


# Mississippi Air National Guard



KC 135R  
STRATOTANKER



To: **LANGFORD KNIGHT**

From: **John Pearson**

Phone: **601 484 9352**

Fax:

Email:

Date sent: \_\_\_\_\_

Time sent: \_\_\_\_\_

Number of pages including cover page: **22**

Message:

- Urgent
- For Review
- Please Comment
- Please Reply

Please hold  
for Mr Knight.  
He should register  
this afternoon.  
Thanks

186th ARW  
6225 M Street  
Meridian, MS

**Final Selection Criteria**  
**Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment**

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

***Military Value***

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

***Other Considerations***

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.
7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities.

## Optimal Range WIDGET Formula

<b>Mission</b>	Tanker
<b>Criterion</b>	Current / Future Mission
<b>Attribute</b>	Geo-locational Factors
<b>Formula #</b>	1245
<b>Label</b>	Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)
<b>Effective %</b>	39.10
<b>Question</b>	<p>If installation has no runway or no active runway, or no serviceable, suitable runway then score 0 pts. See section 1.9 "Shared" for details.</p> <p>For each airspace:          If the Airspace/Route Designator does not start with AR, get 0 points. See OSD # 1245, column 1 for this data.          Otherwise, if the distance to the airspace is &gt; 850 miles, get 0 points. See OSD # 1245, column 2. (N/A means more than 850 NM.)          Otherwise, if the distance to the airspace = 850 miles, get 10 points.          Otherwise, if the distance to the airspace = 250 miles, get 100 points.          Otherwise, pro-rate the distance to the airspace from 250 miles to 850 miles on a 100 to 10 point scale.          This is the base raw total.</p> <p>Once you have a base raw total, find the highest, and the lowest, non-zero raw total across all bases.          If the raw total = 0, the score = 0.          Else, if the raw total = the highest raw total, the score = 100.          Else, if the raw total = the lowest, non-zero raw total, the score = 10.          Else, pro-rate the raw total between the lowest non-zero raw total and the highest raw total on a 10 to 100 scale.</p>
<b>Source</b>	FLIP AP-1A; FLIP AP-1B; IFR Supp; Falcon View or other certified flight planning software

**Tanker / Receiver Ratio by Base**  
2005 BRAC Data

**Northeast**

Location	PAA	Command	Receiver Location	PAA	Type	Total	T/R Ratio
Andrews	8	AFR	Atlantic City	24	F-15	287	35.9
			McGuire	12	C-17		
			Stewart	12	C-5		
			EWV Shepherd	10	C-5		
			Martin State	18	A-10		
			Dover	28	C-5, C-17		
			Langley	72	F-15, F-22		
			Andrews	24	F-16		
			Seymour Johnson	87	F-15		
			<u>287</u>				
Pittsburgh	16	ANG	Andrews	24	F-16	128	8.0
			EWV Shepherd	10	C-5		
			Martin State	18	A-10		
			Selfridge	18	A-0		
			Toledo	24	F-16		
			Ft. Wayne	24	F-16		
			Wright Patterson	10	C-5		
			<u>128</u>				
McGuire	30	AD	Langley	72	F-15, F-22	238	7.9
			Andrews	24	F-16		
			EWV Shepherd	10	C-5		
			Martin State	18	A-10		
			Dover	28	C-5, C-17		
			Atlantic City	24	F-15		
			McGuire	12	C-17		
			Stewart	12	C-5		
			Barnes	24	A-10		
			Westover	14	C-5		
			<u>238</u>				
Pease	12	ANG	Burlington	18	F-16	80	6.7
			Westover	14	C-5		
			Barnes	24	A-10		
			McGuire	12	C-17		
			Stewart	12	C-5		
			<u>80</u>				
Bangor	12	ANG	Burlington	18	F-16	56	4.7
			Westover	14	C-5		
			Barnes	24	A-10		
			<u>56</u>				

**Midwest**

Sioux City	8	ANG	Joe Foss	18	F-15	98	12.3
			Des Moines	18	F-16		
			Offutt	22	R/WC-135		
			Whiteman	40	A-10, B-2		
			<u>98</u>				
Lincoln	8	ANG	Joe Foss	18	F-16	98	12.3
			Des Moines	18	F-16		
			Offutt	22	R/WC-135		
			Whiteman	40	A-10, B-2		
			<u>98</u>				
Tinker	12	AFR	Tulsa	24	F-16	141	11.8
			Tinker	24	E-3		
			Altus	15	C-17		
			Dyess	54	B-1		
			Carswell	24	F-16		
			<u>141</u>				

**Tanker / Receiver Ratio by Base**  
2005 BRAC Data

Location	PAA	Command	Receiver Location	PAA	Type	Total	T/R Ratio
Forbes	12	ANG	Des Moines	18	F-16	128	10.7
			Offutt	22	R/WC-135		
			Whiteman	40	A-10, B-2		
			Tulsa	24	F-16		
			Tinker	24	E-3		
				<u>128</u>			
Selfridge	12	ANG	Selfridge	18	A-0	76	6.3
			Toledo	24	F-16		
			Ft. Wayne	24	F-16		
			Wright Patterson	10	C-5		
				<u>76</u>			
Gen. Mitchell	12	ANG	# Selfridge	18	A-0	76	6.3
			Toledo	24	F-16		
			Ft. Wayne	24	F-16		
			Wright Patterson	10	C-5		
				<u>76</u>			
Scott	12	ANG	Whiteman	40	A-10, B-2	58	4.8
			Memphis	8	C-5		
			Wright Patterson	10	C-5		
				<u>58</u>			
Rickenbacker	18	ANG	Selfridge	18	A-0	86	4.8
			Toledo	24	F-16		
			Ft Wayne	24	F-16		
			Wright Patterson	10	C-5		
			EWV Shepherd	10	C-5		
				<u>86</u>			
Grissom	16	AFR	Selfridge	18	A-0	76	4.8
			Toledo	24	F-16		
			Ft. Wayne	24	F-16		
			Wright Patterson	10	C-5		
				<u>76</u>			
Altus	36	AD	Tulsa	24	F-16	141	3.9
			Tinker	24	E-3		
			Altus	15	C-17		
			Dyess	54	B-1		
			Carswell	24	F-16		
				<u>141</u>			
McConnell	48	AD	Tulsa	24	F-16	125	2.6
			Tinker	24	E-3		
			Altus	15	C-17		
			Offutt	22	R/WC-135		
			Whiteman	40	A-10, B-2		
				<u>125</u>			
Fairchild	30	AD	McChord	42	C-17	102	3.4
			Boise	18	A-10		
			Mountain Home	42	F-15		
				<u>102</u>			
<b>Southwest</b>							
Phoenix	10	ANG	Luke	100	F-16	227	22.7
			Tucson	61	F-16		
			Davis Monthan	66	A-10		
				<u>227</u>			

**Tanker / Receiver Ratio by Base**  
2005 BRAC Data

Location	PAA	Command	Receiver Location	PAA	Type	Total	T/R Ratio
March	12	AFR	Edwards	71	Test	203	16.9
			Fresno	24	F-16		
			Luke	100	F-16		
			March	8	C-17		
				<u>203</u>			
Salt Lake City	8	ANG	Mountain Home	42	F-15	132	16.5
			Hill	72	F-16		
			Boise	18	A-10		
				<u>132</u>			
Travis	24	AD	Travis	28	C-5, C-17	132	5.5
			Moffett Field	9	MC-130		
			Fresno	24	F-16		
			Edwards	71	Test		
				<u>132</u>			
<b>Southeast</b>							
Meridian	12	ANG	Memphis	8	C-5	363	30.3
			Barksdale	73	B-52, A-10		
			Jackson	8	C-17		
			New Orleans ANG	24	F-15		
			Hurlburt	40	M/AC-130		
			Tyndall	96	F-15, F-22		
			Eglin	96	F-16, F-15, A-10, F-22, MC-130, JASF		
			Montgomery	18	F-16		
				<u>363</u>			
Seymour Johnson	16	AD	EWV Shepard	10	C-5	347	21.7
			Andrews	24	F-16		
			Langley	72	F-15, F-22		
			Seymour Johnson	87	F-15		
			Shaw	72	F-16		
			McEntire	36	F-15, C-17		
			Charleston	46	C-17		
				<u>347</u>			
Birmingham	12	ANG	Memphis	8	C-5	228	19.0
			Jackson	8	C-17		
			Robins	10	E-8		
			Montgomery	18	F-16		
			Moody	48	A-10		
			Eglin	96	F-16, F-15, A-10, F-22, MC-130, JASF		
			Hurlburt	40	M/AC-130		
				<u>228</u>			
MacDill	16	AD	Jacksonville	24	F-15	192	12.0
			Homestead	24	F-16		
			Moody	48	A-10		
			Tyndall	96	F-15, F-22		
				<u>192</u>			
McGhee Tyson	12	ANG	Wright Patterson	10	C-5	134	11.2
			Shaw	72	F-16		
			McEntire	24	F-16		
			Montgomery	18	F-16		
			Robins	10	E-8		
				<u>134</u>			

4A

**Tanker / Receiver Ratio  
CONUS and Region  
2005 BRAC Data**

# CONUS

Base	# Tankers	# Rcvrs w/in 250 NM	Rcvrs for each tanker
Andrews D.C.	8	287	35.9
Meridian ANGB	12	363	30.3
Phoenix	10	227	22.7
Seymour Johnson	16	347	21.7
March	12	203	16.9
Salt Lake City	8	132	16.5
Lincoln	8	98	12.3
Sioux City	8	98	12.3
MacDiill	16	192	12.0
Tinker	12	141	11.8
McGhee Tyson	12	134	11.2
Forbes	12	128	10.7
Pittsburgh	16	128	8.0
McGuire KC-10	30	238	7.9
Pease	12	80	6.7
Gen Mitchell	12	76	6.3
Selfridge	12	76	6.3
Travis KC-10	24	132	5.5
Scott	12	58	4.8
Rickenbacker	18	86	4.8
Grissom	16	76	4.8
Bangor	12	56	4.7
Fairchild	30	102	3.4
McConnell	48	125	2.6

