DCN:11978

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Chairman

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

HEARING

MAY 17, 2005

Presentation of Recommendations and Methodology — AIR FORCE

DCN:11978

Mr Secretary:

As you probably know, The Commission has not yet received the Air Force volume on the process due to Office of the Secretary of Defense Security Review

When we DO receive this volume, will we be able to see your Military Value Calculations so we can have a better analytical idea of why you did the things you did?

fl

DCN 1.19.8

3 Protecting your rangers

Small, efficient, + Less Costly

Interservicing: Public or Private sector
Navy - Marine - Airforce A.h.e.'s

Max war fighting capabilities
Older

Like Weapon systems in Single base

Future defense strategy

Excess Capacity:

Guarding the Home land:

Examples of BRAC decisions that were made to benefit homeland security:

[illegible] @ [illegible]

DCN:11978

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

TESTIMONY TO THE

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JOINT STATEMENT
OF

THE HONORABLE MICHAEL L. DOMINGUEZ
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

GENERAL JOHN P. JUMPER
CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

17 May 2005

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission, we are pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Air Force base closure and realignment recommendations. We look forward to working with you as you consider all Department of Defense recommendations over the next few months.

Overview

Downsizing infrastructure is a difficult task, as all Air Force bases are outstanding installations. They stand as a credit to our Nation as a whole and to the exceptional communities that support them. However, we must make difficult decisions and reduce and realign our infrastructure, to posture ourselves for the security challenges we face, and to preserve our limited resources for readiness and modernization. The Air Force recommendations represent bold steps to accomplish those ends. We will move our smaller force structure into fewer, larger, and more effective combat squadrons. Air Force recommendations include 10 base closures and 62 base realignment actions. Each of these individual closure or realignment recommendations may affect multiple bases. Our 72 actions will affect 115 of the 154 installations the Air Force considered within the BRAC process.

Air Force Goals for BRAC

The Air Force recommendations reaffirm the Department of Defense's commitment to defend the homeland, establish a capabilities-based defense strategy, and challenge the military departments to transform themselves to better meet new threats in a changed security

environment. Consistent with the goals outlined by the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force established four BRAC goals to support right-sizing of the force and to enhance our capabilities:

- Maximize war-fighting capability efficiently.
- Transform the Total Air Force by realigning our infrastructure to meet future defense strategy.
- Maximize operational capability by eliminating excess physical capacity.
- Capitalize on opportunities for joint activity.

We are pleased to report that the Air Force would meet its goals through these recommendations, and in turn meet the overarching goals set for the Department by the Secretary of Defense.

Maximizing War-Fighting Capability

The Air Force recommendations maximize our war-fighting capability by effectively consolidating older weapons systems into fewer, but larger squadrons. These more optimally sized units are more efficient and more operationally effective because of economies of scale. For example, we base weapons systems such as the F-16 fighter to allow us to leverage common support requirements for these weapons systems while reducing cost and duplication. And we consolidate like weapons systems where practical at the fewest operational locations; for example, we place the entire B-1 bomber fleet at Dyess AFB, Texas, and the entire active duty CONUS C-130 tactical airlift fleet at Little Rock AFB, Arkansas.

Our recommendations increase almost all fighter squadrons from 15 aircraft to 18 or 24 aircraft. The Air National Guard's F-15 squadron at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, is the only exception to this fighter basing strategy because of location and recruiting. Hickam's F-15 fighters are important to Homeland Defense, but Hawaii's geographic location can pose training challenges, as it is expensive to host adversarial fighter units for training. In addition, Hickam's Air National

Guard wing also flies KC-135 aircraft and will have a C-17 mission; therefore, leaving the unit sized at its current 15 fighter aircraft to recruit to these other weapons systems was the right solution.

Our recommendations also increase mobility squadrons from 8 aircraft to 12 or 16 aircraft. We made some exceptions to increasing reserve component mobility squadron sizes, either because of capacity or recruiting. We applied military judgment to size these units either to the maximum available installation capacity at no extra cost, or at the current or maximum force structure size that capitalizes on that location's recruiting demographics.

Our recommendations leverage the inherent strengths and advantages of our Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces to maximize the Air Force's capabilities. At the same time, we have maintained the balance across the active duty and reserve components, both in aircraft and in manpower. Reserve component manpower that becomes available as a result of Air Force BRAC recommendations will be reinvested into emerging Air Force missions. Our recently established Future Total Force (FTF) office on the Air Staff will work with the Reserve Component and the Adjutant Generals to determine how to distribute those emerging missions across Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces and organizations. BRAC and the FTF are fundamental, complementary elements that will reshape the Air Force for the future.

Meet Future Defense Strategy

The Air Force recommendations also realign Air Force force structure to better support future defense strategy. The strategic objectives of the 2005 National Defense Strategy include defending the United States homeland from direct attack, securing strategic access, and retaining global freedom of action. The Air Force recommendations help secure the homeland

by providing the required capability to meet North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) missions from our proposed constellation of bases. Our recommendations ensure we retain the right bases to support enduring missions of Global Strike, Global Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and Global Mobility, and ensure we maintain unimpeded access to space. For example, we retain C-17s near new Army Stryker brigades in Alaska and Hawaii, providing strategic mobility and response in the western Pacific. Our recommendations also retain the right bases for emerging needs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and the Joint Unmanned Combat Aerial System.

Eliminate Excess Physical Capacity

As mentioned earlier, we have made 10 closure and 62 realignment recommendations that will eliminate excess capacity within the Air Force. Of the 142 Air Force installations that have operational flying missions today, our recommendations reduce that number by 28 flying units, representing a 20% reduction. We reduce our excess flightline infrastructure by 37%, but still retain sufficient ramp space for surge, emerging missions, or to accommodate Air Force aircraft permanently based overseas in the event we ever have to return those forces. We also reduce excess building and facility infrastructure by 79%, yet retain sufficient square footage for surge or emerging missions. Though we eliminate this excess, we maximize operational capability and maintain the surge capacity we need.

