

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Chairman

**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**



**HEARING ON HOMELAND SECURITY /
DEFENSE AND ON UNITS OF THE AIR
NATIONAL GUARD**

AUGUST 11, 2005

DRAFT

DHS/ANG Aug 11 Hearing Questions DRAFT

Panel 1 - OSD, NORTHCOM

Panel 2 - USAF, NGB

Panel 3 - TAGs

To TAGs: We understand you were working on a compromise solution to the ANG issue and it fell apart. If this is an accurate statement, please explain.

The Adjutants General have been working various new mission opportunities for a number of years. The process has always been slow and laborious because of the intricate linkages of funding, training, schedules, and dealing with second and third order effects. Most recently we looked at various alternatives to the Air Force BRAC recommendation package. Our basic approach was to build something different within the constraints of the BRAC schedule and Air Force recommendations which were generally flawed. We had to accept the closure decisions as given and stay within the aircraft constraints imposed by Air Force recommendations. Infrastructure recommendations were inexorably linked to programmatic changes involving aircraft numbers and locations coupled with introduction of the “enclave” concept made any attempt impossible. Additionally, we were forced to accomplish in a matter of weeks what had taken the Air Force over two years to prepare. We also lacked sufficient definition of new mission opportunities, especially schedules for implementation and personnel requirements. Finally, recent legal opinions from the Air Force indicate potential issues with many of the new mission opportunities. Quite simply, we do not yet have the tools to bridge the gap from the programmatic moves which create enclaves to new missions for sites that were selected to lose flying missions.

To TAGs: We have heard some talk of a new proposal. Is one forthcoming? What degree of consensus will any alternate plan have with the 54 states and territories?

Our set of recommendations will be presented at the 11 August hearing. The series of recommendations approaches the issue from a different direction.

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Based on what the BRAC Commission is tasked by law to accomplish we address those items outside of the BRAC charter within the boundaries of Air National Guard recommendations. This approach is principle based and agreed to by the Adjutants General as stated in my previous letter to the commission. I don't think it's accurate to call these recommendations a consensus of all 54 TAGs, but I do think the recommendations for each state reflect the views of that state's TAG.

To TAGs: Are there any ANG installations that you would support for closure or realignment?

The Adjutants General do not take position regarding specific closure recommendations. The BRAC Commission is acting completely within its charter in dealing with closure recommendations. While we contend that the data and analysis used to determine which bases to recommend for closure was flawed. The process provides ample opportunity for sites and communities to make their case before the Commission. With regard to realignment our set contains at least ten instances of support. Our goal in preparing the set of recommendations was to be principled but prudent.

To TAGs: Tell us the ramifications for affecting ANG units near key geographic recruiting bases.

Two primary points are important to geographic location. First, those leaving active duty tend to move to a location first (for job and/or family reasons) and join the Air National Guard located there second—it is seldom the other way around. The Air Force recruits and trains service members and send them to locations—the Air National Guard recruits new service members at locations. Therefore, locations most suitable for ANG units have significant civilian sector job opportunities.

The second key factor is proximity to educational advancement opportunities. Many of our new recruits join for the federal and often state education benefits offered. These benefits are realistically usable only if educational institutions exist within a reasonable distance to the ANG site.

The Air Force also draws significant benefits from ANG sites located in geographic areas with high population density. The military and flying presence coupled with aggressive Air National Guard unit participation in

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community (especially school) activities influences young people to join the Air Force as well as the National Guard.

To TAGs: What do you think of Associate Basing? Are you and the AF on the right track with it?

The Adjutants General fully support various forms of Associate Basing. In fact, we aggressively pursued new Associate Basing opportunities in Virginia, Vermont, California/Nevada, and Nebraska, to name four. Associates concepts for the Air National Guard will in many cases be different than those in place for the Air Force Reserve. Our community based foundation demands this. For example, as discussed in a previous question recruiting and retention require certain geographic related factors to be successful. Currently, the Air Force is conducting a community base model test at Burlington, Vermont. The test is just underway. We hope the Air Force will move quickly to validate this model.

