

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Philip Coyle [martha.krebs@worldnet.att.net]
Sent: Monday, July 25, 2005 1:57 PM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC; 'jbilbray@kkbr.com'; 'skidders@gtlaw.com'
Subject: Re: Ellsworth Base Visit Report

Dear Art: Sorry to have been delayed in responding. With all our travels I don't get back to my computer as often as I'd like.

Your report on Ellsworth is excellent. I only have a few nits:

On page 5, in bullets 1, 6 and 8 you use "we". Suggest you change "we" to "the BRAC Commission".

On page 7 there's a typo. "He told voters throughout his 2004 campaign that his **ties** (not **tires**) to President Bush...."

On page 8, I'd suggest deleting the phrase, "like the UAV", from the last bullet so as to have the sentence end, "...determine feasibility of adding future missions." (Note missions, plural). The BRAC Commission should avoid playing into the South Dakota/North Dakota conflict over where UAVs might be stationed in the future.

I'd suggest adding to the *Concerns Raised* and the *Requests For Staff* sections, something about the cost savings not being realistic since they count savings from personnel at the losing base but do not count the costs at the receiving base to perform the same mission. According to the GAO, 77.73% of the 20-year NPV savings projected by the DOD for closing Ellsworth are due to counting such personnel costs savings but not counting obvious new personnel costs.

In addition, the DOD has not adequately counted the costs to relocate and train new personnel at the receiving base.

Many thanks and best regards,

Phil

Philip E. Coyle, II
2139 Kew Drive
Los Angeles, CA 90046
Tel 323-656-1750
Fax 323-656-1240
E-mail Philip Coyle <martha.krebs@att.net>

From: "Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC" <Arthur.Beauchamp@wso.whs.mil>
Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2005 15:50:09 -0000
To: "'jbilbray@kkbr.com'" <jbilbray@kkbr.com>,
"'skidders@gtlaw.com'" <skidders@gtlaw.com>, "'martha.krebs@att.net'"
<martha.krebs@att.net>

Subject: Ellsworth Base Visit Report

Sirs,

Not sure if you've seen the Base Visit Report for Ellsworth. If not, here's the file for your review. A number of issues with the Air Force decision to close Ellsworth. We are slugging our way through them. We are particularly concerned about relative military value ranking of Ellsworth for both current and future missions.


A summary of the issues are located on pages 5 - 8. If you would like any changes made or follow-up action not listed please let me know. Thanks.

v/r

Art Beauchamp
R&A, Air Force Team
Lead Analyst Ellsworth
(703) 699-2934

<<Ellsworth Base Visit Report(v1).doc>>

ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE, SD AND DYESS AIR FORCE BASE, TX



ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE, SD AND DYESS AIR FORCE BASE, TX
Air Force – 43

ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE, SD

CLOSE

Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
(3,315)	(438)	0	0	(3,315)	(438)	(99)	(3,852)

DYESS AIR FORCE BASE, TX

REALIGN

Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
(1,615)	(65)	1,925	129	310	64	0	374

Recommendation: Close Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD. The 24 B-1 aircraft assigned to the 28th Bomb Wing will be distributed to the 7th Bomb Wing, Dyess Air Force Base, TX.

Recommendation: Realign Dyess Air Force Base, TX. The C-130 aircraft assigned to the 317th Airlift Group will be distributed to the active duty 314th Airlift Wing (22 aircraft) and Air National Guard 189th Airlift Wing (two aircraft), Little Rock Air Force Base, AR; the 176th Wing (ANG), Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK (four aircraft); and the 302d Airlift Wing (AFR), Peterson Air Force Base, CO (four aircraft). Peterson Air Force Base will have an active duty/Air Force Reserve association in the C-130 mission. Elmendorf Air Force Base will have an active duty/Air National Guard association in the C-130 mission.

INTERNAL BRAC USE ONLY. NOT RELEASABLE.**TALKING PAPER****ON****ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE (AFB)****BACKGROUND:**

- As part of its BRAC recommendations, DOD recommended closure of Ellsworth AFB SD.
- Under this recommendation, all B-1 bombers assigned to Ellsworth will transfer to Dyess AFB, TX and Dyess would become the only B-1 Bomber in the Air Force.
- The South Dakota Congressional delegation, led by Senator Thune is waging a strong campaign to keep Ellsworth open.
- Ellsworth is the second largest employer in South Dakota, with a \$278M yearly economic impact to the state.
- Ellsworth is an outstanding installation. The commissioners and BRAC staff visited the installation on 21 Jun and were impressed by the quality of facilities. This assessment is also supported by the number of Air Force (AF) facility awards won by Ellsworth.
- There are a number of issues that we've identified and continue to dig into regarding the recommendation to close Ellsworth. Our assessment is on-going, but the list below highlights some of our initial findings.

DISCUSSION:

- A comparative military value ranking among the three AF bases (Minot, Grand Folks, Ellsworth) in the North Central United States where the AF has stated they must maintain a strategic presence, ranked Ellsworth #1 in 6 of the 8 functional categories.
- This assessment is also supported by the AF's own assessment of 154 bases which ranked Ellsworth high in supporting a diverse number of missions (bombers, UAVs, tankers).
- A comparison of Dyess and Ellsworth shows that Ellsworth beat out Dyess in 3 out of the 4 military value criteria, but lost to Dyess in the most heavily weighted criteria of proximity to air space (i.e. Dyess has 2.3 times the volume of air space as Ellsworth). This was a decisive factor. Because of the air space scoring Dyess scored higher in the overall military value criteria by 5.9 points and was selected over Ellsworth.
- The proximity to air space value however isn't as clear cut as indicated in the scoring. There is an on-going litigation issue regarding Dyess' primary training range that wasn't factored into the scoring.

INTERNAL BRAC USE ONLY. NOT RELEASABLE.

- The litigation involves the Lancer training range (Trans-Pecos vs. USAF) and has resulted in restriction: being placed on using the Lancer range (B-1s can't fly below 500 feet). Ellsworth currently doesn't have this range restriction.
- Consolidating B1 Bomber fleet at one location increases risk to fleet from singular attack; "putting all the eggs in one basket" argument.
- As the GA O BRAC report points out, there are no significant manpower savings with AF BRAC recommendation since the AF is not reducing end-strength. This is evident in the case of Ellsworth since there is almost a one to one transfer of positions to Dyess.
- Recent inquiries into the logistics efficacy claimed by the AF as a result of consolidation indicate they may not be as significant (or as significant as claimed by the AF). According to the AF, there is only a 1-2 percent increase in the mission capable rate of B-1s (short term) caused by the consolidation and no long term improvements.
- Given Ellsworth's attributes (i.e. its airspace, ranges, readiness, etc.) make it a viable consideration for future evolving missions (e.g. global strike, information operation, intelligence surveillance and recon, missile defense, etc.).

RECOMMENDATIONS: None. Information provided as background.

*John Michael Loh
General USAF Retired
125 Captaine Graves
Williamsburg, Virginia
June 15, 2005*

To the Chairman and Commissioners of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC),

Whereas, I desire to submit a Statement and Videotape to the BRAC Commissioners meeting in public session at Rapid City, South Dakota on June 21, 2005, and

Whereas, due to a medical condition preventing extensive travel, I am unable to appear in person at the public hearing in Rapid City, South Dakota on June 21, 2005, and

Whereas, I am providing this Statement voluntarily, at my own request, and without any compensation whatsoever for this testimony, and

Whereas, I am attaching as enclosures to this document the Statement and Videotape for presentation as testimony at the public hearing in Rapid City, South Dakota, therefore,

I do solemnly swear that the testimony I so provide is the truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth, and is accurate to the best of my knowledge, so help me God.

John Michael Loh
John Michael Loh


2 Enclosures:

1. Statement of John Michael Loh, General, USAF Retired, to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) for the Public Hearing of the Commission in Rapid City, South Dakota on June 21, 2005.
2. Videotape containing the Statement in Attachment 1.

Sworn at Williamsburg, Virginia on the 15th day of June, 2005, by John Michael Loh, 125 Captaine Graves, Williamsburg, Virginia.

In the presence of, and notarized by Deborah M. Scott, on the 15th day of June, 2005.

My commission expires April 30, 2008



Statement of John Michael Loh, General, USAF Retired, to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) for the public hearing of the Commission in Rapid City, South Dakota on June 21, 2005.

I thank the Commission for this opportunity to present this statement to the BRAC Commissioners in Rapid City, South Dakota, supporting Ellsworth Air Force Base.

Please allow me to introduce myself.

I am John Michael Loh, a retired Air Force four-star general. I served as commander of Air Combat Command from its inception in June 1992 until my retirement from the Air Force in July 1995. Prior to that, I was the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff during the first Gulf War, and commander of Tactical Air Command from March 1991 until June 1992.

As commander of Air Combat Command I controlled all of the Air Force's bombers and bomber bases including Ellsworth Air Force Base. I was responsible for training, equipping, and maintaining combat readiness for our bomber aircraft and crews for combat operations worldwide. This included all of the B-1 bombers and B-1 bases.

I speak today to urge the Commissioners to retain Ellsworth Air Force Base as a B-1 operational base vital to our nation's security and defense preparedness.

(By the way, and just for the record, I submit this statement voluntarily, at my own request, and I am not being compensated in any way for this testimony.)

I believe the Pentagon deviated significantly from six of the eight BRAC criteria in its recommendation to close Ellsworth and move all of its B-1 bombers to another B-1 base. I will explain why in a minute.

First, we must understand how valuable our fleet of 67 B-1s is to our current warfighting needs. The B-1 bomber is the backbone of the bomber force. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the B-1s delivered more weapons, and struck more targets, than any other bomber or fighter, by far.

In Afghanistan, the B-1 accounted for 40%, by weight, of the weapons delivered. In Iraq, 34%. No other weapon system came close.

So, whatever decisions you make regarding B-1s, please do so carefully because you are dealing with the Air Force's number one offensive weapon system in terms of its impact on the global war on terror.

Enclosure 1

Now when the Air Force created Air Combat Command in 1992 it had four large B-1 bases each with about 24 B-1s. These bases were Ellsworth AFB South Dakota, Grand Forks AFB North Dakota, McConnell AFB Kansas, and Dyess AFB Texas. Subsequent BRACs and Air Force decisions reduced the number of B-1s to its current number, 67, and the number of B-1 bases to two bases, Ellsworth and Dyess.

I mention this brief history because when the Air Force consolidated to two bases in 2001, it violated one of the guiding principles I consistently and scrupulously followed for long range bomber operations; that is, do not operate more than 36 heavy, long range bombers from a single base.

This long-standing principle has a sound basis. In the case of the B-1, putting more than 36 bombers at one base results in a very inefficient operation.

Operational readiness suffers because too many crews must share too few training ranges and training airspace.

Logistics suffers because there is too little support infrastructure to handle greatly expanded maintenance, supply and transportation needs,

Quality of life suffers because one base cannot provide adequately for all the medical, housing and other needs of our people.

Now putting all 67 B-1s at one base, the current plan under BRAC, almost doubles the maximum size for a bomber base and will greatly aggravate these adverse operational, logistical, and security problems. It's a recipe for unmanageable congestion and never-ending chaos that spells inefficiency, waste and degraded operational readiness for the B-1s.

Moreover, having the entire B-1 fleet at one base with only a single runway presents an unacceptable security risk. This situation provides an inviting target to an enemy that could render the entire B-1 fleet inoperable with a single weapon.

In addition, having two B-1 bases allows the Air Force the option of adding back more B-1s from inactive status as it did just recently, and allows for the introduction of additional missions at both bases, an important BRAC criterion not available if Ellsworth is closed.

So, as I read the eight BRAC criteria, I find that the Pentagon deviated significantly from six of them in its recommendation on Ellsworth.

Criteria one concerns the impact on operational readiness. Closing Ellsworth will decrease the operational readiness of the B-1 fleet as I explained earlier.

Enclosure 1

Criteria two concerns facilities and airspace at receiving and existing bases. Closing Ellsworth shuts down forever valuable training airspace in the northwest U.S. and aggravates the available training ranges and airspace at the receiving base.

Criteria three concerns the ability to accommodate future requirements. Closing Ellsworth will deny the Pentagon a valuable base for future missions in an area that will offer ideal, unencroached land and airspace for generations to come.

Criteria four concerns cost and manpower. Closing Ellsworth will not reduce cost or manpower. In the long run, trying to operate 67 B-1s from a single base will cost more than operating two B-1 bases at peak efficiency for each.

Criteria six concerns the economic impact on the community. Closing Ellsworth will be devastating to the regional economy. Others can speak to this impact better than I.


Criteria seven concerns the ability of the receiving infrastructure to support the mission. Closing Ellsworth will cause enormous, long-term infrastructure problems at the receiving base that will adversely impact operational readiness of the B-1 fleet.

So, in my opinion, the Pentagon, in its zeal to consolidate and reach some perceived quota for base closures, picked the wrong base by putting Ellsworth on the list. There are many other options that do not involve this questionable move of all B-1s to a single operating location while closing the one base, Ellsworth, that is located in a region of the country having the capacity for unencroached military operations as far as the eye can see.

