

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Shibley, Eileen P CIV BRAC [eileen.shibley@navy.mil]
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2005 10:37 AM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil; david.epstein@wso.whs.mil
Subject: Sequence
Attachments: ChronologyMugu.xls

David/Les,

As requested, here is the sequence of events on the three scenarios discussed: TECH-0018 (Weapons), TECH-0054 (EW,Sensors, Elex), and DON-0162 (Pt Mugu closure).

<<ChronologyMugu.xls>>

Eileen P. Shibley

DASN (IS&A)
703-602-6424

Date	Event
10-Dec-04	Weapons scenario released to field (ultimately becomes TECH-0018)
21-Dec-04	Certifications completed for Point Mugu, China Lake, and Navy Region Southwest (NRSW)
22-Dec-04	Certifications completed for NAVAIRSYSCOM and CNO (N4)
3-Jan-05	Sensors, electronics, and EW scenario released to field (TECH-0054)
9-Jan-05	Certifications completed for Point Mugu, China Lake, and Navy Region Southwest (NRSW)
10-Jan-05	Certifications completed for NAVAIRSYSCOM and CNO (N4)
11-Jan-05	IAT Tech Team receives DON Analysis Group (DAG) permission to begin preparation of Mugu closure scenario
14-Jan-05	Pt. Mugu closure scenario issued to field
21-Jan-05	Certifications completed for Point Mugu, China Lake, and Navy Region Southwest (NRSW)
24-Jan-05	Certifications completed for NAVAIRSYSCOM and CNO (N4)
31-Mar-05	IEG deferred to CNO desire to keep Pt Mugu open

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Shibley, Eileen P CIV BRAC [eileen.shibley@navy.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2005 8:11 AM
To: Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: FW: Tech 18DR (Point Mugu to China Lake) Clarification

-----Original Message-----

From: Shaffer, Alan, Mr, OSD-ATL [mailto:Alan.Shaffer@osd.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2005 7:53
To: Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Buckstad, Robert, COL, OSD-ATL
Cc: Shibley, Eileen P CIV BRAC; Higgins, Karen L SES; Hamm, Walter B. Col BRAC
Subject: Tech 18DR (Point Mugu to China Lake) Clarification

Les: I understand you are looking for clarification of the rationale for the movement from Point Mugu to China Lake. Here goes:

The intention of TECH-0018 relative to the Point Mugu/China Lake move is to move all weapons related work from Point Mugu to China Lake. This scenario was not intended to affect or move required Sea Range operations. To realize all possible efficiencies, the scenario intended to move the maximum possible amount of Weapons related efforts while keeping the minimum number of people required for Sea Range and targeting operations at the Mugu site. We assume that Sea Range effort remaining at Mugu would include daily operations, range control, and equipment maintenance while targets would include hands-on personnel required for build-up, launch, logistics, and recovery (those target engineering personnel required for daily target operations). All weapons related engineering functions e.g. target engineering would move as a piece of the overall realignment. Subsequently, our scenario represents the movement of all but sea range technical folks from Point MUGU, based on certified data.

Best

Al

7/27/2005

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Gilmer, Bradford NAVAIR [bradford.gilmer@navy.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2005 4:35 PM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil; david.epstein@wso.whs.mil
Cc: Bangle, Marilyn NAVAIR; Rankin, Ellen NAVAIR; Honea, David "Wayne" NAVSEA
Subject: TECH18 rewording and associated perosnnel counts
Attachments: TECH18 Reword - rev2.ppt

Les and David:

As you requested, we submit proposed changes to the TECH18 action associated with the Nava Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu. These changes do not include any personnel numbers from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division. The enclosed file has 4 pages:

- (1) Proposed wording (approved by RDMLs Bachmann and Skinner on 12 July 05)
- (2) Personnel moving based on revised wording
- (3) Technical personnel not moving based on revised wording
- (4) Support personnel (both moving and not moving)

The personnel movements show numbers for both SEP03 and DEC04 on-board count baselines.

Later this week we will complete the cobra analyses associated with the Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) portion of TECH18. We will look at 3 scenarios for:

- (1) Revised personnel and associated equipment/facilities associated with the above recommended revisions (revised green category)
- (2) Green item plus personnel and equipment/facilities associated with the "could move but why" yellow category.
- (3) Green and Yellow plus personnel and equipment/facilities "inextricably tied to sea range" red category.

These cobra runs will be performed on the SEP03 personnel baseline for comparison to present SECDEF recommendations.

If you have any questions or need to provide clarifications, please don't hesitate to call me at the numbers below.

Bradford R. Gilmer

Deputy Director for Test and Evaluation

BRAC Certifier

(805) 989-8445

Cell: (805) 816-5835

7/26/2005

Proposed Wording of TECH18

- Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA by relocating specific Weapons and Armament RDA T&E to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA. Weapons in service engineering, missile hardware in the loop labs, weapons sustainment support, and air-launched weapons installed system test and evaluation engineering will be realigned. (See page 2)
- Specifically excluded are all personnel and equipment from range, targets, test squadron, test article preparation including Ready Missile Test Facility, radar reflectivity anechoic chambers, and system test engineering of naval surface combatants and space systems. (See page 3)
- Production personnel will be realigned with the supported function. General and administrative personnel supporting both China Lake and Point Mugu sites will be excluded. (See page 4)

Personnel Clearly Associated with W&A

	Sep 03 Civ	Sep03 Mil	Dec04 Civ	Dec04 Mil
Personnel Moving	259	0	242	0
Personnel Included but Deployed and not moving	70	0	70	0
Total Effected	329*	0	312	0

* 343 – 14 Ready Missile Test Facility (RMTF)

TECH18 Personnel Associated with Sea Range

	Sep 03 Civ	Sep03 Mil	Dec04 Civ	Dec04 Mil
Personnel Moving	0	0	0	0
Personnel not moving	589*	214	523	200
Total Effected	589	214	523	200

* 505 Range/targets + 24 targets logistics + 14 RCS chambers + 32 VX-30 + 14 RMTF

Support Personnel

	Sep 03 Civ	Sep03 Mil	Dec04 Civ	Dec04 Mil
Production Personnel Moving (Included page 2 above)	12	0	12	0
Production and G&A Personnel not moving	143	0	143	0
Total	155	0	155	0

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Shibley, Eileen P CIV BRAC [eileen.shibley@navy.mil]
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 4:12 PM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
Subject: Technical Question 47s
Attachments: Question 47 - All TECH Scenarios1.xls

Les,
Hope you guys had a good trip home. Forwarding the attached file, as requested.
<<Question 47 - All TECH Scenarios1.xls>>

Eileen P. Shibley

DASN (IS&A)
703-602-6424

DON Block 47 for Technical Scenarios

ScenarioID	OrgCode	Answer	Comments
TECH-0002	COMNAVAIRSYSCOM_P ATUXENT_RIVER_MD	COMMENTS for FIRST (Losing) RELEASE OF SDC TECH 0002A: Concur with comments from participants and would encourage a balance between expected efficiencies and the synergies already realized by the responding activities. COMMENTS FOR SECOND (GAINING) RELEASE OF SDC TECH 0002A: INDIAN HEAD WAS ASKED BY GAINING ACTIVITY TO PROVIDE A BREAKDOWN OF THE WATER CONSUMPTION RATES - THEY COMPLIED. ATTACHED WORD DOCUMENT IS A COPY OF THAT RESPONSE ON WHICH CHINA LAKE BASED A PORTION OF THEIR RESPONSE.	
TECH-0002	COMNAVAIRWARCENW PNDIV_CHINA_LAKE_CA	The individual actions included in TECH-2A were evaluated independent of one another. Should multiple 0002A actions or actions from 0002B or C occur, the aggregate scenario should be evaluated because additional costs and/or savings due to economies of scale are possible. DTRA ALBQ: The DTRA submission includes costs for moving significant test equipment and facilities. While this may be possible, it is perhaps not necessary. The DTRA ALBQ personnel could be relocated to China Lake to achieve significant efficiencies and synergy while some test functions could more practically remain at other sites. Indian Head: Because energetics capability exists at China Lake, a significant portion of the costs estimated in the Indian Head submission (Actions 15-17) would not be required. Rather than incur the cost of moving much of high volume production capability to China Lake, recommend considering transitioning the production work to private industry where excess capacity exists.	
TECH-0002	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ DAHLGREN_VA	System RDAT&E work that is "Inextricable" from WSI: Naval shipborne warfare systems are specifically designed to be fully embedded within the form of a ship's hull design and interoperable with the warfare systems of other ships and aircraft that comprise naval battle groups. The elements of the detect-to-engage sequence (e.g., detection, classification, targeting, weapons initiation, launcher control, weapons control and command & control) are physically and functionally integrated and not separable as independent components. Our response identifies (and severs for realignment/relocation) the work associated with that portion of combat systems equipment RDAT&E that is fully separable from the support for the integrated and assured interoperability of all elements of naval shipborne warfare systems. Details are provided as an attachment in DONBITS.	Ship board weapons should remain at Dahlgren

DON Block 47 for Technical Scenarios

TECH-0002	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_I NDIAN_HEAD_MD	IHDIV's W&A RDAT&E includes the full-spectrum of energetics work (molecular research to production process development). In accordance with the scenario, our response severs for realignment/relocation all W&A, and retains all DEMIL, Guns and Ammo energetics such as gun propellants, primers, etc., as well as energetics-related production. The intellectual capital comprising the RDAT&E workforce is utilized across the full range of products and weapons systems that the energetics effort supports, including Guns & Ammo. The separation will require the replication of some portion of the intellectual capital at one or the other site. These costs and impacts are not included in our response. To the extent personnel do not relocate, there will be additional cost and time to reconstitute the expertise to perform energetics and technical work required to meet Navy requirements. Timing/phasing of this relocation must consider the need to maintain full support for ongoing combat operations. In addition to the personnel identified for relocation there are five personnel who are not included in the data who are located at Hill AFB, Ogden UT, and one person is lo	
TECH-0002	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ PORT_HUENEME_CA	Programs within Missiles, Guns, or Energetics scope: Standard Missile (SM) ESSM, ERGM. "Other" Programs not with in Missiles, Guns, or Energetics scope: NSDSA, STILO, NSPO, Mk74, and Misc Non-Core Support remaining at PHD. System ISE work that is "Inextricable" from WSI: Naval ship borne warfare systems are specifically designed to be fully embedded within the form of a ship's hull design. The elements of the detect-to-engage sequence (e.g., detection, classification, targeting, weapons initiation, launcher control, weapons control and command & control) are physically and functionally integrated and not separable as independent components. Our response identifies the work (and severs for realignment/relocation) associated with that portion of combat systems equipment in-service support that is separable from the support for the integrated elements of naval ship borne warfare systems. Details are provided as an attachment in DONBITS.	Synergy issue. Work should remain at Port Hueneme
TECH-0002	COMNAVAIRSYSCOM_P ATUXENT_RIVER_MD	SDC QB COMMENTS: Concur with comments from participants and would encourage a balance between expected efficiencies and the synergies already realized by the responding activities. COMNAVAIRSYSCOM COMMENTS: This scenario leaves significant Navy Weapons and Armament work in current locations; e.g. underwater weapons and air weapons, weapons work performed at NUWC, Dahlgren, Crane and Keyport. These may be part of other intended scenarios. The dispersion of these efforts could limit the effect of the synergies arising from the proposed weapons centers of expertise. Creating a weapons center of expertise will separate the weapons program management for weapons from that of air platforms. It will be necessary to insure that in gaining the synergy of the weapons center the existing collaboration with air platforms is retained. It is important to understand that the center of expertise established at NAWCWD China Lake relies on the sea range testing capabilities at NAWCWD Point Mugu. This critical capability cannot be lost. □□□□□□	

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TECH-0002	COMNAVAIRWARCENW PNDIV_CHINA_LAKE_CA	The individual Actions included in TECH-0002B were evaluated independent of one another. Should multiple 0002B Actions or other Actions from 0002A or C occur, the aggregate scenario should be evaluated because additional costs and/or savings due to economies of scale are possible. Indian Head (Action 1): Losing activity data zeros. MDA: No Losing Activity data was provided so the Gaining Activity could not respond. The co-location of sea based MDA program offices along with Naval Aviation W&A program offices (Actions 10-13) and W&A technical personnel would provide transformational opportunities and efficiencies. Indian Head NOSSA: Existing Energetics work at China Lake would greatly facilitate the integration of this work. Related movement of Energetics work from Indian Head proposed in TECH-0002A would further enhance these efficiencies. Pax River Program Offices: The co-location of Naval Aviation's weapons program offices with W&A technical personnel improve technical support to the programs and create efficiencies. Point Mugu: The NAVAIR directed assumption for this set of Actions is to leave the following W&A functions at the Mugu	
TECH-0002	NAVAIRWARCENWPNDI V_PT_MUGU_CA	The following areas would require a reduction in the number of personnel, equipment, and facilities to be relocated to the receiving site: (1) F-14 weapons system support has been terminated, a reduction of 132 civilians and 24 contractors; (2) An error of 33 civilians performing EW support; (3) personnel, mission equipment, and facilities performing outdoor air range operations. These are an integrated, fixed base capability that must remain at the Point Mugu site to continue sea range operations, net reduction of 505 civilians, 153 contractors, 2667 tons of mission equipment, and 1022.4 KSFT of facility space; (4) Retaining the 3 anechoic chambers whose primary customer is the targets range complex, a net reduction of 14 civilians, 3 contractors, 90 tons of support equipment, and 44.2 KSF; (5) Keeping logistical support for targets with the targets hardware, a net reduction of 24 civilians,; and (6) Not moving the general and administrative support that currently services both China Lake and Point Mugu, a net reduction of 143 civilians and 22 contractors.	
TECH-0002	NAVORDSAFSECACT_IN DIAN_HEAD_MD	•CNO (OPNAVINST 8020.14) established the independent Navy Explosives Safety Program and assigned technical authority and management to Commander, NAVSEA. Realignment to NAWC China Lake would require a reassignment of this authority. Twenty-five personnel supporting Fleet ordnance safety and assistance inspection are located at Fleet homeports (Norfolk and San Diego). These personnel are included in our response and are identified to be realigned but not relocated.	
TECH-0002	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_I NDIAN_HEAD_MD	In accordance with the scenario, our response severs for realignment/relocation all W&A efforts at Seal Beach, except industrial support functions (e.g., calibration & maintenance) which comprise 13 personnel. If this scenario is executed we recommend these personnel be re-aligned with the Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) at WPNSTA Seal Beach. There are three employees whose permanent duty station is not Seal Beach. These employees are located: at Norfolk, VA; Quantico, VA; and Albuquerque, NM, performing Fleet or site specific support. Our response realigns these personnel but does not include them in the number of personnel to be relocated.	

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TECH-0002	CG_MCB_QUANTICO_VA	<p>All personnel in MARCORSSYSCOM G& A programs RD&A were reported in Action 1. The majority of personnel reported in Action 1 work in all three areas of In Service Engineering (Action 2), Sustainment (Action 3) and Weapons Integration (Action4). Therefore, most personnel reported in Action 1 are not reported in either Action 2, 3, or4. Only where it is possible to associate the preponderance of an FTE work with either Action 1, 2, or 3 was that FTE reported in one of those categories. To allocate the other personnel reported in Action 1 to either Action 2, 3, or 4 would give the inaccurate impression that those personnel could be divided into those functional areas and moved and work independently. Identified functions remain the responsibility of CG MCSC based on scenario realignment vice consolidation. Personnel numbers are based on a snapshot as of today and do not include future personnel realignments planned for MCSC. Responses only consider individuals physically located at MCB Quantico MCSC. The realignments presented in this scenario degrade RDTE&A functions from the Marine Corps perspective. The actions realign functions into colocated joint programs. Joint program</p>	<p>Synergy issue. Work should remain at Quantico</p>
TECH-0002	COMNAVAIRSYSCOM_P ATUXENT_RIVER_MD	<p>Concur with comments from participants and would encourage a balance between expected efficiencies and the synergies already realized by the responding activities.</p>	
TECH-0002	COMNAVAIRWARCENAC DIV_PATUXENT_RIVER_MD	<p>118 FTEs were identified in the Weapons Technical Capability in the NAWCAD Patuxent River Capacity Data Call. Analysis concluded that: 51 FTEs are properly associated with the Air Platform Technical Capability area 67 FTEs remain properly associated as Weapons & Armament. Of the 67 FTEs, 6 FTEs are associated with programs that have been completed (e.g., JSOW Speed Soak, MA-31 and VANDAL) 18 of the 67 FTEs are inextricably linked to air platform activities distributed across multiple projects and competencies, and 16 of these FTEs will be retained at Patuxent River (2 contractors will be eliminated). Therefore 39 civilian and 4 contractual personnel would move to China Lake. Of these 43 moving FTEs: 39 FTEs were categorized as W&A RDAT&E (Action 16), 1 FTE was categorized as W&A RDAT&E In-Service (Action 17), 3 FTEs were categorized as W&A RDAT&E Sustainment (Action18), and 0 FTEs were categorized as W&A RDAT&E Weapons Systems Integration (Action 19).</p>	
TECH-0002	COMNAVAIRWARCENW PNDIV_CHINA_LAKE_CA	<p>The individual Actions included in TECH-0002C were evaluated independent of one another. Should multiple 0002C Actions or other Actions from 0002A or B occur, the aggregate scenario should be evaluated because additional costs and/or savings due to economies of scale are possible. Action 20 (Yorktown to China Lake) – Decontamination Costs. Equipment going from knowledgeable government or contractor to knowledgeable government or contractor can be certified as 3X, with proper documentation and shipped. A current example is the transfer of equipment from Pratt-Whitney Chemical System Division to Aerojet and the Air Force. The difference in cost between 3X and 5X is over an order of magnitude. Cost for decontamination of equipment moving to China Lake will be 10% (3X) of the 5X cost.</p>	

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TECH-0002	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA	NSWC Corona performs independent assessment of W&A from the individual component to the end-to-end battle force level. Examples are missile flight and pre-flight analysis, test systems and interface gage certification, and all portions of end-to-end independent assessment for Navy ship self-defense performance, air defense performance, interoperability including associated threat capabilities. In order to maintain the necessary independence of the assessment process, and to assure assessments are end-to-end, all the analytical elements must be aligned in a single command structure, separate from host activities or activities that perform systems development or acquisition. Realigning this work into an activity responsible for W&A systems design and/or engineering (e.g., NAWC WD, China Lake) would create a conflict of interest. •Our response relocates all W&A DAT&E at NSWC Corona to China Lake (155 personnel), except that portion associated with WSI (161 personnel).	
TECH-0002C	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_INDIAN_HEAD_MD	In accordance with the scenario, our response severs for realignment/relocation all W&A efforts at Seal Beach, except industrial support functions (e.g., calibration & maintenance) which comprise 13 personnel. If this scenario is executed we recommend these personnel be re-aligned with the Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) at WPNSTA Seal Beach. There are three employees whose permanent duty station is not Seal Beach. These employees are located: at Norfolk, VA; Quantico, VA; and Albuquerque, NM, performing Fleet or site specific support. Our response realigns these personnel but does not include them in the number of personnel to be relocated.	
TECH-0002	NSWC_INDIAN_HEAD_DET_YORKTOWN	The IAT confirmed by phonecon that Actions 20 and 21 are duplicates. With IAT concurrence, we have interpreted Action 20 to be: "Realign NAVSURFWARCEN Yorktown (N32889) W&A RDAT&E and relocate to China Lake (N60530)". Action 21 remains as written. The W&A RDAT&E personnel identified to be re-aligned and relocated to China Lake includes three persons whose functions are specifically related to guns/ammo.	
TECH-0002	NAVEODTECHDIV_INDIA_N_HEAD_MD	Our response fully relocates EOD Technology Division to Eglin AFB. The Secretary of the Navy is assigned as the Single Manager within DOD for EODT&T (DOD Directive 5160.62, "Single Manager Assignment for Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training (EODT&T)," April 1989). EOD TECHDIV is under the command of the Navy Flag Officer assigned by SECNAV as the Single Manager. Realignment under the Department of the Air Force requires SECDEF reassignment of these responsibilities. While contractor employees are not normally a consideration in BRAC, the special nature of EOD TECHDIV's contractor support (i.e., senior experienced EOD technicians) argues that consideration should be given to mission impact should these contractors not relocate. Timing/phasing of this relocation must consider the need to maintain full support for ongoing combat operations.	

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TECH-0002	CG_MCB_QUANTICO_VA	Data for Actions 12,13, and 14 are not reported. MCOTEA does not conduct In Service, sustainment and Weapons Integration T&E. MCOTEA conducts pre-production T&E. MCOTE facilities requirements are a minimum of 3400 SF of Administrative space. . MCOTEA conducts Title 10 Testing and Evaluation as part of the USMC's Acquisition triad. This triad includes MCCDC, the capabilities developer and MARCORSYSCOM, the material solution developer. The close proximity of MCOTEA to these organizations facilitates cross functional and cross organizational Product Team execution model. MCOTEA often performs as the integrating organization between the capabilities and material developers. Relocation of any single element or segment of this triad introduces organizational inefficiencies and obstacles to team formation and execution. Secondly, MARCORSYSCOM is our fiscal sponsor. All T&E budget formulation is coordinated through MARCORSYSCOM before forwarding to higher Headquarters, (i.e. Programs and Resources). Specifically regarding "Guns and Ammo", MCOTEA directly supports 9 different Program Managers responsible for approximately 30 sep	Synergy issue. Work should remain at Quantico.
TECH-0002	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_DAHLGREN_VA	System RDAT&E work that is "Inextricable" from WSI: Naval shipborne warfare systems are specifically designed to be fully embedded within the form of a ship's hull design and interoperable with the warfare systems of other ships and aircraft that comprise naval battle groups. The elements of the detect-to-engage sequence (e.g., detection, classification, targeting, weapons initiation, launcher control, weapons control and command & control) are physically and functionally integrated and not separable as independent components. Our response identifies (and severs for realignment/relocation) the work associated with that portion of combat systems equipment RDAT&E that is fully separable from the support for the integrated and assured interoperability of all elements of naval shipborne warfare systems. Details are provided as an attachment in DONBITS.	
TECH-0002	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_INDIAN_HEAD_MD	IHDIV's W&A RDAT&E includes the full-spectrum of energetics work (molecular research to production process development). In accordance with the scenario, our response severs for realignment/relocation all Guns and Ammo efforts and retains the remainder of W&A energetics such as warheads, rocket/missile propellant, PADs/CADs, etc., DEMIL, and energetics-related production. The intellectual capital comprising the RDAT&E workforce is utilized across the full range of products and weapons systems that the energetics effort supports, including W&A. The separation will require the replication of some portion of the intellectual capital at one or the other site. These costs and impacts are not included in our response. To the extent personnel do not relocate, there will be additional cost and time to reconstitute the expertise to perform energetics and technical work required to meet Navy requirements. Timing/phasing of this relocation must consider the need to maintain full support for ongoing combat operations.	Intellectual capital is big issue
TECH-0002	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_PORT_HUENEME_CA	NSWC Louisville performs ISEA work for naval guns and is co-located with the OEMs associated with those systems. Depending on the gaining location, costs may be incurred for replication of selected test complexes.	

