

2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
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Team: AIR FORCE

Name of Team Member: ART BEAUCHAMP (703 698-2934)

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Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD and Dyess AFB, TX DOD Justification



- Achieves operational and economic efficiencies
- Relocates activity to B1 installation with higher military value
- Creates an efficient and single-B1 mission focus
- Enables consolidation of active duty C-130s
- Facilitates ANG, AFR and active duty C-130 association

COBRA

- \$299.1M - One time costs
- Payback - 1 Year
- \$1,853.3M - 20-Year Net Present Value Savings
- 1,520 Military and 341 Civilian Positions Eliminated
- 3,415 Military and 189 civilian Positions Realigned

Environmental: DoD estimated remediation cost is \$26.4M

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• 1,520 Military and 341 Civilian Positions Eliminated; 3,415 Military and 189 civilian Positions Realigned

Ellsworth

Out: (3,315) Military; (438) Civilians

In: 0 Military; (0) Civilians

Net Loss: (3,315) Military; (438) Civilians

Net Loss Contractors: (99)

Total Direct Loss: (3,315) + (438) + (99) = (3,852)

Dyess

Out: (1,615) Military; (65) Civilians

In: 1,925 Military; 129 Civilians

Net Gain: 310 Military; 64 Civilians

• Assuming 67 aircraft are assigned, the breakout would be as follows: (36) combat coded; 18 training coded; (2) test; 4 attrition reserve; 7 BAI
 • If fleet is in place, the following loading is estimated: (6) at depot; 6 TDY in AOR; 2 test at Edwards, 6 in mx, 8-10 daily flyers
 • The AF is showing \$27 million in costs to complete the environmental restoration at Ellsworth. They have spent \$67.36 million through FY03.



**Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX
Issues Raised**

C1.

- Closing installation rated high in military value categories
- Risk to consolidating B-1 fleet at single location
- Gains in operational and logistics efficiencies mixed

C2.

- Impact of litigation on primary training range

C3.

- Cost to accommodate C-130s at gaining base underestimated

@Dyess



**Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX
Issues Raised**

C5.

- Manpower savings

C6.

- Economic impact on surrounding community very significant

C8.

- Environmental restoration costs high



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- The B1 consolidation is also inconsistent with Air Force BRAC Basing Principle #7: "Ensure long-range strike bases provide flexible strategic response and strategic force protection."



**Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX
DoD Recommendation**

- a. Close Ellsworth, SD**
- b. Realign Dyess AFB, TX**
- c. Realign Little Rock AFB, AR**
- d. Realign Elmendorf AFB, AK**
- e. Realign Peterson AFB, CO**





Supporting Slides

For Commission Discussion & Questions
During Final Deliberation





Staff Assessment

Deviation from Final Selection Criteria

Criterion	Military Value				Other			
	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8
Deviation	X	X	X		X	X		

X=Deviation



**Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX**

C1. Current and Future Mission Value

DoD Position:

- Ellsworth ranked lower than gaining base in military value

Community Position:

- Ellsworth provides more current and future value to Air Force-- strategic presence in North Central U.S, capability to beddown emerging missions or all B-1s

Commission Staff Assessment:

- Ellsworth scored highest in 3 of the 4 military value criteria, but lower in the most weighted category current and future missions
- No encroachment, sparsely populated area

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•Overall, Dyess Air Force Base nudged out Ellsworth by 5.9 points (56.7 to 50.8) in the overall Military Value scoring for Bomber bases. The principle reason for the lower scorer is that Ellsworth scored lower than Dyess in Current/Future Mission criteria (31.52 vs. 51.2) due to lower scores in proximity to airspace, instrument routes and training range category. Ellsworth scored higher in all other categories:

- Condition of Infrastructure (63.44 vs. 58.78)
- Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces (74.92 vs. 68.18)
- Cost of Ops/Manpower (81.32 vs. 77.64)



Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD and Dyess AFB, TX C1. Readiness Impact

DoD Position:

- Consolidation has no more risk than other legacy aircraft consolidations

Community Position:

- Consolidation is a severe risk to B-1 Bomber Fleet and Nation

Commission Staff Assessment:

- Reduces long range bomber bases from 5 to 4
- Bomber bases reduced while capability of current and emerging strategic threats is improving
- Concentration of B1s and reduced bomber bases is inconsistent with the National Defense Strategy goal
- Consolidation inconsistent with Air Force BRAC Basing Principle



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•B-1 is a "strategy" capability – the backbone of the Bomber Force is the B-1. In Afghanistan, it accounted for 40 percent by weight, weapons delivered; in Iraq 34 percent consolidating this capability at single location is inconsistent w/Nation Defense Strategy:

•Reduces long range bomber bases to 4; Fewer bases increases risk from current and emerging strategic threats

•The Director DIA, in 17 March 2005 statement to Senate Armed Services Committee noted: "China...by 2015, the number of warheads capable of targeting the continental United States will increase several fold."; "...North Korea could deliver a nuclear warhead to parts of the United States..."; "...Iran will have the technical capability to develop an ICBM by 2015."

•Consolidation of B1s is greater than other bombers MDS

•Closure of Ellsworth reduces long range bomber bases to just 4

•Given the capability of the B-1 and the small number of remaining bomber bases the consolidation is inconsistent with the March '05 National Defense Strategy goal:

"Developing greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not overly concentrating military forces in few locations."

•Consolidation is also inconsistent with Air Force BRAC Basing Principle #7: **"Ensure long-range strike bases provide flexible strategic response and strategic force protect."**

•Consolidating the B1 Bomber fleet at one location increases the risk to the Nation's long range capability. The "putting all the eggs in one basket" argument. The risk is not so much from a terrorist attack, but from current/emerging strategic threats.

•By consolidating the Nation's bomber capability from 5 bases (Ellsworth, Dyess, Minot, Barksdale, and Whiteman) to 4 we are decreasing our strategic redundancy for a capability. We are also increasing the risk to this capability from a first strike by current and emerging strategic threats (China, North Korea, and Iran).



**Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX
C1. Operational and Logistic Efficiencies**

DoD Position:

- Consolidating B-1 fleet at one installation achieves operational and logistical efficiencies

Community Position:

- Sixty-seven B-1s at one location is unworkable and will impact operational readiness and logistics

Commission Staff Assessment:

- Operational readiness as measured by mission capable rates estimated to improve in short term to 2 percent; no expected improvement in long term
- Larger pool of crews expected to provide more flexibility in scheduling aircrew training and missions



- Consolidation of parts inventories should improve mission capable (MC) rate in short term by 1 to 2 percent (one more aircraft available); but no long term improvement expected since B1 fleet target MC rate remains unchanged at 95 percent; increased number of aircraft at one locations provides more flexibility to cannibalizing parts--improves MC rate short term



**Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX
C1. Operational and Logistic Efficiencies**

Commission Staff Assessment:

- Manpower: Consolidation results in less people operating and managing same number of aircraft, net savings: 1,699 positions
 - But, this a cost avoidance not a savings according to GAO
- Spares: Consolidation of parts inventory results in an estimated one time savings of \$11.3M; no significant savings expected long term
- B1 Test and Support Equip: availability expected to improve



--AF intends to use manpower efficiencies to fill shortfall in "stressed career fields" and other needs



**Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX
C3. Consolidation Cost**

DoD Position:

- Little Rock will become the single major active duty C-130 installation, creating a larger, more effective installation

Community Position:

- C-130s transferring to installations with lessor military value, will be costly and inefficient

Commission Staff Assessment:

- Little Rock near its maximum C-130 capacity
- COBRA underestimates additional MILCON required to accept C-130s from all associated C-130 movements to Little Rock – by nearly 68 percent
- No manpower efficiencies gained with C-130 distribution – will take a net increase in manpower of 225 personnel



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•Criteria C3 pertains to the ability of existing and potential receiving locations to accommodate future total force requirements. As part of the Ellsworth recommendation the Air Force plans to distribute most of Dyess' C-130s (24 PAA - 22 AD + 2 ANG) to Little Rock AFB, AK. This is part of the AF's effort to consolidate the CONUS active duty C-130 fleet at Little Rock AFB, AK (116 to 118 primary assigned aircraft); or approximately 27 percent of the C-130 airlift fleet. Little Rock currently does not have the capacity to support this recommendation without significant investment in MILCON. The latest COBRA estimates puts the cost at \$246.7M

•Airlift MCI: Dyess: #11; Score: 65.95; Little Rock: #17; Score 63.25; Peterson: #30; Score 57.20; Elmendorf: #51; Score 51.60

•COBRA Model for this recommend shows a net increase in personnel supporting C-130s at 3 locations vice one installation

•For example, according to COBRA data, 1,680 personnel at Dyess support the C-130 fleet, but when the C-130 are distributed to 3 separate locations it will require 1,905 personnel; a net increase of 225

• (Little Rock: 1,185 positions for 24 PAA); (Peterson 225 positions for 463 personnel); Elmendorf will be required to support the same number of C-130s

•C-130s at Dyess are same type (H1 Models): movement to gaining installations results in mixed C-130 fleet. Inconsistent with AF BRAC Basing Principle #2:

“Optimize the size of our squadrons – in terms of aircraft model, aircraft assigned, and crew ratios applied (e.g. same MDS's)”



**Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX
C4. Cost to Operate Fleet**

DoD Position:

- BRAC savings come from infrastructure reductions, efficiencies in logistics, reductions in overhead; cost to operate mission not factored

Community Position:

- Cost to operate B-1s will increase significantly

Commission Staff Assessment:

- The Air Force did not conduct flying hour cost reduction analysis
- Cost per flying hours not expected to decrease, but may in fact increase
 - No reduction in aircraft or training sorties expected - same number of acft
 - Additional time and sorties to get Utah Training and Test Range (UTTR) from gaining installation will increase

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
DoD Position: Annual recurring savings after implementation is \$161.3M, with a payback period in on year, the net present value of over 20 years is \$1,853.3

Community: Position: Savings overestimated

Commission Staff Assessment: Overall, no savings achieved. *Recommendation results in a COST when you discount the projected military personnel savings identified in COBRA. This assessment is based on the fact that the personnel savings achieved by the consolidation of B1s will be used for other AF personnel needs-- therefore there such savings should not be applied.*

This assessment is supported by GAO's assessment: GAO Military Bases Report, Jul 2005, notes: "...claiming such personnel savings without reducing end strength does not provide dollar savings that can be reapplied outside personnel accounts

A detail assessment of the cost/savings with and without MILPER is in the back-up slides



**Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX
C5. Savings**

DoD Position:

- Closure brings significant savings to DoD

Community Position:

- Savings overestimated

Commission Staff Assessment:

- Overall, no savings achieved
 - GAO report states the savings are a cost avoidance
 - BRAC analysis shows that its a *COST* when you discount the projected military personnel savings

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 **Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX
C5. Airspace Range Litigation**

DoD Position:

- Dyess has 2.3 times volume of airspace, more instrument routes (IR) and training routes than closing installation

Community Position:

- Litigation impacts primary training airspace

Commission Staff Assessment:

- Workarounds available, but litigation impacted primary training according to court records

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Dyess has significantly more airspace, training ranges and IR
Airspace training utilization not part of range scoring calculation
Method to determine range value complex
Not all ranges offer same level of capability, but proximity to installations
weighted heavily in scoring, regardless of airspace range usefulness
Litigation w/primary training range restricted low level attitude flying

 **Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX
C6. Economic Impact**

DoD Position:

- This recommendation could potentially result 6,768 job losses (3,852 direct; 2,916 indirect), for an impact of -8.5 percent to the employment in Rapid City, SD Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)

Community Position:

- DOD significantly underestimated the job loss impact
 - Community estimated the closure would result in 11,181 job losses, for an impact of -20 percent to adjacent communities; - 10 percent to Rapid City MSA

Commission Staff Assessment:

- Second largest employer in State
- Potential economic loss very significant
- Even w/DoD's estimate of - 8.5 percent job loss is substantially high; almost all DoD's estimated impacts for other areas ranged between -1.5 percent and +1.5
- Job loss is compounded by low population growth; net out migration

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DoD Position: Annual recurring savings after implementation is \$161.3M, with a payback period in on year, the net present value of over 20 years is \$1,853.3

Community: Position: Savings overestimated

Commission Staff Assessment: Overall, no savings achieved. *Recommendation results in a COST when you discount the projected military personnel savings identified in COBRA. This assessment is based on the fact that the personnel savings achieved by the consolidation of B1s will be used for other AF personnel needs-- therefore there such savings should not be applied.*

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A detail assessment of the cost/savings with and without MILPER is in the back-up slides



**Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX
C8. Environmental Impact**

DoD Position:

- DOD COBRA costs for environmental restoration at \$26.4M

Community Position:

- DOD underestimated environmental restoration—estimated at \$52M

Commission Staff Assessment:

- DOD's "Defense Environmental Programs Report to Congress, FY 2004" shows estimated restoration costs for Ellsworth \$26.4



•Environmental Impact Underestimated

•The AF is showing \$27 million in costs to complete the environmental restoration at Ellsworth. They have spent \$67.36 million through FY03. I am not sure where the \$1.15 million number came from that he provided. They did not provide backup to the numbers (such as the \$52 million they say it will take to cleanup Ellsworth) so it is hard to say which is correct. However, the number we are using comes from the Defense Environmental Restoration Account which only includes environmental restoration costs for contamination prior to 1986. However, this number usually includes long term monitoring and maintenance of installed corrective action treatment systems. He is correct in saying there are other costs that may be incurred if the installation is closed. These are related to closing underground storage tanks and misc. other units such as oil/water separators and fire training areas. In general these costs are not included in the payback calculations and so they are not tracked. The best we can do is show it as an issue and include DoD's estimate, there is know information that would lead me to believe the cost should be doubled.



**Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX
C4. Cost / (Savings)**


COBRA DATA			
	DoD Baseline	Staff Excursion	Staff Excursion without Mil Pers
One Time Cost	\$299.1M	\$299.1M	\$300.1M
Net Implementation Cost / (Savings)	\$316.4M	\$316.4M	\$224.8M
Annual Recurring Cost / (Savings)	(\$161.3M)	(\$161.3M)	(\$20.1M)
Payback Period	1 Year	1 Year	19 Years
Net Present Value at 2025 Cost / (Savings)	(\$1.853.3M)	(\$1.853.3M)	\$19.4M





() = a Savings



Sec. 109
RBTI (Lancer MOA and IR 178)









Sec. 109
Little Rock C-130 MILCON Summary

Base	Relative Rank	Airlift Score	Share of Little Rock MILCON	Source
Pope AFB	6	69.99	\$ 89.4 million	COBRA
Dyess AFB	11	65.95	\$ 77.0 million	Clearinghouse Response
Reno-Tahoe AGS	101	40.51	\$ 21.1 million	Clearinghouse Response
NFARS	103	40.03	\$ 25.4 million	COBRA
Schenectady Co. AGS	117	37.72	\$ 8.4 million	COBRA
Mansfield-Lahm AGS	119	37.28	\$ 12.7 million	COBRA
Gen. Mitchell ARS	130	33.77	\$ 12.7 million	COBRA
Total MILCON			\$ 246.7 million	



The next recommendation is to realign the Schenectady County Airport Air Guard Station. It is listed as Chapter 3 Section 102 of the Bill.



**Sec. 109: Ellsworth AFB, SD
and Dyess AFB, TX
All Issues**

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF ASSESSMENT
MILITARY VALUE	EXCELLENT BASE, BUT MILITARY VALUE FAVORS GAINING INSTALLATION	OUTSTANDING INSTALLATION. NO ENCROACHMENT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS. RATED HIGH IN ALL AREAS	OUTSTANDING BASE. MILITARY VALUE SCORING FAIRLY APPLIED, BUT NARROWLY FOCUSED ON AIRSPACE RANGE
READINESS IMPACT OF CONSOLIDATING B1	ACCEPTABLE RISK	SEVERE RISK TO COUNTY	REDUCING BASES WHILE THREATS INCREASING
OPERATION EFFICIENCIES	SIGNIFICANT GAINS	NONE	AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY IMPROVES; COST INCREASE
LOGISTICS EFFICIENCIES	SIGNIFICANT GAINS	CREATES SEVERE INEFFICIENCIES	LIMITED. NO REAL CHANGE IN MISSION CAPABILITY RATES
COST AT GAINING C-130 BASE UNDERESTIMATED	NONE	NO CAPACITY ANALYSIS DONE	COSTS RANGE \$107M TO \$247M HIGHER
MANPOWER COSTS	CLAIMS COST SAVINGS BY ALLOWING POSITIONS TO BE RECORDED FOR OTHER NEEDS	OVERSTATED BY AT LEAST 60 PERCENT	NO REAL DOLLAR SAVINGS. WITH MILPER IS PULLED FROM COBRA, NPV IS A COST
TRAINING RANGE LITIGATION	WORKAROUNDS	IMPACTED TRAINING	IMPACTED TRAINING; WORKAROUND AVAILABLE
ENIRONMENTAL COSTS	REMEDATION COST AT \$27m	REMEDATION COSTS EXCEED \$50m	NOT ALL COSTS FACTOR IN COBRA. DOD STATED COSTS IS \$27m
ECONOMIC IMPACT	ACCEPTS IMPACT TO COMMUNITY	SEVERE IMPACT	SUBSTANTIALLY HIGH. WELL ABOVE ACCEPTABLE RANGE



**Comparison of (1) Ellsworth AFB
and (2) Dyess AFB**

MCI: Bomber

Max Points

This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

Earned Points 1 and 2

This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for these two bases, respectively.

Difference

The difference between the two base scores.

Crit	Formula	Max Points	Earned Points 1	Earned Points 2	Difference
1	1242.00 ATC Restrictions to Operations	MAX 5.52	5.52	5.52	0.00
1	1271.00 Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions	MAX 3.68	3.68	3.68	0.00
1	1245.00 Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)	- 20.24	2.29	5.66	-3.37
1	1246.00 Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission	- 16.56	3.47	8.69	-5.22
2	1.00 Fuel Hydrant Systems Support Mission Growth	MAX 2.03	2.03	2.03	0.00
2	8.00 Ramp Area and Serviceability	MAX 3.49	3.49	3.49	0.00
2	9.00 Runway Dimension and Serviceability	MAX 5.52	5.52	5.52	0.00
2	19.00 Hangar Capability - Large Aircraft	+2.91	1.46	1.06	0.40
2	1207.00 Level of Mission Encroachment	-2.03	1.82	2.03	-0.21
2	1231.00 Certified Weapons Storage Area	? 2.03	0.00	0.00	0.00
2	1232.00 Sufficient Explosives-sited Parking	MAX 3.20	3.20	3.20	0.00
2	1233.00 Sufficient Munitions Storage	MAX 2.91	2.91	2.91	0.00
2	1235.00 Installation Pavements Quality	+4.94	4.32	0.00	4.32
2	1266.00 Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission	-12.45	1.57	4.16	-2.59
3	1214.00 Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge	+2.64	1.67	1.52	0.15
3	1241.00 Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment	MAX +1.76	1.76	1.32	0.44
3	213.00 Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance	MAX 1.68	1.68	1.68	0.00
3	1205.10 Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth	MAX +1.96	1.96	0.82	1.14
3	1205.20 Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth	-1.96	0.42	1.47	-1.05
4	1250.00 Area Cost Factor	+1.25	0.96	0.88	0.08
4	1269.00 Utilities cost rating (U3C)	+0.13	0.12	0.09	0.03
4	1402.00 BAH Rate	-0.88	0.70	0.72	-0.02
4	1403.00 GS Locality Pay Rate	MAX 0.25	0.25	0.25	0.00
			50.80	56.70	-5.90

(23) Attributes measured for Military Value
 (E) Scored max pts (7 better than D) : 11/23
 (D) Scored better than (D) 11 : 5/23
 Total : 16/23
 However lost pts in most important (or heaviest weighted area)

Bomber

Rank	Base	Bomber	Current / Future Mission	Condition of Infrastructure	Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces	Cost of Ops / Manpower
1	Seymour Johnson AFB	78.41	80.55	75.14	80.45	85.03
2	Eglin AFB	70.16	62.88	69.82	100	90.39
3	Nellis AFB	68.33	70.74	70.39	54.77	43.94
4	Edwards AFB	68.23	65.51	71.06	75.87	40.87
5	Robins AFB	66.62	62.78	67.36	76	87.45
6	Pope AFB	66.54	75.85	60.66	43.27	86.08
7	Shaw AFB	62.97	67.99	53.19	74.79	85.64
8	Moody AFB	62.36	69.98	48.06	79.47	91.37
9	Langley AFB	62.02	76.3	42.84	72.12	77.2
10	MacDill AFB	61.87	66.44	50.18	85.77	76.56
11	Charleston AFB	61.01	64.68	50.88	82.49	75.49
12	Tyndall AFB	60.8	67.54	49.79	68	90.98
13	Barksdale AFB	60.74	42.61	70.82	97.29	80.79
14	Tinker AFB	60.4	65.22	49.77	75.96	85.8
15	March ARB	58.79	64.12	61.12	27.89	45.41
16	Hill AFB	58.73	45.5	66.3	83.39	77.82
17	Mountain Home AFB	58.44	49.99	62.13	79.54	68.58
18	Andrews AFB	57.19	62.12	50.65	65.5	41.74
19	Hurlburt Field	56.79	63.33	49.8	48.05	87.18
20	Dyess AFB	56.7	51.2	58.78	68.18	77.64
20	Indian Springs AFS	56.7	69.99	47.03	38.84	43.94
22	Holloman AFB	56.57	56.48	54.1	62.59	75.23
23	McConnell AFB	56.28	52.88	61.83	44	75.83
24	Whiteman AFB	56.03	40.12	66.54	80.97	74.42
25	Little Rock AFB	55.78	45.87	59.48	78.03	88.12
26	Kirtland AFB	55.27	54.99	51.65	67.96	69.56
27	Davis-Monthan AFB	54.24	46.78	60.73	57.21	71.89
28	Altus AFB	53.79	56.06	41.75	86.47	80.99
29	McEntire AGS	53.76	66.96	41.86	34.56	85.19
30	Beale AFB	53.29	41.7	63.42	67.18	42.78
31	Luke AFB	52.87	57.37	49.63	41.64	68.92
32	Fairchild AFB	52.78	42.42	56.94	77.86	73.99
33	Jacksonville IAP AGS	52.71	68.04	39.34	31.25	77.87
34	Dover AFB	52.25	56.13	49.91	40.99	64.93
35	Eielson AFB	52.12	52.76	46.54	81.32	16.54
36	Columbus AFB	51.5	51.47	46.44	61.78	94.97
37	Homestead ARS	51.44	46.37	58.47	44.96	53.65
38	Richmond IAP AGS	51	72.78	34.31	13.98	75.18
39	Ellsworth AFB	50.81	32.52	63.44	74.92	81.32
40	Patrick AFB	50.47	63.35	35.27	50.22	66.83
41	Savannah IAP AGS	49.22	66.38	33.66	26	84.65
42	Maxwell AFB	47.77	66.39	30.85	22.86	85.68
43	McGuire AFB	47.61	38.54	54.18	64.69	37.26
44	Dannelly Field AGS	47.39	65.89	30.85	21.36	85.51
45	Sheppard AFB	47.32	53.91	40.52	37.03	80.04
46	Travis AFB	46.72	39.57	58	38.42	24.22
47	Wright-Patterson AFB	46.06	34.29	51.12	72.32	74.09
48	Charlotte/Douglas IAP AGS	46.03	64.45	31.32	13.38	81.48

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Airlift

Rank	Base	Airlift	Current / Future Mission	Condition of Infrastructure	Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces	Cost of Ops / Manpower
1	Eglin AFB	79.43	72.45	81.55	100	90.39
2	Seymour Johnson AFB	78.03	71.25	83.82	83.34	85.03
3	Charleston AFB	74.09	64.57	83.15	79.91	75.49
4	Barksdale AFB	72.43	52.92	87.48	97.7	80.79
5	Altus AFB	71.3	64.97	73.95	87.04	80.99
6	Pope AFB	69.99	71.21	73.4	46.19	86.08
7	Hurlburt Field	69.61	75.12	67.11	50.15	87.18
8	Tinker AFB	68.62	55.2	80.62	76.23	85.8
9	Shaw AFB	67.7	71.86	59.5	78.12	85.64
10	Eielson AFB	67.34	61.25	73.03	84.43	16.54
11	Dyess AFB	65.95	54.87	76.82	68.94	77.64
12	Holloman AFB	65.78	61.34	70.94	62.43	75.23
13	Edwards AFB	65.53	55.18	75.19	79.33	40.87
14	Fairchild AFB	64.22	52.54	72.85	79.72	73.99
15	Nellis AFB	63.95	59.85	72.31	53.08	43.94
16	Robins AFB	63.89	52.22	71.87	78.5	87.45
17	Little Rock AFB	63.25	49.25	73.05	80.66	88.12
18	Andrews AFB	62.05	54.38	70.4	67.79	41.74
19	Tyndall AFB	61.75	68.65	50.88	67.84	90.98
20	MacDill AFB	60.12	47.48	66.41	88.14	76.56
21	Maxwell AFB	59.9	70.78	55.31	22.48	85.68
22	March ARB	59.86	56.53	71.33	31.15	45.41
23	Mountain Home AFB	59.77	46.58	68.64	81.35	68.58
24	Ellsworth AFB	59.4	42.43	72.78	76.53	81.32
25	McEntire AGS	59.35	71.7	49.85	35.48	85.19
26	Hill AFB	58.83	45.27	66.57	84.33	77.82
27	McChord AFB	57.95	49.64	71.78	38.95	57.08
28	Whiteman AFB	57.82	39.47	71.25	82.33	74.42
29	Columbus AFB	57.51	53.22	58.08	65.55	94.97
30	Peterson AFB	57.2	58.4	59.78	39.75	61.91
31	Langley AFB	56.57	53.37	54.97	72.81	77.2
32	Key Field AGS	56.39	64.14	50.02	42.43	75.4
33	Charlotte/Douglas IAP AGS	56.27	70.45	49.46	12.94	81.48
34	Dover AFB	56.06	48.75	66.73	43.17	64.93
35	Davis-Monthan AFB	55.89	45.11	66	59.49	71.89
36	Grissom ARB	55.66	42.59	68.46	58.32	73.25
37	Kirtland AFB	55.47	49.12	58.01	70.63	69.56
38	Sheppard AFB	55.21	60.81	52.33	35.24	80.04
39	McConnell AFB	54.65	45.85	65.92	43	75.83
40	Beale AFB	54.63	38.4	70.78	65.31	42.78
41	Buckley AFB	54.62	56.16	52.45	56.83	53.78
42	Minot AFB	54.34	39.7	65.42	70.91	73.42
43	Wright-Patterson AFB	54.27	44.62	58.95	74.34	74.09
44	Travis AFB	53.86	41.24	72.89	40.31	24.22
45	Luke AFB	52.17	50.43	55.68	41.35	68.92
46	Westover ARB	52	42.8	58.47	68.13	49.23
47	Forbes Field AGS	51.93	43.85	61.74	42.08	77.32
48	McGuire AFB	51.8	39.42	62.51	67.95	37.26
49	Moody AFB	51.72	52.29	41.64	81.05	91.37
50	Ellington Field AGS	51.65	47.25	53.91	60.12	61.2
51	Elmendorf AFB	51.6	29.97	70.05	85.17	8.86
52	Birmingham IAP AGS	50.93	53.99	48.35	40.7	77.96

DCN:4979

**Comparative Military Value Rankings Between
Ellsworth AFB, Grand Forks AFB, & Minot AFB
With Dyess AFB**

“Real” 1st Rankings

Dyess 56.17

Dyess 65.95

Ellsworth 83.73

Dyess 58.96

Dyess 53.14

Ellsworth 87.72

Dyess 72.37

Ellsworth 84.12

Air Force Function	1 st in Rankings	2 nd in Rankings	3 rd in Rankings
Bomber	Ellsworth 50.81	Minot 45.72	Grand Forks 38.48
Lift	Ellsworth 59.40	Minot 54.34	Grand Forks 50.53
Tanker	Ellsworth 83.73	Grand Forks 63.52	Minot 62.74
Fighter	Ellsworth 58.06	Minot 56.64	Grand Forks 55.88
SOF	Minot 45.12	Ellsworth 43.91	Grand Forks 43.75
C2ISR	Ellsworth 87.72	Minot 77.04	Grand Forks 76.33
UAV	Grand Forks 70.93	Ellsworth 69.73	Minot 67.53
Space	Ellsworth 84.12	Minot 83.93	Grand Forks 82.64

Annual

Run ID	Scenario	Page	Analysis Team	One Time Costs (\$M)	Payback (Years)	6 Year Net (\$M)	Cash Flow 2006 (\$M)	Cash Flow 2007 (\$M)	Cash Flow 2008 (\$M)	Cash Flow 2009 (\$M)	Cash Flow 2010 (\$M)	Cash Flow 2011 (\$M)	Beyond Cash Flows (2012-2025) (\$M)	20-Year Net Present Value
71	Naval Station Ingleside, Texas and Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX	DoN-28	Navy	\$ 179.42	21	134,298	13,936	125,123	26,164	(10,362)	(10,362)	(10,362)	(10,951)	\$ 23.16
72	Engineering Field Division/Activity	DoN-28	Navy	\$ 37.81	4	11,168	1,825	10,344	15,065	1,293	(8,640)	(8,640)	(8,640)	\$ (73.17)
73	Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers	DoN-29	Navy	\$ 62.14	1	40,336	13,936	43,303	(3,896)	(4,530)	(4,530)	(4,530)	(5,195)	\$ (7.96)
74	Navy Recruiting Districts	DoN-34	Navy	\$ 2.54	1	(12,898)	0.564	(2,692)	(2,692)	(2,692)	(2,692)	(2,692)	(2,692)	\$ (38.16)
75	Navy Regions	DoN-35	Navy	\$ 3.21	1	(8,877)	0.410	(1,582)	(2,717)	(2,717)	(2,717)	(2,717)	(2,717)	\$ (34.80)
76	Navy Reserve Centers** (Roll up)	DoN-37	Navy	\$ 2.06	1	(23,178)	(2,486)	(4,136)	(4,136)	(4,136)	(4,136)	(4,136)	(4,309)	\$ (61.32)
77	Navy Reserve Readiness Commands	DoN-44	Navy	\$ 2.51	4	(0,623)	1,319	0.784	(0,681)	(0,681)	(0,681)	(0,681)	(0,681)	\$ (7.10)
78	Birmingham International Airport Air Guard Station, AL	Air Force-5	Air Force	\$ 11.00	18	7,685	0.532	10,257	-0.649	-0.818	-0.818	-0.818	-0.818	\$ (0.50)
79	Eielson Air Force Base, AK, Moody Air Force Base, GA, and Shaw Air Force Base, SC	Air Force-6	Air Force	\$ 143.30	5	56,513	9,306	40,190	29,328	-12,494	35,645	-45,662	-45,662	\$ (393.03)
80	Kulis Air Guard Station, AK, and Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK	Air Force-7	Air Force	\$ 81.40	13	54,799	4,988	55,824	9,534	-2,135	-6,706	-6,706	-7,092	\$ (16.01)
81	Fort Smith Air Guard Station, AR, and Luke Air Force Base, AZ	Air Force-8	Air Force	\$ 17.57	100	17,575	1,344	15,588	1,448	-0.179	-0.313	-0.313	-0.313	\$ 13.84
82	Beale Air Force Base, CA and Selfridge Air National Guard Base, MI	Air Force-10	Air Force	\$ 45.45	18	38,564	2,499	1,690	0.224	33,539	-0.389	-1,019	-3,113	\$ 2.92
83	March Air Force Base, CA	Air Force-11	Air Force	\$ 10.82	Never	23,195	0,926	10,298	3,291	2,893	2,893	2,893	2,893	\$ 50.00
84	Onizuka Air Force Station, CA	Air Force-12	Air Force	\$ 123.70	5	47,985	0,681	14,275	0,147	81,985	-24,562	-24,562	-24,562	\$ (198.30)
85	Bradley International Airport Air Guard Station, CT, Barnes Air Guard Station, MA, Selfridge Air National Guard Base, MI, Shaw Air Force Base, SC, and Martins State Air Guard Station, MD	Air Force-14	Air Force	\$ 3.25	9	1,355	0,800	2,069	-0,378	-0,378	-0,378	-0,378	-0,378	\$ (2.31)
86	New Castle Airport Air Guard Station, DE	Air Force-15	Air Force	\$ 15.56	2	17,991	0,789	7,187	-4,553	-7,180	-7,053	-7,180	-7,180	\$ (86.13)
87	Robins Air Force Base, GA	Air Force-16	Air Force	\$ 6.74	3	1,074	0,697	1,690	0,212	2,306	-1,915	-1,915	-1,915	\$ (17.58)
88	Boise Air Terminal Air Guard Station, ID	Air Force-17	Air Force	\$ 2.46	12	1,817	0,287	0,402	0,118	1,499	-0,244	-0,244	-0,244	\$ (0.69)
89	Mountain Home Air Force, ID, Nellis Air Force Base, NV, and Elmendorf Air Force Base	Air Force-18	Air Force	\$ 74.51	Never	66,633	4,929	3,276	3,931	35,531	2,472	16,492	11,380	\$ 172.24
90	Capital Air Guard Station, IL, and Hulman Regional Airport Air Guard Station, IN	Air Force-20	Air Force	\$ 19.86	16	14,341	4,321	13,387	1,661	-1,496	-1,767	-1,767	-1,767	\$ (3.19)
91	New Orleans Air Reserve Station, LA	Air Force-22	Air Force	\$ 50.18	5	33,087	3,653	0,721	0,146	31,253	6,601	-9,308	-10,900	\$ (76.80)
92	Andrews Air Force Base, MD, Will Rogers Air Guard Station, OK, Tinker Air Force Base, OK, Randolph Air Force Base, TX	Air Force-23	Air Force	\$ 21.88	2	-10,938	1,272	15,098	-6,255	-6,685	-7,184	-7,184	-7,184	\$ (99.36)
93	Martin State Air Guard Station, MD	Air Force-24	Air Force	\$ 9.44	1	-12,763	0,368	2,283	0,303	0,700	-6,095	-8,323	-8,323	\$ (92.71)
94	Otis Air National Guard Base, MA, Lambert St. Louis International Airport Air Guard Station, MO, Atlantic City Air Guard Station, NJ	Air Force-25	Air Force	\$ 103.00	4	-4,831	9,295	19,382	41,716	-13,417	-30,334	-31,472	-31,472	\$ (308.94)
95	W.K. Kellogg Airport Air Guard Station, MI	Air Force-27	Air Force	\$ 8.30	1	-24,449	-0,102	5,601	-7,256	-7,564	-7,564	-7,564	-7,564	\$ (98.37)
96	Duluth International Airport Air Guard Station	Air Force-28	Air Force	\$ 2.13	5	-0,215	0,173	1,938	0,019	-0,757	-0,794	-0,794	-0,794	\$ (7.83)
97	Key Field Air Guard Station, MS	Air Force-28	Air Force	\$ 10.71	13	6,887	0,364	3,028	6,277	-0,928	-0,928	-0,928	-0,928	\$ (2.46)
98	Great Falls International Airport Air Guard Station	Air Force-30	Air Force	\$ 9.34	4	-0,732	0,394	6,143	-1,817	-1,817	-1,817	-1,817	-1,817	\$ (18.11)
99	Reno-Tahoe International Airport Air Guard Station, NV	Air Force-31	Air Force	\$ 22.90	12	16,192	0,988	14,973	7,465	-1,837	-2,688	-2,688	-2,688	\$ (10.51)
100	Cannon Air Force Base, NM	Air Force-32	Air Force	\$ 92.07	2	-5,693	-5,987	31,882	-2,276	4,731	-13,914	-20,129	-21,733	\$ (216.54)
101	Niagra Falls Air Reserve Station, NY	Air Force-33	Air Force	\$ 64.70	3	3,610	2,342	18,389	13,038	1,310	-15,734	-15,734	-16,336	\$ (154.82)
102	Schenectady County Airport Air Guard Station	Air Force-34	Air Force	\$ 3.50	81	3,564	0,197	2,035	0,034	0,111	0,154	1,033	-0,121	\$ 2.11
103	Pope Air Force Base, NC, Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station, PA, Yeager Air Guard Station, WV	Air Force-35	Air Force	\$ 219.69	12	146,471	9,697	173,342	6,265	-8,872	-14,844	-19,118	-20,254	\$ (55.13)
104	Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND	Air Force-37	Air Force	\$ 132.92	7	70,713	8,770	59,882	4,280	16,077	-0,283	-18,013	-18,013	\$ (108.32)
105	Hector International Airport Air Guard Station, ND	Air Force-38	Air Force	\$ 1.80	2	-3,323	0,139	0,600	-1,016	-1,016	-1,016	-1,016	-1,016	\$ (12.90)
106	Mansfield-Lahn Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, OH	Air Force-39	Air Force	\$ 33.49	13	18,221	1,843	20,833	2,524	-2,028	-2,475	-2,475	-2,475	\$ (8.00)
107	Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, OH	Air Force-40	Air Force	\$ 11.37	100	11,611	0,746	9,684	1,655	-0,184	-0,106	-0,184	-0,184	\$ 9.34
108	Portland International Airport Air Guard Station, OR	Air Force-41	Air Force	\$ 85.54	10	49,552	4,957	47,351	26,233	-8,568	-10,210	-10,210	-10,210	\$ (51.22)
109	Elisworth Air Force Base, SD and Dyess Air Force Base, TX	Air Force-43	Air Force	\$ 300.19	19	224,834	7,275	187,463	41,236	2,942	3,768	-17,849	-20,007	\$ 19.35
110	Nashville International Airport Air Guard Station, TN	Air Force-44	Air Force	\$ 25.37	2	16,979	0,965	0,111	0,083	0,062	10,536	5,221	-13,267	\$ (119.59)
111	Ellington Air Guard Station, TX	Air Force-45	Air Force	\$ 1.60	5	0,103	0,215	1,159	-0,369	-0,369	-0,369	-0,369	-0,369	\$ (3.60)
112	Lackland Air Force Base, TX	Air Force-46	Air Force	\$ 8.23	Never	40,420	0,385	10,270	8,629	7,185	6,985	6,985	6,985	\$ 105.68
113	Hill Air Force Base, UT, Edwards Air Force Base, CA, Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID, Luke Air Force Base, AZ, Nellis Air Force Base, NV	Air Force-47	Air Force	\$ 28.64	5	-1,381	1,643	23,426	-5,870	-6,860	-6,861	-6,861	-6,861	\$ (67.06)
114	Langley Air Force Base, VA	Air Force-49	Air Force	\$ 1.80	Never	1,903	0,152	1,330	0,342	0,026	0,026	0,026	0,026	\$ 2.07
115	Richmond Air Guard Station, VA, Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station, IA	Air Force-50	Air Force	\$ 24.18	18	15,733	3,333	18,787	-1,466	-1,634	-1,634	-1,634	-1,634	\$ (0.48)
116	Fairchild Air Force Base, WA	Air Force-51	Air Force	\$ 6.36	11	3,277	0,346	5,642	-0,678	-0,678	-0,678	-0,678	-0,678	\$ (3.34)
117	General Mitchell Air Reserve Station, WI	Air Force-52	Air Force	\$ 38.40	5	14,258	1,524	11,343	2,260	11,756	-6,313	-6,313	-6,313	\$ (50.20)
118	Air Force Logistics Support Centers	Air Force-53	Air Force	\$ 9.40	8	3,192	0,841	6,302	-0,719	-0,870	-1,182	-1,182	-1,182	\$ (8.27)
119	F-100 Engine Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities	Air Force-55	Air Force	\$ 9.16	100	7,960	3,298	5,528	-0,206	-0,220	-0,220	-0,220	-0,220	\$ 5.62