We are pleased to be a partner with the Air Force in emerging, transformational missions; however we do not have a good understanding of what the actual requirements will be for these missions. The concern is that there does not appear to be adequate planning or budgeting for the training and other aspects of performing these mission. For example, a recent ruling by the Air Force Office of the Judge Advocate indicated that missions planned for Alaska and North Dakota may not be permissible at Title 32 missions.

To TAGs: What is your estimate of the ANG personnel losses should the DoD recommendations become law?

Informal surveys at many locations identified to become enclaves indicate a loss of seventy to eighty five percent of the personnel within a period of five years or less. Even more accurate is the immediate loss of full time personnel looking to find a new military position at another location before all positions are filled. The other startling information from these informal surveys is that very few of those leaving sites slated to become enclaves will continue their ANG career elsewhere. Since the ANG has older service members community and families ties become entrenched and members seek other employment in order to stay in their communities.

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To TAGs: What sorts of leadership challenges are before your commanders with these BRAC proposals if they are enacted?

Quite frankly, getting volunteers to support overseas rotations will become acutely more difficult. In the highly tasked C-130 community unit members are returning from extended duty only to learn their unit will be disbanded. The Air National Guard has been able to provide sufficient volunteers so that the Air Force has not had to rely on large scale mobilizations similar to the Army. Commanders at sites slated for closure and losing flying units will likely find themselves unable to support key overseas rotations with volunteers. Another challenge for commanders will be convincing full time and traditional members to stay in a unit slated to disband. Some will opt to jump at other opportunities quickly for fear those opportunities will vanish if they wait. Others will become frustrated and just leave the service because they will see no reasonable opportunity to complete a twenty year career to qualify for a retirement.

To TAGs: Do you anticipate a need for an amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 which restricts the use of troops in domestic law enforcement to address the role of the active forces in domestic law enforcement matters?

None whatsoever! Over the past four years the National Guard has provided all the military support necessary to respond to a major terrorist attack, a horrendous hurricane season, and security needs for a major international summit and two political conventions. This was all accomplished while supporting Governors in responding to state disasters of every type and magnitude. Even though the National Guard is being called up to support the active component as never before since World War II sufficient personnel remain in each state and through emergency response agreements between states to meet all imaginable needs.

To TAGs: In Monday's Washington Post cover story it states: "Particular reliance is being placed on the National Guard, which is expanding a network of 22-member civil support teams to all states and forming about a dozen 120-member regional response units. Congress last year also gave the Guard expanded authority under Title 32 of the U.S. Code to perform such homeland missions as securing power plants and other critical facilities."

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In light of the Air National Guard playing a vital role in homeland security, how does the DoD recommendation support the requirement of this act?

The BRAC recommendations largely ignore the emerging homeland security missions and the needs of the Guard. In the case of the Air Guard, the recommendations would make it difficult for the civil support teams to deploy in many cases (as they normally deploy with all of their equipment on C-130s) and would reduce the ability of the Guard to provide adequate response capability. While DoD is clearly focused on transformation, it has still only slowly transformed its approach to this area even after 9-11. We are hoping that the QDR will improve this situation.

In our view the DoD recommendation will diminish the ANG capability to support homeland security needs. First, the reduced numbers and distribution of ANG aircraft, especially cargo and tanker aircraft, leaves wide swaths of the nation with no coverage. The rapid loading and movement Civil Support Teams becomes problematic in many areas. Second, if sites with enclaves are not able to recruit and retain personnel most valuable to the governors in responding to homeland security needs many state will lose all ANG capability.

To TAGs: How would you characterize recruiting and retention over the past five years? Have mobilizations and OPS and PERSTEMPOs of the GWOT contributed to any changes in your ability to recruit and retain?