Capitalize On Opportunities For Joint Activity

Finally, our recommendations, independently and in conjunction with recommendations from other Services and the Joint Cross-Service Groups, capitalize on opportunities for joint

activity by hosting sister Service combat and combat support organizations. For example, we will host the Headquarters for the Third Army--the Army's United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) supporting component command--at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, where it will be located with the Air Force's USCENTCOM component, Headquarters Ninth Air Force.

Through the Department's recommendations we will host the joint initial training location for the Joint Strike Fighter at Eglin AFB, Florida, to provide Air Force, Navy, and Marine operators and maintainers with a location that meets the needs of all -- while providing easy access to the range and airspace complexes near the Gulf of Mexico. Eglin AFB will also host the Army's Seventh Special Forces Group, pairing this combat unit with Air Force special operations forces and the robust training areas of the Eglin complex.

While we transfer ownership of Pope AFB, North Carolina, to the Army at Fort Bragg, enabling other Army recommendations that move forces to Fort Bragg, we retain an airlift squadron and an aerial port capability to continue to support the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps. In addition, our recommendations place optimally sized A-10 fighter squadrons in proximity to Fort Polk, Louisiana, and Forts Benning and Stewart, Georgia, to provide the close air support assets needed to support joint training.

Air Force BRAC Process

The Air Force's BRAC analysis was grounded in the force structure plan, our physical infrastructure inventory, and the BRAC selection criteria. Our Air Force infrastructure analysis was shaped by three underlying tenets. First, military value, both quantitative and qualitative, was the predominant factor. Second, all installations were treated impartially, regardless of

whether or not they were considered for closure or realignment in the past. Third, military value was not determined solely on an installation's current mission, but also on its capacity to support other enduring Air Force missions.

The Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) developed Air Force BRAC recommendations. The BCEG was comprised of 12 general officers and civilian executives representing the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and a wide array of Headquarters Air Force functional staff areas. The Air Force Audit Agency was integrated throughout our entire process to ensure Air Force data collection and analytical processes were comprehensive and auditable.

Rather than focus on fungible attributes of an installation, such as assigned personnel or equipment and forces that could be relocated, our military value assessment stressed installation characteristics that were outside the control of the Air Force or would be difficult to replicate elsewhere without great expense or complexity. These characteristics include an installation's geographic location and proximity to other physical features or defense activities, terrain, and prevailing weather. Those installation characteristics that would be difficult to reconstitute elsewhere might include high volume military training airspace, the local transportation infrastructure, intercontinental ballistic missile silos, or basic airfield infrastructure.

The Air Force assessed the military value of its operational bases using certified data obtained from the individual installations. We not only considered the physical capacity of our installations, but also the operational capacity--to include airspace and ranges--and the natural capacity. Applying operational capability data collected through a Web-based tool to BRAC Selection Criteria 1-4, and the weighted guidance assigned by the BCEG, each of the 154

installations the Air Force considered under BRAC received a score for each of eight mission areas considered by the BCEG. These eight mission areas were: fighter, bomber, airlift, tanker, space, Special Operations Forces (SOF)/Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C2ISR), and unmanned aerial vehicles. The objective was to find an optimal long-term basing plan that, within physical and operational constraints, located the Air Force's long-term force structure at installations that had the highest overall military value.

The Air Force started the scenario development process using an optimization model developed by the Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency. We then deliberated to refine the optimization model output until we achieved a set of potential scenarios. Once an optimal basing plan was identified, the Air Force analysis teams developed a related group of potential base closure and realignment options to implement this basing plan. The BCEG reviewed these proposals and, often with refinement, selected the most promising to become scenarios and to undergo further analysis. Again, an iterative process of review and refinement continued until the BCEG approved each candidate recommendation for consideration by the Department of Defense review group, the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC).

The costs and savings for each scenario were determined through application of a costing model, the Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA). Air Force scenario analysis also considered BRAC Selection Criteria 6-8: the economic impact on the communities; the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to host missions, forces, and personnel; and the environmental impact. Unlike the first four selection criteria, which were installation-dependent, selection criteria six, seven, and eight were scenario-dependent, meaning the information

gathered for these criteria was related to a proposed action, not to the status quo. However, certain factors related to selection criteria seven and eight also were captured in military value analysis as they contributed to an installation's ability to support future and existing missions and the availability and condition of land and airspace.

During this process, scenarios from other Services that affected Air Force installations were worked through the Joint Action Scenario Team (JAST). Opportunities for joint basing were worked into Air Force scenarios and formal analysis, and were considered as part of the development of the Service's own candidate recommendations. Similarly, scenarios from the seven Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSG) that affected Air Force installations were worked in coordination with the Air Force.

Anticipated Costs and Savings and Implementation Schedule

We estimate a total savings and cost avoidance of over $2.6 billion dollars for both personnel and infrastructure during the implementation years, and savings and cost avoidance of over $1.2 billion each year thereafter. The Air Force will reinvest any reserve component manpower made available as a result of BRAC realignments or closures into other high priority Air Force missions, including emerging missions.

The Air Force has begun to develop an implementation schedule for these 2005 recommendations should they be approved, and we will work closely with the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, and our active duty major commands to further develop and refine this schedule.

In prior rounds of BRAC, the Air Force established an excellent record of closing bases

as quickly as possible. This aggressive approach provides the quickest savings to the Air Force and assists the local communities in their efforts to develop the closure and implementation plans necessary to begin economic revitalization. The Air Force will ensure that efforts are undertaken to maximize savings at these installations and to work closely with the local communities to facilitate a prompt transition and the best reuse opportunities.

