner identical to that discussed in Weapons and Armaments, above, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, identified a number of C4ISR positions as being inextricable to the core command mission. These positions and the rationale for identifying them were provided in a Question 47 data call response. Similar to W&A, these reduced numbers were apparently omitted from the final TJCSG roll-up in the reference document. Internal Navy questions requesting clarification have been forwarded, but resolution is not known.

Community Recommendation: Reduce the number of C4ISR jobs to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

3. Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

***DoD Recommendation:** Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.*

***Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1075 jobs (479 direct*

jobs and 596 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area economic area.

Community Position: This recommended realignment of Electronic Warfare from Pt. Mugu to China Lake makes absolutely no sense. Rather than adding military value, such a move would put our Warfighters in harm's way. The specific details behind our objections follow:

(1) Pt. Mugu is the existing, recognized Center of Excellence (COE) for EW. A 2004 Naval Air Systems Command study was conducted to assess the abilities of both Pt. Mugu and China Lake to serve as a Joint EW COE. Due to the "black art" nature of the capability, which would be difficult to reconstitute at China Lake, Pt. Mugu was judged LOW risk and China Lake as HIGH risk. The NAVAIR recommendation was to support establishment of a Joint EW COE at Pt. Mugu.

(2) The Electronic Warfare activities at Point Mugu directly support the combat capability of the Navy and Air Force Warfighters. EW operates on a 24/7/365 basis. Engineers and analysts track the electronic signatures of potential threats gathered from the intelligence community, evaluate those electronic threats, develop solutions and issue hardware designs, data and software updates to operating forces on a response cycle often measured in hours. This capability has supported operational forces since the 1960's. EW personnel and laboratories reside in a state of the art secure facility at Point Mugu. The capability of this enterprise lies more in the expertise developed in the engineering cadre than in the facilities and equipment that are resident there. The EW workforce is very specialized, and while they do work with their aircraft software development counterparts at China Lake, they possess greatly different skills and experience. Quite simply, the majority of the existing Pt. Mugu EW workforce will not relocate to China Lake. Their "intellectual capital" will be lost and the ability of our Warfighters to counter threat systems will be significantly diminished.

(3) In response to the initial EW data call, the Pt. Mugu EW personnel estimated the costs to replicate their facility at China Lake, then dismantle the existing facility at Pt. Mugu. This approach was deemed to be the most practical in order to reduce the risk to operating forces. However, they were subsequently directed by their chain-of-command to reduce their BRAC costs by dismantling their existing facility, then moving it and re-establishing it at China Lake. The risk to the Warfighter is considered to be high in that the assumptions made for this revised submittal: (a) allow for no unforeseen costs nor schedule impacts, (b) disregard all ongoing program work, (c) assume all personnel will be readily available to assist in the move, and (d) assume that all current personnel will move to the new location. None of these assumptions are viewed to be justifiable or supported by historical data. In fact, it is believed that this approach will result in a significant negative impact to the Warfighter's electronic warfare capabilities in that emergency response capacity and time to respond will be degraded by an estimated 80% for a period of time during the transition (12 to 18 months), and at least 50% for the next decade with the loss of the talent base (which takes 8 to 10 years to develop) that would occur as a result of this action. At the very least, this impact would be measured in

hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, and at the worst it will be measured in lost lives of our Warfighters. The community assumes that the rationale for adopting the latter approach centered solely on making the proposed realignment satisfy target cost savings. In reality, it results in significant negative impact to the Warfighter.

(4) The cognizant weapons systems program managers played no significant part in the process. For example, Point Mugu is the primary organization for the in-house development of electronic countermeasures for the Navy and the Air Force. It is currently developing in house jamming technology in support of the Army to defeat improvised explosive devices in Iraq. Yet key DoD program managers in electronic warfare played no real part in the decision to destroy the intellectual capital at Point Mugu and move empty positions to China Lake. Similarly, Point Mugu is developing a countermeasure to hand-held anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADS), which will be disrupted by moving. The program managers, with the best view of EW systems requirements and the responsibility for EW systems development, do not concur with the DoD recommendation to move EW from Pt. Mugu to China Lake.

(5) The justification for this realignment, as stated in the reference document, is not supported by the facts. There is no "redundant infrastructure." The approximately 480 Pt. Mugu EW personnel and approximately 30 China Lake EW personnel work in the same organizational structure with common management. The recommended realignment would not make "more efficient use" of the Electronic Combat Range at China Lake. The EW system development process makes little use of the ECR. In fact, the EW systems in the new EA-6B ICAP III are now so sophisticated, they can tell that the threat emitters on the ECR are not "real." All significant testing is now performed in the laboratory environment.

Community Recommendations:

(1) Reject DoD's recommendation. Retain Electronic Warfare RDAT&E functions at Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Pt. Mugu.

(2) Consider realigning the far lesser number of China Lake positions to Pt. Mugu to enhance the existing Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence at Pt. Mugu.

NAVBASE Ventura County

Scenario	1-Time	6yr Net	Payback	20yr Net	Recurring Savings
TECH - 9	106,071	(88,557)	1 yr	(455,117)	(38,740)
Pt. Magu	4,965	1,733			(568)
TECH - 15	358,142	148,660	7 yr	(433,404)	(59,692)
Pt. Magu	94,648	(67,069)			(45,603)
TECH - 28	72,699	50,871	12 yr	(16,888)	(6,726)
Pt. Magu	68,322	6,867			2,280

162,970

7-12
~~67,069~~
 + 6,867
 (60,202)

~~45,603~~
 + 2,280
 (43,323)

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

BASE SUMMARY SHEET

NAVAL BASE VENTURA COUNTY

INSTALLATION MISSION

- As home to the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Point Mugu is the Navy's full spectrum research, development, test and evaluation, and in-service engineering center for weapons systems associated with air warfare (except for anti-submarine warfare systems), missile and missile subsystems, aircraft weapons integration and assigned airborne electronic warfare systems. Naval Air Weapons Station also maintains and operates the air, land, and sea Naval Western

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- Consolidate Maritime C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation. (TECH-9)
- Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation Center. (TECH-15)
- Realign Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department and transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA. (IND-19)
- Close Naval Support Activity Corona, CA. Relocate Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Corona, CA to Naval Base Ventura County (Naval Air Station Point Mugu), CA. (DON-7)
- Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA. (TECH-28)

DOD JUSTIFICATION

-

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

- One-Time Costs: $162,970$ \$ million
- Net Savings (Cost) during Implementation: $60,202$ \$ million
- Annual Recurring Savings: 433.3 \$ million
- Return on Investment Year: 2006 Calendar Year (Number of Years) $7-12$
- Net Present Value over 20 Years: \$ million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

NSWC PHD/NBVC BRAC Personnel Impacts

**Wayne Honea
NSWC PHD BRAC Coordinator
13 July 2005**

NSWC PHD/NBVC BRAC Scenarios

- **Weapons & Armaments (Missiles, Guns, Energetics)
to NAWC China Lake
(TECH0002A / TECH0018DR)**
- **C4ISR to SPAWAR San Diego
(TECH 0008B & TECH 0008F / TECH 0042A)**

Weapons & Armament (Missiles, Guns, Energetics) to NAWC China Lake

Scenario Action:

- Realign Port Hueneme Weapons and Armaments (except weapon system integration) and relocate to China Lake

Assumptions:

- Relocate most Weapons and Armaments e.g. missiles, energetics, guns, etc RDAT&E to China Lake

Recommendation:

- Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Justification:

- Consolidating the Navy's air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface launched missile RD&A, and T&E activities at China Lake, CA, would create an efficient integrated RDAT&E center.