The Air National Guard continues to be the highest of all Air Force and Army component in recruiting and retaining personnel. Stable and predictable deployment rotations combined with flexible and extensive use of volunteers provides an opportunity for all to service at times that best suite them. There are currently 5,210 Air National Guard volunteers contributing to the National Response and an additional 1,910 have been mobilized in support of GWOT. Stability and the draw of working with the latest technology are also factors that contribute to the high recruiting and retention rates.

To TAGs: Approximately what percentage of your recruits, aircrew and aircraft maintainers particularly, come from active duty? Based upon active duty deployment rates since 9/11, do you expect to see a change in your pool of active duty personnel who might otherwise join the Guard when they left active duty?

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Informal information from about twenty percent of the states indicate that on average over half of aircrew are prior service—in some instances the number reaches ninety percent. For maintenance personnel the number is probably around forty percent with a high of seventy percent. We have observed increased numbers of active duty members wanting to join the Air National Guard because of Air Force draw downs in certain career fields. Also, active duty personnel are leaving the Air Force because of a high operations tempo. Even though the ANG operations tempo is higher than ever members are better able to manage their participation and continue to volunteer.

To TAGs: What do you think the BRAC Commission can do to ensure the Guard is better prepared and provided for in order to support the nation's "1-4-2-1" defense strategy? What can we do to help you?

Our greatest fear is that enactment of the recommendations currently before the Commission will result in a wholesale loss of experienced personnel and valuable locations before being able to transition to new missions and opportunities. Once lost, we see no opportunity for recovery. This will impact all elements of the national defense strategy—most notably homeland defense, projection to four key regions, and strategic reserve. We fully realize that the ANG must transform along with the Air Force. But it must be accomplished at a pace that doesn't tear the fabric of our existence. Removing the programmatic elements from the BRAC recommendations per our set of recommendations will take this transformation off the BRAC fast track and permit us to work with the Air Force to develop transition plans with logical connections from the legacy force to the Future Total Force.

SO - Two Follow-up
Questions -

→ With New London, is the
\$23 million AN accurate
expectation of the Cleanup

^{and} → To what standard is the Department
Liable should the cleanup
NOT BE CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY

CLOSURES only

89	16
91	26
93	28
95	27
	(97)
2005	33

GAC

72% OF THE 500,000 ACRES ON
PREVIOUSLY CLOSED BASES
HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED
FOR REUSE

95% OF THE LAND ALREADY TRANSFERRED
WAS CLEANED UP BEFORE TRANSFER

OTIS
Air Guard Base

18% of Closed Base
AC Range (91,000 acres) WAS
Leased out prior to
completion of CLEANUP

SIR,

ADMIRAL MULLEN CAN SPEAK WITH YOU
at 4:15pm or on his cell phone
after 6pm.

Will see how long this goes.

On another note, the NY Times wants to
speak with you about DOT overstating
savings. We can do the call on the
way to the office.

Suggest limit tax issue to what
the GAO found in its July
report - that the
Commission should
look at ~~the~~ how personnel
savings were counted.

DHS/ANG Aug 11 Hearing Questions

Panel 1 - OSD, NORTHCOM

To OSD: Why have you been reluctant to respond to the Commissioner's questions regarding the requested legality of the Air National Guard recommendations?

To OSD: What is the nature of the relationship between DHS and DoD? ✓

Who supports whom?

Are there ^{memos} ~~letters~~ of understanding or agreement between the two on key issues and ~~concepts~~? Can these be made part of the official record of this hearing? ✓
Support Negoti

To OSD: Do you anticipate a need for an amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 which restricts the use of troops in domestic law enforcement to address the role of the active forces in domestic law enforcement matters?

To OSD: The Vietnam War led General Creighton Abrams and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to ensure our troops had the backing of the American people in military conflicts by situating the Guard and Reserves in such a way that we would not go to war without public support. The DoD recommendations appear to circumvent this Abram's Doctrine approach. Please explain your consideration of this issue.