*Personal
Mving to
Base X
MILCON +
↑ BOS
Not offset
by personal
savings*

() = Savings

(-) = Savings

If Neg = Savings

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : C:\Documents and Settings\gingrick\My Documents\MilPers Runs\109 - Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD and Dyess Air Force Base, TX\COBRA USAF 0018V3 (200.3).CBR
 Option Pkg Name: USAF 0018V3 (200.3) Close Ellsworth
 Std Fctrs File : C:\Documents and Settings\gingrick\My Documents\COBRA 6.10 April 21 2005\BRAC2005.SFF

Starting Year : 2006 *Take 19 yrs to break even*
 Final Year : 2008
 Payback Year : 2027 (19 Years) *20 M*
 NPV in 2025(\$K): 19,347
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 300,155

w/Personal:
 ○ One time Cost ⇒ \$299.1M
 ○ Net Savings (Cost) during implementation ⇒ \$316.4M
 ○ Annual Recovery Savings ⇒ \$16.3M
 ○ NPV over 20 yrs ⇒ \$1.853.3M
 ○ Payback 1 yr

Net Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
MilCon	15,338	170,425	0	0	0	0	185,763	0
Person	0	0	27,490	24,130	24,130	24,130	99,881	24,130
Overhd	-9,837	-8,295	-28,223	-29,373	-26,664	-48,281	-150,674	-50,439
Moving	0	1,251	35,686	172	0	0	37,109	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1,774	24,082	6,282	8,013	6,302	6,302	52,755	6,302
TOTAL	7,275	187,463	41,236	2,942	3,768	-17,849	224,834	-20,007
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	
POSITIONS ELIMINATED								
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ	0	0	341	0	0	0	341	
TOT	0	0	341	0	0	0	341	
POSITIONS REALIGNED								
Off	0	0	599	0	0	0	599	
Enl	0	0	4,367	0	0	0	4,367	
Stu	0	0	7	0	0	0	7	
Civ	0	0	150	0	0	0	150	
TOT	0	0	5,123	0	0	0	5,123	

*w/o Personal Savings
 Take 19 yrs to break even (or cost up to 19 yrs - Payback then @ 19.3 Annual Savings ⇒ 20 M*

Summary:

Close Ellsworth AFB. The 28th Bomb Wing's 24 B-1B aircraft are distributed to the 7th Bomb Wing, Dyess AFB, Texas. The 317th Airlift Group at Dyess assigned C-130 aircraft are distributed to the 176 Wing (ANG), Elmendorf AFB, Alaska (4 PAA); 302d Airlift Wing (AFRC), Peterson AFB, Colorado (4 PAA); and the 314th Airlift Wing (22 PAA) and the 189th Airlift Wing (ANG) (2 PAA), Little Rock AFB, Arkansas. Peterson, will have C-130 active duty/ARC associations at a 50/50 force mix. Elmendorf will have C-130 association mix of 8 PAA/4 PAA (ANG/AD).

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : C:\Documents and Settings\gingrick\My Documents\MilPers Runs\109 - Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD and
 Dyess Air Force Base, TX\COBRA USAF 0018V3 (200.3).CBR
 Option Pkg Name: USAF 0018V3 (200.3) Close Ellsworth
 Std Fctrs File : C:\Documents and Settings\gingrick\My Documents\COBRA 6.10 April 21 2005\BRAC2005.SFF

Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
MilCon	15,338	170,425	0	0	0	0	185,763	0
Person	0	0	44,364	52,342	52,342	52,342	201,389	52,342
Overhd	4,658	6,200	19,032	17,881	29,310	16,412	93,494	16,412
Moving	0	1,251	45,175	172	0	0	46,598	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1,774	24,082	6,282	8,013	6,302	6,302	52,755	6,302
TOTAL	21,770	201,958	114,854	78,408	87,954	75,056	580,000	75,056

Savings in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	16,874	28,211	28,211	28,211	101,509	28,211
Overhd	14,495	14,495	47,255	47,255	55,974	64,694	244,168	66,852
Moving	0	0	9,489	0	0	0	9,489	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	14,495	14,495	73,618	75,466	84,186	92,905	355,166	95,063

Cost w/ Consolidate

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : N:\IEB Files\IEBB\COBRA Team\USAF 0018V3 (200.3)\USAF 0018V3 (200.3).CBR
 Option Pkg Name: USAF 0018V3 (200.3) Close Ellsworth
 Std Fctrs File : N:\IEB Files\IEBB\COBRA Team\COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

Starting Year : 2006
 Final Year : 2008
 Payback Year : 2009 (1 Year)

NPV in 2025(\$K): -1,853,279
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 299,126

Net Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
MilCon	15,338	170,425	0	0	0	0	185,763	0
Person	0	0	-54,801	-130,269	-130,269	-130,269	-445,609	-130,269
Overhd	-9,836	-8,294	-32,909	-34,060	-22,631	-35,529	-143,260	-37,687
Moving	0	1,251	30,866	172	0	0	32,289	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1,774	24,082	6,750	8,417	6,706	6,706	54,435	6,706
TOTAL	7,276	187,463	-50,094	-155,740	-146,195	-159,093	-316,382	-161,251

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	137	0	0	0	137
Enl	0	0	1,383	0	0	0	1,383
Civ	0	0	341	0	0	0	341
TOT	0	0	1,861	0	0	0	1,861
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	462	0	0	0	462
Enl	0	0	2,946	0	0	0	2,946
Stu	0	0	7	0	0	0	7
Civ	0	0	189	0	0	0	189
TOT	0	0	3,604	0	0	0	3,604

Summary:

Close Ellsworth AFB. The 28th Bomb Wing's 24 B-1B aircraft are distributed to the 7th Bomb Wing, Dyess AFB, Texas. The 317th Airlift Group at Dyess assigned C-130 aircraft are distributed to the 176 Wing (ANG), Elmendorf AFB, Alaska (4 PAA); 302d Airlift Wing (AFRC), Peterson AFB, Colorado (4 PAA); and the 314th Airlift Wing (22 PAA) and the 189th Airlift Wing (ANG) (2 PAA), Little Rock AFB, Arkansas. Peterson, will have C-130 active duty/ARC associations at a 50/50 force mix. Elmendorf will have C-130 association mix of 8 PAA/4 PAA (ANG/AD).

Positions Eliminated:
 Military: 1520
 Civilian: 341
 1861

Cost w/all B1 & C130 @ Dyess

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : A:\USAF 0018V3 (200.3) Ellsworth DBCRC Site Survey.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: USAF 0018V3 (200.3) Close Ellsworth DBCRC Site Survey
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA 6.10\BRAC2005.SFF

Starting Year : 2006
 Final Year : 2009
 Payback Year : 2010 (1 Year)

NPV in 2025(\$K): -2,089,842
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 366,916

Net Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
MilCon	20,565	228,502	0	0	0	0	249,067	0
Person	0	0	-54,726	-137,808	-137,808	-137,808	-468,150	-137,808
Overhd	-11,011	-7,559	-13,701	-32,519	-54,504	-54,504	-173,797	-56,662
Moving	0	8,552	21,692	0	0	0	30,244	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1,915	36,212	10,269	8,737	7,560	6,190	70,884	6,190
TOTAL	11,468	265,707	-36,465	-161,590	-184,751	-186,121	-291,752	-188,279

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	115	0	0	0	115
Enl	0	0	1,275	0	0	0	1,275
Civ	0	0	309	0	0	0	309
TOT	0	0	1,699	0	0	0	1,699

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	214	0	0	0	214
Enl	0	0	1,704	0	0	0	1,704
Stu	0	0	7	0	0	0	7
Civ	0	0	129	0	0	0	129
TOT	0	0	2,054	0	0	0	2,054

Summary:

 Per DBCRC request _____

Close Ellsworth AFB. The 28th Bomb Wing's 24 B-1B aircraft are distributed to the 7th Bomb Wing, Dyess AFB, Texas. (Dyess C-130 aircraft stay in place.)

ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE, SD AND DYESS AIR FORCE BASE, TX

Air Force - 43

ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE, SD

CLOSE

Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
(3,315)	(438)	0	0	(3,315)	(438)	(99)	(3,852)

DYESS AIR FORCE BASE, TX

REALIGN

Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
(1,615)	(65)	1,925	129	310	64	0	374

Recommendation: Close Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD. The 24 B-1 aircraft assigned to the 28th Bomb Wing will be distributed to the 7th Bomb Wing, Dyess Air Force Base, TX.

Recommendation: Realign Dyess Air Force Base, TX. The C-130 aircraft assigned to the 317th Airlift Group will be distributed to the active duty 314th Airlift Wing (22 aircraft) and Air National Guard 189th Airlift Wing (two aircraft), Little Rock Air Force Base, AR; the 176th Wing (ANG), Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK (four aircraft); and the 302d Airlift Wing (AFR), Peterson Air Force Base, CO (four aircraft). Peterson Air Force Base will have an active duty/Air Force Reserve association in the C-130 mission. Elmendorf Air Force Base will have an active duty/Air National Guard association in the C-130 mission.

of all but 3 of the 42 Air Force recommendations that were combined¹¹ affects the Air Force Reserve Command or Air National Guard.

Based on our analysis we noted that the majority of the net annual recurring savings (60 percent) are cost avoidances from military personnel eliminations. However, eliminations are not expected to result in reductions to active duty, Air Reserve and Air National Guard end strengths, limiting savings available for other purposes.

None of the recommendations included in the Air Force's report involve consolidation or integration of activities or functions with those of another military service.¹² However, the Air Force believes that its recommendations to realign Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, and Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, and to move A-10 aircraft to Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, will provide an opportunity for joint close air support training with Army units stationed at Forts Benning and Stewart, Georgia. Furthermore, the Air Force's recommendations support transformation efforts by optimizing (increasing) squadron size for most fighter and mobility aircraft.¹³ According to the Air Force BRAC report, the recommendations maximize warfighting capability by fundamentally reshaping the service, effectively consolidating older weapons systems into fewer but larger squadrons, thus reducing excess infrastructure and improving the operational effectiveness of major weapons systems. We have previously reported that the Air Force's could not only reduce

¹¹ The three recommendations that do not affect the reserve component include the closure of Onizuka Air Force Station, California; the realignment of Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; and the Air Force logistics support centers recommendation.

¹² Joint cross-service groups and other service recommendations do, however, allow for increased jointness with the Air Force. For example, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, will host Joint Strike Fighter pilot training and will also host the Army's Seventh Special Forces Group in conjunction with Education and Training Joint-Cross Service Group and Army recommendations, creating substantial joint training opportunities. Additionally, the Air Force enables Army closures and realignments by turning over property ownership of Pope Air Force Base to the Army, though an active/Air Reserve unit will permanently be based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to assist with the aerial port and tactical airlift capabilities needed by the Army's Airborne Corps.

¹³ Based on senior military judgment reflected in the *Expeditionary Air Force Principles White Paper*, fighter squadrons will be optimally sized to 24 aircraft per squadron, and 18 is the acceptable size per squadron for stand-alone reserve installations. Sixteen is the optimum size for C-130s (airlift aircraft) and KC-135s (tanker refueling aircraft), and 12 is the acceptable size for stand-alone reserve installations.

infrastructure by increasing the number of aircraft per fighter squadron but could also save millions of dollars annually.¹⁴

Issues Identified with Approved Recommendations

Time did not permit us to assess the operational impact of each recommendation, particularly where recommendations involve multiple locations. Nonetheless, we offer a number of broad-based observations about the proposed recommendations and selected observations on some individual recommendations. Our analysis of the Air Force recommendations identified some issues that the BRAC Commission may wish to consider, such as the projected savings from military personnel reductions; impact on the Air National Guard, impact on other federal agencies; and other issues related to the realignments of Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina; Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska; and Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota and the closure of Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota.

Military Personnel Savings

Our analysis showed that about \$732 million, or about 60 percent, of the projected \$1.2 billion net annual recurring savings are based on savings from eliminating military personnel positions. Initially, the Air Force counted only military personnel savings that resulted in a decrease in end strength. However, at the direction of OSD, the Air Force included savings for all military personnel positions that were made available through realignment or closure recommendations. The Air Force was unable to provide us documentation showing at the present time to what extent each of these positions will be required to support future missions. According to Air Force officials, they envision that most active slots will be needed for formal training, and all the Air Reserve and Air National Guard personnel will be assigned to stressed career fields and emerging missions. Furthermore, Air Force officials said that positions will also be reviewed during the Quadrennial Defense Review, which could decrease end strength. Either way, claiming such personnel as BRAC savings without reducing end strength does not provide dollar savings that can be reapplied outside personnel accounts and could result in the Air Force having to find other sources of funding for up-front investment costs needed to implement its BRAC recommendations.

¹⁴ GAO, *Air Force Aircraft: Consolidating Fighter Squadrons Could Reduce Costs*, GAO/NSIAD-96-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 1996).

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0259 (CT-0979) Metrics and Data on Dyess and Little Rock

Requester: Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (Ken Small)

Request: Request feedback on the following

Question 1A: What metrics and costs factors did the Air Force use to determine the "operational and logistical efficiencies" in consolidating the B1 fleet at Dyess?

Response 1A: A key Air Force goal is to consolidate like-model aircraft at installations to realize increased "operational and logistical efficiencies." This is in keeping with the GAO's May 1996 report "Consolidating Fighter Squadrons Could Save Costs" which recommended squadron sizes of 24 PAA.

Efficiencies are gained primarily through a reduction in military personnel requirements--wing headquarters command, staff, administrative and maintenance overhead. Larger squadrons allow operational squadrons and maintenance specialty shops to more efficiently utilize manpower, requiring little or no change in production manning while reducing duplicative overhead. Other savings occur due to reduced training, medical services, supplies, and base operating support.

As regards manpower, operations and maintenance manpower will transfer to Dyess AFB with the aircraft and are separate from the base operating support (BOS). The manpower savings (1,699 positions) are derived from the BOS reduction from closing Ellsworth AFB. They are not required at Dyess and are therefore available to support new or stressed missions elsewhere.

The AF did not claim specific, non-manpower logistics efficiencies in the Dyess COBRA analysis due to difficulties quantifying those savings. Potential logistics efficiencies include reduction in spares and support equipment, more economic ordering of spares, and increased transportation and handling efficiency with a reduced number of sites supporting B-1 aircraft.

In the case of the B-1, it was operationally acceptable to consolidate the fleet at a single installation. This consolidation permits the Air Force to realize savings by reducing infrastructure with an installation closure.

Question 1B: And moving all Active Duty C-130s to Little Rock AFB?

Response 1B: The decision to consolidate Active Duty C-130s at Little Rock was based on realizing efficiencies through consolidation. As with B-1s at Dyess, the AF did not claim specific, non-manpower, logistics efficiencies in the Little Rock COBRA analysis due to difficulties quantifying those savings. Potential logistics efficiencies include reduction in spares and support equipment, more economic ordering of spares, and increased transportation and handling efficiency as the number of sites supporting C-130 aircraft are reduced.

Additionally, aircraft movements to Little Rock AFB from other locations permitted other planned aircraft movements, such as the consolidation of the B-1 fleet at Dyess AFB.

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0259 (CT-0979) Metrics and Data on Dyess and Little Rock

Question 2: It's our understanding that Dyess AFB sends significant portions of its avionics assets to Georgia ANG for repairs. If the B-1s are consolidated at Dyess, would this process continue?

Response 2: The B-1 maintenance equipment at Ellsworth AFB is projected to move to Dyess AFB as part of the unit relocation and installation closure. How the major command employs the equipment relocated from Ellsworth AFB, and the extent of the B-1 fleet's continued reliance on Air National Guard repair facilities at Robins AFB, Georgia, will be determined by the command during the site survey process.

Question 3: Under the Air Force recommendation to consolidate B-1s at Dyess, DOD COBRA data shows 3,746 positions being eliminated from Ellsworth. 1,918 of those positions are transferred to Dyess, for a net savings of 1,699 positions. How did the Air Force determine if the 1,918 positions moving from Ellsworth to Dyess is the right requirement and right amount?

Response 3: COBRA data for closure of Ellsworth shows 3,746 positions being eliminated from Ellsworth AFB. Of these positions, 2,054 are transferred to Dyess and 1,699 are saved. The 1,699 "saved" positions are those providing base operating support, headquarters staff, and other personnel to operate Ellsworth AFB. These positions are not required at Dyess and are therefore available to support new missions. To determine the number of positions moved from Ellsworth to Dyess in support of the B-1s, the following steps were followed:

- a. Within the unit manning document (UMD) at Ellsworth, all B-1 operations, maintenance, and direct support (i.e. some security and supply) positions were transferred to Dyess. The amount of manpower assigned for mission requirements is based on the number of PAA. With the movement of all the B-1s from Ellsworth to Dyess, all of the manpower positions follow to support the growth in PAA at Dyess, totalling 1,862 positions.
- b. In accordance with AFI 38-204, "Determining Manpower Requirements," the standard base operating support (BOS) factor of 8% was applied to the mission total for a resulting support tail of 149 positions.
- c. An additional 43 positions assigned to non-AF DoD tenant organizations are also moved to Dyess.

Question 4: What is the estimated portion of Little Rock's C-130 MILCON to beddown the 24 C-130s from Dyess at Little Rock?

Response 4: The estimated portion of the Little Rock MILCON to beddown Dyess AFB C-130s is \$76.996M. In addition to this amount, a total of \$24.455M in One-Time Unique Costs are required to cover infrastructure upgrades, military family housing privatization, furnishings,

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SER 35

23 Aug 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0259 (CT-0979) Metrics and Data on Dyess and Little Rock

equipment and an allowance for current bid climate cost differences. One-Time information technology costs of \$4.021M were also identified.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

15 August 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0209-CT-0849, Questions on Little Rock AFB Capacity

Requester: Mr. Ken Small (BRAC Commission Staff)

Question preamble: DOD recommends transferring Dyess' C-130s to Little Rock, Elmendorf and Peterson. The justification for this is outlined in BRAC Recommendations 47 "to create an efficient, single-mission operation at Dyess, the Air Force realigned the tenant C-130s to other Air Force installations." The majority of the C-130s at Dyess go to Little Rock, where the Air Force plans to consolidate all active duty CONUS C-130s (about 118 C-130s). Given this recommendation we request feedback on the following questions:

Question 1: Does the Air Force expect to achieve operational efficiencies (i.e. aircraft availability) by placing all active duty CONUS C-130s at Little Rock? If so, how?

Answer 1: Yes, the Air Force expects to achieve operational efficiencies by placing all active duty C-130s at Little Rock. We expect increased effectiveness through economies of scale, increased flexibility in scheduling aircraft and crews, and decreased loss of aircrew availability during PCS and TDY to the FTU for formal upgrade training.

Question 2: How does the Air Force expect to obtain logistical efficiencies with a C-130 fleet that is not homogenous? As we understand it, the C-130 fleet at Little Rock under this recommendation will be mixed, consisting of C-130Es, C-130Hs, C-130H1, C-130H3, and the new C-130J? If efficiencies are achieved in what areas?

Answer 2: With nine different C-130 variants across three basic models, the aircraft currently assigned to Little Rock AFB already include multiple models and variants. The Air Force recognizes the operational and dollar cost of operating an airlift fleet with such a diverse collection of aircraft. This presents a daily challenge regardless of where the aircraft are based. The Air Force makes every attempt to assign identical series aircraft in reserve component units. However, bases with larger populations of aircraft include a larger collection of variants. The Air Force BRAC report specifically states that the Air Force expects MAJCOMs to manage their fleets appropriately. In the context of the C-130 fleet, this means arranging model variants to the best operational advantage.

In the case of Little Rock, the Air Force does not incur an operational or dollar cost penalty by bringing more model variants onto its largest C-130 base. In fact, by doing so, the Air Force develops a strategic position that allows for improved efficiency and logistical savings in the future, especially when model and variant commonality among the C-130 fleet is improved (See below).

It should be noted there is some logistic support commonality among all of the C-130 aircraft and differences between some of the model variants are relatively small. More importantly, the Air Force has a program in place to improve fleet commonality. The C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) is the farthest reaching of Air Force efforts to standardize DoD C-130 aircraft. AMP is a cockpit modernization program that replaces aging, unreliable equipment and will result in an identical cockpit configuration across the mobility, SOF-CSAR, and USN C-130 fleets.

Question 3: Does the Air Force have empirical information that shows improvements to key indicators like Mission Capable rates resulting from the consolidation of the C-130 fleet at Little Rock?

Answer 3: No. The Air Force has not accomplished any similar consolidation that could be used to provide empirical data.

Question 4: Given the fact that a certified capacity wasn't completed at Little Rock, it's unclear that Little Rock has sufficient capability to receive such a large fleet of C-130s. Please provide the Commission information that shows that sufficient capacity exists at Little Rock. Of particular note is data:

A. That shows Little Rock has sufficient ramp space, aircraft hangers, maintenance facilities.

B. The number of runways and dimensions, number of drop zones, number of assault strips.

Answer 4a: The capacity data provided by MAJCOMs used parking spaces as the initial, primary indicator for current capacity, then a MILCON cost to build facilities to accept more aircraft in increments of optimum squadron size. Unfortunately, with multiple MAJCOMs involved at Little Rock, a comprehensive capacity view did not occur.

Realizing the deficiency in capacity data for Little Rock, SAF/IEB queried AMC as to the number of C-130s that can be parked on the current ramp at Little Rock. An AMC representative replied on 14 January 2005 that 130 C-130s could be parked at Little Rock using a workable parking plan.

Cost analysis of recommendations that include movements of C-130s to Little Rock included costs required to build hangars, maintenance and support facilities required for gained aircraft. The cost estimates (provided by MAJCOMs in their capacity briefs) to accept additional aircraft were not used in recommendation cost analysis provided to the BRAC Commission.

Answer 4b: Little Rock AFB has a single main runway, 12,000 feet long, 200 feet wide, with 1000 feet long overruns at each end. The airfield also has an assault strip parallel and in close proximity to the main runway. The assault strip is paved and is 3,500 feet long and 60 feet wide with no overruns.

Installations were evaluated based on their proximity to tactical landing zones and drop zones, not only zones that reside on the specific installation. For instance, we know that C-130 units at Little Rock extensively use the drop zones known as "Black Jack" and "All American." These

drop zones are close to Little Rock AFB, but are not part of the Little Rock AFB installation. Therefore, to gain complete awareness of drop zones and landing zones that might be available to aircraft based at Little Rock, please refer to the WIDGET data concerning drop zones and landing zones.

Question 5: Please provide by C-130 model type the breakout of the fleet that will be garrison at Little Rock if this recommendation is approved.

Answer 5: The proposed BRAC end state for Little Rock AFB is the result of seven different Air Force BRAC recommendations. Based on the recommendations submitted to the BRAC Commission and the C-130 fleet breakdown used in development of those recommendations Little Rock AFB would be assigned these aircraft:

C-130E	46
C-130H	66
C-130J	4

116

Subsequently, the C-130J buy numbers have changed. We estimate this would result in this revised set of aircraft assigned at Little Rock AFB. This will include FTU and operational assigned aircraft:

C-130E	33
C-130H	65
C-130J	18

116

Question 6: Why not just keep the C-130s at Dyess along with the consolidation of the B-1s? Dyess has sufficient capability to absorb this mission. It would be more cost effective (ref BCEG minutes dates 14 Aug 2004) to do this than transfer the C-130s to other installations.

Answer 6: The BCEG decided it was in the interest of operations efficiency and safety not collocate aircraft with dissimilar operating characteristics and dissimilar missions at the same base (to the extent practical). Contributing to this military judgment decision is the 1994 incident 1994 where 24 U.S. Army soldiers were killed and more than 100 others injured following a mid-air collision of dissimilar aircraft at Pope Air Force Base. The collision occurred between a C-130 and an F-16, both based at Pope.

There are exceptions to this concept and in those cases where the Air Force has dissimilar aircraft based together it is due to operational interdependency between aircraft (Hurlburt) or geographic restrictions (Elmendorf). Adjusting local procedures, generally to the detriment of local operational effectiveness, mitigates risks associated with dissimilar operations.

Attached is a cost analysis of basing the additional B-1s, the existing B-1s and C-130 aircraft Dyess.

24
Our records show the BCEG did not meet on 24 Aug 2004 and we were unable to identify a BCEG meeting during that month or minutes that were date stamped in that month, that were germane to this question. Please provide more information regarding the response so we may properly respond to your inquiry.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

12 Aug 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0208, CT-0844, B-1s Flying Hours and AEF Cycle

Requester: BRAC Commission (Art Beauchamp, Air Force Analyst)

Request: Request information on the following:

Question 1: What is the B-1 cost per flying hour at Ellsworth and Dyess?

Response: See attachment for B-1 flying hour costs. We provided the information requested, however, flying hour costs are unique to an installation and comparing Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH) at face value is misleading (see attachment). Variables cause variations in the costs incurred, such as: missions they support, support equipment conditions, experience of maintenance personnel, number of deployments and contingency hours flown. No two wings are alike even if they fly the same airframe.

Accounting procedures can affect the CPFH at different wings. For example, home station fuel costs reflect deployed aircraft costs while spare costs are captured in a separate contingency account. A centralized repair facility supports all B-1 engines and this cost is also separate since it cannot be tied directly to any one base (Dyess, Ellsworth, or contingency locations).

We caution against simple head-to-head flying hour cost comparisons as incorrect conclusions may be drawn if extenuating circumstances are not known or understood fully.

Question 2: Does the Air Force expect to reduce the B-1 cost per flying hours if the B-1s are consolidated at Dyess? If yes, what is the estimated savings and in what areas do the savings occur?

Response: The Air Force did not conduct flying hour cost reduction analysis. BRAC savings do not reflect expected operational and logistical savings in the way your question implies. Instead, applicable savings come from infrastructure reductions (manpower, BOS, etc.) due to realignment and closure. These requirements are determined not by the hours flown, but the infrastructure needed to support the overall mission.

Question 3: The AF recommendation to consolidate the B-1s at Dyess shows a manpower reduction in personnel. Per certified COBRA data, 3,308 military and 438 civilians will move from Ellsworth and only 1,918 military and 129 civilians are gained by Dyess. This is a substantial reduction of 1,390 and 309 civilian personnel supporting. What is the expected impacted on the ops tempo for B-1 maintenance personnel and other B1 support personnel due to this consolidation? Will they support more AEF rotations (i.e. will the number of their deployments increase)?

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Re: BI-0208, CT-0844, B-1s Flying Hours and AEF Cycle

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Response: Consolidating forces and logistics reduces organizational overhead and creates efficiency of operations. Ops tempo will be dependent upon scheduling and phasing of maintenance/flying activities to support mission requirements.

Question 4: Closing one of only five bomber bases (i.e. Dyess, Barksdale, Minot, Ellsworth, Whiteman) implies that the AEF rotation cycle for bomber bases will increase. Will it? If yes, to what degree?

Response: Because the number of B-1 units remains constant and the number of operational UTCs supporting the AEF does not change, the Air Force does not expect the AEF rotation cycle for bomber units to change.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

Attachment:
As stated

Attachment:

During a review of the FY06 ACC Flying Hour Program, questions were raised about the difference in Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH) rates on B-1 aircraft at Dyess (7 BW) and Ellsworth (28 BW). The chart below is based on data as of 30 June 05. The CPFH rate is separated into three sections: Aviation Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (AVPOL), Materiel Support Division (MSD)/Depot Level Repairables (DLRs), and Consumables. The following chart breaks down the 7 BW and 28 BW variances:

	Dyess/7 BW	Ellsworth/28 BW
AVPOL (Note 1)	12,091.30	8,990.60
MSD/DLRs (Note 2)	17,004.70	12,537.60
Consumables	<u>2,423.90</u>	<u>2,045.80</u>
Actual CPFH Total	31,519.90	23,574.00

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Note 1: The primary driver for the AVPOL variance is the result of accounting procedures established to record and track fuel costs. Each individual aircraft carries a fuel credit card and all expenses accrued against that card, regardless of where the fuel is purchased, are recorded at the aircraft's home station. Even though the 7 BW flew 5,614 contingency hours versus 2,700 hours flown by the 28 BW, these hours are not factored into the CPFH equation for computing fuel costs. The 7 BW recorded ~\$55.4M in fuel expenditures divided by 4,578 home station hours flown for a CPFH rate \$12,091 per hour compared to the 28 BW fuel expenditures of ~\$38.9M divided by 4,330 home station hours flown for a CPFH rate of \$8,891 per hour.

Note 2: There are three primary reasons for the MSD/DLRs variance. 1) Dyess spent \$2M to pay for parts to repair a fire damaged aircraft. 2) Ellsworth repairs all of its LRUs locally, where as Dyess sends many avionics assets to the Georgia ANG for repairs. Each wing has one string of AIS test equipment. Dyess' one set cannot absorb the additional LRUs driven by their more robust mission (more aircraft, more hours flown, WIC support, and Test support and more contingency hours). 3) Dyess flew more contingency hours resulting in more phase inspections at home station, which is paid for by home station. These factors ultimately contribute to the \$4.5K CPFH delta.