Weapons & Armament (Missiles, Guns, Energetics) to NAWC China Lake

Surface Combatants



NSWC PHD Weapons and Armament Programs

Replenishment Ships



Aircraft Carriers




Strike Groups



Amphibious Ships



Allied Forces



NSWC PHD DONBITs Certified Inputs

TECH 0002A Scenario Data Call

(Rolled into TECH 0018DR)

SDC Action #	FY 2009 Civilians	Rationale
9	113	“Other” non-Missile, Gun, or Energetic – See Question #47

NSWC PHD DONBITs Certified Inputs

SDC Action #	FY 2009 Civilians	Rationale
[Redacted Content]		

- Programs **within** Missiles, Guns, or Energetics scope:
 - Standard Missile (SM) - 119
 - Evolved SeaSparrow Missile (ESSM) - 15
 - Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGM) - 0

NSWC PHD DONBITs Certified Inputs

SDC Action #	FY 2009 Civilians	Rationale
9	113	“Other” non-Missile, Gun, or Energetic – See Question #47

- “Other” Programs **not within** Missiles, Guns, or Energetics scope remaining at PHD:

- Naval Sea Data Support Activity – *Manages NAVSEA/SPAWAR Technical Manuals - 52*
- Scientific Technical Information Liaison Office – *National Intell Info - 9*
- NATO SeaSparrow Depot Management – *Co-located with NATO Program at PHD - 19*
- Mk 74 Fire Control System – *Foreign Military Sales - 9*
- Misc Non-Core Support – *Administrative and Secretarial Support - 24*

NSWC PHD DONBITs Certified Inputs

SDC Action #	FY 2009 Civilians	Rationale

- “System ISE work that is **“Inextricable”** from Weapon Systems Integration.....
 - RAM System (Rolling Airframe Missile System Mk 31) - 72
 - Guided Missile Weapon System Mk 31 includes Mk 49 Guided Missile Launching System. The Mk 31 is an integral part of the SSDS Weapons Systems Integration function which is supported by NSWC PHD. This does not include RAM missile.
 - NSSMS (NATO SeaSparrow Missile System Mk 57) - 67
 - Mk 57 includes the Mk 91 Fire Control System, the Mk 29 Guided Missile Launching System. The Mk 57 is an integral part of the Ship Self Defense System Weapons Systems Integration function which is supported by NSWC PHD. This does not include NATO missile.
 - VLS (Vertical Launch System Mk 41) - 39
 - An integrated Launching System to the Aegis Weapon System - Weapons Systems Integration function which is supported by NSWC PHD.

C4ISR to SPAWAR San Diego

Scenario Action:

- Consolidate Maritime Information Systems RDAT&E functions at NSWC PHD with SPAWAR San Diego

Assumptions:

- This Scenario intends to consolidate the workload that is common with specific areas of C4ISR.

Recommendation:


- Realign Naval Base Ventura County, CA, by relocating Maritime Information Systems RDAT&E to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, and consolidating with the Space Warfare Center to create the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.

Justification:

- These recommended realignments and consolidations provide for multifunctional and multidisciplinary Centers of Excellence in Maritime C4ISR.

C4ISR to SPAWAR San Diego

Surface Combatants




Aircraft Carriers



Amphibious Ships




NSWC PHD C4ISR Programs



Replenishment Ships



Strike Groups




Allied Forces



C4ISR to SPAWAR San Diego

C4ISR to SPAWAR San Diego

(TECH 0008B & TECH 0008F / TECH 0042A)

SDC Action #	FY 2009 Civilians	Rationale
		

C4ISR to SPAWAR San Diego

SDC Action #	FY 2009 Civilians	Rationale
[Redacted Content]		

- **“C4ISR that are to be transferred to SPAWAR”**
 - Distributed Common Ground Station – Navy - 6
 - Integrates geospatial information with signal intelligence data
 - AADC - 0

C4ISR to SPAWAR San Diego

SDC Action #	FY 2009 Civilians	Rationale

- **System ISE work that is “Inextricable” from Weapon Systems Integration.....**
 - Cooperative Engagement Capability – 64
 - Integrates detection information across Battle Group
 - Switchboards – 29
 - Physical connection between detect-control-engage equipment
 - SIAP - 1
 - BG T&E - 2
 - BFTT - 0
 - NTCSS - 0

SUMMARY of PHD at NBVC

Scenario	Civilians in Scope	Civilians Inextricable & Other
China Lake TECH 0002A	134	291
C4ISE-SPAWAR TECH 0008B	6	96
Total	140	387

- 527 total civilians involved in NBVC related recommendations
 - 387 “Inextricable” and “Other” located at NSWC PHD because of physical and functional integrated requirement



Naval Base Ventura County

Overview


Presented to BRAC Commission Staff

10 June 2005

Naval Base Ventura County



***“A Major Aviation Shore Command
and Naval Construction Force
Mobilization Base”***




NBVC Mission

- Provide:

- Airfield
- Seaport
- Base Support Services



- For:

- Fleet Operating Forces
- RDT&E missions
- Naval Training Centers
- Reserve Activities



NBVC Point Mugu



- Home of the Pacific Fleet Hawkeyes
- Aviation Operations
- Two Runways
 - Carrier Landing Boxes



- Sea Test Range
- Weapons Testing
- RDT&E Facilities

NBVC Port Hueneheme

- Home of Pacific Seabees
- Deep Water Port
- Joint Mobilization Site



- CNET Schools
- Multi Service Support
- RD&E Facilities

Major NBVC Tenants

Four Operational Wings

Fleet Operational Commands

 **Airborne Early Warning Wing Pacific**

 **31st Naval Construction Regiment**

• **Test and Evaluation** • **Other Missions**

 **Naval Air Warfare Center**

 **Naval Surface Warfare Center**

 **Naval Facilities**

Engineering Service Center

 **Naval Construction Battalion Center**

 **Naval Satellite Operations Center**

 **Navy Education and Training Centers**

 **Reserve Squadrons / Centers**

 **California Air National Guard**


Naval Air Systems Command

Weapons Division

China Lake
Point Mugu

Aircraft Division


Lakehurst
Patuxent River
Orlando



Depots

Cherry Point
Jacksonville
North Island

NAAWC Weapons Division



Navy's premier test & evaluation center for Weapons

Electronic Warfare

Iraqi Freedom


- EA-6B escorted most strike groups
- Answered more than 100 fleet requests for EW data
- New ELINT files for HARM missiles on the EA-6B and F/A-18






Enduring Freedom

- Provided round-the-clock threat database support
- EWDS laboratory answered over 11,000 email inquiries
- EA-6B team developed ETIRMS and PFPS
- Integrated Mongoose countermeasure pod on AH-1W SuperCobra