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TECH-0002	CG_MCB_QUANTICO_VA	<p>MARCORSYSCOM personnel are not performing W&A Research and T&E. Therefore zero personnel are reported in Actions 5-7, and 11-13. All personnel in MARCORSYSCOM W&A programs D&A were reported in Action 8. The majority of personnel reported in Action 8 work in both the areas of In Service Engineering (Action 9), Sustainment (Action 10). Therefore, most personnel reported in Action 8 are not reported in either Action 9 or 10. Only where it is possible to associate the preponderance of an FTE work with either Action 9 or 10 was that FTE reported in one of those categories. To allocate the other personnel reported in Action 8 to either Action 9 or 10 would give the inaccurate impression that those personnel could be divided into those functional areas and moved and work independently. Identified functions remain the responsibility of CG MCSC based on scenario realignment vice consolidation. Personnel numbers are based on a snapshot as of today and do not include future personnel realignments planned for MCSC. Responses only consider individuals physically located at MCB Quantico MCSC. MCSC does not perform research or operational T&E. The</p>	
TECH-0002	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA	<p>NSWC Corona performs independent assessment of W&A from the individual component to the end-to-end battle force level. Examples are missile flight and pre-flight analysis, test systems and interface gage certification, and all portions of end-to-end independent assessment for Navy ship self-defense performance, air defense performance, interoperability including associated threat capabilities. In order to maintain the necessary independence of the assessment process, and to assure assessments are end-to-end, all the analytical elements must be aligned in a single command structure, separate from host activities or activities that perform systems development or acquisition. Realigning this work into an activity responsible for W&A systems design and/or engineering (e.g., NSWC Port Hueneme) would create a conflict of interest. •Our response relocates only the W&A DAT&E WSI function at NSWC Corona to NSWC Port Hueneme (161 personnel).</p>	
TECH-0002	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_INDIAN_HEAD_MD	<p>Our response includes one employee performing Fleet operations support at WPNSTA Charleston who will be re-aligned but will remain stationed at WPNSTA Charleston.</p>	
TECH-0005	AIRTEVRON_NINE_CHINA_LAKE_CA	<p>VX-9's mission is to conduct operational test (OT) on a wide range of weapons, EW, sensor, and avionics systems (sys) integrated on FA-18C/D/E/F, EA-6B, AV-8B, & AH-1W aircraft. VX-9 doesn't routinely conduct dedicated air platform tests. Air platform testing is an exception rather than the rule. The rotary wing air platform test reported by VX-9 in BRAC TechMilval2 of 13Jul04 & SupDataCall2 of 5Aug04 consisted of 1 phase of early initial OT of the H-1 Upgrade program only. After Operational Evaluation of the H-1 Upgrade program sched to begin in June 05, follow-on testing using the rotary wing air platform will be conducted to evaluate the op effectiveness and suitability of the EW, sensors, & weapons installed on the aircraft. OT of these sys and the air platform are inextricably linked and cannot be separated-Consolidation of the OT role of the H-1 Upgrades program with NAWCAD prior to completion of initial OT would be in violation of Title 10 USC 2399.-NAWCAD conducts DT on variety of air platforms to include flying qualities, carrier suit, & weapons sep. Upon completion of this testing,</p>	<p>VX-9 needs to stay at China Lake...that's where their function is done</p>
TECH-0005	COMNAVAIRSYSCOMPATUXENT_RIVER_MD	<p>Quarterback Comments: VX-9 - In review of this scenario disbursing VX-9 and redeploying it to Pax River would negatively impact VX-9's ability to execute its mission for T&E of Rotary A/C. NSWC Corona - This work is only a portion of the Metrology engineering and Calibration support (METCAL) Program work performed for the Navy and Marine Corps. This work should be excluded from transfer as it is inextricably tied to a larger Navy METCAL Program.</p>	

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TECH-0005	COMNAVAIRWARCENAC DIV_PATUXENT_RIVER_ MD	Although NAWCAD concurs with the non-movement, MILCON requirements will be reported as directed by the IAT. Although NAWCAD Pax River concurs with the non-movement, MILCON requirements will be reported as directed by the IAT. Action item 5 NAWCAD recommends delaying the personnel move identified in FY06 to occur in FY 08 to match up with MILCON BOD date. Unnecessary cost will be incurred to receive these people wit relocatable buildings. Action item 5 NAWCAD Pax River can not identify potential reductions or savings in personnel costs without detailed description of positions and duties of the proposed personnel.	
TECH-0005	NAVAIRWARCENACDIV_ LAKEHURST_NJ	The "Rotary Wing" Air Platform work is included in this scenario, remaining Air Platform Work is in other mission areas.	
TECH-0005	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ CORONA_CA	82 Air Platform T&E FTE (reported in Supplemental Capacity Data Call, Q4277). Sub DTAP level = 33 reported in Rotary Wing (49 Fixed Wing). Moving only these 33 FTE would not result in a full capability at PAX. The FTE were coded under this DTAP because they represent the total workload funded by the NAVAIR Rotary Wing Platform sponsors to perform Metrology and Calibration engineering (METCAL) services. This includes development and fielding of measurement standards and processes which are used by Navy labs to calibrate NAVAIR test equipment used in the maintenance of Rotary Wing Platforms. The 33 FTE are a portion of an integrated Navy-wide METCAL Program that supports planes, ships, subs, USMC, and SPAWAR systems that use test equipment requiring calibration. As required by the scenario, our response severs these FTE from the integrated program, relocates them to PAX and establishes a standalone METCAL program at PAX fully capable of supporting Navy rotary wing aircraft. This will require an additional 86 FTE be recruited, hired and trained at PAX beyond the 33 FTE transferred from Corona. This 119 FTE represents 70% of the 170 F	
TECH-0005	NRL_WASHINGTON_DC	NRL reported 37.8 total FTEs in FY 2003 Air Platforms technical capability area, covering both fixed wing and rotary wing platforms. This included direct-funded federal civilians (15.3 FTEs), direct-funded contractors (13.3 FTEs), and proportional share of overhead support (total federal civilians and contractors amounting to 9.2 FTEs). The rotary wing program (Dragon Warrior) accounted for 69% (or 26.1 Total FTEs). The fixed wing programs comprised the remaining 31% (or 11.7 FTEs) for Dragon Eye (non-maritime), FINDER (non-maritime), and SAMPLE (non-maritime) and UAV Small Engine (both). All Air Platforms projects, in both fixed wing and rotary wing areas have since been completed (Dragon Warrior, FINDER, SAMPLE, and Small Engine) or transferred to production (Dragon Eye), and NRL is no longer involved. As a result, no rotary wing Air Platform RDAT&E work, either maritime or non-maritime, is currently being performed by NRL and none is anticipated. Thus, no transfer of NRL Air Platform research work is now possible.	

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TECH-0006	AIRTEVRON_NINE_CHINA_LAKE_CA	<p>VX-9s mission is to conduct operational test (OT) on a wide range of weapons, EW, sensor, and avionics systems (sys) integrated on FA-18C/D/E/F, EA-6B, AV-8B, & AH-1W aircraft. VX-9 doesn't routinely conduct dedicated air platform tests. The need to do air platform tests is an exception rather than the rule. The FW air platform tests reported by VX-9 in BRAC TechMilval2 of 13Jul04 & SupDataCall2 of 5Aug04 consisted of 2 phases of follow-on OT of the FA-18E/F air platform only. In reality, testing of the air platform was conducted concurrent with that of several other EW, sensor, & weapons sys. OT of these sys and the air platform were, and continue to be, inextricably linked and cannot be separated. No other air platform testing has been conducted recently by VX-9. -NAWCAD conducts DT on variety of air platforms to include flying qualities, carrier suit, & weapons separation. Upon completion of this testing, integration of weapons, avionics, EW, & sensors onto the air platforms is conducted at NAWC China Lake. OT is conducted upon completion of these tests. Consolidating the OT role of FA-18E/F</p>	
TECH-0006	COMNAVAIRSYS COM PATUXENT RIVER MD	<p>Quarterback Comments: ISSUE ONE: VX-9: In review of this scenario disbanding VX-9 and redeploying it to Pax River would negatively impact VX-9's ability to execute its mission for T&E of Strike A/C. NSWC Corona: This work is only a portion of the Metrology engineering and Calibration support (METCAL) Program work performed for the Navy and Marine Corps. This work should be excluded from transfer as it is inextricably tied to a larger Navy METCAL Program. Issue 2: NAVSURFWARCEN DIV CORONA CA [64267] changed the losing activity data AFTER the gaining activity COMNAVAIRWARCENAC DIV PATUXENT RIVER MD [N00421] certified. Change to losing activity data warrants correction to gaining activity data. Per James Hogan, DDC will be issued to COMNAVAIRWARCENAC DIV PATUXENT RIVER MD [N00421] to make these corrections. Attached document defines required changes.</p>	
TECH-0006	COMNAVAIRWARCENAC DIV PATUXENT RIVER MD	<p>Action 8 - Based on the Tri-Service efforts S&T Reliance agreements in 1992, the Air Force became executive agent of all air platform research except maritime air platform work which was assigned to the Navy. Therefore, NAWCAD Air Platform research is all maritime in nature. Work done at NAWCAD, Patuxent River revolves around the challenges of the maritime environment and carrier aviation requirements. Specifically, materials issues dealing with the salt air corrosion issues, aircraft handling qualities specific to carrier landings and take-offs, structures issues, research work are all indicative of the research work performed at NAWCAD. Therefore no non-maritime research work is reported... Action - 5 -. Although NAWCAD concurs with the non-movement, MILCON requirements will be reported as directed by the IAT. No equipment will move. Action - 6. Although NAWCAD concurs with the non-movement, MILCON requirements will be reported as directed by the IAT. No equipment will move.</p>	
TECH-0006	COMNAVAIRWARCENAC DIV CHINA LAKE CA	<p>Action 3: No air platform work at NAWCAD China Lake. Action 9: Input is based on known live-fire work, equipment and personnel at Wright Patterson. No direct input was available from Wright Patterson.</p>	
TECH-0006	NAVAIRWARCENAC DIV LAKEHURST NJ	<p>The "Fixed Wing" Air Platform workyears are included in this scenario....</p>	

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TECH-0006	NAVAIRWARCENWPNDI V_PT_MUGU_CA	All personnel, mission equipment, and facilities in the air platform T&E TCA at this activity are outdoor air range operations. These are an integrated, fixed base capability that must remain at the Point Mugu site to continue sea range operations supporting other TCAs. The Patuxent River site has similar equipment and thus would not need to replicate this capability. The following work years and mission equipment would not move: 1 military officer, 18 military enlisted, 139 civilians, and 33 contractors. 3796 tons of mission equipment.	
TECH-0006	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ CORONA_CA	82 Air Platform T&E FTE (reported in Supplemental Capacity Data Call, Q4277). Sub DTAP level = 49 Fixed Wing (33 reported in Rotary Wing). Moving only these 49 FTE would not result in a full capability at PAX. The FTE were coded under this DTAP because they represent the total workload funded by the NAVAIR Fixed Wing Platform sponsors to perform Metrology and Calibration engineering (METCAL) services. This includes development and fielding of measurement standards and processes which are used by Navy labs to calibrate NAVAIR test equipment used in the maintenance of Fixed Wing Platforms. The 49 FTE are a portion of an integrated Navy-wide METCAL Program that supports planes, ships, subs, USMC, and SPAWAR systems that use test equipment requiring calibration. As required by the scenario, our response severs these FTE from the integrated program, relocates them to PAX and establishes a standalone METCAL program at PAX fully capable of supporting Navy fixed wing aircraft. This will require an additional 70 FTE be recruited, hired and trained at PAX beyond the 49 FTE transferred from Corona. This 119 FTE represents 70% of the 170 F	
TECH-0006	NRL_WASHINGTON_DC	NRL reported 37.8 total FTEs in FY 2003 Air Platforms technical capability area, covering both fixed wing and rotary wing platforms. This included direct-funded federal civilians (15.3 FTEs), direct-funded contractors (13.3 FTEs), and proportional share of overhead support (total federal civilians and contractors amounting to 9.2 FTEs). The rotary wing program (Dragon Warrior) accounted for 69% (or 26.1 Total FTEs). The fixed wing programs comprised the remaining 31% (or 11.7 FTEs) for Dragon Eye (non-maritime), FINDER (non-maritime), and SAMPLE (non-maritime) and UAV Small Engine (both). All Air Platforms projects, in both fixed wing and rotary wing areas have since been completed (Dragon Warrior, FINDER, SAMPLE, and Small Engine) or transferred to production (Dragon Eye), and NRL is no longer involved. As a result, no fixed wing Air Platform RDAT&E work, either maritime or non-maritime, is currently being performed by NRL and none is anticipated. Thus, no transfer of NRL Air Platform research work is now possible.	
TECH-0008	CBTDIRSYSACT_DAM_N ECK_VA	A. All of the work to be relocated is part of the Advanced Sensor Distribution System (ASDS). The ASDS equipment suite is an integral part of a multi use complex utilized by three commands, CDSA Dam Neck, NSWC PHD Det., and Training Support Center Hampton Roads. CDSA uses the complex to develop non-Aegis Combat Systems and to conduct Strike Group Interoperability testing and certification. NSWC PHD Det. is the life cycle support agent for the 48 radars. Training Support Center Hampton Roads, Dam Neck uses the complex to provide fleet training. ASDS provides live radar from the co-located operational radars (AN/SPS-48E, 49, 67 and 73) overlooking the VACAPES Op Areas and linked to Wallops Island to the following Combat Systems labs listed in the Capacity data call: *Ship Self-Defense System MK II, *Distributed Engineering Plant node, *Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS) Block 1 LBTS, *Aircraft Carrier ACDS Mockup, *LHA 1/3/5 ACDS Block 0 Lab, *LHA 2/4 ACDS Block 0 Lab, *DDG 993 Combat Direction System (CDS) Lab, *FFG 7 CDS Lab. Removal of ASDS equipment suite would render the entire complex inoperable from a live radar perspe	Navy Synergy issue. Work need to remain at Dam Neck

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TECH-0008A	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ CORONA_CA	In Supplemental Capacity Data Call-2, Corona reported 192.4 FTEs (151.3 direct and 41.1 overhead for civ/mil/contract). The 8 FTEs to transfer are people assessing the specific performance of the MFR/VSR developmental radar solely for use to improve this radar and not as part of an overall combat system or system interoperability assessment process such as with the exceptions listed below. The following direct work was excluded based on assumptions provided by the Quarterback: 1) 32.8 FTEs of database entry, maintenance, and assessment work related to the Material Readiness Assessment Program. The material readiness work collects data from multiple Navy sources, including surface sensor and EW sources. The Navy spent years eliminating redundant and duplicative data systems and consolidating these in a single system at Corona. Moving the sensor portion of this work to another facility would fracture the consolidated data system. 2) 7.8 FTEs of calibration standards development work within the Navy Metrology R&D Program. Specific tasking pertains to NAVAIR Electro-Optic test equipment. This is not Maritime Sensor or EW work. 3) 42.7 FTEs of independent as	
TECH-0008	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ CRANE_IN	A listing of Programs supported by NSWC Crane and included in Scenario TECH-0008A as C4ISR Maritime Sensor, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare versus C4ISR non-Maritime Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare is posted to the Scenario Notebook.	
TECH-0008	NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV_ NEWPORT_RI	(1) Included in the response is the work to integrate Electro-Optic/Infrared (EO/IR) sensors on the Spartan Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV), 3 FTEs. These sensors are used in various missions to detect and identify surface contacts. Shipboard Electronic Systems Evaluation Facility (SESEF) personnel are included in this scenario response. Per Assumption 4, this facility will not be relocated because it is a regional asset and located with the Fleet. Therefore, the associated 9 FTEs, equipment and facilities data are not reported in DONBITS. Per IAT clarification 1400 12/08/04, the following was excluded: Submarine Sonar, 610 FTEs; Surface Sonar, 247 FTEs; Submarine Periscopes/EW, 87 FTEs; USW Ranges/Sensors/Op Assessment (comprised of Undersea Sensors), 153 FTEs; and Defensive Systems/UUVs, 47 FTEs. Reference the justification table located in DONBITS Notebook General Information Section. (2) Module Test and Repair (MTR) should have been binned in Sensors/EW/Electronics DTAP. MTR was incorrectly binned by NUWCNPT in the IST DTAP. MTR workload is as follows: FY03 17.4 FTE, 20 contractor; FY04 20 FTE, 20 contractor; FY05 22 FTE, 22 co	This is submarine unique work and is a synergy issue. Should remain at NPT
TECH-0008	NRL_WASHINGTON_DC	NRL reported 316.5 total FTEs in Sensors, Electronics, and EW (SEEW) DAT&E, of which 194.9 FTEs were direct program, 90.9 FTEs were the proportional allocation of overhead support, and 30.7 FTEs were for military personnel (including allocated Flight Services support and a proportional share of lab-wide military staff). The direct program is comprised of 146.2 FTEs worked by well over 500 civilian scientists/researchers (the other 48.7 FTEs were specific direct contractor FTEs); the majority of these civilian scientists/researchers efforts were in research programs rather than D&A programs. An analysis of the specific D&A work supported by the civilian researchers revealed that most (87.8 FTEs) are not in the "Maritime" category; that is: 31.4 FTEs for NRL Directed SAPs; 21.8 FTEs for Airborne – EW/IR/EO/Radar/Remote Sensing; 14.1 FTEs for Land – EW/IR/EO/Radar/Remote Sensing; 2.4 FTEs for Components; 3.5 FTEs for non-Federal Activities (International Sponsors & Contractors); 6.0 FTEs for National Agencies (3-letter agencies); 6.4 FTEs for NFFTIO Support Activities; and 2.2 FTEs for	

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TECH-0008	SPAWARSYSCEN_CHAR LESTON_SC	Of the 423 FTE's identified in Supplemental Capacity Question 4277, over half (231) are on-site contractors. This leaves 192 FTEs of which 10 are generated from overtime leaving 182 Government employees associated with sensors. 124 are associated with non-maritime sensors, such as shore perimeter security systems (i.e. US Mint, White House, US Capital, Justice, etc.), NSA shore cryptologic systems, Army and Air Force SIGINT systems, etc. Others (44) are inextricably linked to facilities and the operational forces, such as towed array inspection and repair near ship piers with underground storage tanks and specialized sensor cable load/unload capabilities.	
TECH-0008	SPAWARSYSCEN_SAN_ DIEGO_CA	1. Workload reconciled to DoD 4277 and items not transitioned provided by separate attachment to workbook. Attached spreadsheet reflects three projects being transferred and listing of those projects not being transferred. The spreadsheet reflects the exclusion category for all projects not considered for transfer. Total workload as reported in DoD 4277 is reconciled.	
TECH-0008	COMNAVAIRWARCENAC DIV_PATUXENT_RIVER_ MD	There will be NO MOVES, NO ELIMINATION NOR DUPLICATION OF THE 191 DIRECT FTEs and 24 INDIRECT FTEs associated with Information Systems workload conducted at NAWCAD Patuxent River All of these FTEs are excluded from this Scenario per the following reasons: Based on Assumption # 3, we reviewed all relevant programs for example E-2C CEC, F-18 MIDS, Link-16, E-6B ABNCAP, P-3C TCDL, AYK-14 Mission Computer, etc, and found that personnel and functions listed under information systems are in support of T&E engineering, systems engineering, software support activities, aircrew systems, UAV support, distributed simulation and range support are critical to the conduct of the multitude of NAWCAD projects, programs, and platforms and therefore not included. The Series 2083E Automated Antenna Measurement System, AN/SRQ-4 Radio Terminal Set and AN/ARQ-44 and AN/ARQ-58, and the AN/SRQ-4 Hot Test Bed and AN/SRQ-4 Simulator/Stimulator are also excluded based on assumption 3. Operational support of Naval Aviation using the NALCOMIS Logistics System critical to the aviation life cycle management mission and excluded under assumption	George Ryan can talk to this as I am not familiar
TECH-0008	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ CORONA_CA	In the Supplemental Capacity Data Call-2, Corona reported 357.7 FTEs (286.9 direct and 70.8 overhead FTEs including civilian/military/contractor). Of direct work reported, 0 FTEs transfer to SPAWAR based upon two planning assumptions as defined by the TECH-0008B Quarterback: 1) include only C4ISR work and 2) exclude work that would break a Navy capability if separated. The following direct work was excluded from TECH-0008B because it is not Maritime IS TCA work: 1) 136 FTEs of Fleet Tactical Aircrew Training System (TACTS)/Electronic Warfare (EW) Training Range work. The following direct work was excluded from TECH-0008B because it involves data collection, database maintenance, and analysis of non-C4ISR systems: 1)39.3 FTEs of data collection, entry, and maintenance for data that is used to assess material readiness for in-service weapon and combat systems. 2)16.7 FTEs of data collection, entry, and maintenance for the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) Program. GIDEP collects technical information on DoD weapons and combat systems equipment, consolidates, and distributes it to Service, DoD, and industry customers. 3	
TECH-0008	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ DAHLGREN_VA	A listing of programs included in Maritime Information Systems work versus other non-Information Systems work is posted in the scenario notebook.	