# REGION

	Base	# Tankers	# Rcvrs w/in 250 NM	Rcvrs for each tanker
<b>Northeast</b>	Andrews D.C.	8	287	35.9
	Pittsburgh	16	128	8.0
	McGuire (KC-10's)	30	238	7.9
	Pease	12	80	6.7
	Bangor	12	56	4.7
<b>Mid-West</b>	Lincoln	8	98	12.3
	Sioux City	8	98	12.3
	Forbes	12	128	10.7
	Gen. Mitchell	12	76	6.3
	Selfridge	12	76	6.3
	Scott	12	58	4.8
	Rickenbacker	18	86	4.8
	Grissom	16	76	4.8
<b>Northwest</b>	McConnell	48	125	2.6
<b>Southwest</b>	Fairchild	30	102	3.4
<b>Southeast</b>	Phoenix	10	227	22.7
	March	12	203	16.9
	Salt Lake City	8	132	16.5
	Tinker	12	141	11.8
	Travis	24	132	5.5
<b>Southeast</b>	Meridian ANGB	12	363	30.3
	Seymour Johnson	16	347	21.7
	MacDiill	16	192	12.0
	McGhee Tyson	12	134	11.2

Southeast Region Receiver Training  
Continuation and Qualification Event Detail

Location	Type Receiver	# Aircraft	# Aircraft Commanders	Minimum Calendar Year AR Events Aircraft Commander (1)	Minimum Calendar Year AR Events Location (1)	Events per sortie (2)	AR Sorties Required To Support Tasking		
AL	Montgomery ANG	F-16	18	34	4	136	14	34	Continuation Training
FL	Eglin AFB	A-10, F-15/E, F-16	24	48	2	96	1/2	48	Test Squadrons - 180 day currency
"	Eglin AFB	MC-130	19	30	3	90	1/2	45	2AC per msn
"	Homestead AFB	F-16	24	48	4	192	1/4	48	Continuation Training
"	Hurlburt AFB	AC/MC-130	40	60	4	240	1/2	120	2AC per msn
"	Jacksonville ANG	F-15	24	48	4	192	1/4	48	Continuation Training
"	Tyndall AFB	F-15, F-22, JSF	146	292	4	1168	1/4	292	Continuation Training & Upgrade trng
GA	Moody AFB	A-10	48	96	4	384	1/4	96	Continuation Training
"	Robins AFB	E-8	15	30	6	180	1/3	60	Continuation Training
LA	Barksdale AFB	A-10	24	48	4	192	1/4	48	Continuation Training
"	Barksdale AFB	B-52	39	80	4	320	1/2	160	Continuation Training
"	Barksdale AFB	B-52 (RTU)	10	64	13	832	1/2	416	Upgrade trng (2AC/sortie)
"	New Orleans ANG	F-15	24	48	4	192	1/4	48	Continuation Training
MS	Jackson ANG	C-17	8	36	5	180	1/3	60	Continuation Training (3AC/sortie)
NC	Seymour Johnson AFB	F-15E	87	174	3	522	1/4	130	Continuation Training
SC	Charleston AFB	C-17	46	216	5	1080	1/3	360	Continuation Training (3AC/sortie)
"	McEntire ANG	F-16	24	48	4	192	1/4	48	Continuation Training
"	Shaw AFB	F-16	72	144	4	576	1/4	144	Continuation Training
TN	Memphis ANG	C-5	8	12	7	84	1/3	30	Continuation Training (3AC/sortie)
VA	Langley AFB	F-15, F-22	72	144	4	576	1/4	164	Continuation Training
WV	Shepherd ANG	C-5	10	28	4	112	1/3	37	Continuation Training (3AC/sortie)
			782	1728		7536		2436	

(1) Where applicable, ACC 20 Month RAP tasking prorated to 12 month figure for computation.

(2) Calculated using optimum sortie and event scheduling. FIGHTERS - Four ships to tanker. HEAVIES - Three Pilots per sortie.

5

## 1.7 Air Force Basing Considerations

To help make consistent, coherent and forward-looking basing recommendations, the Air Force developed a white paper combining historical basing trends, expeditionary tenets, task force CONOPS, homeland defense, and core competencies. This white paper, *Air Force Organizing Principles*, captures these ideas for the Air Force and informed the Air Force BRAC process. As part of the BRAC process, OSD published a list of overarching principles to help focus service analysis. The Air Force in turn established 16 principles to help guide its deliberations. Five of these principles were defined as "imperative."

### 1.7.1 Air Force Basing Principles

A principle is an enduring, fundamental tenet that describes an operational or physical characteristic that has or produces military value. The 11 Air Force basing principles are:

1. *Maintain squadrons within operationally efficient proximity to DoD-controlled airspace, ranges, MOAs, and low-level routes*
2. *Optimize the size of our squadrons – in terms of aircraft model, aircraft assigned, and crew ratios applied (e.g., same MDS's)*
3. *Retain enough capacity to base worldwide Air Force forces entirely within the United States and its territories*
4. *Retain aerial refueling bases in optimal proximity to their missions*
5. *Better meet the needs of the Air Force by maintaining/placing ARC units in locations that best meet the demographic and mission requirements unique to the ARC*
6. *Ensure joint basing realignment actions (when compared to the status quo) increase the military value of a function, or decrease the cost for the same military value of that function*
7. *Ensure long-range strike bases provide flexible strategic response and strategic force protection*
8. *Support the AEF construct by keeping two geographically separate munitions sites*
9. *Retain enough surge capacity to support deployments, evacuations, and base repairs*
10. *Consolidate and/or co-locate older fleets*
11. *Ensure global mobility by retaining two air mobility bases and one additional wide-body capable base on each coast*

### 1.7.2 Air Force Basing Imperatives

The five Air Force basing imperatives are:

1. *Ensure unimpeded access to polar and equatorial earth orbits*
2. *Preserve land-based strategic deterrent infrastructure as outlined by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)*
3. *Ensure continuity of operations by maintaining airfield capabilities within the NCR to support the POTUS, Special Airlift Missions, and foreign dignitary visits*
4. *Provide air sovereignty basing to meet the site protection and response time criteria stipulated by USNORTHCOM and USPACOM*
5. *Support global response by U.S. forces by keeping sufficient sovereign U.S. mobility bases along deployment routes to potential crisis areas*

**Ziamba Craig M Capt 153ARS**

---

**From:** Wilson Aaron K Col 186LG/CC  
**Sent:** Friday, June 03, 2005 11:47 AM  
**To:** Ziamba Craig M Capt 153ARS  
**Subject:** Operating cost

Craig,

According to the System Program Office (SPO) at Tinker, Mr. John Booth, DSN 336-2529, The FY-04 cost per flying hour for a KC-135R was \$8,513. We recently received a first time ever mid-year increase in fuel pricing (30%) which increased the cost per hour by an average of \$600.  $10,000 \text{ lb per hr} \div 6.7 \text{ lb per gallon} \times \$1.34 = \$2000 \times 30\% = \$600$ . \$8,513 plus \$600 puts us over \$9,000 per hour. AK

~~Figure 6~~**Refueling Area Comparison Chart**

<u>Base</u>	<u>Fuel Required</u>	<u>Flt Time</u>	<u>Difference</u>
<b><u>AR 302</u></b>			
Key Field	14,365 lbs./2,113 gal.	1+21	0/0
McGhee Tyson	24,384 lbs./3,650 gal.	2+47	1,537 gal./1+26
Macdill	26,448 lbs./3,889 gal.	2+59	1,776 gal./1+38
Tinker	27,209 lbs./4001 gal.	3+06	1,888 gal./1+45

**Eagle G**

Key Field	14,066 lbs./2,069 gal.	1+13	0/0
McGhee Tyson	21,624 lbs./3,180 gal.	2+24	1,111 gal./1+13
Macdill	20,291 lbs./2984 gal.	2+12	915 gal./+59
Tinker	26,418 lbs./3,885 gal.	3+02	1816 gal./1+49

**W-151**

Key Field	13,993 lbs./2,058 gal.	1+14	0/0
McGhee Tyson	19,651 lbs./2,890 gal.	2+04	832 gal./+50
Macdill	19,438 lbs./2,856 gal.	2+04	798 gal./+50
Tinker	29,963 lbs./4,406 gal.	3+30	2,348 gal./2+16

**Pine Hill MOA**

Key Field	12,797 lbs./1,882 gal.	1+06	0/0
McGhee Tyson	18,437 lbs./2,711 gal.	1+55	829 gal./+49
Macdill	19,936 lbs./2,932 gal.	2+10	1,050 gal./1+04
Tinker	23,754 lbs./3,493 gal.	2+41	1,611 gal./1+35

**Fla A**

Key Field	14,129 lbs./2,078 gal.	1+18	0/0
McGhee Tyson	17,235 lbs./2,535 gal.	1+47	457 gal./+29
Macdill	15,050 lbs./2,213 gal.	1+25	135 gal./+07
Tinker	29,355 lbs./4,317 gal.	3+24	2,239 gal./2+06