NAWCWD Ranges



Threat/Target Systems



Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneheme Division

NAVSEA

PORT HUENEME

Surface Warfare Center Division



**AEGIS Combat
Systems**



Ship Missile Systems



Underway Replenishment



In-Service Engineering



Missile Launching Systems

PHD NSWC Product Areas

■ SHIPS AND SHIP SYSTEMS

- Signature and Silencing Programs
- Vulnerability and Survivability Systems
- **Machinery Systems and Components**
- Hull Forms and Propulsion
- Structures and Materials
- Environmental Quality Systems

■ SURFACE SHIP COMBAT SYSTEMS

- Air and Surface Surveillance and Detection Systems
- Combat Control Systems
- Engagement Systems
- Electronic Warfare Systems
- Theater Air Defense Systems

■ LITTORAL WARFARE SYSTEMS

- Mine Countermeasures and Clearance Systems
- Amphibious Warfare Systems
- Special Warfare Systems
- Diving Systems

■ NAVY STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS

- Targeting, Navigation, Fire Control, Missile and Launcher Subsystems

■ ORDNANCE

- Mines, Warheads, Rockets, and Ammunition
- Energetic Chemicals, Pyrotechnics, Propellants, and Explosives
- Explosive Safety Standards and Ordnance Environmental Protection00

Combat Systems

Surface Search Radar Gun Fire Control Radar

Fire Control Radar

Vertical Launching System

Command & Decision System

CIWS System

AEGIS Spy Radar

Tomahawk/
Standard
Missile


Gun System

Harpoon
Weapon
System



Proximity to Sea Range

- Proximity to Navy's Largest, Best Instrumented Sea Test Range Enhances Use of Self Defense Test Ship
- Surface Warfare Engineering Facility (SWEF) in Line-of-Sight with NAWC Electronic Warfare Laboratory







Naval Base Ventura County

CAPT Paul Grossgold
07 July 2005



Naval Base Ventura County



“We are a base team dedicated to providing the highest level of support and quality of service for all operating forces and tenants at Naval Base Ventura County”



Naval Base Ventura County

- Navy's only deep water port between San Diego and Puget Sound
- Unencroached coastal Air Field
- Navy's West Coast Sea Test Range
- Supports multiple DOD missions
 - Basing and training of active and reserve forces
 - Air and ship weapons and systems development and testing
 - Multi-service mobilization



CBC Port Hueneeme

Home of the Pacific Seabees

Supports Mobilization, Test and Evaluation-
and In-Service Engineering Missions

3 Navy, 1 Joint Use and

2 Commercial Wharves

Railway Accessible



NAS Point Mugu

Home of the West Coast Hawkeye's

Integral to Sea Test Range

11,000-ft Main Runway

Unencroached





San Nicolas Island

Transferred to NBVC 1 Oct 2004

Integral to Sea Test Range

10,000 ft Main Runway, C-5/141 Capable

Unencroached (AIR/Sea)



Mobilization Infrastructure



Railhead



Laydown



Air Field



Deep Water Port



Transient
Berthing/Messing

Warehousing



Navy Region Southwest in Ventura County



**Naval Base
Ventura County
\$1.7B Salaries**

***Largest single employer
in Ventura County !***

• NAS Fallon

• Naval Post Graduate School
• NAS Lemoore

• NAS China Lake

• Port Hueneheme
• Point Mugu

• NSWC Corona
• NWS Seal Beach

• NB Coronado
• NB San Diego
• NB Point Loma

• NAF EICentro



Navy Region Southwest Ventura County

• NAS Fallon

• Naval Post Graduate School
• NAS Lemoore

• NAS China Lake

• Port Hueneme
• Point Mugu

• NSWC Corona
• NWS Seal Beach

• NB Coronado
• NB San Diego
• NB Point Loma

• NAF El Centro

Tenants	104
Personnel	17,000
Acres	19,475
Facilities SQ FT	10.1M
Miles of RR	16
Family Housing	1783
BOH/BEQ	3200



Major Missions

- Fleet Operational Commands
 - Airborne Early Warning Wing Pacific
 - 31st Seabee Readiness Group

• RDT&E - ISE

- Naval Air Warfare Center
-  Naval Surface Warfare Center
-  Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center

• Others


-  Naval Facilities Expeditionary Logistics Center
-  Naval Satellite Operations Center
-  Navy Education and Training Centers
-  Reserve Squadrons / Centers
California Air National Guard

Commander Airborne Early Warning Wing U.S. Pacific Fleet



- Headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Fleet E-2C Hawkeye community
- Weapons Tactics Unit
- 5 E-2C Squadrons (4 at NBVC, 1 in Japan)
- AIMD/ Sea OPDET
- 1 C-2 Squadron at NAS North Island San Diego
- Simulators

Home of the Pacific Seabees



SEABEES

"We Build, We Fight"

- 31st Seabee Readiness Group
- 4 Naval Mobile Construction Battalions
- 1 Naval Under Water Construction Team
- Homeport Training
- Construction Equipment Depot

Weapons Division


Total-Combat-System
Operational Flight Programs

Electronic and
Information Warfare

RDT&E

Systems Test and Evaluation (T&E)

Avionics Hardware



Navy's premier test & evaluation center for Weapons

NAVSEA

PORT HUENEME

Surface Warfare Center Division

Port Hueneeme Division Naval Surface Warfare Center

Keeping America's Navy #1 in the World!



**Center of Excellence
Unique R&D, Test, and
Training Capability**




**Range T&E Asset
Problem Replication and
Resolution Battle Spares**



**Deep Water Port
Ship Grooms
Adjacent to Test Range**



**At Sea T&E, Training
Live Fire Testing**



**Shared
Facilities**

Mission: Provide Test and Evaluation, In-Service Engineering, and Integrated Logistics Support for surface warfare combat systems and subsystems, unique equipments, and related expendable ordnance.

Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center

Ocean Facilities

Environmental Technology



Shore Facilities

Energy and
Utilities

Expedient Logistics

The Navy's Center for Specialized Facilities Technology



Naval Facilities Expeditionary Logistics Center



Providing:

- Life Cycle Management of the Naval Construction Force (NCF) and other Expeditionary units Table of Allowance.
- Communication and Information Technology development in support of the NCF and NBG.
- Sealift Support development and products.
- Development of training curriculums in military skills and construction for the NCF and NBG.
- Management of Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel and Stock for the NCF, including MPF assets.
- Primary procurement of the Navy's tactical vehicle and construction equipment fleets.
- Mobile Utilities Support Equipment (MUSE)
- Information Technology support to the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC).