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TECH-0008	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ PORT_HUENEME_CA	Programs included in C4ISR Realignment are DCGS-N which had 18 FTEs, AADC had 4 FTEs, and C3I had 2 FTEs in the Capacity data call. AADC and C3I are not currently funded and have no funding forecasted for Port Hueneme. Those who had been working these programs were reassigned in FY 04 to other tasks. DCGS-N is forecasted to have 6 FTEs in FY06 transferred to SPAWAR in the realignment. The following Programs were reported (with FY 03 Capacity FTEs) but are not C4ISR. CEC 18, SIAP 2, Switchboards 22, eNTCSS 2, BFTT 14, DEP 6, and BG T&E 8.	
TECH-0008	NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV_ NEWPORT_RI	(1) Included are all submarine communications FTEs, Mission equipment and facilities move from NUWCNPT to SPAWAR Systems Center San Diego. The total submarine communications FTEs, Mission/Support equipment equals 157 FTE, \$65.8M and 118 tons. Trident Integrated Radio Room (IRR), along with requisite FTE (11), will remain in NPT (not included in scenario response) because IRR configuration is phased out in FY11. Per direction by SPAWAR Quarterback scenario response was limited solely to submarine radio room integration, leaving the submarine antenna programs and requisite support facilities at NPT, thus reducing this scenario response to 63 FTEs, \$19.7M, and 74 tons. Land Based Submarine Radio Room needs to be retained at Newport for Tomahawk Strike Network and Electronic Warfare end to end testing and duplicated at SPAWARSYSCEN (\$19.7M). (2) The "first of the class" SSBN CSRR integration completes in FY06. As the operational experience is gained with the SSBN CSRR, improvements and lessons learned must be developed and integrated consistent with operational force requirements and without disruption to the operational Fleet. Accordin	Submarine unique synergy and integration issue
TECH-0008	NCTSI_SAN_DIEGO_CA	NCTSI, in its entirety is involved in Maritime Information Systems RDAT&E functions. NCTSI has four detachments, which are ideally located in fleet concentration areas to perform their fleet support functions: Det-1 - San Diego, CA (UIC: N42496); Det-2 - Norfolk, VA (UIC: N41738); Det-4 - Sigonella, Italy (UIC: N42499); Det-5 - Yokosuka, Japan (UIC: N42497). NCTSI HQ and NCTSI Det-1 are currently co-located within walking distance of SPAWARSYSCEN San Diego facilities on Naval Base Point Loma. Since NCTSI HQ is conveniently located in Building 24A on Naval Base Point Loma, adjacent to SSC, it would be hard to justify physical movement of technical personnel or equipment. Highly recommend not moving NCTSI's two specialized testing labs also located near SSC in Building 24B. Anticipate SSC would take over administrative, supply, contracting administration and comptroller functions, along with some of those personnel. Most NCTSI billets supporting those functions could be eliminated. The NCTSI detachments (6 officer and 37 enlisted billets total) would remain in their geographical locations in support of the fleet, but would need to come under the adminis	Issue is being working by C4ISR sub-groups

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TECH-0008	NRL_WASHINGTON_DC	<p>NRL reported 131.3 total FTEs in Information Systems (IS) DAT&E, of which 86.5 FTEs were direct program, 37.3 FTEs were proportional allocation of overhead support, and 7.5 FTEs were for military personnel (including allocated Flight Services support and a proportional share of lab-wide military staff). The direct program is comprised of 60.8 FTEs worked by well over 200 civilian scientists/researchers (the other 25.7 FTEs were specific direct contractor FTEs). An analysis of the specific work supported by the civilian researchers revealed that none are in "maritime" category. For example, 23.5 FTEs were for NSA- and SPAWAR-funded general-purpose INFOSEC technology, including secure voice, secure data, and cryptographic key management technology. This work provides non-platform-specific technology that is used across DoD and the Intelligence Community (IC). In addition, 10.8 FTEs were for terrestrial-based communication technology. It provides mobile communications technology for the Army and non-DoD customers such as the White House Communications Agency. The remaining 26.5 FTEs were funded by a variety of customers and were u</p>	
TECH-0008	SPAWARSYSCEN_CHARLESTON_SC	<p>FTE's not reported in questions N002, N003, N004, N046 are either associated with non-maritime information systems or are inextricably tied to direct support of Fleet platforms or inextricably tied to other non-maritime systems efforts. As a result of BRAC 93 SSC Charleston occupies ultra modern state-of-the-art facilities in support of the DoD warfighter and other federal agencies. SSC Charleston is located on a joint-use military installation with over 836 acres zoned and open for construction to support growth and surge capability in support of the warfighter. There are no RF restrictions or encroachments in the SSC Charleston area that would impede information systems development, testing, or training. SSC Charleston has been very successful in recruiting top engineering talent at educational institutions from Florida to Virginia. Because of the quality of life in Charleston, SC, we have also been very successful in retaining top engineering talent. SSC Charleston is located at a critical transportation hub and joint-use facility that is connected to the primary East Coast C-17 base,</p>	
TECH-0008	SPAWARSYSCEN_NORFOLK_VA	<p>Personnel/billets relocating to SPAWARSYSCEN San Diego from SPAWARSYSCEN Norfolk are directly involved in the engineering of Maritime C4ISR Information Systems whose work does not require they be colocated with the Fleet/Warfighter. Personnel/billets remaining in Norfolk are in direct contact with fleet personnel/warfighters in the Atlantic Fleet and commands located in the Norfolk area. Desks, chairs, confernece tables, files and cabinets accompanying personnel/billets moving to SPAWARSYSCEN San Diego total 33.4 tons in FY-08. These costs should be estimated by SPAWARSYSCEN San Diego.</p>	
TECH-0008	SPAWARSYSCEN_SAN_DIEGO_CA	<p>1. Through a series of graduated steps (existing spaces/conversion of spaces [change FAC codes], increased density of existing spaces, rehab of existing facilities and BRACON, SSC San Diego has identified facilities (and/or buildable land) to accomodate an increased workforce of up to 4000 workyears. 2. NUWC Newport/SSC San Diego resolved the distribution of work with undersea sensors (antennas) remaining at NUWC thus avoiding costs of relocating antenna work to San Diego The workload distribution btwn NUWC/SSC SD has the concurrence of the scenario quarterback.</p>	

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TECH-0008	SPAWARSYSCOM_SAN_DIEGO_CA	<p>SPAWARSYSCOM Alternate Scenario for the SPAWAR claimancy, in addition to the actions accomplished in Tech 0008B. To provide more balanced support to the fleet on the East Coast than afforded in Tech 0008B, while ensuring key support to JFCOM and NETWARCOM, we propose the following: (1) Consolidate East Coast presence of SPAWAR System Centers Charleston, Norfolk and San Diego into a single command, headquartered in Norfolk. (2) Consolidate core workload from SSC Charleston's remote sites at Pensacola, Jacksonville, NOB in Bldg. V-53, Yorktown and Washington Navy Yard to Charleston, SC and Norfolk, Va. Eliminate billets associated with non-core workload. (3) Realign SSC Norfolk presence in San Diego to SSC San Diego. (4) Move 45 SPAWAR HQ billets to government space in Norfolk to support JFCOM and NETWARCOM. (5) Move the SPAWAR Washington Liaison Office, PEO-IT, DNMCI, and DERP from National Capital Area leased space to government space in the Washington Navy Yard. This scenario will strengthen SPAWAR support to the joint warfighter and the fleet. The move of SPAWAR HQ billets to support NETWARCOM will facilitate</p>	<p>Alternatives in progress w/C4ISR sub-group</p>
TECH-0008	CG_MCB_CAMPEN	<p>The movement of the D&A and T&E functions for ground systems will have an adverse impact on the ability of MCTSSA to accomplish its mission. As part of Marine Corps Systems Command, our mission is to provide technical support to the program managers, operating forces, Deputy Commander for C4I integration and to provide a systems integration facility (SIF). Most C4ISR systems are located in all elements of the MAGTF. For example, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is located in the air wing, aboard naval ships, with the service support group, the MEF headquarters as well as division units. Personnel involved in both acquisition and testing develop a broad knowledge base of operations unique to the Marine Corps and how C4ISR systems interoperate with each other across all echelons and regimes (air, ground, and maritime). In that light, systems do not operate solely as air or ground, but rather as a "system of systems" working together. They are developed with this in mind and they are tested for integration and interoperability in this manner as well. Data is</p>	<p>Pulled from scenario by JCSG</p>
TECH-0008	COMNAVAIRSYSCOM_PATUXENT_RIVER_MD	<p>Based on Assumption #2 in Scenario, the work that supports sensors, electronic warfare, and electronics; and information systems is an "inextricable part of a specific effort etc." is not included. Maritime platforms are not included in this category as well as the sensors, electronic warfare, and electronics; and information systems that are integrated on and inextricable from platform are also excluded. Platforms reviewed and excluded include: H-53, V-22, H-60 variants, H-1 variants, P-3, Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft, E-6B, S-3B, E-2C, F-14, F/A-18C/D/E/F, E/A-6B, JSF Naval variant, maritime UAVs, transport/executive aircraft. Sensors and information systems integrated with maritime platforms include radars, data-links, integrated self-protection systems, electro-optics, navigation systems, datalinks, computers, radios, data busses, and communication electronics. This eliminates all but that described in the. Maritime Systems/functions are defined as: "The systems used to provide dominant maritime combat power focused to support Sea Power 21 Naval capabilities. These include systems</p>	<p>George Ryan can talk to this as I am not familiar</p>

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TECH-0008	COMNAVAIRWARCENAC DIV_PATUXENT_RIVER_ MD	Based on Assumption #2 in Scenario, the work that supports sensors, electronic warfare, and electronics; and information systems and is an "inextricable part of a specific effort etc." is not included. Maritime platforms are not included in this category as well as the sensors, electronic warfare, and electronics; and information systems that are integrated on and inextricable them. Platforms reviewed and excluded include: H-53, V-22, H-60 variants, H-1 variants, P-3, Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft, E-6B, S-3B, E-2C, F-14, F/A-18C/D/E/F, E/A-6B, JSF Naval variant, maritime UAVs, transport/executive aircraft. Sensors and information systems integrated with maritime platforms include radars, data-links, integrated self-protection systems, electro-optics, navigation systems, datalinks, computers, radios, data busses, and communication electronics. This eliminates all but that described below. Maritime Systems/functions are defined as: "The systems used to provide dominant maritime combat power focused to support Sea Power 21 Naval capabilities. These include systems deployed from a	
TECH-0008	CBTDIRSYSACT_DAM_N ECK_VA	A. All of the work to be relocated is part of the Advanced Sensor Distribution System (ASDS). The ASDS equipment suite is an integral part of a multi use complex utilized by three commands, CDSA Dam Neck, NSWC PHD Det., and Training Support Center Hampton Roads. CDSA uses the complex to develop non- Aegis Combat Systems and to conduct Strike Group Interoperability testing and certification. NSWC PHD Det. is the life cycle support agent for the 48 radars. Training Support Center Hampton Roads, Dam Neck uses the complex to provide fleet training. ASDS provides live radar from the co-located operational radars (AN/SPS-48E, 49, 67 and 73) overlooking the VACAPES Op Areas and linked to Wallops Island to the following Combat Systems labs listed in the Capacity data call: *Ship Self-Defense System Mk II, * Distributed Engineering Plant node, *Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS) Block 1 LBTS, * Aircraft Carrier ACDS Mockup, *LHA 1/3/5 ACDS Block 0 Lab, *LHA 2/4 ACDS Block 0 Lab, *DDG 993 Combat Direction System (CDS) Lab, *FFG 7 CDS Lab. Removal of ASDS would render the entire complex inoperable from a live radar perspective and preclud	
TECH-0008	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ CORONA_CA	•192.2 FTE – Sensors/EW/Electronics DAT&E (Supplemental Capacity Data Call, Q4277) •6 FTE - Maritime (subsurface) Sensors/EW/Electronics DAT&E •7 FTE – CNI •179.2 FTE - Maritime (surface and above) Sensors/EW/Electronics DAT&E □ 145.8 direct (125.4 civilian, 20.4 contractor) □ 33.4 indirect (29.1 civilian, .7 military, 3.6 contractor) •NSWC Corona performs independent assessment ranging from individual component to end-to-end battleforce level for Navy ship self-defense & air defense performance, including interoperability and associated threat capabilities. To maintain the necessary autonomy of the Navy's Independent Assessment process and assure end-to-end assessments, all analytical elements must be aligned in a command structure separate from activities that perform SEEW systems design, development, acquisition and/or engineering. •8 FTE of Maritime surface SEEW work involves assessment of MFR/VSR developmental testing and is sufficiently isolated from the work discussed below that it could be realigned under this scenario. •The other 171.2 FTE of Maritime surface SEEW work is inextricable from the overall end-to-end, independent assessme	
TECH-0008	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ CRANE_IN	A listing of Programs supported by NSWC Crane and included in Scenario TECH-0008E as C4ISR Maritime Sensor, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare versus C4ISR non-Maritime Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare is a certified attachment to the DONBITS System.	

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TECH-0008	NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV _NEWPORT_RI	<p>(1) Included in the response is the work to integrate Electro-Optic/Infrared (EO/IR) sensors on the Spartan Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV), 3 FTEs. These sensors are used in various missions to detect and identify surface contacts. (2) Shipboard Electronic Systems Evaluation Facilities (SESEF) Fort Story will remain in its present location as it contributes to fleet C4ISR material readiness through electromagnetic test and evaluation services to ashore and afloat commands. Therefore, the associated 9 FTEs, equipment and facilities data are not reported in DONBITS. (3)The following are not surface sensors and therefore are excluded from this scenario: Submarine Sonar; Submarine Periscopes/EW; USW Ranges/Sensors/Op Assessment (comprised of Undersea Sensors); and Defensive Systems/UUVs: 1572 FTE. (4) Module Test and Repair (MTR) should have been binned in Sensors/EW/Electronics DTAP. MTR was incorrectly binned by NUWCNPT in the IST DTAP. MTR workload is as follows: FY03 17.4 FTE, 20 contractors; FY04 20 FTE, 20 contractors; FY05 22 FTE, 22 contractors.</p>	
TECH-0008	NRL_WASHINGTON_DC	<p>In this SDC, NRL is reporting 84 civilian FTEs, 12 milpers, and 22 contractors in Maritime surface Sensors, Electronics, and EW (SEEW) DAT&E. 35 of these civilian FTEs are inextricably linked with the direct Research work remaining at NRL. 26 civilian FTE and 9 contractor FTE are a proportional allocation of overhead support; the magnitude of the direct work does not generate any overhead for transfer. The 12 military FTE are allocated Flight Services support and are not subject to any transfer/relocation since the function cannot be split and is inextricably linked to other NRL missions. Thus, 23 civilian and 13 contractor FTEs are associated with Maritime surface SEEW DAT&E and could be transferred. In the capacity data call, NRL reported 316 total FTEs for SEEW DAT&E, of which 193 are non-Maritime (NRL-directed SAPs; Airborne EW/IR/EO/radar/remote sensing, Land EW/IR/EO/radar/remote sensing, components, non-Federal activities such as international sponsors & contractors, National (3-letter) Agencies, and NFFTIO support activities); 5 are subsurface Maritime;</p>	
TECH-0008	SPAWARSYSCEN_CHAR LESTON_SC	<p>In question 4277 SSC Charleston listed 423 FTE's, of this number 178 were on-site contractors and 6 were accounted for by over-time. Sub-Surface sensors covered in 0008I was 19 FTE's. 198 FTE's are associated with non-maritime sensors, such as shore perimeter security systems (i.e. US Mint, White House, US Capital, Justice, etc.), NSA shore cryptologic systems, Army and Air Force SIGINT systems. 8 FTE's are inextricably linked to SPAWAR programs which will not move as part of this scenario. These 8 FTE's also have an associated contractor base reported in Q46 of 35 people, which should be removed. The following costs, associated with the inextricably linked effort, should be removed from Q17, 20, and 22: One Time Moving Costs of \$125K and Mission Costs of \$150K per year for a total of \$450K. Additionally, Q9 Movement of Mission Equipment will reduce by 8 tons.</p>	

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TECH-0008	SPAWARSYSCEN_SAN_DIEGO_CA	<p>Program Description & Impacts uploaded in SDC and to the SDC notebook. Program Description & Impacts uploaded in SDC and to the SDC notebook. DoD 4277 reporting FTEs for Sensors: are 364 Govt and 136 KTR. (Full spreadsheet provided in Scenario Notebook and uploaded to Scenario Data Call.) Work proposed for transfer: Undersea [37 Govt FTE and 15 KTR] and Surface [25 Govt FTE and 10 KTR] CLASSIFIED projects not reported in questions #02-46 comprise 28 Govt and 11 KTR FTEs. NON-MARITIME not reported in #02-46 [52/21] DoE Radiac, JMeDSAF, MDSE, NS Radiac, Photonic Link, DARPA, DT Radiac, JMeDSAF, JSAF, and JSIMS-USMC. COMPLETED work or WORK TO COMPLETE prior to FY 09 not reported in #02-46 comprise 51 Govt and 21 KTR FTEs working Technology Transfer, TRIDENT support, (SIE) UAV, AASS, CBNR Sensors, Comp Controlled Coupler, ENWGS, IASW, JSIMS, Misc Support, MTWC MAG TAF, NIST WWVB Testing, SWSSP, UCS, USNS CONCORD, WSTTT, Verification & Validation, MEMS, Antenna Testing, AREPS, EM Models, M CCP, Topside Design, PMRF Optics. Reported work in SDC0008(I/E) deemed</p>	
TECH-0008	COMNAVAIRWARCENAC DIV_PATUXENT_RIVER_MD	<p>There will be NO MOVES, NO ELIMINATION NOR DUPLICATION OF THE 191 DIRECT FTEs and 24 INDIRECT FTEs associated with Information Systems workload conducted at NAWCAD Patuxent River. All of these FTEs are excluded from this Scenario per the following reasons: This Scenario covers only Maritime (Not Air Domain); based on Assumption #2, we reviewed all relevant programs for example, E-2C, CEC, F-18 MIDs, Link-16, E-6B ABNCAP, P-3C TSDL, AYK-14 Mission Computers, etc., and found that personnel and functions listed under Information Systems are in support of T&E Engineering, Systems Engineering, Software Support Activities, Aircrew Systems, UAV Support , Distributed Simulation and Range support are critical to the conduct of the multitude of NAWCAD Projects, Programs, and Platforms and therefore not included. The Series 2083E Automated Antenna Measurement System, AN/SRQ-4, Radio Terminal Set and AN/ARQ-44 and AN/ARQ-58, and the AN/SRQ-4 Hot Test Beds, and AN/SRQ-4 Simulator/Stimulator are also excluded based on Assumption 2. Other workload identified as Information Systems but is non-Maritime at</p>	
TECH-0008	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_CORONA_CA	<p>•357.7 FTE Information Systems Technology (IST) DAT&E (Supplemental Capacity Data Call, Q4277) –11 FTE are CNI; 333.7 FTE Maritime IST DAT&E (273.9 Direct (203.3 civilians, 1 military, 69.6 contractors); and 59.8 Indirect (52.3 civilians, 1.1 military, 6.4 contractors) •13 FTE Non-Maritime IST excluded as Air Force Range Instrumentation Engineering work. •NSWC Corona performs independent assessment ranging from individual component to end-to-end battle force level for Navy ship self-defense and air defense performance, including interoperability and associated threat capabilities. To maintain the necessary autonomy of the Navy's Independent Assessment process and assure end-to-end assessments, all analytical elements must be aligned in a command structure separate from activities that perform IST system design, development, acquisition and/or engineering. •The other 333.7 FTE of Maritime IST is inextricable from the overall end-to-end, independent assessment process and involves: –39.3 FTE of data collection, entry, and maintenance for data that is used to assess in-service weapon and combat systems material readiness; –16.7 FTE of data collec</p>	

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TECH-0008	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_DAHLGREN_VA	NSWC Dahlgren reported 483 Total Civilian Wkyrs (pre CNI)/ 386 Direct Wkyrs in the Info Systems DTAP in the Capacity Data Call. This included 4 of DD's Tech Capabilities i.e. Warfare Anal (92 wkyrs), Mission Plan and Target Sys (30 wkyrs), National Needs (H&FP) (281 wkyrs), and Battleforce Systems (79 wkyrs). They were put in IS DTAP because they did not fit into W&A and Sensors/EW/Electronics DTAPs. In the early 90's, NSWC DD was purified with all our C4I programs sent to SSC San Diego and SSC Charleston. . Maritime Information Systems RDAT&E work that is "Inextricable" from Warfare Systems: Naval shipborne warfare systems are specifically designed to be fully embedded within the form of a ship's hull design and interoperable with the warfare systems of other ships and aircraft that comprise naval battle groups. The elements of the detect-to-engage sequence (e.g., detection, correl & class, targeting, wpns initiation, launcher control, weapons control and com & cont) are physically and functionally integrated and not separable as independent components. Our response identifies (30 positions) (and severs for realignment/relocation) the work as	Synergy issue. Navy unique work should remain at Dahlgren
TECH-0008	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_PORT_HUENEME_CA	//152 FTE Information Systems DAT&E (Supplemental Capacity Data Call, Q4277): 127 civilians; 6 military and 19 contractors // 25 FTE decrease due to reduced tasking/workload = DCGS-N, AADC, C3I Forecasted Reduction in FY09 Tasking of 15 FTEs + Inextricable Programs from WSI are forecasted to reduce by 10 FTEs) // 7 FTEs (6 civilian and 1 contractor) to be relocated to SPAWAR in support of DCGS-N, AADC, and C3I // 120 FTEs (96 civilian, 1 officer and 23 contractors) is inextricable to Weapons Systems Integration (WSI) at NSWC PHD: Naval Shipborne Warfare Systems are specifically designed to be fully embedded within the form of a ship's hull design. The elements of the detect-to-engage sequence (e.g. detection, classification, targeting, weapons initiation, launcher control, weapons control and command & control) are physically and functionally integrated and not separable as independent components. This response identifies the work (and severs for realignment/relocation) associated with that portion of combat systems equipment in-service support	Synergy issue. Navy unique work should remain at Port Hueneme
TECH-0008	NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV_NEWPORT_RI	(1)In the Capacity Data Call NUWC Newport binned a total of 995 FTE (769 direct, 226 overhead) in Information Systems Technology (IST). Integrated Submarine Combat Systems work, 829 FTE (638 direct, 191 overhead), were in IST. This work is Integrated Submarine Combat Systems FTE an inextricable part of the Submarine Weapons System work and include USW Sonar, Periscope, EW Sensor, Torpedo, Tomahawk and Weapon Launchers. The TECH0008F Scenario quarterback has directed us not to include this IST work in our scenario response. (2) Through previous realignment actions, the Navy has been eliminating redundant and duplicative submarine combat systems efforts and consolidating all efforts at a single site, NUWC Newport, to create an integrated Submarine Weapon System Capability to include RDAT&E for SSN, SSBN, SSGN, Submarine New Construction and Foreign Military Sales of Submarine Combat Systems. The development and testing of an end-to-end weapon system requires concurrent and highly integrated Sensor, Communications, Weapon, Weapon Launcher and Combat Systems facilities that replicates shipboard and tactical conditions unde	Submarine unique synergy and integration issue