Closed

27 June 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0097 (CT-0411)
Threat Assessment for B-1 Bombers at Dyess AFB, TX

Requesters: BRAC Commission (Ken Small, Air Force Team Leader; Art Beauchamp, POC)

Request: Mr Ken Small states that as part of its BRAC recommendations, the Secretary of Defense has recommended to close Ellsworth AFB, SD and move all B-1 Bombers assigned at Ellsworth AFB to Dyess AFB, TX. Will consolidate all Air Force B-1 Bombers at Dyess AFB, TX.

Given this recommendation, the BRAC Commission requests a Threat Assessment completed on this action. Specifically, "what is the vulnerability to national security and operational risk of placing all B1 Bombers in the Air Force at one location." The response should also address any threat mitigation actions.

Response: : Upon evaluation of legacy systems and the B-1's evolved conventional mission, consolidation can occur with no more risk than was accepted for other aircraft at locations like Whiteman AFB, MO, for B-2s, Beale AFB, CA, for U-2s, Holloman AFB, NM, for F-117s, and Robbins AFB, GA, for E-8 JOINT STARS, etc. The Air Force bases single airframe fleets at single bases in order to gain efficiencies from consolidated logistics, manpower and other cost saving factors.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

Re: BI-0212 (CT-0874) Dyess Airspace

Question 2: Can the Air Force duplicate the capability provided by the RBTI at other MOA/IR within 300 NM from Dyess?

Response: No, RBTI is a unique capability. The same capability could be replicated elsewhere, but the same NEPA process must be applied if a major change to military operations is proposed in the United States. The RBTI EIS was deemed acceptable for the proposed actions in all aspects, except for the lack of sufficient analysis of the effect of wing tip vortices and a single administrative issue. These two issues are not location specific to the "IR-178/Lancer Option" chosen in the EIS. Therefore, another location would not provide any relief from the requirement for a supplemental EIS.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

15 July 2005

Inquiry Response**Re:** BI-0134 (CT-0547) Ellsworth AFB**Requester:** Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission (Mr Arthur Beauchamp)

Question 1: During the recent BRAC Commissioners visit to Ellsworth AFB, SD, it was discovered that the Air Force underestimated the square footage capability at Ellsworth by 80,000 sq feet. Please validate this?

Response: We are unable to address the underestimated square footage capability at Ellsworth because it is not qualified as to type of square footage. If the square footage of the installation is incorrect by 80,000 square feet, it was an installation reporting error. However, even without the error, it would not change the relative MCI ranking of Ellsworth AFB.

Question 2: Assuming that the square footage was underestimated, what is the impact, if any, on the MCI scoring for Ellsworth given this added capacity? Does it improve? If so, by how many points?

Response: A review of Mission Compatibility Indexes (MCIs) shows Ellsworth AFB received maximum credit for the following attributes that involve square footage/yardage: runways (Question 9), and ramp area and serviceability (Question 8). The square footage reflected by Ellsworth's ability to hangar large aircraft (Question 19) resulted in an installation effective score of 1.46, 1.45 points less than the 2.91 maximum effective score. If the installation had scored the maximum points for the ability to hangar large aircraft, the difference in bomber MCI scores between Ellsworth (48.55) and Dyess (59.85) would be reduced from 11.35 points to 9.90 points. An increase in square footage, therefore, would not result in a revised recommendation to the Commission.

Question 3: In discussion with Ellsworth personnel and the Ellsworth community, as well as our own analysis we determined that Ellsworth AFB has the basic capacity to beddown all 67 B-1 Bombers in the Air Force fleet with a MILCON investment of about \$69M. While the MILCON cost to prepare Dyess to receive the consolidated B-1 Fleet is \$124M. Can you also confirm this? If so, why not consolidate the B-1 fleet at Ellsworth given this cost savings?

Response: Air Combat Command presented its capacity brief to the BCEG the week of 24 August 04. The \$66.7M was the cost briefed to the BCEG to prepare Ellsworth to receive 2 additional squadrons of B-1s. Ellsworth was presented as capable of receiving 71 B-1s, but as the ramp laydown presented to the Commission clearly shows, the parking density would be extremely problematic. Hangar access and taxiways are blocked. All available ramp space, regardless of location, is completely full making airfield management difficult. No mention is made as to whether the parking plan presented to the Commission conforms to ACC standards for clearance and jet blast considerations.

Dyess AFB, by comparison, was briefed as able to support 66 aircraft without moving the 28 currently assigned C-130s from the field. COBRA estimated \$124M to move 2 B-1 squadrons to Dyess, and that was the figure on which the BCEG based its recommendation. ACC concluded

15 July 2005

Inquiry Response**Re: B1-0134 (CT-0547) Ellsworth AFB**

its site survey of Dyess AFB, 24 June 2005, and estimated \$159M to implement the Air Force recommendation.

Bomber MCI scores clearly indicate Dyess is the best B-1 bomber installation. Dyess has FAA approved training airspace volume 2.3 times that available at Ellsworth AFB giving it a 4.36 effective score advantage. It has superb low level access giving it a 9.10 point lead in the bomber MCI over Ellsworth. The range complex within 300NM also gave Dyess a 3.12 point advantage. Attached are two graphics that depict the airspace for both Ellsworth AFB and Dyess AFB for comparison. This operational environment would be complex and difficult to replicate at other locations and is geographically connected to the installation.

The costs briefed by ACC in its capacity brief for both Ellsworth AFB and Dyess AFB cannot be equivalently compared. The cost estimate for adding two squadrons to Ellsworth AFB does not include the significant base operations support bill or infrastructure build that would be required to host the added aircraft or manpower for a mission increase. The Ellsworth AFB ramp laydown presented to the Commission further confirms the difficulty of basing the entire B-1 fleet at Ellsworth. On the other hand, the 29 June 2005 ACC site survey of Dyess AFB reports the entire B-1 fleet can be comfortably bedded down with room to spare. The Dyess AFB COBRA estimate and subsequent ACC site survey provide the accuracy needed to confidently support the DoD beddown recommendation.

Ultimately, military judgment led the BCEG to weigh the operational advantage of keeping Dyess AFB as the premier B-1 installation against cost and concluded the Dyess AFB airspace and training environment is well worth the investment to train and employ the B-1 fleet.

Approved.



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Executive Officer, Base Realignment and Closure


2 Attachments:

1. Ellsworth - Airspace within 300NM
2. Dyess - Airspace within 300NM

DON 4943



300M Distance
Instrument Route
Special Use Airspace
Air-to-Ground Ranges



57

17 Aug 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: Mr. Arthur Beauchamp Questions to LtCol Roland D Fenton, 7 BW/XP, Dyess AFB

Requester: BRAC Commission

Question 1: What is the total cost per flying hour budget for Dyess for 2005? If no 2005, 2004 data is fine.

Answer: 26,649 (per hour for B-1s only, does not include the C-130s).

Question 2: What is the cost per flying hr per B-1 at Dyess in FY05 (if no FY05, use FY04)?

Answer: 26,855 (per hour, actual flying hour cost for B-1s in FY05).

Question 3A: What are the number of transit hours to get to RBTI?

Answer: Lancer MOA is approximately 28 nms; 4-5 minutes from Dyess to Lancer MOA. IR-178 entry is just under 300 nms and is approximately 45 minutes away; the IR-178M exit is 170 nms from Dyess and takes approximately 24-25 minutes.

Question 3B: Given the total number of training sorties in FY05 at Dyess what is the utilization rate of the RBTI?

Answer: 310 of 533 total FY05 training sorties were flown in the component parts of the RBTI, for a utilization rate of 58%.

Question 4: What is the utilization for all major training airspaces used by Dyess other than the RBTI.

Answer: Bison/Smokey: 51 sorties - 10%
Mt Dora: 42 sorties - 8%
UTTR: 28 Sorties - 5%
IR 126: 22 sorties - 4%
WSMR: 13 sorties - 2%
Warrior MOA: 11 sorties - 2%
Melrose/Gecco: 11 sorties - 2%
Brownwood: 10 sorties - 2%
Pyote: 8 sorties - 1%
Yuma: 7 Sorties - 1%
Mt Home Range: 5 sorties - 1%


Chocolate Mountain: 4 sorties 1%
W-157/158: 3 sorties - 1%
Fallon: 2 sorties - 0.5%
W-122: 2 sorties - 0.5%
Eureka MOA: 2 sorties - 0.5%
NTTR: 2 sorties - 0.5%

Question 5: What is (are) the primary weapons release range used by Dyess crews?

Answer: 65% of weapons releases are accomplished at the Smoky Range, with 25% at the Utah Test & Training Range, and the remaining 10% at Chocolate Mountain, Fallon, Patuxent River, and Saylor Creek.

Note: Recommend that this data not be used as the basis for BRAC decisions. It is **not certified data** and the accuracy cannot be verified. In addition, the operational and maintenance data are management related and should not be used. Many of the factors that effect this data are transitory in nature (spares, manning, aircraft age, weather) and do not reflect the military value of the installation.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0180 (CT-0752) DYESS AFB and RBTI Litigation - Follow-up Questions

Requester: BRAC Commission (Arthur Beauchamp)

Reference: BI-0135 (CT-0551) Dyess AFB and RBTI Litigation, 19 July 2005

Commission Provided Background: To help us better understand the scoring method for instrument routes and airspace training ranges please provide clarification to the Air Force's statement below:

"Installations were not scored on the altitude restrictions of instrument routes. The scoring methodology only considered the relative distance of entry and exit points to the subject installations. The greater the number of routes an installation had available within the prescribed distance of 300 nautical miles for the Bomber MCI, the better the installation's MCI score."

Questions:

Question 1: Based on our reading of the above statement there was no consideration given to the quality of instrument routes (IR) [and special use airspace and training ranges]. The score was based on the proximity and number of instrument routes [and special use airspace and training ranges] to an installation. Was the quality of an IR [and special use airspace and training ranges] considered? If no, why not?

NOTE: The AF BRAC office called the BRAC Commission Staff, for clarification. The question asks for IR quality but intended to ask about the quality of airspace in general as mentioned in the background above. This is an airspace question, not just an IR question. On 3 Aug 05, members of the AF BRAC Staff went for a face to face meeting on this subject and discussed it for approximately one hour. The answer paraphrases that discussion.

Response 1: Yes. Quality was definitely considered in AF airspace analysis. USAF Ranges and Airspace uses proximity, time (to the airspace), volume and attributes as the qualities applied to airspace. *Proximity*, in and of itself, is very important quality, particularly to slow moving aircraft that take more time in transit or small aircraft with limited range. *Time* is the availability of the airspace. Saturated airspace or airspace restricted by environmental or seasonal restrictions is of less military value. *Volume* does not neatly apply to low level routes because they are long, linear tracks and vary in all aspects from beginning to end, but volume is very important when considering military operating areas, whiskey areas and restricted areas (ranges) that host all training types from small single ship to large force exercises. In general, bigger volume is better because it allows crews to fly at all altitudes and attack targets from multiple directions. Air to air combat is less constrained and more realistic in a larger area. Another very important aspect of airspace is *Attributes*. *Attributes* include threats, over water, lights out, weapons delivery, chaff, flare, supersonic, electronic combat, scoring, terrain, LASER ops, etc. Attributes were collected in WIDGET questions and applied in the MCI formula #1245, *Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission*, by weighting airspace volume (15%), operating hours (15%), scoreable range (10%), air to ground weapons delivery (11.25%), live ordnance (3.75%),

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0180 (CT-0752) DYESS AFB and RBTI Litigation - Follow-up Questions

IMC weapons release (5%), electronic combat (10%), laser use authorized (10%), lights our capable (10%), flares authorized (5%) and chaff authorized (5%). While this formula does not address IR routes it certainly illustrates the vital importance placed on airspace attributes for other types of special use airspace (restricted areas, whiskey areas, military operating areas, ATCAAs, etc.).

The quality of *Quantity* was scored by determining the number of IR entry and exit points. *Quantity* statistically covers the "diversity of terrain" mandated by BRAC Law without creating specific requirements for terrain types. It also allows for greater diversity in training—flying the in the same airspace countless times is less tactically stimulating and challenging. The IR question, and the companion mathematical equation that yielded an MCI score, looked at the number of IR entry and exit points within the prescribed distance from the installation. The distance standard was dependent on the MCI being considered. For the bomber MCI, that distance was 300 NM. The greater the number of instrument routes and the closer the entry and exit points the better the score.

A mathematical model able to account for detailed elements such as altitude blocks, minimum altitudes allowed, terrain types, restrictions to operations, climactic variations and other attributes—all of which can change within an IR route and some which can change day to day within an IR route—was too complex. It is difficult to compare a mountainous route to a route over flat terrain; to compare one that is forested, to one over desert; to compare a single route that went for hundreds of miles, to one that did not; or an instrument route with a narrow corridor to one that offered a wide corridor. One is not necessarily better but variety is definitely better. The BCEG, therefore, agreed that the installation's IR airspace quality is best reflected by the number of opportunities to conduct low-level training within the prescribed distance for the MCI. More instrument route low-level opportunities yielded a better score and is a strong measure of a supportive training environment.

BRAC Law directs the SECDEF to consider [emphasis added]:

" The selection criteria prepared by the Secretary shall ensure that military value is the primary consideration in the making of recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations under this part in 2005" and that Military value must at a minimum preserve **training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces...throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas in the United States....**"

~~The MCIs, by not discriminating against or for one type of terrain, meet the legal requirement for diverse terrain. All types of terrain are important because our enemies reside in all types of places. Tactics and techniques for flat or rolling terrain differ from mountainous terrain. Aircrews need a variety of training for full proficiency in all types of tactical environments.~~

portfolio of Airspace and ranges throughout the Country ensured that we met this requirement.

Military judgment, and a large ~~network~~ ^{comprehension and} of varied.

2 August 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0180 (CT-0752) DYESS AFB and RBTI Litigation - Follow-up Questions

Question 2: Same question but applied to airspace training ranges. In scoring a range did the Air Force factor in the quality or capability of a training range (i.e. operating hours, laser use capability, lights out capable, flares and chaffs capable, etc.,). If no, why not?

Response 2: Yes. Please reference the answer above. In short, the Air Force did factor operating hours, laser use capability, lights out, flares and chaff, etc. into its range scores. The Air Force Volume V, Part II, describes the formula process in detail. The website follows:

Department of the Air Force: Analysis and Recommendations BRAC 2005;
Volume V, Part 2 of 2.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/pdf/VAirForce-o.pdf>

Question 3: Were instrument routes and training ranges not yet FAA approval to operate (still in works), considered in installation's score?

Response 3: The date established for acceptance of information regarding instrument routes and ranges was the same as for all other data reported in WIDGET: 30 Sep 2003. This date was established by the BCEG and provided a consistent, measurable, non-moving standard against which all installations could be fairly and equitably compared.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

22 July 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0145 (CT-0585)

Requester: Art Beauchamp, Senior Analyst BRAC, Air Force Team

Question: One of the key rationales the Air Force has stated for consolidating the B-1 bomber fleet is "achieving operational efficiencies" (ref: AF Analysis and Recommendations Vol V, Page 169").

From a logistics supportability perspective, how will B-1 parts/spares availability rates improve under a consolidation? We request empirical data, or an analysis that shows, or at least estimates the degree to which B-1 spares parts/spares supportability improves under a consolidation.

Answer: The combination of the B-1s at one installation will result in a minimal 1 to 2 percent increase in Mission Capable (MC) rate. The initial savings will be \$700K...\$500K in stock and \$200K in repair avoidance. After the merger of the B-1s, there will also be a one-time savings in the budget computation cycle of \$11.6M...\$9.3M in reduced buy requirements and \$2.3M in repair avoidance. In order to determine the consumable MICAPS avoided, the number of lateral supports shipments of consumable items between the two bases were considered. Each shipment should be satisfying a MICAP condition. If it were assumed that the consumable would have been present at Dyess if the bases were combined, then the MICAP would have been avoided. ACC records indicated that there were 96 shipments of consumable items between the two bases from 1 Jun 04 to 30 Jun 05, which breaks down to 7.4 MICAPs avoided each month. Using the above referenced study, this results in an increase of less than 1% in mission capable aircraft. This figure did not change the overall MC rate. But preventing 7.4 MICAPs a month is a tangible improvement. Three other items not discussed earlier involve test equipment, parts and experienced manpower. The B-1B Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) will be concentrated in one location. This will decrease the number of Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) awaiting maintenance, allow for simultaneous batching on the ATE and place more useful LRUs in the system. Finally, parts will be needed for the same number of aircraft but now they will be concentrated in one place, reducing delivery times and eliminating the need to decide which base gets priority for any given part.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

July 26, 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0156, CT-0646, What Has Changed to Suggest Basing All B-1s at One Base

Requester: BRAC Commission (Kenneth Small, AF Team Leader)

Issue: During the hearing on August [sic] 18, 2005, the Commission asked General Moseley what had changed to cause the Air Force to propose to base all the B-1s at one location. General Moseley responded that the number of B-1s has been reduced from 100 to 67, and, the Air Force had several examples where all the aircraft of a type were in one location, such as the B-2, F-117, J-Stars and several other aircraft types.

Question: Please respond to the following question: What has changed, other than you have fewer aircraft, that leads you to conclude that you can base all the B-1 aircraft at one base with one runway?


Answer: On July 18, 2005 Commissioner Skinner raised concerns about the uniqueness of the B-1s operating at a single-runway base, especially in the event of a catastrophe to the runway or facilities at that one base. In his testimony, Gen Moseley replied to Commission Skinner that bedding down an entire weapons system at one installation would not be inconsistent with how the Air Force bases and operates other unique, low-density weapons systems:

"Sir, addressing the single location, we have our Global Hawks and our U-2s now at only one location. We have J-STARS at one location, Rivet Joint at one location, the F-117s at one location, the B-2s at one location. And so, the notion of going to a single location is not inconsistent with some of our other force structure pieces of inventory that we sit with about 60 or 70 airplanes."

What Commissioner Skinner addressed is not uncommon in today's Air Force given the smaller, diversified force structure; multiple unique, high-value platforms; and the Air Force's historical installation inventory. For example, the B-2 fleet resides at a single-runway base at Whiteman; the U-2/Global Hawk fleet at a single-runway base at Beale; the RC-135/NAOC fleet at a single-runway base at Offutt; and the Joint STARS fleet at a single-runway installation at Robins--all former SAC large aircraft locations. These type of bases had a long, single-runway configuration to disperse, generate and launch a strategic alert force--unlike TAC or ATC bases, which had multiple runways to accommodate concurrent airfield or training events, or whose type of aircraft did not have the range to recover elsewhere. Additionally, all F-117s are located at Holloman and the majority of all special operations aircraft at Hurlburt Field (single runway). All these installations have MDS-unique infrastructure that is difficult to replicate, but this is an operational risk the Air Force has traditionally accepted given the high cost in creating redundant infrastructure elsewhere. This is also a result of the installation inventory today's Air Force has evolved from, to include four previous rounds of base closures. The Air Force uses contingency basing plans in the event of scheduled runway maintenance or natural disaster, such as hurricane evacuation, to ensure portions of its fleet can disperse to, and temporarily operate from, other CONUS locations. The Department's BRAC recommendations can accommodate this type of surge requirement within the remaining Air Force installation inventory.

Bottom Line: The B-1 fleet is now a conventional fleet and force dispersal requirements vis-à-vis its former SIOP mission no longer apply. As Gen Moseley testified, today's B-1 force has 67 aircraft, including combat-coded, training, test, attrition reserve and backup inventory. Having balanced both operational risk and cost, consolidating this conventional fleet of combat-coded and training aircraft at Dyess makes fiscal sense. It will allow the Air Force to maximize effectiveness of its base loading and further leverage common support requirements for its B-1 fleet, not unlike the operational risk it assumes for its other unique weapons systems.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0135 (CT-0551) Dyess AFB and RBTI Litigation

Requester: BRAC Commission (Arthur Beauchamp)

Commission Provided Background: Attached memo was submitted to the BRAC. It outlines litigation filed by the Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Association against the Air Force (Davis Mountains v. USAF).

The case centers on the adverse impacts to the community and organizations when B-1 Bombers use the Dyess LANCER Military Operation Area (MOA) and Instrument Route (IR) 178 (also known as the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (RBTI)). The suit has resulted in a district court order issued on 29 Jun 05 imposing flying restriction on B-1s at LANCER and IR 178. The order reads: "no aircraft will fly lower than 500 ft AGL (Above Ground Level), AP/1B altitude in IR-178, and no lower than 12,000 ft MSL (Mean Sea Level) when utilizing Lancer MOA."

In reviewing the information, the training restrictions were suggested by Air Combat Command as temporary measures to the court until the litigation is resolved.* The rationale being that it at least preserves the opportunity, even if limited, for use of the RBTI (reference: Additional Declaration of ACC Director of Air and Space Operations (Case No 03-10506) dated 5 Jan 05).

Given this litigation we request feedback on the following questions:

* **ACC Clarification of Commission Background:** Air Combat Command suggested the training restrictions as temporary measures to the court until the supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) and record of decision are completed and the FAA issues any implementing orders.

Questions:

1. Given the importance of training ranges and IR routes to the military value of an installation was this litigation factored into the MCI for Dyess?

Response: This litigation was not factored into the MCI score for any Air Force base. There was no viable method to consider ongoing litigation in computation of the MCI score.

2. Why has the Air Force changed its training to 500 ft AGL when in the past it was 300 ft AGL? Was this caused by the above litigation?

Response: The Air Force didn't change its training to 500 ft AGL--it proposed lowering its training altitude to 300 ft AGL when it created the RBTI along an existing route. The Air Force voluntarily returned its training altitude to 500 ft AGL pending the outcome of a SEIS. The presiding judge accepted the temporary return to 500 ft AGL pending the outcome of the supplemental wingtip vortices analysis, completion of an SEIS and issuance of FAA decisions as directed by the court.

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0135 (CT-0551) Dyess AFB and RBTI Litigation

3. Did an installation score higher for those ranges that allow for flying at 200 ft AGL (given the fact that the B-1 has the capability to fly at 200 ft AGL and in some cases this is required for B-1 testing).

Response: Installations were not scored on the altitude restrictions of instrument routes. The scoring methodology only considered the relative distance of entry and exit points to the subject installations. The greater the number of routes an installation had available within the prescribed distance of 300 nautical miles for the Bomber MCI, the better the installation's MCI score.

4. If the AF loses the suit and is permanently restricted to flying at 500 ft at the RBTI, how will this impact B-1 training? This is a particular concern given the fact that the AF recommends consolidating the B-1 fleet at Dyess.

Response: Currently, there is no permanent restriction issue pending in court. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the original EIS analysis, which used wingtip vortices affects at high altitude extrapolated to 300 ft AGL, as insufficient. The Court therefore directed a new analysis at 300 ft AGL.

The Air Force is in the process of analyzing wingtip vortices at 300 ft AGL as part of the SEIS and will make an appropriate decision on RBTI use once the SEIS is complete. If the results support flight at 300 ft AGL, the Air Force will follow the normal process of obtaining FAA approval to use the RBTI as originally requested. None of the court's rulings require the Air Force to return to court for approval as part of this process.

If the results do not support operations at 300 ft AGL, the 500 ft restriction will most likely apply. The training requirement to fly at 300 ft AGL, however, can be accomplished at restricted ranges. Given that possibility, Dyess AFB still has access to closer low-altitude ranges and airspace than Ellsworth AFB. Even at 500 ft AGL, the RBTI is still valuable. See attachments for Dyess AFB and Ellsworth AFB for depiction of currently existing ranges.

5. Request the Air Force rescore the MCI for Dyess training range and IR capability with this restriction.

There is no impact to the MCI score for the Bomber MCI as a result of instrument route altitude restrictions. Altitudes were not factored into consideration of instrument routes when calculating MCI scores. As regards the volume of airspace, Dyess AFB has 2.3 times the volume of airspace

19 July 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0135 (CT-0551) Dyess AFB and RBTI Litigation

as Ellsworth and is still the higher scoring installation of the two given the voluntary altitude restriction of 12,000' MSL placed on the Lancer Military Operating Area.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

- 2 Attachments (11" X 17" formats)
1. Dyess - Airspace within 300NM
 2. Ellsworth - Airspace within 300NM

Ellsworth AFB


300NM Distance
[Circle symbol]

Instrument Route
[Dashed line symbol]

Special Use Airspace

- [Light gray box] MOA
- [Medium gray box] Restricted
- [Dark gray box] Warning

Air-to-Ground Ranges
[Black box]



0 50 100 200 300 Nautical Miles
HQ AF Ranges and Airspace, as of 07/13/08. Contact 703.588.2023

What if Ellsworth were to request more airspace - is the airspace available - If request

15 July 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0134 (CT-0547) Ellsworth AFB

its site survey of Dyess AFB, 24 June 2005, and estimated \$159M to implement the Air Force recommendation.

Bomber MCI scores clearly indicate Dyess is the best B-1 bomber installation. Dyess has FAA approved training airspace volume 2.3 times that available at Ellsworth AFB giving it a 4.36 effective score advantage. It has superb low level access giving it a 9.10 point lead in the bomber MCI over Ellsworth. The range complex within 300NM also gave Dyess a 3.12 point advantage. Attached are two graphics that depict the airspace for both Ellsworth AFB and Dyess AFB for comparison. This operational environment would be complex and difficult to replicate at other locations and is geographically connected to the installation.

3 pts
Airspace Vol
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log of
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Approved.

DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Executive Officer, Base Realignment and Closure

2 Attachments:

- 1. Ellsworth - Airspace within 300NM
- 2. Dyess - Airspace within 300NM

Increase in MILCON by to beddown
the B-1 @ Dyess = 159-124 ~~159~~ 153.5M

15 July 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0134 (CT-0547) Ellsworth AFB

Requester: Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission (Mr Arthur Beauchamp)

Question 1: During the recent BRAC Commissioners visit to Ellsworth AFB, SD, it was discovered that the Air Force underestimated the square footage capability at Ellsworth by 80,000 sq feet. Please validate this?

Response: We are unable to address the underestimated square footage capability at Ellsworth because it is not qualified as to type of square footage. If the square footage of the installation is incorrect by 80,000 square feet, it was an installation reporting error. However, even without the error, it would not change the relative MCI ranking of Ellsworth AFB.

Question 2: Assuming that the square footage was underestimated, what is the impact, if any, on the MCI scoring for Ellsworth given this added capacity? Does it improve? If so, by how many points?

Response: A review of Mission Compatibility Indexes (MCIs) shows Ellsworth AFB received maximum credit for the following attributes that involve square footage/yardage: runways (Question 9), and ramp area and serviceability (Question 8). The square footage reflected by Ellsworth's ability to hangar large aircraft (Question 19) resulted in an installation effective score of 1.46, 1.45 points less than the 2.91 maximum effective score. If the installation had scored the maximum points for the ability to hangar large aircraft, the difference in bomber MCI scores between Ellsworth (48.55) and Dyess (59.85) would be reduced from 11.35 points to 9.90 points. An increase in square footage, therefore, would not result in a revised recommendation to the Commission.

Question 3: In discussion with Ellsworth personnel and the Ellsworth community, as well as our own analysis we determined that Ellsworth AFB has the basic capacity to beddown all 67 B-1 Bombers in the Air Force fleet with a MILCON investment of about \$69M. While the MILCON cost to prepare Dyess to receive the consolidated B-1 Fleet is \$124M. Can you also confirm this? If so, why not consolidate the B-1 fleet at Ellsworth given this cost savings?

Response: Air Combat Command presented its capacity brief to the BCEG the week of 24 August 04. The \$66.7M was the cost briefed to the BCEG to prepare Ellsworth to receive 2 additional squadrons of B-1s. Ellsworth was presented as capable of receiving 71 B-1s, but as the ramp laydown presented to the Commission clearly shows, the parking density would be extremely problematic. Hangar access and taxiways are blocked. All available ramp space, regardless of location, is completely full making airfield management difficult. No mention is made as to whether the parking plan presented to the Commission conforms to ACC standards for clearance and jet blast considerations.

Dyess AFB, by comparison, was briefed as able to support 66 aircraft without moving the 28 currently assigned C-130s from the field. COBRA estimated \$124M to move 2 B-1 squadrons to Dyess, and that was the figure on which the BCEG based its recommendation. ACC concluded

15 July 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0134 (CT-0547) Ellsworth AFB

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
Approved.



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Executive Officer, Base Realignment and Closure

2 Attachments:

1. Ellsworth - Airspace within 300NM
2. Dyess - Airspace within 300NM



Office 703-614-6088
Cell 703-608-6200

As for the remainder of this holiday weekend, the Clearinghouse will be open on Saturday, closed on Sunday and hopefully open most of Monday.

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Miller, Gary, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 6:09 PM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
CC: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cook, Robert, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Ellsworth Environmental Clean-up Costs

Art,

The AF is showing \$27 million in costs to complete the environmental restoration at Ellsworth. They have spent \$67.36 million through FY03. I am not sure where the \$1.15 million number came from that he provided. They did not provide backup to the numbers (such as the \$54 million they say it will take to cleanup Ellsworth) so it is hard to say which is correct. However, the number we are using comes from the Defense Environmental Restoration Account which only includes environmental restoration costs for contamination prior to 1986. However, this number usually includes long term monitoring and maintenance of installed corrective action treatment systems. He is correct in saying there are other costs that may be incurred if the installation is closed. These are related to closing underground storage tanks and misc. other units such as oil/water separators and fire training areas. In general these costs are not included in the payback calculations and so they are not tracked. The best we can do is show it as an issue and include DoD's estimate, there is know information that would lead me to believe the cost should be doubled.

Gary

Gary Miller, P.E.
Environmental Analyst
RAC Commission
3-699-2930
gary.miller@wso.whs.mil

*The cost in COPRA are
for compliance*

-----Original Message-----

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 4:40 PM
To: Miller, Gary, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cook, Robert, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: FW: Ellsworth Environmental Clean-up Costs

Gary, can you confirm this? Or let me know how I can. It just so happened that this morning Bob asked that we take a hard look at the Environmental Remediation at Ellsworth so the timing on this email is good. Tks.]

Art

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [mailto:Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 1:21 PM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: Ellsworth Environmental Clean-up Costs

Art, we will likely send you an overall cost/savings paper that includes this later today, I wanted to pass to you our estimates on actual clean-up costs if Ellsworth closes.

We believe the Air Force grossly underestimated the cost of environmental clean-up. I

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 1:21 PM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: Ellsworth Environmental Clean-up Costs

Art, we will likely send you an overall cost/savings paper that includes this later today, but wanted to pass to you our estimates on actual clean-up costs if Ellsworth closes.

We believe the Air Force grossly underestimated the cost of environmental clean-up. I believe their estimate was only \$1.15 million total cost.

According to DoD's own 2004 Environmental Programs Annual Report to Congress, (dtd Feb 25, 2005) Ellsworth has received \$69.5 million to date for environmental clean-up and remediation.

The estimated cost of completion in this report is stated to be at least \$26.4 million (through FY 2028).

Keep in mind these estimated costs were put together as if Ellsworth continues to operate as an active military base. Cost to clean-up a closed base about to be handed over for civilian use rise markedly.

Therefore, it's safe to assume that these costs will increase dramatically should Ellsworth be subject to closure:

- 1) Additional remediation/clean-up costs could pop-up once the base is shut down;
- 2) The duties that the Air Force was otherwise was taking care of (i.e. monitoring and treatment of contamination) will be passed along to the state and/or the surrounding town/county, but the costs will still be borne by DoD.

We think the costs are probably more accurately in the range of \$52 million, conservatively.

8/17/2005

BASE VISIT REPORT

**28th Bomber Wing (28th BW)
Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD
Tuesday June 21, 2005**

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Samuel K. Skinner

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

James H. Bilbray
Philip E. Coyle, III

COMMISSION STAFF:

Mr. Bob Cook
Mr. Art Beauchamp
Ms. Tanya Cruz
Mr. Mike Delaney
Mr. Andy Napoli

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Attendees

Senator John Thune
Senator Tim Johnson
Rep Stephanie Herseth
Gov Mike Rounds
Col Jeffrey Smith,
Lt Col David Garrett
Lt Col Thomas Reford
Capt Jennifer Rollins
Lt Col Navnit Singh
Lt Col Mark Schlichte
Capt Jennifer Rollings
Capt Michael Johnson
Mr. Mark Wheeler
Mr. Arliss Sakos
Mr. Douglas Frey
Mr. Herges Lawrence

Position

Senator, SD
Senator, SD
Representative, SD
Governor, SD
28th BW/CC
28th BW/XP
28th MSG/CD
28th BW/XP
28th CES/CC
28th OSS/DO
28th BW/XP
28th BW/PA
28th BW/CE
28th BW/CCP;
28th BW/ATO;
28th CES/CECN

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

- The 28th Bomber Wing (BW), Ellsworth Air Force Base (AFB), SD is home of the B-1 Bomber. Ellsworth is one of only two remaining B1 bomber bases in the Air Force. The other B-1 bomber base is located at Dyess AFB, TX. There are 29 B-1 bomber aircraft located at Ellsworth, assigned to two squadrons, the 34th Bomber Sq and 37th Bomber Sq.
- The mission of the 28th BW is global attack--putting bombs on target. The wing's mission statement reads "Provide rapid, decisive and sustainable combat air power and expeditionary combat support." The B-1 can rapidly deliver massive quantities of precision and non-precision weapons. It carries the largest payload of both guided and unguided weapons in the Air Force inventory. The B-1 has become the Air Force's bomber of choice during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, dropping more bombs and precision weapons than any other aircraft.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION:

- Close Ellsworth AFB, SD. All B-1 aircraft assigned to the 28th Bomb Wing will be distributed to the 7th Bomb Wing, Dyess Air Force Base, TX. Realign Dyess AFB, TX. The C-130 aircraft assigned to the 317th Airlift Group will be distributed to the active duty 314th Airlift Wing (22 aircraft) and Air National Guard 189th Airlift Wing (two aircraft), Little Rock AFB, AR; the 176th Wing (ANG), Elmendorf AFB, AK (four aircraft); and the 302d Airlift Wing, AFR, Peterson AFB, CO (four aircraft). Peterson AFB will have an active duty/Air Force Reserve association in the C-130 mission. Elmendorf AFB will have an active duty/Air National Guard association in the C-130 mission.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION:

- This recommendation consolidates the B-1 fleet at one installation to achieve operational efficiencies. To create an efficient, single-mission operation at Dyess, the Air Force realigned the C-130s from Dyess to other Air Force installations. The majority of the C-130s went to Little Rock. This enables consolidation of the active duty C-130 fleet into one stateside location. Those C-130s not going to Little Rock will go to Elmendorf AFB and Peterson AFB. This will facilitate active duty associations with the Guard and Reserve units at these installations.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

- The following facilities and infrastructure were reviewed. Overall assessment, the **facilities and infrastructure at Ellsworth are outstanding.**
- There are 376 structures at Ellsworth. Total square footage of all structures is about 4.4M sq ft. The Air Force has invested significantly in infrastructure improvements at Ellsworth. Since FY02, over \$69M has been spent on new construction. Ellsworth has won a number of ACC and Air Force awards for facility designs. Since 1994, nine of ten newly constructed facilities at Ellsworth AFB received an ACC design award and Ellsworth was recently assessed by ACC as 4 out of 16 ACC bases for new facility requirements (lower is better). Ellsworth also has the lowest utility rates in of all ACC and Air Force installations.
- Maintenance Hangars
 - Ellsworth AFB has 5 maintenance hangars. All are in good condition.
- Runway
 - Ellsworth runway dimension are 13,500 ft. in length x 300 ft. wide. It is better than the minimum requirement for B-1s (12,000 ft x 300 ft).
- Ramp
 - In March 2004 a \$10 million Parking Ramp project was completed. The ramp is referred to as LOLA (Live Ordnance Loading Area). This Ramp enables the simultaneous loading and deicing of 4 aircraft. This is a unique capability. As a result, there is no towing necessary and maintenance operations are not effected. Another LOLA project is planned to add an additional eight parking spots so that a full squadron can be parked there. LOLA Maintains the JASSM (Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile) requirements.
- Fire Station
 - This facility was built 5 years ago and received an ACC design award. The fire station is manned with a minimum of 17 fire fighters 24 hours a day. They dispatch medical calls, have 1 of 2 hazmat teams in the Rapid City area, have 17 total vehicles, and are technologically 6 years old. There are 3 crash trucks, each containing 3,300 gallons of agent (9,900 gallons total). According to the Fire Chief, 7,780 gallons of agent is the requirement. In addition, they have an older crash truck as a reserve. According to the fire chief, increasing the number of aircraft would not require them to increase the number of fire trucks as the system is agent-dependent and not vehicle dependent.
- Pavement
 - Since 2004, additional improvements have been made to taxiways, aprons, and one of the runways.
- The Rushmore Center
 - This facility was built in 1996. Ten buildings were demolished to construct the \$15 million 115,000 square foot building which consolidates 20 separate administrative functions. According to officials, the construction of this facility yielded space savings (45,000 square feet) and cost savings for utilities.