Naval Satellite Operations Center

NAVSOC Satellites Supported



FEP




FLTSAT


SATELLITE	CONTACTS #	MISSION	PER DAY
Ultra HF Follow on	10	UHF-EHF Communications	254
Fleet Satellites	3	UHF Communications	59
Fleet EHF	2	EHF Communications	40
POLAR	1	EHF Communications	18
Navy Ionosphere Monitoring	6	Research	18
Geodetic Follow on	1	Radar Altimetry	10
	<u>23</u>		<u>399</u>



UFO



NIMS





POLARSAT



GFO

Naval Education and Training

- Center for Seabees and Facilities Engineering
 - Civil Engineer Corps Officer School (CECOS)
 - Naval Construction Training Center (NCTC)
- Engineering Duty Officer (EDO) School
- Naval Facilities Acquisition Training Center (NFACT)



Reserve Squadrons / Centers

- NAVAL AIR RESERVES POINT MUGU

- VP-65 P-3


- VR-55 C130

- RESERVE UNITS PORT HUENEME

- Naval Reserve Center


- Marine Reserve

- 1st Naval Construction Regiment



1st Naval Reserve Force

Shaping the Naval Reserve of the 21st Century



California Air National Guard – 146th Airlift Wing



RE



Value to National Defense

Unique Range Capabilities

- Encroachment Free

Full Mobilization capabilities

- Synergy Among Fleet, SYCOMS and Active and Reserve

Expeditionary Operational Forces

- Operating Forced and Training Commands

- Outstanding Community Relationships



BRAC Realignment

Scenario Number **Title**

DON-161B

Close NSA Corona

Action Description: Relocate Naval Surface Warfare Center Corona Division to Naval Base Ventura County, NAS, Point Mugu

Affected Buildings: PM36, PM3008, PM3015, PM512
PM761, PM7020

Gap: Solution as proposed and certified will not meet MS Lab requirements. Proposed solution is to provide new construction for MS Lab instead of renovating PM761 and PM7020, which we believe will be more cost effective.

BRAC Realignment

<u>Scenario Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
TECH 18 (2B)	Create Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments RDAT&E Center

Action Description: Relocate all NAWC WD, Point Mugu Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition and Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) to China Lake

Affected Buildings: PM36, PM3008, PM3015, PM761, PM7020
PM512, PM372, PM520 thru PM528, PM335,
PM356, PM351, CA240, CA244, CA246,
CA248



BRAC Realignment

Scenario Number Title

TECH 54

Navy Sensors Electronic Warfare
and Electronics RDAT&E

Action Description: Relocate NAWC WD, Point Mugu Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) to China Lake

Affected Buildings: PM36, PM3008, PM3009, PM3015



BRAC Realignment

<u>Scenario Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
TECH 18 (2A)	Create Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments RDATE&E Center

Action Description: Relocate all PHD NSWC Weapons And Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition And Test & Evaluation to China Lake

Affected Buildings: PM36, PM3008, PM3009, PM3015



BRAC Realignment

<u>Scenario Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
IND-101A	Establish Fleet Readiness Centers

Action Description: Realign AEWING Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) by transferring all Intermediate maintenance workload capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Point Mugu

Affected Buildings: None – Change of name/designation



BRAC Realignment

<u>Scenario Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
(Other than Navy)	Realign Reno-Tahoe International Airport Air Guard Station, Nevada

Action Description: Aviation related Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) moves to Channel Islands Air National Guard Station

Affected Buildings: NBVC Facilities not affected

Bldg 356

- Missile Prep
- Bldg/Communication
- Maintenance Shop

Hangar 351

- Aircraft Sys Integration/Missile Lab

CAMARILLO AIRPORT BLDGS

- Bldg: 240 Navy Ranges Targets
- Bldgs: 244 246 248 Fleet
- Weapons Engineering

Hangar 3009

- Aircraft Systems Missile
- Support Equip Lab

Hangar 372

- VX-30 Aircraft
- Maintenance

Bldg 335

- Missile Prep/Guided
- Missile Lab

Bldg 3008

- Electronic Warfare
- Systems Lab

Bldgs 520-528

- Missile Test Facilities

Bldg 36

- Admin

Bldg 512

- Component
- Test/Optics

Bldg 3015

- Missile Systems
- Evaluation Lab

BRAC

**NAWC WD to
China Lake**

Legend

- Red = NAWC WD to China Lake
- Green = NAWC WD remains in portion of bldg

Bldg 7020

- Weapons
- Systems
- Support Lab

Bldg 761

- Combined Research Lab
- Missile Integration

Bldg 3008

- Joint Warfare Assessment Lab
- Quality Assurance Lab

Construct

- Measurement Science Lab

Bldg 36

- Admin
- NAWC WD Admin

Bldg 512

- Storage


Bldg 3015

- Joint Warfare Assessment Lab
- NAWC WD Missile Systems Evaluation Lab

**BRAC
NSWC Corona
to Point Mugu**

Legend

- Blue = Corona Relocation
- Green = NAWC WD remains in portion of bldg
- Purple = Potential BRAC CON



Bldg 1388
• Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E


Bldg 1380
• Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E

Bldg 5
• Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E

Bldg 1387
• Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E

BRAC
NSWC Port Hueneme
Division to China Lake

Legend
Green = NSWC PHD remains in bldgs
Red = NSWC PHD to China Lake





Proposed Wording of TECH18

- Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA by relocating specific Weapons and Armament RDATE to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA. Weapons in service engineering, missile hardware in the loop labs, weapons sustainment support, and air-launched weapons installed system test and evaluation engineering will be realigned.
- Specifically excluded are all personnel and equipment from range, targets, test squadron, test article preparation including Ready Missile Test Facility, radar reflectivity anechoic chambers, and system test engineering of naval surface combatants and space systems.
- Production personnel will be realigned with the supported function. General and administrative personnel supporting both China Lake and Point Mugu sites will be excluded.

ELTON GALLEGLY

24TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0524

August 22, 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

I want to thank you for speaking with me briefly this week regarding my concerns with the DoD recommendations at Naval Base Ventura County. I am sorry to be contacting you at this late date, but I believe the Technical Joint Cross Services Group continues to provide you false and misleading information which I feel compelled to counter. The information below is true and accurate to the best of my beliefs.

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The Honorable Anthony Principi, Chairman
August 22, 2005
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The above are the most egregious examples of what I consider to be improper and unprofessional processes conducted by the TJCSG. Based on the serious nature of these flawed processes and their negative effect on NBVC and to our men and women currently serving overseas, I strongly recommend that you and your fellow Commissioners vote to reject DoD's recommendations to realign NBVC functions to China Lake.

Sincerely,



ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

EG:bm

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August 22, 2005

The Honorable James H. Bilbray
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner Bilbray

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- HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
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The Honorable James H. Bilbray, Commissioner
August 22, 2005
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
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ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

EG:bm



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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0524

August 22, 2005

The Honorable Phillip Coyle
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner Coyle:

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The Honorable Phillip Coyle, Commissioner
August 22, 2005
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ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

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Congress of the United States
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August 22, 2005

General James T. Hill, USA (Ret.)
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

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General James T. Hill, USA (Ret.), Commissioner
August 22, 2005
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Member of Congress

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Congress of the United States
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August 22, 2005

The Honorable James V. Hansen
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

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The Honorable James V. Hansen, Commissioner
August 22, 2005
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
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ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

EG:bm


Jim
Thank you

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Congress of the United States
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August 22, 2005

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Admiral Gehman:

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Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. USN (Ret.), Commissioner
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ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

EG:bm

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August 22, 2005

General Lloyd W. Newton, USAF (Ret.)
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear General Newton:

First, I would like to thank you and your fellow Commissioners for your unselfish service to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission and to our country. I am sorry to be contacting you at this late date, but the Technical Joint Cross Services Group continues to provide you false and misleading information which I feel compelled to counter. The information below is true and accurate to the best of my beliefs.