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TECH-0008	NCTSI_SAN_DIEGO_CA	<p>NCTSI in its entirety is involved in Maritime Information Systems RDAT&E. NCTSI has four detachments, which are ideally located in fleet concentration areas to perform their fleet support functions: Det-1 - San Diego, CA (UIC: N42496); Det-2 - Norfolk, VA (UIC: N41738); Det-4 - Sigonella, Italy (UIC: N42499); Det-5 - Yokosuka, Japan (UIC: N42497). NCTSI HQ and Det-1 are co-located within walking distance of SPAWARSYSCEN San Diego facilities on the THIRD Fleet compound of Naval Base Point Loma. NCTSI HQ San Diego occupies portions of Building 24A, 24B and 56. Det-1 is sole occupant of Building 67. Det-2 is sole occupant of Building CEP-210 and 172 on Naval Station Norfolk. Both Det-1 and Det-2 are geographically located to best support units in the two major fleet concentration areas. Since NCTSI HQ and Det-1 are located adjacent to SSC, it would be hard to justify physical movement of technical personnel or equipment. Highly recommend not moving NCTSI's two specialized testing labs also located near SSC in Building 24B. Anticipate SSC would take over administrative, supply, contracting administration and comptroller functions, along with some</p>	
TECH-0008	NRL_WASHINGTON_DC	<p>NRL reported 131.3 total FTEs in Information Systems (IS) DAT&E, of which 86.5 FTEs were direct program, 37.3 FTEs were proportional allocation of overhead support, and 7.5 FTEs were for military personnel (including allocated Flight Services support and a proportional share of lab-wide military staff). The direct program is comprised of 60.8 FTEs worked by well over 200 civilian scientists/researchers (the other 25.7 FTEs were specific direct contractor FTEs). An analysis of the specific work supported by the civilian researchers revealed that none are in "maritime" category. For example, 23.5 FTEs were for NSA- and SPAWAR-funded general-purpose INFOSEC technology, including secure voice, secure data, and cryptographic key management technology. This work provides non-platform-specific technology that is used across DoD and the Intelligence Community (IC). In addition, 10.8 FTEs were for terrestrial-based communication technology. It provides mobile communications technology for the Army and non-DoD customers such as the White House Communications Agency. The remaining 26.5 FTEs were funded by a variety of customers and were u</p>	
TECH-0008	SPAWARSYSCEN_CHARLESTON_SC	<p>In 4277 we reported 3,201 FTEs for info systems. 1,119 are on-site contractors, IPAs, etc. and 51 FTEs equate to Gov. overtime leaving 2,031 as our baseline of civilian and Mil info systems personnel. 529 are maritime of which 18 FTEs were reported under SDCs IND-0063C, 73E, and 83G. The non-maritime FTEs consist of 555 Joint, 435 other Federal, 373 ground, and 139 air. Of the 511 remaining maritime FTEs, 155 are inextricably linked to direct, waterfront installs, repair, and training support of the Atlantic Fleet in Norfolk, Mayport, and Kings Bay. 31 FTEs are inextricably linked to the oversight of the production, integration and testing of new construction ship and submarine radio rooms (SSGN, SSBN, LHA(R), LPD, CVN, DDG, LHD, LCS, TAKE, and TAGMR) produced and tested in Charleston. Moving this capability is extremely expensive, would require duplicate facilities so as not to interrupt production, and would substantially increase the cost due to the labor cost differentials between Charleston and San Diego. 91 FTEs are inextricably linked to maintain operational readiness and</p>	Being address by C4ISR Sub-group

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TECH-0008	SPAWARSYSCEN_NORF OLK_VA	<p>The increase in quantities reported in SDC 0008F over those reported in SDC 0008B reflect 100% SSC Norfolk assets being transferred to SSC San Diego and will result in significant adverse impacts. Quantities originally reported in SDC 0008B provide the most efficient and effective organization that fully meets the spirit, intent and details of the Maritime Info Sys RDAT&E consolidation while maintaining the ability to leverage a presence in Norfolk for the purpose of essential Direct Fleet Support and support of joint and coalition efforts at JFCOM, NETWARCOM, and CFFC. These assets are required to remain in Norfolk to provide direct fleet support to customers located in the Norfolk area. Fleet customers and sponsors located within 60 miles of Norfolk as stated in the military value data call total 332. This represents the largest single concentration of SSC Norfolk customers and stakeholders in the world. Further, a total of 1,370 customer sites are located in the Atlantic Fleet, which are currently supported by fleet support assets located in Norfolk. Fleet Response Plan,</p>	Being address by C4ISR Sub- group
TECH-0008	SPAWARSYSCOM_SAN_ DIEGO_CA	<p>SPAWARSYSCOM Alternate Scenario for the SPAWAR claimancy, in addition to the actions accomplished in Tech 0008F. To provide more balanced support to the fleet on the East Coast than afforded in Tech 0008F, while ensuring key support to JFCOM and NETWARCOM, we propose the following: (1) Consolidate East Coast presence of SPAWAR System Centers Charleston, Norfolk and San Diego into a single command, headquartered in Norfolk. (2) Consolidate core workload from SSC Charleston's remote sites at Pensacola, Jacksonville, NOB in Bldg. V-53, Yorktown and Washington Navy Yard to Charleston, SC and Norfolk, Va. Eliminate billets associated with non-core workload. (3) Realign SSC Norfolk presence in San Diego to SSC San Diego. (4) Move 45 SPAWAR HQ billets to government space in Norfolk to support JFCOM and NETWARCOM. (5) Move the SPAWAR Washington Liaison Office, PEO-IT, DNMCI, and DERP from National Capital Area leased space to government space in the Washington Navy Yard. The projected savings in lease costs are \$1.3M annually. This scenario will strengthen SPAWAR support to the joint warfighter and the fleet. The move</p>	
TECH-0008	CG_MCB_CAMPEN	<p>The movement of the D&A function for ground systems will have an adverse impact on the ability of MCTSSA to accomplish its mission. As part of Marine Corps Systems Command, our mission is to provide technical support to the program managers, operating forces, Deputy Commander for C4I integration and to provide a systems integration facility (SIF). Most C4ISR systems are located in all elements of the MAGTF. For example, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is located in the air wing, aboard naval ships, with the service support group, the MEF headquarters as well as division units. Personnel involved in D&A activities are also involved in T&E activities and have developed a broad knowledge base of how the Marine Corps operates and how C4ISR systems interoperate with each other across all echelons. In that light, systems do not operate solely as air or ground, but rather as a "system of systems" working together. They are developed with this in mind and they are tested for integration and interoperability in this manner as well. Relocation of this function will essentially "break" the ability of the Marine Corps to field C4ISR systems to the operating fo</p>	

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TECH-0008	COMNAVAIRSYSCOM_P ATUXENT_RIVER_MD	NAWCAD has FTEs in Air (not Maritime) area, Air (Maritime), Maritime (not Air) and ground based systems (not Air, not Maritime).The Air (Maritime) Sensor Electronic Warfare and Electronics FTEs, represent the majority of the Sensor Electronic Warfare and Electronics work at NAWCAD. This covers the gamut of Naval Aviation capabilities at NAWCAD Pax River. Specifically, work in the Air (Maritime) Sensor Electronic Warfare and Electronics airborne systems includes: radar, airborne IFF, electro-optics, infra-red, electronic warfare sensors, navigation and/or mission systems (electronics) on the following naval platforms: E-2, P-3, E-6B, MH-60R, SH-60R, MH-60S, SH-60F, S-3, H-53, UH-1, AH-1, F-14, F/A-18, CH-46, and T-45. FTEs in the Maritime (not Air) cover work on shipboard landing aids/radars, air traffic control systems, shipboard IFF systems, and shipboard electronics systems. FTEs supporting ground based Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics include work supporting Special Forces sensors and electronics, support to the White House communications, National Guard communications and electronics. Actions 1 and 3: NAWCAD Pax River reported 2339 FTEs Sensor El	
TECH-0008	COMNAVAIRWARCENAC DIV_PATUXENT_RIVER_MD	NAWCAD has FTEs in Air (not Maritime) area, Air (Maritime), Maritime (not Air) and ground based systems (not Air, not Maritime).The Air (Maritime) Sensor Electronic Warfare and Electronics FTEs, represent the majority of the Sensor Electronic Warfare and Electronics work at NAWCAD. This covers the gamut of Naval Aviation capabilities at NAWCAD Pax River. Specifically, work in the Air (Maritime) Sensor Electronic Warfare and Electronics airborne systems includes: radar, airborne IFF, electro-optics, infra-red, electronic warfare sensors, navigation and/or mission systems (electronics) on the following naval platforms: E-2, P-3, E-6B, MH-60R, SH-60R, MH-60S, SH-60F, S-3, H-53, UH-1, AH-1, F-14, F/A-18, CH-46, and T-45. FTEs in the Maritime (not Air) cover work on shipboard landing aids/radars, air traffic control systems, shipboard IFF systems, and shipboard electronics systems. FTEs supporting ground based Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics include work supporting Special Forces sensors and electronics, support to the White House communications, National Guard communications and electronics. Actions 1 and 3: NAWCAD Pax River reported 2339 FTEs Sensor El	
TECH-0008	CBTDIRSYSACT_DAM_N ECK_VA	A. The special sensors systems at Combat Direction Systems Activity (CDSA) Dam Neck include the AN/USQ-149 (V) 2 CLUSTER SNOOP, AN/WSQ-5 CLUSTER SPECTATOR, AN/WLR-18 CLASSIC SALMON, AN/URL-21 CLASSIC TROLL, AN/BRQ-2 CLASSIC ERNE, PORTHOLE and related classified sensor systems sponsored by the Office of Naval Intelligence, Commander Naval Security Group, NAVSEA PMS-435, CNO Special Projects and other DoD organizations. CDSA's role for these programs includes full life cycle services from acquisition, integration, test, training and fleet support for the intelligence warfighting community. An issue not captured in this data call that has tangible mission impact not costed or considered elsewhere is the pre-deployment fleet intelligence operator training conducted using the unique special sensor systems that are transferred by this action. Additional costs should be factored in for travel, etc. for fleet sailors. For planning purposes, in FY 04 training for approximately one hundred and fifteen intelligence operators was conducted on these assets. B. Sensor, Electronic Warfare and Electronic DAT&E activities from the capacity data call that v	

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TECH-0008	COMNAVAIRWARCENAC DIV_PATUXENT_RIVER_ MD	NAWCAD reported 2339 FTE in Maritime SEW&E in FY03 in the Capacity Data Call. Of this number, only 70 FTE perform SEW&E work in maritime subsurface sensors; specifically sonobuoy development which is accomplished in close coordination with the development airborne processors and mission systems and requires careful integration into existing and future a/c such as MMA, P3, MH60R, and SH60B. The remaining FTE support SEW&E work in non-subsurface maritime (air) e.g., radar, airborne IFF, electro-optics, infra-red, EW sensors, navigation and/or mission systems (electronics) on the following naval platforms: E-2,P-3,E6B,MH60R,SH60R,MH60S,SH60F,S3,H53,UH-1,AH-1,F14, FA18,CH46 and T45: maritime (not air) work on shipboard landing systems, shipboard IFF systems and shipboard electronics systems; and ground-based work supporting Special Forces, White House and National Guard. In addition to CIVPERS FTE, NAWCAD reported 23 MILPERS. Of these 21 support A/C and flight test missions for all air platform work at NAWCAD; including flight crew, mission systems, T&E of the complete sensor	
TECH-0008	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ CORONA_CA	•192 FTE – Sensors/EW/Electronics DAT&E (reported In SCD, Q4277) •7 FTE – CNI •6 FTE - Maritime (subsurface) Sensors/EW/Electronics DAT&E •179 FTE - Maritime (surface and above) Sensors/EW/Electronics DAT&E •NSWC Corona performs independent assessment ranging from individual component to end-to-end battleforce level for Navy ship self-defense & air defense performance, including interoperability and associated threat capabilities. To maintain the necessary autonomy of the Navy's Independent Assessment process and assure end-to-end assessments, all analytical elements must be aligned in a command structure separate from activities that perform SEEW system design, development, acquisition and/or engineering. The subsurface work (6 FTE) is inextricable from the overall independent assessment process and involves: •1) 1 FTE of database entry, maintenance, and assessment work for the Material Readiness Assessment Program. The Navy consolidated combat system readiness programs into a single Material Readiness Database to eliminate redundant systems and enable consistent, higher level assessment of the combat system, pla	
TECH-0008	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ CRANE_IN	A listing of Programs supported by NSWC Crane and included in Scenario TECH-0008i as C4ISR- subsurface Maritime Sensor, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare versus C4ISR non-subsurface Maritime Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare is a certified attachment to the DONBITS system.....Sonobuoy testing is currently conducted in a fresh water lake located at NSWC Crane, Indiana. If this scenario is executed and access to the lake is not available to NUWC Newport, then a suitable location for conducting sonobuoy testing must be identified.	

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TECH-0008	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ DAHLGREN_VA	<p>In the Capacity Data Call, NSWC Dahlgren reported 268 Total Civilian FTEs equating to 208 Direct FTEs for Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics. These were the sum of the efforts in Sensor Systems RDT&E (104 Dir Wkys), Electronic Warfare Systems RDT&E (49 Direct Wkys), and Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (55 Direct Wkys) NSWCDD Technical Capabilities. There were no efforts in Maritime Subsurface Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics. Programs included in Sensor Systems RDT&E are: Electro Optics, ELINT, SPY/MFR, ONI Collection Systems, SSDS Sensor Systems Support, Cobra Judy, and Several Classified Programs. None are subsurface. Programs included in Electronic Warfare Systems RDT&E include: Pulse Power/Directed Energy, SLQ32, Surf EW Improv Prog (SEWIP), NULKA, and TSSC. None are subsurface. Programs included in Electromagnetic Environment Effects include: SEMCIP, Freq Mgmt Analysis, Topside Design, E3 Ship/System Assessments, and HERO. None are subsurface</p>	<p>Appears to be DON surface unique and should stay at Dahlgren</p>
TECH-0008	NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV_ NEWPORT_RI	<p>1. Cheatham Annex Facility to remain in place with existing personnel under NUWC Newport. 2. Sonobuoy testing is currently conducted in a fresh water pond located at NSWC Crane, Indiana. If this scenario is executed and access to the pond is not available to NUWC Newport (e.g., due to a full closure of all government activities in Crane Indiana), then a suitable location for conducting sonobuoy testing must be identified. Candidate locations may be Seneca Lake (located at Seneca, New York) or Lake Pend Oreille (located near Bayview, Idaho) but will require verification that local ambient noise is sufficiently low to meet test requirements. For purposes of developing cost data for this scenario, the recurring cost for conducting fresh water tests has been calculated assuming Seneca Lake is found to be an acceptable test site.</p>	
TECH-0008	NRL_WASHINGTON_DC	<p>In this SDC, NRL is reporting 3 civilian FTEs and 2 contractors in Maritime subsurface Sensors, Electronics, and EW (SEEW) DAT&E. 1 of these civilian FTEs is inextricably linked with the direct Research work remaining at NRL and 1 additional civilian FTE is a proportional allocation of overhead support; the magnitude of the direct work does not generate any overhead for transfer. There are no military personnel working on Maritime subsurface SEEW. Thus, only 1 civilian and 2 contractor FTEs are directly associated with Maritime subsurface SEEW DAT&E and could be transferred. In the capacity data call, NRL reported 316 total FTEs for SEEW DAT&E, of which 193 are non-Maritime (NRL-directed SAPs; Airborne EW/IR/EO/radar/remote sensing, Land EW/IR/EO/radar/remote sensing, components, non-Federal activities such as international sponsors & contractors, National (3-letter) Agencies, and NFFTIO support activities); 118 are surface Maritime; and 5 are subsurface Maritime (3 civilian and 2 contractors) as delineated above.</p>	

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TECH-0008	SPAWARSYSCEN_CHAR LESTON_SC	<p>In question 4277 SSC Charleston listed 423 FTE's, of this number 178 are on-site contractors and 6 were accounted for by over-time. Surface and above sensors reported in 0008E is 22 FTE's. 198 FTE's are associated with non-maritime sensors, such as shore perimeter security systems (i.e. US Mint, White House, US Capital, Justice, etc.), NSA shore cryptologic systems, and Army and Air Force SIGINT systems. Of the remaining personnel, 19 FTE perform undersea sensor work. 18 of these perform waterfront support to Navy's SURTASS vessels including preparation of deployment load-out kits and repair of undersea sensor arrays at a specialized facility located at the SURTASS vessel pier on Naval Amphibious Base (NAB), Little Creek. The remaining 1 FTE is located at Cheatham Annex Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, Williamsburg, VA, providing specialized waterfront support to undersea cable laying vessels operating from Cheatham Annex Naval Weapons Station. Unique aspects of these facilities include: underground ISOPAR/ NORPAR storage tanks and associated plumbing to transport oil to depot for filling modules; 300+ ft facility to accommodate towed array modu</p>	
TECH-0008	SPAWARSYSCEN_SAN_ DIEGO_CA	<p>O/H personnel elimination in FY06 & 07 as coordinated with losing activity. Program Description & Impacts uploaded in SDC and to the SDC notebook. Program Description & Impacts uploaded in SDC and to the SDC notebook. DoD 4277 reporting FTEs for Sensors: are 364 Govt and 136 KTR. (Full spreadsheet provided in Scenario Notebook and uploaded to Scenario Data Call.) Work proposed for transfer: Undersea [37 Govt FTE and 15 KTR] and Surface [25 Govt FTE and 10 KTR] CLASSIFIED projects not reported in questions #02-46 comprise 28 Govt and 11 KTR FTEs. NON-MARITIME not reported in #02-46 [52/21] DoE Radiac, JMeDSAF, MDSE, NS Radiac, Photonic Link, DARPA, DT Radiac, JMeDSAF, JSAF, and JSIMS-USMC. COMPLETED work or WORK TO COMPLETE prior to FY 09 not reported in #02-46 comprise 51 Govt and 21 KTR FTEs working Technology Transfer, TRIDENT support, (SIE) UAV, AASS, CBNR Sensors, Comp Controlled Coupler, ENWGS, IASW, JSIMS, Misc Support, MTWC MAG TAF, NIST WWVB Testing, SWSSP, UCS, USNS CONCORD, WSTTT, Verification & Validation, MEMS, Antenna Testing, AREPS, EM Models, MCCP, Topside</p>	
TECH-0009	NRL_WASHINGTON_DC	<p>NRL-MRY & SSC are unique national assets whose locations were chosen to maximize effectiveness. Both co-located with principal operational customers (NRL-MRY with FNMOC & NRL-SSC with NAVOCEANO & CNMOC), as well as with variety of other government & academic institutions engaged in ocean & atmospheric sciences. This scenario would hurt their day-to-day interactions & the rapid transition of new technology into DOD systems. NRL-MRY is only DOD activity performing R&D for multiscale numerical weather prediction systems with global automated satellite applications. NRL-SSC is only DOD activity dedicated to performing R&D for ocean battlespace environmental characterization & forecasting using global to local in-situ, remotely sensed, & other data and advanced, high-performance computation. Proposed move will result in massive personnel loss & long-term loss to DOD S&T capability. Recruitment pool for NRL-MRY/SSC (almost exclusively PhDs) is small. Number of new atmospheric/oceanographic science PhDs is limited, many not US citizens, and even fewer have specializations required. Recruitment/training time & costs will be substantial, & will se</p>	