Mr. Chairman, I have served as the senior commander of bomber operations for our nation. I sincerely feel that tinkering with our most productive bomber fleet in this way is a misguided and risky application of the BRAC process.

I urge you to retain Ellsworth Air Force Base as an urgently needed B-1 base, and remove it from the closure list.

Thank you.



John Michael Loh
General, USAF Retired
125 Captain Graves
Williamsburg Virginia

June 21, 2004

Enclosure 1

Statement of John Michael Loh, General, USAF Retired, to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) for the public hearing of the Commission in Rapid City, South Dakota on June 21, 2005.

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Thank you.



John Michael Loh
General, USAF Retired
125 Captaine Graves
Williamsburg, Virginia

June 21, 2005

Enclosure 1

Submitted by Senator Thorne's office

Military Value:

- **Recommendation substantially deviates from criteria # 1 by failing to accurately measure impact of consolidation of B-1 aircraft at a single base.**

DoD failed to assess negative impact on warfighting, training and overall readiness of the B-1 fleet operating from a consolidated base.

DoD failed to assess potential for congestion and diminished efficiency of consolidated operational infrastructure and its impact on readiness; training time/space; use of airspace; air traffic control; use of runway; range availability and maintenance support.

DoD failed to compare readiness ratings of Ellsworth & Dyess B-1 squadrons and aircrews and assess probable readiness ratings when operating in a consolidated mode.

DoD failed to assess whether the operational squadrons and aircrews would experience a proportional reduction of training/ range time; flight time; and simulator time.

DoD failed to assess increased threat to high-value B-1 fleet from consolidation at a single base. DoD failed to include DTRA evaluations in their assessments/modeling. DoD failed to consider not only conventional threats against the aircraft but threats of terrorist attacks using CBW weapons against aircrew and family housing. DoD failed to consider risk to consolidated operations from simple viral epidemics.



July 25, 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 S. Clark St., Ste. 1000
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi :

At the Commission's hearing on Monday, July 18, you urged the Air Force, the governors, and their Adjutants General to "work to a solution that best serves the interests of our national security and our country." We are prepared and eager to do just that.

This response is a collective action of the Adjutants General Association of the United States (AGAUS), following a special meeting of the body in Washington, DC on Friday, July 22, 2005. We are mindful that 83 percent of the Air Force recommendations pertain to the Air National Guard and that the majority of these recommendations are outside the charter of the BRAC Act dealing with closure or realignment of installations. A "realignment" under the Base Closure Act pertains to installations, not to units, unit equipment, people or positions. As the BRAC Commission's Deputy General Counsel has opined, "The purpose of the Act is to close or realign excess real estate and improvements that create an unnecessary drain on the resources of the Department of Defense. The Base Closure Act is not a vehicle to effect changes in how a unit is equipped or organized."

The Adjutants General believe the proposed recommended actions are beyond the scope of the Base Closure Act and it would therefore be improper for the BRAC Commission to include these actions in its recommendations to the President and to the Congress. There are well established processes for dealing with these operational decisions--processes that have stood the test of time and have been followed for decades to the mutual advantage of the federal government and those of the states and territories.

We have a way ahead for the Future Total Air Force and we are eager to engage with the Air Force outside of the BRAC process and its time constraints. Without going into detail, it provides (1) for an Air National Guard flying unit in every state, (2) unit equipped ANG air refueling and tactical airlift missions directly accessible to governors strategically dispersed on a regional basis for responding to domestic emergencies including homeland defense and homeland security exigencies, (3) sufficient and

WILLIAM H. FRIST
TENNESSEE



United States Senate
OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

BRAC Commission

JUL 25 2005

Received

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., (USN, Ret)
2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 South Clark Street
Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Admiral Gehman:

As the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commission continues its important work, I want to draw your attention to a matter that requires close scrutiny—the recommendation by the Defense Department to close Ellsworth AFB in South Dakota.

I have visited Ellsworth AFB and have always been impressed by its facilities, its personnel, and the support it receives from the local community. Ellsworth AFB has unfettered airspace, exceptional facilities and infrastructure, and does not suffer from the problems of encroachment that other bases now experience. In my view, Ellsworth AFB has excellent potential to serve as a multi-mission platform, or as a hub for future research, development, testing and experimentation.

The base and its units have a long, proud history of defending the Nation and advancing our national security. From the dark days of the Cold War to the Global War on Terrorism, the military personnel stationed at Ellsworth AFB have served our country well, and have always received the full and unrelenting support of the local community. Finally, I have concerns about the wisdom of consolidating all of the nation's B-1 bombers at one base.

I urge you to give full consideration to Ellsworth AFB, including its unique characteristics and unlimited potential, before the BRAC Commission prepares its final recommendations. I think you will find, as I have, that Ellsworth AFB has a critical role to play in the 21st Century in our Nation's defense.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "William H. Frist".

William H. Frist M.D.
Majority Leader
United States Senate

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Aarnio, James, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Tuesday, August 02, 2005 7:13 AM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Dyess Site Visit Report # 5442

Art,

First, Dyess itself isn't counting the routes. DoD does the metrics, not any of the Commands. The criteria is one entry point and one exit point per route within a certain mileage depending on the platform - period. No reverses in the process. The range data and scoring comes from the Airforce Airspace and Range Office in Rosslyn. Everyone was scored by the same criteria. FAA can only provide information on Special Use Airspace (MOA's, IR's, etc.) that is allocated to Dyess as the Using Agency (remember, FAA is Controlling Agency - the provider). DoD has information on how many "other" areas Dyess would have joint access to where other Units or Commands are the Using Agency. The Dyess Range Officer who handles "scheduling" could most likely provide that information. FAA does not care "who" is using the MOA's, as long as there is a Using Agency designated for that (airspace) and they are being used for what they were wet up to be used for.

I CAN attest to the fact that Dyess has MORE diversity in range and training capabilities for joint training exercises than Ellsworth. Far more.

Let me know about the meeting when you have more information...I'll try to be there.

Jim

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Monday, August 01, 2005 3:45 PM
To: Aarnio, James, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: FW: Dyess Site Visit Report # 5442

Can you attend? It will be in the morning -- 2 Aug @ BRAC office. Time TBD. Tks. Art

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [mailto:Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
Sent: Monday, August 01, 2005 3:40 PM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Dyess Site Visit Report # 5442

Thank you Art. I appreciate it. Art, if have not already, you want to look into how Dyess is counting the number of IRs/VRs. Is Dyess counting the ability to fly through a MTR in one direction as one route, and then flying through it in the reverse direction as two separate routes? In other words, double counting the same route.

I am trying to arrange a brief staff level meeting with you, Ken Small and Frank Cirillo sometime this week to provide you some info re the range issue and NEPA litigation.

Bob

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC [mailto:Arthur.Beauchamp@wso.whs.mil]
Sent: Monday, August 01, 2005 3:25 PM
To: Taylor, Bob (Thune)
Subject: RE: Dyess Site Visit Report # 5442

8/2/2005

Bob, don't have the locations, but here's the names. The FAA can provide your office with the locations. All, but 7 are within the 100 NM criteria. r/Art

Ranges:

Snyder
Ft Hood
Falcon
Melrose
Pecos/Pyote
Catulla
Centennial
Red Rio
Oscura
Case
Smokey Hill
UTTR

MOAs

Brownwood
Lancer
Westover
Brady
Texon
Sheppard 1
Laughlin 1
Sheppard 2
Bronco
Hollis
Washita
Laughlin 2
Randolph 2A
Pyote
Randolph 1
Vance
Laughlin 3
Crystal
Talon
Pecos/Taiban
Kingsville 4
Kingsville 3
Valentine
Kingsville 5
Mt Dora
Kingsville 1
Kingsville 2
Warrior
Bison

There are also 20 IR routes and 22 VR routes

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [mailto:Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
Sent: Monday, August 01, 2005 10:14 AM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: Dyess Site Visit Report # 5442

8/2/2005

Art, is there a specific list anywhere I can get with the names and locations of the 42 ranges available to Dyess mentioned in your June site visit report? Thxs.

Bob

8/2/2005

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

To: Taylor, Bob (Thune); Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 Cc: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 Subject: RE: Air Force ROD

Bob,

Regarding the sq ft...your right. The actual number according to Ellsworth is 804,000 sq ft shortage. That is the shortage we asked the AF to provide feedback on. We went back with a clarification on this (it should be posted). Not sure why the figure is higher, but will look into

Art

-----Original Message-----

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [mailto:Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
 Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2005 4:58 PM
 To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 Cc: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 Subject: RE: Air Force ROD

You are welcome. If you are seeking any other basic data on any issue (doesn't have to be related to Ellsworth), and you are not getting a rapid response from DoD, let me know. We will be happy to try and get it through the armed services committee. They tend to respond pretty quick to SASC member requests for data.

Also Art, I noticed on the attached clearinghouse request where you asked about the square footage discrepancy noted at Ellsworth. However, I believe the number you used is incorrect - missing a "0." I believe it is an 800,000 square ft discrepancy, not 80,000. We thought it did not look right, so I confirmed it again today with the base engineer.

Additionally, the figure of \$69 million milcon needed to house all B-1s at Ellsworth is a higher figure than the base engineer provided you earlier, of only \$49.5 M. (Though \$69 M is still a big difference from the \$124 M needed at Dyess. I was curious as to how and why this figure changed.

-----Original Message-----

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 [mailto:Arthur.Beauchamp@wso.whs.mil]
 Sent: Monday, July 25, 2005 9:40 AM
 To: Taylor, Bob (Thune)
 Subject: RE: Air Force ROD

Bob, thanks for the data. Art

-----Original Message-----

From: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 Sent: Friday, July 22, 2005 3:02 PM
 To: 'Taylor, Bob (Thune)'
 Cc: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 Subject: RE: Air Force ROD

Bob

I appreciate the data. Art is out of pocket until tomorrow AM. I expect that he will catch up over the weekend. I will leave it to Art to give you a read on the level of information you are sending along.

Ken

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [mailto:Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2005 11:32 AM
To: Small, Kenneth CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Air Force ROD

Ken,

You are very welcome. Please tell me if I'm sending you stuff you don't need. Here are some recent AF data tables that may also be helpful.

Also, did you receive the data you requested from Ellsworth AFB through the ACC & clearinghouse pertaining to ability to handle all B-1s and associated long-term milcon costs i.e. saying Ellsworth can receive them now and needs only \$49.5 million in long-term milcon to house 67 B-1s, as compared to \$123 million needed at :yess?

Bob

From: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC [mailto:Kenneth.Small@wso.whs.mil]
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2005 9:37 AM
To: Taylor, Bob (Thune); Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Air Force ROD

Bob

Thanks. We may need this before we are through. Having the AFH in hand saves us the time to perform the search to find the reference.

Again, the data and continued flow of information is appreciated.

Ken Small

Air Force Team Leader

BRAC Commission R&A

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [mailto:Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2005 9:31 AM
To: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC

CC: ^{DCN:11986}Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Air Force ROD

You probably already have this, or a more recent version. It might be helpful to you.

Air Force Handbook (AFH) 32-1084, Facility Requirements, provides facility space allowance guidance by category code. These criteria are used in assigning occupancy of existing facilities and in programming new facilities. This handbook applies to all Air Force commanders and managers that plan, program, review, certify, and approve Air Force facilities.

a. Ramp space required per MDS (Mission Design Series or aircraft type)

:
Chapter 2, Section D

b. Logistics/Maintenance space (Supply warehousing, transportation facilities, hangars, maintenance shops, etc) allocations per MDS

Chapters 3, 5 - 7, 9, 10, and 12

--- Petroleum Dispensing and Operating Facilities: Chapter 3

--- Hangars: Chapters 5 and 7; Training: Chapter 6

--- Transportation and Maintenance Facilities: Chapter 7

--- Explosives Facilities: Chapter 9; Supply Warehousing: Chapter 10

--- Administrative Facilities: Chapter 12

From: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC [mailto:Kenneth.Small@wso.whs.mil]
Sent: Thursday, July 21, 2005 5:56 PM
To: Taylor, Bob (Thune)
Cc: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Air Force ROD

Got it. Thanks for the research. We shall see where these go.

Ken Small

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [mailto:Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2005 12:48 PM
To: kenneth.small@wso.whs.mil; Arthur.Beauchamp@wso.whs.mil
Subject: Air Force ROD

Ken/Art;

When we visited you last Tuesday and dropped off the packet pertaining to the RBTI litigation, I failed to include a copy of the Air Force Record of Decision, prepared with their initial EIS. It is an important document because it goes to the issue of what the AF envisioned as the RBTI's ideal range capability and clearly states their concept

and intended use of the Lancer MOA and IR-178, once the RBTI and EIS were approved;

* On page 1, it states without equivocation that the MTR (IR-178) could permit flights down to 300 feet above ground level in some segments..

* It also states that the MOA (Lancer) would have a floor of 3,000 feet AGL.