~~Figure 1~~

### Homeland Defense Points of Interest Comparison Chart

<u>Base</u>	<u>Fuel Required</u>	<u>Flt Time</u>	<u>Difference</u>
<b><u>New Orleans</u></b>			
Key Field	12,100 lbs./1,779 gal.	1+03	0/0
McGhee Tyson	17,679 lbs./2,600 gal.	2+31	1,548 gal./1+28
Maddill	21,342 lbs./3,139 gal.	2+38	1,360 gal./1+35
Tinker	23,558 lbs./3,464 gal.	2+37	1,685 gal./1+34
<b><u>Houston</u></b>			
Key Field	20,500 lbs./3,015 gal.	2+05	112 gal./ +04
McGhee Tyson	30,175 lbs./4,438 gal.	3+31	1,423 gal./1+26
Maddill	30,477 lbs./4,482 gal.	3+27	1,467 gal./1+22
Tinker	19,743 lbs./2,903 gal.	2+01	0/0

8A

DATE:	SQDN:	WING:	CREW:	A/C TYPB: KC-135R	A/C#:									
PILOT:	CO-PILOT:	NAV:	BOOM:	TCS:	RCS:									
<b>FLIGHT INFORMATION</b> Takeoff Time (Z): 15:54 Land Time (Z): Fuel Load: 80000 Fuel Used: 14365 Acft CG: Sched Duration : 01+21 Fuel On Board : 09+02 Fuel Reserve : 07+41 Remarks: LstWod: 17 May 2005 1431Z Acft Gross Wt: 200000														
<b>AIR REFUELING INFORMATION</b> A/R Track: Pri. Freq: Sec. Freq: APN 69 BCN: Remarks: A/R Altitude: Off/Onload: REC/TRK Type: A/A TACAN:														
TP#	NVAD RADDMS	TAC	LAT	W/V	MC	TEMP	IAS	TAS	GDST	TIME	ETA	ATA	GROSS	FUEL
REMARKS	VOR	LONG	TRK	DCA	TH	VAR	CH	ALT	MACH	GS	ACDST	ACTIME	WEIGHT	RMWG
1	KMEI/A		N 32 19.96	323/003	010	+23C	010	297M			5.0	00+02	200000	2500
	KEY FLD		W088 45.11	009 0	009	0.6W	010				5.0	00:02	15:54	77500
	.level off		N 31 58.41	005/000	229		229				40.0	00+07		
			W089 19.51	228 1	229	0.2W	229				45.0	00:09	16:03	2809
2	AEX/R095100	108X	N 31 00.59	005/000	228		228				86.5	00+12	197191	74691
	ALEXANDRIA	116.10	W090 34.82	228 0	228	0.8E	228				131.5	00:21	1868	
	.orbit		N 31 00.59	005/000	278		278				0.0	00+15	195323	72823
			W090 34.82	279 0	279	0.8E	278				131.5	00:36	2194	
3	SJI	100X	N 30 43.56	288/006	098		098				115.9	00+17	193129	70629
	SEMMES	115.30	W088 21.56	098 0	098	0.6W	098				247.4	00:54	2428	
	.descent pt		N 31 10.68	288/006	348		348				27.8	00+04	190701	68201
			W088 28.76	347 -1	346	0.7W	347				275.2	00:58	595	
4	MEI/R	117X	N 32 22.71	221/007	348		348				73.8	00+13	190106	67606
	MERIDIAN	117.00	W088 48.26	347 -1	346	0.6W	347				348.9	01:11	971	
	.descent pt		N 32 19.96	122/003	137		137				3.8	00+10	189135	66635
			W088 45.11	136 0	136	0.6W	136				352.8	01:21	1000	
TP# FORM 200 (COMPUTER GENERATED)														

DATE CREATED 17 MAY 05

M:\local\302E PP.rte

KMEI - 302E 14365 LBS ÷ 6.8 density  
2113 gal

## Parking Capacity

According to the Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations, Table 1, Volume V, Part 1 of 2, page 2, the optimal KC-135 optimal size squadron is 16 aircraft with 12 aircraft as an acceptable squadron size. Under the BRAC recommendations no Air National Guard KC-135 unit other than Rickenbacker ANGB is set to operate more than 12 aircraft. Key Field ANGB currently operates 9 aircraft and by the Air Force's own evaluation has the capacity to park up to 13 aircraft on available ramp space. In comparison, two of the units receiving Key Field ANGB's nine KC-135R's have the following current capacity to park KC-135R aircraft on their aprons:

**Table 1.**

UNIT	Available KC-135R Parking Locations
Key Field AGS	13
General Mitchell IAP AGS	11
McGee Tyson	10

(Source:

Tab\_2\_Mil\_Value\_and\_Capacity\_Supporting\_Information\_USAF\_0077V3\_(437c5).pdf)

Given that these units cannot accommodate the 12 aircraft proposed to be appropriated to them by the 2005 BRAC, additional construction would be needed for ramp area as seen in Table 2.

**Table 2.**

Unit	Additional Aircraft ramp space needed for 12 KC-135R (Square Yards)	Total Military Construction Cost for Additional Ramp
Key Field AGS	0	\$0
McGhee Tyson AGS	28,545	\$3,486,000
General Mitchell IAP AGS	3,753	\$569,000
Scott AFB	3,753	\$623,000
<b>Total Ramp MILCON Costs</b>		<b>\$4,678,000</b>

Source: Tab\_3\_COBRA\_Run\_USAF\_0077V3\_(437c5)  
 Tab\_3\_COBRA\_Run\_USAF\_0121V4\_(318.3c2)  
 Tab\_3\_COBRA\_Run\_USAF\_0083v2\_(421c2)  
 Tab\_3\_COBRA\_Run\_USAF\_0117V3\_(420c4)  
 Tab\_3\_COBRA\_Run\_USAF\_0084V2\_(435c5)  
 Tab\_3\_COBRA\_Run\_USAF\_0080V3\_(436c5)

Unit	Location	KC135 Model	PAA	OP-TEMPO	Rank	PERS-TEMPO	Rank	BOY Actual	FH	Actual FH per PAA	Rank
101 ARW	Bangor ME	E	8	816	1	102	14	3,552		444	3
107 ARW	Niagara Falls NY	R	8	515	7	140	10	3,382		423	4
108 ARW	McGuire AFB NJ	E	16	219	18	69	17	4,625		289	18
117 ARW	Birmingham AL	R	8	526	6	200	4	2,289		286	19
121 ARW	Rickenbacker AGB OH	R	18	465	9	188	5	5,022		279	20
126 ARW	Scott AFB IL	E	8					3,849		481	1
128 ARW	Milwaukee WI	R	9	458	10	140	11	3,382		376	8
134 ARW	Knoxville TN	E	8	249	14	165	7	3,035		379	5
141 ARW	Fairchild AFB WA	R	8	357	12	116	13	3,672		459	2
151 ARW	Salt Lake City UT	E	8	245	15	154	8	2,938		367	10
154 WG	Hickam AFB HI	R	8	477	8	166	6	2,445		306	17
155 ARW	Lincoln NE	R	8	406	11	122	12	2,873		359	12
157 ARW	Pease AFB NH	R	9	277	13	101	15	3,364		374	9
161 ARW	Phoenix AZ	E	8	244	17	101	16	3,019		377	7
163 ARW	March AFB CA	R	9	701	2	257	2	2,996		333	14
168 ARW	Eielson AFB AK	R	8	666	3	232	3	2,584		323	15
171 ARW	Pittsburgh PA	R	16	601	4	148	9	5,100		319	16
184 ARW	McCormell AFB KS	R	9	47	20	27	20	3,150		350	13
185 ARW	Sioux City IA	E	8	122	19	63	19	1,434		179	21
186 ARW	Meridian MS	R	9	552	5	267	1	3,236		360	11
190 ARW	Forbes AFB KS	E	8	245	16	69	18	3,034		379	6
Averages	186 ARW at Meridian, MS above average			409		141				354	
				35.0%		89.4%				1.7%	

Sources: unless otherwise stated, data is from the ANG Flying Hour page <https://airguard.ang.af.mil/xo>. The "actual" flying hours by unit and per PAA data were obtained from <https://guardian.drc.com>, Guardian Information Analysis Network, contracted to Dynamics Research Corporation. Searches were made 6 Nov 04.

Definitions: OPTEMPO is all calendar days of military duty performed by traditional and technician members and all duty days in addition to normal work days by AGR members. PERSTEMPO represents OPTEMPO days performed at a location other than home station.

ANG Tanker Units; FY04 Flying Hour (FH) Allocations  
OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO for Sep 01 - Oct 04 for Flying Squadrons

## Cost to Robust to 16 Tankers

In accordance with the optimal sized squadron of 16 PAA, Key Field ANGB has a significantly lower cost to robust than any of the units receiving its aircraft. Some ANG units, listed in Table 3 as "Partial", are classified as partial squadrons that *cannot be expanded to 16 PAA*.

**Table 3.**

Unit	Cost to Robust to Optimal Squadron Size - 16 KC-135R Aircraft (million)
Key Field AGS	\$11.0
Bangor IAP AGS	\$27.6
McGhee Tyson Airport AGS	\$32.7
General Mitchell IAP AGS	\$45.1
Niagara Falls IAP ARS	Partial
Phoenix Sky Harbor IAP AGS	Partial
Portland IAP AGS	Partial
Scott AFB	Partial
Sioux Gateway APT AGS	Partial

(Source:

Tab\_2\_Mil\_Value\_and\_Capacity\_Supporting\_Information\_USAF\_0077V3\_(437c5).pdf  
)

Bangor IAP AGS, McGhee Tyson AGS, and General Mitchell IAP AGS will all receive aircraft from the realignment of Key Field AGS nine KC-135R aircraft even though the cost to robust these units to the optimal KC-135 squadron size is significantly higher than that of Key Field. In addition, several units *will never* have the ability to robust to 16 aircraft should the need arise in the future. Also it was noted that under the 2005 Air Force BRAC proposal Phoenix Sky Harbor will remain at an unacceptable squadron size of 10 aircraft and Sioux Gateway AGS will remain at an unacceptable squadron size of 8 aircraft, both of which violate the *Air Force's own acceptable squadron size criteria* of 12 PAA.