Summary

In conclusion, BRAC offers the Air Force the opportunity to accomplish four things. First and foremost, it transforms our smaller force structure into fewer, larger, more effective combat squadrons. Second, it ensures the transformed force and the infrastructure we retain provides the capabilities necessary to support the future defense strategy. Third, it increases overall efficiency by eliminating excess plant capacity while retaining the surge capability we need. Fourth, it supports joint basing initiatives in smart ways.

Mr. Chairman, we have looked to the future for our mission and our infrastructure requirements, and these recommendations provide for an Air Force that is and will be capable of responding to any challenge, in any theater, at any time. Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you today. Our staff will be made fully available to answer the Commission's questions as it considers the Department's recommendations.

Air Force 37 – Grand Forks AFB, ND



One time cost	$131.5M
Net cost + savings	$322.5M
Annual savings	$173.3M
Expected payback	1 Yr
20 Yr NPV	$1,982.0M

Base	Jobs Direct	Indirect	TOTAL	Pct %
Grand Forks (Rlgn)	(2,645)	(2,284)	(4,929)	(7.4)
Grand Forks TOTL	**(2,645)**	**(2,284)**	**(4,929)**	**(7.4)**

LEGEND

BLUE = Primary Move From Grand Forks (AF-37)
GREEN = Primary Move From McConnell to Forbes (AF 37)
RED = Aircraft Retirements From Forbes and Scott (AF-37)

DCN:11978

DCN:11978

General Tamper, you noted the need to maintain some bases ~~and~~ ~~stations~~ in a caretaker staff for future needs and for recruitment.

Isn't this an argument for retaining other bases and stations such as the Kulis Air Guard Station in Alaska?

Questions for Chairman Principi
Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Hearing on Air Force Recommendations and Methodology

Witnesses:
The Honorable Michael L. Dominguez, Secretary of the Air Force
and
General John P. Jumper, Air Force Chief of Staff
May 17, 2005

1. ~~Did the Office of the Secretary of Defense~~ Were any of your recommendations remove/or add ~~any installation closures or realignments from your recommendations to the Secretary~~ by the Office of the Secretary of Defense? If so, will you please elaborate on the specifics? ~~Did~~ Were you or your department ~~the Office of the Secretary of Defense~~ instruct ~~your Service~~ not to place any specific installations for closure or realignment on your listed recommendations to the Secretary? If so, will you please elaborate on the specifics?

2. According to the summary of the Air Force selection process, you established the four goals to support right-sizing the force and enhancing its capabilities through BRAC 2005. Those goals were: (1) Transform by maximizing the war-fighting capability of each squadron, (2) Transform by realigning Air Force infrastructure with the future defense strategy, (3) Maximize operational capability by eliminating excess physical capacity, and (4) Capitalize on opportunities for joint activity.

   a. Can you provide some examples of your BRAC decisions that achieved these goals?
   b. Where do you believe you fell short and why?

3. As this Commission begins its review and analysis of the BRAC recommendations and the supporting data, we want to have a complete understanding of your definitions of Military Value and the process used to assign a metric to Military Value. Would you please give us the definition of Military Value and how you applied it in your process of defining recommendations?

4. In recent Congressional testimony, General Jumper was asked what issues keep him "up at night". One of his primary answers was "our aging aircraft fleet." How does the Air Force intend to use savings from the base closure and realignment process to address this concern?
Considering the increased efficiency of the F-22 over the current fleet, and the diminishing "buy" projections for the F-22, have the BRAC recommendations remained current with the changing size of the F/A-22 buy? The Army appears to becoming more dependent on rapid deployment from the United States; can the Air Force airlift capability support the Army?

5. As you know, the law requires that you consider total costs to the government in the development of your recommendations.
   a. How would you characterize the interagency coordination and consideration in the BRAC process?
   b. Are there any recommendations that could have an impact on other federal agencies?
   c. To what extent have you analyzed the financial implications for these other agencies and include their expected costs in developing your overall costs and savings estimates?

6. Are closures and major realignments fairly and evenly distributed among the Active Duty and Air reserve Components?

   a. How do the Air Force's previously released "Future Total Force" plans mesh with the proposed closures and realignments?
   b. At many of the Air National Guard Bases where aircraft are being distributed to other locations, small groups are remaining in place at the losing Guard Base. What is your rationale for not closing these bases in total? Would greater savings result by closing these installations completely?

7. Do you have any concerns about the impact of the consolidation of Reserve and Air National Guard centers on your recruitment and retention ~~eff~~ programs?

2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission Suggested Talking Points

1. ***The Congress established the 2005 BRAC Commission to ensure the integrity of the base closure and realignment process. As directed by law, the Commission will provide an independent assessment of the list of suggestions created by DoD.***

   - The BRAC Commission is autonomous from DoD and all other entities.
   - The actions of the Commission are controlled by statute, and the recommendations of the Commission are submitted to the President for approval.
   - The BRAC Commission is non-partisan and is made up of both highly-qualified Democrats and Republicans. The Commission will seek a consensus while drawing on each Commissioner's individual views, background, and experience.
   - The BRAC Commission will conduct an objective, non-partisan, and quantitative analysis.
   - The purpose of the BRAC Commission is to ensure that DoD does not deviate from requirements prescribed by law.

2. ***The recommendations provided by the Department of Defense are extremely complex and interrelated, requiring the utmost attention to detail and in-depth analysis.***

- For the first time, the Secretary of Defense has submitted recommendations from a joint cross-service-oriented, rather than a specific-service-oriented, perspective.
- Many recommendations, received from the Secretary of Defense, contain multiple actions, impacting different services and installations.
- The Commission must analyze individually each of the numerous integrated impacts on both the military value and the community.

3. ***The BRAC Commission will follow a fair and equitable process, to asses the military value of a base and the potential economic impact that the closure of that base may have on the surrounding community.***

- The Commissioners will place military value and our national security as priorities while still taking into account the potential economic effects if base closures.
- The Commission is mindful of the potential human impact that the closure of a base may have on the surrounding community.
- The Commissioners will have the responsibility to ensure that all interests have been fairly considered.