- 34th Bomber Squadron
 - This recently completed \$14.5 million 58,000 square foot facility received an ACC design award for the concept of placing flyers and maintainers in one facility. This is a unique facility. It provides synergy between the operational and maintenance communities. According to officials, this concept not only produces efficiencies but also gives them the opportunity to operate as they would deploy. The facility has an auditorium with seating for 200 and classified as well as declassified briefing capability, a mission planning area, an operations desk, aircraft maintenance unit, debriefing room, maintenance day room, and a support section where maintainers can check out and trade equipment, if necessary.
- PRIDE (Professional Results in Daily Efforts) Hangar
 - This facility houses the base's current flightline fitness center but could hold two 747s, if necessary.
- Housing
 - A 3-phase housing development project is projected to cost \$80.3 billion. The first phased involved the development of 100 new housing units last summer. The second phase is slated to occur in the fall 2005.
- Education Center
 - Built in 2002, this facility has a combined enrollment of 3,000 students (annually?) in 3 universities—Black Hills State, University of South Dakota, and National American University.
- Medical Clinic
 - There are currently 11,600 enrollees at Laughlin's clinic. The clinic provides general practices and individuals needing specialists are referred to the medical system in downtown Rapid City.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

- A comparative military value ranking among the three Air Force bases in the north central United States where the Air Force has stated they must maintain a strategic presence, ranked Ellsworth #1 in 6 of the 8 functional categories. Given the military value of Ellsworth, it's clear that Ellsworth is an important base and we must take an in-depth look at the Air Force's rationale for closing Ellsworth.
- The metric on which the bomber mission capability measurement is based may not have considered the quality of the training available on the range. This could be an issue since Ellsworth has a number of outstanding training ranges and low level routes. For example, Ellsworth owns the Powder River Training Complex 58 Nautical Miles (8 minutes flying time) from the base, where Ellsworth conducts 85-90 percent of its training at Powder River.
- Another potential issue impacting the value of military ranges is current litigation involving a primary training range at Dyess (Trans-Pecos vs. USAF). Litigation has resulted in restrictions placed on using the Lancer training range (B-1s can't fly below 500 feet; aircraft is capable of flying as low as 200 feet and until recently trained at 300 feet). Need to assess the impact to training operations at Dyess if this restriction is ruled permanent by the courts (could change the relative ranking of Ellsworth).
- Given Ellsworth's attributes (i.e. its airspace, ranges, readiness, etc.); it should be a viable consideration for future evolving missions (e.g. global strike, information operation, intelligence/surveillance and recon, missile defense, etc.).
- Having the entire B-1 fleet at a base with only one runway poses a security risk. It creates an inviting enemy target, making the B-1 fleet vulnerable to terrorist attacks (and natural disasters). Air Force decision to consolidate the fleet requires a detail DOD assessment of this risk.
- The Air Force underestimated the total gross square footage of Ellsworth by over 800,000 sq ft. Given this oversight we need to work with the Air Force and re-calculate the military value of Ellsworth. This is particularly important since Dyess nudged Ellsworth by 5.9 points in military value.
- It may cost more to operate a consolidated fleet at Dyess than it does two B-1 bases (i.e. Dyess and Ellsworth). Concern requires further evaluation.
- The Air Force has stated that combining Dyess and Ellsworth will improve logistics supportability. We have not seen any empirical data to support this claim. Concern requires further research and analysis.
- The recommendation would relocate B-1s to a receiving base with less plant replacement value and less infrastructure and capacity.

- BRAC criteria does not take into account subjective information such as airmen retention, housing, and other quality of life factors. Officer and enlisted development will be impacted by reducing the number of locations B-1 personnel to one and the number of leadership positions in half (for example, squadron command). Also, having two B-1 bases allows room for the addition of new missions at each base, a BRAC criterion.

INSTALLATION CONCERNS RAISED

- Base officials believe that the MCI did not accurately capture information pertaining to the airspace. According to officials, the MCI questions emphasized quantity rather than quality. For example, the MCI's range metric was 300 miles but officials told us that 600 miles is the appropriate metric for bombers.
- Officials also said that there was a discrepancy in the DoD data reflecting the installation's size. This data is short over 800,000 square feet, according to base officials.
- Officials also noted that Ellsworth has sufficient capability to house all 67 B1 Bombers.
- According to base officials, Ellsworth's current Plant Replacement Value is \$1.9 billion and its Base Operating Support budget is approximately \$20 million. Though the base itself is over 60 years old, the majority of its facilities are less than 25 years old due to a base modernization program. Since 1994, nine of ten newly constructed facilities at Ellsworth AFB received an ACC design award.
- According to base officials, there are virtually no encroachment issues and the base is not subject to any environmental requirements. In addition, the base has not used its full water allocation and is projected to have a sufficient amount for the next 25 years.
- Officials commented that Ellsworth AFB has plenty of room for expansion. They own all leasing rights to the additional land available on base and the Ellsworth Task Force recently purchased 60 acres for the base's use. There are a total of 1800 acres available for development. They also told us that they are currently using 36 percent of their storage capacity and 45 percent of their explosive capacity. In addition to their own, Ellsworth AFB also stores munitions for the Army National Guard.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:


- Community is waging a vociferous campaign, led by Senator John Thune to save the base
 - Their concerns:
 - Consolidating B1 Bomber fleet at one location increases risk to fleet from singular attack; “putting all the eggs in one basket” argument.
 - The Air Force delay in releasing all BRAC selection data put the community at a significant disadvantage in reviewing the Air Force’s selection process (issue has since been resolved with the Air Force releasing the information).
 - The fact that Ellsworth scored higher in three out of four military value criteria for bomber mission, yet still resulted in Ellsworth being recommended for closure isn’t consistent with the military value criteria (brings into question the whole selection process).
 - Analyst Note: Overall, Dyess Air Force Base nudged out Ellsworth 56.7 to 50.8 in the overall Military Value scoring for Bomber bases. The principle reason for the lower scorer is that Ellsworth scored lower than Dyess in Current/Future Mission criteria (31.52 vs. 51.2) due to lower scores in the training range category. Ellsworth scored higher in all other categories:
 - Condition of Infrastructure (63.44 vs. 58.78)
 - Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces (74.92 vs. 68.18)
 - Cost of Ops/Manpower (81.32 vs. 77.64)

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS:


- Ellsworth is second largest employer in South Dakota.
 - Economic impact on Rapid City (Ellsworth is just outside city) and State: \$278M per yr
- Keeping the base open has become a political issue.
 - Senator Thune strongly voiced his advocacy for keeping Ellsworth open during his election campaign. He told voters throughout his 2004 campaign that his ties to President Bush would help save Ellsworth from closure” (Source: Inside the Air Force, June 3, 2005); “a GOP senator on friendly terms with the President Bush would be in a better position to keep the base open” (Source: Nation Review, June 7, 2005).
- Senator Thune is attempting to delay the entire BRAC process to save the base through several pieces of legislation.
 - One vote cancels the process entirely in DOD doesn’t submit to Congress all documentations related to its BRAC recommendations.
 - Another delays the BRAC process until Congress considers various reviews, including the work of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure and the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
 - Senator Thune also introduced legislation that would permit any member of the military to testify before the BRAC Commission about the value of a military installation
 - According to Senator Thune, the MCI for Current/Future Mission criteria (accorded a weight of 46 percent) does not accurately reflect Ellsworth AFB’s proximity to low-level flying routes or proximity to airspace supporting their mission. Senator Thune reiterated that it takes 8 minutes flying time to get to low-level routes at Powder River (where Ellsworth AFB

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

- Determine the quality of the training ranges at Ellsworth and Dyess.
- Validate the military value scoring for Ellsworth in light of the fact that the gross square footage at Ellsworth was underestimated by over 800,000 sq ft.
- Request a DOD threat assessment of Ellsworth and Dyess on risk of placing all B1s at one location.
- Research the litigation issue revolving a major airspace training range at Dyess. As a result of the litigation training restrictions were placed on B-1 training at Dyess. This could impact the military value scoring of Dyess.
- Request an analysis by the Air Force of changes to B-1 parts supportability if fleet is consolidated.
- Determine total cost to operate a consolidated fleet at Dyess and compare to operating two B-1 bases (i.e. Dyess and Ellsworth).
- Given Ellsworth's attributes (i.e. its airspace, ranges, readiness, etc.) determine feasibility of adding future mission like the UAV.



Dyess AFB - Abilene, Texas



Parallel Taxiway:

**13,000 ft long - Ideal for
Emergency Runway Use**

Dyess AFB - Abilene, Texas



Dyess AFB - Abilene, Texas



Dyess AFB - Abilene, Texas

TALKING PAPER

ON

ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE (AFB)

BACKGROUND:

- As part of its BRAC recommendations, DOD recommends closing Ellsworth AFB SD.
- Under this recommendation, all B-1 Bombers assigned to Ellsworth will transfer to Dyess AFB, TX and Dyess would become the only B-1 Bomber in the Air Force.
- Under the same recommendation C-130s assigned at Dyess will be realigned to other installations. To also create a single mission focus at Dyess supporting the B-1, the C-130s assigned to Dyess are transferred to Little Rock (22 aircraft), Elmendorf ANG (4 aircraft) and Peterson AFB (4 aircraft)
- Ellsworth is second largest employer in South Dakota, w/\$278M yearly economic impact
- Ellsworth is an outstanding installation. The commissioners and BRAC staff visited the installation on 21 Jun and were impressed by the quality of facilities. This assessment is also supported by the number of Air Force (AF) facility awards won by Ellsworth.

ISSUES:

- **The projected cost savings identified in closing Ellsworth are unrealistic**
 - DOD COBRA data shows 3,746 positions being eliminated from Ellsworth. 1,918 of those positions are transferred to Dyess, for a net savings of 1,699 positions.
 - This appears to be a significant savings, BUT, since the Air Force is not reducing military end-strength the savings are not realized in the aggregate. The Air Force intention is to convert positions saved at one base into positions that support stressed career fields and emerging missions¹.
 - Further, according to the GAO, "...claiming such personnel as BRAC savings without reducing end strength does not provide dollar saving that can be reapplied outside personnel accounts."²

¹ Report to Congressional Committees "Military Bases, Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignment" July 2005, Page 124

² Ibid, Page 124

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- The table below shows costs/saving with and without personnel savings.

Costs/Savings Categories	DOD COBRA With Personnel Savings	BRAC COBRA W/O Personnel Savings	Delta
One Time Costs	\$299.1M	\$300.1M	\$1M diff rounding error
Net Implementation Costs	\$316.4M	\$224.8M	\$91.6M more saved
Annual Recurring Savings	\$161.3M	\$20.1M	\$141.2 less than projected
Return on Investment (2027)	1 year	19 years	Takes 18 yrs longer
Net Present Value in 20 yrs	\$1.853.3M Savings	\$19.4M (Costs)	

- When personnel savings are excluded from the cost data, it will take DOD 19 years (in 2027) to recover the cost (\$316.4) to close Ellsworth. After that DOD only gains DOD an estimated \$20.1M savings per year vice the \$161.3M claimed in the recommendation.
- **Costs to operate and maintain the fleet not expected to significantly decrease**
 - The size of the B-1 fleet will not change as a result of this recommendation.
 - The AF did not analysis the cost to operate and maintain the B-1 fleet after the consolidation. Cost efficiencies are gained by consolidating B-1 support personnel, but they are offset by the fact the Air Force is not reducing end strength (see above).
 - The cost per B1 flying hour are expected to increase slightly since the duration time to get to the principle training range at Dyess is about 0.7 longer than at the principle training range at Ellsworth.
- **Logistics efficiency gains are marginal.**
 - In the short term there is a 1-2 percent increase in the B-1 mission capable rate (equals one additional aircraft) due consolidating the B-1 parts inventory (and a \$11.2 one time savings); but in the long term no increase in the mission capability rate is expect.
 - Why? The Air Force buys spares to a targeted 95 percent mission capability rate, after the initial consolidating of inventories the system will adjust back to the target mission capability rate
- **Concerns about the gaining installation (Little Rock)**
 - The C-130s assigned to Dyess are moving from Dyess ranked 11th for military value supporting airlift missions to Little Rock, which is ranked 17th
 - The Air Force is consolidating all active duty C-130s at Little Rock. Little Rock will have a mixed C-130 fleet of about 118 C-130s. This isn't consisted with the Air Force plan to consolidate aircraft of the same mission design (i.e. Air Force basing principle #2)

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- COBRA MILCON costs to support beddown of additional C-130s are suspect. The MILCON costs are expected to exceed what is projected in COBRA. They range from \$107M to \$292M.
- **Closing Ellsworth impacts readiness--from a total force perspective.**
 - Consolidating the B1 Bomber fleet at one location increases the risk to the Nation's long range strike capability. The "putting all the eggs in one basket" argument.
 - The risk is not so much from a terrorist attack, but from current and emerging strategic threats.
 - By consolidating the Nation's bomber capability from 5 bases (Ellsworth, Dyess, Minot, Barksdale, and Whiteman) to 4 we are decreasing our strategic redundancy for a capability. We are also increasing the risk to this capability from a first strike by current and emerging strategic threats (China, North Korea, and Iran).
 - The Director DIA, in 17 March 2005 statement to Senate Armed Services Committee noted:
 - "China...by 2015, the number of warheads capable of targeting the continental United States will increase several fold."
 - "...North Korea could deliver a nuclear warhead to parts of the United States..."
 - "...Iran will have the technical capability to develop an ICBM by 2015."
- *The B1 consolidation is inconsistent with Nation Defense Strategy: "Developing greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not overly concentrating military forces in few locations."*
- *The B1 consolidation is also inconsistent with Air Force BRAC Basing Principle #7: "Ensure long-range strike bases provide flexible strategic response and strategic force protection."*
- **Military value scoring favored gaining installation, but only in one criteria (airspace)**
- A comparison of Dyess and Ellsworth shows that Ellsworth beat out Dyess in 3 out of the 4 military value criteria, but lost to Dyess in the most heavily weighted criteria of proximity to air space (i.e. Dyess has 2.3 times the volume of air space as Ellsworth). Because of this Dyess scored higher than Ellsworth by just 5.9 points.
- The proximity to air space value however isn't as clear cut as indicated in the scoring. There is an on-going litigation issue regarding Dyess' primary training range that wasn't factored into the scoring. While transient, the litigation will provide uncertainty on the capabilities available for use in the airspace for several years.
- The litigation involves the Lancer training range (Trans-Pecos vs. USAF) and has resulted in restrictions being placed on using the Lancer range (B-1s can't fly below 500 feet). Ellsworth currently doesn't have this range restriction.

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- A comparative military value ranking among the three AF bases (Minot, Grand Folks, Ellsworth) in the North Central United States where the AF has stated they must maintain a strategic presence, ranked Ellsworth #1 in 6 of the 8 functional categories.

TALKING PAPER

ON

ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE (AFB)

Cost over 6 yrs

At the end of the period you start saving \$20.1M per yr vs \$161.3M

ISSUES:

- Military Value Criterion 4 and 5: The projected cost savings identified in closing Ellsworth are unrealistic; and the timing to achieve the return on investment in closing Ellsworth exceeds DoD projections significantly (when manpower savings are excluded)
- The table below shows costs/saving with and without personnel savings.

You can't recover the imp cost until 2027 vs

Costs/Savings Categories	DOD COBRA With Personnel Savings	BRAC COBRA W/O Personnel Savings	Delta
One Time Costs	\$299.1M	\$300.1M	\$1M diff rounding error
Net Implementation Costs	\$316.4M	\$224.8M	\$91.6M more saved
Annual Recurring Savings	\$161.3M	\$20.1M	\$141.2 less than projected
Return on Investment (2027)	1 year	19 years	Takes 18 yrs longer
Net Present Value in 20 yrs	\$1.853.3M Savings	\$19.4M (Cost)	

- When personnel savings are excluded from the cost data, it will take **DOD 19 years (in 2027) to recover the cost (\$316.4) to close Ellsworth.** After that there is an estimated \$20.1M savings per year vice the \$161.3M claimed w/manpower savings.
- Military Value Criteria 4: Costs to operate and maintain the B-1 fleet after the consolidation are not expected to decrease (they most likely will increase.)
 - The size of the B-1 fleet will not change as a result of this recommendation.
 - *The AF did not factor the cost to operate the B-1 fleet after the consolidation (see Clearinghouse response dated 12 Aug 05 "The Air Force did not conduct flying hour cost reduction analysis".*
 - The primary cost driver on operating aircraft or "cost per B1 flying hour" is not expected to decrease. In fact, if you compare the cost per flying hr between Ellsworth (\$23,754) and Dyess (\$31,519) it's more expensive to operate the B-1 at Dyess (using AF provided data)
 - Manpower efficiencies are gained by consolidating B-1 support personnel (only 1,918 positions of the total authorized position at Ellsworth are moving to Dyess; but this efficiency (and savings) is offset by the fact the Air Force is not reducing end strength (see above).
 - Additionally, it takes more transit time, about 0.7 longer, to get to the principle training range at Dyess (Lancer MOA) than the principle training range at Ellsworth (Powder)--flying hr costs should increase

- Logistics efficiency are achieved-- but not significantly
- Parts/Spares Analysis
 - In the short term, due to the consolidation of the B-1s parts inventories from Ellsworth and Dyess, there is a 1-2 percent increase in the B-1 mission capable rate (this equals 1 additional aircraft operational)
 - The consolidation of parts the parts inventory also results in a one-time parts buy/repair savings \$11.2.
 - This savings however and increase in the MC is only short term. Why? The Air Force buys spares to a targeted 95 percent mission capability rate, after the initial consolidating of inventories the system will adjust back to the target mission capability rate and the parts buy process will adjust to support the consolidated inventory
- Equipment Analysis
 - The consolidation will improve the availability of B-1 test and support equipment
- Military Value Criterion 4: Costs concerns about the gaining installation (Little Rock)
 - The C-130s assigned to Dyess are moving from Dyess ranked 11th for military value supporting airlift missions to Little Rock, which is ranked 17th
 - The Air Force is consolidating all active duty C-130s at Little Rock. Little Rock will have a mixed C-130 fleet of about 118 C-130s. This isn't consisted with the Air Force plan to consolidate aircraft of the same mission design (i.e. Air Force basing principle #2)
 - COBRA MILCON costs to support beddown of C-130s from Dyess (24 aircraft) and other installation to Little Rock is significantly underestimated.
 - The MILCON costs range from \$107M to \$270M—much higher that projected in COBRA
- Military Value Criterion 1: Closing Ellsworth impacts readiness.
 - Consolidating the B1 Bomber fleet at one location increases the risk to the Nation's long range strike capability. The "putting all the eggs in one basket" argument.
 - The risk is not so much from a terrorist attack, but from current/emerging strategic threats.
 - By consolidating the Nation's bomber capability from 5 bases (Ellsworth, Dyess, Minot, Barksdale, and Whiteman) to 4 we are decreasing our strategic redundancy for a capability.

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We are also increasing the risk to this capability from a first strike by current and emerging strategic threats (China, North Korea, and Iran).

- The Director DIA, in 17 March 2005 statement to Senate Armed Services Committee noted:
 - “China...by 2015, the number of warheads capable of targeting the continental United States will increase several fold.”
 - “...North Korea could deliver a nuclear warhead to parts of the United States...”
 - “...Iran will have the technical capability to develop an ICBM by 2015.”
- *The B1 consolidation is inconsistent with Nation Defense Strategy: “Developing greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not overly concentrating military forces in few locations.”*
- *The B1 consolidation is also inconsistent with Air Force BRAC Basing Principle #7: “Ensure long-range strike bases provide flexible strategic response and strategic force protection.”*
- **Military Value Criterion 2: Military value scoring favored gaining installation, but only in one criteria (airspace)**
- A comparison of Dyess and Ellsworth shows that Ellsworth beat out Dyess in 3 out of the 4 military value criteria, but lost to Dyess in the most heavily weighted criteria of proximity to air space (i.e. Dyess has 2.3 times the volume of air space as Ellsworth). Because of this Dyess scored higher than Ellsworth by just 5.9 points.
- The proximity to air space value however isn't as clear cut as indicated in the scoring. There is an on-going litigation issue regarding Dyess' primary training range that wasn't factored into the scoring. While transient, the litigation will provide uncertainty on the capabilities available for use in the airspace for several years.
- The litigation involves the Lancer training range (Trans-Pecos vs. USAF) and has resulted in restrictions being placed on using the Lancer range (B-1s can't fly below 500 feet). Ellsworth currently doesn't have this range restriction.
- **Criterion 6: Economic impact to the community at Ellsworth is significant:**
- *Ellsworth is second largest employer in the State. DOD estimates an employment impact of 8.5 percent. Economic Impact: \$278 million annually (\$761,000 per day).*
- Ellsworth community places the impact in the adjacent metropolitan center of Rapid City (pop. 60,000) and 10% of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).

Dyess Air Force Base

The DoD Recommendation to Transfer C-130s From Dyess to Lower Ranked Bases Will Be Costly and Inefficient

DoD Recommendation:

- The DoD recommends transferring Dyess's 32 C-130s to Little Rock, Elmendorf and Peterson. The DoD's proposal:
 - Transfers C-130s from a more highly ranked base to lower ranked bases.
 - Requires 225 additional military and civilian personnel.
 - Costs an additional \$18 million in MILCON funds.
 - Costs additional funds to transfer personnel.
 - Does not result in logistical efficiencies because Dyess's C-130H1 models would be mixed with C-130Es, C-130H3s and the new C-130J.
 - Puts unreasonable stress on Little Rock's single main runway, training ranges, assault strips and drop zones.
 - Is not supported by a certified capacity analysis of Little Rock.

Better Alternative:

- Recommend that the BRAC Commission keep the 32 C-130s at Dyess, which would give the Air Force two optimally-sized 16-aircraft C-130 squadrons.

Justifications:

- Criteria #1, 2, 3 and 4: The DoD recommends transferring Dyess's C-130s to Little Rock, Peterson and Elmendorf even though Dyess had a higher MCI score than all these bases.

	Rank	Score
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Elmendorf	51	51.6

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Subtotal:	+1,905
Less Dyess Personnel	(1,680)
Net Increase Requirement..	+225

- The AF must also pay **the additional cost of transferring 1,680 personnel** to Little Rock, Peterson and Elmendorf.
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- Capacity and Efficiency of Operations: A key advantage of keeping the C-130s at Dyess is that all its 32 aircraft are the same, i.e., the H1 model. If the C-130s at Little Rock were identical, there might be efficiencies in terms of operations, maintenance and logistics. In fact, **Little Rock will have five significantly different C-130 models:**

- C-130Es
- C-130Hs
- C-130H1s
- C-130H3s
- C-130Js

- **C-130Es:** Built in the 1960s and early 1970s, using the Allison T56-A-7 engine.
C-130Hs: An upgraded "E" model.
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C-130H3s: Digital cockpits that are different from the C-130Es and C-130H1s.
C-130Js: Introduced in 1999, it is substantially different from the older C-130 models. It has a Rolls Royce AE2100D3 engine, fully integrated digital cockpit, improved fuel, environmental and ice protection systems and an enhanced cargo-handling system.
- Having 118 C-130s at Little Rock will put stress on its single main runway and existing training ranges, assault strips and drop zones. Little Rock's single main runway may already be at its capacity with the 87 aircraft stationed there today. Per DoD certified data, Little Rock logs 110,000 takeoffs/landings each year, more than triple the activity at Dyess, which has 36,200. Adding the 4,300 takeoffs/landings for Ellsworth's B-1s would give Dyess a total of 40,500. Little Rock has more than double this amount with its existing C-130s.
- It is unclear whether Little Rock has sufficient ramp space for 118 C-130s. More importantly, it appears that the DoD did not prepare a formal, certified capacity analysis. In response to a question from Senators Hutchison and Cornyn and Congressman Neugebauer, the Air Force stated:
no formal capacity analysis was accomplished for Little Rock AFB by the Air Force because Little Rock AFB fell under the purview of the Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group. During the scenario phase of the Air Force analysis the Air Education and Training Command was asked if Little Rock had adequate capacity to bed down additional C-130 aircraft. **Their**

Airlift

Rank	Base	Airlift	Current / Future Mission	Condition of Infrastructure	Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces	Cost of Ops / Manpower
1	Eglin AFB	79.43	72.45	81.55	100	90.39
2	Seymour Johnson AFB	78.03	71.25	83.82	83.34	85.03
3	Charleston AFB	74.09	64.57	83.15	79.91	75.49
4	Barksdale AFB	72.43	52.92	87.48	97.7	80.79
5	Altus AFB	71.3	64.97	73.95	87.04	80.99
6	Pope AFB	69.99	71.21	73.4	46.19	86.08
7	Hurlburt Field	69.61	75.12	67.11	50.15	87.18
8	Tinker AFB	68.62	55.2	80.62	76.23	85.8
9	Shaw AFB	67.7	71.86	59.5	78.12	85.64
10	Eielson AFB	67.34	61.25	73.03	84.43	16.54
11	Dyess AFB	65.95	54.87	76.82	68.94	77.64
12	Holloman AFB	65.78	61.34	70.94	62.43	75.23
13	Edwards AFB	65.53	55.18	75.19	79.33	40.87
14	Fairchild AFB	64.22	52.54	72.85	79.72	73.99
15	Nellis AFB	63.95	59.85	72.31	53.08	43.94
16	Robins AFB	63.89	52.22	71.87	78.5	87.45
17	Little Rock AFB	63.25	49.25	73.05	80.66	88.12
18	Andrews AFB	62.05	54.38	70.4	67.79	41.74
19	Tyndall AFB	61.75	68.65	50.88	67.84	90.98
20	MacDill AFB	60.12	47.48	66.41	88.14	76.56
21	Maxwell AFB	59.9	70.78	55.31	22.48	85.68
22	March ARB	59.86	56.53	71.33	31.15	45.41
23	Mountain Home AFB	59.77	46.58	68.64	81.35	68.58
24	Ellsworth AFB	59.4	42.43	72.78	76.53	81.32
25	McEntire AGS	59.35	71.7	49.85	35.48	85.19
26	Hill AFB	58.83	45.27	66.57	84.33	77.82
27	McChord AFB	57.95	49.64	71.78	38.95	57.08
28	Whiteman AFB	57.82	39.47	71.25	82.33	74.42
29	Columbus AFB	57.51	53.22	58.08	65.55	94.97
30	Peterson AFB	57.2	58.4	59.78	39.75	61.91
31	Langley AFB	56.57	53.37	54.97	72.81	77.2
32	Key Field AGS	56.39	64.14	50.02	42.43	75.4
33	Charlotte/Douglas IAP AGS	56.27	70.45	49.46	12.94	81.48
34	Dover AFB	56.06	48.75	66.73	43.17	64.93
35	Davis-Monthan AFB	55.89	45.11	66	59.49	71.89
36	Grissom ARB	55.66	42.59	68.46	58.32	73.25
37	Kirtland AFB	55.47	49.12	58.01	70.63	69.56
38	Sheppard AFB	55.21	60.81	52.33	35.24	80.04
39	McConnell AFB	54.65	45.85	65.92	43	75.83
40	Beale AFB	54.63	38.4	70.78	65.31	42.78
41	Buckley AFB	54.62	56.16	52.45	56.83	53.78
42	Minot AFB	54.34	39.7	65.42	70.91	73.42
43	Wright-Patterson AFB	54.27	44.62	58.95	74.34	74.09
44	Travis AFB	53.86	41.24	72.89	40.31	24.22
45	Luke AFB	52.17	50.43	55.68	41.35	68.92
46	Westover ARB	52	42.8	58.47	68.13	49.23
47	Forbes Field AGS	51.93	43.85	61.74	42.08	77.32
48	McGuire AFB	51.8	39.42	62.51	67.95	37.26
49	Moody AFB	51.72	52.29	41.64	81.05	91.37
50	Ellington Field AGS	51.65	47.25	53.91	60.12	61.2
51	Elmendorf AFB	51.6	29.97	70.05	85.17	8.86
52	Birmingham IAP AGS	50.93	53.99	48.35	40.7	77.96

informal analysis confirmed that adequate capacity existed to accommodate the Dyess C-130 aircraft.

- Such an “informal analysis” is not sufficient for this major realignment proposed by the DoD.

Bottom Line:

- Given (1) Dyess’s higher military value, (2) the additional MILCON costs, (3) the additional manpower and personnel costs, (4) the efficiencies of having C-130H1 models at Dyess, (5) the inefficiencies of having four different C-130 models at Little Rock, and (6) the stress on Little Rock’s facilities and ranges, the DoD recommendation to transfer Dyess’s C-130s to Little Rock **substantially deviates** from selection criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

July 2005

**Economic Impact of
Potential Realignment at Dyess Air Force Base**

- The Defense Department's recommendations for Dyess are as follows:

	Number of Positions Military and Civilian
Transfer B-1s from Ellsworth to Dyess	2,054
Transfer C-130s from Dyess to Little Rock, Elmendorf and Peterson	<u>(1,680)</u>
Net Gain at Dyess	<u>374</u>

- The small net increase in positions at Dyess may mask the major realignment the base would undergo and the significant negative impact on Dyess and Abilene if Ellsworth's B-1s are not transferred to Dyess and the C-130s are transferred from Dyess.
- If the Commission were to allow Ellsworth to keep its B-1s and also approve the transfer of the C-130s from Dyess, then Dyess would lose 1,680 positions.
- The loss of the 1,680 positions would result in the indirect loss of another 1,600 jobs in Abilene, resulting in a **total loss of 3,280 jobs in Abilene.**
- This would cause a **3.5% drop in employment in Abilene.**
- The loss of the 3,280 jobs in Abilene would be **the 24th highest** among the more than 220 communities that are affected by BRAC.
- The 3.5% drop in employment in Abilene would be **the 12th highest** among the more than 220 communities that are affected by BRAC.
- The Commission's stated policy is to have site visits if a base loses more than 300 civilian positions or 400 military positions. Commissioners have made more than 80 site visits to bases around the country. However, despite the economic impact of this potential realignment at Dyess, there has been no Commission site visit.

BRAC 2005 Closure and Realignment Impacts by Economic Area

Economic Area Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct	Indirect Changes	Total Job Changes	Economic Area Employment	Changes as Percent of Employment
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ						
Abilene, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area													
Dyess Air Force Base	Gain	(1,615)	(65)	1,925	129	310	64	0	374	358	732	92,846	0.8%
	Total	(1,615)	(65)	1,925	129	310	64	0	374	358	732	92,846	0.8%
Aguadilla-Isabela-San Sebastian, PR Metropolitan Statistical Area													
Aguadilla-Ramey U.S. Army Reserve Center/BMA-126	Realign	(10)	0	0	0	(10)	0	0	(10)	(5)	(15)	80,981	0.0%
	Total	(10)	0	0	0	(10)	0	0	(10)	(5)	(15)	80,981	0.0%
Akron, OH Metropolitan Statistical Area													
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center Akron	Close	(26)	0	0	0	(26)	0	0	(26)	(10)	(36)	398,976	0.0%
Armed Forces Reserve Center Akron	Gain	0	0	37	0	37	0	0	37	14	51	398,976	0.0%
	Total	(26)	0	37	0	11	0	0	11	4	15	398,976	0.0%
Alamogordo, NM Micropolitan Statistical Area													
Holloman Air Force Base	Realign	(17)	0	0	0	(17)	0	0	(17)	(11)	(28)	27,515	-0.1%
	Total	(17)	0	0	0	(17)	0	0	(17)	(11)	(28)	27,515	-0.1%
Albany, GA Metropolitan Statistical Area													
Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany	Gain	(2)	(42)	1	193	(1)	151	0	150	119	269	79,160	0.3%
	Total	(2)	(42)	1	193	(1)	151	0	150	119	269	79,160	0.3%
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY Metropolitan Statistical Area													
Schenectady County Air Guard Station	Realign	(10)	(9)	0	0	(10)	(9)	0	(19)	(19)	(38)	529,819	0.0%
	Total	(10)	(9)	0	0	(10)	(9)	0	(19)	(19)	(38)	529,819	0.0%

This list does not include locations where no changes in military or civilian jobs are affected.
Military figures include student load changes.