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TECH-0010	CNR_ARLINGTON_VA	<p>*10 USC 5014 designates Chief of Naval Research (CNR) as member of Secretary of the Navy's staff. All members of SECNAV's staff are located within NCR. CNR also serves as Director, Test and Evaluation and Technology Requirements (N091) on the Chief of Naval Operation's staff and Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps (Science & Technology). *Though Chesapeake Beach MD may be considered in the Washington DC area, separation from proximity to SECNAV and other assigned functions would negatively impact mission requirements. *Fort Belvoir, VA and ARL, Adelphi MD do not have access to a public mass transportation system; geographic separation from proximity to SECNAV would adversely affect mission. *Potential community impact associated with loss of Navy Federal Credit Union (NFCU) co-located with ONR. Since ONR subsidizes lease cost of NFCU, branch is expected to close if ONR relocates, impacting 23,000+ NFCU members living within 5 miles of branch. *Local travel costs could increase significantly for Fort Belvoir, ARL, and Chesapeake Bay sites. *Preferred site within NCR is 1) Anacostia Annex (close proximity to the Pentagon and convenient access to public transportation).</p>	
TECH-0013	CG_MCB_QUANTICO_VA	<p>The realignments presented in this scenario degrade RDTE&A functions from the Marine Corps perspective. The actions realign functions into colocated joint programs. Joint programs are already efficiently being coordinated. The actions in this scenario isolate functions from their parent Marine Corps Command and from the established Marine Corps combat development process. This process consists of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Marine Corps Systems Command and the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity all located at MCB Quantico. The synergy derived from being colocated with the entire development process, to include the command that will develop the system, test the system, direct deployment and ultimately, use the system can not be understated nor can a value be placed on its worth. Numbers of contractors includes personnel co-located at MCSC as well as those providing program support but not co-located at MCSC. The rationale for this is that if the function moves, so will the support capability. MCSC does not perform Research or Operational T&E. Vehicles identified are in support of the engineering test facility.</p>	<p>Synergy issue. Needs to stay at Quantico</p>
TECH-0013	DRPM_AAA_WASHINGTON_DC	<p>Within the DRPM AAA, the development and acquisition (D&A) functions directly interface on a daily basis with our production, test and evaluation and logistics functions to execute an integrated program management strategy. In addition, DRPM AAA is co-located with our prime contractor, General Dynamics, through an integrated process and product development structure necessary to provide focus on the design, procurement, production and fielding of the vehicle. Removing the government D&A efforts from this integrated environment would destroy the program continuity by negatively impacting real-time communication and information availability and by impairing efficient and timely decision making. This integrated environment is particularly critical during the development and early production stages of our program to ensure rapid responses are provided to emerging technical issues and to provide feedback to all aspects of the program through the design, build, test, redesign cycle. The DRPM AAA is currently located within a 30 minute radius of Quantico and the Pentagon where the SSC San Diego has responded with all "0" or "N/A" for all the questions in scenario TECH0014 because it had no reported work in "Space Platforms" in BRAC data calls.</p>	<p>This runs counter to contract and acquisition strategy. Should be pulled from scenario.</p>
TECH-0014	SPAWARSYSCEN_SAN_DIEGO_CA	<p>SSC San Diego has responded with all "0" or "N/A" for all the questions in scenario TECH0014 because it had no reported work in "Space Platforms" in BRAC data calls.</p>	

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TECH-0014	SPAWARSYSCOM_SAN_DIEGO_CA	Special Requirements to be added by the Receiving Activity as follows: (1) Dedicated SCIF room; 300 SF with 2 SIPRNET seats and 1 safe. (2) One Time IT Costs: \$115,000 for NMCI infrastructure build-out. (3) New modular furniture for 40 people: \$180,000. Additionally, two of the three billets included in the "Det Washington DC" (Action 4) are located at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in Chantilly, VA. These billets have dual reporting to the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Space Systems and to the SPAWAR Space Field Activity (SSFA) at the NRO. Because of the duties associated with the Naval NRO activities, these two billets must remain in Chantilly. We have complied with the scenario Data Call regarding the one remaining billet at "Det Washington DC" moving from our Washington Liaison Office in Arlington, VA, to Peterson AFB, CO. However, that billet should remain in the DC area because it is needed to support the major space acquisition program Mobile User Objective System (MUOS). The incumbent in this WLO billet will continue to	
TECH-0017	CG_MCB_QUANTICO_VA	Identified functions remain the responsibility of CG MCSC based on scenario realignment vice consolidation. Personnel numbers are based on a snapshot as of today and do not include future personnel realignments planned for MCSC. Responses only consider individuals physically located at MCB Quantico MCSC. MCOTE facilities requirements are a minimum of 3400 SF of Administrative space. . MCOTEA conducts Title 10 Testing and Evaluation as part of the USMC's Acquisition triad. This triad includes MCCDC, the capabilities developer and MARCORSYSCOM, the material solution developer. The close proximity of MCOTEA to these organizations facilitates cross functional and cross organizational Product Team execution model. MCOTEA often performs as the integrating organization between the capabilities and material developers. Relocation of any single element or segment of this triad introduces organizational inefficiencies and obstacles to team formation and execution. Secondly, MARCORSYSCOM is our fiscal sponsor. All T&E budget formulation is coordinated through MARCORSYSCOM before forwarding to higher Headquarters, (i.e. Programs and	
TECH-0017	COMNAVAIRWARCENW_PNDIV_CHINA_LAKE_CA	Action 7: Movement of guns/ammo work before JSF IOC may impact JSF schedule.	
TECH-0017	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_DAHLGREN_VA	System RDAT&E work that is "Inextricable" from WSI: Naval shipborne warfare systems are specifically designed to be fully embedded within the form of a ship's hull design and interoperable with the warfare systems of other ships and aircraft that comprise naval battle groups. The elements of the detect-to-engage sequence (e.g., detection, classification, targeting, weapons initiation, launcher control, weapons control and command & control) are physically and functionally integrated and not separable as independent components. Our response identifies (and severs for realignment/relocation) the work associated with that portion of combat systems equipment RDAT&E that is fully separable from the support for the integrated and assured interoperability of all elements of naval shipborne warfare systems. Details are provided as an attachment in DONBITS.	

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TECH-0017	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_I NDIAN_HEAD_MD	IHDIV's W&A RDAT&E includes the full-spectrum of energetics work (molecular research to production process development). In accordance with the scenario, our response severs for realignment/relocation all Guns and Ammo efforts and retains the remainder of W&A energetics such as warheads, rocket/missile propellant, PADs/CADs, etc., DEMIL, and energetics-related production. The intellectual capital comprising the RDAT&E workforce is utilized across the full range of products and weapons systems that the energetics effort supports, including W&A. The separation will require the replication of some portion of the intellectual capital at one or the other site. These costs and impacts are not included in our response. To the extent personnel do not relocate, there will be additional cost and time to reconstitute the expertise to perform energetics and technical work required to meet Navy requirements. Timing/phasing of this relocation must consider the need to maintain full support for ongoing combat operations.	
TECH-0017	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ PORT_HUENEME_CA	NSWC Louisville performs ISEA work for naval guns and is co-located with the OEMs associated with those systems. Depending on the gaining location, costs may be incurred for replication of selected test complexes.	
TECH-0018	CG_MCB_QUANTICO_VA	MCB Quantico / MARCORSSYSCOM does not conduct research. Therefore, the questions in this data call are marked N/A. MCB Quantico Actions 1-3 should have addressed all areas of RDTE&A. The three actions in the data call pertain to Research only. As directed by the Quarterback and IAT, the answers provided by MCB Quantico are based on Actions 1-3 as stated in the data call (the incorrect actions covering Research only). A new data call needs to be issued containing the corrected actions for MCB Quantico / MARCORSSYSCOM and MCOTEA..	
TECH-0018	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_I NDIAN_HEAD_MD	There are three employees whose permanent duty station is not Seal Beach. These employees are located: at Norfolk, VA; Quantico, VA; and Albuquerque, NM, performing Fleet or site specific support. Our response realigns these personnel but does not include them in the number of personnel to be relocated.	
TECH-0018	NSWC_INDIAN_HEAD_D ET_YORKTOWN	The W&A RDAT&E personnel identified to be re-aligned and relocated to Indian Head includes three persons whose functions are specifically related to guns/ammo.	
TECH-0019	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_I NDIAN_HEAD_MD	This scenario dealt only with moving energetic material capabilities to Indian Head. In addition to relocating energetic materials capability from Indian Head Division Yorktown Detachment, recommend moving all energetics capability from the Indian Head Division Yorktown Detachment to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head, MD. Energetic materials capability encompasses the majority but not all of the capability at the Indian Head Division Yorktown Detachment. If Scenario TECH-0019 is enacted the Navy would be left with 24 FTEs conducting weapons engineering and QE work at the Indian Head Division Yorktown Detachment. Additionally the engineering and QE work done at the Indian Head Division Yorktown Detachment is similar to work being done at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head, MD. Moving all of the detachment would increase the receiving site cost. However, maintaining a very small detachment would be costly and inefficient for mission accomplishment.	

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TECH-0019	NSWC_INDIAN_HEAD_DET_YORKTOWN	<p>This scenario dealt only with moving energetic material capabilities to Indian Head. In addition to relocating energetic materials capability from Indian Head Division Yorktown Detachment, recommend moving all energetics capability from the Indian Head Division Yorktown Detachment to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head, MD. Energetic materials capability encompasses the majority but not all of the capability at the Indian Head Division Yorktown Detachment. If Scenario TECH-0019 is enacted the Navy would be left with 24 FTEs conducting weapons engineering and QE work at the Indian Head Division Yorktown Detachment. Additionally the engineering and QE work done at the Indian Head Division Yorktown Detachment is similar to work being done at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head, MD. Moving all of the detachment would increase the receiving site cost. However, maintaining a very small detachment would be costly and inefficient for mission accomplishment.</p>	
TECH-0020	NRL_WASHINGTON_DC	<p>NRL-MRY is the only DOD activity performing R&D for multiscale numerical weather prediction (NWP) systems with global automated satellite applications. Substantial personnel losses in execution of this scenario would require completely rebuilding DOD scientific expertise in this area; would decimate DOD's NWP R&D capability, thereby seriously reducing DOD's ability to produce state-of-the-art, tactical NWP inputs for operations, including Spec Ops, Strike, and Expeditionary Warfare. The proposed relocation would separate NRL-MRY from its principal operational customer (FNMOC), would require an investment of \$44M (not including the required MILCON and the COBRA-calculated BRAC costs) but would provide no significant savings. NRL-MRY intellectual capital required 33 years to develop into a unique DOD capability, focused exclusively on measurement and prediction of militarily relevant atmospheric phenomena, extending from basic research to transition into operational products. Relocation of this cohesive activity will result in massive loss of personnel and long-term loss to DOD S&T capability. Similarly, move-related attrition is expected to cripple the highly specialized Nav</p>	
TECH-0020	NRL_WASHINGTON_DC	<p>NRL-MRY is the only DOD activity performing R&D for multiscale numerical weather prediction (NWP) systems with global automated satellite applications. Substantial personnel losses in execution of this scenario would require completely rebuilding DOD scientific expertise in this area and would decimate DOD's NWP R&D capability, thereby seriously reducing DOD's ability to produce state-of-the-art, tactical NWP inputs for operations, including Spec Ops, Strike, and Expeditionary Warfare. The proposed relocation would separate NRL-MRY from its principal operational customer (FNMOC), would require an investment of over \$30M of one-time costs & \$2.9M annual additional recurring costs (not including the required MILCON and the COBRA-calculated costs to relocate personnel & move 137 tons of equipment and related material), but would provide no significant savings. NRL-MRY intellectual capital required 33 years to develop into a unique DOD capability, focused exclusively on measurement and prediction of militarily relevant atmospheric phenomena, extending from basic</p>	

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TECH-0028	NAVSURFWARCEN_COA STSYSSTA_PANAMA_CIT Y_FL	Per IAT clarification 12/08/04, response includes the cost of relocating the helo unit to RI. Specific receiving site for the aviation assets needs to be identified. Facility Sq Ft: Per info provided by NSA PC, total sq ft of all facilities, including tenants at NSA PC is 1,351,864 broken down as follows: NSWC PC 719,858; PWC Jax Det 22,260; VA Clinic 6,950; NSA PC (NDSTC/CEODD, NEDU, NEX, Housing, CSD, Branch Medical, Branch Dental, Spec War Det SDV, EOD, ROICC, USCG, other) 602,796. NSWC PC as a tenant of NSA PC can only certify the data for the sq ft that is occupied & maintained by NSWC PC. While we believe the remainder of the info to be accurate, the sq ft reported by NSA PC for the other tenants requires certification by Commander Navy Region SE. Note: Current response to question 30, Facilities Shutdown, is 484KSF. This number is incorrect should be changed to 246.4KSF. The current answer incorrectly included shutdown sq ft for AirOps & MIW T&E support (would remain open to support T&E & exercises), Shops (would remain in-service for remaining mission areas), and 66KSF of future requirements erroneously included as existing MIW space. Range	
TECH-0028	NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV _NEWPORT_RI	Personnel and equipment relocation will occur between FY07 and FY09 and require 127 KSF of new facilities and 108 KSF of refurbished facilities. Lack of knowledge of the facility infrastructure at local aviation facilities and in the absence of any contact with them, the premise for the cost for moving aviation assets is that it would require new capital investment for the 23.8 KSF hanger which is identified in question DoD32133. Cost for that is calculated automatically by COBRA.	
TECH-0030	COMNAVSEASYSKOM_ WNY_DC	"We suggest an alternative scenario be considered to co-locate DJC2 program office with ongoing C2 and joint C4I work in SPAWAR (PEO C4I) in San Diego."	
TECH-0030	NAVSURFWARCEN_COA STSYSSTA_PANAMA_CIT Y_FL	1. This response is being certified and submitted by NSWC PC on behalf of the Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) Joint Program Office (JPO), a separate command since Q4 FY04. The DJC2 JPO was originally established in mid-FY03 under NSWC PC and staffed by NSWC PC employees. Thus, NSWC PC's responses to all prior BRAC data calls included the DJC2 JPO and the response to this SDC is consistent with those data calls. 2. An accompanying data call certification has been provided by the DJC2 JPO.	
TECH-0031	COMNAVAIRWARCENAC DIV_PATUXENT_RIVER_ MD	The Capacity reported Sea Vehicle workyears (33.3 T&E) fall into one of two categories: Range Support and Aviation Ship Integration. The Range Support category includes range (air and sea space) required to support a number of customers, including NAVSEA and NSWC workload. The NAVAIR ranges, and in particular, the Atlantic Test Range (ATR) located at Patuxent River MD, provides the range expertise and knowledge, in addition to TSPI (Time, Space, Position Information) and photo optical instrumentation required to support open ocean, sea vehicle T&E. Specific areas of support include range clearance, range safety, test conductors, aerial targets, surface targets, range support boats on the ATR range and in an open ocean environment. This work requires utilization of the knowledge and assets already resident at ATR that supports NAVAIR workload. The second category, Aviation Ship Integration, includes the T&E of aircraft catapult, arresting gear, and electronic and visual landing aids. This testing requires unique land based facilities and airspace which are currently	
TECH-0031	COMNAVSEASYSKOM_ WNY_DC	Losing activity identified 8 personnel in Program Management to be transferred.	

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TECH-0031	NAVSURFWARCEN_CAR DEROCKDIV_BETHESDA _MD	Carderock does not have water access to accommodate operation/testing of LCACs or SDVs. It is proposed that these assets and their associated personnel and equipment/facilities be located at Little Creek, VA. Of the 149 personnel who will transfer in this action, 104 personnel whose work requires that they be co-located with the craft will be relocated to Little Creek, VA and 45 personnel will be relocated to West Bethesda, MD. Currently the Panama City, FL location provides several features necessary for LCAC and SDV efforts that will be replicated in the Little Creek, VA area. Relocation of SDVs to Little Creek, VA will restrict SDV T&E Operations. Water temperatures in Little Creek, VA area are typically below 50 degrees for 5 months per year. Operation in such temperatures significantly reduces mission time and effectiveness, causing a corresponding time increase to test and introduce system upgrades to the end users. NAVSPECWARCEN SDV Det PC is currently co-located with the SDV program at NSWC Panama City. This facilitates sharing of an SDV and	
TECH-0031	NAVSURFWARCEN_COA STSYSSTA_PANAMA_CIT Y_FL	This response does include the cost of relocating the LCACs and SDVs to the Mid Atlantic Area. A specific receiving site for the LCAC and SDV assets and associated support personnel/equipment needs to be identified. A listing of programs included in the Sea Vehicles work versus the other Amphibious and Special Warfare work is posted in the scenario notebook.	
TECH-0031	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ PORT_HUENEME_CA	Sea Vehicles at NSWC PHD covers two Programs, UNREP and PCMS. Phasing for UNREP starts in FY 09 and is tied to phasing for completion of current program requirements. To the extent that personnel do not relocate, there will be addition training cost and time to reconstitute the UNREP expertise needed to meet Navy fleet deck plate technical representative support for UNREP requirements.	
TECH-0032	NAVMEDRSCHCEN_SILV ER_SPRING_MD	1. BDRD is a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) designated Tier 2 resource for a classified mission. Required response times for this mission cannot be met by BDRD from the Ft. Detrick location. 2. Relocation to Ft. Detrick will increase BDRD's response time in support of US Secret service and a NCR classified customer for sample receipt, analysis and confirmation of suspected BW samples. 3. Relocation to Ft. Detrick will increase BDRD response time in support of USMC CBIRF activities in the NCR.	
TECH-0032	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ CRANE_IN	The Chemical Biological Detection D&A work is collocated with the Electro-Optics expertise/facilities at Crane. With the relocation of the Chem-Bio Detection D&A function to Aberdeen, NSWC Crane will need to replicate the shared expertise in common technologies that is required by the Night Vision Electro Optics function.	
TECH-0032	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_ DAHLGREN_VA	1. This action closes the only U.S. over-water chemical test range. Over water Chem-Bio testing is essential to validate propagation models, test/certify CBRD sensors and protection equipment in a marine/shipboard environment. This capability must be replaced at the gaining site. 2. To the extent that personnel do not relocate, there will be additional training cost and time to reconstitute the shipboard Chem Bio expertise needed to meet Navy and Joint Chem Bio defense requirements. 3. This action will co-locate 2 of the 3 DoD Bio Safety Level 3 (BSL 3) non-medical labs at one site. 4. Gaining activity response by the new NSWC Dahlgren Detachment is not included. NSWC Dahlgren Detachment gaining activity data will be estimated and posted in the Scenario Notebook.	

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TECH-0038A	NRL_WASHINGTON_DC	<p>The planned site for this project is substantially on a 12 acre site adjacent to NRL with direct access to Bolling AFB vice NRL. This is part of Special Area EA, Bellevue Housing, reported in the COMNAVDIST WASHINGTON DC data call. The MILCON planned is nine stories high with all surface parking. There is some concern that this solution will not be acceptable to the National Capital Planning Commission (concern about maintaining line of sight to the Capitol). There is a potential to reduce the height of the facility by constructing of a parking garage, however total cost would increase. Additionally, this site has been identified by COMNAVDIST WASHINGTON as a potential location for future Flag and Senior Enlisted housing.</p>	
TECH-0040A	IF_ANACOSTIA_ANNEX_WASHINGTON_DC	<p>COMNAVDIST WASHINTON DC sees no major impediments to implementing this scenario. Community impacts identified in Q43 are managable.</p>	
TECH-0043	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_DAHLGREN_VA	<p>Dahlgren's response provides lab space, bomb proof, and pilot plant capability for synthesis, formulation, processing, and scale up of energetic materials through 30 gal mixers. It provides lab space for analyses, characterization, detonation physics, and scale tests of energetic materials. Facilities and equipment accommodated by this response include: Center for Applied Analytical Technology, Detonation Physics R&D Facility, High Pressure Explosives, Physics, & Combustion Lab, Initiation and Component Systems Characterization Lab, Novel Material R&D Lab, Radiography Component of Ordnance Test Facility, and Weapons Engineering. All of Indian Head and Yorktown Det requirements cannot be accommodated by Dahlgren mainly because the resultant explosive quantity distance arcs exceed available space. Facilities and equipment not accommodated by this response include: Aircrew Escape Ordnance Development & Prototyping, Cast Composite Rocket Motor & PBX Scale-up, Continuous Twin Screw R&D Facilities, Ordnance Test Facility, Rocket Motor Dissection and Propellant Machining, Solventless Extruded Double Base Dev, Specialty Energetics Che</p>	<p>Notes that Dahlgren can not take full Indian Head mission</p>
TECH-0043	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_INDIAN_HEAD_MD	<p>IHDIV's W&A RDAT&E includes the full-spectrum of energetics work (molecular research to production process development). In accordance with the scenario, our response severs for realignment/relocation all W&A, and retains weapons simulation and energetics-related production. Indian Head one-time costs include decontamination, removal, shipment, installation and check-out at the receiving site of unique energetic materials processing equipment. Costs also include replacing energetic equipment and capability transferred to the receiving site, but which will be required to support energetics-related production. The intellectual capital comprising the RDAT&E workforce is utilized across the full range of products and weapons systems that the energetics effort supports, including energetics-related production. The separation will require the replication of some portion of the intellectual capital at Indian Head. These costs and impacts are not included in our response. Timing/phasing of this relocation must consider the need to maintain full support for ongoing combat operations. In addition to the personnel identified for relocation there are five personnel who are not inc</p>	