# CRS Report for Congress

## Military Pilot Retention: Issues and Options

September 11, 1998

Michael C. Ryan  
National Defense Fellow  
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division



06/22/2005 09:17 FAX

004/005

# Military Pilot Retention: Issues and Options

## Issue

Retention of pilots by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps is again becoming a problem. According to service officials, all relevant indicators are down and the services expect a continuing exodus of fully-trained, combat-ready, experienced aviators for the foreseeable future. The combination of high operational tempos that affect on their quality of life, coupled with perceptions of erosion in both career opportunities and benefits, are stressing pilots and their families at a time when rewarding opportunities offered by the major airlines are increasing dramatically. The result is that approved separations of pilots are up over last year, and many aviators are declining both incentive pay and assignments that would extend their commitment to serve on active duty.<sup>1</sup> To counter these trends, the services asked, and in November 1997 the Congress approved, increased aviation pay and bonuses as monetary incentives for pilots to remain on active duty.<sup>2</sup> This paper will review the issues involved and the options available. As the Air Force is the largest employer of military pilots, this paper will focus on the Air Force and will note differences in the Navy and Marine Corps situation and approaches where applicable.

## Why is it important to retain pilots?

As perceived by the armed services, it is important to retain experienced aviators due to the high cost of training pilots, the important role of flying experience in leading and employing combat air forces, and an increased use of air assets in operations since the end of the Cold War.

Some believe "Pilots are not special, just expensive."<sup>3</sup> Others see military pilots as an invaluable asset. It costs more to train a pilot than it does to train anyone else in the Air Force. [According to Air Force personnel officials, the average training cost, measured in both time and money, for a trained and experienced pilot, for all

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<sup>1</sup>For details of these trends and source references, see Table 1 and Figure 1. Unless otherwise stated, the Office of the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel provided the statistics and information regarding Air Force pilot retention used in this paper.

<sup>2</sup>Public Law 105-85, sections 615-616.

<sup>3</sup>Brackett, David, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF. National Defense Fellow, Harvard. Commentary in *Air Force Times* "How the Air Force Can Keep Pilots." 30 June, 1997.

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CRS-2

FY2006 - \$5.5

aircraft in the Air Force, is \$4.3 million.<sup>4</sup> The cost to train and provide a needed level of operational experience to pilots in four representative aircraft are:

Airlift	Bomber	Fighter	Fighter
C-141B: \$3.4M	B-52H: \$6.1M	F-15C: \$6.5M	F-16: \$3.0M
FY2006 \$4.4	\$7.8	\$8.4	\$3.9

These costs represent the total amount required to train and develop a pilot to the point where he or she is a fully-qualified, combat-ready, experienced aviator.<sup>5</sup> According to the Air Force, replacing these optimally "seasoned" pilots requires nine years of operational flying; therefore, a long-lead time is required to recover an equivalent capability when large numbers of pilots leave the service. Skeptics question the scope of this cost calculation model.

In addition to flying, pilots fill many military positions that serve to broaden them professionally and prepare them for leadership positions. This is a necessary process for developing leaders, but it also serves a role in combating cyclical drops in retention. In the past, the services enjoyed a large excess of pilots that were assigned throughout the military. These pilots could share their operational perspectives and learn the various mission-support aspects of their service. This large surplus enabled the services in general, and the Air Force in particular, to ride out periods of reduced retention. The post-Cold War drawdown eliminated this buffer and effectively removed one tool for combating cyclical drops in retention.<sup>6</sup>


President Clinton's National Security Strategy of Engagement, from which is derived the National Military Strategy, actively involves the military in a wide range of operations that depend to a large degree on speed, responsiveness, flexibility, and precision. The requirement to deploy air forces on short notice and at a much higher rate than during the Cold War has increased the peacetime importance of pilots

<sup>4</sup>To arrive at this estimation, the Air Force uses a computation called "The Pilot Cost Model." In March 1997, the average cost derived using this model was \$4.3 million. The model uses flying hour and training costs associated with pilot development (one year to earn wings and 8 years flying experience). These costs include aircraft operation per flight hour estimates, the cost of physically conducting aircraft operations, the direct and indirect costs of staffs that support flying operations, and academic/student costs. The calculations do not include pay and allowances for pilots, pay for temporary duty away from home station, or any other personnel costs. Since the last calculation in March 1997, the Air Force has updated the model to account for changes in Air Force operating procedures and increases in operating costs. The increased attrition of pilots has also contributed to a change in the model as more replacements than anticipated required training. As of publication of this paper, the Air Force has revised its estimate of the average per pilot training cost upward from \$4.3 million to 5.9 million.


<sup>5</sup>Data provided by the office of the AF Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, May 1997.

<sup>6</sup>In 1989, there were 21,750 pilots in the Air Force compared to 14,774 in 1996. During this seven year period the pilot inventory dropped 32% while the inventory of all Air Force officers dropped only 27%. Annual production of new pilots dropped from 1581 in 1989 to 480 in 1995 (a 70% decline), but rose to 523 in 1996 and 682 in 1997. Detailed information of Air Force pilot demographics can be found on the Air Force Personnel Center's web site at <http://www.afpc.af.mil/demographics>.

# Key Field Existing Capacity




**2005 BRAC Tanker Receiver Recommendation**



**Support Station Locations**

<b>CONUS Ratio</b>	<b>1:5.5</b>
<b>Northeast Ratio</b>	<b>1:2.5</b>
<b>Midwest Ratio</b>	<b>1:1.4</b>
<b>Northwest Ratio</b>	<b>1:4.2</b>
<b>Southwest Ratio</b>	<b>1:9.0</b>



**Tanker to Receiver Ratio**  
**1:16.8**

CI (RET.) LANGFORD KNIGHT 601-917-5794 LLKKNIGHT@aol.com  
MAJ. CRAIG ZIEMBA 601-679-8146

## Key Field BRAC Presentation Script 27 Jun 2005 with index notes

Start with: F-22 AR slide (Introductions all around)

>>>

This >>> afternoon we will show how the Department of Defense tanker basing plan substantially deviates from BRAC criteria,<sup>1</sup> how much this deviation will cost, and then offer a simple solution to fix it.

I. Let's open with a practical, customer-oriented approach to tanker basing.

>>> If you were deciding where to place a tanker force, **you'd first want to know where the receivers, or customers are, how many there are, and what their requirements will be.** This chart shows the location and number of fighters, bombers, and airlift (refueling customers) proposed by the Department of Defense plan.

Now in a perfect world, you would locate your tanker assets to meet that demand with complete coverage but minimal overlap. >>> In this scenario, we've drawn a 250 mile radius ring over each imaginary tanker base to show the optimal range figure that was used by the DoD in their own data calls.<sup>2</sup> That range allows enough time to get airborne, complete air refueling checklists, and meet mission timing without excessive time lost in transit.

We >>> understand that in the real world, there are a lot of different factors at play, but let's look at what the DoD ended up proposing >>> as their tanker basing plan. >>> **(PAUSE)** Notice there are some areas with inefficient, overlapping coverage while other areas were not covered at all.

There are many different ways >>> we could quantify the distribution of tankers, but nationally, you can see that the ratio<sup>3</sup> of tankers to customers is 1: 5.5.

Now we'll break down the DoD plan by region.

>>> In the Northeast the ratio is 1 tanker for every 2.5 customers.

>>> In the Midwest, the ratio is 1 tanker for every 1.4 customers.

>>> In the Northwest, the ratio is 1: 4.2.

>>> In the Southwest, the ratio is 1 tanker for every 9 receivers.

And >>> the Southeastern ratio is 1:16.8. In other words, >>> there are ten times more tankers per receiver in the Midwest than there are in the Southeast.<sup>4</sup> This disproportionate ratio in the Southeast is significant.

>>> The DoD proposal increases the number of refueling customers in the Southeast to make use of the Coastal training areas. This decision follows Air Force Basing Principle #1 (pause time to read). . You'll notice that carrier battle groups will also make use of the Eglin ranges since Vieques was closed.

In the DoD proposal, >>> many Southeast receiver units will robust and the DoD has also chosen Eglin Air Force Base >>> as the home for Joint Strike Fighter training for the Navy, Air Force, and Marines.

Currently, >>> tankers are based at Knoxville, Seymour Johnson, Birmingham, Warner Robbins, Key Field, and Macdill, providing coverage for the region. But here's what the DoD proposes. >>> There's a gain of 100 plus customers at the same time there's a net **loss** of 13 tankers.

This gap is a Substantial Deviation >>> of BRAC Criteria because it negatively impacts joint warfighting, training, and operational readiness. During wartime or contingencies, aircraft will be deployed wherever they are needed. But while contingencies are sporadic, intermittent, and unpredictable, training is continuous<sup>5</sup> and costly. That's the rationale behind Air Force Basing principle #4 which stated that the service would "retain air refueling bases in **optimal proximity**<sup>6</sup> to their missions." It's more efficient to base tankers near training areas and deploy them for contingencies than the other way around.

Furthermore, >>> the gap in the Southeast directly impacts the cost and availability of tanker support for homeland defense missions in what is now the fastest growing region of the country. The Second BRAC Criteria and Fourth Air Force Basing Imperative<sup>6</sup> stressed the importance of considering homeland defense in any decision to close or realign a base.

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**II.** In addition to the obvious geographical lapses within the DoD's tanker basing proposal, their plan >>> constitutes a Substantial Deviation of Military Value Criteria #4 which mandates that prior to realigning or closing a base, the Department of Defense must consider "the cost of operations and manpower implications".

There are three major costs that were not considered in the proposal to realign Key Field.