**The Selection Criteria And
Sound Military Judgment
Fully Support Consolidating
the B-1 Fleet at Dyess**

Background.

- The DoD has recommended that the 67 aircraft of the B-1 fleet be consolidated at Dyess. This is clearly supported by the BRAC selection criteria. For example:
- Dyess ranked 20th for bombers. Ellsworth ranked only 39th.
- Dyess has 126 ranges within 300 NM. Ellsworth has only 34 ranges within 300 NM.
- Dyess has enough ramp space to beddown 67 B-1s and its 28 C-130s. The AF has stated:
 - Dyess has so much ramp space that it can “support 66 aircraft without moving the 28 currently assigned C-130s from the field.”
- However, if all the B-1s were at Ellsworth, the AF has stated:
 - “Parking density would be extremely problematic.”
 - “Hangar access and taxiways would be blocked.”
 - “All available ramp space is completely full making airfield management difficult.”

Consolidation of the B-1 Fleet Is Needed, Justified and Supported By Sound Military Judgment.

- There are unfounded allegations that the B-1s should not be consolidated at Dyess because of the simplistic catch phrase of “don’t put all your eggs in one basket.” This simplistic catch phrase is no substitute for the highly detailed analysis and the sound military judgment of the current DoD and AF leadership.
- Dyess is the B-1 training base and has the majority of the B-1s. Consolidating the fleet at Dyess will provide the Air Force significant efficiencies in:
 - Training
 - Operations
 - Maintenance
 - Annual MILCON savings
 - Personnel Savings

These efficiencies and savings are a primary goal of the BRAC process. Consequently, consolidation, by its very nature, will achieve a key goal of the BRAC process. In fact, this is the reason that the AF, the Army, the Navy and the DoD are realigning and closing bases.

Consolidation of the B-1s Is Fully Consistent With the Consolidation of Other Aircraft.

- Consolidation of the 67 B-1s is fully consistent with the DoD’s longstanding policy of consolidating other fleets of less than 75 aircraft.
 - B-58s
 - F-111s

- 4-2s
- F-117s
- B-2s
- JSTARs

- Consolidation of the B-1s at one base in 1995 might have been difficult when the B-1 fleet had more than 90 aircraft. With the recent retirement of 33 B-1s, the B-1 fleet now has only 67 aircraft. Consolidation today makes sense.

Unfounded Allegations Regarding "Security".

- Some have raised unfounded allegations concerning security of a consolidated fleet.
- The entire B-1 fleet would rarely, if ever, be physically at Dyess. Unlike 1995, the B-1s today are often deployed overseas. Also, as with any other aircraft, several B-1s are in depot undergoing overhauls at any one time. Thus, there will typically be fewer than 50 B-1s actually at Dyess.
- From a security standpoint, the AF bomber fleet will still be dispersed.
 - Whiteman: B-2s
 - Dyess: B-1s
 - Barksdale: B-52s
 - Minot: B-52s
- The Commission should consider that
 - the current DoD and Air Force leadership have made their recommendation in the context of the post-9/11 environment.
 - the DoD and Air Force leadership, in their military judgment, have fully taken into account the necessary security measures to protect the bomber fleet.
- If the Commission were to override the DoD recommendation for Dyess, it would have to apply the same rule to dispersing other Air Force aircraft, the Navy's fleet and numerous Army components. The resulting BRAC process would become one of dispersions and inefficiencies.

Unfounded Allegations Regarding a "Natural Disaster".

- Some have raised unfounded allegations regarding a possible "natural disaster".
 - Dyess has been a key Air Force base for 50 years. During this 50 years, there have been no problems with "natural disasters," *i.e.*, no problems with tornadoes, hurricanes, or earthquakes.
 - As for "natural disasters," according to news reports, the Rapid City area had a tornado in 1967 and gets major snowstorms during the winter.
- In fact, Dyess has received aircraft from Gulf Coast bases that were moved to avoid hurricanes.
- If the "natural disaster" allegation were to be applied to Dyess, then, to be consistent, the Commission would have to make changes to most DoD recommendations.
 - The East and Gulf Coast bases are susceptible to hurricanes and would have to be shut down.

- The West Coast bases are susceptible to earthquakes and would have to be shut down.
- Ellsworth and other bases in the Northern tier are susceptible to blizzards and would have to be shut down.

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- Some have raised unfounded allegations regarding Dyess's single runway.
 - Most bases have only a single runway.
 - Dyess, like all Air Force bases, is prepared for emergencies and would quickly repair any damage to its runway.
 - Dyess has a 13,500-foot long parallel taxiway that could easily be used as a runway if there should ever be an emergency.

July 25, 2005

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July 25, 2005

Dyess Air Force Base

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- ✓ Having 118 C-130s at Little Rock will put stress on its single main runway and existing training ranges, assault strips and drop zones. Little Rock's single main runway may already be at its capacity with the 87 aircraft stationed there today. Per DoD certified data, Little Rock logs 110,000 takeoffs/landings each year, more than triple the activity at Dyess, which has 36,200. Adding the 4,300 takeoffs/landings for Ellsworth's B-1s would give Dyess a total of 40,500. Little Rock has more than double this amount with its existing C-130s.
- It is unclear whether Little Rock has sufficient ramp space for 118 C-130s. More importantly, it appears that the DoD did not prepare a formal, certified capacity analysis. In response to a question from Senators Hutchison and Cornyn and Congressman Neugebauer, the Air Force stated:
 - 7 **no formal capacity analysis was accomplished for Little Rock AFB by the Air Force** because Little Rock AFB fell under the purview of the Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group. During the scenario phase of the Air Force analysis the Air Education and Training Command was asked if Little Rock had adequate capacity to bed down additional C-130 aircraft. **Their**
 - 0

informal analysis confirmed that adequate capacity existed to accommodate the Dyess C-130 aircraft.

- Such an “informal analysis” is not sufficient for this major realignment proposed by the DoD.

Bottom Line:

- Given (1) Dyess’s higher military value, (2) the additional MILCON costs, (3) the additional manpower and personnel costs, (4) the efficiencies of having C-130H1 models at Dyess, (5) the inefficiencies of having four different C-130 models at Little Rock, and (6) the stress on Little Rock’s facilities and ranges, the DoD recommendation to transfer Dyess’s C-130s to Little Rock **substantially deviates** from selection criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

July 2005

COUNTER POINT to BRAC DCN 4979, Entitled:

“Issues for BRAC Staff Consideration”

A. ALLEGATION:

Issue #1: Closing Ellsworth will not create the savings Air Force estimates.

1. GAO Analysis of Air Force Selection Process for Base Closures and Realignment (GAO-05-785, July 2005) specifically noted:

- In *Issues Identified with Approved Recommendations* (p. 124), the "BRAC Commission may wish to consider the closure of Ellsworth AFB, SD."
- Over 60% of the Air Force's net savings are cost avoidances from military personnel however, eliminations are not expected to result in end strength (p. 123). *Will closing Ellsworth actually save \$1.853.3 billion?*

COUNTER POINT:

Per COBRA data, 3,308 military and 438 civilian positions will move from Ellsworth and only 1,918 military and 129 civilian positions are gained by Dyess. This is a substantial savings of 1,390 military and 309 civilian positions (a total of 1,699 positions) to operate the same number of B-1s at Dyess vs. operating out of both Ellsworth and Dyess. The facts are that there are manpower savings from this action. The same numbers of aircraft are being operated with fewer people. This is efficiency.

Since the C- 130 move costs 225 manpower authorizations, even more savings can be realized by reversing the DOD recommendation to move C-130s out of Dyess. This will result in efficient loading of Dyess.

Exact recurring B-1 sustainment and BOS support are difficult to determine from published COBRA data. However, there are some excellent indicators of cost reduction through consolidation at Dyess. Dyess supports 35% more personnel than Ellsworth (5,777 vs. 3,753) with only 18% more BOS costs per year. Sustainment costs efficiencies are even more obvious. Gross sustainment costs are higher at Ellsworth (operating only 29 B-1s) than the sustainment costs at Dyess (operating 36 B-1s AND 29 C-130s (\$14.4M vs. \$14.3M)). In other words, Ellsworth has a higher gross sustainment cost for a significantly smaller operation. Simply put, the DoD certified data shows Dyess is a more cost effective location to operate and the recurring savings in manpower, BOS and sustainment costs are substantial if B-1s are consolidated at Dyess.

B. ALLEGATION:

Issue #1. Item 1.

- Claiming BRAC associated personnel savings without end strength reductions does not provide dollar savings that can be applied outside of personnel accounts and could

require other sources for up-front investment costs (p. 124). *How will the cost (\$299.1 million), to close Ellsworth be funded?*

COUNTER POINT:

The \$299.1 million one time cost is for all parts of this COBRA Scenario (B-1 and C-130 moves to / from Dyess). The payback is from BOS savings, sustainment savings, and personnel cost avoidance. Moving the C-130s from Dyess costs 225 additional manpower authorizations, creates unnecessary personnel moves, and costs more in military construction than leaving them at Dyess. Thus, keeping the C-130s at Dyess would make the actual payback faster. Sustainment costs and BOS costs are less at Dyess than at Ellsworth (See above).

C. ALLEGATION:

Issue #2. Item 1.

- The estimated savings from closing Grand Forks AFB, ND (\$2.656.3 billion) was reduced to \$1.982 billion by a realignment versus closure decision in the week prior to the approval of the final recommendations (p. 129). Ellsworth is rated as a higher valued base in 7 of 8 Air Force functions; *why not close Grand Forks?*
- The Air Force did not develop one composite score for each base across all eight mission areas rather they established index scores in each mission area **and were not able to clearly delineate between lower and higher military value rankings** *If composite scores were used, would Ellsworth 's rating as higher value in 7 of 8 mission areas have clearly defined it as a base to be retained?*

COUNTER POINT:

When comparing all 8 categories for Dyess and Ellsworth. Dyess is ranked 14th of 154 installations and Ellsworth ranked 25th of 154. Dyess MCI was greater for 5 of 8 areas (Bomber, Airlift, Fighter, SOF, and UAV) and 5 of 6 flying missions. Bomber Rankings: Dyess is ranked 20th and Ellsworth is ranked 39th. Airlift Rankings: Dyess is ranked 11th and Little Rock is ranked 17th, Peterson is ranked 30th, and Elmendorf is 51st.

D. ALLEGATION:

Issue #1, Item 2.

The consolidation of the entire B-1B fleet at Dyess AFB, TX and the closure of Ellsworth may not realize:

- The reported savings of \$1.853 billion as it includes a significant percentage of personnel savings which can not be applied outside of personnel accounts;
- Any cost associated with consolidated B-1B flying operations in the Dyess area will be increased by \$14,000 per mission due to an increase of 0.7 hrs of flight time when

compared to similar missions flown at Ellsworth (estimated twenty year cost could range as high as \$280 million).

COUNTER POINT:

The longer missions at Dyess are due to the differences in missions between Dyess and Ellsworth, not the location of MOAs. If comparisons are made between primary MOAs: Powder River is 58 NM from Ellsworth (1 of 34 named MOAs /ranges) while Lancer is 28 NM from Dyess (1 of 126 named MOAs /ranges). Moreover, Dyess has the initial B-1 aircrew training at the FTU. This squadron is larger and flies more hours at home station than the squadron that deploys for significant periods of time. FTU, throughout the AF, historically fly longer average sorties. Almost all sorties require air refueling, multiple patterns (engine out, no flap, no slat, precision, non precision, visual) as well as a full array of combat training activities of ECM, bombing, low level routes, basic flight maneuvers (BFMs), and high altitude operations of ECM and bombing. Many times pattern activities are demonstrated by an instructor and then practiced by the student crew member. These added activities on a single sortie all add to sortie length. On the other hand, once a crew member is qualified and in the operational squadron the requirements many times require less time (i.e. it is easier to maintain currency and proficiency than it is to acquire it). If the FTU was at Ellsworth, the sorties would likely be longer because they have fewer local low level routes, fewer MOAs, and fewer capabilities (or in some cases no capabilities) to accomplish required aircrew training.

ALLEGATION:

Issue #1, Item 2.

- The estimated savings of consolidated flying operations due to limited or inaccessible aerial training areas/altitudes in the Dyess area and/or the continued use of the Powder River Military Operating Area, specifically,
 - Powder River MOA missions flown from Dyess AFB will require an added five hours of flight time at a cost of \$100,000.00 per mission or \$100 million per 1,000 missions flown --- twenty year cost for such could range from \$1 to 2 billion.

COUNTER POINT:

Low level is just one of many training activities required for mission ready status. Low level is not utilized as a day to day tactic in today's combat operations, nor does the training have to be accomplished at Powder River. Per AFI, the stated requirement to log low level training is below 5000 feet AGL. See below:

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 11-2B-1,
VOLUME 1
4 JUNE 2004
Flying Operations
B-1 AIRCREW TRAINING
A2.4.8. Low Altitude Events (LE).

A2.4.8.1. **Low Altitude Navigation (Low Alt Nav).** May be accomplished in a low level route, Military Operating Area (MOA) or restricted area (below 5,000 feet AGL). Crewmembers may take credit for two events if the low level route or MOA permits more than 30 minutes of low altitude navigation and includes two or more target areas. No more than two events may be logged in a single route/MOA

In fact, Dyess has many opportunities to accomplish low level training at altitudes below 500 feet. See below chart about low level routes at Dyess #38 and Ellsworth #39:

Org	1 Route Name/# ()	2 Route Length where Min Altitude is Less Than 500' AGL ()	3 Route Length (NM)	4 Effective Times Available Per Year (Hrs/Yr)	5 Hours Scheduled Per Year (Hrs/Yr)	6 Terrain Type (see amplification) ()	7 Feed into Bombing/ECM Range? (list range) ()
38	IR 128	234.1	405.6	8760	0	FLAT	YES - MELROSE
38	IR 180	281.9	405.9	8760	0	FLAT	YES - MELROSE
38	IR 500	432.1	542.1	8760	0	FLAT - ROLLING	NO
38	IR 501	277.9	387.5	8760	0	ROLLING	NO
38	IR-126	295.1	458.3	8760	250	MOUNTAINOUS MOUNTAINS - FLAT AND	YES, NELLIS RANGE
38	IR-150	200.5	295.3	8760	10	ROLLING MOUNTAINS - FLAT &	NO
38	IR-177	272.2	363.2	8760	10	ROLLING	NO
38	IR-178	353.6	611.4	8760	2467	MOUNTAINOUS	YES, LANCER MOA/ESS
38	IR-266	340.5	458.4	8760	100	MOUNTAINS	NO
38	IR-320	210.7	449.9	8760	15	MOUNTAINOUS	NO
	Dyess Totals	2898.6	4377.6	87600	2852	6 mtn, 2 flat rolling, 2 flat3 feed into range, 2 with drop capability	
39	IR-473	623	716	8736	0	Mountainous	Belle Fourche ESS
39	IR-485	249	311	8736	1	Flat and Rolling	Belle Fourche ESS
39	IR-492	465	581	8064	0	Flat and Rolling	Belle Fourche ESS
39	IR-499	308	359	8736	4	Mountainous	N/A
	Ellsworth Totals	1645	1967	34272	5	2 mtn, 2 flat rolling, 3 feed the exact same range , no drop	

F. ALLEGATION:

Issue #1, Item 3.

The cost to close Ellsworth AFB (\$299 million) is the most expensive of all Air Force recommended actions and provides the least rate of return over the 20 years of calculated

savings. Other major closures and realignments provide returns on investment in a range two to five times greater.

COUNTER POINT:

Referencing GAO Report pp.120-124, the cost of the entire scenario is one of the largest costs, but also has one of the highest savings and therefore, has a payback period of 1 year. Of the AF recommendations it ranks #5 of 42 changes in annual savings (\$161M savings per year). According to the GAO report data, the savings from the move of B-1s to Dyess is greater than the cumulative savings of 64 of the 72 listed DoD recommendations for the AF. The scenario also includes the inefficient move of C-130s from Dyess to lower ranked MCI bases. These C-130 moves add recurring costs of an additional 225 manpower authorizations and inefficient MILCON adds that duplicate existing facilities at Dyess that can not be utilized by inbound additional B-1s.

Because the C-130 portion of the scenario adds costs (recurring manpower and one time MILCON) when the C-130 moves from a MCI ranked Dyess # 11 to Little Rock # 17th, Peterson # 30th, and Elmendorf # 51st are reversed, the savings would be greater and the payback period even shorter.

G. ALLEGATION:

Issue #1, Item 4.

The \$124 million MilCon cost to prepare Dyess for a consolidate B-1B mission will still position Dyess with less facility space than a closed Ellsworth.

COUNTER POINT:

Consolidation of the B-1 fleet at Dyess removes "excess – excess" facilities and right sizes them at Dyess. This efficiency is improved even more if C-130s remain at Dyess ... which properly loads the base.

H. ALLEGATION:

Issue #2: Retaining Ellsworth will create savings the Air Force has not considered.

1. As there may be no cost savings realized by consolidating the entire B-1B fleet at Dyess AFB, TX and closing Ellsworth, two alternative initiatives are available for consideration:

COUNTER POINT:

This is factually inaccurate. The previous mentioned facts disprove this statement.

I. ALLEGATION:

Issue #2, Item 1.

- Retain Ellsworth's current B-1B mission; close Grand Forks AFB, ND and realize the estimated savings of \$2.656 billion (or such an amount as allowed) and designated Ellsworth AFB as the base for continued strategic presence in **the north central U.S.**

- Ellsworth was the only base in the north central U.S. judged suitable for the bed down of the Global Hawk mission (ACC Environmental Impact Statement, March 2001); Ellsworth should be designated for the emerging UAV mission;
- In terms of other future missions, Ellsworth ranked first in six of eight Air Force categories (Bomber, Airlift, Tanker, Fighter, SOF, C2ISR and Space) when compared to Grand Forks and Minot (other two north central bases).

COUNTER POINT:

When comparing all 8 categories for Dyess and Ellsworth. Dyess is ranked 14th of 154 and Ellsworth ranked only 25th of 154. Dyess MCI was greater for 5 of 8 areas (Bomber, Airlift, Fighter, SOF, and UAV).

J. ALLEGATION:

Issue #2, Item 1.

- If it is the judgment of the commission that the B-1Bs should be consolidated at one base, retain Ellsworth as the principal base to house the B-1 mission. Ellsworth is better suited to maintain and operate all B-1B's than Dyess for the following reasons:
 - The Military Operating Area and low level route used by Dyess AFB are under control of the federal courts; do not currently provide a suitable B-1B crew training area and are subject to one or possibly two Supplemental Environmental Impact Statements and probable future flight operating restrictions;
 - The Military Operating Area and low level route used by Ellsworth AFB is better suited for all B-1B training and qualification missions; is more readily accessible to Ellsworth; requires fewer total flying hours to accomplish similar missions; and is not subject to the controversy of the Dyess ranges.
 - As Ellsworth can handle 71 large aircraft, it requires only \$63.9 million in construction cost to bed down two additional squadrons. A third additional squadron can be housed in an existing facility recently made available by the construction of a new B-1B squadron operations facility.

COUNTER POINT:

This statement is not corroborated by the Air Force. In fact the AF, in response to a BRAC inquiry dated July 15, 2005 (DCN 4943), counters the statement that all the B-1s fit at Ellsworth. The AF states, "Ellsworth was presented as capable of receiving 71 B-1s, but as the ramp laydown presented to the Commission clearly shows, the parking density would be extremely problematic. Hangar access and taxiways are blocked. All available ramp space, regardless of location, is completely full making airfield management difficult." In short, all the B-1s do NOT fit because ramp configuration would prevent required movement of aircraft. On the other hand, in the same document

the AF states, "the 29 June 2005 ACC site survey of Dyess AFB reports the entire B-1 fleet can be comfortably bedded down with room to spare."

K. ALLEGATION:

Issue #2, Item 2.

Ellsworth is also the most logical choice as a bed down base for the Airborne Laser platform (ABL), having both unencumbered airspace and a hanger capable of housing two B-747 aircraft.

COUNTER POINT:

The "747 ready facility" is currently used as a fitness area with a running track. As of 21 June, the ceiling was being significantly lowered to allow heating and cooling systems to be installed for the people utilizing the fitness center. Moreover, E-4 (747) aircraft currently divert to Dyess AFB on a regular basis and are evidence that Dyess has 747 compatibility. In addition, BCEG minutes from 30 Sept. 2004 laid out the requirements for ABL. They included access to White Sands Range-- the largest volume of unobstructed range in the US with altitudes from Surface to Space. This range is 453 miles from Dyess and 1,119 miles from Ellsworth.

L. ALLEGATION:

- The Bottom Line is Ellsworth should be retained. Ellsworth provides more current and future value to the Air Force than competing large aircraft bases; maintains a base for high tempo B-1B operations; immediate access to an unrestricted MOA; strategic presence in the north central U.S. and can either bed down emerging missions or all B-1B aircraft.

COUNTER POINT:

The Air Force does not concur with this statement. In a letter to the BRAC dated July 15, 2005 (DCN 4943), the AF states, "Bomber MCI scores clearly indicate Dyess is the best B-1 bomber installation. Dyess has FAA approved training airspace volume 2.3 times that available at Ellsworth AFB ... It has a superb low level access giving it a 9.10 point lead in the bomber MCI over Ellsworth. The range complex within 300NM also gave Dyess a 3.12 point advantage... Dyess AFB airspace and training environment is well worth the investment to train and employ the B-1 fleet."

Comments on Testimony before the BRAC Commission

Ref DCN 4982 and 21 June 2005 Testimony

Purpose: The concept of operations, B-1 aircraft capabilities, aircrew training requirements, tactics techniques and procedures (TTP), and Ellsworth / Dyess regional training capabilities have all dramatically changed since 1995 and the last BRAC. This paper comments on direct testimony given to the BRAC (reference DCN 4982).

Testimony: "In Afghanistan, the B-1 accounted for 40%, by weight, of the weapons delivered. In Iraq, 34%. No other weapon system came close."

Comment: The B-1 has performed extremely well and continues to be the "backbone" of the long range strike mission. However, starting with the first use of the B-1 in combat (*Desert Fox* in December 1996) the weapons have ALWAYS been employed from mid altitude (above 18,000 feet). There has been "show of force" low altitude "fly by" in Afghanistan. This has had the effect of disbursing suspected Taliban. However, when weapons are used, they are "guided weapons" from medium or high altitude. The B-1 has NEVER dropped a weapon in ANY conflict at low altitude.

The low altitude delivery was the major tactic technique during the Cold War. The Air Force has B-1 low level training requirements to keep that skill available. It is part of the capability that the aircraft and crewmembers need to train to maintain this skill, but today's combat emphasis is above 18,000 ft operations training on "sensor to shooter" with speed and efficiency. This happens every day in SWA at medium to high altitude. Again, the B-1 has never dropped weapons at low level during any conflict.

Testimony by Gen. Loh: "I mention this brief history because when the Air Force consolidated to two bases in 2001, it violated one of the guiding principles I consistently and scrupulously followed for long range bomber operations; that is, do not operate more than 36 heavy, long range-bombers from a single base."

Comment: As indicated in the testimony, the AF has not observed this policy since at least 2001 and did not follow this policy in the 1995 BRAC as B-52s were moved from Castle AFB (closed) to Barksdale AFB. In fact, Barksdale has had over 36 Bombers for many years. Barksdale AFB presently has 48 B-52 PAA aircraft [see BCEG Minutes 24 Aug 2004] and when including all attrition reserve, training, backup inventory, etc. they have 59 B-52s at Barksdale. As stated in testimony, the

“Loh rule” was not the policy of AF leadership in 2001 and it is not the policy of today’s AF leadership as it faces the future with an AEF concept and the Global War On Terrorism. Today’s policy reflects the reality of today’s threat and today’s AEF concept of operation. In fact, today’s leaders and today’s AF leadership articulated today’s AF policy

“The Air Force recommendations in this report maximize war fighting capability...effectively consolidating older weapons systems into fewer, larger squadrons.”

[Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations BRAC 2005 (Volume V, Part 1 of 2) p 1. para 1.3].

Testimony: “Operational readiness suffers because too many crews must share too few training ranges and training airspace.”

Comment: This can be true if training assets are not available, but NOT true if B-1s are moved to Dyess. Ellsworth’s training capability is limited due to significantly fewer regional aircrew training assets (ECM, live drop ranges, electronic warfare sites, low level routes and MOA airspace). Dyess has a robust training environment. Per DoD certified data, aircrew training requirements can be accomplished within 300 NM of Dyess ... several can not be accomplished within 300NM of Ellsworth. [ref. AFI 11-2b-1v1,2,3; DoD certified data 1245, 1274,1266]

Testimony: “Logistics suffers because there is too little support infrastructure to handle greatly expanded maintenance, supply and transportation needs”

Comment: The B-1 fleet is homogeneous and all the B-1 aircraft are the same configuration (parts, engines and cockpit configurations etc.). As a result, there are efficiencies of maintenance, logistics and aircrew training that are not available with some aircraft fleets (C-130, P-3, -135 aircraft, etc.). In fact, following the consolidation of B-1s to 2 bases the Mission Capability (MC) rate rose to record high levels. This was despite the fact that we had aircraft deployed to Diego Garcia for SWA, Guam for East Asia, and 2 installations to support. This showed that consolidation has a positive (NOT negative) impact on the B-1 fleet readiness and logistics issues.

If B-1 unique parts are short, having them at a single location eliminates transportation delays, costs, and the need for prioritization between the “present need” at one base vs. the “possible future need” at another base. The Boeing repair facilities and organic B-1 engine repair facilities presently at Dyess become even more cost effective and responsive for the entire B-1 fleet. Lastly, if the AF needs to forward deploy special equipment, the consolidation at Dyess will free up even more assets for possible “pre-positioning” of B-1 specialized equipment (stands, test equipment, etc) to overseas forward operating locations (FOLs).



Testimony: “Quality of life suffers because one base cannot provide adequately for all the medical, housing and other needs of our people.”

Comment: This is not true for Dyess. Keep in mind that in the 1990s Dyess had more than 90 large aircraft, i.e., B-1s, KC-135s and C-130s, and was able to provide adequately for the needs of its people. Placement of all B-1s at Dyess will allow long term investment in homes, long term employment in the “larger” Dyess community and the use of a single school system for the families. Abilene has always supported the medical needs of the AF and the medical community is growing with the addition of a third major hospital in Abilene this year. Abilene has documented capability to add over 2000 military families in the schools and in housing. In fact, Abilene had over 550 housing starts in the month of April 2005. In addition, it will decrease PCS moving costs for the DoD. [ref DoD certified data, *JPAT 7 Installation and Activity Reports Air Force as of April 20, 2005 and BRAC Hearing 11 July 2005 San Antonio, TX*]

Testimony: “In addition, having two B-1 bases allows the Air Force the option of adding back more B-1s from inactive status as it did just recently”



Comment: After the Air Force reduced the fleet from 90 to 60, the success of the B-1 in SWA led to Congress adding back 7 aircraft. An effort was made to bring back another 5 but this met stiff resistance and the Air Force said it would be too expensive. The retired B-1s are NOT in flyable condition. Some are on static display, like the ones at Ellsworth and Dyess AFB. Others have been cannibalized for spare parts.

Testimony: “Moreover, having the entire B-1 fleet stationed at a base with only one runway presents an unacceptable security risk ... an enemy could render the entire B-1 fleet inoperable with a single weapon”

Comment: The Civil engineers of today’s expeditionary AF have a requirement to accomplish rapid runway repair “in X minutes”. In addition, Dyess has a 13,500-foot by 200-foot parallel taxiway that has served as an emergency back-up runway for decades. It has NEVER been needed. The taxiway at Ellsworth can not be used because of airfield layout. This issue of single location and/or single runway is true at many of the AF installations today: Whiteman (B-2), Beale (U-2), Robbins (E-8), Offutt (E-4) etc. It should not be treated as a unique issue for B-1s.

Testimony: “Closing Ellsworth shuts down forever valuable training airspace in the northwest U.S. and aggravates the available training ranges and airspace at the receiving base.”



Comment: We assume this is refers to Powder River. This statement is then inaccurate. If the Powder River MOA is still required by DoD (and not excess-

excess), it can be kept available when Ellsworth is closed, even though Ellsworth may be the "primary user" for the area. If Powder River were to be closed, it would be because its stated "unique" capability is not required by other installations or the requirement is being filled by existing, more capable ranges / MOAs closer to home station. The use of Powder River might be limited because the requirement to fly low for accurate weapons delivery has drastically decreased (B-1 low level training requirements is defined by AFI as flight below 5000 feet AGL) as the GPS and laser guided weapons become the basic standard of employment. According to DoD certified data, Dyess has a 2.3 times the MOA volume and 3.7 times the IR routes than Ellsworth. Therefore, there is no "aggravation" of training ranges if B-1s move to Dyess. The opposite is true if B-1s were to move to Ellsworth as suggested as an alternative. [Ref DoD certified data 1245, 1274, 1266]

Testimony: As a result of a class action lawsuit, there are currently training range restrictions at Dyess. Dyess' primary low-level training route (IR-178) and the Lancer MOA, together known as the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (RBTI), is controlled by a District court order. For example, flying is only allowed at 500 ft. or above for low-level routes. According to Gen. Loh, low-level training is necessary. Specifically, low-level entry training (at 100 A.) to avoid detection is still very important.

Comment: An AF response has been given to the issue of RBTI (reference DCN 5321). This document states, "there is no permanent restriction issue pending in court. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the original EIS analysis, which used wingtip vortices affects at high altitude extrapolated to 300 ft AGL, as insufficient ... If the results support flight at 300 ft AGL, the Air Force will follow the normal process of obtaining FAA approval to use the RBTI as originally requested. None of the court's rulings require the Air Force to return to court for approval as part of this process... If the results do not support operations at 300 ft AGL, the 500 ft restriction will most likely apply.... The training requirement to fly at 300 ft AGL, however, can be accomplished at restricted ranges" [note: Powder River and Lancer are both MOAs and NOT Restricted Areas, thus the same restrictions would then apply to both]. "Given that possibility, Dyess AFB still has access to closer low-altitude ranges and airspace than Ellsworth AFB. Even at 500 ft AGL, the RBTI is still valuable."

If the new EIS finds an issue with the altitude flown, this would likely influence restrictions on low level operations for the B-1, regardless of location. Current *AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 11-2B-1, VOLUME 1 and dated 4 JUNE 2004* indicates, "Low level can be logged as a training event at altitudes "below 5000' AGL." Also, in *AFI 11-2B-1V3 11 MARCH 2002 Para 7.10.2* it states, "Minimum operating altitudes/Set Clearance Planes (SCP) are 300 feet day and 500 feet night/IMC" and in para 7.10.2.1, "Minimum TF altitudes for military training routes in FLIP AP/1B and AP/3 and those provided by the local airspace managers at the originating activity will take precedence if higher than the altitudes listed above."

Testimony: “Criteria four concerns cost and manpower. Closing Ellsworth will not reduce cost or manpower. In the long run, trying to operate 67 B-1s from a single base will cost more than operating two B-1 bases at peak efficiency for each.”

Comment: Stationing 26 B-1s at Ellsworth and 39 at Dyess is NOT efficient base loading. This would leave “excess-excess” capability at both bases, NOT “peak efficiency”. It is a well established fact that significant “open the door manpower costs” are required for an installation of any size. Two bases mean 2 wing staffs, 2 of each type of group staffs, 2 civil engineers, etc, etc ,etc. The savings of consolidation at Dyess is substantial. Per certified COBRA data, 3,308 military and 438 civilians will move from Ellsworth and only 1,918 military and 129 civilians are gained by Dyess. This is a substantial savings of 1,390 military and 309 civilian positions (a total of 1,699 positions) to operate the same number of B-1s at Dyess vs. operating out of both Ellsworth and Dyess.

Looking at the recurring costs of dual bases vs. consolidation, COBRA’s “today’s costs” are reduced by \$24.7M / year in recurring cost of operating the same number of B-1 and C-130 aircraft. Dyess is a more efficient operation than Ellsworth by measuring recurring cost of BOS and sustainment. Dyess supports 35% more personnel (5,777 vs. 3,753) than Ellsworth for only 18% more BOS costs per year. Sustainment costs efficiencies are even more pronounced. Gross sustainment costs today are higher at Ellsworth for support of 29 B-1s than the sustainment costs at Dyess for operating 36 B-1s AND 29 C-130s (\$14.4M vs. \$14.3M). Simply put, the DoD certified data shows Dyess is a more cost effective location to operate and the recurring savings in manpower, BOS and sustainment costs are substantial if B-1s are consolidated at Dyess.

Testimony: “Criteria seven concerns the ability of the receiving infrastructure to support the mission. Closing Ellsworth will cause enormous, long-term infrastructure problems at the receiving base that will adversely impact operational readiness of the B-1 fleet.”

Comment: The AF certified data under criteria 7 shows that Abilene has the necessary infrastructure to support the additional missions and personnel.

**Substantial Cost Savings in Closing
Ellsworth and Transferring the B-1s to Dyess**

- The Air Force will **save \$1.8 billion in closing Ellsworth**. This is fifth largest savings for the Air Force and a significant portion (12%) of the Air Force's BRAC savings.
- Ellsworth has 3,308 military and 438 civilians positions. Only 1,918 military and 129 civilians positions will be moved to Dyess. The Air Force will **save 1,390 military and 309 civilians positions** by operating the same number of B-1s at Dyess versus Dyess and Ellsworth.