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SUBCOMMITTEES:

- CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
- EUROPE

JUDICIARY

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HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

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- TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY

General Lloyd W. Newton, USAF (Ret.), Commissioner
August 22, 2005
Page two

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Sincerely,


ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

EG:bm

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24TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA
www.house.gov/gallegly/

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SOLVANG, CA 93463
(800) 423-0023
(805) 686-2525

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0524

August 22, 2005

The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Secretary Skinner:

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
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August 22, 2005

Brigadier General Sue E. Turner, USAF (Ret.)
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

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Brigadier General Sue E. Turner, Commissioner
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ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

EG:bm



Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Gilmer, Bradford NAVAIR [bradford.gilmer@navy.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2005 9:34 AM
To: lester.farrington@wso.WHS.mil; david.epstein@wso.whs.mil
Subject: Data Response
Attachments: SEA RANGE FUNCTIONS rev 081205.ppt

Les and David:

We understand that the numbers that were certified in response to your data call on the minimum personnel to operate the sea range have yet to be sent to you. The following are the numbers that were certified:

Number of Civilian Personnel:

Sea Range Daily Operations	245 FTE
Range Control	175 FTE
Equipment Maintenance	198 FTE
Targets	262 FTE
Total	880 FTE

The data is consistent with the information we gave you on your visit. A breakdown of the numbers is included here:

<<SEA RANGE FUNCTIONS rev 081205.ppt>>

Please note that these include 32 civilians in the test squadron. Military personnel would also need to remain at Point Mugu (214 range support aircraft, 28 range radar controllers).

Bradford R. Gilmer

Deputy Director for Test and Evaluation

BRAC Certifier

(805) 989-8445

8/23/2005

Sea Range Personnel

Category	Function	FTE	NAVAIR certified TECH 02B - JAN 05	Additional Comments
Range	357 institutional and Direct Product Acct 60 Burdened, reimbursable	417	316 W&A reported – Q47 (3) requested exemption	101 non-W&A not considered in scenario
Targets	120 Institutional and Direct Product Acct 69 Burdened, reimbursable	189	189 W&A reported – Q47(3) requested exemption	
Target Logistics	Inventory control, parts tracking, and data management of targets	24	24 reported – Q47 (5) requested exemption	
RCS Chamber	Measure target RCS for sea range customers	14	14 reported – Q47 (4) requested exemption	Chambers not included in MILCON
Missile Test Prep	Modify live missiles to be instrumented for sea range ops	14	0	Non-W&A, not considered in scenario
Range support aircraft	Daily operations on sea range for safety, telemetry relay, command destruct signals	32	32 reported	Resulted in significant inefficiencies to move aircraft daily to Point Mugu
Test engineering not in W&A	Plan, conduct, and analyze tests on sea range (support to space systems, MDA, fleet training, homeland defense, etc)	47	0	Non-W&A, not considered in scenario
Indirect Support	Ordering, receiving of supplies, security, personnel support, business and financial operations, and environmental support	143	143 reported – Q47 (6) requested exemption	

Threat Simulation Overview

- **FUNCTION**
 - **DoD Project Reliance Lead** for the complete Life-Cycle support (RDAT&E), technical development, acquisition, demonstration and operational use of Airborne Electronic Attack and Threat Radar Transmission Simulators.
 - Provide the NAVAIR Enterprise and tri-services with an integrated representation of air-land and seaborne threats (i.e. Radar cross-section, RF emitters, Electronic Attack) to include **all target vehicles** and their associated electronic payloads.
 - As Navy's lead activity provides a complete **turnkey program** to ensure that US Weapon Systems are tested and operators are trained in a complete, high fidelity RF environment.
 - Support Fleet / Joint Force /FMS **pre-deployment** preparations
 - CSSQTs
 - Fleet Exercises
 - Fleet Experiments

Threat Simulation Overview

- **CAPABILITY**
 - **Singular site** for the definition, development, integration and employment of electronic simulators into all platforms, including aerial and seaborne targets (manned/unmanned) as well as land based, laboratory and littoral environments.
 - Complete inventory of **high fidelity**, validated simulations of Threat EA and Radar systems.
 - Development, production support and employment of airborne electronics
 - AN/AST-5 Range Control Pod
 - Range Aircraft Integration
 - Flight Certification

Threat Simulation Overview

- **ADVANTAGES OF CURRENT LOCATION**

- Access to the **ocean / littoral environment** required for the development, demonstration and operation of specific over water/low altitude countermeasures techniques (San Nicholas Island, Laguna Peak)
- Co-Location with **Aerial/Seaborne Targets Engineering** required for payload integration and demonstration
- Local access to NSWCPHD Surface Warfare Evaluation Facility (**SWEF**), Self Defense Test Ship (**SDTS**), **Fleet Units** significantly enhances efficiency
- Co-Location with the **Tactical Electronic Attack** community provides synergy in developmental technology.
- Pt. Mugu is the singular location where all all of these vehicles/environments are available.


Threat Simulation Overview

Implementation Planning Challenges


- Geographic dislocation between threat/targets and primary operating range
 - impact on operational scheduling, resource allocation, cost, range integration & personnel support of missions.
 - Lack of a local littoral environment impacts on ability to develop and test systems used in operational support to the Navy.
 - Potential loss of core personnel/expertise

Threat Simulation Overview

Threat Simulators Airborne Application / Vehicle Integration



ALQ-167 Airborne EA



AST-6 Radar Simulator




Electronic Target Simulator




ULQ-21 Installed in
BQM-34S Drone



AST-9 Radar
Simulator




ULQ-21 EA System



Harpoon Seeker Installed
in BQM-34S Drone

Threat Simulation Overview

Threat Simulators Littoral Environment / Fleet Interaction



At Sea
Fleet Support

CVN Under Test

Threat Simulator
Upload

DDG-92 Under Test





DDG-92

Fleet
Exercise

Threat Simulation Overview

Threat Simulators

Range Support/ Ground based / Laboratory Applications



Threat Simulation Overview

Electronic Attack & Threat Radar Simulation Mission Summary (FY-04 through May, 2005)

Mission Category	Number of Missions
Test and Evaluation Operations	467
Training Operations	347
Grand Total	814

Threat Simulation Overview

Airborne Treat Simulation / Vehicle Efficiencies

- Local facilities/expertise for integration/modification of aerial vehicles to meet the evolving threat capabilities.
- Local access to Seaborne vehicles facilities and unique expertise (Naval Architecture) for integration/operation in the littoral/open ocean environments.
- Littoral / Blue Water environment for experimentation, development, demonstration and operational use of sea-skimming countermeasures techniques and radar simulations

Threat Simulation Overview

Local Interaction Efficiencies

- Co-Located with the Radar Cross Section Laboratory
- Adjoining NAVSEA Facilities
 - Surface Warfare Evaluation Facility
 - Self Defense Test Ship
- Easy access to Fleet Units
 - “No-cost” experimentation



Threat Simulation Overview

Summary

- The Threat Simulation capability at NAWCWD Point Mugu is the singular source of Airborne Threat Simulators throughout DoD.
 - Electronic Attack (Jammers)
 - Active Emitter (Threat Radars, Aircraft & Missiles)
 - Airborne Support Electronics (AST-5, ...)
- Threat Simulation efficiencies are maintained in the current location:
 - Synergy with the vehicle developers and operators
 - Ready access to the littoral / Blue Water environment
 - Ready access to NSWCPHD assets and Fleet units
- This capability is a core component of Navy and DoD readiness.