The first and largest >>> is the fact that the shortage of tankers in the Southeast will dramatically increase >>> the number of flight hours and the amount of fuel burned per sortie to the coastal training areas. According to the Systems Program Office at Tinker Air Force Base, the cost of operating a KC-135 is \$9,000 an hour.<sup>7</sup> Flying missions from bases that are twice >>> as far away as Key Field will average at least one extra flight hour per sortie.<sup>8</sup>

Key Field tankers currently fly about 400 training sorties each year to coastal areas with just nine jets.

Four hundred additional flight hours >>> times \$9,000 per hour equals 3.6 million dollars per year or 72 million dollars over the 20 year payback period.

By comparison, the DoD plan estimated that consolidating Key Field tankers to larger bases would save only 2.5 million dollars over twenty years.

One of the objectives of BRAC was to save money. In this case, however, the additional expense of flight hours and fuel alone means that the projected savings will **never** exceed the cost. >>> That in our estimation is a Substantial Deviation of Final Selection Criteria # 4 and 5.

The second major expense >>> of realigning tankers from Key Field is the cost of replicating elsewhere what is already in place at an ideal location. Key Field's facilities were specifically designed for the refueling mission and completed in 1994.

Our ramp >>> can currently taxi in and out 12 KC-135s<sup>9</sup> and park five more on the site, and unlike other bases requires no towing or runway crossings to taxi and service our aircraft.

The Air Force priced the total cost to robust our facility to the supposed<sup>10</sup> Optimal Squadron Size of 16 jets at 11 million. Compare that to 27, 32, and 45 million dollars it's going to cost to robust the bases where our jets are going.<sup>11</sup> (Criteria #7).

Our lease is one dollar a year through 2047, we have no encroachment or noise complaints and plenty of room to grow.

>>> Our five-year-old full motion, full visual simulator allows us to train in-house. To move it would cost 9 million dollars, a figure also not included in the COBRA computations.

But even more important than the flight hour or facility costs, >>> disbanding the tanker squadron at Key Field would mean the loss of most of its combat experienced aircrew. Because citizen soldiers are community based and have civilian careers, the implication of moving their mission is much more serious than relocating an active duty squadron. BRAC planners projected that 80% of the aircrew and maintenance personnel would follow the airplanes in their realignment, but experience with past closures has shown that 80% of traditional guardsmen are in fact **lost** when their mission moves out of the commuting area.

And in our case, >>> the loss of just one of our 38 pilots would nullify<sup>12</sup> the DoD's 2.5 million dollar savings over the 20 year payback period. Ironically, the reason many of them couldn't be here today to show their support is that they're either standing alert or deployed overseas.

After seeing our facilities and location, >>> one might wonder how our overall MCI score was low. We're not here to criticize the formula or to dispute the accuracy of the widget data itself, but we **are** questioning the conclusions that were drawn from it. Like the four blind men describing the elephant, widget tunnel vision can lead to illogical conclusions.

For instance, when scoring infrastructure, the DoD data call asked, "How many square yards of apron do you have?" But what they really needed to know was, "How much **contiguous** ramp space do you have and **how many** tankers can you taxi in, out, and park?" Our ramp didn't score well, but our efficient configuration<sup>13</sup> allows us to do more with less.

When scoring airspace, >>> what the data call asked was, "How many refueling **areas** are within 250 miles of your base?" What they needed to know was how many **customers**<sup>14</sup> are within that optimal range and how many other units already serve the same area.<sup>15</sup>

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**III.** The gap in the DoD tanker basing proposal and the costs associated with it are clear. We believe the solution is as well.

You could >>> fly three more jets to Key Field tomorrow morning and have a fully operational 12 aircraft squadron tomorrow afternoon **at minimal cost.**

>>> Two KC-135s can park side by side fully enclosed in our two bay hangar, which is the only one of its kind in the Air National Guard.

>>> Our Fuel Cell/ Corrosion Control Facility won the Air Force Engineering Award in 1994.

>>> Key Field's fire station was designed to handle large aircraft.

>>> We have the right facilities in the right place at the right price. Retaining >>> a squadron at Key Field would improve readiness and training, help fill the gap in the Southeast and save money.

Conclusion: That's why we ask, >>>

"Does it make sense to go through with a plan where the savings will never exceed the costs?"

"Does it make sense to move jets away from a base specifically designed for the refueling mission to send to other bases that do not even have room to park them?"

"Does it make sense to serve your customers from further away at a greater cost?"

"Does it make sense to have so much overlap in some regions of the country while others are uncovered?" - *MAINT BULLET CORE COMPETENCY / AVERAGE YRS OF SERVICE*

"And does it make sense to risk losing the experience of citizen soldiers who have flown in three wars in the past ten years?"

No sir, this plan does not make sense.

And we **do** believe this is a substantial deviation from the Final Selection Criteria >>> and is not in the best interest of the nation. That, sir, is why we respectfully ask you to remove Key Field from the realignment list. Thank you and we now welcome your questions.

## Index Listing

Index 1	Final Selection Criteria
Index 2	Optimal Range Widget Formula
Index 3	Regional and Base by Base Tanker Ratios
Index 4	Tanker to Receiver Ratio Ranking
Index 5	Southeastern Training Table Matrix and Numbers
Index 6	USAF Basing Principles and Imperatives
Index 7	Flight Hour Cost
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Index 9	Parking Capacity Comparisons
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Index 14	CONUS Tanker/Receiver Chart
Index 15	Southeast Tanker/Receiver Chart

FY 04 FORCE STRUCTURE BY BASE BY QUARTER									
	MDS	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Avg PAA	Total Hours	Total Missions	Hours Per PAA
McCONNELL(AMC)	R/T	48	44	40	36	42	34515.2	6734	821.8
FAIRCHILD (AMC)	R/T	48	44	40	36	42	30612	5674	728.9
GR/FORKS (AMC)	R/T	48	48	48	48	48	32433.5	5651	675.7
MACDILL (AMC)	R	12	12	12	12	12	7659.1	1526	638.3
ROBINS (AMC)	R	12	12	12	12	12	7234.5	1474	602.9
ALTUS (AETC)	R	24	24	24	24	24	13201	2900	550.0
KADENA (PACAF)	R	15	15	15	15	15	7110	1609	474.0
MILDENHALL (USAFE)	R	15	15	15	15	15	6683.1	1535	445.5
<b>ACTIVE TOTAL</b>		<b>222</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>206</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>139448.4</b>	<b>27103</b>	<b>664.0</b>

FAIRCHILD	R	8	8	8	8	8	3671.7	1009	459.0
NIAGARA	R	8	8	8	8	8	3381.7	1066	422.7
SCOTT	E	10	10	10	10	10	3849.4	1173	384.9
MITCHELL	R	9	9	9	9	9	3381.7	1009	375.7
PEASE	R	9	9	9	9	9	3364.3	1065	373.8
MERIDIAN / Key Fid MS	R	9	9	9	9	9	3235.9	923	359.5
LINCOLN	R	8	8	8	8	8	2872.9	881	359.1
BANGOR	E	10	10	10	10	10	3552.1	1181	355.2
McCONNELL	R	9	9	9	9	9	3150.2	871	350.0
MARCH	R	9	9	9	9	9	2995.7	813	332.9
EIELSON	R	8	8	8	8	8	2584	707	323.0
PITTSBURGH	E	20	16	16	16	16	5124.9	1570	320.3
HICKAM	R	8	8	8	8	8	2444.8	620	305.6
McGHEE	E	10	10	10	10	10	3035.4	1035	303.5
FORBES	E/D	10	10	10	10	10	3033.6	998	303.4
PHOENIX	E	10	10	10	10	10	3018.6	844	301.9
SALT LAKE	E	10	10	10	10	10	2938.4	870	293.8
BIRMINGHAM	R	8	8	8	8	8	2289.4	689	286.2
RICKENBACKER	R	18	18	18	18	18	5021.8	1935	279.0
McGUIRE	E	20	20	20	20	20	4625	1379	231.3
SIoux CITY	E	8	8	8	8	8	1433.9	446	179.2
<b>ANG TOTAL</b>		<b>219</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>69005.4</b>	<b>21084</b>	<b>321.0</b>

BEALE	E	8	8	8	8	8	3135	937	391.9
MARCH	R	8	8	8	8	8	3047.5	649	380.9
PORTLAND	R	6	6	6	8	8	2885	760	360.6
GRISSOM	R	18	16	16	16	16	5589.3	1481	349.3
TINKER	R	8	8	8	8	8	2765.4	726	345.7
SEYMOUR	R	10	8	8	8	8	2753.9	779	344.2
SELFRIDGE	E/R	8	8	8	8	8	1621.2	470	202.7
ANDREWS	R	4	8	8	8	8	1366.5	401	170.8
<b>AFR TOTAL</b>		<b>70</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>23163.8</b>	<b>6203</b>	<b>321.7</b>

Table A2-1 BUDGET YEAR 05 (FY05 Const \$s)