To NORTHCOM: We see that Admiral Keating signed a letter indicating that capabilities would still be adequate after BRAC. To what degree did NORTHCOM review the ANG recommendations with respect to the elimination of aircraft at sites like Portland, Houston and Otis? Was it clear to ^{NORTHCOM} ~~them~~ that other than the (2) alert aircraft at each site, that all the other planes would be gone? ✓

To NORTHCOM: Otis is well situated in its location with the Atlantic Ocean all around. Bradley Field in Hartford, CT is almost 150 miles to the west – away from the ocean, has congested air routes, concerns about supersonic flight overland, and only two jets on alert with none on station (over) ✓

behind them, etc. Are you really comfortable with the Air Force recommendation regarding Otis? ✓

To NORTHCOM: Houston is the fourth largest population area and site of significant petro-chemical and shipping interests. Are you really comfortable with the Air Force recommendation at Ellington ANG base? ✓

To NORTHCOM: In terms of air defense of the Pacific Northwest, are you really comfortable with the AF recommendation at Portland ANG base?

To NORTHCOM: Please tell us how the capabilities offered by the C-130 are of interest to you.

Would you think that a dispersal of these assets or a centralization of them would best suit your needs?

What is in the future for the aerial firefighting mission for the C-130, especially in the West?

In light of the Air National Guard playing a vital role in homeland security, how does the DoD recommendation support the requirement of this act?

^(Aug 8)
To NORTHCOM: In Monday's "Washington Post" cover story it states: "Particular reliance is being placed on the National Guard, which is expanding a network of 22-member civil support teams to all states and forming about a dozen 120-member regional response units. Congress last year also gave the Guard expanded authority under Title 32 of the U.S. Code to perform such homeland missions as securing power plants and other critical facilities." ✓

~~In light of the Air National Guard playing a vital role in homeland security, how does the DoD recommendation support the requirement of this act?~~



In light of the DoD BRAC recommendation to close or realign consolidate many of the ANG C-130s, how will ANG C-130 units provide the timely support for civil support teams and regional response units? In short, will the C-130s be free when needed?



There is no dispute with the BRAC Implications.
 Efficiency and speed are important in providing
 our services from the time we are contacted, capability
 and readiness.

However, we are a partner of use and our Guard plays
 a critical part in the Global War on Terror and
 in particular in the area of force protection and security
 of our personnel.

Patience is not a virtue




He is not very smart
 with that answer

Post-BRAC KC-135R Distribution + KC-10


Bottom Line % of Total:

POST




TOTAL PRE → POST BRAC LAYDOWN
 450 → 389 Jets (-61)
 501 → 448 KC-135R Equivalent (-53)

Post-BRAC KC-135R Distribution



Active, Guard & Reserve Receivers

	MEI	BHM
Current Tnkr PAA	9	8
250 NM Rcvrs	313.0	279.0
250 NM Rcvr/Tnkr	34.8	34.9
850 NM Rcvrs	1212.0	1248.0
850 NM Rcvr/Tnks	134.7	156.0