4. The BRAC Commission's process is transparent by nature and the Commission seeks public input into the decision-making process.

- The BRAC Commission wants to ensure that those who will be impacted by the decisions are a part of the process.
- The Commission will hold approximately 15 regional hearings in various parts of the country in order to encourage public involvement and input into the Commission's decision-making process.
- The Commission's decision will be driven by an objective analysis of facts.
- All materials received and created by the BRAC Commission, with the exception of those sensitive to national security, will be publicly available on the Commission's website: www.brac.gov.
- A library containing all documents which have been either created by or submitted to the BRAC Commission, with the exception of documents sensitive to national security, will be open to the public.

Suggested Commissioner Questions
Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Panel I
The Honorable Michael L. Dominguez, Secretary of the Air Force
and
General John P. Jumper, Air Force Chief of Staff
May 17, 2005

General

1. The Air Force has recommended closure of 3 major bases in its Active component. Many of your BRAC recommendations are either in the Reserve Component or results in only minor closures and realignments, below threshold for actions required by BRAC. This is particularly surprising considering earlier projections of excess capacity.

    a. Are you satisfied with the consideration of active component bases for this BRAC round?
    b. What percent of the active component excess capacity is being reduced?
    c. More so than in prior BRAC rounds, this year's round appears to shift various organizations and bodies of work from one base to another without closing many active component bases. How does emptying space on a base that remains open create savings in overall costs of maintaining those facilities?

Air Force Selection Process

2. According to your summary of the selection processes, the Air Force's rebasing strategy among other things "retained those Air Force bases that, by virtue of location or other difficult to reconstitute attributes, had the highest military value" Can you please provide some examples of these attributes which would lead to a high military value, e.g. ranges, airspace, etc.?

Statement
of
Anthony J. Principi

Chairman
2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Hearing of the Commission

9:30 AM
May 17th, 2005

G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington D.C.

**

Good Afternoon,

I'm pleased to welcome The Honorable Michael L. Dominguez, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, and General John P. Jumper, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. They are joined by Gerald F. "Fred" Pease Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Basing and Infrastructure Analysis, and Major General Gary W. Heckman, who is the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs. These two individuals are not delivering formal remarks, but are prepared to comment on the methodology employed by the Air Force. .

Today's hearing will help shed more light on the Air Force recommendations for restructuring our nation's defense installations, and harnessing this process to advance long-term transformation goals.

In support of that objective, we will hear testimony today from several key Air Force infrastructure decision-makers and analysts. I know that the Air Force has poured an enormous amount of time, energy, and brainpower into the final product that is the subject of our hearing. It is only logical and proper that our witnesses be afforded this opportunity to explain to the American public, and to

our independent Commission, what they've proposed to do to the Air Force infrastructure that supports Joint military operations.

As I have previously stated publicly, this Commission takes its responsibility very seriously to provide an objective and independent analysis of these recommendations. We will carefully study each Air Force and Department of Defense recommendation in a transparent manner, steadily seeking input from affected communities, to make sure they fully meet the Congressionally mandated selection criteria. Those recommendations that substantially deviate from the criteria we will either modify or reject as the facts and circumstances warrant.

I now request our witnesses to stand for the administration of the oath required by the Base Closure and Realignment statute. The oath will be administered by Mr. Dan Cowhig.

Mr. Cowhig. [witnesses swear required oath]

3. Your summary of the selection process also indicated that the Air Force's rebasing strategy "supported joint basing initiatives where feasible".

   a. Can you please describe your joint basing initiatives?
   b. What types of specific Air Force activities will be integrated with another Service, e.g. installation management, operations, etc.?
   c. PLEASE PROVIDE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES WHERE THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED

4. According to the Air Force summary, the concept of joint operational basing will be advanced by the reassignment of the Army's Seventh Special Forces Group to Eglin AFB, where it will collocate with the center of Air Force Special Operations. Initial graduate-level pilot training on the Joint Strike Fighter for the Navy, Marines, and Air Force will be conducted jointly at the same base.

   a. Can you please expand on your rationale and implementation of this "joint operational basing" concept?
   b. How much does it cost to implement?
   c. WHAT ARE THE PROJECTED SAVINGS?

5. Your summary of the selection process also indicated that the Air Force's rebasing strategy included actions that would generate savings within a reasonable period.

   a. What constitutes a reasonable period?
   b. If savings were not achieved, would an action be made for another reason? Please provide some examples?

6. Your summary of the selection process also indicated that "Air Force flying units will be restructured into a smaller number of fully equipped squadrons to increase operational effectiveness and efficiency. In the process, aircraft of like configuration (i.e., block) will be based together. In selected cases, personnel from Reserve Component units will be transferred into blended units similar to the well-proven Reserve Associate concept that has long been common in the strategic airlift mission area."

   a. Can you please expand on your rationale and provide some examples of these restructurings?
   b. What analysis was done to examine the most efficient unit size?

c. Please explain how effectiveness and efficiencies exist in creating a larger number of smaller squadrons?

7. Your summary of the selection process also indicated that "forces across mission areas will be based to enhance their capability to provide a global response to the needs of combatant commanders around the world".

   a. Can you please provide some examples?
   b. How were these decisions coordinated with the combatant commanders?

8. Did your community infrastructure assessments indicate that a base or community was at risk of not being able to adequately receive additional units and personnel?
   a. Please provide some examples of any "red flags" raised?
   b. Please explain your process for these assessments?