	Military	Civilians
Ellsworth	3,308	438
Transfers to Dyess	<u>1,918</u>	<u>129</u>
Savings	1,390	309


- Chairman Principi is quoted as saying: "that those military personnel are not coming off the end strength, but they're being moved. . . From our accounting perspective, it's really not a cost savings."
- Chairman Principi is wrong.
 - Paying the extra 1,390 military and 309 civilians needed at Ellsworth **clearly wastes money**.
 - Eliminating the 1,390 military and 309 civilians positions at Ellsworth **clearly saves money**.
 - The fact that the Air Force can use these savings to hire personnel for new mission requirements at other locations is a good thing and is what base closure is all about.
 - If Ellsworth is not closed, the Air Force will have to pay the extra personnel at Ellsworth **and then** either (1) not hire personnel for new missions or (2) get extra money to hire new personnel.
- Chairman Principi incorrectly misstates the GAO's position. The GAO does not disregard the cost savings in reducing personnel at a closed base. The GAO only points out that "claiming such personnel as BRAC savings without reducing end strength does not provide dollar savings that can be reapplied outside personnel accounts and could result in the Air Force having to find other sources of funding for up-front investment costs needed to implement its BRAC recommendation." GAO Report at 124. The fact that personnel savings may be kept in the personnel account still means that there are savings.
- The GAO notes the Air Force position that the saved slots will be used for formal training, stressed career fields and emerging missions. **This is what the BRAC is all about.**
- In reviewing the Ellsworth closure, the GAO raised no concerns regarding the cost savings. GAO Report at 130.
- Closing Ellsworth will also save operating costs. The gross sustainment costs for Ellsworth (operating only 29 B-1s) are \$14.4 million versus \$14.3 million for Dyess (operating 31 B-1s and 29 C-130s).

John Michael Loh
General, USAF Retired
125 Captaine Graves
Williamsburg, Virginia 23185

August 16, 2005

Chairman Anthony Principi and Members of the Commission
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clarke Street
Arlington VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and Members of the Commission,



As a follow-up to my sworn testimony of June 21 at Rapid City, I write to provide you with a succinct summary of my logic and set of arguments supporting the retention of Ellsworth AFB and its B-1 bombers. Following my testimony and after hearing the responses from the Pentagon in response to your questions, I am even more convinced that you should retain Ellsworth.

Please recall that as Commander, Air Combat Command, I commanded all of the Air Force's combat aircraft including the B-1 and other bombers.

Also, I am no stranger to the base closing process. As a result of previous BRACs from 1991 until my retirement in 1995, I personally closed 13 major operational bases in Air Combat Command (George AFB, Bergstrom AFB, March AFB, England AFB, Homestead AFB, Myrtle Beach AFB, Griffiss AFB, Carswell AFB, Eaker AFB, K.I. Sawyer AFB, Wurtsmith AFB, Loring AFB and Castle AFB.) I also oversaw the realignment of several other Air Combat Command bases. I can think of no other Air Force officer, active or retired, that has more experience in this business than I.

Also, as I stated in my sworn testimony and as is still true today, I accept no compensation whatsoever for this work to keep Ellsworth open. I do it because I consider it my duty and essential for our national security. I cannot stand by and let this misguided Pentagon recommendation go unanswered.

Here are my major arguments and supporting rationale:

Military Value of the B-1/Ellsworth Combination. Today and for the foreseeable future, the fleet of 67 B-1 bombers is the backbone of the Air Force's combat power. The B-1 dominated the combat action in both Afghanistan and Iraq delivering more weapons than any other aircraft. Emerging threats in the Western Pacific and Middle East demand that we not uproot the B-1 force and risk severe degradation of combat readiness by moving all of them to one location. The QDR currently underway in DoD will likely validate threat scenarios in the Western Pacific and East Asia that will place an even greater value on the B-1's long range and high payloads. The upheaval of the B-1 force alone will cause extreme and immediate turmoil for several years, and continuing readiness problems thereafter.

Unacceptable Congestion and Overcrowding at Dyess. Sixty seven B-1 bombers at one base is unworkable and will result in the loss of operational readiness, overcrowding of facilities such as hospitals, housing and schools, and reduction in the morale and quality of life for Air Force members and dependents.

The guiding principle for decades in the Air Force for the right size of a bomber base is a maximum of 36 bombers. The nominal number per base is 24 bombers. Twenty Four to thirty bombers are the functional equivalent of 54-72 fighters. Therefore putting 67 bombers at one base is like putting 2 ½ fighter wings, 140-180 fighters, at one base. The mission will suffer greatly. Consolidation may be good in theory, but overconsolidation, the situation here, is misguided.

The Air Force provided a misleading answer to the Commission's question about consolidating all B-1s at one base. The Air Force said consolidating B-1s is no different than having all B-2s, E-8 JSTARS, E-3 AWACS, U-2s, RC-135 Rivet Joints, and F-117s at one base. But, the numbers are very different. Here are the numbers of aircraft in those fleets:

B-2 – 21 aircraft; E-8 JSTARS – 17 aircraft; E-3 AWACS – 32 aircraft; U-2 – 33 aircraft; RC-135 Rivet Joints – 21 aircraft; and F-117 Stealth Fighter – 55 aircraft.

None of these is even half the size of the B-1 fleet of 67 aircraft except the F-117. But the F-117 is a fighter and 55 fighters is a nominal size for a fighter wing. However, 67 long range B-1 bombers at one base is unprecedented and a formula for failure.

Loss of Operational Readiness. The condition I describe above is bound to cause a loss of combat readiness, aggravated in the short term by the move from Ellsworth, but extending for the long term because of saturated working conditions for operations, maintenance, supply, transportation, base services and munitions handling and storage. The B-1 has four engines, four crew members and a robust set of missions that require a larger number of people per assigned aircraft than any other combat weapon system. The overcrowding at Dyess is too risky a step to take for this front-line bomber.

Encroachment. In my opinion, the Pentagon failed in its assessment of Ellsworth in the criterion regarding present and future encroachment. In my book, Ellsworth ranks number one of all Air Force bases in terms of its resistance to encroachment on the ground and in the air particularly when looking 40-50 years ahead as the Air Force should. Ellsworth enjoys a sparse operating environment, mostly over federal BLM land where encroachment and complaints from citizens is minimal and will be for generations to come. Ellsworth can accept new, future missions and still be free from encroachment or any operating restrictions. Closing Ellsworth will forever deny the Pentagon the use of a base from which it can operate any type of aircraft, subsonic, supersonic, hypersonic for as far as the eye can see. It would be unconscionable to close it.

Endless Range Problems at Dyess. Even absent the current operating restrictions at the Dyess ranges, doubling the number of B-1s operating in the ranges in west Texas will degrade readiness because of range saturation. At the time of my

testimony, I was not aware of the operating restrictions in the ranges used by Dyess's B-1s that currently impose a significant impact to operational readiness according to sworn testimony of the Air Force.

Active lawsuits by farmers and ranchers are causing these operating limitations that further weaken the readiness of the Dyess B-1 crews. Now, doubling the number of B-1s will likely incur more legal action because the plaintiffs there feel empowered to take action as the number of B-1 flights doubles. This situation will only make operations from Dyess worse. Dyess's neighbors are not friendly to the Air Force and B-1 operations, and this situation will only get worse. The Air Force can expect endless litigation and more operating restrictions at Dyess.

Contrast that unfriendly environment with the situation around Ellsworth. As I wrote above, the Ellsworth environment is unencroached and its ranges are largely over federal BLM land. There is no litigation or serious noise complaints in South Dakota and Montana where Ellsworth's B-1s fly. Ellsworth has friendly neighbors and, because of the remoteness of the flying areas, those areas are likely to remain friendly for many decades.

Projected Cost Savings are Illusory and Likely Unattainable. The Pentagon projects cost savings of about \$90 million per year by closing Ellsworth. Apparently, between the GAO and the Air Force, this number has already been reduced considerably. But, even so, my experience with DoD cost projections tells me that the projected savings are extremely optimistic and somehow never materialize, for several reasons.

The two biggest estimating errors in base closure numbers are the cost to close the existing base, and the cost to provide facilities for the gaining base.

Base closure costs are always underestimated. That's because the DoD invariably understates the cost of environmental restoration and the cost of unforeseen problems like unexploded ordnance, dangerous materials in weapon storage areas and remediation of hazardous materials. Many of these costs emerge later and become unprogrammed expenses in current year budgets. I have many examples based on my personal experience in closing 13 bases. I do not believe we ever met the projected DoD cost savings for closure.

Secondly, and more startling, the cost of building the infrastructure for the gaining base is always underestimated by wide margins. Why? Well, the Air Force believes that minimal modifications to existing facilities are all that's required to beddown the new aircraft. In actuality, and based on my own in-depth personal experience, what really happens is that an entire new base infrastructure is funded and approved through the Military Construction process. When it's all said and done, the cost to move Ellsworth's B-1s to Dyess will far exceed the number in the Pentagon's BRAC Report. I know. I've seen it happen over and over again.

So, I look at these cost savings with great skepticism. I seriously doubt there will be any net savings from closing Ellsworth. And that means the Pentagon is causing all this turmoil and risk to our national security in its zeal to meet a meaningless base closure goal. That is irresponsible.

*No net saving when you factor in
misc costs*

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission, I have served as the senior commander of bomber operations for our nation. I sincerely feel that this massive movement of half our B-1s, the most productive bomber we have, to a single base, given all the real world issues I describe here, and based on my personal and professional experience, is misguided, risky, costly and will be injurious to our national security.

I urge you, once again, to retain Ellsworth AFB as a model B-1 base, capable of additional missions, unencroached as far as the eye can see, and essential for our nation's defense preparedness.

Sincerely,



John Michael Loh
General, USAF Retired
Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, 1990-1991
Commander, Tactical Air Command, 1991-1992
Commander, Air Combat Command, 1992-1995

Regional Hearing Issue Summary
Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD

Rapid City, SD Regional Hearing 6/21/05

South Dakota

- Witness: Colonel Jim McKeon, USAF (Retired)
 - Issue #1: DoD's mismanagement in the release of data, records of discussions, etc. used in the formulation of recommendations.
 - Issue #2: DoD's process is inconsistent with the gravity of the national security decisions being made.
 - Issue #3: Among the three bases in north central US, Ellsworth ranked first in six of the eight categories.
 - Issue #4: Consolidating all B-1 aircraft in one base with one runway violates the USAF's principle that the long range strike force mission needs flexibility in providing strategic response.
 - Issue #5: Substantial deviation from the criteria in the development of the recommendation to close Ellsworth AFB.
 - Criteria 1 violation: recommending the consolidation of B-1s at a base with decreased operational readiness.
 - Criteria 2 violation: recommending moving the B-1 fleet to a base whose airspace is not as accessible thereby increasing costs and reducing effectiveness.
 - Criteria 3 violation: the recommendation denies DoD a base for future missions in an unencroached area.
 - Criteria 4 violation: the cost to operate the entire B-1 fleet will exceed the cost of maintaining two bases.
 - Criteria 6 violation: Ellsworth's closure would have a greater economic impact on the community than those bases that would be retained.
 - Criteria 7 violation: the recommendation would relocate B-1s to a receiving base with less plant replacement value and less infrastructure and capacity.
 - Issue #6: The metric on which the bomber mission capability measurement is based does not consider the quality of the training available on the range or the average sortie time required to accomplish identical mission requirements.
 - Issue #7: It will cost more to for another base to use the Powder River MOA to accomplish the B-1 mission than it would for Ellsworth (the added cost per mission is estimated at \$100,000, an estimated \$68.6 million cost or a \$1.3 billion, over \$3 billion cost over the next 20 years).

- Witness: General John Michael Loh, USAF (Retired)
 - Issue #1: There should not be more than 36 B-1s at one base. Otherwise, there is too few training ranges and airspace for too many crew which results in deficiencies,

waste, and decreased operational readiness. Logistics as well as quality of life suffer too.

- Issue #2: DoD deviated from 6 of 8 of the criteria in its recommendation to close Ellsworth and move all the B-1s to another base (details regarding the deviations are above in the McKeon testimony).
- Issue #3: Need to be especially careful in dealing with any decisions regarding B-1s given that they are the Air Force's number one weapon system in the GWOT.
- Issue #4: Having the entire B-1 fleet at a base with only one runway poses a security risk. It creates an inviting enemy target.
- Issue #5: Having two B-1 bases allows room for the addition of new missions at each base, a BRAC criterion.

- Witness: Lieutenant General Thad Wolfe, USAF (Retired)

- Issue #1: Ellsworth's military value includes its proximity to uncrowded and accessible airspace and ranges.
- Issue #2: BRAC criteria are flawed in that it does not take into account subjective information such as airmen retention, housing, and other quality of life factors. The unique relationship between the base and the community is not quantifiable. This relationship impacts quality of life significant to military value as well as operational readiness. Ellsworth's B-1s outscore their peers in readiness measurements in large part due to these factors.
- Issue #3: DoD's data may not reflect the most recent updates at Ellsworth AFB (e.g. new housing units, infrastructure improvements, etc.).
- Issue #4: DoD's data may not have considered the quality of the training ranges but rather the distance to them.
- Issue #5: Given Ellsworth's attributes (i.e. its airspace, ranges, readiness, etc.); it should be a viable consideration for future evolving missions (e.g. global strike, information operation, intelligence/surveillance and recon, missile defense, etc.). Our response to GWOT should consider Ellsworth for the UAV mission.

- Witness: Colonel Pat McElgunn, USAF (Retired)

- Issue #1: Ellsworth's modernized facilities and base operations support cost was not properly accounted for.
- Issue #2: Ellsworth's infrastructure makes it an ideal base for future missions as well as a base for active duty, guard or reserve missions. Ellsworth has 1,800 acres of land that can be easily developed.
- Issue #3: Geographically, Ellsworth is in prime location for current and future missions. It has easy and quick access to ranges, unconstrained airspace, and excellent flying weather.
- Issue #4: Ellsworth has a 65-year history of supporting multiple aircrafts and therefore has joint mission capability.
- Issue #5: Ellsworth has invested an excess of \$150 million into its infrastructure and its quality of life facilities. Overall, it's an efficient and cost effective base. There

is new housing on base, some of the lowest utility rates in the ACC, and reasonable electric, gas, and water rates.

- Witness: Jim Shaw, Rapid City Mayor
 - Issue #1: Airmen at Ellsworth rave about the access to Powder River MOA and the uncongested skies.
 - Issue #2: Ellsworth receives unlimited support from its community. For example, it addressed encroachment in the 90s by relocating an interstate highway and thus moving development away from the base. There are few, if any, encroachment issues.
 - Issue #3: Management and retention of military personnel a result of the community paying close attention to and contributing to the quality of life issues. A 2004 survey rated the overall quality of life of those in Rapid City community to be in the top 25 percent of 60 military communities evaluated.

- Tim Johnson, U.S. Senator
 - Issue #1: Given the military's reliance on the B-1 bomber in defending our country, Ellsworth AFB has been transformed to ensure that its mission was not compromised and its operational readiness is maintained. There has been \$140 million invested in the base over the past decade.
 - Issue #2: Ellsworth AFB affords airmen a good quality of life (new housing, expanded child care center, new library, and new education center).
 - Issue #3: Ellsworth AFB is strategically located with good access to training ranges and potential for growth. Ellsworth has strong community support and does not face the urban encroachment issues that confront many of our other military installations.

- John Thune, U.S. Senator
 - Issue #1: Does it make military sense to house the entire B-1 fleet in a single location? Further consolidation of the B-1s would create a security risk (makes B-1 fleet vulnerable to terrorist attacks and natural disasters). Need to consider history (e.g. Pearl Harbor, Cold War, and September 11) as well as emerging threats (e.g. China, N. Korea, and Iran). We should not aim to save money at the expense of security.
 - Issue #2: As threats change, we need to increase not reduce our flexibility to respond. National Defense Strategy report supports this.
 - Issue #3: Ellsworth's military value is clear and could easily expand to take on additional missions. Ellsworth AFB scored highest in 6 of 8 functional categories and scored higher in Tankers than 3 Tanker bases (McConnell, Fairchild, and McDill).

- Stephanie Herseth, U.S. Representative
 - Issue #1: Ellsworth is one of the few bases with the viability to accept the emerging missions currently being developed and deployed, and it is well-positioned to operate virtually any defense platform conceived by the military in the future.
 - Issue #2: Ellsworth was identified by the USAF as an excellent candidate for an unmanned aerial vehicle mission, such as the Predator or Global Hawk. In fact, Ellsworth was the only north central base considered suitable for the initial bed down of a Global Hawk UAV mission in 2001.
 - Issue #3: Ellsworth also has been surveyed for the bed down of an Airborne Laser, and its Pride Hanger is capable of housing two 747 sized aircraft, making it a prime candidate for that mission.

- Sidney Goss, Ph.D., SD School of Mines & Technology
 - Issue #1: The BRAC recommendation would greatly impact the economy of the area. A 10,000 person loss would be 9 percent of the MSA (South Dakota's entire population is 771,000 people, Rapid City has a population of about 60,000, and the Rapid City MSA has a population of 160,000 people).
 - Issue #2: Ellsworth is South Dakota's 2nd largest employer. If Ellsworth were to close, there would be a loss to other areas as well (e.g. education, services, medicine, culture, security and safety, etc.).
 - Issue #3: The area is also experiencing net out-migration. Losing 10,000 people in one year would equal 76 years of out-migration for the area.

- Mike Rounds, Governor of South Dakota
 - Issue #1: America needs the B-1 on more than one base so the B-1 is not vulnerable to a single attack or a natural disaster. Why wasn't the importance of redundancy a factor in DoD's scoring system?
 - Issue #2: The Air Force erred when it testified that Ellsworth could not handle all the B-1B aircraft. Ellsworth has the space to house 71 large aircraft. The Air Force also underestimated the total square footage of the available ramp space by 20 percent.
 - Issue #3: Ellsworth should also be considered for its jointness capability.

Wyoming

- Rick Hawkins, representing the county commissioners from Crook County
 - Issue #1: There is a concern regarding the continuing monitoring of abandoned nuclear radar station outside of Sundance, Wyoming. At the present time, the people use Ellsworth as a base for their operations, and we just want to make sure that they have a continuing base of operations to do their test for radioactive material in our area.
 - Issue #2: Closing Ellsworth will cause some veterans who still use the facilities there financial hardship.

Issues for BRAC Staff Consideration

Issue #1: Closing Ellsworth will not create the savings the Air Force estimates.

1. GAO Analysis of Air Force Selection Process and Recommendation for Base Closures and Realignment (GAO-05-785, July 2005) specifically noted:

- In *Issues Identified with Approved Recommendations* (p. 124), the “BRAC Commission may wish to consider ... the closure of Ellsworth AFB, SD.”
- Over 60% of the Air Force’s net annual recurring savings are cost avoidances from military personnel eliminations; however, eliminations are not expected to result in end strength reduction (p. 123). *Will closing Ellsworth actually save \$1.853.3 billion?*
- Claiming BRAC associated personnel savings without end strength reductions does not provide dollar savings that can be applied outside of personnel accounts and could require other sources for up-front investment costs (p. 124). *How will the cost (\$299.1 million) to close Ellsworth be funded?*
- The estimated savings from closing Grand Forks AFB, ND (\$2.656.3 billion) was reduced to \$1.982 billion by a realignment versus closure decision in the week prior to the approval of the final recommendations (p. 129). Ellsworth is rated as a higher valued base in 7 of 8 Air Force functions; *why not close Grand Forks?*
- The Air Force did not develop one composite score for each base across all eight mission areas rather they established index scores in each mission area and were not able to clearly delineate between lower and higher military value rankings (p. 117). *If composite scores were used, would Ellsworth’s rating as higher valued in 7 of 8 mission areas have clearly defined it as a base to be retained?*

2. The consolidation of the entire B-1B fleet at Dyess AFB, TX and the closure of Ellsworth may not realize:

- The reported savings of \$1.853 billion as it includes a significant percentage of personnel savings which can not be applied outside of personnel accounts;
- Any cost associated with consolidated B-1B flying operations in the Dyess area will be increased by \$14,000 per mission due to an increase of 0.7 hrs of flight time when compared to similar missions flown at Ellsworth (estimated twenty year cost could range as high as \$280 million).

- The estimated savings of consolidated flying operations due to limited or inaccessible aerial training areas/altitudes in the Dyess area and/or the continued use of the Powder River Military Operating Area, specifically,
 - Powder River MOA missions flown from Dyess AFB will require an added five hours of flight time at a cost of \$100,000.00 per mission or \$100 million per 1,000 missions flown --- twenty year cost for such missions could range from \$1 to 2 billion.

3. The cost to close Ellsworth AFB (\$299 million) is the most expensive of all Air Force recommended actions and provides the least rate of return over the 20 years of calculated savings. Other major closures and realignments provide returns on investment in a range two to five times greater.

4. The \$124 million MilCon cost to prepare Dyess for a consolidate B-1B mission will still position Dyess with less facility space than a closed Ellsworth.

Issue #2: Retaining Ellsworth will create savings the Air Force has not considered.

1. As there may be no cost savings realized by consolidating the entire B-1B fleet at Dyess AFB, TX and closing Ellsworth, two alternative initiatives are available for consideration:

- Retain Ellsworth's current B-1B mission; close Grand Forks AFB, ND and realize the estimated savings of \$2.656 billion (or such an amount as allowed) and designate Ellsworth AFB as the base for continued strategic presence in the north central U.S.
 - Ellsworth was the only base in the north central U.S. judged suitable for the bed down of the Global Hawk mission (ACC Environmental Impact Statement, March 2001); Ellsworth should be designated for the emerging UAV mission;
 - In terms of other future missions, Ellsworth ranked first in six of eight Air Force categories (Bomber, Airlift, Tanker, Fighter, SOF, C2ISR and Space) when compared to Grand Forks and Minot (other two north central bases).
- If it is the judgment of the commission that the B-1Bs should be consolidated at one base, retain Ellsworth as the principal base to house the B-1 mission. Ellsworth is better suited to maintain and operate all B-1B's than Dyess for the following reasons:


- **The Military Operating Area and low level route used by Dyess AFB are under control of the federal courts; do not currently provide a suitable B-1B crew training area and are subject to one or possibly two Supplemental Environmental Impact Statements and probable future flight operating restrictions;**
- **The Military Operating Area and low level route used by Ellsworth AFB is better suited for all B-1B training and qualification missions; is more readily accessible to Ellsworth; requires fewer total flying hours to accomplish similar missions; and is not subject to the controversy of the Dyess ranges.**
- **As Ellsworth can handle 71 large aircraft, it requires only \$63.9 million in construction cost to bed down two additional squadrons. A third additional squadron can be housed in an existing facility recently made available by the construction of a new B-1B squadron operations facility.**

2. Ellsworth is also the most logical choice as a bed down base for the Airborne Laser platform (ABL), having both unencumbered airspace and a hanger capable of housing two B-747 aircraft.

The Bottom Line is Ellsworth should be retained. Ellsworth provides more current and future value to the Air Force than competing large aircraft bases; maintains a base for high tempo B-1B operations; immediate access to an unrestricted MOA; strategic presence in the north central U.S. and can either bed down emerging missions or all B-1B aircraft.


Comparative Military Value Rankings Between Ellsworth AFB, Grand Forks AFB, & Minot AFB

Air Force Function	1 st in Rankings	2 nd in Rankings	3 rd in Rankings
Bomber	Ellsworth 50.81	Minot 45.72	Grand Forks 38.48
Lift	Ellsworth 59.40	Minot 54.34	Grand Forks 50.53
Tanker	Ellsworth 83.73	Grand Forks 63.52	Minot 62.74
Fighter	Ellsworth 58.06	Minot 56.64	Grand Forks 55.88
SOF	Minot 45.12	Ellsworth 43.91	Grand Forks 43.75
C2ISR	Ellsworth 87.72	Minot 77.04	Grand Forks 76.33
UAV	Grand Forks 70.93	Ellsworth 69.73	Minot 67.53
Space	Ellsworth 84.12	Minot 83.93	Grand Forks 82.64



Candidate # USAF - 0018V3/ S200.3
#USAF - 0117V2/ S420c3

	Ellsworth Air force Base	Grand Forks Air force Base
One-time Cost:	\$229 M	\$129 M
Payback period:	1yr / 2009	Immediate
NPV Savings:	\$1,853 M	\$2,656 M



“As we transform our posture, we are guided by the following goals:

...Developing greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not overly concentrating military forces in a few locations;...”

Source: DoD, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005, page 22.




Principles and Corresponding Imperatives

Deploy & Employ (Operational):


- The Department needs secure installations that are optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense)... and that ensure strategic redundancy.

Major Active Duty U.S. Air Force Bases (Northern Region, Flying Mission) 1958



Source: AIR FORCE Magazine

Major Active Duty U.S. Air Force Bases (Northern Region, Flying Mission) 2005



Source: AIR FORCE Magazine

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
2521 CLARK STREET, SUITE 600
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
(703) 699-2950

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: July 12, 2005

TIME: 9:30 AM

MEETING WITH: General Michael Loh (USAF Ret.)

SUBJECT: Ellsworth Air Force Base

PARTICIPANTS:

General Michael Loh
Senator Thune (attendee by conference call)
Bob Taylor/Legislative Director, Senator Thune's Office/202-228-5385
Matt Zabel/Chief of Staff, Senator Thune's Office/202-224-2321
Steve Moffitt/Principal, WHD Government Affairs/202-851-1428
Barry Rhoads/TRG/202-632-0040
Pat McElgunn/Director, Ellsworth Task Force/605-348-6317
Murray Feldman/Counsel to Davis Mountains Trans Pecos Heritage Association,
Holland & Hart LLP/208-342-5000
Kaare Remme/Chairman, Davis Mountains Trans Pecos Heritage Association/
512-396-4828

Commission Staff:

Frank Cirillo, Director of Review & Analysis
Bob Cook, Interagency Issues Team Leader
Ken Small, Air Force Team Leader
Dan Cowhig, Deputy General Counsel
Art Beauchamp, Senior Air Force Analyst
Tim MacGregor, Senior Air Force Analyst
Dave Combs, Senior Air Force Analyst
Craig Hall, GAO Analyst, Air Force Team
*** Tanya Cruz, GAO Analyst, Air Force Team**
Justin Breitschopf, Air Force Associate Analyst

MEETING SUMMARY:

We met with Gen. Loh as well as other officials to discuss the recommended closure of Ellsworth Air Force Base (AFB). Unless specifically mentioned, all information contained herein can be attributed to Gen. Loh or other non-BRAC officials participating in the meeting.

Gen. Loh is currently the unpaid mentor and advisor to the QDR team (Gen. Jumper requested his help). In the past, he has been very involved in the closure of several bases. Based on his experience, those bases recommended for closure were closed because the force structure at that base went away (e.g. B-52s). Therefore, he does not understand why the SecDef's recommendations call for closing bases where the force structure is staying around. Whereas it makes sense to close Cannon because F-16s would be retired under DoD's recommendation, it does not make sense to close Ellsworth.

Therefore, he wanted to help in this instance because the B-1s are not going away and he believes consolidating them all in one location is the wrong thing to do.

Our subsequent discussion is summarized below under the following broad topics:

Points to consider

- Gen. Loh's guiding principle for B-1s calls for no more than 36 bombers at one base. According to Gen. Loh, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) has nothing to do with this principle. Instead, it is based on a logistical, operational, and quality of life point of view. For example, if coordinating both logistics and training at one base, you reach a point of diminishing returns in terms of operational readiness. However, maintaining 24-36 B-1s at one base keeps logistics and operations in balance. Gen. Loh questioned why DoD would break up efficient operations at two bases to create inefficient operations at one base.
- The shifting of the National Security Strategy. Putting all the assets on one base makes it a very visible and inviting target. DoD needs to get serious about looking at the Western Pacific from a national security perspective. This issue calls into play the value of the long-range strike assets such as the B-1s and the caution necessary when tinkering with such a combat ready fleet.
- Gen. Loh believes there would be increased training opportunities and thus more opportunities for Command if more than one B-1 base exists. He said that if the Air Force was going to build 67 new bombers, they would, in all probability, put them on three bases as they have done in the past.

Speculation as to the reason for DoD's recommendation

- The B-1 is significantly undervalued in the military. The B-1 does not get as much attention as the fighters despite the fact that it is the backbone of the Air Force and was responsible for 34% of the weapons delivered in Iraq.
- DoD's cost analysis beat out its operations analysis. This is problematic given that some of the cost savings are not legitimate. For example, personnel savings are elusive because overall DoD is not cutting end strength.
- USAF's principle that consolidating like aircraft produces efficiencies.

Dyess Litigation

- As a result of a class action lawsuit, there are currently training range restrictions at Dyess. Dyess' primary low-level training route (IR-178) and the Lancer MOA, together known as the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (RBTI), is controlled by a District court order. For example, flying is only allowed at 500 ft. or above for low-level routes. According to Gen. Loh, low-level training is necessary. Specifically, low-level entry training (at 100 ft.) to avoid detection is still very important.
- The litigation was likely brought forth because of noise complaints, environmental problems, and structural problems. As a result, the training assets mentioned above are subject to such court imposed restrictions until the USAF prepares a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
- Officials claim that DoD's deliberative documents do not include information regarding the Dyess AFB litigation. Such an omission calls into question Dyess AFB's military value scores related to proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission and Low Level Routes under the Current and Future Mission category. According to a summary document provided by officials, "the over-inflation of Dyess' assessed military value in this category – in comparison to Ellsworth AFB – was a principle determining factor in placing Ellsworth on the closure list. Therefore, DoD substantially deviated from its evaluation of military criteria and the recommended consolidation of the B-1 fleet at Dyess AFB should be rejected."
- Senator Thune added (via phone) that should the operating restrictions remain in effect for some time, Dyess AFB's missions would have to be flown at Ellsworth's Powder River Training Complex. Over time, such a commute would add significant costs.
- In 50 years, the difference between Ellsworth AFB and Dyess AFB boils down to federal land at Ellsworth versus private land at Dyess. According to officials, there is a certain amount of risk accepted on federal land that is not accepted on private land.

Encroachment

- In terms of encroachment, Gen. Loh said that DoD should be projecting 50 years into the future. If that were done, according Gen. Loh, Ellsworth would outrank other bases. Gen. Loh said he did not understand why Luke AFB or Oceana were not on the closure list given their encroachment issues.
- Gen. Loh said that if DoD wants to put all of the B-1s at one base, a better move would have been to put them at Ellsworth. He said Ellsworth has good ranges, great facilities, and is a tremendous base for new missions. He believes Ellsworth was ranked #1 for the UAV mission. In addition, officials said that according to severe weather reports (provided), tornadoes and damaging winds are more likely to occur at Dyess AFB in Texas than at Ellsworth AFB in South Dakota.