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TECH-0044	CG_MCB_QUANTICO_VA	<p>Identified functions remain the responsibility of CG MCSC based on scenario realignment vice consolidation. Personnel numbers are based on a snapshot as of today and do not include future personnel realignments planned for MCSC. Responses only consider individuals physically located at MCB Quantico MCSC. MCOTE facilities requirements are a minimum of 3400 SF of Administrative space. . MCOTEA conducts Title 10 Testing and Evaluation as part of the USMC's Acquisition triad. This triad includes MCCDC, the capabilities developer and MARCORSYSCOM, the material solution developer. The close proximity of MCOTEA to these organizations facilitates cross functional and cross organizational Product Team execution model. MCOTEA often performs as the integrating organization between the capabilities and material developers. Relocation of any single element or segment of this triad introduces organizational inefficiencies and obstacles to team formation and execution. Secondly, MARCORSYSCOM is our fiscal sponsor. All T&E budget formulation is coordinated through MARCORSYSCOM before forwarding to higher Headquarters, (i.e. Programs and</p>	<p>Synergy and Marine Corps unique issue.</p>
TECH-0044	COMNAVAIRWARCENWPNDIV_CHINA_LAKE_CA	<p>Action 8: Movement of guns/ammo work before JSF IOC may impact JSF schedule.</p>	
TECH-0044	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_DAHLGREN_VA	<p>•NSWCDD is receiving activity for Guns/Ammo RDAT&E. •Information received and processed for Navy and Marine Corps activities (Actions 3, 4 5, 6, 7, 8, & 10). •No Air Force information given (Eglin – Action 9) – assume 0. •Army information (Actions 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, & 15) for facilities was incomplete; only received square footage by FAC code, not attached to specific actions. In order to complete the data call, made the following assumptions for Army data: –DOD 42833: All facilities data apply across all Army actions (1,2,11,12,13,14,15), but were listed under Action #1 due to lack of specificity of information. –DOD 42833: Square footage in facility codes given was assumed to include office space. No contractor numbers were given. –DOD42833-41 Assumed no special facility requirements, since none were listed, therefore, no special costs. Assumed no testing or other special facilities were needed, since no information was given. –DOD42837 & 42842 Assumed no environmental impact due to lack of information. Accommodation of NSWC Indian Head requirements</p>	
TECH-0044	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_INDIAN_HEAD_MD	<p>IHDIV's W&A RDAT&E includes the full-spectrum of energetics work (molecular research to production process development). In accordance with the scenario, our response severs for realignment/relocation all Guns and Ammo efforts and retains the remainder of W&A energetics such as warheads, rocket/missile propellant, PADs/CADs, etc., DEMIL, and energetics-related production. The intellectual capital comprising the RDAT&E workforce is utilized across the full range of products and weapons systems that the energetics effort supports, including W&A. The separation will require the replication of some portion of the intellectual capital at one or the other site. These costs and impacts are not included in our response. To the extent personnel do not relocate, there will be additional cost and time to reconstitute the expertise to perform energetics and technical work required to meet Navy requirements. Timing/phasing of this relocation must consider the need to maintain full support for ongoing combat operations.</p>	
TECH-0044	NAVSURFWARCENDIV_PORT_HUENEME_CA	<p>NSWC Louisville performs ISEA work for naval guns and is co-located with the OEMs associated with those systems. Depending on the gaining location, costs may be incurred for replication of selected test complexes.</p>	

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TECH-0054	COMNAVAIRSYSCOM_P ATUXENT_RIVER_MD	NAVAIR recommends Sensors, EW, and electronics work at Point Mugu be consolidated at China Lake to take advantage of synergy with similar operations.	
TECH-0054	COMNAVAIRWARCENW PNDIV_CHINA_LAKE_CA	Portions of the information provided in the Donor and Gainer's response to TECH 0054 are the result of a cooperative effort between Point Mugu and China Lake personnel. This represents the minimum risk approach to ensuring 24/7 response capability at the current levels with significant overlap in capability during the transition. Under this plan, the 24/7 response capability would be in place at China Lake in 18 months for the EA-6B laboratory and 24 months for the Electronic Combat Systems Evaluation Laboratory (ECSEL) with no breaks in service. An alternative approach that is not reflected in the above response was also explored which would rely more heavily on transferring existing equipment from Point Mugu and would reduce the cost of purchasing new equipment by approximately \$20 million. This approach would necessitate shutting down the 24/7-response capability for approximately 3 months. While there are partial workarounds that would require an increased reliance on flight testing during this shutdown period, the ability to support urgent Fleet needs would be high	
TECH-0054	NAVAIRWARCENWPNDI V_PT_MUGU_CA	Point Mugu provides a wide range of synergistic EW support to TACAIR platforms, stand-off jammers (AEA), threat simulation, intelligence/sensor engineering, and jamming technique optimization for Navy, USMC, Air Force, and FMS customers. This action would most likely result in the loss of significant electronic warfare intellectual capital that could not be replaced. EW currently shares resources and processes to improve integration efficiency and to reduce duplicative efforts. Point Mugu has worldwide recognition as the leader in EW development, test, evaluation, and in-service engineering, with 15 years per person average EA-6B, AEA, TACAIR EW, and Threat Analysis engineering experience. Over 4500 work-years of EW specialized experience exist at this site. The Point Mugu EA-6B Weapons System Support Laboratory provides real-time operational support to the Fleet during times of war. This capability must be maintained at 24/7/365. When a crisis occurs in the world, the JATO Lab (Jammer Technique team), EWDS Lab (Threat Sensor Engineering team), Mission Planning laboratory, and the Systems Engineering laboratories are required to urgently respond	
TECH-0055	COMNAVAIRSYSCOM_P ATUXENT_RIVER_MD	NAVAIR recommends Sensors, EW, and electronics work at Point Mugu be consolidated at China Lake, per SDC TECH 0054, to take advantage of synergy with similar operations.	
TECH-0055	NAVAIRWARCENWPNDI V_PT_MUGU_CA	Point Mugu provides a wide range of synergistic EW support to TACAIR platforms, stand-off jammers (AEA), threat simulation, intelligence/sensor engineering, and jamming technique optimization for Navy, USMC, Air Force, and FMS customers. This action would most likely result in the loss of significant electronic warfare intellectual capital that could not be replaced. EW currently shares resources and processes to improve integration efficiency and to reduce duplicative efforts. Point Mugu has worldwide recognition as the leader in EW development, test, evaluation, and in-service engineering, with 15 years per person average EA-6B, AEA, TACAIR EW, and Threat Analysis engineering experience. Over 4500 work-years of EW specialized experience exist at this site. The Point Mugu EA-6B Weapons System Support Laboratory provides real-time operational support to the Fleet during times of war. This capability must be maintained at 24/7/365. When a crisis occurs in the world, the JATO Lab (Jammer Technique team), EWDS Lab (Threat Sensor Engineering team), Mission Planning laboratory, and the Systems Engineering laboratories are required to urgently respond	
TECH-0056	COMNAVAIRSYSCOM_P ATUXENT_RIVER_MD	NAVAIR recommends Sensors, EW, and electronics work at Point Mugu be consolidated at China Lake, per SDC TECH 0054, to take advantage of synergy with similar operations.	

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TECH-0056	NAVAIRWARCENWPNDI V_PT_MUGU_CA	Point Mugu provides a wide range of synergistic EW support to TACAIR platforms, stand-off jammers (AEA), threat simulation, intelligence/sensor engineering, and jamming technique optimization for Navy, USMC, Air Force, and FMS customers. This action would most likely result in the loss of significant electronic warfare intellectual capital that could not be replaced.
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Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

NBVC-POINT MUGU

From: Shaffer, Alan, Mr, OSD-ATL
Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 3:29 PM
To: Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Hamm, Walter B. Col BRAC; Shibley, Eileen P CIV BRAC; Geith, James W CTR TJCSG
Subject: mugu sea range figures
Signed By: alan.shaffer@osd.mil

Les: we continue to have confusion with the number of folks to leave at the Mugu sea range. Since we are out of time, I am choosing the certified number of 355 in the Education and Training Capacity Data Call. Actual numbers during implementation may still float.

You should have the no fooling cobra soon

AI

Alan R. "AI" Shaffer
Director, Plans and Programs
ODDRE
(703) 695-9604

CIVILIANS Point Merge (all certified data)
NBVC

	initial	now	
Tech 9 SPAWAR	-102	-102	To Point Loma
Tech 18 creep & armaments	-1679 (505 staying sea range)	-1440 (355 staying sea range)	To China Lake
Tech 28 EW	-368	-368	To China Lake

(301) 757-7825 VKDM Maassenburg
(CAPT TOM VANDENBERG)

TO - Phil Coyle 8/17/05

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Shibley, Eileen P CIV BRAC [eileen.shibley@navy.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 11:06 AM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
Cc: Hamm, Walter B. Col BRAC
Subject: Sensors, Elex, EW

Les,
Providing following data, as requested.

From the Supplemental Capacity Data call, the following FTE numbers were certified for FY03 Technical workload in the DTAP area of Sensors, Electronics, and EW:

	China Lake	Point Mugu
Research	129.8	6.7
T&E	146.6	58.4
D&A	260.3	265.4
Total	536.7	330.5

During the Technical scenario data call TECH-0054, the number reported for Mugu is 368.

Eileen P. Shibley

DASN (IS&A)
703-602-6424

NBVC POINT MUGU
TECH-15
(Rec # 184)

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

To: Shibley, Eileen P CIV BRAC
Subject: FW: CH 10 Section 184 Language

Eileen:

Didn't know whethet I had shared this with yiu or not.

Les

From: Gilmer, Bradford NAVAIR [mailto:bradford.gilmer@navy.mil]
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 4:58 PM
To: lester.farrington@wso.WHS.mil; david.epstein@wso.whs.mil
Subject: CH 10 Section 184 Language

Les/David:

We really need to get specific language into this recommendation to keep the sea range and targets personnel at Point Mugu. Please help!!!!!!

Bradford R. Gilmer

Deputy Director for Test and Evaluation

BRAC Certifier

(805) 989-8445

-----Original Message-----

From: Gilmer, Bradford NAVAIR
Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2005 6:34
To: 'lester.farrington@wso.WHS.mil'; 'david.epstein@wso.whs.mil'
Subject: Data Response

Les and David:

We understand that the numbers that were certified in response to your data call on the minimum personnel to operate the sea range have yet to be sent to you. The following are the numbers that were certified:

Number of Civilian Personnel:

Sea Range Daily Operations 245 FTE

Range Control 175 FTE

Equipment Maintenance	198 FTE
Targets	262 FTE
Total	880 FTE

The data is consistent with the information we gave you on your visit. A breakdown of the numbers is included here:

<< File: SEA RANGE FUNCTIONS rev 081205.ppt >>

Please note that these include 32 civilians in the test squadron. Military personnel would also need to remain at Point Mugu (214 range support aircraft, 28 range radar controllers).

Bradford R. Gilmer

Deputy Director for Test and Evaluation

BRAC Certifier

(805) 989-8445

NBVC POINT MUGU
TECH-15
(Rec# 184)

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Gilmer, Bradford NAVAIR [bradford.gilmer@navy.mil]
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2005 1:22 PM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil; david.epstein@wso.whs.mil
Subject: Suggested wording

Les and David:

I was asked to forward to you proposed commission language to reflect our recommended changes to the 2 actions affecting Point Mugu. The numbers for Point Mugu and Port Hueneme in TECH18 below were derived from our proposed rewording slides sent previously. I could not address changes for the other activities.

Recommended BRAC Commission Language

TECH18 - Weapons & Armament Center of Excellence – The Commission validates the Department’s recommendation to ‘Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armament Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center’ by realigning and consolidating Weapons & Armament technical functions from multiple facilities to China Lake, CA. This action transfers 997 civilian billets to NAS China Lake, CA from the following sites: NSWC Crane, IN (193 positions), NSWC Dahlgren, VA (147 positions), NSWC Indian Head, MD (80 positions), NAWC Patuxent River, MD (94 positions), NAWC Point Mugu, CA (329 positions), NSWC Port Hueneme, CA (134 positions), and NSWC Seal Beach, CA (20 positions).

TECH54 - The Commission finds that the Department’s recommendation for ‘Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation’ is a stand-alone relocation that does not consolidate similar functions into a Center of Excellence, nor does it yield significant savings. The commission does not recommend approval of this recommendation and does recommend that the Navy retain capability in EW as a Specialty Site at Pt. Mugu, CA.

Bradford R. Gilmer

Deputy Director for Test and Evaluation

BRAC Certifier

(805) 989-8445

-----Original Message-----

8/29/2005

From: Gilmer, Bradford NAVAIR

Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2005 11:13

To: 'lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil'; 'david.epstein@wso.whs.mil'

Cc: Bangle, Marilyn NAVAIR; Rankin, Ellen NAVAIR; Honea, David "Wayne" NAVSEA; Gilmer, Bradford NAVAIR

Subject: RE: TECH18 rewording and associated perosnnel counts

Les and David:

We have completed the COBRA analysis that you requested. We ran 18 different cases for your consideration (enclosed).

<< File: COBRA Mugu_PHD Runs R2.xls >>

The cases ran were for the Green, Green + Yellow, and Green + Yellow + Red functional variations; 0% , 5.5% and 15% personnel efficiency cases; and both NBVC alone and NBVC included with other TECH18 activities. The "Green" runs were based on the proposed rewording for the NBVC activities that we have enclosed again for completeness.

<< File: PHD BRAC RECOMMENDATIONS.doc >> << File: TECH18 Point Mugu Reword.ppt >>

We ran the different personnel efficiency cases to show the impact this assumption has on ROI. Clearly 15% is the only case that shows a reasonable ROI. When the GAO 5.5% number is used the ROI in most cases exceeds 20 years. We believe the 0% runs are closer to what can be achieved given the efficiencies already gained between the 2 sites.

For comparison purposes, we have included in the spread sheet the data from the TJCSG TECH18 COBRA run. For our comparative case (15% G+Y+R), we corrected the dynamic data to allow 100% of NBVC activity inputs, corrected the aircraft ramp space requirement, and added MILCON to handle additional personnel. We did not include MILCONS for new range operations center, target launch and recovery facilities, and their associated dynamic and recurring costs since we could not envision how to operate the sea range given the recommendation as proposed. These costs are substantial and would most likely drive the ROI to 20 years+.

If you have any questions, please call me at one of the numbers below.

Bradford R. Gilmer

Deputy Director for Test and Evaluation

BRAC Certifier

(805) 989-8445

Cell: (805) 816-5835

-----Original Message-----

From: Gilmer, Bradford NAVAIR

Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2005 13:35

To: 'lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil'; 'david.epstein@wso.whs.mil'

Cc: Bangle, Marilyn NAVAIR; Rankin, Ellen NAVAIR; Honea, David "Wayne" NAVSEA

Subject: TECH18 rewording and associated perosnnel counts

Les and David:

As you requested, we submit proposed changes to the TECH18 action associated with the Nava Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu. These changes do not include any personnel numbers from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division. The enclosed file has 4 pages:

- (1) Proposed wording (approved by RDMLs Bachmann and Skinner on 12 July 05)
- (2) Personnel moving based on revised wording
- (3) Technical personnel not moving based on revised wording
- (4) Support personnel (both moving and not moving)

The personnel movements show numbers for both SEP03 and DEC04 on-board count baselines.

Later this week we will complete the cobra analyses associated with the Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) portion of TECH18. We will look at 3 scenarios for:

- (1) Revised personnel and associated equipment/facilities associated with the above recommended revisions (revised green category)
- (2) Green item plus personnel and equipment/facilities associated with the "could move but why" yellow category.
- (3) Green and Yellow plus personnel and equipment/facilities "inextricably tied to sea range" red category.

These cobra runs will be performed on the SEP03 personnel baseline for comparison to present SECDEF recommendations.

If you have any questions or need to provide clarifications, please don't hesitate to call me at the numbers below.

Bradford R. Gilmer

Deputy Director for Test and Evaluation

BRAC Certifier

(805) 989-8445

Cell: (805) 816-5835

<< File: TECH18 Rword - rev2.ppt >>

NBVC
Tech 15 9 28

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

(Rec # 184 & 190)

From: Jack Dodd [jack.dodd@emc-inc.com]
Sent: Wednesday, August 10, 2005 8:33 PM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
Cc: Lynn Jacquez; Bill Simmons; RADM George Strohsahl
Subject: Information from Lynn Jacquez
Attachments: A Workable Alternative.ppt; Workable BRAC alternative.doc

Les,

Per Lynn Jacquez's request, I am forwarding two documents: the "Workable Alternative" slide from RADM Strohsahl's testimony at the LA Regional Hearing, and the "Workable BRAC Alternative" point paper submitted after the hearing.

Please let us know if you have any questions, or if we can help in any other way.

V/R,
Jack

Jack D. Dodd
Engineering Management Concepts, Inc
805-484-9082
805-383-2602 (FAX)
jack.dodd@emc-inc.com

8/29/2005

A Workable Alternative

- Retain NAWCWD two-site concept.
- Retain proposed concept of Weapons and Electronic Warfare Centers, but with distributed positions at two sites.
- Do not move any NAWCWD Pt. Mugu positions.
- Realign NSWC PHD weapons positions to NAWCWD.
- Realign NSWC PHD C⁴ISR positions to Pt. Loma after decreased by Question 47 data.

A Workable Alternative

How to use the existing construct of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division to comply with DoD's strategy of establishing centers of technical excellence, while significantly increasing military value, decreasing the cost of realignment and reducing the loss of intellectual capital.

Background

The Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division (NAWCWD) stood up as a command within the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) claimancy on 1 January 1992. Its planning and legal basis stem from the Navy preparation for BRAC 91 and the subsequent BRAC implementation established by law. While initially encompassing several separate and independent NAVAIR field activities and the prior Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, then a field activity of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), it quickly evolved to a two-site technical organization at China Lake and Pt. Mugu. At the time of its formation, two other centers under NAVAIR were created, the NAWC Aircraft Division headquartered at Patuxent River, MD, and the Training Systems Division at Orlando, FL. A headquarters for the three centers was established as the NAWC in Washington, D.C. under NAVAIR. At the same time as the NAWC and its divisions were formed, companion centers were created in the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and in SPAWAR.

The Intent

When planning started for BRAC 91, the leadership in the Navy was intent on consolidating the vast systems commands' RDT&E field activities into a much leaner structure. This was to be accomplished through realignments and closures affecting most of the field activities within the three systems commands organizations. NAVAIR leadership had had much earlier visions of a field activity structure with a flag officer in charge on each coast. The focus on the east coast would be airplanes and on the west coast, weapons, although the complexity of activity across all the supporting field structure was far greater than just those two commodities. Where activities were to continue to exist, the command function would vest in the NAWC division commander (a flag officer) and the supporting base function would be a subordinate command.

One very important aspect of this consolidation was the elimination of independent competing technical commands and functions around the country. Because weapons RDT&E functions were performed both at China Lake (more heavily R&D) and Pt. Mugu (more heavily T&E), a primary NAWCWD consolidation goal was to eliminate areas of overlap between the main sites. The new NAWCWD command structure significantly reduced middle management positions and located technical leadership at the site where it made the most sense. For example, Range, Targets, Test Wing, Logistics, Avionics and T&E Engineering leadership was located at Pt. Mugu, while System Engineering and Weapons leadership was located at China Lake. NAWCWD also adopted common systems for major supporting functions (e.g., financial, personnel,

information technology) depending on which site was judged most efficient. These consolidation efficiencies commenced in 1992 and were favorably noted during BRAC 95 site visits.

What followed in NAWCWD was a single command, headquartered first at Pt. Mugu and later at China Lake, commanding all the technical work at both places as an integrated organization, with subordinate Naval Air Weapons Station commands at each location to run the support functions of the bases themselves. Incredibly, there were really only two reasons for even identifying the two NAWCWD sites as separate entities. One involved the US Postal Service and the need to correctly address mail. The other had to do with detailed personnel management within the Department of the Navy and the need to have separate Unit Identification Codes (UIC) at each site.

NAVSEA used a different construct for their consolidated field activities and allowed each of the remaining activities renamed as Divisions, after closures occurred, to continue to exist as separate technical commands, coordinated in their work by a Washington, D.C. based Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) headquarters staff. NSWC Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD) remains as one of those technical commands. The NSWC recently adopted a form of competency alignment under Product Area Directors and has significantly reduced redundancy and competition between the separately commanded Surface Warfare Center Divisions.

The Management Imperative

First within the NAWC, then quickly followed by all of NAVAIR, a Competency Aligned Organization (CAO) management paradigm was adopted. This structure of management aligns people by technical function or specialty to provide support for programs without regard to physical location. NAVAIR in many ways ceased being a headquarters organization, which it had to do because of very aggressive mandated downsizing, and adopted a process by which leadership at all management levels was placed where the "center of gravity" for specific functions really existed. In the case of Ranges, Target Systems, Weapons, Electronic Warfare and other technical areas, that meant that the NAWCWD was in charge of those areas for all of NAVAIR. Within NAWCWD, the technical leadership for Weapons R&D is clearly at China Lake with T&E work also being accomplished in that competency at Pt. Mugu and Patuxent River. Technical leadership for Open Air Ranges, of which there are four within NAVAIR, Targets (used at all the ranges), and Electronic Warfare reside at Pt. Mugu. Since, in terms of total workload and people employed, China Lake has always been the larger element of NAWCWD, it was decided that the headquarters (flag pole) for NAWCWD would remain at China Lake, instead of alternating between the two sites, as had been the original concept. However, it is extremely important to understand that the residence of the flag officer and his immediate staff does not create an organization centered at China Lake with a detachment at Pt. Mugu. The commander of NAWCWD maintains offices at Pt. Mugu. He and his staff spend a considerable amount of time there, as they are the only technical command function at both locations.

In contribution to the support of programs, both sites work together in a fully integrated manner and are literally an inseparable team. At every level, management has been flattened and the work fully distributed to the people best suited to perform it. In the flat management chain, it is very common to find workers at one site reporting to a manager at the other site. Modern electronic communications technology, including dedicated fiber optic and microwave links and a network of video teleconference nodes, combined with a regularly scheduled aircraft shuttle service, have been employed to tightly link technical work. For example some electronic warfare and weapons laboratories are connected by fiber optics and literally function as one across the two sites. The NAWCWD infrastructure is transformational in that it adopted these methods more than 10 years ago and has since refined them to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness.

In 1998, as part of the Navy's shore establishment regionalization initiative, the Air Station at Pt. Mugu was moved from NAVAIR control to the fleet. Additionally, in 2000, the Naval Air Station at Pt. Mugu was merged with the Construction Battalion Center at Port Hueneme to create Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC). The effect at NBVC was to eliminate duplicate base command and support functions at the two proximate bases. That consolidation effort continues to this day. It is important to note that NAWCWD Pt. Mugu and NSWC PHD exist today as technical tenant activities on NBVC. There are dozens of other tenant activities on NBVC. However, the only ones subject to BRAC 2005 realignment are NAWCWD and NSWC PHD.