Cost savings

9. You have indicated that the annual recurring savings of the Air Force recommendations will be approximately $2.6B, and the net present value of these savings over twenty years will be $14.5B.

   a. Do these costs include environmental remediation costs?
   b. Do these costs include the costs of rebasing of Air Force units from overseas?
   c. Do these costs include potential costs across the federal government?
   d. Based on GAO reviews, DOD's savings estimates are rough approximations of the likely savings. Please explain what, if anything, DOD has done for this BRAC round to improve the method for determining Air Force savings or Air Force cost avoidances.
   e. The base closure criteria address "the cost of operations and manpower implications" as part of "military value". Roughly, how many of your recommendations will not yield savings in terms of cost of operations and manpower reductions? Why are these recommendations being made?

Air Force Transformation

10. The Air Force's Transformation Flight Plan states that in order to play its part in transformation in support of the Joint Forces Commander, the Air Force will work with other Services, the Joint Staff, other DOD agencies and allies/coalition partners to "enhance joint and coalition war-fighting."

- **a.** As you prepared your BRAC submissions to DOD, how specifically did you work with other Services, the Joint Staff and other Federal agencies to ensure that your proposed force structure "enhanced joint and coalition war-fighting?"
- **b.** How does your F/A-22 and Joint Strike Fighter force structure account for, and enhance the Navy's air operations?

Force Structure Plan

11. The legislation authorizing this BRAC round required that DOD develop a 20-year force structure plan to help guide BRAC recommendations. However, there appears to be much uncertainty regarding future force structure requirements.

- **a.** How do your BRAC recommendations relate to your force structure plan?
- **b.** How did you deal with the uncertainties of planning your force structure over the next 20 years? How were those uncertainties taken into consideration in developing the BRAC recommendations?
- **c.** What key assumptions influenced the Air Force's force structure plan? For example, what assumption does the Air Force make regarding replacement of existing aircraft—one for one replacement, or something smaller? What assumption does it make regarding the future of unmanned aircraft (UAVs) relative to replacing other manned aircraft?
- **d.** Does the force structure plan submitted in March 2005 reflect the December 2004 decision by the Office of Secretary of Defense to reduce the number of F-22s to be bought?
- **e.** How did F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter basing plans impact your BRAC recommendations?

f. Given uncertainties regarding future force structure requirements, how can the BRAC Commission be confident that it isn't being asked to approve reductions at installations where future requirements may grow?
g. To what extent is the force structure likely to change as a result of the QDR and how much flexibility will the Air Force have to accommodate a different and potentially larger force structure under the proposed BRAC closing and realignment plan?

Impact of BRAC ongoing operations

12. As you know, there has been some resistance to BRAC given today's security environment and at a time when the U.S military is involved in two major operations.

    a. How can we ensure that BRAC decisions in CONUS do not negatively affect ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
    b. How will these potential risks be mitigated?

Excess/surge capacity

13. Base closure criterion #3 addresses the need to consider surge requirements.

    a. How did this requirement effect your determination for selecting bases for closure and or realignment?
    b. What metrics were used to measure installation surge capabilities?
    c. Are there particular areas where potential surge capacity is needed most?

14. The Overseas Basing Commission has made recommendations concerning the Department's plan to move units from overseas to the Continental United States.

    a. What effect would implementation of the Overseas Basing Commission recommendations have on the capacity of the proposed basing structure after implementation of this round of the BRAC?

b. To what extent has the Air Force fully calculated the costs of implementing the overseas rebasing initiative, including need for new facilities overseas, new training range requirements, as well as mobility and prepositioning requirements?

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

15. As we discussed at a previous hearing, the ongoing QDR and BRAC are interrelated. We are concerned that there is a possibility that decisions made as a result of the ongoing QDR may contradict some of your BRAC recommendations to the Commission.

a. Did you attempt to integrate QDR and BRAC analyses and decisions?
b. How can we ensure that decisions made in the ongoing QDR do not contradict?

Mobility Capability Study

16. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 23 Sep 04, Secretary Rumsfeld noted that "U.S. forces in the next century must be agile...[and] readily deployable...[and] must be able to project our power over long distances, in days or weeks, rather than months."

a. Has DOD's BRAC submission accounted for results of the recent department-wide Mobility Capabilities Study? If so, how?
b. If not, how can we ensure that our decisions on base closure and realignment do not conflict with these studies findings?
c. How can the Air Force justify the reduction of airlift and air refueling aircraft before the results of the Mobility Capabilities Study have been released?

Environmental Issues

17. Are there any specific environmental issues that we should carefully consider? Are there any specific actions/recommendations where environmental issues stand out? Any significant environmental impacts at receiving bases?

18. The Department of Defense is responsible for remediating contamination on its facilities whether they remain open or closed. However, contaminant remediation at closing bases is likely to be expedited using current dollars versus future dollars. Additionally, uncontaminated parcels of property could conceivably be transferred more rapidly and with greater values than contaminated parcels.

a. Was the differential between present and future remediation costs and rapid versus delayed property transfer considered as an economic factor in deciding what bases to close?

19. Were the costs associated with improving existing infrastructure and support to satisfy environmental requirements at realigned or gaining installations included in estimates of potential savings associated with selecting bases for closure? ·

20. Volume I of the Base Closure and Realignment Report is remarkably silent on the general topic of ranges, whether the range be used for firing, bombing, supersonic flight, electronic warfare, strafing, or other military exercises. The usefulness of a range is constrained by airspace use, the ground environment including private development, and transit time to and from the ranges.

a. Would you please comment on the military value of the Barry M. Goldwater Range (associated with Luke AFB) and Melrose Range (associated with Cannon AFB)? Will the recommended actions improve the use of the range complex in general while continuing to allow good stewardship of the environment?

b. What impact will continued use of these two ranges have on the management of these protected resources including endanger species?

c. What impact will the closure of Cannon AFB, NM have on Melrose Range?

d. What impact will the Joint strike Fighter and Special Forces realignment have on the environment in Florida and the Gulf of Mexico?

Homeland Defense

21. The homeland defense mission has placed additional demands on the military. According to the Air Forces summary of its BRAC selection process, "forces will be rebased to fully support the homeland security-related air sovereignty taskings of the US Northern Command."