* Denotes individual responsible for completing the memorandum

Quarter 1266

141

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Range/MOA	Dist	Approx Dimensions	Airspace Volume (AV) nm ³	Operating Hours (OH)/wk	Scoreable Range (SR)	to Ground Weapons Delivery (AGWD)	Live Ordnance (LO)	IMC Weapon Release (IW)	Electronic Combat (EC)	Laser Use Auth (LU)	Lights Out Capable (LC)	Flare (FA)	Chaff (CA)
Ranges													
Snyder ESS/Lancer	40	80 X 40	17,801	60	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
Ft Hood/R6302	107	25 x 22	1,450	?	Y?	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	?	?
Falcon/R5601	140	19 x 8	951	60	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Melrose	221	30 X 13	1,104	60	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pecos ESS/ Pyote	240	130 x 110	61,192	60	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
Catulla/R6312	253	26 x 6	584	60	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Centennial/R5103C	285	25 x 20	3,703	75	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Red Rio (excludes restricted area)	320	15 x 15	878	75	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Oscura (excludes restricted area)	321	18 x 15	1,564	75	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Casa (excludes restricted area)	335	30 x 20	494	75	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Smokey Hill	383	20 x 14	1,267	40	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Dim	Y	Y
UTTR	804	80 x 70	48,848	88	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
MOAs													
Brownwood	23	80 x 40	4,687	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Lancer	27	80 x 40	17,801	60	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
Westover	33	55 x 70	5,386	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Brady	67	50 x 20	1,975	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Texon	100	40 x 30	2,370	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Sheppard 1	111	30 x 35	1,728	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Laughlin 1	116	85 x 50	6,295	24 hrs/ day via	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Green = Range is Capable
Yellow = Undetermined at this time

As of 24 Jun 05

1 of 3

Range/MOA	Dist	Approx Dimensions	Airspace Volume (AV) nm ³	Operating Hours (OH)/wk	Scoreable Range (SR)	to Ground Weapons Delivery (AGWD)	Live Ordnance (LO)	IMC Weapon Release (IW)	Electronic Combat (EC)	Laser Use Auth (LU)	Lights Out Capable (LC)	Flare (FA)	Chaff (CA)
				schedule									
Sheppard 2	117	35 x 25	1,440	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Bronco	119	90 x 50	30,597	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Hollis	122	38 x 28	1,226	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Washita	145	37 x 25	1,522	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Laughlin 2	152	55 x 30	2,987	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Randolph 2A	155	45 x 25	1,666	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Randolph 2B	171	20 x 15	197	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Pyote	175	130 x 110	61,192	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
Randolph 1	204	75 x 25	3,302	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Vance	204	110 x 80	14,773	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Laughlin 3	211	35 x 9	259	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Crystal	211	50 x 40	3,950	24 hrs/ day via	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Green = Range is Capable
Yellow = Undetermined at this time

As of 24 Jun 05

Range/MOA	Dist	Approx Dimensions	Airspace Volume (AV) nm ³	Operating Hours (OH)/wk	Scoreable Range (SR)	to Ground Weapons Delivery (AGWD)	Live Ordnance (LO)	IMC Weapon Release (IW)	Electronic Combat (EC)	Laser Use Auth (LU)	Lights Out Capable (LC)	Flare (FA)	Chaff (CA)
				schedule									
Talon	225	50 x 35	12,230	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Pecos/Taiban	228	55 x 50	20,956	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
Kingsville 4	236	45 x 40	2,666	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Kingsville 3	240	55 x 30	2,716	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Valentine	240	45 x 40	889	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Kingsville 5	245	20 x 20	592	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Mt Dora	285	80 x 60	9,381	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Kingsville 1	299	70 x 55	6,336	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Kingsville 2	300	17 x 17	238	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Warrior	310	70 x 60	5,530								Y		
Bison	362	50 x 30	6,419	24 hrs/ day via schedule	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Yn	Y

12
 Green = Range is Capable
 Yellow = Undetermined at this time

As of 24 Jun 05

Low Level Training Routes With Entry and/or Exit Points Within 300 NM of
Dyess AFB TX

IR Routes

IR ROUTE	ENTRY DISTANCE	EXIT DISTANCE	IR ROUTE	ENTRY DISTANCE	EXIT DISTANCE
139	71	118	181	252	234
128	75	87	175	255	273
124	77	93	116	256	317
180	85	74	113	259	237
154	91	123	147	261	165
155	94	123	150	265	299
103	99	139	185	271	254
123	130	90	164	273	329
149	165	261	134	282	308
169	167	102	133	283	318
170	176	262	102	287	284
172	185	253	503	291	273
117	205	325	178	297	68
129	207	224	*136	304	312
148	229	245	*135	312	304
127	231	221	115	317	256
145	233	257	132	318	287
171	234	253	142	319	279
130	241	269	166	329	274
107	245	237			


VR Routes

VR ROUTE	ENTRY DISTANCE	EXIT DISTANCE	VR ROUTE	ENTRY DISTANCE	EXIT DISTANCE
118	59	100	188	193	209
186	77	120	1120	197	259
1116	80	138	114	201	236
1143	85	96	196	205	252
1138	89	98	100	223	233
1110	93	120	125	231	222
162	94	80	187	233	224
101	95	123	152	235	390
1142	96	85	168	251	200
159	97	94	197	252	205
1144	97	85	1106	255	209
1139	102	173	1121	259	197
163	103	129	1123	259	156
1145	108	128	189	260	283
104	121	141	1108	260	182
1124	123	117	1104	276	333
144	124	154	1175	279	446
143	126	100	119	292	391
184	153	123	106	293	351
1122	167	259	138	294	392
1141	175	96	151	299	291
1117	177	260	*1195	337	325

*Although the entry and exit points are outside of 300 NMs, the bulk of IR-135, IR-136 and VR-1195 are inside 300 NMs



DYESS B-1B TNG DEV SUMMARY FOR MAY 04 - APR 05



Prep. by: Dario Hernandez-Delucca /DSN 461-3436

	CPT2	CPT3	CPT5	CPT6	MT2	WST2	WST4
HRS AVAIL	1900	1904	1922	1912	2132	1964	2404
SCHD	1433	1375	1477	1377	1154	1396	1638
UTIL	1433	1373	1477	1377	1127	1311	1538
UTIL %	75	72	77	72	53	67	64

MAY 04 - APR 05 B-1B TNG DEV AVAIL/SCHD/UTIL HR

AVAIL	May-04	Jun-04	Jul-04	Aug-04	Sep-04	Oct-04	Nov-04	Dec-04	Jan-05	Feb-05	Mar-05	Apr-05	TOTALS
CPT2	158.5	164.5	162.5	165	164.5	151	157	137	150	145	182	163	1900
CPT3	157.5	166.5	165	166.5	162.5	151.5	156	136.5	150.5	146.5	182	162.5	1903.5
CPT5	159.5	167	166	167	165	151	156	151	150.5	146	181	162	1922
CPT6	159.5	167	167	166.5	163	151.5	154	139	151.5	147	182.5	163.5	1912
MT2	199.5	210	209.5	220	208.5	190	180	168	48	151.5	182	165	2132
WST2	198	209.5	206	197.5	0	50	193	177	184	193	186.5	169	1963.5
WST4	199	207.5	209	220	207.5	197.5	189.5	173.5	182	190	224.4	204	2403.9
TOTALS	1231.5	1292	1285	1302.5	1071	1042.5	1185.5	1082	1016.5	1119	1320.4	1189	14136.9


SCHD	May-04	Jun-04	Jul-04	Aug-04	Sep-04	Oct-04	Nov-04	Dec-04	Jan-05	Feb-05	Mar-05	Apr-05	TOTALS
CPT2	137	142	131.5	127.6	132	132.7	127.3	76.5	104.5	93.5	123.7	105	1433.3
CPT3	136.2	137	146.8	142.5	134.8	138.5	89.5	73	71	99.5	83	123	1374.8
CPT5	147.5	144.5	143	133	121.5	125.5	87	81	118	131.5	128	116.5	1477
CPT6	150	126.5	122	107.5	111.5	59.8	60.8	113.5	143.5	125	121	135.5	1376.6
MT2	166.5	130	163	171	97.5	4	2	0	48	132	133	106.5	1153.5
WST2	110.2	132	153	164.5	0	10.3	137.5	127	151	153	123.5	133.8	1395.8
WST4	168.1	164.5	169.5	162.6	156.5	155.1	147	100.5	135.7	0	146.5	132.4	1638.4
TOTALS	1015.5	976.5	1028.8	1008.7	753.8	625.9	651.1	571.5	771.7	734.5	858.7	852.7	9849.4

UTIL	May-04	Jun-04	Jul-04	Aug-04	Sep-04	Oct-04	Nov-04	Dec-04	Jan-05	Feb-05	Mar-05	Apr-05	TOTALS
CPT2	137	142	131.5	127.6	132	132.7	127.3	76.5	104.5	93.5	123.7	105	1433.3
CPT3	136.2	137	146.3	141.5	134.8	138.5	89.5	73	71	99.5	83	123	1373.3
CPT5	147.5	144.5	143	132.5	121.5	125.5	87	81	118	131.5	128	116.5	1476.5
CPT6	150	126.5	122	107.5	111.5	59.8	60.8	113.5	143.5	125	121	135.5	1376.6
MT2	166.5	127	163	162.3	88.7	4	1.5	0	48	131.5	133	101.3	1126.8
WST2	104.9	123.4	142	156.9	0	9.3	130.5	120.7	145.6	145.9	117.3	114	1310.5
WST4	166.3	156.6	163.1	155.6	142.2	148.4	129.1	89.6	129	0	133.3	125.1	1538.3
TOTALS	1008.4	957	1010.9	983.9	730.7	618.2	625.7	554.3	759.6	726.9	839.3	820.4	9635.3

%UTIL	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
CPT2	86	86	81	77	80	88	81	56	70	64	68	64	75
CPT3	86	82	89	85	83	91	57	53	47	68	46	76	72
CPT5	92	87	86	79	74	83	56	54	78	90	71	72	77
CPT6	94	76	73	65	68	39	39	82	95	85	66	83	72
MT2	83	60	78	74	43	2	1	0	100	87	73	61	55
WST2	53	59	69	79	0	19	68	68	0	76	63	67	52
WST4	84	75	78	71	69	75	68	52	71	0	59	61	64



Dyess Owned MOAs



Lancer MOA...3K AGL floor

Dyess

Snyder ESS


Pecos ESS

100 NM

Pyote ATCAA

3 Lancer sized areas...18K MSL floor

300 NM



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

23 AUG 2005

The Honorable John Thune
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-4105

Dear Senator Thune:

Thank you for your letter and call regarding Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations and litigation regarding the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (RBTI). I want to address the two overarching concerns expressed in your letter and our conversation: that the Air Force responses to the BRAC Commission did not adequately address the impact of the RBTI litigation on Air Force operations, and that the Air Force did not adequately address the litigation impacts in its BRAC recommendations. Let me assure you the Air Force is committed to providing full and complete information to the Commission, and I regret any perception that our responses have been less than complete. I hope this letter and the discussions by our staffs help allay any unfortunate misperceptions that may exist regarding these issues.

I understand your concern about the potential impact of litigation, and I believe the Air Force is accurately assessing the impact of the RBTI litigation on its ongoing operations. The RBTI is a unique and critical component of the multiple training opportunities near Dyess Air Force Base (AFB), and we take the litigation challenging our environmental analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) very seriously. As you know, the Air Force won the initial phase of the lawsuit in the District Court. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Air Force's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on all but two procedural grounds, and ordered the Air Force to perform a supplemental EIS to correct the record regarding its study of wingtip vortices and how certain comments by the FAA were addressed. As with other cases where courts have remanded a decision for NEPA deficiencies, once that supplemental EIS is completed, the Air Force and FAA will proceed with a new decision with no necessity to seek or obtain the approval of any court before that new decision goes into effect. Although future litigation challenging that new decision is always a possibility, we firmly believe our analysis in the Supplemental EIS will ensure compliance with NEPA.

On January 5, 2005, after the Court of Appeals decision was issued (but before it was final), the Air Force requested the Court exercise its discretion to allow continued use of the RBTI during completion of the supplemental EIS, and in support of that motion the Air Force informed the Court it would issue a directive stating aircrews will fly no lower than 500 feet above ground level (AGL) when utilizing IR-178, and no lower than 12,000 feet above mean sea level (MSL) for the Lancer Military Operating Area (MOA). That Directive was issued on January 12, 2005. As noted in your letter,

the Air Force also submitted affidavits from its Air Combat Command (ACC) to the Court identifying the adverse impacts that would result if the Court denied the motion and refused to allow use of the RBTI. The affidavits confirmed that continued use within the operational parameters adopted in the Air Force's January 12 directive would still allow aircrews to "continue training as realistically as possible." This is true even though use pursuant to those parameters may not fully meet the standards applicable at that time for low-level realistic training on IR-178. The Fifth Circuit granted the Air Force request, and remanded the case to the District Court to determine what operational conditions should be established. On June 29, 2005, the District Court adopted the January 12 flight procedures (as the Air Force had requested) as an enforceable part of its Order.

In the interim, apart from any litigation but as part of the normal periodic operations review process, Air Combat Command revised its low-level bomber training policy. In April of 2005, ACC issued a Directive establishing 500 feet as the minimum B-1 bomber low-level altitude for realistic training nation-wide (with certain exceptions for test crew flights). Moreover, because IR-178 is exclusively low-level training, the Lancer MOA rounds out crew training requirements by affording high altitude training well above 12,000 MSL. Thus, in accordance with current Air Force Directives and the District Court Order, the Air Force continues to provide effective and realistic training in the IR-178 low-level route and Lancer MOA. Although the plaintiffs appealed the District Court's Order on August 11, 2005, the Order remains in effect during the pendency of the matter, and the Air Force believes that Order should withstand the appeal. In any event, by their own terms the District and Circuit Court orders will terminate once the new decision is issued upon completion of the supplemental EIS, which will occur well before any realignments take place. As noted above, our intent is to be prepared to withstand any additional litigation concerning the new decision.

Finally, I would like to assure you that appropriate consideration was given to the potential impacts of this litigation on base closure and realignment recommendations. The low-level airspace component of the military value metric for bomber installations identified all low-level airspace within 300 nautical miles of each installation without regard to the varying minimum or maximum altitudes within that airspace (such as those embodied in the Air Force Directives and the District Court Order). The greater the amount of airspace within that radius, and the closer the airspace is to the installation, the better the score.

The Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) was aware of the RBTI litigation, but since the litigation did not prevent the use of IR-178, in the judgment of the BCEG it did not detract from the base's value or cause concern for future operations. Furthermore, while we will perform an appropriate environmental analysis of all of the potential impacts from any realignments that ultimately become effective, under current operational conditions and utilization it appears that the RBTI can, if necessary, absorb the number of additional sorties that might result from the recommended realignments. Historical training records show that operational squadrons fly a significantly lower rate of sorties at the RBTI than training squadrons do. Therefore, the addition of operational

squadrons from Ellsworth would not "double" the number of missions flown at the RBTI or significantly "change the dynamics" of the supplemental EIS process as your letter suggests.

I appreciated the opportunity to speak with you and discuss your concerns on this matter, and I understand we may have a genuine difference of opinion regarding our assessment of the impact of the RBTI litigation. Nevertheless, I am confident the Air Force has thoughtfully exercised its judgment, and has made and will continue to make every effort to ensure that its responses to the Commission on these issues are straightforward and complete. I remain ready and willing to engage with you or your staff at your convenience to further discuss your concerns.

Sincerely,



Pete Geren
Acting Secretary of the Air Force

JOHN THUNE
SOUTH DAKOTA

COMMITTEES
ARMED SERVICES
ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS
SMALL BUSINESS
VETERANS' AFFAIRS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

August 3, 2005

The Honorable Pete Geren
Acting Secretary of the Air Force
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On 19 July 2005, the Air Force replied to an inquiry from the Base Realignment and Closure Commission concerning ongoing litigation and court imposed constraints on the use of a key military operating area (MOA) and military training route (MTR) that serves the aerial training requirements for both Dyess and Barksdale AFB. I found the Air Force reply to be both disappointing and unresponsive to the commission's questions. Frankly, I find it distressing that the Air Force would apparently misrepresent the status of the litigation and attempt to mislead the Commission by suggesting that the constraints were "voluntarily" self-imposed.

The litigation in question challenged the Air Force's Record of Decision (ROD) and Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), both prepared by the Air Force pursuant to requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) before obtaining FAA approval to operate in IR-178 MTR and Lancer MOA, together known as the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (RBTI). On appeal, the 5th Circuit found the EIS to be inadequate and set aside the ROD. The court further directed the District Court to determine the conditions upon which the Air Force could continue operations in the MTR and MOA. On 29 June 2005, after almost 5 years of judicial activity in the case, the District Court imposed significant operating conditions limiting the continued Air Force use of the MTR and the MOA pending a supplemental EIS.

The operating conditions directed by the court limits the effectiveness of MTR and MOA by imposing altitude limitations on air operations significantly greater than those specified in the Air Force ROD. (The ROD would have allowed flights in the MTR down to 300 feet AGL, and in the MOA down to 3,000 feet AGL. The court imposed a floor of 500 feet AGL in the MTR, and 12,000 feet MSL in the MOA.) As noted by the Director of Air Space Operations, Air Combat Command, Major General DeCuir, in a sworn affidavit to the federal court in January 2005, these changes "...do not, in my opinion, allow aircrews to fully meet necessary realistic training objectives." The suggestion made by the Air Force to the BRAC commission, that it "voluntarily returned its training altitude to 500 feet AGL" is disingenuous. In reality, the Air Force scrambled to mitigate the damage of the litigation and an impending court order, hardly a voluntary and willing concession.

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SIOUX FALLS, SD 57104
(605) 334-9596

1313 WEST MAIN STREET
RAPID CITY, SD 57701
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320 SOUTH 1ST STREET
SUITE 101
ABERDEEN, SD 57401
(605) 226-8825

The Air Force was also misleading when it stated that "it proposed *lowering* its training altitude to 300 feet AGL when it created the RBTI along an existing route," thus implying that 500 feet AGL was the normal training altitude on that same route. This statement is demonstrably false by the Air Force's own words. First, the Air Force originally proposed the RBTI route to be as low as 200 feet AGL, which was the minimum altitude of some route segments for the pre-existing IR-178. This fact is well documented in the Air Force ROD on page 7 point (2) of the "Management Actions." The Air Force, in fact, raised it to 300 feet AGL when drafting the ROD to address "public expressed concerns."

This litigation has been ongoing for years. The court clearly has oversight of the matter. Yet, the Air Force reply to the Commission states that "[N]one of the court's rulings require the Air Force to return to court for approval as part of this process." This ignores several facts. First, the case is still subject to appeal. If the Air Force wants the court to relinquish jurisdiction and authority in the matter, they will have to apply to the court for a dismissal. Second, even a casual review of the history of this case reflects the persistence of the plaintiffs. Any perceived flaws in subsequent Air Force or FAA decision-making on the RBTI may, and likely will, be challenged in court. The plaintiff groups have achieved one victory and if the Commission approves the consolidation of the B-1B fleet at Dyess AFB, with the consequent doubling of B-1B training operations, these plaintiffs will have yet another target rich environment for years of future litigation.


The rather cavalier attitude displayed by the Air Force in responding to the BRAC commission, implying that this litigation will be over (and that air operations will be unconstrained) when the Air Force and FAA complete their supplements does not reflect the history of the litigation or the implications of doubling the B-1B fleet at Dyess AFB. Indeed, the court has yet to even be informed by the Air Force that the number of B-1Bs and the training requirements at Dyess AFB may, in fact, double if the BRAC recommendation stands, though a supplemental EIS is underway per the court's order. It is clear that increased training operations flown from Dyess, would only exacerbate the adverse environmental impacts on the plaintiffs, while still under the aegis of the court and completely change the dynamics of the supplemental EIS now being prepared.

It also strikes me as somewhat presumptive on the part of the Air Force to state that if the results of the supplemental EIS do not support operations at 300 feet AGL, "the 500 feet restriction will most likely apply." I am curious to know how the Air Force can be so certain as to the final outcome and what restrictions might apply, before the supplemental EIS has even been completed, and any subsequent plaintiff challenges to the department's analysis have been heard.

Please understand, I am not advocating the consolidation of the nation's B-1B fleet at Ellsworth AFB, as an alternative to Dyess AFB. To the contrary, I believe it to be in this country's best interest to maintain the two separate B-1B bases we now have – in terms of preserving their security, operational effectiveness and overall quality of training. As we present our arguments and evidence to the BRAC Commission to support that position, we will not, in any way, seek to intentionally mislead or distort the

facts. As the Air Force responds to Commission inquiries related to our presentations, we expect it to behave in a similar manner.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John Thune". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "J" and "T".

John Thune
United States Senator

From: Nan L Terry/ASW/FAA
To: James Aarnio/AWA/FAA@FAA
cc: Joe Yadouga/ASW/FAA@FAA

Date: Monday, August 22, 2005 08:39AM
Subject: Re: BRAC Deliberations

Jim

Regarding NMTRI, I had a message on my voice mail from the USAF requesting a telcon with me and the FAA lawyer. We'll try to do that soon. I'll keep you informed.
 Regarding RBTI, we are reviewing the 2nd version of the preliminary draft supplemental EIS for RBTI. Once an agreement is reached b/w us and the USAF, the USAF will publish the draft and public hearings will be about 2 weeks later.
 Good luck with your hearings. I can't imagine doing what you are doing as a short-timer! Have fun!

Nan L. Terry
 Environmental Specialist
 Central Enroute and Oceanic Service Area
 phone: 817-222-5594

▼ James Aarnio/AWA/FAA

James Aarnio/AWA/FAA To: Joe Yadouga/ASW/FAA@FAA, Nan L Terry/ASW/FAA@FAA
 cc
 08/18/2005 09:29 AM Subject: BRAC Deliberations

Joe, Nan,

Hope you guys are doing well? It's getting down to crunch time here with final deliberations starting next Wednesday - Saturday wherein the Commissioners will vote yea or nay on the issues. Unfortunately, I'll be at the side witness table for back-up testimony on CSPAN for those days, which will run from 0800-2000. Really looking forward to that.

My main hot items are the Oceana (an add from the last hearings) closure and possible move back to Cecil Field in FL (a controversial closure in 1993 BRAC); NMTRI and Cannon; Ellsworth-Dyess and Lancer RBTI. Those are the most controversial (and political).

So, just wanted to check in with you guys to see if anything is new that you think I need to know about? I think my weakest area is the RBTI, but still feel comfortable with it. The Air Force presenter here on the BRAC (non pilot or ATC) is really wrestling with parsing out the issues. Hard to believe I'm doing this with only 7 work days left until I'm eligible to retire. Going to be interesting to see where Mike Cirillo puts me when I get back to FAA. He's going through a bit of trouble with the IG at the moment on contract issues if you haven't heard. I'll be the least of his concerns, for sure. I could possibly be on this detail through the end of Sept., however.

Take care. I'm cool. No problem you can't solve without the proper application of pharmaceuticals (prescribed, of course!)

[https://awamail4.faa.gov/mail7/jaarnio.nsf/\(\\$Inbox\)/61A43BC69A512C1F8625706500451...](https://awamail4.faa.gov/mail7/jaarnio.nsf/($Inbox)/61A43BC69A512C1F8625706500451...) 8/22/2005



My Best to you all - and the ZAB folks, too. Thanks for everything.

Jim Aarnio
System Operations, ATO-R
202-493-5304

BRAC Commission
Interagency Team, Airspace
703-699-2929
james.aarnio@wso.whs.mil


Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0212 (CT-0874) Dyess Airspace

Requester: BRAC Commission (Art Beauchamp, Air Force Analyst)

Question 1: How far are the closest entry and exit points for IR-178 to Dyess?

Response: The primary entry and exit points of MTRs were used to determine the base MCI values in the Air Force BRAC analysis. The primary entry point for Military Training Route IR-178 is 299 nautical miles from the Dyess AFB runway complex. The primary exit point, where the MTR enters Lancer MOA, is 69 nautical miles from the Dyess runway complex. These are the points most commonly used for entry and exit of the route. MTRs also consist of several points along the path of the route. In some instances, these points can also be used as entry or exit points. The map below depicts all these points along IR-178, which range from 69 to 299 nautical miles from Dyess AFB.



19 July 2005

Priority Response

Re: BI-0135 (CT-0551) Dyess AFB and RBTI Litigation**Requester:** BRAC Commission (Arthur Beachamp)**Commission Provided Background:** Attached memo was submitted to the BRAC. It outlines litigation filed by the Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Association against the Air Force (Davis Mountains v. USAF).

The case centers on the adverse impacts to the community and organizations when B-1 Bombers use the Dyess LANCER Military Operation Area (MOA) and Instrument Route (IR) 178 (also know as the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (RBTI)). The suit has resulted in a district court order issued on 29 Jun 05 imposing flying restrictions on B-1s at LANCER and IR 178. The order reads: "no aircraft will fly lower than 500 ft AGL (Above Ground Level), AP 1B altitude in IR-178, and no lower than 12,000 ft MSL (Mean Sea Level) when utilizing Lancer MOA."

In reviewing the information, the training restrictions were suggested by Air Combat Command as temporary measures to the court until the litigation is resolved.* The rationale being that it at least preserves the opportunity, even if limited, for use of the RBTI (reference: Additional Declaration of ACC Director of Air and Space Operations (Case No 03-10506) dated 5 Jun 05).

Given this litigation we request feedback on the following questions:

* **ACC Clarification of Commission Background:** Air Combat Command suggested the training restrictions as temporary measures to the court until the supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) and record of decision are completed and the FAA issues any implementing orders.

Questions:

1. Given the importance of training ranges and IR routes to the military value of an installation, was this litigation factored into the MCI for Dyess?

Response: This litigation was not factored into the MCI score for any Air Force base. There was no viable method to consider ongoing litigation in computation of the MCI score.

2. Why has the Air Force changed its training to 500 ft AGL when in the past it was 300 ft AGL? Was this caused by the above litigation?

Response: The Air Force didn't change its training to 500 ft AGL--it proposed lowering its training altitude to 300 ft AGL when it created the RBTI on an existing route. The Air Force voluntarily returned its training altitude to 500 ft AGL pending the outcome of a SEIS. The presiding judge accepted the temporary return to 500 ft AGL pending the outcome of the supplemental wingtip vortices analysis, completion of an SEIS and issuance of FAA decisions as directed by the court.

19 July 2005

Enquiry Response

Re: BI-0135 (C T-0551) Dyess AFB and RBII Litigation

3. Did an installation score higher for those ranges that allow for flying at 200 ft AGL (given the fact that the B-1 has the capability to fly at 200 ft AGL, and in some cases this is required for B-1 testing)?

Response: Installations were not scored on the altitude restrictions of instrument routes. The scoring methodology only considered the relative distance of entry and exit points to the subject installations. The greater the number of routes an installation had available within the prescribed distance of 300 nautical miles for the Bomber MCI, the better the installation's MCI score.

4. If the AF loses the suit and is permanently restricted to flying at 500 ft at the RBII, how will this impact B-1 training? This is a particular concern, given the fact that the AF recommends consolidating the B-1 fleet at Dyess.

Response: Currently, there is no permanent restriction issue pending in court. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the original FIS analysis, which used wingtip vortices affects at high altitude extrapolated to 300 ft AGL, as insufficient. The Court therefore directed a new analysis at 300 ft AGL.

The Air Force is in the process of analyzing wingtip vortices at 300 ft AGL as part of the SEIS and will make an appropriate decision on RBII use once the SEIS is complete. If the results support flight at 300 ft AGL, the Air Force will follow the normal process of obtaining FAA approval to use the RBII as originally requested. None of the court's rulings require the Air Force to return to court for approval as part of this process.

If the results do not support operations at 300 ft AGL, the 500 ft restriction will most likely apply. The training requirement to fly at 200 ft AGL, however, can be accomplished in restricted ranges. Given that possibility, Dyess AFB still has access to closer low altitude ranges and airspace than Ellsworth AFB. Even at 500 ft AGL, the RBII is still valuable. See attachments for Dyess AFB and Ellsworth AFB for depiction of currently existing ranges.

5. Request the Air Force rescore the MCI for Dyess training range and IR capability with this restriction.

There is no impact to the MCI score for the Bomber MCI as a result of instrument route altitude restrictions. Altitudes were not factored into consideration of instrument routes when calculating MCI scores. As regards the volume of airspace, Dyess AFB has 2.3 times the volume of airspace

19 July 2005

Reply Response

Re: BL-0135 (C-130551) Dyess AFB and RBTL litigation

as Ellsworth and is still the higher scoring installation of the two given the voluntary airspace restriction of 12.00 MSF placed on the Lancer Military Operating Area.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, LLCC, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

- 2 Attachments (7" X 17" format)
- 1. Dyess - Airspace within 30 NM
- 2. Ellsworth - Airspace within 30 NM

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Rollins Jennifer A Maj 28 BW/XP [Jennifer.Rollins@ellsworth.af.mil]
Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2005 10:20 AM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Garrett Dave S LtCol 28 BW/DS
Subject: FW: BRAC Questions: Suspense: ASAP

Mr. Beauchamp,

Below are our answers to # 3, 4, 5, 6; we are still working on # 1 and 2. Answers to question # 1 and 2 will fill in the "xxx's" mentioned in # 4. We cannot answer # 7 for Dyess.

V/r
Maj Rollins

P.S. I don't suppose you can pass the time at which the hearing on 27 Aug will take place?

Maj Jennifer "Bolt" Rollins

28 BW/XP, Deputy Chief of Wing Plans
1958 Scott Drive, Suite 6
Ellsworth AFB, SD 57706
DSN 675-5640
Commercial (605) 385-5640
Fax (605) 675-2456
jennifer.rollins@ellsworth.af.mil

These answers are based upon scheduled sorties for the past year.

3. A round trip direct to and from Powder is 17 minutes. With 979 scheduled sorties to Powder, the 28 BW scheduled 277.4 hours (16,643 minutes) flying to and from Powder.
A round trip to and from Hays (going around Powder) is 76 minutes. With 72 scheduled sorties to Hays, the 28 BW scheduled 91.2 hours (5,472 minutes) flying to and from Hays.
4. The 28 BW scheduled 277.4 hours (16,643 minutes) flying to and from Powder. At \$xx,xxx per flying hour, the 28 BW planned to spend \$x,xxx,xxx flying to and from Powder.
The 28 BW scheduled 91.2 hours (5,472 minutes) flying to and from Hays. At \$xx,xxxx per flying hour, the 28 BW planned to spend \$x,xxx,xxx flying to and from Hays.

Note: These costs only reflect transit time to the MOAs and do not include the time flown in the MOAs to accomplish training. While most sorties spend an hour in the MOAs, 28 BW aircraft will occasionally spend up to two hours in the MOAs to accomplish required training.

5. The short answer is Powder, and Powder offers better training opportunities than RBTI.

The long answer is Lancer/IR178 is based on the same model as Powder/IR473/IR485/IR492 (low altitude instrument route feeding into MOA), so in theory, they both provide similar training opportunities. Both MOAs offer Electronic Scoring Sites (ESS) situated within the MOA. The ESS provides offensive and defensive training for the aircrews: offensive training is provided through the SEEK SCORE system and defensive training is provided by the MUTES/Mini-MUTES systems. Currently there are two Electronic Scoring Sites supporting the Lancer/IR178 combination: Pecos ESS provides low altitude training opportunities along IR178 and Snyder ESS provides high altitude training opportunities within Lancer. Belle Fourche ESS provides both high and low altitude training opportunities within the Powder MOA.

8/18/2005

The biggest difference between RBTI and Powder is the airspace constraints of the two MOAs themselves. For Powder, the airspace extends to the surface in half of the MOA and to 1000 feet in the other half. Perfect altitudes to accomplish day/night low altitude training. For Lancer, even before the RBTI litigation, the lowest the MOA went is 6,200 MSL (approximately 3,000 to 4,200 feet AGL). The Lancer MOA has never offered the B-1 a low altitude training opportunity since the aircraft must be at or below 2,000 AGL before aircrews can even accomplish terrain following training. So even if the RBTI litigation (which currently has raised the floor of the Lancer MOA even higher) is resolved, the B-1 will still not be able to accomplish low altitude training within the MOA. Dyess resolves this lack of low altitude training within the Lancer MOA by having crews fly IR178. While IR routes are good for procedural training (running checklists), they offer limited opportunity for aggressive, low altitude defensive training since aircrews must remain within route corridor limits (typically about 10nm wide) and they can never reverse course. Because Powder allows aircrews to freely maneuver the B-1 while at low altitude, Powder truly offers a better overall training experience for B-1 aircrews than RBTI does.

An interesting side note is there used to be multiple Electronic Scoring Sites located in the Hays MOA and along the IR routes within 300nm of Ellsworth. While budget constraints and a dwindling bomber force saw these sites close over time, it does highlight the capability certainly exists to expand training opportunities around Ellsworth should the equipment/funds become available.

6. No, to fly from Ellsworth to RBTI would be an unwise use of valuable training hours. Not totally clear on the second part of this question, but Ellsworth crews already receive superior training in Powder so there is no need to fly the extra hours to receive inferior training at RBTI.

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC [mailto:Arthur.Beauchamp@wso.whs.mil]

Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 12:34 PM

To: Garrett Dave S LtCol 28 BW/DS; Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

Cc: Rollins Jennifer A Maj 28 BW/XP

Subject: RE: BRAC Request: PRT Utilization Rate (Suspense: ASAP)

Dave,

We're getting down to the wire so more questions may be coming your way.

New questions that are indirectly related to the Utilization questions:

1. What is the total cost per flying hour budget for Ellsworth for 2005? If no 2005, 2004 data is fine.
2. What is the cost per flying hr per B-1 at Ellsworth?
3. What are the number of transit hours to get to the airspace to Powder and Hays?
4. What is the estimated flying hour cost for Power and Hays in 2005 (if not available, use 2004 costs).
5. Does Ellsworth have any training capabilities within the 300 NW limitation that are equal or similar to that provided by the RBTI (i.e Lancer MOA and IR 178)? If so, what are they?
Power?

6 Do Ellsworth crews fly B-1 from Ellsworth to the RBTI? Or do they receive the same

8/18/2005

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Rollins Jennifer A Maj 28 BW/XP [Jennifer.Rollins@ellsworth.af.mil]
Sent: Monday, August 01, 2005 3:12 PM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Follow-Up Questions

Sir, great minds think alike I was just cutting and pasting the answers for you.

Answer to Question #1:

Restrictions for Powder River MOA are no chaff/flares or actual weapons releases within the MOA. Another restriction would be no supersonic flight down low, but this is typical of bomber MOAs. A restriction Powder MOA doesn't have is data link suitability since it already has frequency approval for Link16 within the MOA and surrounding area (tremendous future capability).

Portions of Powder MOA do permit training down to 300' AGL. Powder River A MOA extends all the way down to the surface and would permit training at 300' AGL or lower (Powder River B MOA goes down to 1000' AGL).

Additionally, all the IR routes (IR-473, IR-485, IR-492, and IR-499) in Ellsworth's "backyard airspace" (within 150 nm) extend down to 100' AGL and offer training opportunities at 300' AGL or lower.

The major benefit of Powder River MOA is it permits aircrews, within the confines of the MOA, to accomplish realistic, defensive maneuvers. To accomplish this defensive training only in an IR route would result in less than ideal training for the aircrews.

Answer to Question #2:

Operational B-1 units do not have a 300' AGL training requirement. Guidance from Air Combat Command currently limits routine low-altitude training to 500' for B-1 aircrews. However, two B-1 units that do have a requirements and permission to operate below 500' are the Weapon School (77 WPS) and the Test Squadron (337 TES). These units have special training/test requirements which occasionally require them to operate at 200' to 300' AGL. Both these squadrons used to be located at Ellsworth and while they were located here, they were able to meet their training objectives within Ellsworth's backyard airspace (Powder River A MOA and the nearby IR routes).

Answer to Questions #3:

An increase in the Mission Capable Rate of 3.4% will result in another aircraft (B-1) being available based on the 29 B-1's that we have at present. Increasing the number of aircraft would decrease the ratio, i.e. the 3.4%.

Maj Jennifer "Bolt" Rollins

28 BW/XP, Deputy Chief of Wing Plans
1958 Scott Drive, Suite 6
Ellsworth AFB, SD 57706
DSN 675-5640
Commercial (605) 385-5640
Fax (605) 675-2456
jennifer.rollins@ellsworth.af.mil

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC [mailto:Arthur.Beauchamp@wso.whs.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2005 1:40 PM

8/1/2005

To: Garrett Dave S LtCol 28 BW/DS; Rollins Jennifer A Capt 28 BW/XP
Cc: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Wheeler Mark H Civ 28 CES/CD
Subject: Follow-Up Questions

Dave or Capt Rollins,

1. Are there any restrictions of use at the Power River MOA? Does the Power River MOA allow training at an altitude to 300 ft AGL (Above Ground Level).
2. Is there a training requirement to fly at 300 AGL or lower?
3. Can you ask your maintenance POC the following. If the Mission Capable rate or Fully Mission Capable rate were to increase by 1-2 percent what does that translate into in terms of B-1 availability (for example, does it = one more B-1 available for missions).

r/Art

8/1/2005

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Garrett Dave S LtCol 28 BW/DS [Dave.Garrett@ellsworth.af.mil]
Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 3:56 PM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Rollins Jennifer A Maj 28 BW/XP
Subject: FW: BRAC Request: PRT Utilization Rate (Suspense: ASAP)

Art,

Let me know if this answers the mail. Have a good weekend...I be on email over the weekend

//Levi//

Dave S. Garrett, Lt Col, USAF
 28 BW Director of Staff
 DSN: 675-6410
 COMM: (605) 385-6410
 CELL: (605) 431-3010

Levi, I just compiled the data from the 28 BW's last 1,984 scheduled sorties (pretty much the last year). Here is the breakdown of the major training airspaces the wing utilized:

Powder: 49.4% (979 scheduled sorties)
 UTTR: 18.1% (359 scheduled sorties)
 Nellis: 6.4% (126 scheduled sorties)
 Smoky Hill: 5.9% (118 scheduled sorties)
 Hays MOA: 3.6% (72 scheduled sorties)

The other 16.6%, or 330 sorties, were flown to a wide variety of ranges/airspaces like Chocolate Mountain, White Sands Missile Range, Saylor Creek (Mt Home Range Complex), IR-499, Tiger MOA, for a variety of reasons (ROVING SANDS, other large force exercises, etc).