The Proposed Technical Mega-Centers at China Lake in BRAC 2005

The proposed Weapons and Armament Center and the Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Center at China Lake will probably never exist in the final management structure, even if all the BRAC realignments are put into law. In keeping with the CAO management paradigm of NAVAIR those positions would be aligned into existing, or perhaps some new competencies within the overall NAVAIR structure. In a world of industrial funding for program work, management can ill afford to add additional management layers to accommodate BRAC realignment rationale. The resulting management structure will continue to employ people at multiple sites that do not close. In the case of the Pt. Mugu realignment, from a management perspective, literally nothing will be changed except the positions will physically relocate to China Lake under a new mailing address and UIC. Unfortunately, most of the technical experts in their specialties from NBVC will not move and fill those positions. The loss of intellectual capital will be devastating for several years. If the positions are not relocated, they will continue to support programs, through the CAO, and under the technical command of the same flag officer, as they are today joined "at the hip" with their counterparts at China Lake

In the case of the realignment of functions from NSWC PHD, there is a case for consolidating a small part of that work under different systems commands. The weapons management functions at PHD, which are not inextricable to their essential shipboard weapons system integration work, probably could be more efficiently managed within NAWCWD. However the people literally do not have to move to make that happen.

They can realign in place and remain at Port Hueneme as part of the NAWCWD on NBVC, or if NAWC management prefers, move over to the Pt. Mugu side of the base. There are a handful of C4ISR functions at NSWC PHD which more properly align under SPAWAR and should realign and relocate to Pt. Loma.

An Alternative Philosophical Rationale

Given the data provided by the Ventura County BRAC Task Force, it is obvious that the proposed NBVC realignment will trigger a large and painful loss of intellectual capital, perhaps in excess of 80%, will incur costs that are not reasonably recoverable, and have a serious impact on the program customers as well as the effectiveness of our war fighters. Yet the concept of establishing consolidated Weapons and Armament and Sensors, EW, and Electronics centers, if in name only, under one systems command has merit. Therefore the BRAC Commission need only honor the simple fact that the two-site NAWCWD exists as a totally integrated single technical command established by BRAC 91 and that those proposed centers really are to be established at NAWCWD, the command, not the singular location of China Lake. By so doing, (1) the realignment of all functions out of Pt. Mugu would be cancelled, (2) only the appropriate weapons functions at NSWC PHD would be realigned, in place, to NAWCWD and (3) a handful of C4ISR positions would actually move to Pt. Loma. The proposals for other bases to realign functions to the consolidated Weapons and Armament center would be judged on their individual merits under the BRAC process. If they were to be realigned, in keeping with this rationale, the gaining organization would be NAWCWD, and the most relevant site for the relocation would be selected based on the nature of the functions to be realigned.

Following this alternative recommendation would comply with DoD's strategy of establishing centers of technical excellence, while significantly increasing military value, decreasing the cost of realignment and reducing the loss of intellectual capital.



Department of the Navy

**Tech 28 or TJCSG TECH-0054
Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and
Electronics Research, Development and
Acquisition, Test and Evaluation
(RDAT&E)**

13 August 2005



Navy Sensors, EW, and Electronics RDA T&E

ROI Summary

One-Time Costs	Steady-State Savings	ROI Years	20 Year NPV
\$72.7	\$6.7M	12 years	\$16.9M

Recommendation:

- Realigns and consolidates sensors, EW, and electronics efforts from Pt. Mugu to China Lake
- China Lake has significantly higher Military Value in both T&E and Research with Pt. Mugu having slightly higher MV in Acquisition
- Realignment strengthens the synergy between sensor, EW, and electronics functions at Mugu and the Electronic Combat Range and the advanced sensor integration laboratories already existing at China Lake

Gaining community impacts:

- No encroachment or environmental issues
- Infrastructure will support increased growth



Department of the Navy

Integrated Naval Weapons RDAT&E Center of Excellence at China Lake

- **Issues**
 - None. No deviation from the criteria.
- **Benefits:**
 - Creates a full-spectrum integration environment for the future that is synergistic and competent in all aspects of Naval sensor, EW, and electronics technologies and applications
 - Puts the Navy on a parity with the USAF and USA
 - Positions DOD for Jointness in the Sensors, EW, and electronics arena while preserving needed service-specific site and healthy competition
 - Sensor integration site for F/A-18 and EA-18G is at China Lake
 - Lead Sensor Integration responsibility for JSF is at China Lake
 - future state has already shifted to more sensor integration up front vice build a box and then integrate



Department of the Navy

EA-18G Merges Two Proven Systems

The EA-18G

Starts with Block 2 F/A-18F


- Latest technology systems
 - Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar
 - Fiber-optic data bus
- Next-generation situational awareness
 - Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS)
 - Tactical Aircraft Moving Map Capability (TAMMAC)
- Enhanced crew performance
 - Independent crew station operation
 - Advanced mission computer and displays
- Network-centric operations
 - Digital Communication System (DCS)
 - Multifunction Information Distribution System (MIDS)

Integrates Latest Technology Electronic Attack Suite


- ALQ-218(V)2 receiver
- ALQ-99 tactical jamming pods
- Communication Countermeasures Set
- Satellite communications



JSF Integrated Sensors Suite (U)



EO Targeting System



Multispectral Fusion Target Imagery





Tech 28 or TJCSG TECH-0054, Sensors, EW, Electronics
RDAT&E

ACQ		RESEARCH		T&E	
Point Mugu	.3495	China Lake	.3594	China Lake	.5610
China Lake	.3267	Point Mugu	.2811	Point Mugu	.3103

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Hamm, Walter B. Col BRAC [walter.hamm@navy.mil]
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 2:19 PM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil; David.Epstein@wso.whs.mil
Subject: Ventura County Memo
Attachments: Memo_Ventura[1].pdf

David, Les,

I rather enjoy reading some of the info on the BRAC website. Every now and then I think it is helpful to add some perspective taken from a few years of work with the Navy Technical commands and Technical JCSG.

In this case, I need to point out that the Naval Air Systems Command (a joint team from Point Mugu and China Lake) did all the planning for the Sensors and Electronics Recommendation move from Point Mugu to China Lake. In addition, the NAVAIR Commander specifically recommended that the scenario be approved (Block 47 of the command certification). Such recommendation for approval is rare in scenario data calls. No info from the NAVAIR plan was changed by the JCSG and it was directly translated to COBRA. What you see in the JCSG recommendation is exactly what was proposed by NAVAIR. You may check this by comparing the scenario data call info, certified by the NAVAIR Commander, and the COBRA data.

I would encourage you to check this with the Technical JCSG. Both the Chair, Mr. Shaffer, and the C4ISR sub-group leader, Mr. Mleziva are very familiar with this.

I am just trying to be sure you have the facts!

Regards,

Walter

<<Memo_Ventura[1].pdf>>

REALIGNING EW RDAT&E FROM POINT MUGU TO CHINA LAKE: THE REAL ISSUE

August 19, 2005

Issues of varying importance associated with Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electronics have been addressed in testimony before the BRAC Commission and subsequent correspondence to the BRAC Commission professional staff. We believe the crux of the debate can be boiled down to one basic issue: the extent of long term military value versus the near term risk associated with short-term loss of human capital.

Extent of Long Term Military Value

Claims by Advocates of Realignment:

- Next generation combat aircraft represent significant steps forward in integrating the full electronic warfare (EW), sensors and weapons suite over earlier aircraft such as the retiring EA-6B. The EA-18G is a fully integrated EW weapon system in which two crewmen replace the four in the older EA-6B aircraft. Members of the integration team must work closely together to achieve the needed automation and to realize the potential improved capabilities. The JSF is an even more radical departure using common apertures and eliminating black boxes. Co-location enhances teamwork and reduces operating costs.

Claim by Opponents of Realignment:

- No improvement in capability or cost will be realized by co-locating the integration team.

Risk Associated with Near-Term Intellectual Capital Loss:

Claim by Opponents of Realignment:

- The majority of personnel choose not to move during previous realignments. Near-term loss of intellectual capital will be devastating to our forces engaging the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan and other potential conflicts in the interim until a viable team could be assembled in China Lake.

Claims by Advocates of Realignment:

- Roughly a third of employees have chosen to move in past realignments, and one must plan that a majority of potential transferees will choose not to move. That is the cost of realignment. Of those who chose to move in the past, the great majority were senior people critical to the projects on which they worked and great success was achieved in past moves to Patuxent River and China Lake. Today's high cost of housing, traffic issues and other urban life penalties of the West Coast environment might increase the ratio of those choosing to move.

- Near-term loss of intellectual capital during planned transition period can be managed by allowing key team members to continue on site as employees, re-employed annuitants or contractors. The relocated team would be built from those who choose to transfer, experts at China Lake, and from recruitment of employees by China Lake. They point to the superior recruitment record of China Lake, which would enhance the long-term effectiveness of the EW effort independent of other military value enhancements.

Recommendation. BRAC Commission approve the DoD recommendation to realign Sensors, Electronic Warfare and Electronics RDAT&E from Point Mugu to China Lake.

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Van Saun, David, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 7:25 PM
To: Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: FW: Admiral Strohsahl response to 8-5-05 TJCSG memo

Les - Make sure this gets in the E-Library. I don't buy it all necessarily but could buy the NAWCWD part. I also buy that the "super-center" part may not be the best thing to do. Industry is moving in the direction of decentralization and virtual centralization. Keep thinking!

-----Original Message-----

From: Jacquez, Lynn [mailto:ljacquez@clj.com]
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 10:58 AM
To: Dave Van Saun (E-mail)
Cc: David Epstein (E-mail); Lester Farrington (E-mail)
Subject: Admiral Strohsahl response to 8-5-05 TJCSG memo

Following are a few thoughts on the One University, Two Campuses paper in the hands of the BRAC commission attributed to the OSD TJCSG.

Background

* When NAWC was established there were several commands that, from the outset, were slated for closure/realignment. NWEF at Albuquerque and the White Sands detachment were just two. Recall that PMRF was also realigned to PACFLT. NAWCWD oversaw these actions and provided a home, mostly at China Lake, for the work that needed to continue. There was never a construct of Four Campuses, just two with the other sites rapidly closing and realigning.

* While the daily air shuttle service was needed at the outset of NAWCWD operations, improvements in electronic communications, better personal familiarity by workers at both sides, and the decrease in workload have reduced the reliance on the air shuttle. In terms of travel, the vast majority of travel from both sites is not the inter-NAWCWD travel but is to other locations where industry or customers are located, almost all of which is via LAX. Travel costs to and from LAX are considerably less from Pt. Mugu than China Lake.

* The flag location at China Lake after initially being at Pt. Mugu simply acknowledged that there was a somewhat greater workload at China Lake and the Admiral ended up spending more time there than at Pt. Mugu. The intent was to alternate that location but since this would also affect a large number of staff positions, that idea was dropped in the interest of economy. The flag is the leader of NAWCWD which is a two site organization. He is no more in charge of China Lake than he is Pt. Mugu. He maintains an office at Pt. Mugu and spends significant time there.

* While there are offices for some support functions at both sites, they function together as a single office with a single lead manager. The size of the offices and the number of positions in those offices reflects the amount of work and workers at each site. Moving all the work from Pt. Mugu would simply result in increasing the size of the those offices at China Lake.

* As the paper indicated, technical areas have been effectively streamlined between the two sites. In most cases, either the size of each site's workforce in a complimentary area requires deputy managers, or the deputy job is additional duty for a technical worker. There are very few savings to be had in this area with a move to China Lake. Senior management can take measures to ensure that all available electronic communications means are utilized before unnecessary travel is made.

Current State

* There is excess capacity at both sites due to the workload decrease. This capacity exists mainly in the form of facilities and equipment and not workforce. All the people at both sites are fully employed and most are industrially funded. Without work, the positions are eliminated. The work proposed to move from Pt. Mugu to China Lake would not, in most cases, be suitable for placing in excess China Lake facilities such as the largely unused huge and expensive MESA facility.

* The future vector is only pointing to China Lake in the eyes of those who wish that were so. If this BRAC recommendation is allowed to become law, clearly there will be an increase in the workforce, and work in progress, at China Lake. If the BRAC Commission overturns the recommendation due to the numerous fatal flaws in analysis and logic, the vector for the future will be toward the NAWCWD organization, not just the China Lake

site.

* China Lake is the site for the WSSA for all models of the F/A-18. However the EA-18G is, by COMNAVAIR decision and strongly supported by the Program Manager and the operational AEA Wing Commander supported at both China Lake and Pt. Mugu. The aircraft has, with two seats, functionally two separate software and electronic systems. The front seat pilot controls the airplane, navigation and those routine F/A-18 functions, the back seat NFO controls the EW system which is a replication of the EA-6B system supported for many years at Pt. Mugu. The two labs are linked by fiber optics and can simulate the entire aircraft at either location or function together in real time simulating actual mission conditions. This allocation of resources was made primarily on the basis of where the technical expertise resides. Modern communications technology makes this not only possible but the best possible solution to a very advanced and technical challenge. A support site for JSF has not been chosen, and if the trend of better utilization of industry to deliver to a performance specification continues, no government site will have that primary support function. Should a NAWCWD site be desired to support JSF, it is just as likely that the expertise at Pt. Mugu would be chosen as that at China Lake.

Conclusion

* The combining of two technically superior facilities into a single operating site was not an experiment. The operation of NAWCWD with it's two site construct has been anything but Virtual. The study work that lead to its implementation preceded BRAC 91 by at least two decades. It has worked wonderfully for 13 years. No large high tech company today thinks in terms of achieving greater capability by co-locating work. Technology and management practices have made that construct obsolete. It is anything but transformational.

* The TJCSG indeed proposed a vision of mega centers at China Lake. That vision, unfortunately neglects the long ongoing trend in industry and government of distributed work, ignores the terrible impact of loss of intellectual capital when skilled workers jobs are moved to a less desirable location, overlooks certified data to achieve a predetermined outcome, and sadly appears to be the creation largely of individuals who have or are executive managers at China Lake.

*

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Philip Coyle [martha.krebs@worldnet.att.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2005 11:51 AM
To: Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC; 'jbilbray@kkbr.com'
Cc: Epstein David B Ctr AF/ILEXR; Van Saun, David, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: Re: Point Mugu Visit

Dear Les: Good job on the base visit report.

My only question on your base visit report is in the category, *Requests For Staff As A Result of Visit*. Is there a pending request for staff with regards the cost to move Corona, and its two big facilities to Point Mugu? And is there a pending request for staff with respect to the cost savings, or lack thereof, associated with certain Point Mugu/China Lake options? If not, fine.

Congressman Ken Calvert called me this morning to ask why you had put out a data call for information that would support moving Corona to China Lake? I told him I was not aware of such a data call, which I'm not. Have you put out a data call and if so what information is it that you have requested?

In that the DOD recommendations for Corona and Point Mugu are tied together, my feeling is that the Commission should vote on a staff recommendation to reject the DOD recommendations on Corona and NBVC in their entirety.

As you and David noted in one of your questions back to the Navy, the Corona move doesn't save any money. Did you ever get an answer from the Navy to that question?

So Corona would be a move that disrupts an effective organization for nothing.

As we saw during our visit to Naval Base Ventura County, moving people and hardware from Point Mugu to China Lake, when to perform their work they would have to turn around and head back to Point Mugu, would actually cost more not less, sea going targets being a prime example.

Overall, I'm not sure if moving parts of any functions from Point Mugu to China Lake (or for that matter from China Lake to Point Mugu) would save much money either. For me, this one falls into the category of "Yes, it's possible, but why?" So far I haven't heard a compelling argument for moving any pieces or parts.

You say, "...while keeping the Sea Range open and supported." Neither the NAVY nor the DOD has proposed not keeping the sea range open and supported, so I don't understand why the BRAC Commission would comment on that. As we have heard from the Services and DOD, God isn't making anymore ocean-front property for weapons testing and training, and if we give it up we'll never get it back.

With respect to the relationship between Point Mugu and China Lake, they already operate as "one university with two campuses", with people moving back and forth between the two sites according to daily needs. The Navy deserves a lot of credit for this arrangement, and if the Navy wants to swing it one way or the other in the future they are free to do that. But I don't see it as a proper BRAC action to force the Navy to change this relationship when the Navy already has full control of both sites, they operate together under joint management, and can do what they want day-by-day or longer term. Unlike

certain other Navy facilities we have visited around the country, very high level Navy leadership supported our base visit to NBVC and were quite candid about their needs.

As we heard, there is no "excess capacity" between the two sites, or certainly no "excess-excess capacity" as Admiral Gehman puts it, because the Navy squeezes it out. And to compete for customers, both sites have to be as efficient as possible under working capital fund costing.

In discussions, some of our Commissioners have described the BRAC process as a "real estate" process to point out that we shouldn't be getting into day-to-day operations. At Point Mugu there is no real estate to be turned over to the community, nor any other advantage to the community by moving people around so long as the bases stay the same. And the footprints of the bases at Point Mugu and China Lake are not proposed to physically change.

I'll be back in Washington before and after the hearings on August 11th, and available to discuss further at your convenience.

Thanks again and best regards,

Phil

Philip E. Coyle, III
2139 Kew Drive
Los Angeles, CA 90046
Tel 323-656-6750
Fax 323-656-6240
E-mail Philip Coyle <martha.krebs@att.net>

From: "Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC" <Lester.Farrington@wso.whs.mil>
Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2005 00:05:58 -0000
To: 'Philip Coyle' <martha.krebs@worldnet.att.net>, "jbilbray@kkbr.com" <jbilbray@kkbr.com>
Cc: Epstein David B Ctr AF/ILEXR <DavidB.Epstein@pentagon.af.mil>, "Van Saun, David, CIV, WSO-BRAC" <David.VanSaun@wso.whs.mil>
Subject: Point Mugu Visit

<<BASE VISIT REPORT-NBVC.doc>>

Phil and Jim:

Attached is the base visit report covering our visit to Point Mugu. My feeling right now is that we should support the DOD recommendation that moves parts of Point Mugu to China Lake (weapons & armaments and electronic warfare recommendations) while keeping the Sea Range open and supported. China Lake ranks very high in military value. Although the loss of intellectual capital could be an issue, I am confident that in this case since these two entities are under one Navy organization, it can be worked out. Also, it is clear that since China Lake is geared to meeting future EW and weapon system integration requirements, the move from Point Mugu makes sense.

We will get the Corona visit report to you shortly. Let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

Les Farrington

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Jack Dodd [jack.dodd@emc-inc.com]
Sent: Wednesday, August 10, 2005 8:33 PM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
Cc: Lynn Jacquez; Bill Simmons; RADM George Strohsahl
Subject: Information from Lynn Jacquez
Attachments: A Workable Alternative.ppt; Workable BRAC alternative.doc

Les,

Per Lynn Jacquez's request, I am forwarding two documents: the "Workable Alternative" slide from RADM Strohsahl's testimony at the LA Regional Hearing, and the "Workable BRAC Alternative" point paper submitted after the hearing.

Please let us know if you have any questions, or if we can help in any other way.

V/R,
Jack

Jack D. Dodd
Engineering Management Concepts, Inc
805-484-9082
805-383-2602 (FAX)
jack.dodd@emc-inc.com

8/11/2005

A Workable Alternative

- Retain NAWCWD two-site concept.
- Retain proposed concept of Weapons and Electronic Warfare Centers, but with distributed positions at two sites.
- Do not move any NAWCWD Pt. Mugu positions.
- Realign NSWC PHD weapons positions to NAWCWD.
- Realign NSWC PHD C⁴ISR positions to Pt. Loma after decreased by Question 47 data.

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A Workable Alternative

How to use the existing construct of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division to comply with DoD's strategy of establishing centers of technical excellence, while significantly increasing military value, decreasing the cost of realignment and reducing the loss of intellectual capital.

Background

The Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division (NAWCWD) stood up as a command within the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) claimancy on 1 January 1992. Its planning and legal basis stem from the Navy preparation for BRAC 91 and the subsequent BRAC implementation established by law. While initially encompassing several separate and independent NAVAIR field activities and the prior Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, then a field activity of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), it quickly evolved to a two-site technical organization at China Lake and Pt. Mugu. At the time of its formation, two other centers under NAVAIR were created, the NAWC Aircraft Division headquartered at Patuxent River, MD, and the Training Systems Division at Orlando, FL. A headquarters for the three centers was established as the NAWC in Washington, D.C. under NAVAIR. At the same time as the NAWC and its divisions were formed, companion centers were created in the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and in SPAWAR.

The Intent

When planning started for BRAC 91, the leadership in the Navy was intent on consolidating the vast systems commands' RDT&E field activities into a much leaner structure. This was to be accomplished through realignments and closures affecting most of the field activities within the three systems commands organizations. NAVAIR leadership had had much earlier visions of a field activity structure with a flag officer in charge on each coast. The focus on the east coast would be airplanes and on the west coast, weapons, although the complexity of activity across all the supporting field structure was far greater than just those two commodities. Where activities were to continue to exist, the command function would vest in the NAWC division commander (a flag officer) and the supporting base function would be a subordinate command.

One very important aspect of this consolidation was the elimination of independent competing technical commands and functions around the country. Because weapons RDT&E functions were performed both at China Lake (more heavily R&D) and Pt. Mugu (more heavily T&E), a primary NAWCWD consolidation goal was to eliminate areas of overlap between the main sites. The new NAWCWD command structure significantly reduced middle management positions and located technical leadership at the site where it made the most sense. For example, Range, Targets, Test Wing, Logistics, Avionics and T&E Engineering leadership was located at Pt. Mugu, while System Engineering and Weapons leadership was located at China Lake. NAWCWD also adopted common systems for major supporting functions (e.g., financial, personnel,

information technology) depending on which site was judged most efficient. These consolidation efficiencies commenced in 1992 and were favorably noted during BRAC 95 site visits.

What followed in NAWCWD was a single command, headquartered first at Pt. Mugu and later at China Lake, commanding all the technical work at both places as an integrated organization, with subordinate Naval Air Weapons Station commands at each location to run the support functions of the bases themselves. Incredibly, there were really only two reasons for even identifying the two NAWCWD sites as separate entities. One involved the US Postal Service and the need to correctly address mail. The other had to do with detailed personnel management within the Department of the Navy and the need to have separate Unit Identification Codes (UIC) at each site.

NAVSEA used a different construct for their consolidated field activities and allowed each of the remaining activities renamed as Divisions, after closures occurred, to continue to exist as separate technical commands, coordinated in their work by a Washington, D.C. based Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) headquarters staff. NSWC Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD) remains as one of those technical commands. The NSWC recently adopted a form of competency alignment under Product Area Directors and has significantly reduced redundancy and competition between the separately commanded Surface Warfare Center Divisions.