Of course, the federal court now imposes a 500 feet AGL floor in the MTR and a 12,000 feet MSL floor in the Lancer MOA. Also of interest, on page 7, note that in response to community concerns raised in the administrative approval process, the Air Force placed self-imposed limitations on the number of sortie-operations thus, reducing the number from 2,600 per year down to 1,560 per year. (The sortie issue will obviously be a fertile ground for additional litigation if the Dyess B-1 inventory and training requirements should double.) On the same page, the Air Force seems to indicate that 200 feet AGL as the proposed minimum altitude in the MTR IR-178, but they raised it to 300 in response to concerns raised by the public.

Art, I saw your questions submitted to the Air Force posted on the BRAC website. I immediately thought of several related issues not asked you may want to ask as a follow-up:

What number of training sorties does the AF estimate as a requirement for RBTI if the entire B-1 fleet is consolidated at Dyess?

Assuming the consolidation of all 67 B-1s at Dyess, and if the court should limit the number of sorties flown per year into the RBTI, e.g. even at its present level, where will the other Dyess B-1s go for alternative training? What additional costs will result from flying to these alternative training sites, per year?

If the AF is permanently restricted to flying at 12,000 feet MSL in the Lancer MOA, how will this impact B-1 training?

In light of both MC DeCuir's sworn affidavit (limitations do not fully meet realistic training requirements) and LTC Garrett's sworn affidavit (no substitute ranges within a reasonable flying distance of our bases in Texas) that were submitted to the court in January 2005 and given under penalty of perjury (and no doubt fully staffed within ACC before being submitted), I look forward with great interest as to how the AF will answer your questions on the impact of the court's restrictions.

Bob

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2005 9:31 AM
To: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Air Force ROD
Attachments: BA 3E Requirements.pdf

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Chapters 3, 5 - 7, 10, and 12

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--- Transportation and Maintenance Facilities: Chapter 7

--- Explosives Facilities: Chapter 9; Supply Warehousing: Chapter 10

--- Administrative Facilities: Chapter 12

From: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC [mailto:Kenneth.Small@wso.whs.mil]
Sent: Thursday, July 21, 2005 5:56 PM
To: Taylor, Bob (Thune)
Cc: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Air Force ROD

Got it. Thanks for the research. We shall see where these go.

Ken Small

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [mailto:Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2005 12:48 PM
To: kenneth.small@wso.whs.mil; Arthur.Beauchamp@wso.whs.mil
Subject: Air Force ROD

Ken/Art;

7/25/2005

When we visited you last Tuesday and dropped off the packet pertaining to the RBTI litigation, I failed to include a copy of the Air Force Record of Decision, prepared with their initial EIS. It is an important document because it goes to the issue of what the AF envisioned as the RBTI's ideal range capability and clearly states their concept and intended use of the Lancer MOA and IR-178, once the RBTI and EIS were approved;

* On page 1, it states without equivocation that the MTR (IR-178) would permit flights down to 300 feet above ground level in some segments.

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Of course, the federal court now imposes a 500 feet AGL floor in the MTR and a 12,000 feet MSL floor in the Lancer MOA. Also of interest, on page 7, note that in response to community concerns raised in the administrative approval process, the Air Force placed self-imposed limitations on the number of sortie-operations thus, reducing the number from 2,600 per year down to 1,560 per year. (The sortie issue will obviously be a fertile ground for additional litigation if the Dyess B-1 inventory and training requirements should double.) On the same page, the Air Force seems to indicate that 200 feet AGL was the proposed minimum altitude in the MTR IR-178, but they raised it to 300 in response to concerns raised by the public.

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In light of both MG DeQuair's sworn affidavit (limitations do not fully meet realistic training requirements) and LTC Garrett's sworn affidavit (no substitute ranges within a reasonable flying distance of our bases in Texas) that were submitted to the court in January 2005 and given under penalty of perjury (and no doubt fully staffed within ACC before being submitted), I look forward with great interest as to how the AF will answer your questions on the impact of the court's restrictions.

Bob

7/25/2005

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: MacGregor, Timothy, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2005 3:08 PM
To: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Grand Forks

Ken,

BTW - your contact, as his facts wrong. I did not say there was a significant conflict operating UAVs out of a bomber base. What I said was that meshing all three missions, UAV, Bombers and Tankers at one base would be very difficult. (Not just bombers and UAVs as stated by Mr. Allen.)

In fact, my reference to the difficulty of meshing all three is in large part in consideration of the very scheduling efforts that would be needed, as noted by Mr. Allen.

Here's the text from the hearing transcript:

MR. PRINCIPI: I think from a strategic presence, you're absolutely correct. However, the Air Force has made clear, at least to me, that it would not be an apples to apples comparison because if Ellsworth were to remain open, if the commission decided to do that, the Air Force would not want to have bombers and a new generation of tankers and UAVs at Ellsworth. I mean, that was their response when I asked that very question that Admiral Gehman has just -- yes, sir.

(Cross talk.)

MR. MACGREGOR: It would likely be very difficult to mesh those three separate and distinct missions together on one airfield.

Not that I choose to engage in a pi**ing match with Mr. Allen, but I don't like being critiqued when the critiquer is factually incorrect.

I'd be grateful if you'd correct Mr. Allen as to what I actually said, and for what what I said actually meant.

V/R
Tim

Tim MacGregor
Senior Air Force Analyst
Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 Clark Street, Suite 625-14
Arlington, VA 22202
(703) 699-2921

7/26/2005

<mailto:timothy.macgregor@wso.whs.mil>

<http://www.brac.gov>

From: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Thursday, July 21, 2005 6:05 PM
To: MacGregor, Timothy, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: FW: Grand Forks

Another view....don't engage unless the UAV v. bombers looks like an issue to you, then we need to work with Art as the issue is Ellsworth.

Ken

From: Johnallen@bellsouth.net [mailto:johnallen50@bellsouth.net]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2005 5:54 PM
To: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: Grand Forks

Nice try, Ken.

I suppose this means you won't need further input from Minot, right?

BTW - your staffer had one wrong answer. After going through a practical operations concept with the ACC staff a couple of weeks ago, they said there was no significant conflict operating UAVs out of a bomber base. It just took a scheduling effort. (Fighters - different story.)

John Allen

Beauchamp, Arthur , CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Thursday, July 21, 2005 6:27 PM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Breitschopf, Justin, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Combs, David, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cruz, Tanya, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Flinn, Michael, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Hall, Craig, CIV, WSO-BRAC; MacGregor, Timothy, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: FW: Just in case

Attachments: 1277_nov2.xls; 1277_6.pdf; 1277_5.pdf; 1277_4.pdf; 1277_3.pdf; 1277_2.pdf; 1277_1.pdf



1277_nov2.xls (22 KB)



1277_6.pdf (820 KB)



1277_5.pdf (729 KB)



1277_4.pdf (804 KB)



1277_3.pdf (142 KB)



1277_2.pdf (254 KB)



1277_1.pdf (218 KB)

This

might be of interest to several of you.

Ken

From: Pease Fred SES SAF/IEB
Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 7:20 AM
To: Small, Kenneth CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: FW: Just in case

-----Original Message-----

From: Sample James Ctr AF/XOO-ARA
Sent: Tuesday, July 12, 2005 2:18 PM
To: Pease Fred SES SAF/IEB
Cc: Holland William Brig Gen AF/XOO; McCullough Carl SES AF/XOO-ARA; From James Lt Col AF/XOXJ; Brennan Timothy Ctr SAF/IEBB
Subject: RE: Just in case

Hello Sir,

In short I believe he is wrong about the airspace calculations; he misinterpreted how we did the volume metrics. At first it was going to be that a base got credit for [sections of airspace] in proximity. But we also saw the problem with this and specifically W72. W72 was switched from one warning area to about 16 during the BRAC process. It was the same amount of airspace so magically it shouldn't be 16 times better because of name changes. So we took a different approach. We calculated the actual volume of the sections of MOAs, restricted, Warning Areas and ATCAAs within 150, 200, 250, and 300 NM of a base and used that number for the metric.

The PDFs attached provide pictures of the analytical process:

#1 Shows the all the airspace used for analysis

Shows a graphical summary volumes for each base

#3 Using Moody AFB as an example, this shows the volumes of airspace used to calculate the 150 and 200NM values for the base

#4 is 3-D view of the area around Moody & all the airspace

#5 Is the same as #3 for the 150NM distance but in 3-D

#6 is a 3-D view of the volumes of airspace used to calculate the 150NM distance for Moody

I also attached the answers calculated for each base and put in widget.

Let me know if you need anything else.

VR - Jim

-----Original Message-----

From: Pease Fred SES SAF/IEB

Sent: Tue 7/12/2005 11:07 AM

To: Sample James Col AF/XOO-ARA

Cc: Holland William Brig Gen AF/XOO; McCullough Carl SES AF/XOO-ARA; From James Lt Col AF/XOXJ

Subject: FW: Just in case

Jim,

Thoughts pls. Visit is for tomorrow

Gerald F. (Fred) Pease Jr.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

Basing and Infrastructure Analysis

Rm 5C 283 (703) 607-2524

gerald.pease@pentagon.af.mil

WORCESTER: We found that when we corrected these errors in the three data error blocks depicted here on the slide, our recalculated score rises substantially from 42.83 to 60.88.

This correction achieves what should have been Otis' correct MCI rating. It was based on a precise recalculation using the correct data applied to the Air Force's own formulas.

The impact of this correction is huge.

Using the initial inaccurate score, we were dead on arrival when the Air Force developed its basing scenarios. Only those bases with the highest military value ratings were considered for key flying missions. Those with the lowest scores were closed.

If our corrected score had been used by the Air Force, Otis would have remained open.

The three data error categories I just briefed can be further broken down into nine different attributes that contained substantial errors where data corrections or recalculations gained additional points for Otis.

In the next few slides we're going to discuss these attributes in a little bit greater detail.

Three air space categories or attribute issues are problematic: proximity to air space supporting mission, range complex supporting mission, and access to supersonic air space.

The three air space issues are summed up on this slide.

The three major air space ranges were not included by the DOD in the BRAC data collection process, resulting in a loss of credit for those air spaces. For the air space we did get credit for, that credit was incomplete or improper as identified in the briefing graphic block on the upper right-hand side, or for failure to consider several important air space attributes such as proximity or access to supersonic air spaces.

When you include the missing air spaces, that which we didn't get credit for, Otis is number one in the nation for total volume of air space available.

Under key mission infrastructure and large-scale deployment, initial credit was given for 18 explosive-sited parking spots -- that's very critical to our mission -- and the ability to load armament on them, hangar spots for 12 F-15s and parking for three C-17s, far below our true capacity.

WORCESTER: We should have been credited for the actual capacity which is much more than 50 explosive-sited parking spots, more than 30 hangar spots and more than six spots for C-17s.

By the way, all of these points would have brought us up to 100 percent credit in those categories. Otis can support all of these forces simultaneously unlike many other installations, where they would have to make the decision to harbor or bed-down all of those airlift aircraft or their fighter aircraft.

At Otis, we can do it all simultaneously, concurrently, with no impact to any other operations.

Our airfield capacity rivals or exceeds the capacity at many higher-rated Air Force installations.

Using the formulas and algorithms that the Air Force used, my team was able to input the correct data to arrive at the fighter MCI score that Otis Air National Guard Base should have received.

Please note we rose in value by 42 percent and a ranking from 88 to a new position of 27 overall. This ranking was based on certifiable Air Force data and results in a dramatic change in our overall ranking compared to other Air National Guard installations.

We are confident when our analysis is complete, we will be the highest ranked fighter base in the Air National Guard.

So far, we have shown you that correcting Otis' ranking using the Air Force's own methodology resulted in a dramatic leap in Otis' ranking. What we will discuss now are flaws with Air Force's methodology; flaws which, if corrected, would have resulted in an even higher rating for Otis.

For example, the Air Force methodology rated installations with access to a few large high-quality ranges lower than those with access to many small ranges. Ranges that were too small to support fighter operations were included in the fighter MCI equally and skewed the overall military value.

WORCESTER: In another example, the Air Force methodology did not consider air space saturation and accessibility. These attributes are too important to ignore.

Finally, the Air Force methodology purported to measure a base's proximity to air space, but a high percentage of the score bore little relation to actual proximity.

If the Air Force had gotten its methodology right, Otis would have rated higher still.

Here is a detailed look at how the flawed methodology affected the Air Force's evaluation of training ranges.

The blue depicts the high usage air spaces that our unit uses at this time. If you just look at our two normal air spaces and then compare them to those further down the South coast that are in a congested area, you will notice that the mid-Atlantic bases identified in red with multiple ranges get higher scores.

Whiskey 72, an alphanumeric designator for air space, that space which is on the bottom of the slide broken up into small pieces or segments, is again broken into 16 different individual air spaces.

Langley Air Force Base received credit for 16 separate ranges as did any other base that was within 150 miles of those ranges. These are additive, which artificially boosts their score. And, unfortunately, this is factored into 34 percent of the total MCI.

Interestingly, our prime air space, that Whiskey 105 area at the 6:00 position in blue, only got one credit for one air space and yet it is broken into nine individual segments.