The answer to the question for airspace within 300nm: The second most used airspace is Hays MOA. 28 BW scheduled Powder 979 times (49.4%) and Hays 72 times (3.6%). 28 BW schedule Powder 13.5 times more frequently than the next most used training airspace within 300nm.

The answer to the question for outside 300nm: The most used airspace outside 300nm is the UTTR. 28 BW scheduled Powder 979 times (49.4%) and the UTTR 359 times (18.1%). 28 BW schedule Powder 2.7 times more frequently than the most used training airspace outside 300nm.

Analysis: The UTTR is the 28 BW's number two scheduled airspace because it is the wing's primary weapons release range. Inside of 300 nm, despite the high frequency of Powder usage, there are still plenty of time slots available to schedule Powder for training sorties. Additionally, Ellsworth has a lot of airspace within 300 nm (Hays MOA and all the IR routes the 28 BW owns) that hasn't even been tapped into yet due to the convenience of having Powder so close and its able to meet the majority of the wing's training needs. If the local B-1 training demand was to increase, the airspace within 300 nm of Ellsworth could easily accomodate the higher training load.

From: Garrett Dave S LtCol 28 BW/DS
Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 5:58 AM
Subject: BRAC Request: PRT Utilization Rate (Suspense: ASAP)

8/15/2005

Got a call from Art Beauchamp...BRAC commission requests data on how often, by percentage; Ellsworth uses the PRT relative to our next most utilized training airspace 1) Within 300nm 2) Outside 300nm.

Thanks

//Levi//

Dave S. Garrett, Lt Col, USAF

28 BW Director of Staff

DSN: 675-6410

COMM: (605) 385-6410

CELL: (605) 431-3010

8/15/2005

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2005 9:55 AM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Supplement to letter # 5789

Art, thanks. I appreciate it. You probably already intend to ask these but here are some questions you might ask:

-- because training requirements, threat analysis and technology changes over time doesn't the AF desire flexibility built into their ranges, MOAs and MTRs to allow them to adjust as necessary to different flying requirements, including altitude? Was this factored-in, if not why not? Isn't overall capability measured?

-- If a MOA or MTR has limitations put on its altitude floor or ceiling how did the Air Force measure the quality of that particular training area? Does it not effect the quality of training, if a commander would like his crews to run a training mission at 300 feet, but cannot.

-- Did the AF assess and score the quality of electronic scoring (e.g. the number and types of different simulator-emitters) on its MTRs?

-- If the AF has all these other MOAs and IRs available in Texas for the B-1s, why has it established and fought so hard since 1997 to obtain approval of the RBTI?

-- Why did senior AF officers swear under oath that the RBTI is vital to training earlier this year, yet the AF is implying to the BRAC commission now that it would not be constrained by limitations on the RBTI?

-- Does the AF assess numbers of sortie-operations into range, MOA use and availability? Does it measure limitations put on sortie-operations?

-- Does the AF distinguish between ranges having certain access without training limitations and ranges with a future of uncertainty as to access & training limitations?

-- Besides the RBTI, what is the nearest low-level MTR to Dyess that would "both" allow them to fly down to 300 feet AGL and have electronic scoring?

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC [mailto:Arthur.Beauchamp@wso.whs.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2005 9:23 AM
To: Taylor, Bob (Thune)
Subject: RE: Supplement to letter # 5789

Bob, tks for the information. I have a meeting this morning with the Air Force OPRs to dicuss the degree to which quality was factored into the training ranges and IRs. If you have any specfic questions let me know before 1000 hrs this morning.
 Art


From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [mailto:Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
 Sent: Tuesday, August 02, 2005 1:20 PM
 To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 Subject: Supplement to letter # 5789
 Importance: High

8/3/2005

Art, thanks for meeting with us this morning. Attached is a supplement to the weather related letter the SD delegation sent last week, # 5789 in the Commission's library.



8/3/2005

F
A
SWeapons of
Mass
DestructionWMD Around
the World

B-1B Lancer

The B-1B is a multi-role, long-range bomber, capable of flying intercontinental missions without refueling, then penetrating present and predicted sophisticated enemy defenses. It can perform a variety of missions, including that of a conventional weapons carrier for theater operations. Through 1991, the B-1 was dedicated to the nuclear deterrence role as part of the single integrated operational plan (SIOP)

The B-1B's electronic jamming equipment, infrared countermeasures, radar location and warning systems complement its low-radar cross-section and form an integrated defense system for the aircraft.

The swing-wing design and turbofan engines not only provide greater range and high speed at low levels but they also enhance the bomber's survivability. Wing sweep at the full-forward position allows a short takeoff roll and a fast base-escape profile for airfields under attack. Once airborne, the wings are positioned for maximum cruise distance or high-speed penetration. The B-1B holds several world records for speed, payload and distance. The National Aeronautic Association recognized the B-1B for completing one of the 10 most memorable record flights for 1994.

The B-1B uses radar and inertial navigation equipment enabling aircrews to globally navigate, update mission profiles and target coordinates in-flight, and precision bomb without the need for ground based navigation aids. Included in the B-1B offensive avionics are modular electronics that allow maintenance personnel to precisely identify technical difficulties and replace avionics components in a fast, efficient manner on the ground.

The aircraft's AN/ALQ 161A defensive avionics is a comprehensive electronic counter-measures package that detects and counters enemy radar threats. It also has the capability to detect and counter missiles attacking from the rear. It defends the aircraft by applying the appropriate counter-measures, such as electronic jamming or dispensing expendable chaff and flares. Similar to the offensive avionics, the defensive suite has a re-programmable design that allows in-flight changes to be made to counter new or changing threats.

The B-1B represents a major upgrade in U.S. long-range capabilities over the B-52 -- the previous mainstay of the bomber fleet. Significant advantages include:

- Low radar cross-section to make detection considerably more difficult.
- Ability to fly lower and faster while carrying a larger payload.
- Advanced electronic countermeasures to enhance survivability.



Numerous sustainment and upgrade modifications are



ongoing or under study for the B-1B aircraft. A large portion of these modifications which are designed to increase the combat capability are known as the Conventional Mission Upgrade Program. In FY93, The Air Force initiated CMUP in FY1993 to improve the B-1's conventional warfighting capabilities. The \$2.7 billion CMUP program is intended to convert the B-1B from a primarily nuclear weapons carrier to a conventional weapons carrier. Capability will be delivered in blocks attained by hardware modifications with corresponding software updates:


- Initial conventional capability was optimized for delivery of Mk-82 non-precision 500lb gravity bombs
- Current capability (Block C) also provides delivery of up to 30 Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs) per sortie for enhanced conventional capability against advancing armor. Initial capability achieved in September 1996 with FOC in August 1997. The upgrade consists of modification for B-1B bomb module from the original configuration of 28 500-pound bombs per unit to 10 1,000-pound cluster bombs per bomb rack. The modifications apply to a total to 50 refitted bomb racks -- enough to equip half the B-1B fleet.
- Block D integrates the ALE-50 repeater decoy system, the first leg of the electronic countermeasures upgrade, and JDAM for near precision capability and adds anti-jam radios for secure communication in force packages. FY96 and FY97 Congressional plus-ups are being used to accelerate JDAM initial capability by 18 months (1QFY99). Congress has provided extra funding to allow a group of seven aircraft to be outfitted and ready a full 18 months early, with the first three JDAM equipped aircraft to be ready by December 1998, and the last of those seven aircraft are planned to arrive at Ellsworth AFB by Feb 99.
- Block E upgrades the current avionics computer suite and integrates Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD), Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) and Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) for standoff capability (FY02)
- Block F improves the aircraft's electronic countermeasures' situational awareness and jamming capabilities in FY02

Conventional Payload



			Combat Ready
84 - Mk 82, Mk 62			Now
30 - CBU 87/89/97			Now
24 - JDAM			Now
30 - WCMD			2001
12 - JSOW			2002
24 - JASSM			2002

Bomber Payloads




Background

The B-1B is a modified B-1A with major revisions in offensive avionics, defensive avionics, weapon payload, range, and speed. These modifications were made to incorporate certain technological advances that had occurred between the original B-1A contract award in 1970 and the LRCA competition in 1980. Improvements consist primarily of off-the-shelf technology such as a new radar, new generation computers, expanded ECM capabilities, reduced RCS, and avionics compatibility with the ALCM. The wing sweep is restricted to 60 which limits the maximum speed to just above supersonic. Rockwell also estimated range increases for the modified B-1.

Differences between the B-1B and its predecessor, the B-1A of the 1970s, are subtle, yet significant. Externally, only a simplified engine inlet, modified over-wing fairing and relocated pilot tubes are noticeable. Other less-evident changes include a window for the offensive and defensive systems officers' station and engine housing modifications that reduces radar exposure. The B-1B was structurally redesigned to increase its gross takeoff weight from 395,000 to 477,000 pounds (177,750 to 214,650 kilograms). Still, the empty weight of the B-1B is but 3 percent greater than that of the B-1A. This added takeoff weight capacity, in addition to a movable bulkhead between the forward and intermediate weapons bay, allows the B-1B to carry a wide variety of nuclear and conventional munitions. The most significant changes, however, are in the avionics, with low-radar cross-section, automatic terrain-following high-speed penetration, and precise weapons delivery.

Prior to 1994 B-1B fleet had never achieved its objective of having a 75-percent mission capable rate. In 1992 and 1993 the B-1B mission capable rate averaged about 57 percent. According to the Air Force, a primary reason for the low mission capable rate was the level of funding provided to support the B-1B logistics support system. Concerned about the low mission capable rate, a history of B-1B problems, and

the Air Force's plans to spend \$2.4 billion modifying the B-1B to become a conventional bomber, the Congress directed the Air Force to conduct an Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) from June 1, 1994, through November 30, 1994. The purpose of the ORA was to determine whether one B-1B wing was capable of achieving and maintaining its planned 75-percent operational readiness rate for a period of 6 months, if provided the full complement of spare parts, maintenance equipment and manpower, and logistic support equipment. During the ORA the test unit achieved an 84.3-percent mission capable rate during the test period. The ORA demonstrated that, given a full complement of spare parts, equipment, and manpower, the Air Force could achieve and sustain a 75-percent mission capable rate for the B-1B. The Air Force projects that the entire B-1B fleet will reach a 75-percent mission capable rate by 2000 by virtue of numerous on-going and future reliability, maintainability, and management initiatives. However, as of mid-October 1999 the Air Force wide mission capable rate of the B-1 had fallen to 51.1 percent -- mainly because of maintenance problems and a shortage of parts. Over the previous 12 months, the Kansas Guard had maintained a mission capable rate of 71.1 percent for the 10 usable aircraft assigned to it.



The basis for the projection of useful life of the B-1 is the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP). The useful life of the structure is assumed to be the point at which it is more economical to replace the aircraft than to continue structural modifications and repairs necessary to perform the mission. The limiting factor for B-1's service life is the wing lower surface. At 15,200 hours, based on continued low level usage, the wing's lower skin will need replacement. Current usage rates, operational procedures, and mishap attrition will place the inventory below the requirement of 89 aircraft in 2018, while the service life attrition will impact around 2038.

B-1 Economic Service Life

The first B-1B, 83-0065, *The Star of Abilene*, was delivered to the Air Force at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, in June 1985, with initial operational capability on Oct. 1, 1986. The 100th and final B-1B was delivered May 2, 1988. The Air Force has chosen to fully fund the operation of only 60 B-1Bs for the next few years, compared with plans to fund 82 beyond fiscal year 2000. In the short term, the Air Force has classified 27 of 95 B-1Bs as "reconstitution aircraft." These aircraft are not funded for flying hours and lack aircrews, but they are based with B-1B units, flown on a regular basis, maintained like other B-1Bs, and modified with the rest of the fleet. B-1B units will use flying hours and aircrews that are based on 60 operational aircraft to rotate both the operational aircraft and the reconstitution aircraft through its peacetime flying schedule. These 27 aircraft will be maintained in reconstitution reserve status until the completion of smart conventional munition upgrades. At that time, around the year 2000, there will be 95 aircraft providing an operational force of 82 fully modified B-1s. The B-1 will complete its buy back of attrition reserve by the fourth quarter of FY03, and re-code six training aircraft to attain 70 combat-

The first B-1B, 83-0065, *The Star of Abilene*, was delivered to the Air Force at Dyess Air Force Base,


coded aircraft by the fourth quarter of FY04.

During the Cold War, heavy bombers were used primarily for nuclear deterrence and were operated solely by the active duty Air Force. According to the Air Force, the National Guard's part-time workforce was incompatible with the bombers' nuclear mission because of a requirement for continuously monitoring all personnel directly involved with nuclear weapons. With the end of the Cold War and increased emphasis on the bombers' conventional mission, the Air Force initiated efforts to integrate Guard and reserve units into the bomber force. As part of its total force policy, the Air Force assigned B-1B aircraft to the National Guard. Heavy bombers entered the Air Guard's inventory for the first time in 1994 with a total of 14 B-1Bs programmed by the end of fiscal year FY 1997 for two units, the 184th Bomb Wing (BW), Kansas, and the 116th BW, Georgia. The 184th completed its conversion in FY 1996 at McConnell Air Force Base (AFB), Kansas. After a long political struggle that involved resisting the planned conversion from F-15s and an associated move from Dobbins AFB near Atlanta to Robins AFB near Macon, the 116th began its conversion on 1 April 1996. The unit completed that process in December 1998. All the bombers in both units were configured for conventional, not nuclear, missions.

Prior to 1994, the B-1B fleet operated out of four bases: Dyess Air Force Base, Texas; Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota; McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; and Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. In 1994, the Air Force realigned the B-1B fleet by closing the Grand Forks Air Force Base and transferring the aircraft at McConnell Air Force Base to the Air National Guard. With the transfer, the B-1B support structure, including spare parts, was distributed to the two remaining main operating bases. The concentration of aircraft and repair facilities at Dyess and Ellsworth Air Force Bases resulted in improved support capabilities, which improved mission capable [MC] rates.

On 26 March 1996 it was announced that the 77th Bomb Squadron would return to Ellsworth. On 1 April 97, the squadron again activated at Ellsworth as the geographically separated 34th Bomb Squadron completed its transfer to its home at the 366th Wing, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. By June 1998, the 77th had six of its B-1Bs out of the reconstitution reserve. This number ballanced those lost by the 34th BS.

Upgrades




Cockpit Upgrade Program (CUP) - Current B-1 cockpit display units are not capable of supporting graphic intensive software modifications. The CUP installs a robust graphic capability via common display units throughout the front and aft stations. This program increases B-1 survivability by providing critical situational awareness displays, needed for conventional operations, keeping pace with current and future guided munitions integration, enhancing situational awareness, and improving tactical employment.

Link-16 – Providing Line-of-Sight (LOS) data for aircraft-to-aircraft, aircraft-to-C2, and aircraft-to-sensor connectivity, Link-16 is a combat force multiplier that provides U.S. and other allied military services with fully interoperable capabilities and greatly enhances tactical Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence mission effectiveness. Link-16 provides increased survivability; develops a real-time picture of the theater battlespace, and enables the aircraft to quickly share information on short notice (target changes). In addition to a localized capability, the B-1's datalink will include BLOS capability increasing flexibility essential to attacking time-sensitive targets.

B-1 Radar Upgrade is a candidate Long Term Upgrade that would improve the current Synthetic Aperture Radar resolution from three meters to one foot or better, allowing the B-1 to more autonomously and precisely Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, and Assess enemy targets with guided direct-attack or standoff munitions (JDAM/JSOW). Finally, the upgrade would replace older components that will be difficult to maintain due to obsolescence and vanishing vendors.

B-1B Team



Specifications

Primary Function:	Long-range, multi-role, heavy bomber
Builder:	Rockwell International, North American Aircraft
Operations Air Frame and Integration:	Offensive avionics, Boeing Military Airplane; defensive avionics, AIL Division
Power Plant:	Four General Electric F-101-GE-102 turbofan engine with afterburner
Thrust:	30,000-plus pounds (13,500-plus kilograms) with afterburner, per engine
Length:	146 feet (44.5 meters)
Wingspan:	137 feet (41.8 meters) extended forward, 79 feet (24.1 meters) swept aft
Height:	34 feet (10.4 meters)
Weight:	Empty, approximately 190,000 pounds (86,183 kilograms)
Maximum Takeoff	477,000 pounds (214,650 kilograms)

Weight:
Speed: 900-plus mph (Mach 1.2 at sea level)
Rotate and Takeoff Speeds: 210 Gross - 119 Rotate kts / 134 kts Takeoff
 390 Gross - 168 kts Rotate / 183 kts Takeoff
Landing Speeds: 210 Gross - 145 kts
 380 Gross - 195 kts
Range: Intercontinental, unrefueled
Ceiling: Over 30,000 feet (9,000 meters)
Crew: Four (aircraft commander, pilot, offensive systems officer and defensive systems officer)

	<u>NUCLEAR</u>	<u>CONVENTIONAL PRECISION</u>
		84 <u>Mk 62</u> 30 <u>WCMD</u>
		84 <u>MK82</u> 24 <u>JDAM</u>
Armament:	30 <u>CBU 87</u>	12 <u>GBU-27</u>
	30 <u>CBU 89</u>	12 <u>AGM-154 JSOW</u>
	30 <u>CBU 97</u>	12 <u>TSSAM</u>
	12 <u>Mk 65</u>	

Date Deployed: June 1985
Unit Cost: \$200-plus million per aircraft
 100 total production
 93 total current inventory
 Active force, 51 PMAI (69 actual)
 ANG, 18 PMAI (22 actual)
 Reserve, 0
 AFMC, 2 (Test)

Deployment

Inventory:	Cmd #	Location	Unit
	ACC 39	<u>Dyess AFB, TX</u>	9th Bomb Wing
	ACC 21	<u>Ellsworth AFB, SD</u>	28th Bomb Wing
	ACC 9	<u>Mountain Home AFB, ID</u>	366th Air Expeditionary Wing
	ANG 10	<u>Robins AFB, GA</u>	116th Bomb Wing
	ANG 12	<u>McConnell AFB, KS</u>	184th Bomb Group
	AMC 2	Edwards AFB, CA	test aircraft
		6	lost to mishaps [as of 18 Feb 98]
		1	eliminated under START II Treaty


Airframe Inventory

#	Tail #	Name	Location	Comment
---	--------	------	----------	---------

1		
2	83-0065 Star of Abilene	<u>Dyess</u>
3	83-0066 Ole' Puss	<u>Dyess</u>
4	83-0067 Texas Raider	<u>Dyess</u>
5	83-0068 Predator	<u>Dyess</u>
6	83-0069 The Beast	<u>Dyess</u>
7	83-0070 7 Wishes	<u>Dyess</u>
8	83-0071 Spitfire	<u>Dyess</u>
9	84-0049	Edwards
10	84-0050 Dawg B-One	<u>Dyess</u>
11	84-0051 Boss Hog	<u>Dyess</u>
12	84-0052	Lost 09-25-87 @ La Junta, Colorado
13	84-0053 Lucky 13	<u>Dyess</u>
14	84-0054 Rage [Tasmanian Terror]	<u>Dyess</u>
15	84-0055 Shockwave [Lethal Weapon]	<u>Dyess</u>
16	84-0056 Sweet Sixteen	<u>Dyess</u>
17	84-0057 Hellion	<u>Dyess</u>
18	84-0058 Eternal Guardian	<u>Dyess</u>
19	85-0059	
20	85-0060	<u>McConnell</u>
21	85-0061	<u>Ellsworth</u>
22	85-0062 Uncaged	<u>Dyess</u>
23	85-0063	Lost 11-09-88 @ <u>Dyess</u> AFB, Texas
24	85-0064	<u>McConnell</u>
25	85-0065	
26	85-0066 On Defense	<u>Ellsworth</u>
27	85-0067	
28	85-0068	Edwards
29	85-0069	<u>McConnell</u>
30	85-0070	
31	85-0071	
32	85-0072 Polarized	<u>Dyess</u>
33	85-0073	<u>McConnell</u>
34	85-0074 Crew Dawg	<u>Dyess</u>
35	85-0075	<u>Ellsworth</u>
36	85-0076	Lost 11-17-89 @ <u>Ellsworth</u> AFB S.D.
37	85-0077	<u>Ellsworth</u>
38	85-0078	<u>Ellsworth</u>

39	85-0079	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
40	85-0080		
41	85-0081		
42	85-0082 Global Power	<u>Dyess</u>	
43	85-0083	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
44	85-0084	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
45	85-0085	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
46	85-0086	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
47	85-0087	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
48	85-0088		
49	85-0089		
50	85-0090	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
51	85-0091	<u>Robins</u>	
52	85-0092	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
53	86-0093	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
54	86-0094	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
56	86-0096	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
57	86-0097	<u>Robins</u>	
58	86-0098	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
59	86-0099	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
60	86-0100 Phoenix	<u>Dyess</u>	
61	86-0101 Heavy Metal	<u>Dyess</u>	
62	86-0102	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
63	86-0103 Reluctant Dragon	<u>Dyess</u>	
64	86-0104	<u>Robins</u>	
65	86-0105 Snake Eyes	<u>Dyess</u>	
66	86-0106		Lost 12-01-92 @ IR 165, Van Horne TX
67	86-0107		
68	86-0108 Alein With An Attitude	<u>Dyess</u>	
69	86-0109 Spectre	<u>Dyess</u>	
70	86-0110 Stairway to Heaven	<u>Dyess</u>	
71	86-0111	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
72	86-0112 Black Widow	<u>Dyess</u>	
73	86-0113	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
74	86-0114	<u>Ellsworth</u>	
75	86-0115		
76	86-0116	<u>Robins</u>	
77	86-0117 Night Stalker	<u>Dyess</u>	

78	86-0118	<u>Robins</u>
79	86-0119 The Punisher	<u>Dyess</u>
80	86-0120 Iron Horse	<u>Dyess</u>
81	86-0121	<u>Robins</u>
82	86-0122	
83	86-0123 [none]	
84	86-0124	<u>Dyess</u>
85	86-0125	<u>Robins</u>
86	86-0126	
87	86-0127	
88	86-0128	<u>Ellsworth</u>
89	86-0129	<u>Ellsworth</u>
90	86-0130 Bad Company	<u>Dyess</u>
91	86-0131	<u>Robins</u>
92	86-0132 Oh, Hard Luck	<u>Dyess</u>
93	86-0133	<u>Ellsworth</u>
94	86-0134	<u>Robins</u>
95	86-0135 Deadly Intentions	<u>Dyess</u>
96	86-0136	
97	86-0137 Ace In The Hole	<u>Dyess</u>
98	86-0138	<u>Robins</u>
99	86-0139	<u>Robins</u>
100	86-0140 Last Lancer	<u>Dyess</u>



B-1B Image Gallery

Sources and Resources

<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber/b-1b.htm>

8/20/2005

- [General Accounting Office Reports](#)
- [ANNEX F Common Solution/Concept List \(U\) Air Force Mission Area Plan \(MAP\) \[as of 11 July 1997 - Rev 10\]](#) - Detailed and comprehensive Air Combat Command descriptions of weapon system modernization efforts required to satisfy known needs.
- [Air Force White Paper on Long-Range Bombers](#) 01 March 1999
- [B-1B Systems Program Office - Wright Patterson Air Force Base Ohio](#)
- [Conventional Mission Upgrade Program The B-1B CMUP](#)
- [B-1B FACT BOOK North American Aircraft NA 95-1210 - CHG 5 - 20 July 1995](#)
- [B-1 Bomber Offensive Avionics @ Boeing](#)
- [B-1B Aircraft Software Home Page @ Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma](#)
- [AN/ALQ-161A Electronic Countermeasure System](#)
- [JDAM Homepage](#)
- [B-1B Air Combat Command Factsheet](#)

News

- [Air Combat Command releases B-1B accident investigation report](#) : Jun 12, 1998
- [ACC commander defends role of B-1](#) : Jun 8, 1998 (AFNS) -- The B-1 can carry more bombs, go faster, and fly just as far as any other bomber, so it's going to be a workhorse, said Gen. Dick Hawley, Air Combat Command commander, during a visit here recently.
- [GPS, JDAM communication upgrade kits ready for B-1B](#) Released: May 4, 1998 (AFNS) -- A new weapon will make the B-1B Lancer more lethal and bring the Air Force weapons arsenal into the 21st Century.
- [B-1B drops its first guided joint direct attack munition](#) Released: Mar 10, 1998
- [Dyess 'stands down' B-1B flying operations](#) Released: February 20, 1998
- [B-1B accident investigation report released](#) Released: December 9, 1997
- [Air Combat Command moves up safety stand down day](#) Sep 20, 1997 (AFNS) -- At approximately 3:20 p.m. MDT on Sept. 19 a B-1B from the 28th Bomb Wing at Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.D., crashed 25 miles north of Alzada, Mont. All four crew members were killed in the crash.
- [Robins team delivering on B1-B modification program 970823](#) -- The air logistics center is working on a modification program which allows a new cluster bomb to be dropped from the B-1B bomber.

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<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber/b-1b.htm>

Maintained by [Webmaster](#)

Updated Wednesday, October 13, 1999 9:35:11 AM



Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Fenton Roland D LtCol 7 BW/XP [roland.fenton@dyess.af.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, August 09, 2005 4:02 PM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Distance from IR 178 to Dyess
Importance: High

Art,

Doing well. AM is getting ready to deploy.

If you want an official data call answer I would be required to direct you to Air Staff level.

Here's the factual distance that my experienced pilot and EWO measured from runway center to the low-level points:

Entry: 298 NM

Alt Entry: 275 NM

Exit: 69 NM

We also checked the distances with our software planning tools.

The route is also being surveyed to fly backwards. The estimated availability would be in early 06. This would place the entry near the current exit point.

Don't work too hard..

Roland

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC [mailto:Arthur.Beauchamp@wso.whs.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, August 09, 2005 12:11 PM
To: Fenton Roland D LtCol 7 BW/XP
Subject: Distance from IR 178 to Dyess

Roland,

Hope all is well. We need to know the official distance from IR 178 to Dyess in NM. Thanks. Art

→ Primary Range is 298 NM.
→ Relative to other MOA/IR in the 300 NM radius of Dyess ~~the~~ AFB

→ How often by percentage is the RBT I used relative to the other MOA/IR available to Dyess w/in the 300 NM radius ^{under the current PAA @} Dyess & what is the more

8/9/2005

u delegate under the proposal
insulation of BI @

~~~~~

# of Base / in TX with data  
vice

000000  
000000  
000000

Bombers aren't going away -- fighters are

**Recommendation Detail**

**109 Air Force - 43 Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD and Dyess Air Force Base, TX**  Y  N **109**

**DoD Description** Close Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD. The 24 B-1 aircraft assigned to the 28th Bomb Wing will be distributed to the 7th Bomb Wing, Dyess Air Force Base, TX. Realign Dyess Air Force Base, TX. The C-130 aircraft assigned to the 317th Airlift Group will be distributed to the active duty 314th Airlift Wing (22 aircraft) and Air National Guard 189th Airlift Wing (two aircraft), Little Rock Air Force Base, AR; the 176th Wing (ANG), Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK (four aircraft); and the 302nd Airlift Wing (AFR), Peterson Air Force Base, CO (four aircraft). Peterson Air Force Base will have an active duty/Air Force Reserve association in the C-130 mission. Elmendorf Air Force Base will have an active duty/Air National Guard association in the C-130 mission.

**COBRA Data**

|                           |                 |                |                        |                         |                 |                          |                 |                |
|---------------------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <b>1 Time Costs (\$M)</b> | <b>Rank/190</b> | <b>% Total</b> | <b>Payback (Years)</b> | <b>6 Year Net (\$M)</b> | <b>Rank/190</b> | <b>20-Year NPV (\$M)</b> | <b>Rank/190</b> | <b>% Total</b> |
| \$299.10                  | 18              | 1.24%          | 1                      | (\$316.38)              | 12              | (\$1,853.30)             | 10              | 3.79%          |

**Job Impact at Affected Bases**

| Action                                  | Base Name                  | State | Net Mil.      | Net Civ.    | Net Cont.  | Total Dir.    | Total InDir.  | Total Chng    |
|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------|---------------|-------------|------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Closure                                 | Ellsworth Air Force Base   | SD    | -3,315        | -438        | -99        | -3,852        | -2,913        | -6,765        |
| Gainer                                  | Dyess Air Force Base       | TX    | 310           | 64          | 0          | 374           | 357           | 731           |
| Gainer                                  | Elmendorf Air Force Base   | AK    | 247           | 10          | 0          | 257           | 187           | 444           |
| Gainer                                  | Little Rock Air Force Base | AR    | 1,095         | 90          | 0          | 1,185         | 896           | 2,081         |
| Gainer                                  | Peterson Air Force Base    | CO    | 482           | -19         | 0          | 463           | 339           | 802           |
| <b>Net Jobs for this Recommendation</b> |                            |       | <b>-1,181</b> | <b>-293</b> | <b>-99</b> | <b>-1,573</b> | <b>-1,134</b> | <b>-2,707</b> |

**Other OSD Recommendations**

\*\*\*See Appendix - Alphabetical Listing of Bases

**110 Air Force - 44 Nashville International Airport Air Guard Station, TN**  Y  N **110**

**DoD Description** Realign Nashville International Airport (IAP) Air Guard Station (AGS), TN. This recommendation distributes the C-130H aircraft of the 118th Airlift Wing (ANG) to the 182nd Airlift Wing (ANG), Greater Peoria Airport AGS, IL (four aircraft), and the 123rd Airlift Wing (ANG), Louisville IAP AGS, KY (four aircraft). Flying related ECS (aerial port and fire fighters) moves to Memphis IAP AGS. The Aeromedical Squadron from Nashville moves to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth. Other ECS remains in place at Nashville.

**COBRA Data**

|                           |                 |                |                        |                         |                 |                          |                 |                |
|---------------------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <b>1 Time Costs (\$M)</b> | <b>Rank/190</b> | <b>% Total</b> | <b>Payback (Years)</b> | <b>6 Year Net (\$M)</b> | <b>Rank/190</b> | <b>20-Year NPV (\$M)</b> | <b>Rank/190</b> | <b>% Total</b> |
| \$25.40                   | 116             | 0.11%          | 2                      | \$16.74                 | 120             | (\$120.00)               | 76              | 0.25%          |

**Job Impact at Affected Bases**

| Action                                  | Base Name                                          | State | Net Mil.  | Net Civ.    | Net Cont. | Total Dir.  | Total InDir. | Total Chng  |
|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| Realign                                 | Nashville International Airport Air Guard Station  | TN    | -19       | -172        | 0         | -191        | -136         | -327        |
| Gainer                                  | Greater Peoria Regional Airport                    | IL    | 13        | 21          | 0         | 34          | 23           | 57          |
| Gainer                                  | Louisville International Airport Air Guard Station | KY    | 0         | 1           | 0         | 1           | 0            | 1           |
| Gainer                                  | Memphis International Airport Air Guard Station    | TN    | 2         | 6           | 0         | 8           | 5            | 13          |
| <b>Net Jobs for this Recommendation</b> |                                                    |       | <b>-4</b> | <b>-144</b> | <b>0</b>  | <b>-148</b> | <b>-108</b>  | <b>-256</b> |

**Other OSD Recommendations**

\*\*\*See Appendix - Alphabetical Listing of Bases

**Recommendation Detail**

**Air Force - 45 Ellington Air Guard Station, TX**

**DOD Description** Realign Ellington Field Air Guard Station, TX. The 147th Fighter Wing's F-16s (15 aircraft) will retire. The wing's expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements will remain in place. Ellington retains the capability to support the Homeland Defense mission. The 272nd Engineering Installation Squadron, an ANG geographically separated unit, moves into available space on Ellington.

**COBRA Data**

|                    |          |          |     |               |       |
|--------------------|----------|----------|-----|---------------|-------|
| 1 Time Costs (\$M) | \$1.60   | Rank/190 | 183 | % Total       | 0.01% |
| Payback (Years)    | 5        |          |     |               |       |
| 6 Year Net (\$M)   | \$0.10   | Rank/190 | 78  |               |       |
| 20-Year NPV (\$M)  | (\$3.60) | Rank/190 | 156 | % Total 0.01% |       |

**Job Impact at Affected Bases**

| Action                           | Base Name                         | State | Net Mil. | Net Civ. | Net Cont. | Total Dir. | Total Indir. | Total Chng |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------|----------|----------|-----------|------------|--------------|------------|
| Realign                          | Ellington Field Air Guard Station | TX    | 0        | -3       | 0         | -3         | 0            | -5         |
| Net Jobs for this Recommendation |                                   |       |          |          |           |            |              |            |
|                                  |                                   |       | 0        | -3       | 0         | -3         | 0            | -5         |

Other OSD Recommendations  
 \*\*\*See Appendix - Alphabetical Listing of Bases

**Air Force - 46 Lackland Air Force Base, TX**

**DOD Description** Realign Lackland Air Force Base, TX. Relocate the Standard Air Munitions Package (STAMP)/Standard Tank, Rack, Adaptor, and Pylon Packages (STRAPP) function from Lackland Air Force Base, Medina Annex to McConnell Air Force Base, KS, and transfer the mission to the Air National Guard.

**COBRA Data**

|                    |           |          |     |               |       |
|--------------------|-----------|----------|-----|---------------|-------|
| 1 Time Costs (\$M) | \$8.10    | Rank/190 | 155 | % Total       | 0.03% |
| Payback (Years)    | 2         |          |     |               |       |
| 6 Year Net (\$M)   | (\$4.69)  | Rank/190 | 62  |               |       |
| 20-Year NPV (\$M)  | (\$32.40) | Rank/190 | 115 | % Total 0.07% |       |

**Job Impact at Affected Bases**

| Action                           | Base Name                | State | Net Mil. | Net Civ. | Net Cont. | Total Dir. | Total Indir. | Total Chng |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------|-------|----------|----------|-----------|------------|--------------|------------|
| Realign                          | Lackland Air Force Base  | TX    | -103     | -4       | 0         | -107       | -90          | -197       |
| Realign                          | McConnell Air Force Base | KS    | 63       | 3        | 0         | 66         | 47           | 113        |
| Net Jobs for this Recommendation |                          |       |          |          |           |            |              |            |
|                                  |                          |       | -40      | -1       | 0         | -41        | -43          | -84        |

Other OSD Recommendations  
 \*\*\*See Appendix - Alphabetical Listing of Bases