**Commission Briefing
BRAC 2005**

Radar Reflectivity Laboratory

Don Hilliard



805-989-9370

donald.p.hilliard@navy.mil

RADAR REFLECTIVITY LABORATORY

- **Why is the Radar Reflectivity Laboratory at Point Mugu?**
 - **Targets Operations** is the principle reason for having the Radar Reflectivity Laboratory (RRL) at Point Mugu
 - The RRL provides critical Monostatic and Bistatic Radar Cross Section (**RCS**) measurements of targets that accurately replicate threat systems in flight on the Sea Range
 - **Over 50%** of the RRL work supports the **Point Mugu Targets Department**

**RCS Analysis of BQM-74 Target
Ensuring Proper Radar Signature
Prior to Sea Range Operational Flight**



RADAR REFLECTIVITY LABORATORY


- **FUNCTION**

- Characterize Monostatic and Bistatic Radar Cross Sections (**RCS**) of U.S. and Foreign weapon systems and surrogate Threat Targets.

- **CAPABILITY**

- Highly secure indoor TS/SAR Facilities
- **Bistatic Anechoic Chamber**
 - Size: 150' (W) x 150' (L) x 60' (H)
 - Frequency ranges: 100 MHz to 100 GHz
 - Full Bistatic Angular Coverage: 0 – 180 degrees (Horz.), 0 – 90 degrees (Vertical)
 - *No other facility like this in DOD or private industry*
- **Large Monostatic Anechoic Chamber**
 - Size: 40' (W) x 100' (L) x 40' (H)
 - Frequency Range: 800 Mhz to 100GHz
- **Monostatic Anechoic Chamber**
 - Size: 27' (W) x 57' (L) x 17' (H)
 - Frequency Range: 1 – 100 GHz

***Over 76,000 square feet
of facility space***



Bistatic Anechoic Chamber



**Large Monostatic
Anechoic Chamber**

RADAR REFLECTIVITY LABORATORY

- **SIGNIFICANT ISSUES**

- Unique ***DOD national assets*** and ***highly specialized expertise*** in RCS RDAT&E
- Broad Customer base: **Tri-services**, Private Industry, Foreign Countries
- DOD Programs cannot cope with significant downtime in RCS testing
 - RCS testing and analysis for customer requirements is **constant all year round** with about **110+ DOD Programs supported** annually
- Close proximity to related laboratories, Test Ranges, Target Systems and Local Weapon Developers.
 - Synergy and operational efficiency provided by co-location with Target Systems Department and Sea Test Range at Point Mugu in support of DT and OT missions
- The high precision RCS test equipment in the anechoic chambers requires mild temperatures to function

RADAR REFLECTIVITY LABORATORY




- **MAJOR DOD PROGRAMS IMPACTED BY MOVE**
 - **National Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense**
 - Characterize Actual Threats and Develop **Target Systems** with Accurate Radar Signature for DT and OT Flight Testing on **Sea Range**
 - **Navy stealth ship development**
 - DDX
 - Current DDG's
 - Littoral Combatant's
 - **Stealth Air Platforms**
 - Joint Strike Fighter, F-22, others
 - Combat UAV
 - **Network Centric Warfare/C4IR/Intelligence**
 - Threat Signature Characterization
 - **Advanced Weapons**
 - JSOW and others
 - **Home Land Defense**
 - Special Projects

RADAR REFLECTIVITY LABORATORY


- **EXAMPLE CUSTOMERS**
 - **Targets Department**
 - Target systems are RCS tested and analyzed prior to launch on **Sea Range**
 - **Missile Defense Agency**
 - MDA depends heavily on Point Mugu RCS Laboratory for characterizing the radar signature of **ballistic missile threats** and high-value **ballistic surrogate targets** that accurately emulate these threats in developmental and operational testing on national test ranges.
 - **Navy**
 - **Cruise Missile Defense** programs depend on Point Mugu RCS Lab for same type of function as MDA applied to cruise missile threats
 - **Stealth Weapons (e.g. JSOW)**
 - **Stealth Ships** (DDX, LPD-17, Littoral Combatant)
 - **Air Force**
 - **JSF, F-22, F-117, AMRAAM**
 - **Intelligence Agencies**
 - **Threat Characterization**
 - **Home Land Defense**
 - **Counter Terrorism**

RADAR REFLECTIVITY LABORATORY

RCS Testing of Targets Prior to Sea Range Operations is the Major Function of the RRL (>50% of the Work)



*RRL Ensures that Target RCS Properly Emulates the
Threat Prior to Sea Range Tests*



BQM-34 Target


Reduced RCS
BQM-34 Target

AQM-37
Increased
RCS Target



Reduced RCS
BQM-74 Target
(Kit-II)

RADAR REFLECTIVITY LABORATORY

RCS testing and analysis of Vindicator UAV used as a target against the Aegis Combat System on the Point Mugu Sea Range



UNCLASSIFIED



RADAR REFLECTIVITY LABORATORY

JSOW Stealth Missile




Ballistic Missile Target for
THAAD Flight Test



Global Hawk UAV
Antenna Testing




Ultra-Light Aircraft / Counter Terror



RADAR REFLECTIVITY LABORATORY

Littoral Combatant Gun System





Navy Stealth Ship Developments


LPD-17 SPQ-9B Stealth Antenna



DDX Stealth
Phased Array
Antenna







VX-30 Sea Range Support Aircraft

CDR Thomas Bourbeau

Commanding Officer



Air Test and Evaluation Squadron THREE ZERO

BRAC Relocation Introduction

- **BRAC Proposal to Re-Align Weapons and Armament from Pt Mugu to China Lake Lake**
 - Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 30 (VX-30), also referred to as “Weapons Test Squadron” in BRAC data, was included in the relocation of Weapons and Armament.
 - VX-30 does not test Weapons or Armament. The squadron provides airborne support to the Sea Range in it’s support to a multitude of Navy, DoD and FMS testing and Navy/Marine Corps Fleet training.
- **VX-30 (Weapons Test Squadron) Aircraft Alignment Analysis**
 - VX-30 aircraft are mission aligned with the Sea Test Range and Targets Support (86%)
 - VX-30 provides minimal support of China Lake Land Test Range – 1% of sorties for “Big Wing Aircraft (P-3 & C-130)
- **Economic Analysis**
 - Non-recurring start up costs (Hangar/Ramp MILCON & Relocation costs): ~\$28.3M
 - Recurring annual costs (Mainly additional Transit/Detachment costs): ~\$6.8M per year


Background

- In 1995, all NAVAIR Range and Target Support aircraft at the Point Mugu site were consolidated as VX-30
- Primary mission areas for VX-30 aircraft:
 - (3) NP-3D Range support aircraft (Airborne range instrumentation/optics)
 - (2) DC-130 Range support aircraft (Airborne drone launch and Sea Test Range logistics support)
 - (6) F/A-18 Range tactical support aircraft with RDT&E & Fleet training missions




Range Geography

- Point Mugu and China Lake geographically separated by 150 miles by plane, 190 miles by car
- Approximately 40 minutes transit each way from China Lake to the Sea Test Range for NP-3D and DC-130 aircraft, 25 min transit for FA-18 aircraft
- Non-direct route of flight required to avoid high volume Los Angeles Air Traffic Area



Integrated Range Support Concept




Range Support Aircraft Sorties

P-3 / C-130

FY03- FY05

(Data through June 05)