The Management Imperative

First within the NAWC, then quickly followed by all of NAVAIR, a Competency Aligned Organization (CAO) management paradigm was adopted. This structure of management aligns people by technical function or specialty to provide support for programs without regard to physical location. NAVAIR in many ways ceased being a headquarters organization, which it had to do because of very aggressive mandated downsizing, and adopted a process by which leadership at all management levels was placed where the "center of gravity" for specific functions really existed. In the case of Ranges, Target Systems, Weapons, Electronic Warfare and other technical areas, that meant that the NAWCWD was in charge of those areas for all of NAVAIR. Within NAWCWD, the technical leadership for Weapons R&D is clearly at China Lake with T&E work also being accomplished in that competency at Pt. Mugu and Patuxent River. Technical leadership for Open Air Ranges, of which there are four within NAVAIR, Targets (used at all the ranges), and Electronic Warfare reside at Pt. Mugu. Since, in terms of total workload and people employed, China Lake has always been the larger element of NAWCWD, it was decided that the headquarters (flag pole) for NAWCWD would remain at China Lake, instead of alternating between the two sites, as had been the original concept. However, it is extremely important to understand that the residence of the flag officer and his immediate staff does not create an organization centered at China Lake with a detachment at Pt. Mugu. The commander of NAWCWD maintains offices at Pt. Mugu. He and his staff spend a considerable amount of time there, as they are the only technical command function at both locations.

In contribution to the support of programs, both sites work together in a fully integrated manner and are literally an inseparable team. At every level, management has been flattened and the work fully distributed to the people best suited to perform it. In the flat management chain, it is very common to find workers at one site reporting to a manager at the other site. Modern electronic communications technology, including dedicated fiber optic and microwave links and a network of video teleconference nodes, combined with a regularly scheduled aircraft shuttle service, have been employed to tightly link technical work. For example some electronic warfare and weapons laboratories are connected by fiber optics and literally function as one across the two sites. The NAWC WD infrastructure is transformational in that it adopted these methods more than 10 years ago and has since refined them to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness.

In 1998, as part of the Navy's shore establishment regionalization initiative, the Air Station at Pt. Mugu was moved from NAVAIR control to the fleet. Additionally, in 2000, the Naval Air Station at Pt. Mugu was merged with the Construction Battalion Center at Port Hueneme to create Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC). The effect at NBVC was to eliminate duplicate base command and support functions at the two proximate bases. That consolidation effort continues to this day. It is important to note that NAWCWD Pt. Mugu and NSWC PHD exist today as technical tenant activities on NBVC. There are dozens of other tenant activities on NBVC. However, the only ones subject to BRAC 2005 realignment are NAWCWD and NSWC PHD.

The Proposed Technical Mega-Centers at China Lake in BRAC 2005

The proposed Weapons and Armament Center and the Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Center at China Lake will probably never exist in the final management structure, even if all the BRAC realignments are put into law. In keeping with the CAO management paradigm of NAVAIR those positions would be aligned into existing, or perhaps some new competencies within the overall NAVAIR structure. In a world of industrial funding for program work, management can ill afford to add additional management layers to accommodate BRAC realignment rationale. The resulting management structure will continue to employ people at multiple sites that do not close. In the case of the Pt. Mugu realignment, from a management perspective, literally nothing will be changed except the positions will physically relocate to China Lake under a new mailing address and UIC. Unfortunately, most of the technical experts in their specialties from NBVC will not move and fill those positions. The loss of intellectual capital will be devastating for several years. If the positions are not relocated, they will continue to support programs, through the CAO, and under the technical command of the same flag officer, as they are today joined "at the hip" with their counterparts at China Lake

In the case of the realignment of functions from NSWC PHD, there is a case for consolidating a small part of that work under different systems commands. The weapons management functions at PHD, which are not inextricable to their essential shipboard weapons system integration work, probably could be more efficiently managed within NAWCWD. However the people literally do not have to move to make that happen.

They can realign in place and remain at Port Hueneme as part of the NAWCWD on NBVC, or if NAWC management prefers, move over to the Pt. Mugu side of the base. There are a handful of C4ISR functions at NSWC PHD which more properly align under SPAWAR and should realign and relocate to Pt. Loma.

An Alternative Philosophical Rationale

Given the data provided by the Ventura County BRAC Task Force, it is obvious that the proposed NBVC realignment will trigger a large and painful loss of intellectual capital, perhaps in excess of 80%, will incur costs that are not reasonably recoverable, and have a serious impact on the program customers as well as the effectiveness of our war fighters. Yet the concept of establishing consolidated Weapons and Armament and Sensors, EW, and Electronics centers, if in name only, under one systems command has merit. Therefore the BRAC Commission need only honor the simple fact that the two-site NAWCWD exists as a totally integrated single technical command established by BRAC 91 and that those proposed centers really are to be established at NAWCWD, the command, not the singular location of China Lake. By so doing, (1) the realignment of all functions out of Pt. Mugu would be cancelled, (2) only the appropriate weapons functions at NSWC PHD would be realigned, in place, to NAWCWD and (3) a handful of C4ISR positions would actually move to Pt. Loma. The proposals for other bases to realign functions to the consolidated Weapons and Armament center would be judged on their individual merits under the BRAC process. If they were to be realigned, in keeping with this rationale, the gaining organization would be NAWCWD, and the most relevant site for the relocation would be selected based on the nature of the functions to be realigned.

Following this alternative recommendation would comply with DoD's strategy of establishing centers of technical excellence, while significantly increasing military value, decreasing the cost of realignment and reducing the loss of intellectual capital.

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Jacquez, Lynn [ljacquez@clj.com]
Sent: Monday, July 25, 2005 4:33 PM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
Subject: Fw: White Paper

Attachments: Workable BRAC alternative.doc



Workable BRAC
alternative.doc ...

-----Original Message-----

From: Jacquez, Lynn <ljacquez@clj.com>
To: 'lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil' <lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil>
Sent: Thu Jul 21 12:03:29 2005
Subject: White Paper

Les,

Attached is the white paper from Admiral Strohsahl. Please give me a call on my cell (202) 744-2745 once you've had a chance to review. I would really appreciate your thoughts. Thanks

Lynn

<<Workable BRAC alternative.doc>> <<Workable BRAC alternative.doc>>

A Workable Alternative

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8/4/05

One University, Two Campuses. What does this mean? How does this work relative to Point Mugu and China Lake?

Background: In January 1992, the Navy put in place the concept of Warfare Centers. One manifestation of this “new, virtual” construct organizationally combined four NAVAIR sites (Pt. Mugu, China Lake, Albuquerque, and White Sands) into the Naval Air Warfare Center – Weapons Division. So, to begin with it was “One University with four campuses”. Over the years, two of those campuses, White Sands and Albuquerque, have been closed down as a result of reductions in workload and changes in mission with the resulting reductions in personnel. The analogy of “One University with four campuses” was used to illustrate how the new “One Command” was to function. Many things happened at China Lake and Pt. Mugu as a result of that, including:

- A daily air shuttle service began to move people back and forth between the two sites (annual cost \$4M)
- Reduced from two to one Command with one flag. That flag is at China Lake. At that time (January 1992), there were 5,362 civilian employees at China Lake and 4,445 civilian employees at Pt. Mugu.
- Theory was that all overhead functions would be cut in half. Reality is that there are still two personnel offices, two contracts shops, two budget departments, etc.
- Some consolidations occurred and some organizational efficiencies were realized in the Technical arena e.g. reduced to one systems engineering office, one software support branch, etc.. There was a cost associated, however, in that almost all consolidations resulted in a lead at one site and a deputy at the other site. This necessitates much more travel and challenges with communications.

Current State: The downturn in DOD during the 90’s resulted in decreases at both sites. At the time of the reorganization, the combined sites had 9,807 employees. Today the combined sites have less than half that number (4,207) but the same amount of infrastructure. They have half as many people with roughly half as much work and tremendous excess capacity. The drawdowns have been disproportional with Pt. Mugu decreasing by 66.1% while China Lake has decreased by 44.6%. The future vector is in the direction of China Lake with most new efforts gravitating toward the center at China Lake (e.g. weapon/sensor integration for EA-18G and JSF). To use the analogy of “One University with Two Campuses” is still true but now there is only enough “student loading” for one campus.

Conclusion: The experiment of “virtually” combining Point Mugu and China Lake has completed its course. The next step of transforming the way the Navy performs its weapons, armaments, sensors, electronic warfare and electronic equipment mission requires a co-located synergistic approach. Clearly, this is something that was not achievable under the limited authorities of a “virtual” multi-sited organization. BRAC is the opportunity to finish consolidating the organization. This is consistent with the TJCSG vision of an Integrated RDT&E Naval Weapons Center at China Lake. This meets the transformational goals of the DOD in this area and would very nicely position DOD for the future in the weapons and sensors/EW arena while significantly reducing excess infrastructure and saving the government money (\$71 M each year).

SOURCE: OSD'S TECHNICAL JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

Point Mugu / China Lake

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Harlow, Bradford (NAVAIR) [bradford.harlow@navy.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, July 13, 2005 8:15 PM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil; david.epstein@wso.whs.mil
Subject: Wording
Attachments: Tech 54 and Tech 18 wording.doc

Les and David,

Thanks again for taking time out of your busy schedules to come and visit us. I appreciate your willingness to hear from all sides in an attempt to reach ground truth. Here is the proposed re-wording you asked me to provide. Please don't hesitate to contact me should you require any additional information.

Brad

(760)939-3500 office

(760)382-6923 cell

<<Tech 54 and Tech 18 wording.doc>>

**Proposed Wording Change to Encompass the
Intent of TECH-0018 and TECH-0054:**

Background: The BRAC process is about gaining efficiencies and redirecting resources to help us develop the capabilities to meet tomorrow's threats. BRAC is essential to reshape our Navy to respond to its global missions today and into the future; to save money by cutting excess infrastructure, and to maximize the Navy's opportunities to train, deploy and fight as part of the joint force.

Gaining efficiencies: Moving the functions associated with TECH-54 and TECH-18 from Point Mugu to China Lake will:

- a. Save money and reduce infrastructure. Combined savings for DOD from the two scenarios is \$67M each year.
- b. Allow Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division to divest itself of over a half a million sq/ft of aging infrastructure at Pt. Mugu that is an artifact of when both commands were twice the size of the current population and workload. This will allow us to reduce our rates under the Naval Working Capital Fund so that more warfighting equipment can be purchased for the same dollars or at a reduced cost to the taxpayer. The Point Mugu/China Lake shuttle can be eliminated reducing the cost to the command by \$3.8 million/year. Leaving TECH-54 functions at Pt. Mugu will preclude cancellation of the shuttle.
- c. Support the DOD concept of establishing three core centers of excellence for weapons across the country.
- d. Provide greater synergy by combining the intellectual capital in electronics, EW, and sensors technology used to support weapons development and testing efforts in one location. The same intellectual capital exists between scientists and engineers currently working in the areas of weapons, sensors, platforms, threat data files, electronics, etc.
- e. Transform the way we do business today to position us for the future. The vision is rapidly becoming reality when we look at systems such as JSF whose future vector contains no single boxes, instead using multiple shared integrated airframe apertures to handle the same function as the multiple dedicated pods on the EA-6B (e.g. F/A-18 AESA and JSF). Enormous integration challenges are presented with the future model that will be hampered by geographic separation. The current model of build the box and ship it to be tested will not work in the future. Maintaining a Software Engineering Institute level 5 software maturity model (currently exists only at China Lake) for the future (F/A-18G) is largely dependent on co-location of platform and electronic warfare expertise.

- f. Moving the entire engineering function (weapons, armaments, electronic warfare) will increase the chance that people will make the choice to move rather than seeking employment with the remaining function. NAWCWD is a highly integrated command, this integration goes both horizontally and vertically. Moving part of the engineering function is less than optimal, both TECH-18 and TECH-54 should move together.

Proposed wording:

Create an Integrated Weapons and Armament Center at China Lake, CA by aligning Naval weapons, armament and electronic warfare research, development, acquisition, test and evaluation. Integrated Weapons and armaments includes all functionality associated with the entire life cycle of naval weapon and armaments development, integration, test and evaluation engineering, in-service engineering and life cycle support, range management, VX-30 Squadron, and all associated administrative support. Pacific Sea Range and targets operations support will remain at Point Mugu. The intent is to create an integrated co-located center capable of providing a complete weapon system research, development, acquisition, test and evaluation environment enabling warfighter dominance in the battle space arena of the future.

Specifically with respect to the functions that will relocate from Point Mugu, CA to China Lake, CA:

Competency 2.0, Contracts.

Competency 3.0, Logistics, exclusive of logistics direct labor support for range targets.

Competency 4.0, Research and Engineering, exclusive of Radar Reflectivity Laboratory and associated direct labor.

Competency 5.0, T&E Engineering and Range Department management levels 1 and 2.

Competency 7.0, Proportion of personnel associated with moving functions.

Competency 10, Comptroller.

Competency 11, Legal.

Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Thirty, VX-30

Baseline TECH-0018DR:

Starting Year : 2006

Final Year : 2008

Payback Year : 2015 (7 Years)

NPV in 2025(\$K): -433,404
1-Time Cost(\$K): 358,142

TECH-0018DR modified to leave Range operations, Radar Reflectivity Lab, Target Logistics and associated support personnel at Point Mugu, CA. (Estimated at 400 personnel)

Starting Year : 2006
Final Year : 2008
Payback Year : 2015 (7 Years)

NPV in 2025(\$K): -365,264
1-Time Cost(\$K): 338,730

Delta:

Change in Payback year: None.
Change in 20 year net present value: -68,140K
Change in 1-Time Costs: -19,412K

TECH-0054: Current savings incorporate is the mutually (Point Mugu/China Lake) agreed to number of 5.7%. Changing the savings to the JCSG allowed number of 15% would result in a payback of 6 years.

Baseline savings of 5.7%:

Starting Year : 2006
Final Year : 2009
Payback Year : 2021 (12 Years)

NPV in 2025(\$K): -16,888
1-Time Cost(\$K): 72,699

Savings at 15%:

Starting Year : 2006
Final Year : 2009
Payback Year : 2015 (6 Years)

NPV in 2025(\$K): -83,750
1-Time Cost(\$K): 72,699

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Harlow, Bradford (NAVAIR) [bradford.harlow@navy.mil]
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2005 2:45 PM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil; david.epstein@wso.whs.mil
Subject: Don McErlean

David and Les,

You asked me to let you know after I had given Don McErlean a heads up that you may be calling him about his opinion regarding China Lake and Point Mugu EW capabilities and the advisability of consolidating EW at China Lake from Point Mugu. As you recall, Don lives at Pax River and is the senior civilian within NAVAIR's Research and Engineering organization which includes the EW groups at Pax, Mugu, and China Lake. He probably has the most unbiased and accurate viewpoint of all the folks you will talk to. His phone number is (301)342-1108.

Brad

Point Mugu

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: mileyf29@aol.com
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 12:52 PM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
Attachments: Points to ponder.doc

Mr. Farrington

I enjoyed meeting you at the evening reception at the Marriot in Ventura CA on July 8, 2005. I had discussed the attached paper with Mr. Epstein and I will send it to the BRAC official web site. Would you pass a copy to Mr. Epstein for me. I misplaced his email address. Thanks

Frank Miley
Associate Director Electronic Warfare Point Mugu (Ret)
Tel: 805-482-3333
Email: mileyf29@aol.com

7/18/2005

Points to ponder.

1. The DoD in forwarding their base closure and realignment recommendations to the BRAC committee has recommended moving the Army Electronic Warfare (EW) effort from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen, EW efforts at Crane Indiana to Widbey Island Washington, portions of the Air Forces EW program at Eglin AFB to Edwards AFB, and the Navy's EW effort at Point Mugu to China Lake. I am concerned that moving these efforts to a new activity with different management goals will destroy the operational response of US EW capability that exists in the country today. In both private industry and the public sector the merger and realignment of functions is a risky venture. This movement of premier EW assets in the Army, Navy and Air Force by the DoD in the face of our on going war in Iraq and Afghanistan risks the lives of US Service personnel and the war fighting capability to achieve our goals in these areas. In addition if this intellectual capital is lost it cannot be easily restored.
2. The EW capability that exists at Point Mugu was been developed over the last 54 years. Range testing, targets, missile development tests, aircraft hardware and software testing in the labs, and flight tests have played an integral part in the formulation of the EW technical capability that exists at Point Mugu today. This training and growth can never be duplicated.
3. China Lake disbanded their EW capability almost twenty years ago as a minor player in future warfare.
4. In many instances when an entity is merged into another activity the receiving group has a management goal in place which is different than the management goal of the transferred group. China Lake has already notified personnel at Point Mugu that they want to transfer a high value equipment asset used in current ongoing EW work to their laboratory for their use on a future program.
5. The ECHO. Range at China Lake has a low use rate. Current NAVAIR programs are using other ranges that have more up to date simulations of threat weapons.

Sincerely,

Frank Miley
Associate Director of Electronic Warfare (Ret.)
Tel: 805-482-3333 work
805-482 5382 home
Mileyf29@aol.com

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Jacquez, Lynn [ljacquez@clj.com]
Sent: Thursday, June 09, 2005 10:46 AM
To: lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
Subject: Pt Mugu BRAC Questions

Les--I really appreciate the time you spent discussing Naval Base Ventura County with me and your willingness to meet with me and Jack Dodd tomorrow morning. I look forward to renewing our acquaintance from 1995! Below please find the text of questions submitted from the base that pretty much outlines our major issues. I will forward additional read ahead material later today. I look forward to seeing you in the morning.

Lynn Jacquez

Dr. Higgins,

Per our telcon yesterday please see the discussion below. We believe we understand the outcome of TECH 54 and we believe TECH 162 was rejected. We do not understand the outcome relative to TECH2B.

Background on the issue:

NAWCWD_PT_MUGU responded to the following scenario data calls:

TECH2B Relocate Weapons and Armament to China Lake
 TECH05 Relocate Rotary Air Platform to Patuxent River
 TECH06 Relocate Fixed Wing Air Platforms to Patuxent River
 TECH54/6 Consolidate C4ISR and Sensors at China Lake, Patuxent River, or
 Edwards AFB
 DON162 Close NAS Pt Mugu

SECDEF recommended to relocate all weapons and armament RDAT&E from Point Mugu to China Lake. We interpret this to be enactment of scenario TECH2B.

When TECH2B was issued, guidance included

“Report FTEs, equipment and facilities that are within this scenario category (W&A) but are an inextricable part of a specific effort performed by your activity that is not Weapons; however, identify and explain in #USN0047 those areas of conflict.”

In earlier scenarios this inseparable work was not included in the personnel and equipment movement, dynamic costing or military construction requirements. This guidance presented a real problem for weapons work since the vast majority of the sea range and targets complex events are weapons related. Obviously we were not going to pick up the range and move it. Furthermore the vast majority of the sea range work cannot be accomplished on the land range due to physical size, safety, and/or security requirements. In discussions with the NAVAIR principal, we agreed to “hold back” several functions that would not move. The only area of disagreement between NAVAIR and NAWCWD was the movement of VX-30 Weapons Test Squadron. We were instructed to relocate VX-30 even though it was inextricably tied to the sea range. We believe this decision was based on a poor understanding of the VX-30 mission since it would mean repositioning the aircraft almost daily from China Lake to Point Mugu. After much discussion between WD, NAVAIR, and IAT, the Question 47

6/10/2005

wording submitted was:

The following areas would require a reduction in the number of personnel, equipment, and facilities to be relocated to the receiving site: (1) F-14 weapons system support has been terminated, a reduction of 132 civilians and 24 contractors; (2) An error of 33 civilians performing EW support; (3) personnel, mission equipment, and facilities performing outdoor air range operations. These are an integrated, fixed base capability that must remain at the Point Mugu site to continue sea range operations, net reduction of 505 civilians, 153 contractors, 2667 tons of mission equipment, and 1022.4 KSFT of facility space; (4) Retaining the 3 anechoic chambers whose primary customer is the targets range complex, a net reduction of 14 civilians, 3 contractors, 90 tons of support equipment, and 44.2 KSF; (5) Keeping logistical support for targets with the targets hardware, a net reduction of 24 civilians,; and (6) Not moving the general and administrative support that currently services both China Lake and Point Mugu, a net reduction of 143 civilians and 22 contractors.

In the above statement, "personnel, mission equipment, and facilities performing outdoor air range operations" include both Range and Threat/Target Departments.

Similar guidance was given for TECH05 and TECH06 but in these cases we were directed via scenario discrepancy data call (SDDC) to remove the functions identified in question 47 from the baseline data to reduce the complexity of the data analysis.. We fully expected to receive an SDDC for TECH2B to remove the question 47 functions, but we did not.

This impact of the question 47 reduction in TECH2B is significant:

NAWCWD Personnel Movement from Point Mugu to China Lake (Questions 38802-4, 38846)

61 Officers, 153 Enlisted, 1267 Civilians, 336 Contractors = Total of 1817 direct jobs

Considering Question 47 reductions the net movement is:

61 Officers, 150 Enlisted, 423 Civilians, 134 Contractors = Total of 768 direct jobs

Per Wayne Honea, a similar problem occurred with the NSWC Port Hueneme in TECH2A. They indicated a total of approximately 432 direct jobs in the movement tables but indicated only about 134 would move via question 47 or some other means.

In the SECDEF recommendation the impact on the community is a total of 2250 direct jobs (1817 NAWC + 432 NSWC). Apparently none of the question 47 reductions were applied in the recommendation.

This presents us with these questions:

(1) What was the intent of the recommendation? Were any of the functions identified in question 47 to be part of the recommendation?

(2) Was the analysis performed correctly? Neither the losing nor receiving site included dynamic or facility costs to relocate the functions identified in question 47. If the analysis used the full personnel movements without the accompanying costs, the return on investment calculation would be incorrect.