Our unit only got credit for one and at least it should have gotten nine.

Saturation concerns, meaning how many units using the same air space in a fixed amount of time, was not factored into the equation. Issues such as range scheduling, deconfliction, necessity to seek air space extensions, et cetera, are all current day-to-day problems that were not addressed.

These are not an issue for Otis.

We have access to superb, large, high-volume air space around the clock. And yet we were scored lower than other bases such as Langley, Atlantic City and others to the south that have to share and deconflict their ranges.

We are the 95 percent user of our air space. Our air space can support advanced long-range, large force training scenarios that are critical to the fielding of fourth and fifth-generation fighter aircraft capabilities and is part of the BRAC philosophy established by the Air Force for current and future mission assessments.

WORCESTER: The last several slides consider the Air Force's failure to accurately measure important attributes because of flawed methodology.

To our surprise, one vital attribute of military value that the Air Force did not even attempt to capture was a base's value to homeland defense mission.

This slide depicts the actual fighter MCI criteria and corresponding weighting factors.

As you can plainly see, homeland defense was not a consideration in rating a base's military value. The emphasis on training ignored strategic military value and homeland defense.

As you can see from this quote, the Air Force acknowledged the importance of this mission, yet failed to quantitatively or qualitatively measure its importance as a current mission.

In fact, the United States Navy took this approach to homeland defense at Naval Air Station Point Mugu and removed the base from BRAC consideration.

The Air Force, however, chose not to follow this approach.

Factors obviously crucial to a fighter base's contribution to national security were left out. Factors such as current air sovereignty alert mission as we do at Otis; our superb strategic location; our surge capability and response to increased NORAD threat levels, such as what was accomplished on 9/11; our extensive base security and multilayered protection; and our future and asymmetric threat assessments and response capabilities in the future are all attributes that should have been considered.

Otis would have stood out as the premier air defense location for the protection of the entire Northeastern United States.

Let's sum up our military value component.

Using the corrected military value score, Otis should be ranked 27 out of 154 bases. The correct military value prevented Otis from being considered by the base closure executive group for the basing scenarios that followed. We were excluded from the game.

If they had corrected the flawed methodology for evaluating air space and given proper consideration to current and future homeland defense missions, the Air Force would have

improved its ranking process and Otis would have remained open.

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2005 6:30 PM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Ellsworth Savings/Cost Analysis

Art,

Here is how the \$290 M crew training cost difference is calculated:

$\$20,000$ (per hr flying cost) \times 0.7 hr difference in flying time = $\$14,000$ additional cost per sortie \times $1,000$ sorties \times 20 years = $\$280$ million in added cost to send 24 planes to Dyess.

The 1,000 sorties into Powder River is an approximation of the scheduled 2005 sorties of 979; we also had a reported figure of 680 for June 2004 – June 2005 (but that was during a deployment period when Ellsworth B-1s were deployed to Diego Garcia, so the true number would have again been closer to 1,000)

The 0.7 was given to us by AF sources who extracted it from Aircraft Utilization or Average Sortie Duration (ASD) reports submitted by both Dyess & Ellsworth.

It is not just derived from only the difference in respective flying time from Dyess to Lancer and from Ellsworth to Powder River, but also includes additional flying time that Dyess aircrews must expend to meet their required training within the MCA or route – e.g. low level, which cannot be done in Lancer, but can in Powder River. It includes all extra time reported by Dyess needed to perform the same crew training functions.

But the mileage is what we talked about this morning, 69 mi to Lancer from Dyess; and 58 miles to Powder River from Ellsworth.

The crew training mission as I mentioned before and as explained to me by a B-1 rated officer – in a B-1 unit now – are those skill qualification training exercises/missions conducted to maintain their crew proficiency and it excludes live bombing missions, test flights, air shows and air support exercises for other services.

On the Bombing sortie cost figure:

Distances from Dyess to UTTR (Hill) is 768. Distance from Ellsworth to UTTR is 433. These numbers were provided by AF to us

That formula is much like the other:

$\$20,000$ (per hr flying cost) \times 1.16 hr. difference in flying time = $\$23,200$ additional cost per sortie \times 359 sorties \times 20 years = $\$166$ million (I think we actually miscalculated this one by using 1.1 giving us only $\$158$ million on the draft we sent you.)

The 1.16 was rather simple to find in this case, because it represents the straight-out flying time difference to the range based upon each distance and normal flying speed (given to us by AF).

Art, I encourage you to call someone at Ellsworth to explain what causes the crew training time differences far better than I can.

Bob

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC [mailto:Arthur.Beauchamp@wso.whs.mil]
Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2005 4:41 PM
To: Taylor, Bob (Thune)
Subject: RE: Ellsworth Savings/Cost Analysis

8/18/2005

DCN: 11988

Bob,

Why didn't the analysis assume no MILPER cost savings -- if you go with the assumption that DOD isn't reducing military personnel end-strength?

To confirm. This analysis assumes no live weapon drops occur w/in 300 NW circle from Dyess? And therefore, Dyess crews have to obtain the wpns drop training at UTTR?

How was the 0.7 determined? I assume this is the difference between the Powder and Lancer MOA? Is so, what distance was used for Powder? or Lancer? (i.e. the ASD used for Dyess and Ellsworth).

Define standard crew training mission?

What were the miles from Dyess to UTTR used? What were the miles from Ellsworth to UTTR used?

How was the \$280M derived?

Tks.

Art

From: Taylor, Bob (Thursday) [mailto:Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]

Sent: Thursday, August 11, 2005 2:21 PM

To: Beauchamp, Arthur, IV, WSO-BRAC

Subject: Ellsworth Savings/Cost Analysis

Art, here is a draft copy of our savings/ cost analysis. We are waiting on some range usage info we requested of the AF through their liaison office here, so the flying hour estimate may change somewhat depending on Dyess's usage of the lesser bombing ranges. As I mentioned this morning, we would subtract-out whatever percentage of live bombing sorties flown to the ranges other than UTTR from Dyess. Our figure includes only calculations of cost to UTTR, and does not include additional costs of scheduled sorties to Nellis which could also be added and may offset any non-UTTR sorties flown from Dyess. In any case, we use the factor of \$20,000 per hour (though this may be higher now) ; the difference in flying time of 1.16 hours and; the figure of 359 scheduled sorties from Ellsworth to UTTR in 2005. This adds an additional \$158 million in cost from live bombing missions to UTTR, to the \$280 million difference already calculated in localized CT.

8/18/2005

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Rollins Jennifer A Maj 28 BW/XP [Jennifer.Rollins@ellsworth.af.mil]
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 10:29 AM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Garrett Dave S LtCol 28 BW/DS
Subject: FW: BRAC Questions: Suspense: ASAP

Art-

Answers to Question # 1

Current OPTEM PO BUDGET for FY05 IS \$161.2 Million

Question # 2

As of 31 July our Bottom line total CPFH (cost per flying hour) is \$24,903
That dollar figure is broken out as follows:
MSD (Parts for the B1) \$13,741 per hour
GSD (Consumables/oils, filters etc.) \$2,108 per hour
AVPOL (Fuel for the B1) \$9,034
Non Fly AVPOL (Fuel for Aerospace Ground Equipment) \$20 per hour

V/r
Maj Rollins

Maj Jennifer "Bolt" Rollins

28 BW/XP, Deputy Chief of Wing Plans
1958 Scott Drive, Suite 6
Ellsworth AFB, SD 5706
DSN 675-5640
Commercial (605) 381-5640
Fax (605) 675-2456
jennifer.rollins@ellsworth.af.mil

Dave,

We're getting down to the wire so more questions may be coming your way.

New questions that are indirectly related to the Utilization questions:

1. What is the total cost per flying hour budget for Ellsworth for 2005? If no 2005, 2004 data is fine.
2. What is the cost per flying hr per B-1 at Ellsworth?
3. What are the number of transit hours to get to the airspace to Powder and Hays?
4. What is the estimated flying hour cost for Powder and Hays in 2005 (if not available, use

8/19/2005

2004 costs).

5. Does Ellsworth have any training capabilities within the 300 NW limitation that are equal or similar to that provided by the RBTI (i.e Lancer MOA and IR 178)? If so, what are they? Power?

6. Do Ellsworth crews fly B-1 from Ellsworth to the RBTI? Or do they receive the same qualification training at Ellsworth?

7. Do you know the primary weapons release range used by Dyess crews?

Thanks!

r/Art

DCN:11986

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2005 2:21 PM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: Ellsworth Savings/Cost Analysis
Attachments: Ellsworth Savings Analysis.pdf

Art, here is a draft copy of our savings/ cost analysis. We are waiting on some range usage info we requested of the AF through their liaison office here, so the flying hour estimate may change somewhat – depending on Dyess' usage of the lesser bombing ranges. As I mentioned this morning, we would subtract-out whatever percentage of live bombing sorties flown to the ranges other than UTTR from Dyess. Our figure includes only calculations of cost to UTTR, and does not include additional costs of scheduled sorties to Nellis – which could also be added and may offset any on-UTTR sorties flown from Dyess. In any case, we use the factor of \$20,000 per hour (though this may be higher now); the difference in flying time of 1.16 hours and; the figure of 359 scheduled sorties from Ellsworth to UTTR in 2005. This adds an additional \$158 million in cost from live bombing missions to UTTR, to the \$28 million difference already calculated in localized CT.

UTTR

1.16 * 359

Spencer Lee Love from

8/18/2005

Closure of Ellsworth AFB: High Risk, Low Savings

Executive Summary

In addition to the risks and congestion associated with consolidating all 67 B-1Bs in one location and the risks associated with the ongoing litigation over the primary Dyess training range, closing Ellsworth will not save the DoD estimate of \$1.853 billion over 20 years. At most, it would save only \$252 million over 20 years (\$12.6 million per year), and could actually cost DoD as much as \$1.75 billion over 20 years.

- The GAO's **60% adjustment** for illusory personnel savings alone reduces the DoD's projected \$1.853 billion savings to **\$742 million**.
- The **additional flying time** required for training the Ellsworth B-1Bs at Dyess would increase costs, and thus reduce savings, by an **additional \$438 million**.
- If the federal court that currently controls the primary training range at Dyess does not permit additional B-1B training missions, the **additional cost of conducting similar missions** at a suitable alternative range could be as high as **\$2 billion** over 20 years.
- The recommendation to close Ellsworth is the **most expensive** of all Air Force recommendations and provides the **lowest "return on investment."** DoD estimates Ellsworth's plant replacement value at \$1.753 billion; therefore, DoD would be **abandoning an asset valued at \$1.753 billion in an attempt to obtain actual savings of \$252 million**.
- DoD's own reports demonstrate that its BRAC-estimated costs of **environmental remediation** at Ellsworth have been **grossly under-reported**.

Potential Costs Resulting From Dyess Training Range Litigation

The primary Dyess MOA and low-level route are currently entangled in protracted litigation and are under the control of a federal court. If the B-1B fleet is consolidated at Dyess and the federal court does not authorize additional B-1B missions, the continued use of the Powder River MOA (as the only other equivalent training area) will require an added five hours of flight time at a cost of \$ 00,000 per mission, or \$100 million per 1,000 missions flown.

The 20-year cost for such longer missions could range from \$1-2 billion.

3. The Costs of Closing Ellsworth are Unique.

The cost to close Ellsworth (\$299 million) is the *most expensive of all Air Force recommendations*. (GAO Report, p. 120-22)

Even by the DoD's figures, the recommendation (\$299 million costs, \$1.853 billion savings) provides the *lowest "return on investment"* of all of the Air Force's active duty base closure recommendations. (GAO Report, p. 120-22)

By DoD's own estimate, Ellsworth has a \$1.753 billion plant replacement value. (DoD COBRA 5-19-05, p. 2) Therefore, *DoD would be abandoning an asset valued at \$1.753 billion in an attempt to obtain, at most, \$252 million in savings.*

4. DoD's Environmental Cost Estimate is Significantly Under-Reported.

DoD substantially under-reported in its COBRA analysis that environmental restoration at Ellsworth would cost only \$3.2 million. DoD's own reports show that Ellsworth will require at the very least \$26.4 million in environmental cleanup over the next 23 years. (DoD Environmental Programs Annual Report to Congress for FY 2004, dated Feb. 25, 2005)

Even this \$26.4 million figure grossly understates the real cost because it presumes that Ellsworth will continue to operate as an active military base. If the base is closed and transferred out of federal ownership, extensive additional environmental costs would be incurred to clean up the jet fuel, chlorine-based solvents, low-level nuclear waste, mustard gas agents, and other environmental hazards present at the 53-year-old base. An approximate doubling of this cost to \$ *2 million* would be a conservative estimate.