* Off Range Operations are conducted in various over-water locations, worldwide



VX-30 Aircraft Alignment Analysis

Military Value

- **Range Support Aircraft at the Point Mugu site:**
 - Essential for Sea Test Range Operations
 - Provide co-located aircraft mission support for DoD, MDA, FMS and other DoD related customers on the Sea Test Range
 - **Telemetry receipt, display, recording and relay**
 - **Photometric receipt, display, recording and relay**
 - **Range safety, surveillance and clearance**
 - **Flight monitoring and commanded destruct systems**
 - **Airborne launch of subscale drones as targets for other systems under test**
 - **Tactical safety/photo chase and high speed targets**
 - **Logistics (Cargo) to/from San Nicolas Island and the mainland**
 - Military Value Customers include sea-based weapon systems (Aegis equipped ships, Trident missiles, Tomahawk, etc), air-based weapon systems (Sidewinder, AMRAAM, SLAM-ER, etc), and space-based systems testing (MDA systems)

VX-30 Aircraft Alignment Analysis Implementation Plan

- **Increased Military infrastructure, not a reduction of facilities**
 - Hanger and ramp facilities require MILCON at China Lake
- **Additional transit time & transit costs to missions**
 - **825 (86%)** of Sorties located on **Sea Test Range at Point Mugu**
 - **121 (13%)** of Sorties supported customers **Off-Range worldwide**
 - **13 (1%)** of Sorties located on **Land Range at China Lake**
- **Challenges in providing Sea Test Range support**
 - Geographic separation from the Sea Test Range hinders communications for mission coordination, planning, briefing, and de-briefing
 - Increased transit and stop-over time at Pt Mugu to load and maintain range equipment and pick up range equipment operators (for many missions)
- **Test Operation completion risk**
 - Increased mission support complexity - greater risk of aircraft breaking down because of required interim stop at Pt Mugu site to pick up targets, project specific equipment, personnel, and range specific equipment for many range operations


Summary

Proposed Relocation of VX-30 from Point Mugu to China Lake

- **VX-30 Aircraft Mission Alignment Analysis**
 - Mission of VX-30 aircraft is aligned with Sea Test Range and Targets at Pt Mugu, not with Weapons and Armament testing at China Lake Land Range
 - Mission success complexity challenges:
 - Additional flights required for many missions (stopover at Pt. Mugu)
 - Geographic separation from the Sea Test Range complicates mission coordination, planning, briefing and execution
- **Economic Analysis**
 - Additional MILCON & re-location costs **~\$28.3M**
 - New aircraft hanger and ramp required to be built at China Lake
 - Additional Recurring costs **~\$6.8M per year**
 - Cost for additional aircraft transit time and required detachment travel

VX-30 Range Support Missions


Highly Modified Range Support Aircraft



Range Support Equipment Layout


Long Range Missile Testing Support

HYPER-X




Tactical Weapon Testing Support


JSOW




Air-Launch Test Mission Support




Surface-launch Test Mission Support



Fleet Training Mission Support




Range Support Aircraft: Mission Requirements



- **Primary Customers**
 - TOMAHAWK
 - AIM-9X
 - Titan II/IV
 - AEGIS BMD
 - MDA
 - NASA
 - Trident
 - Fleet Support
 - Numerous FMS
- **Ranges/Facilities**
 - Sea Test Range
 - Land Ranges at CL and Edwards AFB
 - SPAWAR (San Diego)
 - Vandenberg AFB
 - Reagan Test Site (Kwajalein)
 - PMRF (Barking Sands)
 - All Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic Ocean areas
- **Types of Tests**
 - Air to Air
 - Air to Surface
 - Surface to Air
 - Surface to Surface
 - Ballistic Launch, Intercept and Re-entry


Missile Defense Testing Support

**MDA
KODIAK LAUNCHES**



NASA Launch Support

VANDENBERG




**CAST
GLANCE
OPTICAL
COVERAGE**

**CRITICAL STAGING EVENTS
APPROXIMATELY 1,300 NMI
SSW OF VANDENBERG**


**MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL
SATELLIGHT LAUNCHES**

Tomahawk Missile Testing Support

TOMAHAWK




Trident Testing Support



Strategic Weapon Testing Support

PEACEKEEPER



Aircraft Alignment and Economic Analysis Data

Economic Analysis (based on COBRA data)

- **Non-Recurring Costs ~ \$28.3M Additional Cost**
 - Costs for re-location of personnel, aircraft and associated equipment (\$5.6M)
 - Costs for MILCON of a new (P-3/C-130) hangar to replicate existing hangar (\$16.3M)
 - Costs for MILCON of a new (P-3/C-130) ramp area to replicate existing ramp area (\$6.4M)
- **Recurring annual increased cost of operations ~ 6.8M per year Additional Cost**
 - Costs for additional transit time (P-3) to Sea Test Range from CL site (\$4.5M)
 - Costs for additional transit time (C-130) to Sea Test Range from CL site (\$2.4M)
 - Costs for required detachments at PM site from CL to support PM site operations (\$.33M)
 - Approximate savings - lower wage rate at CL site (civilians & contractors) (\$0.43M)
- **Summary:**
 - Relocating the VX-30 Range Support Aircraft from existing hangar and ramp facilities at the Pt Mugu site does not create any meaningful consolidation efficiencies, and generates a significant net cost increase, both initial and recurring.

Detailed ROI Data-Non Recurring Costs

- **MILCON costs**
 - Hangar - 53,536 sq ft = \$10.39M to \$16.25M (Cobra)
 - Ramp – 68,639 sq yd = \$3.33M to \$6.38M(Cobra)
- **Relocation costs: movement of aircraft & personnel**
 - Transit aircraft, equipment and materials = \$0.38M
 - Move personnel (194 military and 17 civilian persons) = \$3.24M
 - Move 55 contractor maintenance personnel excluded = \$0.00M
- **Labor costs: labor involved in executing re-location**
 - Military lost mission time costs = \$1.28M
 - Civilian lost mission time costs = \$ 0.17M
 - Contractor lost mission time costs = \$ 0.55M

Detailed ROI data-Recurring Costs

Increased distance to Sea Test Range Op Area adds transit costs

- Annual cost increase to Range customers = \$ 6.9M per year (BRAC scenario data)

- **Increased flight hours and takeoff/landings increase fatigue life costs**

- Additional takeoffs & landings = approximately 400 per year

- 880 added flight hours per year - uses up airframe quicker

- Increased complexity for support adds risk to customer

- Additional takeoffs & landings (at PM site) increase risk to mission completion

- **Very minimal labor savings due to consolidation/location pay**

- No military savings for P-3/C-130: military personnel are also minimum aircrew

- No contractor maintenance savings: already at minimum staffing for 5 aircraft

- 55 contract maintainers maintain 5 VX-30 “Big Wing Aircraft” (P-3 & C-130)

- 150 – 175 active duty Sailors maintain 4 Fleet Squadron aircraft (E-2 or EA-6B)

- 212 – 225 active duty Sailors maintain 9 Fleet Squadron aircraft (P-3C) (Ratio 118 –125 for 5 P-3C aircraft)

- No additional civil service savings: Civilian manning tied to Range Support Aircraft minimum required for Range Support Aircraft operations

- Very small labor rate delta = \$ 0.43M per year savings based upon 10% lower wage costs for contractors and civilians