- **a.** Can you please describe how the demands of this mission were factored into your BRAC recommendations?
- **b.** Can you elaborate on the coordination that occurred with the Department of Homeland Security and/or local governments as part of your BRAC deliberations?
- **c.** Can you please provide some examples of BRAC decisions that were made to benefit homeland security?

Air Reserve / Air National Guard Components

22. Your recommendations include reductions in the number of Air National Guard bases and aircraft and the realignment of others.

- a. What analysis was used to determine the most efficient unit size that is mentioned in the Base Realignment and Closure Report?
- b. Given the assertion that Guard units are often less expensive to operate than active units partly because they often operate at civilian or state-owned facilities, will the consolidation of Guard units achieve enough savings to justify the personnel turmoil associated with consolidating units?

23. As you know, a legal issue has been raised over the role of states and their governors in approving the closure or relocations of guard units. Please tell us the extent to which state governors, adjutant generals, or other state officials have been consulted in advance regarding your proposed BRAC recommendations.

Cannon AFB, NM

24. DOD has made a recommendation to close Cannon Air Force Base and to distribute the 27th Fighter Wing's F-16 aircraft to other bases.

The projected economic impact to the Clovis, New Mexico community is substantial with an approximate loss of 20 percent of the jobs in the Clovis community. (A loss of 2,824 direct and 1,956 indirect jobs within an economic area employment of 23,348).

a. What emphasis was given to economic impact this closure would have on the Clovis community?
b. How did Cannon AFB compare to other small aircraft bases?
c. Was the proposed New Mexico Training Range Initiative (NMTRI), which would establish expand airspace for supersonic flight training considered in your decision to close Cannon? If not why not?

25. The Recommendation for Cannon AFB notes that the three F-16 squadrons are currently equipped with three different series (that is "blocks") of F-16 aircraft. The report says that the Block 50 (most current series) is being relegated to a spares role, while the older aircraft are going to other locations with higher military value. Please explain how this fits into the 2025 Force Structure Plan?

Pope AFB, NC

26. The Air Force proposes to realign Pope Air Force Base, NC by distributing 25 C-130E aircraft to Little Rock AFB, AR and replacing them with 16 C-130H aircraft: eight from Yeager Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), WV and eight from Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station (ARS), PA. Additionally, 36 A-10 aircraft will be removed to Moody AFB, GA and not replaced. Finally, the Army intends to increase manpower at Fort Bragg, NC by adding another airborne brigade.

a. Could you please explain how the Air Force will be able to support a presumed increase in airlift requirement with nine fewer aircraft?
b. Will the command and control associated with an AFRC provide sufficient joint planning capabilities for integration with rapid deploying forces within XVIII Airborne Corps?
c. Also, what impact will moving the 36 A-10s to Moody AFB, GA have on joint services training and support?

Eielson AFB, AK

27. The Air Force's realignment of Eielson AFB, Alaska includes leaving an Air National Guard unit in place and keeps the base open in a "warm" status.

- **a.** Can you explain what you mean by keeping the base open in a "warm status"? How will the base be used?
- **b.** How much of the base will be maintained in "warm status"?
- **c.** Does this really present savings or does it pass on additional installation management costs to the Air National Guard?

Economic Impact

28. Many of the hardest hit communities as a result of BRAC recommendations are results of Air Force closures. Communities impacted by Air Force BRAC recommendations include the communities of Clovis, NM (20.5% job loss); Rapid City, SD (8.5%); Fairbanks, AK (8.6%); Grand Forks, ND (7.4%); and Mountain Home, ID (6.2). Please explain how the economic impact criteria played in your decisions?

Depot Maintenance

29. As you know, the law requires that no more than 50 percent of the department's depot maintenance workload can be contracted out in order to retain a viable organic base to perform this work.

- **a.** What assurances can you provide us that implementation of your recommendations will not violate the "50/50" provision?
- **b.** How will the Air Force's consolidation of intermediate and depot level maintenance activities affect its ability to accurately account for depot level maintenance under 50/50 reporting requirements?
- **c.** What excess capacity will be available if the maintenance requirements increase through increased operations or unplanned maintenance or upgrades?

Technical/contractor base considerations

30. The military often depends on civilian contractors to perform critical and highly specialized functions such as research, engineering development, and technical support.

a. How did you measure the impacts on mission and workforce when you considered units and installations that are highly dependent on the civilian and contractor employees?

b. Are there any installations where these considerations were especially prominent?

What We heard:

- SECDEF, ~~and~~ General Myers & USD Wynne
- Emphasized that Change
  - is nothing new - and closing/restructuring bases is nothing new.
  - is essential to respond to Changing military capabilities and Changing threats/challenges.
- addressed the question of placing the BRAC before QDR - expressed their confidence that there is no conflict. - points out can't freeze in place pending study outcomes - since there are always studies underway.
- asserted that BRAC proposal isn't just saving money but would make military more effective - ~~promoting~~
  - * efficiency.
  - * jointness between services
  - * 1st criterion was "military value"
  - * takes reserve components into account
  - * responds to post 9-11 security environment
- asserted Proposal takes surge, mobilization into account

Questions for General Jumper

General Jumper, you recently testified before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that there is an ever increasing demand for supersonic airspace because of newer capabilities of our military aircraft and the increasing use of stand off weapons.

I have learned about an initiative called the New Mexico Training Range Initiative, which is nearing final approval, under which the training ranges at Cannon Air Force Base would be expanded both horizontally and vertically to include substantially more airspace for supersonic operations. Yet Cannon Air Force Base is recommended for closure, which apparently would result in loss not only of existing airspace but also the proposed expanded airspace.

Was the New Mexico Training Range Initiative considered in making this recommendation?

If not, why not?