Background

1. Military Personnel Savings are Illusory and Should Not be Included.

The GAO has noted that over 60% of the Air Force's net annual recurring savings are cost avoidances from military personnel eliminations; however, eliminations are not expected to result in end-strength reductions. (GAO-05-785, July 2005 ["GAO Report"], p. 123)

GAO further reported that claiming personnel savings without end-strength reductions does not provide dollar savings that can be applied outside of personnel accounts, and specifically suggested that the "BRAC Commission may wish to consider ... the projected savings from military personnel reductions [related to] ... the closure of Ellsworth AFB, SD." (GAO Report, p. 124)

This adjustment alone reduces DoD's estimated savings of \$1.853 billion over 2 years to \$742 million (40% thereof), or \$37.1 million per year over 20 years.

2. Consolidating the B-1Bs Would Increase Costs and Reduce Savings.

Consolidating all B-1B operations at Dyess AFB contains additional hidden costs not considered in DoD's recommendations. These unconsidered costs are due to the increased distance between Dyess AFB and its primary training area (the Lancer MOA) as compared to the distance between Ellsworth AFB and its primary training area (the Powder River MOA).

Based on a comparison of the Average Sortie Duration (ASD) of the 28th Bomb Wing (Ellsworth) and the 9th Bomb Wing (Dyess), an average of 0.7 additional flight hours are required to complete the standard crew training missions flown from Dyess. This additional cost is already being borne by the B-1Bs currently operating from Dyess. Consolidating all B-1Bs at Dyess would result in this same increase in per mission cost for the consolidated Ellsworth B-1Bs.

Using an average cost of \$20,000 per B-1B flight hour, this increase in flying distance would result in an average \$14,000 per training sortie cost increase.

Over a 20-year time frame, this increased flying distance would result in a increase in B-1B training costs of nearly \$280 million.

This same point is true of live-drop training missions, generally flown to the Utah range, which is closer to Ellsworth than Dyess. **This increase in flying distance would also result in an increased per mission flight time of 1.16 hours and increase the 20-year cost by \$158 million.**

<u>Summary Calculation</u>	
<i>Best Case Scenario</i>	
DoD estimated savings	\$1.853 billion
Deduction for illusory personnel savings (GAO reduction of 60%)	- \$1.11 billion
Additional 20-year flying hours cost at Dyess	- \$438 million
Additional environmental restoration costs	- \$52 million
	<hr/>
	\$252 million (\$12.6 million per year for 20 years)
<u>ACTUAL REDUCED SAVINGS</u>	
<i>Worst Case Scenario</i>	
Total Savings Under Best Case Scenario	\$252 million
20-year cost if Powder River MOA must be used by Ellsworth B-1Bs consolidated at Dyess	- \$2 billion
	<hr/>
<u>POTENTIAL COST</u>	
	+ \$1.75 billion

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 9:15 AM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: B-1 Flying Hour Program

Art

Justin caught a copy of the response from the clearinghouse for me. Looks to me that you hit a really interesting question. If the AF does not accumulate costs to the level required to discriminate between fuel loaded at D.G. v. fuel loaded at home station, then the AF cost system is really politicized. Also, I note that the comment that the AIS string at Dyess is not sufficient to support the test and checkout requirements for boxes at Dyess. When the AF deployed 4 B-1 wings, I am willing to bet that they purchased 4 or more AIS strings. Is the AF in a corner on the maintainability of the B-1s because they haven't maintained the maintenance tool kit?

We aren't in the maintenance management analysis process, but I think you looked in the manhole or a really messy area.

Keep chugging. You solicited one of the most interesting clearinghouse responses to date.

Ken

Beauchamp Arthur Lt. Col AF/ILGM

From: KING, Randy [RKING@lmi.org] **Sent:** Thu 8/11/2005 2:39 PM
To: Tew Scott Lt. Col AF/ILGM; Beauchamp Arthur Lt. Col AF/ILGM
Cc: Davey Kir L MAJ AFLMA/LGS; Gehrich David L Capt AFLMA/LGS; Blazer Doug Contr AFLMA/LGS; SILVER, Bradley; MATTERN, Ginny
Subject: RE: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis (Suspense 1200 20 Jul)
Attachments:

Since the buy and repair numbers as quoted came from LMI, let me further clarify and interpret them. First, let me cite the text from Captain Gehrich's original message:

We looked at the current stock levels for B-1 parts coming out of the D200 and then re-computed these levels given the consolidation. We saw overall reductions in inventory requirements (valued at procurement cost) of \$35.5 million. However, when taking existing assets into account, this projected to potential near-term savings of \$11.6 million, \$2.3M in repair and \$9.3M in buy. Note that these reductions should result in no change in overall readiness, since we're continuing to support the B-1 fleet to a 95% aircraft availability target.

Now this is accurate but some of the details are being lost in translation. Reductions in stock levels are valued at \$35.5 million. This is the amount we would save if every item was in a "buy position"; i.e., if the current spares requirement projected procurements of \$35.5 that would not be needed under the consolidation. But most reparable items are not in a buy position -- we have enough assets (some serviceable, some unserviceable) so reducing the requirement will not always result in buy savings. We took the actual asset position into account in estimating the \$11.6 m savings for buy and \$9.3 m savings in repair. Now I don't know what is meant by saying the \$9.3 m was meant to "fill the warehouse" -- these are buy requirements that are no longer needed. When procurements are delivered, the assets are sent to the bases with outstanding requisitions. Those bases might use them to fill MICAPs or might put them in base supply -- who knows? It doesn't matter for this purpose. ~~We're saying that, in the near term, the current asset posture is such that requirements can be reduced by \$11.6 m for buy and \$9.3 m for repair.~~ These are one-time savings in stock levels for the reasons discussed in earlier email correspondence. 11.6M

Now what about the "other" \$23.9 m? This is the value (at buy cost) of levels reductions for which we see no current buy or repair requirement. The only way you save this \$23.9 m is if we eventually attrit enough assets (condemnations, etc.) so that we save on future procurements. But our analysis is showing that for now this is not the case -- these items are not now in a buy position, nor is there a current repair requirement that can be "saved". This suggests that we have an abundance of serviceables relative to their current activity levels -- so I would basically ignore the \$23.9 million number.

Final point, again as noted in Capt Gehrich's initial summary. While you can get some short term improvement in readiness (the 1 or 2 % that's been mentioned), in the longer term the requirements system will simply reduce the requirement to achieve the SAME level of readiness. The B-1 Aircraft Availability target was and remains at 95% (meaning that the spares are sized to permit an estimated 5% NMCS on average). While we're consolidating the aircraft into a single location, the target is the target. So in the end you're resourcing to an estimated 5% NMCS down -- before and after the consolidation. Therefore the readiness impacts are for the most part short term, reflecting the improvements we'll have until the requirements system has had time to make a downward adjustment in stocks.

LMA/LMI were so pressed with the tight suspense that we didn't have time for thorough documentation (although everything I'm saying was touched on in Captain Gehrich's write-up). And it's not that easy to articulate via email in the best of circumstances. But I felt some clarification was necessary since we're starting the drill all over again with the C-130.

Fire away if there are still more questions.

Randy

DCN:11986

Randall M. King
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean, VA 22102-7805
703.917.7359 F
703.917.7595 F

-----Original Message-----

From: Blazer Doug Contr AFLMA/LGS [mailto:doug.blazer.ctr@maxwell.af.mil]

Sent: Wednesday, August 10, 2005 5:18 PM

To: KING, Randy

Subject: FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis (Suspense 1200 20 Jul)

fyi and reply if appropriate.

-----Original Message-----

From: Tew Scott Lt Col AF/ILGM

To: Beauchamp Arthur Lt. Col AF/ILGM

Cc: Blazer Doug Contr AFLMA/LGS; Stim Christopher Maj AF/ILGM

Sent: 8/10/2005 1: 3 PM

Subject: RE: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis (Suspense 1200 20 Jul)

Art,

I'm sure Doug Blazer will have more detail, but this is the way Maj Davey and I worked out to better explain the numbers.

As you stated below, the \$11.6M is a one-time savings. When we combine all stock, we will avoid spending \$9.3M to fill the warehouse and avoid spending \$2.3M to repair items needed to fill base requirements. The rest of the \$35.5M figure mentioned below (\$23.9M) is wrapped up in safety stock that we will no longer need. I guess you could say the \$23.9M would be a cost avoidance...we don't actually save this money.

If in the future, we have two bases of B-1s, it could potentially cost us \$23.9M more every year to maintain extra safety levels over the safety levels required at a single base. Is that vague enough for you!

On the MC rate, I have always used straight math to compare MC rates to aircraft availability. If there are 67 B-1s, then an MC rate of 100% would mean all 67 birds are MC. Using this somewhat simplistic logic (but logic we used on the flightline), 1 point increase in the MC rate would put .67 birds back on the ramp. So an increase of 2 points would mean 1 extra bomber ready for combat. I think a more realistic estimate, building on other efficiencies with combining all support at one base, is that a increase of 3 points would be achievable...meaning 2 more birds available at any time.

I hope this info helps. I will phrase the answer for the C-130 question like I did above to make it more useful for your needs.

DCN:11986

Have a great Air Force day,

Scott
 LtCol Scott Tew
 Chief, Ops Readiness Support Branch
 HQ USAF/ILGM
 DSN 227-9447 Cell 703-697-9447

-----Original Message-----

From: Beauchamp Arthur Lt. Col AF/ILGM
 Sent: Monday, August 08, 2005 11:41 AM
 To: Tew Scott LtCol AF/ILGM
 Cc: Blazer Doug Ctr AFLMA/LGS
 Subject: FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis (Suspense 1200 20 Jul)
 Importance: High

Scott,

Pls reference LMI/MA reply. In it, they note a one time buy requirement savings of \$9.3M and one-time repair decrease of \$2.3M. Need clarification. Are these just one time savings caused by the consolidation of inventory? If yes, how can that be since the number of aircraft aren't decreasing. If not, how is the saving achieved?

What does a 1-2 percent increase in MC translate into in terms of aircraft availability?

Thanks for your help.

r/Art

-----Original Message-----

From: Piotrowski Paul J LtCol ACC/XPX (A54A)
 Sent: Wednesday July 20, 2005 4:21 PM
 To: Johansen David L LtCol SAF/IEB
 Cc: ACC/XPX Basing Division ALL PERSONNEL; Neall Raymond Ctr SAF/IEBB; ACC/XPX Basing Division (A54A); Mattner Donald F Civ ACC/XPXBA (A5412); ACC/XPX Basing Branch (A541); Jensen Brooke E Civ ACC/LGXP; Tew Scott LtCol AF/ILGM; Vance Donna E Civ ACC/LGSW; Sharp Robert B LtCol ACC/LG/LGA1/DRA1; Tyler Sean K Maj ACC/LGSWC

Subject: FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis (Suspense 1200 20 Jul)

MEMORANDUM FOR SAF/IEBB

FROM: ACC/A5 Basing

SUBJECT: BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis

1. The BRAC Commission request (email below) from Mr. Beauchamp requests, "From a logistics supportability perspective, how will B-1 parts/spares availability rates improve under a consolidation? We request empirical data, or an analysis that shows, or at least estimates the degree to which B-1 spares parts/spares supportability improves under a consolidation." Lt Col Scott Tew, HQ AF/ILGM, initiated an analysis on 18 Jul 05 by AFLMA/LGS and LMI. The analysis is focused on aircraft availability rates under a B-1 consolidation considering Aircraft Availability Model (AAM) computations based on depot level system (D200) data. The estimated completion date for a complete analysis is 26 Jul 05 if requested. ACC would have requested the same analysis from AFLMA/LGS to provide this data.

2. We received some preliminary data from AFLMA that provides some answers and their complete e-mails are below (attachments labeled logistics 1 and 2).

The synopsis states: "The combination of the B-1s will result in a minimal 1 to 2 percent increase in Mission Capable (MC) rate

- The initial savings will be \$700K...\$500K in stock and \$200K in repair avoidance

- After the merger of the B-1s, there will be a one-time savings in the budget computation cycle of \$11.6M...\$9.3M in reduced buy requirements and \$2.3M in repair avoidance

- In order to determine the consumable MICAPS avoided, we looked at the number of lateral support shipments of consumable items between the two bases. Each shipment should be satisfying a MICAP condition. If we assume that the consumable would have been present at Dyess if the bases were combined, then the MICAP would have been avoided. We found there were 96 shipments of consumable items between the two bases from 1 Jun 04 to 30 Jun 05, which breaks down to 7.4 MICAPs avoided each month. Using the above referenced study, this results in an increase of less than 1% in mission capable aircraft. This figure did not change the overall MC rate. But preventing 7.4 MICAPs a month is a visceral, tangible improvement that all us flightline folks can relate to."

3. Pending a more complete AFLMA analysis, the short answer is that Mission Capable (MC) rates will improve 1-2% with all maintenance in one place. Three other items not discussed in these preliminary responses involve test equipment, parts and experienced manpower. The B-1B Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) (equipment with poor reliability and long reconfiguration time) will be concentrated in one location. This will decrease the number of Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) awaiting maintenance, allow for simultaneous batching on the ATE and place more

useful LRUs in the system. Parts will be needed for the same number of aircraft but now they will be concentrated in one place, reducing delivery times and eliminating the need to decide which base gets priority for any given part. From a maintenance perspective the B-1B is one of the most demanding aircraft in the inventory and it has been a balancing act to attempt to balance experience between both Dyess and Ellsworth. The base with more experience almost always has a substantially better MC rate than the other. With all the experience in one place, the MC rate for the fleet should improve.