Range Support Aircraft Flight Hour and Sortie Summary Data

Range Support Breakdown By Location FY-03-FY05


	P-3				C-130				P-3/C-130 Combined			
	Hours	% hrs	Sorties	% sorties	Hours	% hrs	Sorties	% sorties	Hours	% hrs	Sorties	% sorties
FY03 Sea Range	630.7	73%	155	79%	79.3	43%	116	89%	710.0	67%	271	83%
FY03 Off Range	206.9	24%	34	17%	99.9	54%	13	10%	306.8	29%	47	14%
FY03 Land Range	31.0	4%	6	3%	6.0	3%	2	2%	37.0	4%	8	2%
FY03 Total	868.6	100%	195	100%	185.2	100%	131	100%	1053.8	100%	326	100%
FY04 Sea Range	925.7	78%	239	84%	224.2	93%	180	97%	1149.9	81%	419	90%
FY04 Off Range	252.3	21%	42	15%	10.7	4%	3	2%	263.0	18%	45	10%
FY04 Land Range	8.8	1%	2	1%	6.2	3%	2	1%	15.0	1%	4	1%
FY04 Total	1186.8	100%	283	100%	241.1	100%	185	100%	1427.9	100%	468	100%
FY05 Sea Range	340.9	68%	83	76%	83.6	88%	52	93%	424.5	72%	135	82%
FY05 Off Range	156.8	32%	26	24%	8.1	9%	3	5%	164.9	28%	29	18%
FY05 Land Range	0.0	0%	0	0%	3.4	4%	1	2%	3.4	1%	1	1%
FY05 Total	497.7	100%	109	100%	95.1	100%	56	100%	592.8	100%	165	100%
FY03-05 Sea Range	1897.3	74%	477	81%	387.1	74%	348	94%	2284.4	74%	825	86%
FY03-05 Off Range	616.0	24%	102	17%	118.7	23%	19	5%	734.7	24%	121	13%
FY03-05 Land Range	39.8	2%	8	1%	15.6	3%	5	1%	55.4	2%	13	1%
FY03-05 Total	2553.1	100%	587	100%	521.4	100%	372	100%	3074.5	100%	959	100%

- * FY-03 C-130 off range hours include one-time Iraqi Freedom Deployment
- * P-3 Off Range Flights include 11 detachments to Hawaii, 2 to Ascension Island, and 1 to Antigua
- * FY-05 data thru 7 June 05


Range Support Sortie Breakdown By Location (FY03-FY05)

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Sea Range</u>	<u>Land Range</u>	<u>Off Range</u>
NP-3D	76-84%	0-3%	15-24%
DC-130	88-97%	1-2%	5-10%
FA-18 (FY05)	63%	37%	0%
TOTAL (average)	84%	5%	11%


**VX-30 Range Support (FY03-05)
(All Aircraft Types)**



P-3 Sorties (FY03-05)




C-130 Sorties (FY03-05)



FA-18 Sorties (FY05 only)




FY-04 NP-3D FLIGHT HOUR BREAKDOWN (ALL LOCATIONS)




TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS: 1186.8

TELEMETRY:	267.1
CAST GLANCE:	193
AREA CLEARANCE:	720.6

FY-04 AREA CLEARANCE BREAKDOWN BY CUSTOMERS (ALL LOCATIONS)




FY-04 TELEMETRY BREAKDOWN BY CUSTOMER (ALL LOCATIONS)




TELEMETRY: 267.1 HOURS
23% OF TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS

FY-04 CAST GLANCE BREAKDOWN BY CUSTOMER (ALL LOCATIONS)



CAST GLANCE: 193 HOURS
16% OF TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS


FY04 C-130 PROJECT HOUR BREAKDOWN (ALMOST ALL SEA RANGE)



TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS: 257.8

LOGISTICS:	181.8
TARGETS:	50.0
PROJECTS:	26.0

FY04 C-130 Customer Breakdown (ALMOST ALL SEA RANGE)



COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 1/2
 Data As Of 4/29/2005 8:16:37 AM, Report Created 4/29/2005 8:16:39 AM

Department : Technical JCSG
 Scenario File : Z:\COBRA Database\TECH-0054\COBRA 6-10\Realign\J - TECH-0054 COBRA Input Final (6.10)
 04292005.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: Navy C4ISR RDAT&E Consolidation at China Lake
 Std Fctrs File : C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

Starting Year : 2006
 Final Year : 2009
 Payback Year : 2021 (12 Years)

NPV in 2025(\$K): -16,888
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 72,699

Net Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
MilCon	315	0	3,500	0	0	0	3,815	0
Person	0	0	0	-304	-2,158	-2,158	-4,620	-2,158
Overhd	301	-1,849	-3,411	-4,488	-4,570	-4,570	-18,586	-4,570
Moving	405	3	1	19,564	0	0	19,973	0
Missio	1,000	1,000	4,000	0	0	0	6,000	0
Other	16,730	17,914	6,037	3,594	7	7	44,290	2
TOTAL	18,752	17,067	10,127	18,367	-6,721	-6,721	50,871	-6,726

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	0						

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	0	4	0	0	4
Enl	0	0	0	7	0	0	7
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	0	368	0	0	368
TOT	0	0	0	379	0	0	379

Summary:

 Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Pt. Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.

Point Mugu provides a wide range of synergistic EW support to TACAIR platforms, threat simulation, and intelligence/sensor engineering for Navy, USMC, Air Force, and FMS customers. This action would most likely result in the loss of significant electronic warfare intellectual capital that could not be replaced. EW currently shares resources and processes to improve integration efficiency and to reduce duplicative efforts. Point Mugu has worldwide recognition as the leader in EW development, test, evaluation, and in-service engineering, with 15 years per person average EA-6B, AEA, TACAIR EW, and Threat Analysis engineering experience. Over 4500 work-years of EW specialized experience exist at this site. The Point Mugu EA-6B Weapons System Support Laboratory provides real-time operational support to the Fleet during times of war. This capability must be maintained at 24/7/365. When a crisis occurs in the world, EWDS Lab (Threat Sensor Engineering team), Mission Planning laboratory, and the Systems Engineering laboratories are required to urgently respond to the Fleet needs. Example of recent Fleet support, (1) pushed reprogrammed User Data Files (UDF) to deployed squadrons on 9/11/2001, (2) 31,900 data requests (sample from June 03 to June 04) with 100% responded in less than 24 hour response time to deployed squadrons. Reference #DON026: If we move the EA-6B laboratories to another location, a recurring cost to maintain existing laboratories will exist at Point Mugu to support the EA-6B Prime contractor on-going software development activities. Until this contract expires, the government is obligated to provide this facility. Recurring cost of \$1900K per year until lab can be relocated. Item 40 in receiving submittal includes \$480K of shuttle annual savings through contract restructure that cannot be achieved as a result of this action.

China Lake Response: Portions of the information provided in the Donor and Gainer's response to TECH 0054 are the result of a cooperative effort between Point Mugu and China Lake personnel. This represents the minimum risk approach to ensuring 24/7 response capability at the current levels with significant overlap in capability during the transition. Under this plan, the 24/7 response capability would be in place at China Lake in 18 months for the EA-6B laboratory and 24 months for the Electronic Combat Systems Evaluation Laboratory (ECSEL) with no breaks in service. An alternative approach that is not reflected in the above