<u>Possible follow-up question if he suggests that the expanded airspace would continue to be available after Cannon AFB is closed:</u>

General, I am told that that an integral part of New Mexico Training Range Initiative are a number of easements granted by the State Of New Mexico which were conditioned upon Cannon AFB being retained as an active Air Force Base.

Do you know if that is the case, and if you do not know today, would you provide the Commission with that information?

DCN:11978

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

TESTIMONY TO THE

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JOINT STATEMENT
OF

THE HONORABLE MICHAEL L. DOMINGUEZ
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

GENERAL JOHN P. JUMPER
CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

17 May 2005

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission, we are pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Air Force base closure and realignment recommendations. We look forward to working with you as you consider all Department of Defense recommendations over the next few months.

Overview

Downsizing infrastructure is a difficult task, as all Air Force bases are outstanding installations. They stand as a credit to our Nation as a whole and to the exceptional communities that support them. However, we must make difficult decisions and reduce and realign our infrastructure, to posture ourselves for the security challenges we face, and to preserve our limited resources for readiness and modernization. The Air Force recommendations represent bold steps to accomplish those ends. We will move our smaller force structure into fewer, larger, and more effective combat squadrons. Air Force recommendations include 10 base closures and 62 base realignment actions. Each of these individual closure or realignment recommendations may affect multiple bases. Our 72 actions will affect 115 of the 154 installations the Air Force considered within the BRAC process.

Air Force Goals for BRAC

The Air Force recommendations reaffirm the Department of Defense's commitment to defend the homeland, establish a capabilities-based defense strategy, and challenge the military departments to transform themselves to better meet new threats in a changed security

environment. Consistent with the goals outlined by the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force established four BRAC goals to support right-sizing of the force and to enhance our capabilities:

- Maximize war-fighting capability efficiently.
- Transform the Total Air Force by realigning our infrastructure to meet future defense strategy.
- Maximize operational capability by eliminating excess physical capacity.
- Capitalize on opportunities for joint activity.

We are pleased to report that the Air Force would meet its goals through these recommendations, and in turn meet the overarching goals set for the Department by the Secretary of Defense.

Maximizing War-Fighting Capability

The Air Force recommendations maximize our war-fighting capability by effectively consolidating older weapons systems into fewer, but larger squadrons. These more optimally sized units are more efficient and more operationally effective because of economies of scale. For example, we base weapons systems such as the F-16 fighter to allow us to leverage common support requirements for these weapons systems while reducing cost and duplication. And we consolidate like weapons systems where practical at the fewest operational locations; for example, we place the entire B-1 bomber fleet at Dyess AFB, Texas, and the entire active duty CONUS C-130 tactical airlift fleet at Little Rock AFB, Arkansas.

Our recommendations increase almost all fighter squadrons from 15 aircraft to 18 or 24 aircraft. The Air National Guard's F-15 squadron at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, is the only exception to this fighter basing strategy because of location and recruiting. Hickam's F-15 fighters are important to Homeland Defense, but Hawaii's geographic location can pose training challenges, as it is expensive to host adversarial fighter units for training. In addition, Hickam's Air National

Guard wing also flies KC-135 aircraft and will have a C-17 mission; therefore, leaving the unit sized at its current 15 fighter aircraft to recruit to these other weapons systems was the right solution.

Our recommendations also increase mobility squadrons from 8 aircraft to 12 or 16 aircraft. We made some exceptions to increasing reserve component mobility squadron sizes, either because of capacity or recruiting. We applied military judgment to size these units either to the maximum available installation capacity at no extra cost, or at the current or maximum force structure size that capitalizes on that location's recruiting demographics.

Our recommendations leverage the inherent strengths and advantages of our Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces to maximize the Air Force's capabilities. At the same time, we have maintained the balance across the active duty and reserve components, both in aircraft and in manpower. Reserve component manpower that becomes available as a result of Air Force BRAC recommendations will be reinvested into emerging Air Force missions. Our recently established Future Total Force (FTF) office on the Air Staff will work with the Reserve Component and the Adjutant Generals to determine how to distribute those emerging missions across Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces and organizations. BRAC and the FTF are fundamental, complementary elements that will reshape the Air Force for the future.

Meet Future Defense Strategy

The Air Force recommendations also realign Air Force force structure to better support future defense strategy. The strategic objectives of the 2005 National Defense Strategy include defending the United States homeland from direct attack, securing strategic access, and retaining global freedom of action. The Air Force recommendations help secure the homeland

by providing the required capability to meet North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) missions from our proposed constellation of bases. Our recommendations ensure we retain the right bases to support enduring missions of Global Strike, Global Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and Global Mobility, and ensure we maintain unimpeded access to space. For example, we retain C-17s near new Army Stryker brigades in Alaska and Hawaii, providing strategic mobility and response in the western Pacific. Our recommendations also retain the right bases for emerging needs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and the Joint Unmanned Combat Aerial System.

Eliminate Excess Physical Capacity

As mentioned earlier, we have made 10 closure and 62 realignment recommendations that will eliminate excess capacity within the Air Force. Of the 142 Air Force installations that have operational flying missions today, our recommendations reduce that number by 28 flying units, representing a 20% reduction. We reduce our excess flightline infrastructure by 37%, but still retain sufficient ramp space for surge, emerging missions, or to accommodate Air Force aircraft permanently based overseas in the event we ever have to return those forces. We also reduce excess building and facility infrastructure by 79%, yet retain sufficient square footage for surge or emerging missions. Though we eliminate this excess, we maximize operational capability and maintain the surge capacity we need.

Capitalize On Opportunities For Joint Activity

Finally, our recommendations, independently and in conjunction with recommendations from other Services and the Joint Cross-Service Groups, capitalize on opportunities for joint

activity by hosting sister Service combat and combat support organizations. For example, we will host the Headquarters for the Third Army--the Army's United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) supporting component command--at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, where it will be located with the Air Force's USCENTCOM component, Headquarters Ninth Air Force.