4. These comments should answer Mr. Beauchamp's questions. Additional empirical data will be available if more extensive AFLMA analysis is completed. Our ACC/A5 Basing POC is Mr. Kevin Flood, DSN 574-2050.

//Signed//

PAUL J. PIOTROWSKI, Lt Col, USAF
Deputy Chief, Basing Division
Directorate of Plans and Programs
DSN: 574-5814

paul.piotrowski@langley.af.mil <mailto:paul.piotrowski@langley.af.mil>
<mailto:paul.piotrowski@langley.af.mil>

Atchs: ACC/LG and AFLMA/LG comments

<<RE OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585FW B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis.htm>> <<GS words on B1.doc>> <<Logistic Analysis 2.rtf>>
<<Logistics analysis 1.rtf>>

From: Johansen David L LtCol SAF/IEB [
mailto:David.Johansen@pentagon.af.mil
<mailto:David.Johansen@pentagon.af.mil>] <
mailto:%5bmailto:David.Johansen@pentagon.af.mil%5d
<mailto:%5bmailto:David.Johansen@pentagon.af.mil%5d> >

Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2005 8:42 AM

To: Evans Gerald B Col ACC/XPX (A54)

Cc: Kinkead Charles C Ctr ACC/XPX-BRAC (A5422); Flood Kevin J Ctr
ACC/XPX-BRAC (A5422); Neall Raymond Ctr SAF/IEBB

Subject: FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber
Supportability Analysis

Col Evans, Request your help in answering the BRAC Commission question on B1 supportability. See the bottom email from Mr Beauchamp. The commission has a tight turnaround on this, we'll need your response by 20 July to meet their suspense. Ray Neall in IEBB has already discussed this yesterday with Kevin, if you have any questions please call Ray

directly at dsn 22- 577...thanks.

VR, Dave
 David L. Johanser Lt Col, USAF
 Chief, Base Realignment & Closure Div
 DSN: 222-9510 Comm: (703) 692-9510

-----Original Message-----

From: Neall Raymond Ctr SAF/IEBB
 Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 2:43 PM
 To: Johansen David L LtCol SAF/IEB
 Subject: FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis

Sir,

Just spoke to Kevin Flood at ACC. ACC can give us some creditability on the B-1 parts issue. He requested we send this through Col Evans (ACC/XPX) at ACC with an info copy to himself and Charlie Kinhead. The suspense is 20 July. This should not be too tough for a B-1 parts expert to answer.

V/R
 Ray

From: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
 Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 12:29 PM
 To: BRAC Inquiry Workflow
 Cc: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 Subject: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis
 Please provide a response to the inquiry below and return to OSD BRAC Clearinghouse NLT noon Wednesday, 20 July, 2005, with the designated signature authority, in PDF format.

When contacting the Clearinghouse, please refer to OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585.
 Thank you for your cooperation and timeliness in this matter.
 OSD BRAC Clearinghouse

-----Original Message-----

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 12:25 PM
 To: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
 Cc: Sillin, Nathaniel, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cirillo, Frank, CIV, WSO-BRAC;
 Cook, Robert, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Flood, Glenn, CIV, OASD-PA; Hoggard, Jack, CTR, WSO-OSD_DOT JCSG; Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Breitschopf, Justin, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 Subject: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis
 Clearinghouse:

One of the key rationales the Air Force has stated for consolidating the B-1 bomber fleet is "achieving operational efficiencies" (ref: AF Analysis and Recommendations Vol V, Page 169")

From a logistics supportability perspective, how will B-1 parts/spares

availability rates improve under a consolidation? We request empirical data, or an analysis that shows, or at least estimates the degree to which B-1 spares parts/spares supportability improves under a consolidation.

Thanks.

Art Beauchamp

Senior Analyst BRAC

Air Force Team

(703) 699-2934 << FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber

Supportability Analysis (Suspense 1200 20 Jul)>> <<RE: OSD BRAC

Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis>>

Beauchamp, Arthur ; CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Cirillo, Frank, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2005 7:13 AM
 To: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 Subject: RE: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis
 Importance: High

Agree - - Art feels the same way. Somehow, somewhere, if there is a valid argument for the consolidation we need to present it or make it available. It does not seem the Air Force is helping themselves. Common analysis sense (at least to me) supports the effort - but most Commissioners see it



U.S. AIR FORCE

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Frar

MC Rate

99-51.8% lack parts
00-51.8% parts become available
01-57.7% -
02-66.4%
03-69.9%
04-77.8% - deployed 9 months
05-75.5%
62.6%

py and hand it back to Gary

ome of their failures which walk away from all the it reasons.

r Supportability Analysis

ouble speak or the io. I do see some reduction

Intuitively, I guess yes,

at 10 lines on a Background rs, particularly if we have commodate the equipment.

-BRAC
RAC; Saxon, Ethan, CIV,

r Supportability Analysis

hwhile to send to a few charts and discuss with

RAC; Cook, Robert, CIV,

F

S
T
C

DCN:11986

WSO-BRAC; Flood, Glenn, CIV, OASD-PA; Hoggard, Jack, CTR, WSO-OSD_DST JCSG
Subject: FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis

Attached is the response to your inquiry.

OSD BRAC Clearinghouse

-----Original Message-----

From: Cook Jeannette J Civ SAF/IEBB On Behalf Of BRAC Inquiry Workflow
Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2005 1:59 PM
To: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
Subject: RE: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis

Attached is the answer to subject tasker.

JJ Cook

-----Original Message-----

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 12:25 PM
To: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
Cc: Sillin, Nathaniel, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cirillo, Frank, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cook, Robert, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Flood, Glenn, CIV, OASD-PA; Hoggard, Jack, CTR, WSO-OSD_DST JCSG; Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Breitschopf, Justin, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis

Clearinghouse:

One of the key rationals the Air Force has stated for consolidating the B-1 bomber fleet is "achieving operational efficiencies" (ref: AF Analysis and Recommendations Vol V, Page 169")

From a logistics supportability perspective, how will B-1 parts/spares availability rates improve under a consolidation. We request empirical data, or an analysis that shows, or at least estimates the degree to which B-1 spares parts/spares supportability improves under a consolidation.

Thanks.

Art Beauchamp
Senior Analyst BRAC
Air Force Team
(703) 699-2934

DCN:11986

Beauchamp Arthur Lt. Col AF/ILGM

From: Vance Donna E Civ ACC/LGSW **Sent:** Tue 7/19/2005 6:21 PM
To: ACC/LGX (A4X) Logistics Plans & Programs Division; ACC/LGXP Logistics Plans Branch
Cc: Anderson Dorothy H Civ ACC/LGXR; Tew Scott LtCol AF/ILGM; Tyler Sean K Maj ACC/LGSWC; ACC/LGS (A4S) Supply Division; Beck Gordon K SMSgt ACC LG/LGSWC; Clark Charles E Maj ACC/LGSI
Subject: FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis (Suspense 1200 20 Jul)
Attachments:

MEMORANDUM FOR LGX

FROM: LGS

SUBJECT: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis (Suspense 1200 20 Jul)

1. LGS reviewed the subject BRAC tasker requesting "empirical data, or an analysis that shows, or at least estimates the degree to which B-1 spares parts/spares supportability improves under a consolidation." B-1 bomber supportability should improve under consolidation. To determine the level of improved support, Lt Col Scott Tew, HQ AF/ILGM, initiated an analysis on 18 Jul 05 by AFLMA/LGS and LMI. The analysis is focused on aircraft availability rates under a B-1 consolidation considering Aircraft Availability Model (AAM) computations based on depot level system (D200) data. The estimated completion date for the analysis is 26 Jul 05. Per conversation with Lt Col Scott Tew, HQ AF/ILGM, DSN: 227-9447, recommend SAF/IEB direct updates on this issue to Lt Col Tew

2. If you have any questions please contact our POC, Maj Sean Tyler, ACC/LGSCW, at 4-3669.

//SIGNED, dev, 19 Jul 05//

DONNA E. VANCE, GM-13, DAF

Acting Chief, Supply Division

Attachment:

LGX Tasking Email

Atch

<<FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis (Suspense 1200 20 Jul)>>

From: Vance Donna E Civ ACC/LGSW
Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 2:13 PM
To: Flood Kevin J Ctr ACC/XPX-BRAC (A5422)
Cc: Tyler Sean K Maj ACC/LGSWC
Subject: FW: Using ASM to measure peace-time effects
 2nd of two emails.
 Donna

From: Tew Scott LtCol AF/ILGM [<mailto:Scott.Tew@pentagon.af.mil>]
Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 1:17 PM
To: Vance Donna E Civ ACC/LGSW; Tyler Sean K Maj ACC/LGSWC
Cc: Gehrich David L Capt AFLMA/LGS
Subject: FW: Using ASM to measure peace-time effects

Sean,

Here is an update from Laine. The change of note here is the avoidance of 7.4 MICAPs a month. This figure could not change the overall MC rate. But preventing 7.4 MICAPs a month is a visceral, tangible improvement that all us flightline folks can relate to. You may want to include this in your response. Remember, this is just consumables...the XD improvements are reflected in the overall MC rate improvement.

Have a great Air Force day,

LtCol T
LtCol Scott Tew
Chief, Ops Readiness Support Branch
HQ USAF/ILGM
DSN 227 9447 Comm 703-697-9447

-----Original Message-----

From: Gehrich David L Capt AFLMA/LGS
Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 1:10 PM
To: Stim Christopher Maj AF/ILGM; Gehrich David L Capt AFLMA/LGS; Tew Scott LtCol AF/ILGM; Tyler Sean K Maj ACC/LGSWC; Vance Donna E Civ ACC/LGSW
Cc: Stephens Christopher L CMSgt AF/ILGM; Tew Scott LtCol AF/ILGM; VanBuren Anthony SMSgt AF/ILGM; Virostko Donald Ctr AF/ILGM; Parnacott Les Civ ACCRSS/CCD; Beck Gordon K SMSgt ACC LG/LGSWC; dfauld@lmi.org; Dietz John K Civ AFLMA/LGY; Bowman Gale J Civ AFLMA/LGY; Parrish Woodrow A Contr AFLMA/LGS; Smith Bernard N Contr AFLMA/LGS; Blazer Doug Contr AFLMA/LGS; rking@lmi.org; Davey Kim L MAJ AFLMA/LGS; Snow Edward Capt AFLMA/LGR
Subject: FW: Using ASM to measure peace-time effects

Here's what we have for the final answer, including consumables; changes are in blue. THANKS!!

-----Original Message-----

From: Gehrich David L Capt AFLMA/LGS
Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 9:59 AM
To: Stim Christopher Maj AF/ILGM; Tew Scott LtCol AF/ILGM; Tyler Sean K Maj ACC/LGSWC
Cc: Dietz John K Civ AFLMA/LGY; Bowman Gale J Civ AFLMA/LGY; Parrish Woodrow A Contr AFLMA/LGS; Smith Bernard N Contr AFLMA/LGS; Gehrich David L Capt AFLMA/LGS; Blazer Doug Contr AFLMA/LGS; rking@lmi.org; Davey Kim L MAJ AFLMA/LGS; Snow Edward Capt AFLMA/LGR
Subject: RE: Using ASM to measure peace-time effects

Here is the combined LMI/LMA reply:

AFLMA and LMI were asked by LtCol Tew at AF/ILGM to estimate the mission impact and any cost reductions from combining B1 aircraft from Ellsworth with B1s at Dyess. We used several methods to estimate the impact. There will be a short term and a long term impact. In the short term (using the existing requirement), we expect mission capability (as measured by Mission Capable aircraft) to increase 1 - 2 percent at reduced levels worth \$500K and reduced repair cost of approximately \$200K. In the long term, we expect mission capability will be unaffected because we continue to plan and buy to reach a 95% aircraft availability target, but there will be a one-time spare part "buy" requirement drop of roughly \$9.3M and one-time repair decrease of \$2.3M.

In order to reach this conclusion, we attempted to answer several questions:

- 1) How much will the future buy and repair requirement, as determined by D200, change? We used D200 to estimate this cost savings.
- 2) Will supporting only Dyess with the current pool of spares result in an increased mission capable rate? We used the Readiness Based Leveling (RBL) program to estimate this.
- 3) How much will combining operating locations decrease MICAP incidents for consumable parts? We answered this question by looking at lateral support shipment of consumable items at the two locations.

D200 Process

We looked at the current stock levels for B-1 parts coming out of the D200 and then re-computed these levels given the consolidation. We saw overall reductions in inventory requirements (valued at procurement cost) of \$35.5 million. However, when taking existing assets into account, this projected to potential near-term savings of \$11.6 million, \$2.3M in repair and \$9.3M in buy. Note that these reductions should result in no change in overall readiness, since we're continuing to support the B-1 fleet to a 95% aircraft availability target.