							Per PAA Costs		
							Depot Maint	Suprt Equip	Total PAA Costs
A-10A	\$503.03	\$23.27	\$2,265.59	\$588.22	\$40.00	\$3,420.11	\$136,849.00	\$46,049.23	\$182,898.23
AC-130H	\$907.35	\$0.00	\$3,445.31	\$912.82	\$172.00	\$5,437.48	\$453,413.00	\$1,556.23	\$454,969.23
AC-130U	\$1,765.00	\$41.51	\$3,504.08	\$863.23	\$172.00	\$6,345.83	\$453,413.00	\$2,358.92	\$455,771.92
AT-38B	\$187.12	\$13.17	\$397.04	\$452.36	\$0.00	\$1,049.70	\$7,494.00	\$28.71	\$7,522.71
B-1B	\$1,902.42	\$92.18	\$15,134.18	\$3,498.47	\$350.00	\$20,977.25	\$673,373.00	\$4,863.12	\$678,236.12
B-2A	\$760.19	\$122.57	\$7,593.29	\$2,046.26	\$0.00	\$10,522.31	\$0.00	\$10,803.95	\$10,803.95
B-52H	\$726.31	\$57.50	\$4,254.47	\$3,065.34	\$1,231.00	\$9,334.62	\$1,341,398.00	\$13,814.34	\$1,355,212.34
C-12F	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$88.04	\$0.00	\$88.04	\$0.00	\$658.44	\$658.44
C-12G	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$88.04	\$0.00	\$88.04	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
C-12J	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$88.04	\$0.00	\$88.04	\$0.00	\$141.38	\$141.38
C-130E	\$449.69	\$24.93	\$2,067.72	\$696.88	\$178.00	\$3,417.22	\$195,636.00	\$4,658.63	\$200,294.63
C-130H	\$449.69	\$24.93	\$2,067.72	\$696.88	\$178.00	\$3,417.22	\$195,636.00	\$9,414.79	\$205,050.79
C-130J	\$282.77	\$9.61	\$776.04	\$662.77	\$178.00	\$1,909.19	\$195,636.00	\$2,475.41	\$198,111.41
C-135B	\$193.95	\$160.05	\$864.83	\$1,631.34	\$692.00	\$3,542.17	\$674,507.00	\$0.00	\$674,507.00
C-135C	\$193.95	\$160.05	\$864.83	\$1,631.34	\$692.00	\$3,542.17	\$674,507.00	\$0.00	\$674,507.00
C-135E	\$193.95	\$160.05	\$864.83	\$1,631.34	\$692.00	\$3,542.17	\$674,507.00	\$60.40	\$674,567.40
C-141B	\$750.44	\$15.70	\$2,030.08	\$1,962.26	\$736.00	\$5,494.49	\$718,322.00	\$1,479.49	\$719,801.49
C-141C	\$750.44	\$15.70	\$2,030.08	\$1,962.26	\$736.00	\$5,494.49	\$718,322.00	\$4,400.72	\$722,722.72
C-17A	\$162.06	\$14.61	\$125.92	\$2,779.30	\$0.00	\$3,081.88	\$4,575.00	\$1,268.18	\$5,843.18
C-20B	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$587.16	\$0.00	\$587.16	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
C-20C	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$587.16	\$0.00	\$587.16	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
C-20H	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$587.16	\$0.00	\$587.16	\$0.00	\$2,599.41	\$2,599.41
C-21A	\$1.72	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$179.33	\$0.00	\$181.04	\$0.00	\$426.02	\$426.02
C-26A	\$3.90	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$86.02	\$0.00	\$89.92	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
C-26B	\$3.90	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$86.02	\$0.00	\$89.92	\$0.00	\$52.73	\$52.73
C-32A	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$912.82	\$0.00	\$912.82	\$0.00	\$1,292.25	\$1,292.25
C-37A	\$104.28	\$33.43	\$0.00	\$463.79	\$0.00	\$601.50	\$0.00	\$180.06	\$180.06
C-38A	\$6.82	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$225.68	\$0.00	\$232.50	\$0.00	\$2,891.57	\$2,891.57
C-40B	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$695.24	\$0.00	\$695.24	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
C-5A	\$1,439.31	\$47.09	\$4,289.28	\$3,273.93	\$1,799.00	\$10,848.61	\$1,275,734.00	\$3,414.15	\$1,279,148.15
C-5B	\$1,439.31	\$47.09	\$4,289.28	\$3,273.93	\$1,799.00	\$10,848.61	\$1,275,734.00	\$2,385.90	\$1,278,119.90
C-5C	\$1,439.31	\$47.09	\$4,289.28	\$3,273.93	\$1,799.00	\$10,848.61	\$1,275,734.00	\$1,874.13	\$1,277,608.13
C-9C	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$932.05	\$0.00	\$932.05	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
CV-22	\$1,372.24	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$408.85	\$0.00	\$1,781.08	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
E-3B	\$610.94	\$21.85	\$2,636.62	\$2,188.99	\$939.00	\$6,397.40	\$1,231,285.00	\$22,008.87	\$1,253,293.87
E-3C	\$610.94	\$21.85	\$2,636.62	\$2,188.99	\$939.00	\$6,397.40	\$1,231,285.00	\$16,503.12	\$1,247,788.12
E-4B	\$292.38	\$34.44	\$1,640.93	\$4,653.16	\$0.00	\$6,620.91	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
E-8C	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$817.77	\$1,859.04	\$0.00	\$2,676.80	\$845,141.00	\$13,451.23	\$858,592.23
E-9A	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$149.78	\$0.00	\$149.78	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
EC-130E	\$303.48	\$14.85	\$1,478.44	\$709.36	\$172.00	\$2,678.13	\$4,222.00	\$6,127.07	\$10,349.07
EC-130H	\$303.48	\$14.85	\$1,478.44	\$709.36	\$172.00	\$2,678.13	\$4,222.00	\$1,456.23	\$5,678.23
EC-130J	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$768.10	\$172.00	\$940.10	\$4,222.00	\$12,641.58	\$16,863.58
EC-135C	\$289.44	\$17.19	\$925.43	\$1,515.72	\$358.00	\$3,105.77	\$689,862.00	\$0.00	\$689,862.00
F-117A	\$160.81	\$8.10	\$115.91	\$991.76	\$0.00	\$1,276.58	\$0.00	\$743.23	\$743.23
F-15A	\$614.97	\$22.29	\$7,573.08	\$1,550.38	\$69.00	\$9,829.71	\$227,265.00	\$4,676.41	\$231,941.41
F-15B	\$614.97	\$22.29	\$7,573.08	\$1,550.38	\$69.00	\$9,829.71	\$227,265.00	\$2,976.86	\$230,241.86
F-15C	\$716.20	\$42.32	\$8,182.06	\$1,488.89	\$69.00	\$10,498.47	\$227,265.00	\$1,607.03	\$228,872.03
F-15D	\$716.20	\$42.32	\$8,182.06	\$1,488.89	\$69.00	\$10,498.47	\$227,265.00	\$1,626.08	\$228,891.08
F-15E	\$732.85	\$24.84	\$8,478.05	\$1,747.38	\$69.00	\$11,052.12	\$227,265.00	\$3,024.76	\$230,289.76

F-16A	\$661.75	\$17.22	\$3,550.56	\$807.57	\$141.00	\$5,178.11	\$60,710.00	\$1,597.11	\$62,307.11
F-16B	\$661.75	\$17.22	\$3,550.56	\$807.57	\$141.00	\$5,178.11	\$60,710.00	\$1,765.23	\$62,475.23
F-16C	\$499.22	\$27.14	\$3,210.64	\$830.94	\$141.00	\$4,708.94	\$60,710.00	\$3,143.09	\$63,853.09
F-16D	\$499.22	\$27.14	\$3,210.64	\$830.94	\$141.00	\$4,708.94	\$60,710.00	\$3,058.02	\$63,768.02
F-22A	\$673.57	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$1,788.13	\$0.00	\$2,461.69	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
HC-130N	\$882.43	\$53.71	\$2,557.12	\$776.48	\$171.00	\$4,440.74	\$329,323.00	\$5,949.39	\$335,272.39
HC-130P	\$882.43	\$53.71	\$2,557.12	\$776.48	\$171.00	\$4,440.74	\$329,323.00	\$48,027.08	\$377,350.08
HH-60G	\$771.06	\$67.60	\$1,888.73	\$125.25	\$19.00	\$2,871.65	\$152,284.00	\$26,734.25	\$179,018.25
KC-10A	\$3.90	\$10.10	\$0.00	\$2,589.87	\$0.00	\$2,603.87	\$216.00	\$18.68	\$234.68
KC-135D	\$289.44	\$17.19	\$925.43	\$1,515.72	\$358.00	\$3,105.77	\$689,862.00	\$2,055.43	\$691,917.43
KC-135E	\$289.44	\$17.19	\$925.43	\$1,515.72	\$358.00	\$3,105.77	\$689,862.00	\$4,428.40	\$694,290.40
KC-135R	\$289.44	\$17.19	\$925.43	\$1,515.72	\$358.00	\$3,105.77	\$689,862.00	\$4,895.31	\$694,757.31
KC-135T	\$289.44	\$17.19	\$925.43	\$1,515.72	\$358.00	\$3,105.77	\$689,862.00	\$2,099.05	\$691,961.05
LC-130H	\$404.46	\$13.17	\$1,637.21	\$935.08	\$75.00	\$3,064.92	\$62,369.00	\$11,697.23	\$74,066.23
MC-130E	\$750.44	\$24.31	\$3,372.13	\$785.31	\$175.00	\$5,107.20	\$158,622.00	\$0.00	\$158,622.00
MC-130H	\$714.38	\$2.24	\$4,546.51	\$781.26	\$175.00	\$6,219.39	\$158,622.00	\$3,265.48	\$161,887.48
MC-130P	\$761.11	\$4.80	\$2,637.11	\$728.64	\$175.00	\$4,306.66	\$158,622.00	\$16,807.40	\$175,429.40
MH-53J	\$1,939.45	\$4.49	\$5,891.73	\$286.39	\$258.00	\$8,380.06	\$527,850.00	\$659.82	\$528,509.82
MH-53M	\$1,939.45	\$4.49	\$5,891.73	\$286.39	\$258.00	\$8,380.06	\$527,850.00	\$2,386.90	\$530,236.90
OA-10A	\$503.03	\$23.27	\$2,265.59	\$588.22	\$39.00	\$3,419.11	\$41,086.00	\$102,753.63	\$143,839.63
OC-135B	\$220.26	\$0.00	\$1,116.37	\$1,594.91	\$0.00	\$2,931.54	\$325.00	\$4,281.69	\$4,606.69
RC-135S	\$353.78	\$26.34	\$1,484.15	\$1,821.59	\$0.00	\$3,685.86	\$1,583.00	\$0.00	\$1,583.00
RC-135U	\$353.78	\$26.34	\$1,484.15	\$1,821.59	\$0.00	\$3,685.86	\$1,583.00	\$848.58	\$2,431.58
RC-135V	\$353.78	\$26.34	\$1,484.15	\$1,821.59	\$0.00	\$3,685.86	\$1,583.00	\$2,028.80	\$3,611.80
RC-135W	\$353.78	\$26.34	\$1,484.15	\$1,821.59	\$0.00	\$3,685.86	\$1,583.00	\$1,732.44	\$3,315.44
T-1A	\$0.97	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$180.14	\$0.00	\$181.11	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
T-37B	\$83.82	\$7.09	\$139.93	\$162.93	\$0.00	\$393.76	\$2,507.00	\$2,573.61	\$5,080.61
T-38A	\$378.88	\$17.21	\$528.27	\$370.55	\$0.00	\$1,294.91	\$20,881.00	\$1,594.44	\$22,475.44
T-38C	\$397.64	\$52.68	\$553.64	\$431.11	\$0.00	\$1,435.06	\$20,881.00	\$575.32	\$21,456.32
T-41D	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$11.13	\$0.00	\$11.13	\$0.00	\$1,066.17	\$1,066.17
T-43A	\$23.39	\$2.03	\$158.87	\$792.39	\$0.00	\$976.68	\$339.00	\$0.00	\$339.00
T-43C	\$23.39	\$2.03	\$158.87	\$792.39	\$0.00	\$976.68	\$339.00	\$0.00	\$339.00
T-43U	\$23.39	\$2.03	\$158.87	\$792.39	\$0.00	\$976.68	\$339.00	\$0.00	\$339.00
T-6A	\$0.97	\$1.01	\$0.00	\$56.67	\$0.00	\$58.66	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
TC-135S	\$353.78	\$26.34	\$1,484.15	\$1,821.59	\$0.00	\$3,685.86	-\$185,587.00	\$0.00	-\$185,587.00
TC-135W	\$353.78	\$26.34	\$1,484.15	\$1,821.59	\$0.00	\$3,685.86	-\$185,587.00	\$1,233.23	-\$184,353.77
TG-14A	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$4.05	\$0.00	\$4.05	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
UC-26C	\$3.90	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$86.02	\$0.00	\$89.92	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
UH-1N	\$285.65	\$14.27	\$643.17	\$85.52	\$30.00	\$1,058.61	\$1,708.00	\$9,010.28	\$10,718.28
UV-18B	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$59.71	\$0.00	\$59.71	\$0.00	\$3,638.20	\$3,638.20
VC-25A	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$3,262.68	\$0.00	\$3,262.68	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
WC-130J	\$246.57	\$25.80	\$1,348.27	\$606.19	\$171.00	\$2,397.83	\$430,973.00	\$272.15	\$431,245.15
WC-135W	\$353.78	\$26.34	\$1,484.15	\$1,821.59	\$0.00	\$3,685.86	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00