DCN:11957

186th Air Refueling Wing

Best for America

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BULLET BACKGROUND PAPER

ON


BRAC TANKER ACTIONS

- The following paper discusses current and post-BRAC tanker inventory and lay-down, KC-135E retirements and costs, and comparison of two ANG Southeast U.S. tanker bases, Birmingham, AL and Key Field, MS
- The current USAF tanker inventory includes 590 total tankers permanently based at 41 locations (including four instances of Active, Guard and/or Reserves sharing a runway) in 29 U.S. states and 2 allied nations
 - o 417 KC-135Rs, 114 KC-135Es and 59 KC-10s
 - Air National Guard operates 46% of KC-135s (243 aircraft)
 - Active Duty operates 38% (204 aircraft)
 - Air Force Reserves operate 16% (84 aircraft)
 - o KC-10s are flown by four active duty and four reserve associate squadrons, and are not included in any BRAC recommendations
- BRAC recommendations involve only KC-135 forces, functions and installations
 - o Air National Guard (22 KC-135 bases pre-BRAC→15 bases post-BRAC):
 - 7 bases lose all aircraft; 9 bases gain aircraft
 - o Active Duty (9 KC-135 bases pre-BRAC→7 bases post-BRAC (3 CONUS, 2 overseas, 1 training only, and 1 test and evaluation base which has only 1 aircraft)):
 - 2 bases lose all aircraft; 2 bases gain aircraft
 - o Reserves (8 KC-135 bases pre-BRAC→5 bases post-BRAC):
 - 3 bases lose all aircraft; 3 bases gain aircraft
- Air National Guard operates 100% of the KC-135E fleet (114 aircraft) at 6 bases
 - o 29 of 114 KC-135Es have been grounded since September, 2004 due to safety issues
 - The grounded aircraft are distributed amongst multiple KC-135E installations
 - o Air Force estimates approximately \$1.9B in maintenance and repair, and \$2.9B in operations and sustainment needed to fly KC-135Es through FY11
 - o The USAF intends to programmatically retire all KC-135Es by 2008
 - BRAC recommendations note programmatic retirement of 56 KC-135E Primary Authorized Aircraft from 6 bases
 - 5 of those bases convert to KC-135Rs
 - The remaining KC-135Es are retired in actions unrelated to BRAC
- Several tanker units and community delegations have voiced concerns to the Commission that DOD's BRAC tanker lay down disproportionately increases tanker presence in the Central United States while excessively decreasing tanker presence in the Northeast and Southeast
 - o Statistical analysis of the pre- and post-BRAC lay down shows the concern is unfounded

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- Analysis of tanker capability *must* include 59 KC-10s located on the West and East coasts
- It is standard, accepted practice throughout DOD to analyze tanker capacity in terms of “KC-135R Equivalents” in which general air refueling capability of a given model of tanker is compared to that of a KC-135R
 - Where a KC-135R is considered a 1.0
 - KC-135Es are considered 0.85 of a KC-135R
 - KC-10s are considered 2.0 KC-135Rs
- Analysis of tanker capability should *not* include 24 KC-135s in Oklahoma which are fenced for aircrew training “Schoolhouse” purposes only and are not “operational” assets (though could be used in a time of national emergency)

Post-BRAC KC-135R Distribution + KC-10



- Dividing the nation into three East-West sections at the Rocky Mountains and the Mississippi River (West/Central/East), further subdividing the East section into North-South sections along a line separating Kentucky and Virginia from Tennessee and North Carolina (North East and South East) reveals the following pre- and post-BRAC lay-down data, expressed as a percentage of the overall United States-based tanker fleet:

	Aircraft Quantity		R-Model Equivalent	
	Pre %	Post %	Pre %	Post %
W	29%	28%	31%	30%
C	24%	23%	21%	20%
NE	35%	39%	37%	41%
SE	13%	11%	11%	10%

- Including KC-10 air refueling capability, and excluding the non-operational fenced trainers, analysis shows that Western and Central U.S. based tankers *decrease* by 1% each as a part of the overall fleet
 - The Southeast *decreases* by 2% of the physical aircraft, and 1% of the KC-135R equivalents
 - The Northeast *increases* by 4% as a percentage of the overall fleet
 - From an operational stand-point, there has been a significant increase in tanker requirements in and through

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the Northeast region in support of operations in Southwest Asia, North Africa, and Europe