The range of items included in our analysis was all items with B-1 applications but number of stockage locations of 10 or less. So we included B-1 unique items as well as some of the common items, but deleted items that are so widely used that the impact of this consolidation should be negligible.

RBL Analysis

To use RBL and meet the short suspense, we had to make several assumptions. First, we assumed that all demand data would be additive. So, if Ellsworth had a Daily Demand Rate (DDR) of 2, and Dyess had a DDR of 1, then the combined DDR would be 3. Likewise, if Ellsworth had a minimum stock level of 3 assigned, then that also transferred to Dyess. Finally, we ran RBL with NSN's loaded with a B-1 SMC code, thus, the RBL analysis looked at B-1 unique items only parts shared with other aircraft were not looked at. This was because we had no method to identify all B-1 used parts within the timeframe allowed.

When we ran RBL we initially realized a decrease in Expected Back-Orders (EBOs) of 5 for the combined operations at Dyess. After looking at the data, we realized there was one part with an 'N' problem item code that had an EBO of 6.5. RBL does not allocate levels for 'N' problem items, therefore the EBO increase identified is not valid. Additionally, there were 10 stock numbers with an increase of at least one EBO each. Upon further study, we identified that Ellsworth had a significantly higher percentage of base repair (PBR) for these items than Dyess. Assuming Ellsworth's repair capability is available at the combined location, an additional reduction of 10 EBOs will be realized. Since we used Dyess's PBR, we think it likely that Ellsworth would bring the repair capability when they moved to Dyess, therefore the

increase in the pipeline (and therefore EBOs) could most likely be avoided as well. Therefore, we identified a range of 10 - 20 EBOs decreased at the combined location, and worldwide EBO's could be between unchanged and a decrease of 10.

We used a previous AFLMA study (LS200031200 Relating Mission Capable Incidents to AF Mission Capable Rates) to estimate decrease in Non-Mission Capable due to Supply (NMCS) time. Assuming that one reduced EBO is equivalent to avoiding one MICAP for repairable parts, a reduction of 10 EBOs results in an increase of 1% in mission capable aircraft.

Consumable Item Analysis

In order to determine the consumable MICAPS avoided, we looked at the number of lateral support shipments of consumable items between the two bases. Each shipment should be satisfying a MICAP condition. If we assume that the consumable would have been present at Dyess if the bases were combined, then the MICAP would have been avoided. We found there were 96 shipments of consumable items between the two bases from 1 Jun 04 to 30 Jun 05, which breaks down to 7.4 MICAPs avoided each month. Using the above referenced study, this results in an increase of less than 1% in mission capable aircraft.

Caveats

The short term suspense did not permit a thorough analysis; indeed, the longer term impacts on inventory estimated by LMI and the shorter term impacts on readiness estimated by LMA were performed independently and do not encompass the same set of stock numbers. In addition, there has not been time to validate the results and to investigate anomalies (for example instances where the levels are increased as a result of the consolidation).

-----Original Message-----

From: Tyler Sean K Maj ACC/LGSWC [<mailto:Sean.Tyler@langley.af.mil>]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2005 3:59 PM
To: Tew Scott LtCol AF/ILGM
Cc: Stim Christopher Maj AF/ILGM; VanBuren Anthony SMSgt AF/ILGM; Madison Traci Maj AF/ILPY; KING, Randy; Beck Gordon K SMSgt ACC LG/LGSWC; Cuington Tracy L SMSgt ACC/LGSWC; Blakey Robert M Civ HQ AFMC/LGRX; MATTERN, Ginny; SILVER, Bradley; Cuington Tracy L SMSgt ACC/LGSWC; Blakey Robert M Civ HQ AFMC/LGRX; MATTERN, Ginny; SILVER, Bradley; Blazer Doug Contr AFLMA/LGS; Davey Kim L MAJ AFLMA/LGS; Snow Edward Capt AFLMA/LGR; Dietz John K Civ AFLMA/LGY; Smith Dianna N Capt AFLMA/LGS; Vance Donna E Civ ACC/LGSW; Gehrich David L Capt AFLMA/LGS
Subject: RE: Using ASM to measure peace-time effects
Importance: High

<< Message: Untitled Attachment >> << Message: FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Task C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis (Suspense 1200 20 Jul) >>

From: Sharp Robert B LtCol ACC LG/LGA1/DRA1
Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 7:18 AM
To: Jensen Brooke E Civ ACC/LGXP
Cc: James Christopher Maj HQ ACC/LGXP; Keilholz Stephen M CMSgt ACC/DRA1
Subject: RE: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis

Brooke,

I'm on leave and this (Wednesday morning) is the first chance I've had to see and respond to your email. As I see it, Mr. Beauchamp has asked: "From a logistics supportability perspective, how will B-1 parts/spares availability rates improve under a consolidation? We request empirical data, or an analysis that shows, or at least estimates the degree to which B-1 spares parts/spares supportability improves under a consolidation."

To the best of my knowledge, no analysis has been done which measures consolidation's impact on B-1 spares parts/spare supportability. Unfortunately, that means we do not have empirical data, analysis, or even estimates to pass on to Mr. Beauchamp. That type of analysis is typically done by the System Program Director (SPD). The B-1 SPD is at Tinker AFB. I do not feel comfortable passing Mr. Beauchamp's request to them as I do not know who at the B-1 SPD office has signed BRAC nondisclosure agreements.

Based on my experience working with this aircraft, I can offer some assumptions (I have also sent this email to Chief Keilholz, he may have something to add. As I am on leave, I do not know when I will be checking my email again).

1. B-1 Automatic Test Equipment (ATE): Consolidation will concentrate all the B-1 ATE at one location. B-1 ATE is used by the maintenance backshops to perform maintenance and analysis on avionics line replaceable units (LRUs). Aging and unreliable ATE is one of the biggest challenges for B-1 support (and arguably places the most significant strain on B-1 mission capable rates). On average, there are 1000 LRUs waiting to be repaired fleetwide. Unfortunately, B-1 ATE has not been modernized or replaced since initial fielding in the mid-1980s. This aging equipment is showing its age and the mission capable rate regularly falls well below ACC's acceptable Mission Capable (MC) standard. Additionally, the poor reliability record of this test equipment has contributed to a backlog of over 1,000 LRUs fleet wide. The ATE must be reconfigured for each different type of LRU; this reconfiguring takes 2-24 hours. Consolidation will put more equipment in one location, allowing them to run several different configurations simultaneously (batching). This will result in a decrease in LRUs awaiting maintenance and put more useful LRUs into the supply system.

2. Parts: While supply will still be required to support the same number of aircraft, they will only be supporting one operational base. This will concentrate the parts warehouses at one location reducing delivery times and eliminating the need to decide which base has priority for any given part.

3. Experienced Manpower: From a maintenance perspective, the B-1 is one of the most demanding aircrafts in the Air Force inventory. A highly qualified B-1 maintenance technician is several years in the making. Historically, we have never been able to achieve an "experience balance" between all the B-1 MOB's. At times, Dyess has had more experience. At other times, it has been Ellsworth. As a result, one base will struggle for days with a maintenance problem that the other base handles as a matter of course. The base with more experience almost always has a substantially better MC rate than the other.

vr

Bob

Robert B. Sharp, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, B-1 Weapon System Team
DSN 574-4100

DCN:11986

From: Jensen Brooke E Civ ACC/LGXP
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2005 9:54 AM
To: Sharp Robert B Lt Col ACC LG/LGA1/DRA1
Cc: Jensen Brooke E Civ ACC/LGXP; James Christopher Maj HQ ACC/LGXP
Subject: FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis
Importance: High

Sir,

Please refer to original question at the bottom of the email chain. BRAC is asking for an analysis of how the consolidation of B-1 aircraft at Dyess will improve parts/spares availability rates.

As mentioned, turnaround is tight with a response due tomorrow. I haven't seen the official tasker yet but did not want to wait for it.

Please give me a call if you have any question or would like to discuss.

Brooke Jensen
LGXP
4-7895

From: Kinkead Charles C Ctr ACC/XPX-BRAC (A5422)
Sent: Tue 7/19/2005 10:37 AM
To: Jensen Brooke E Civ ACC/LGXP
Cc: LaRose Susan K Civ ACC XPX-BRAC (A5421); Oliver Geoff S LtCol ACC/XPXB (A541); Mattner Donald F Civ ACC/XPXBA (A5412); Flood Kevin J Ctr ACC/XPX-BRAC (A5422)
Subject: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis

Brooke,

Per our conversation -- should be coming out of XPX soon. Thanks for your help. Charlie

From: Johansen David L LtCol SAF/IEB [<mailto:David.Johansen@pentagon.af.mil>]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2005 8:42 AM
To: Evans Gerald B Col ACC/XPX (A54)
Cc: Kinkead Charles C Ctr ACC/XPX-BRAC (A5422); Flood Kevin J Ctr ACC/XPX-BRAC (A5422); Neall Raymond Ctr SAF/IEBB
Subject: FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis

Col Evans, Request your help in answering the BRAC Commission question on B1 supportability...see the bottom email from Mr Beauchamp. The commission has a tight turnaround on this, we'll need your response by 20 July to meet their suspense. Ray Neall in IEBB has already discussed this yesterday with Kevin, if you have any questions please call Ray directly at dsn 22-4577...thanks.

VR, Dave

David L. Johansen, Lt Col, USAF

Chief, Base Realignment & Closure Div

DSN: 222-9510 Comm: (303) 692-9510

-----Original Message-----

From: Neall Raymond Ctr 3AF/IEBB
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 2:43 PM
To: Johansen David L Lt Col SAF/IEB
Subject: FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis

Sir,

Just spoke to Kevin Flood at ACC. ACC can give us some credibility on the B-1 parts issue. He requested we send this through Col Evans (ACC/XPX) at ACC, with an info copy to himself and Charlie Kinhead. The suspense is 20 July. This should not be too tough for a B-1 parts expert to answer.

V/R

Ray

From: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 12:29 PM
To: BRAC Inquiry Workflow
Cc: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV WSO-BRAC
Subject: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis

Please provide a response to the inquiry below and return to OSD BRAC Clearinghouse NLT noon **Wednesday, 20 July, 2005**, with the designated signature authority, in PDF format.

When contacting the Clearinghouse, please refer to OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker **C0585**.

Thank you for your cooperation and timeliness in this matter.

OSD BRAC Clearinghouse

-----Original Message-----

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 12:25 PM
To: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
Cc: Sillin, Nathaniel, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cirillo, Frank, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cook, Robert, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Flood, Glenn, CIV, OASD-PA; Hoggard, Jack, CTR, WSO-OSD_DST JCSG; Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Breitschopf, Justin, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis

Clearinghouse:

One of the key rationales the Air Force has stated for consolidating the B-1 bomber fleet is "achieving operational efficiencies" (ref: AF Analysis and Recommendations Vol V, Page 169")

From a logistics supportability perspective, how will B-1 parts/spares availability rates improve under a consolidation? We request empirical data, or an analysis that shows, or at least estimates the degree to which B-1 spares parts/spares supportability improves under a consolidation.

Thanks.

Art Beauchamp

Senior Analyst BRAC

Air Force Team

(703) 699-2934

Beauchamp Arthur Lt. Col AF/ILGM**From:** Sharp Robert B LtCol ACC LG/LGA1/DRA1**Sent:** Wed 7/20/2005 7:17 AM**To:** Jensen Brooke E Civ ACC/LGXP**Cc:** James Christopher Maj HQ ACC/LGXP; Keilholz Stephen M CMSgt ACC/DRA1**Subject:** RE: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis**Attachments:**

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Importance: High

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Chief, Base Realignment & Closure Div

DSN: 222-9510 Comm: (703) 692-9510

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From: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse

Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 12:29 PM

To: BRAC Inquiry Worklow

Cc: Beauchamp, Arthur [mailto:CIV, WSO-BRAC]

Subject: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0585/FW: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis

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OSD BRAC Clearinghouse

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Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 12:25 PM

To: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse

Cc: Sillin, Nathaniel, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cirillo, Frank, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cook, Robert, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Flood, Glenn, CIV, OASD-PA; Hoggard, Jack, CTR, WSO-OSD_DST JCSG; Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Breitschopf, Justin, CIV, WSO-BRAC

Subject: B1 Bomber Supportability Analysis

Clearinghouse

One of the key rationales the Air Force has stated for consolidating the B-1 bomber fleet is "achieving operational efficiencies" (ref: AF Analysis and Recommendations Vol V, Page 169)

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Thanks.

Art Beauchamp

Senior Analyst BRAC

Air Force Team

(703) 699-2934

JOHN THUNE
SOUTH DAKOTA

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

COMMITTEE
ARMED SERVICES
ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS
SMALL BUSINESS
VETERANS' AFFAIRS

August 9, 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

On July 19, 2005, the Air Force replied to an inquiry from the Base Realignment and Closure Commission concerning ongoing litigation and court imposed constraints on the use of the primary military operating area (MOA) and military training route (MTR) that serves the aerial training requirements for both Dyess and Barksdale AFB. I found some of the Air Force replies to the commission's questions to be incorrect and I would like the opportunity to comment.