**Acronyms:**

AFCAIG	Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group
AFTOC	Air Force Total Ownership Cost
AVFUEL	Aviation Fuel
BES	Budget Estimate Submission
CAIG	Cost Analysis Improvement Group
CLS	Contractor Logistics Support
COD	Cost of Operations Division
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DLR	Depot Level Repairables
DMIF	Depot Maintenance Industrial Fund
EEIC	Element of Expense/Investment Code
FH	Flying Hour
FHCS	Flying Hour Consumable Supplies
FY	Fiscal Year
GSD	General Support Division

GSD	General Support Division
GSE	Ground Support Equipment
IMPAC	International Merchant Purchase Access Card
MDS	Mission, Design, Series
MSD	Material Support Division
NRTS	Not Repairable This Station
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
O&S	Operating and Support
PAA	Primary Aircraft Authorization
PB	President's Budget
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
RSD	Reparable Support Division
SSD	Systems Supply Division
WSCRS	Weapon System Cost Retrieval System

#### References/Links:

1. See Tables A6-1 and A7-1 for Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) factors.
2. See Table A15-1 for flying hour reimbursement rates

#### Table Description:

This table calculates the logistic costs by flying hour and primary aircraft authorizations. It includes supplies, fuel, and organic maintenance and repair, but does not include any contractor logistic support costs.

#### Table Uses:

1. Use these tables in the programming and budgeting process to increment and decrement the baseline program as a result of force structure changes.
2. The figures in tables A2-1 through A4-1 are used in developing fiscal year budget requirements and are presented in constant dollars. Since budget figures are normally expressed in current or then-year dollars, the estimates generated by using constant dollar factors should be inflated to arrive at projected then-year budget requirements.
3. These logistics cost factors are especially useful in estimating incremental O&S costs based on FH and PAA programming changes.
4. Flying Hour Consumable Supplies (GSD) factors are used in the programming and budgeting process to build as well as increment and decrement consumable supply requirements based on changes in flying hours.
5. Depot maintenance factors are used in the programming and budgeting process to increment and decrement depot maintenance budgets due to changes in flying hours and/or PAA. These factors are not designed to build an operating budget.
6. Use aviation fuel (AVFUEL) factors to build as well as increment and decrement the AVFUELS budget based on changes in flying hour programs.
7. Use the Replacement Ground Support Equipment (Support Equipment per PAA) factors to build part of the support equipment budget as well as increment and decrement that budget based on changes to PAA.

#### Business Rules & Assumptions:

1. Costs presented in tables A2-1, A3-1 and A4-1 are semi-variable costs.
2. The factors created include GSD (includes flying hour IMPAC purchases), Depot Level Repairable (DLRs), and AVFUEL.
3. The working capital fund has now ostensibly combined what was SSD and DLR into a new commodity called Material Support Division (MSD).
4. Depot maintenance numbers only include organic maintenance costs and do not include Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) maintenance costs.
5. Depot maintenance costs are an average of three years.
6. The support equipment costs are calculated using the AFCAIG 6.1 factor from the AFTOC database.
7. Flying hour factors are assumed to vary with flying hours whereas the PAA factors are assumed to vary with the number of assigned aircraft.
8. The budget factors are developed for the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) exercise. They are then updated with fact-of-life changes for the Budget Estimate Submission (BES) and finally the President's Budget (PB). They are a result of command inputs and Air Staff analysis.
9. Flying Hour Consumable Supplies (FHCS) consist of supplies to be expended in Air Force Elements of Expense/Investment Code (EEIC) 609 (general support) within functional category 03 (maintenance). The FHCS factors measure expendable supplies directly associated with the repair of flying mission assets at base level. General support consumable items are managed by DLA; other services are purchased through local purchase authority. System support consumable items are managed by the Air Force. These parts are usually more design unstable or technically more complicated.
10. Depot Maintenance Cost per Flying-Hour Factors and Cost per PAA Factors, include expected obligations for all organic and contract elements of expenditures incurred by the Depot Maintenance Industrial Fund (DMIF) to inspect, repair, overhaul, or perform other aircraft maintenance not performed at base level. It excludes costs of

perform other aircraft maintenance not performed at base level. It excludes costs of repairing base-generated Depot Level Repairables (DLR). Depot maintenance costs per flying hour are those costs associated with repair effort during engine overhaul. Depot maintenance costs per aircraft are those costs associated with repair effort during aircraft overhaul. This maintenance can be either "organic" or "contract."

- a. Organic refers to maintenance performed by the Air Force using government-owned or -controlled facilities, equipment, and military or civilian government personnel. Organic costs include civilian labor, military labor, material expense, and overhead expense.
  - b. Contract maintenance is performed under contract by private, commercial organizations using contractor personnel and facilities or government-furnished material and facilities. Contract costs include payments to contractors and the dollar value of government-furnished material provided to contractors.
  - c. Through analysis of depot maintenance historical cost data, a cost factor per flying hour and a cost factor per PAA are developed. The factors do not include fixed costs, such as depot facility related costs that reflect general and administrative expenses.
11. During the course of FY98 the working capital fund ostensibly combined Systems Support Division (SSD), Repairable Support Division (RSD) and the Cost of Operations Division (COD) together into a new commodity called Material Support Division (MSD). This factor represents both repair and surcharge costs associated with aircraft and engine component equipment repair on items sent to a depot as a "not repairable this station" (NRTS) action and system support division costs. These costs are collected in EEIC 644XX and 605XX at base level. The repair price is based on the estimated cost of repairing an asset. The surcharge is a preset percentage of the asset acquisition cost. Together they equal the "exchange price" charged to the customer at base level. The surcharge includes various Stock Fund management costs, transportation, depreciation, DLA handling, and replenishment spare buys.
12. Fuel Factors represent Air Force O&M appropriation fuel consumption (table A13-1) priced at the current Air Force jet fuel price. These prices are subject to change.

13. Replacement Ground Support Equipment (GSE) cost factor represents the yearly cost, by MDS, to replace organizational and intermediate common and peculiar GSE purchased with Appropriation 3010 funds under Budget Program 10 - Aircraft Support Equipment, and Budget Program 12 - Ground Support Equipment (CAIG Element 6.1 Support Equipment Replacement). GSE encompasses a wide range of items such as various test equipment, noise suppressers, generators, tow bars, simulators, and bomb loading carts. The factors represent the cost of procuring, not repairing, both common and peculiar support equipment
14. The total FHCS requirements equal the FHCS factors times the particular mission, design, series (MDS) flying hour program.
15. The Air Force derives fuel factors from the total Air Force O&M fuel consumption and FH data for each MDS.
16. Total FH Costs is the sum of the GSD, MSD, Aviation fuel, IMPAC and Depot Maintenance per FH, columns.
17. Total PAA Costs is the sum of the Depot Maintenance per PAA and Support Equipment Columns.