Through the Department's recommendations we will host the joint initial training location for the Joint Strike Fighter at Eglin AFB, Florida, to provide Air Force, Navy, and Marine operators and maintainers with a location that meets the needs of all -- while providing easy access to the range and airspace complexes near the Gulf of Mexico. Eglin AFB will also host the Army's Seventh Special Forces Group, pairing this combat unit with Air Force special operations forces and the robust training areas of the Eglin complex.

While we transfer ownership of Pope AFB, North Carolina, to the Army at Fort Bragg, enabling other Army recommendations that move forces to Fort Bragg, we retain an airlift squadron and an aerial port capability to continue to support the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps. In addition, our recommendations place optimally sized A-10 fighter squadrons in proximity to Fort Polk, Louisiana, and Forts Benning and Stewart, Georgia, to provide the close air support assets needed to support joint training.

Air Force BRAC Process

The Air Force's BRAC analysis was grounded in the force structure plan, our physical infrastructure inventory, and the BRAC selection criteria. Our Air Force infrastructure analysis was shaped by three underlying tenets. First, military value, both quantitative and qualitative, was the predominant factor. Second, all installations were treated impartially, regardless of

whether or not they were considered for closure or realignment in the past. Third, military value was not determined solely on an installation's current mission, but also on its capacity to support other enduring Air Force missions.

The Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) developed Air Force BRAC recommendations. The BCEG was comprised of 12 general officers and civilian executives representing the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and a wide array of Headquarters Air Force functional staff areas. The Air Force Audit Agency was integrated throughout our entire process to ensure Air Force data collection and analytical processes were comprehensive and auditable.

Rather than focus on fungible attributes of an installation, such as assigned personnel or equipment and forces that could be relocated, our military value assessment stressed installation characteristics that were outside the control of the Air Force or would be difficult to replicate elsewhere without great expense or complexity. These characteristics include an installation's geographic location and proximity to other physical features or defense activities, terrain, and prevailing weather. Those installation characteristics that would be difficult to reconstitute elsewhere might include high volume military training airspace, the local transportation infrastructure, intercontinental ballistic missile silos, or basic airfield infrastructure.

The Air Force assessed the military value of its operational bases using certified data obtained from the individual installations. We not only considered the physical capacity of our installations, but also the operational capacity--to include airspace and ranges--and the natural capacity. Applying operational capability data collected through a Web-based tool to BRAC Selection Criteria 1-4, and the weighted guidance assigned by the BCEG, each of the 154

installations the Air Force considered under BRAC received a score for each of eight mission areas considered by the BCEG. These eight mission areas were: fighter, bomber, airlift, tanker, space, Special Operations Forces (SOF)/Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C2ISR), and unmanned aerial vehicles. The objective was to find an optimal long-term basing plan that, within physical and operational constraints, located the Air Force's long-term force structure at installations that had the highest overall military value.

The Air Force started the scenario development process using an optimization model developed by the Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency. We then deliberated to refine the optimization model output until we achieved a set of potential scenarios. Once an optimal basing plan was identified, the Air Force analysis teams developed a related group of potential base closure and realignment options to implement this basing plan. The BCEG reviewed these proposals and, often with refinement, selected the most promising to become scenarios and to undergo further analysis. Again, an iterative process of review and refinement continued until the BCEG approved each candidate recommendation for consideration by the Department of Defense review group, the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC).

The costs and savings for each scenario were determined through application of a costing model, the Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA). Air Force scenario analysis also considered BRAC Selection Criteria 6-8: the economic impact on the communities; the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to host missions, forces, and personnel; and the environmental impact. Unlike the first four selection criteria, which were installation-dependent, selection criteria six, seven, and eight were scenario-dependent, meaning the information

gathered for these criteria was related to a proposed action, not to the status quo. However, certain factors related to selection criteria seven and eight also were captured in military value analysis as they contributed to an installation's ability to support future and existing missions and the availability and condition of land and airspace.

During this process, scenarios from other Services that affected Air Force installations were worked through the Joint Action Scenario Team (JAST). Opportunities for joint basing were worked into Air Force scenarios and formal analysis, and were considered as part of the development of the Service's own candidate recommendations. Similarly, scenarios from the seven Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSG) that affected Air Force installations were worked in coordination with the Air Force.

Anticipated Costs and Savings and Implementation Schedule

We estimate a total savings and cost avoidance of over $2.6 billion dollars for both personnel and infrastructure during the implementation years, and savings and cost avoidance of over $1.2 billion each year thereafter. The Air Force will reinvest any reserve component manpower made available as a result of BRAC realignments or closures into other high priority Air Force missions, including emerging missions.

The Air Force has begun to develop an implementation schedule for these 2005 recommendations should they be approved, and we will work closely with the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, and our active duty major commands to further develop and refine this schedule.

In prior rounds of BRAC, the Air Force established an excellent record of closing bases

as quickly as possible. This aggressive approach provides the quickest savings to the Air Force and assists the local communities in their efforts to develop the closure and implementation plans necessary to begin economic revitalization. The Air Force will ensure that efforts are undertaken to maximize savings at these installations and to work closely with the local communities to facilitate a prompt transition and the best reuse opportunities.

Summary

In conclusion, BRAC offers the Air Force the opportunity to accomplish four things. First and foremost, it transforms our smaller force structure into fewer, larger, more effective combat squadrons. Second, it ensures the transformed force and the infrastructure we retain provides the capabilities necessary to support the future defense strategy. Third, it increases overall efficiency by eliminating excess plant capacity while retaining the surge capability we need. Fourth, it supports joint basing initiatives in smart ways.

Mr. Chairman, we have looked to the future for our mission and our infrastructure requirements, and these recommendations provide for an Air Force that is and will be capable of responding to any challenge, in any theater, at any time. Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you today. Our staff will be made fully available to answer the Commission's questions as it considers the Department's recommendations.