- One BRAC Review and Analysis proposal has suggested that at least one of the Southeast sector ANG units slated to lose their aircraft be allowed to keep their KC-135s
 - Pre-BRAC, there were 3 ANG, 2 Active and 1 Reserve tanker bases in the Southeast, representing 57 total aircraft
 - Post-BRAC, two ANG bases and one Active base lose all their aircraft, while the remaining three bases increase total aircraft
 - Total post-BRAC Southeast tanker lay-down is 44 aircraft
 - As a percentage of the overall U.S. tanker fleet, the recommendations represent a decrease from 13% of the fleet to 11% in the Southeast
 - The following table compares the two Southeastern U.S. ANG bases, located 125 nm apart, that lose their aircraft: Birmingham AGS, AL and Key Field AGS, MS
 - If one base is selected to keep its aircraft (reject realignment), Birmingham would appear to be a stronger choice based upon:
 - Higher Tanker MCI, greater tanker mission capability due to 2,000' (20%) longer runway, collocation with KC-135 depot contractor, greater disparity in nearest in-state ANG mission-type
 - The importance of the 2,000' difference in runway lengths for large aircraft such as tankers is noted in the following two (uncertified data) scenarios. Generally speaking, longer runways equate to heavier gross weights (including fuel load) available at take-off.
 - Under a given set of climatological conditions, the maximum range to remain on station 4 hours and offload 85,000 lbs of fuel:
 - From Birmingham: 1,174 miles
 - From Meridian: 736 miles
 - Under a given set of climatological conditions, the max range to either carry 50,000 lbs of fuel for offload (or 50,000 lbs of cargo)
 - From Birmingham: 6,568 miles
 - From Meridian: 4,545 miles
- Realigning Key Field as recommended, will incur a slightly higher cost (if including costs to move Key Field's KC-135 simulator) than Birmingham, as well as higher economic impact on the Key Field MSA as a percentage

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Base	Birmingham AGS, AL	Key Field, Meridian, MS
Unit	117th ARW	186th ARW
Recommendation	AF-5	AF-28
Pre-BRAC PAA	8 KC-135Rs	9 KC-135Rs
Post-BRAC PAA	0	0
Post-BRAC status	ECS remain	ECS remain
Tanker MCI Ranking	#63 of 154	#92 of 154
MCI Points	57.28	52.82
One time cost	\$11M	\$11M
Net cost	\$7.7M	\$6.9M
Payback	18 yrs	13 yrs
Annual recurring savings	\$0.8M	\$0.9M
20 yr NPV Savings	\$0.46M	\$2.5M
Direct MIL jobs	-66	-33
Direct CIV jobs	-117	-142
Indirect jobs	-124	-163
Total jobs	-307	-338
MSA	622,605	54,548
Percent of Employment Change	0.0%	-0.6%
# Suitable Runways	2	1
Longest Runway	12,000	10,000
# Receivers w/i 250nm	279	313
# Receivers w/i 850nm	1,248	1,212
250 nm rcvrs per tnkr	34.9	34.8
850 nm rcvrs per tnkr	156.0	134.7
Current Ramp Space--DOD reported	12 KC-135s	13 KC-135s
Max Ramp Space--DOD reported	16 KC-135s	16 KC-135s
Max Parking Space with No Construction--Base Reported	13 KC-135s	17 KC-135s
Cost to Increase to 16 PAA	\$22.8M	\$11.2M
Enclosed Hangars	2	2 + corrosion control facility
FY04 Hours Flown per PAA	286.2	359.5
1999-2003 manning	99.50%	101.20%
Add'l Info	Collocated w/contract KC-135 depot; routinely provides depot support aircrew	Houses one of only four full-motion KC-135R simulators in the ANG; estimated \$3M cost to move
	Nearest Alabama ANG unit is 99 mile drive (Dannelly/F-16s)	Nearest Mississippi ANG unit is 78 mile drive (Jackson/C-17s)

- Overall Assessment of DOD Tanker-related recommendations: When considering DOD's proposed tanker force structure and lay-down, specific to ANG units, there are no substantial training, operational, or MCI reasons to *significantly* adjust DOD lay-down
 - o Overall tanker lay down appears to match operational and training requirements
 - Percentages of tanker fleet by region appear generally equivalent pre- and post-BRAC, (decrease $\leq 2\%$ each) with the exception of the Northeast (increases 4%)
 - o If BRAC Commission elects to propose or facilitate a significant restructuring of DOD's ANG tanker installation proposals based upon retention of direct manpower authorizations (Criteria 4), then the Commission's findings, deliberative documentation, and final report should explicitly so state