**Source Data:**

1. The data portrayed in the GSD (EEIC 609), MSD (EEIC 644), Aviation Fuel (EEIC 699), and IMPAC (EEIC 61952) columns are based upon the results of the 2005 Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group (AFCAIG) approved factors.
2. Flying Hour Depot Maintenance cost is a three year average of the VEOC\_FH column of WSCRS data. WSCRS data was carried forward from last year's table due to a lack of availability of current WSCRS data. WSCRS contact is AFMC/FMPC DSN 787-7047.
3. PAA Depot Maintenance cost is a three year average of the VACC\_PAA column of WSCRS data. WSCRS data was carried forward from last year's table due to a lack of availability of current WSCRS data. WSCRS contact is AFMC/FMPC DSN 787-7047.
4. PAA Support Equipment is provided by AFTOC CAIG element 6.1 (Support Equipment Replacement).

**Table Notes:**

**POC:**

AFCAA/FMFT DSN 332-9246 or (703) 602-9246

## REIMB RATES FY05

March 31 2005

MDS	(DOD)	(OTH/FMS)	(PUBLIC)
A-10A	\$3,815	\$3,883	\$4,038
AC-130H#	\$5,438	\$6,102	\$6,346
AC-130U#	\$6,346	\$7,011	\$7,291
AT-38B	\$1,079	\$1,147	\$1,193
B-1B	\$22,928	\$23,200	\$24,128
B-2A	\$13,294	\$13,430	\$13,967
B-52H%	\$13,351	\$13,691	\$14,238
C-12F%	\$1,693	\$1,829	\$1,902
C-12J	\$1,376	\$1,511	\$1,572
C-130E%	\$3,830	\$4,106	\$4,270
C-130H%	\$3,952	\$4,228	\$4,397
C-130J%	\$2,536	\$2,726	\$2,835
C-135C	\$4,479	\$5,140	\$5,345
C-135E	\$3,542	\$3,927	\$4,084
C-141B*	\$6,969	\$7,213	\$7,502
C-141C	\$6,567	\$6,812	\$7,084
C-17A%	\$5,400	\$5,572	\$5,795
C-20B	\$3,205	\$3,449	\$3,587
C-20C	\$3,557	\$3,802	\$3,954
C-20H%	\$3,952	\$4,196	\$4,364
C-21A	\$1,378	\$1,514	\$1,574
C-32A	\$23,410	\$23,866	\$24,821
C-37A	\$5,975	\$6,219	\$6,468
C-38A%	\$2,032	\$2,204	\$2,292
C-40B^	\$22,418	\$22,734	\$23,644
C-5A	\$14,885	\$15,166	\$15,772
C-5B	\$10,849	\$11,129	\$11,574
C-5C	\$10,849	\$11,129	\$11,574
C-9A#*%	\$6,256	\$6,636	\$6,901
C-9C	\$5,442	\$5,794	\$6,026
E-3B	\$8,375	\$9,565	\$9,947
E-3C	\$8,031	\$9,220	\$9,589
E-4B	\$49,564	\$50,738	\$52,768
E-8C	\$4,037	\$5,077	\$5,280
EC-130E#*	\$2,985	\$3,649	\$3,795
EC-130H	\$11,698	\$12,295	\$12,787
EC-135C\$	\$3,106	\$3,490	\$3,630
F-117A	\$17,891	\$17,959	\$18,678
F-15A	\$10,707	\$10,775	\$11,206
F-15B	\$10,790	\$10,925	\$11,362
F-15C	\$11,308	\$11,376	\$11,831
F-15D	\$11,331	\$11,467	\$11,926
F-15E	\$11,781	\$11,917	\$12,394
F-16A	\$5,423	\$5,491	\$5,711
F-16B	\$5,428	\$5,564	\$5,787
F-16C%	\$4,942	\$5,010	\$5,210
F-16D%	\$4,935	\$5,071	\$5,274

F-22A	\$2,462	\$2,530	\$2,631
HC-130N	\$5,774	\$6,231	\$6,480
HC-130P	\$5,267	\$5,724	\$5,952
HH-60G	\$3,443	\$3,723	\$3,872
KC-10A	\$7,931	\$8,140	\$8,465
KC-135E	\$5,170	\$5,410	\$5,626
KC-135R	\$4,896	\$5,136	\$5,342
KC-135T	\$5,319	\$5,559	\$5,782
LC-130H	\$3,154	\$3,430	\$3,568
MC-130E#	\$5,107	\$5,627	\$5,852
MC-130H#	\$6,220	\$6,636	\$6,901
MC-130P	\$4,691	\$5,143	\$5,349
MH-53J/M#	\$8,379	\$8,696	\$9,043
OA-10A	\$3,419	\$3,487	\$3,627
OC-135B	\$2,933	\$3,489	\$3,629
RC-135S*	\$12,929	\$13,761	\$14,312
RC-135U	\$3,691	\$4,903	\$5,100
RC-135V	\$3,689	\$4,923	\$5,120
RC-135W	\$3,688	\$4,922	\$5,119
T-1A	\$999	\$1,135	\$1,180
T-37B	\$398	\$466	\$485
T-38A	\$1,353	\$1,421	\$1,478
T-43A	\$3,256	\$3,460	\$3,599
TC-135S#%	\$3,447	\$3,718	\$3,867
TC-135W#%	\$3,298	\$3,502	\$3,642
UH-1N	\$1,063	\$1,235	\$1,284
WC-130J#	\$3,835	\$4,179	\$4,346

### Acronyms:

AF - Air Force  
 AFB - Air Force Base  
 AFRC - Air Force Reserve Command  
 AFTOC - Air Force Total Ownership Cost  
 AMC - Air Mobility Command  
 ANG - Air National Guard  
 CLS - Contractor Logistics Support  
 DBOF-T - Defense Business Operating Fund-Transportation  
 DoD - Department of Defense  
 FMR - Financial Management Regulation  
 FMS - Foreign Military Sales  
 HQ - Headquarters  
 JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff  
 MDS - Mission, Design, Series  
 OLAP - On-Line Analytical Processing  
 OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense

SAAM - Special Assignment Airlift Mission  
TWCF - Transportation Working Capital Fund  
USTRANSCOM - United States Transportation Command

### References/Links:

1. See Tables A6-1 and A7-1 for CLS costs
2. See Tables A2-1, A3-1, and A4-1 for organic costs
3. For TWCF rates go to <https://www.amcfrn.scott.af.mil/filecabinet/docs/fy04/saam.doc> and download the JCS and SAAM rates, which will provide the equivalent to this table. Or call DSN 779-1114/Commercial (618) 229-1114 for a rate. If making a call to obtain a rate, know the destination of the mission, and weight of cargo and number of personnel being transported to obtain a helpful cost estimate
4. For OSD rates go to <http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/rates/index.html> and select aircraft reimbursements.

### Table Description:

This table provides the DoD, FMS and Public per flying hour reimbursement rates by MDS.

### Table Uses:

Used for cost estimates and billings.

### Business Rules & Assumptions:

1. OSD provides guidance for computing reimbursement rates in DoD Financial Management Regulation Volume 11A Chapter 6.
2. Rates in this table reflect the cost of operating the aircraft for one hour.
3. There are three categories of reimbursement rates the AF publishes: DoD, Other Federal Agency or FMS, and Public. Per DoD FMR, the FMS rate is to include unfunded civilian retirement rate, but that rate is NOT included in this table's rates.
4. The elements, which comprise these reimbursement rates, are logistics costs (fuel, depot maintenance, depot level reparables and consumables), CLS costs, and personnel costs for aircrew.
5. HQ Air Mobility Command (AMC/FMBT) and USTRANSCOM develop rates for Defense Business Operating Fund-Transportation (DBOF-T), now known as Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF). The rates included in this table are NON-TWCF aircraft

### Source Data:

1. The following are used as input to update and publish this table:
  - a. [Table A2-1 – Logistics Cost Factors](#)
  - b. [Table A7-1 – CLS Aircraft](#)
  - c. AFTOC OLAP Appropriations cube
  - d. [Table 19-2 – FY Standard Composite Rates by Grade](#)
  - e. [Table A36-1 – Authorized Aircrew Composition \(Active\)](#)
  - f. [Table A37-1 – Authorized Aircrew Composition \(ANG\)](#)

g. Table A38-1 – Authorized Aircrew Composition (AFRC)

**Table Notes:**

1. # FY05 Programmed Flying Hours Not Available - 04 Actuals used
2. \* 05 Programmed Inventory not available - 04 Actuals used
3. \$ 05 Inventory not available - Inventory data from last year's table used
4. % Most recent CLS data not available - CLS data from last year's table used
5. ^ Programmed flying hours taken from CLS brochure
6. The C-37A aircraft is leased at MacDill, AFB and Hickam, AFB and their respective costs are reported on CLS brochures. The C-37A rate listed above is for non-leased aircraft. The leased rates for C-37A will be different.

**POC:**

AFCAA/FMFT  
703-602-9246 or DSN 332-9246



- Brod
- Tim MacGregor
- Johnny
- Langford Knight
- Berry
- Tom

8/3 Key Field mty  
 MCI New Facility 92-93 (12) Tankers \* Park 17 Tankers  
 w/ Hyr Space

Airspace supporting mission - ~~is~~ not suff credit for people they serve

Tanker to Rec Ratio 1:17 in south 1:5 national

Strong support from Airport auth.

\$11M robust to 16 tankers

Leave expires 2047

Sim 1 of 4 in Guard no next in BRAC about sim

Strength: 100%+

Unit Performance: Excellent

Follow on mission: nothing out there

4300

Carles  
 11/38 pilots

One or two <sup>^</sup> elsewhere  
 might go