Background

The commission inquiry was based upon an issue I raised, which calls into question the wisdom of DoD's recommendation to consolidate all 67 operational B-1s at a single location, Dyess AFB. It had come to my attention that the primary bomber training area, upon which Dyess' B-1s depend for close proximity training, had been mired in litigation for the last five years, thus making both its future availability and its capability to support consolidated B-1 training uncertain. The training area, in fact, now operates subject to court order. The training airspace includes IR-178 MTR and Lancer MOA, together known as the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (RBTI). The litigation in question challenges the Air Force's Record of Decision (ROD) and Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), both prepared pursuant to requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as part of the process of obtaining FAA approval for the RBTI - a process begun in 1997 and still not approved because of the litigation. On appeal, the 5th Circuit found the EIS to be inadequate and set aside the ROD on October 12, 2004. The court further directed the District Court to determine the conditions upon which the Air Force could continue operations in the MTR and MOA. On June 29, 2005, the District Court imposed significant operating conditions limiting the continued Air Force use of the MTR and the MOA pending a supplemental EIS. There was no evidence in any of DoD's or Air Force's released BRAC deliberation documents or meeting minutes that this issue was discussed or considered in any detail. In fact, the Air Force has subsequently admitted that neither the present impact, nor future risk, posed by this litigation were factored into its deliberation because it did not have a method to calculate into the MCI scoring.

320 NORTH MAIN AVENUE
SIOUX FALLS, SD 57104
(605) 334-9596

1313 WEST MAIN STREET
RAPID CITY, SD 57701
(605) 348-7551

320 SOUTH 1ST STREET
SUITE 101
ABERDEEN, SD 57401

Air Force Statement: "This litigation was not factored into the MCI score for any Air Force base. There was no viable method to consider ongoing litigation in computation of the MCI score."

Comment: In acknowledging that this litigation (and the consequent results) were not factored into the MCI score, nor considered under *military judgment*, the Air Force has conceded that a substantial liability on present and, potentially, future training access, was not factored into its deliberation to consolidate all B-1s at Dyess AFB and how that would affect training readiness and inherent costs involved with flying to more distant alternative training areas. The inability to determine "a viable method" to address the ongoing litigation calls into question the overall credibility of scores related to Dyess training areas, and represents a substantial deviation from the BRAC criteria.

Air Force Statement: "The scoring methodology only considered the relative distance of entry and exit points to the subject installations."

Comment: The Air Force methodology for calculating the MCI score for bomber bases only included a quantitative assessment of ranges and routes, with no analysis of access, availability, flying limitations or true quality of heavy bomber training. This analysis fails to evaluate any factors that may cause adverse impact on training and readiness, and fails altogether to consider the ramifications of adding 24 B-1s to the Dyess inventory. The Director of Air Space Operations at Air Combat Command, Major General DeCuir, in a sworn statement to the court commented on the effect of the court imposed restrictions: "*It is my personal and professional opinion that losing the ability to use IR-178 and the Lancer MOA as currently configured will cause grievous and irreparable harm to Air Force training and the ability of the Air Force to meet its national defense objectives.* He went on to state: "*These changes to the bomber training program, which would be in effect while the Air Force completes the SEIS and the FAA takes action accordingly, do not in my opinion, allow aircrews to fully meet necessary realistic training objectives.*"

Air Force Statement: "The Air Force voluntarily returned its training altitude to 500 ft AGL pending the outcome of a SEIS."

Comment: It is disturbing that the Air Force would apparently represent the status of the court imposed flying limitations as being "voluntarily" self-imposed. The facts, however, are indisputable. On January 31, 2005, the 5th Circuit directed that the district court set operating conditions under which the Air Force could continue to use the RBTI, pending the outcome of the SEIS. These conditions would not be "voluntary." The Air Force, seeking to avoid harsher restrictions requested by the plaintiffs, asked the court to accept certain limitations greater than those specified in the Air Force ROD that would still allow aircrews "the opportunity to train as realistically as possible." The ROD would have allowed flights in the MTR down to 300 feet AGL, and in the MOA down to 3,000 feet AGL. On June 29, 2005, the district court incorporated the Air Force proposed restrictions and imposed a floor of 500 feet AGL in the MTR, and 12,000 feet MSL in the MOA, pending the SEIS. These limitations are set under a court order and are in no way

what restrictions might apply, before the supplemental EIS has even been completed and any subsequent plaintiff challenges to the Department's analysis have been heard. The Air Force seems to be suggesting advanced foresight in knowing with certainty that the court will dismiss as meritless any arguments to be made by plaintiffs seeking greater limitations (e.g. 1,000 ft AGL minimum floor in the MTR), something that should never be assumed in litigation.

Air Force Statement: "As regards the volume of airspace, Dyess has "2.3 times the volume of airspace as Ellsworth."

Comment: This is not only irrelevant, it is misleading. First, the amount of airspace in comparison to Ellsworth has nothing to do with the actual question, which is how Dyess AFB would fare under an MCI score that accounts for the restrictions imposed by litigation. Further, the issue is whether the Air Force has an equivalent alternative to the RBTI within the 300-mile radius of Dyess, not whether there is generic airspace available to Dyess (belonging to other installations and probably approved for other types of aircraft). The RBTI was designed specifically for heavy bomber training and is a unique creation designed to interface with permanently housed electronic emitters and threat simulators situated at intervals along a specific low-level ingress route. The Air Force would not have created the RBTI, if it was not needed. The available "airspace" the Air Force implies can serve as a substitute to the RBTI was there before the RBTI was established but apparently not adequate – hence why the RBTI was created. So, it appears odd that the Air Force would now assert that this same airspace can adequately replace the RBTI if it should be closed-down or limited by action of the court. In a separate sworn affidavit by Major General DeCuir, he unequivocally stated, "*The other sites, even collectively, would not be able to absorb the additional training hours required if the Dyess and Barksdale units were displaced from RBTI.*"

Please understand, I am not advocating the consolidation of the nation's B-1B fleet at Ellsworth AFB, as an alternative to Dyess AFB. To the contrary, I believe it to be in this country's best interest to maintain the two separate B-1B bases we now have – in terms of preserving their security, operational effectiveness and overall quality of training. It is vitally important, therefore, that you receive the most accurate information available.

Thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully yours,



John Thune
United States Senator

MILITARY VALUE OF THE AERIAL TRAINING ROUTES AND MILITARY OPERATING AREAS (MOA) SUPPORTING DYESS AFB

SUMMARY

The USAF submitted flawed, misleading and egregiously incomplete analysis with respect to the availability, capability and future access to aerial training routes and MOAs supporting Dyess AFB. Inexplicably, the USAF failed to acknowledge in its analysis, scoring and recommendations that Dyess' primary training route (IR-178) and Lancer MOA, together known as the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (RBTI), are in fact operating subject to a Federal District Court order that has placed limits on its availability and operating conditions. The USAF failed to consider that this training route and MOA have been under continuous litigation since 2000 and are, in fact, vulnerable to future litigation that could further limit USAF operations and access. The service also failed to reveal in its recommendations that these key Dyess training assets will remain subject to Court imposed restrictions until the USAF prepares a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and both the court and FAA issue new decisions on whether to retain these airspace training assets. Any such decision could result in yet further operational limitations. Finally, the USAF negligently failed to consider the cumulative effects from an increase of training requirements resulting from the addition of B-1s coming from Ellsworth and a possible court imposed cap on sortie-operations. As a consequence, the final DoD scoring value for Dyess AFB lacks integrity and was based upon flawed scores related to proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM) and Low Level Routes under the Current and Future Mission category. The over-inflation of Dyess' assessed military value in this category - in comparison to Ellsworth AFB - was a principle determining factor in placing Ellsworth on the closure list. Therefore, DoD substantially deviated from its evaluation of military criteria and the recommended consolidation of the B-1 fleet at Dyess AFB should be rejected.

LITIGATION BACKGROUND

As early as 1997, the Air Force recognized that the aerial training ranges available to aircraft proximate to Dyess and Barksdale AFB were inadequate for realistic and effective training to ensure readiness. The Realistic Bomber Training Initiative was the result of that requirement. As such, an environmental impact statement (EIS) was initiated in December 1997. The AF initiative generated significant controversy with over 1,500 written and oral comments in opposition. The Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) was published in January, 2000. The AF Record of Decision selected a route and range complex (IR-178 and the Lancer MOA) which it deemed critical to the effective training and readiness of bomber air crews stationed at Dyess and Barksdale AFB. After the FEIS was published in January, 2000, litigation was initiated in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas on behalf of residents and organizations adversely affected by the noise, vibration, vortices and loss of value of their property resulting from the training flights over their land.¹

- Two cases were decided by the District Court and were consolidated on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which decided on October 12, 2004 that the Air Force and FAA compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act, 42

¹:Davis Mountains Trails-Pecos Heritage Assoc., et. al., ("Plaintiffs"), v. United States Air Force, et. al., ("Defendants"), 249 F. Supp. 2d 763 (N.D. Tex. 2003); Welch v. USAF, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21081 (N.D. Tex., Dec. 19, 2001)

U.S.C. 4321-4370(f), was defective. The Court of Appeals vacated the AF's Record of Decision, the decisions of the district court and the FAA orders approving the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (RBTI) and ordered the AF to prepare a supplemental EIS (SEIS) (Westlaw at 2004 WL 2295986, No. 02-60288 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2004)).

- On January 31, 2005, the appellate court on petition for rehearing, denied the Air Force a rehearing but granted continued use of the RBTI pending the preparation of the EIS "under conditions of operation set by the district court." (2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1620)
- On June 29, 2005, the district court issued an order imposing flying restrictions proposed by the USAF (under FCIF A05-01) to allow limited use pending the SEIS; thus setting limitations on the Air Force that no aircraft will fly lower than 500 ft. AGL, AP/1B altitude in IR-178, and no lower than 12,000 ft. MSL when utilizing Lancer MOA.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that Dyess' access to the RBTI throughout the foreseeable future is far from being a settled issue. The approval of the SEIS is a lengthy process, potentially lasting up to two years, assuming no further legal challenges. The RBTI's future availability as an optimal training range is, in fact, tenuous at best and vulnerable to finding itself in a continuous litigation limbo. In effect, Dyess access to RBTI is presently under the control of the district court, not the Air Force. And, it is operating under altitude limitations which render the training inadequate when compared to alternative MOAs (e.g. compare to Powder River MOA, Hays MOA, Belle Fourche MTR, Nevada Test & Training Ranges (NTTR) and the Utah NTTR).

QUALITY OF TRAINING UNDER COURT ORDER

On January 5, 2005, the Director of Air and Space Operations, Air Combat Command, filed with the appellate court two separate declarations. First, he asserted the essential nature of IR-178 and the Lancer MOA to the readiness and training of the Dyess AFB bombers. His declaration described the continued use of the RBTI as critical. Second, he asserted the Air Force will make temporary operational changes to its use of the RBTI by flying no lower than 500 feet above ground level or the published minimum altitudes on IR-178, whichever is higher and that aircraft will fly no lower than 12,000 feet mean sea level (an increase of approximately 6,000 ft.) during normal training operations in the Lancer MOA (FCIF A05-01).

- As to the matters of military value, two major discrepancies are generated by the declarations. First, these proffered changes are characterized as temporary, implying that these limitations will be abandoned when the Supplemental EIS and resulting Record of Decision are completed. No doubt, this will be challenged in the courts by the plaintiffs when the Supplemental EIS is completed, unless the Air Force abandons the present location of the RBTI site. At a minimum, this represents substantial delay in final judicial approval, if such final approval can ever be obtained. The second declaration is an acknowledgement that the court accepted limitations are inadequate for Air Force training "[T]he changes to the bomber training program, which would be in effect while the Air Force completes the SEIS and the FAA takes action accordingly, do not, in my opinion, allow aircrews to fully meet necessary realistic training objectives."

Thus, by the admission of the Director of Air and Space Operations, Air Combat Command, adequate training objectives for the B-1B bomber crews presently stationed at Dyess AFB cannot be met with the court imposed restrictions of June 29, 2005.

FUTURE LITIGATION

As this matter has been in litigation since at least 2001, it is reasonable to conclude that litigation could, and probably will, continue pending the results of the SEIS.² However, the recommended consolidation of all USAF B1-B operations at Dyess AFB raises numerous new issues that have yet to be addressed:

- The court order of June 29, 2005, and prior filings, make no mention of Air Force plans to consolidate and double the number the B-1B aircraft at Dyess AFB.
- Although the January, 2005 court order was well before the BRAC recommendations were announced, it should be noted that the USAF failed to advise the district court of the BRAC recommendations after their release and the possibility of increased flight activities at Dyess (an estimated 35% increase in annual missions utilizing the RBTI).
 - Whatever the existing baseline of flight operations in the RBTI, that number will increase significantly if all B-1Bs are located to Dyess AFB - unless the Air Force accepts a significant decrease in readiness and training. As noted by the appellate court in its reversal and remand of the case, the implementing regulations of the EPA, promulgated by the President's Council on Environmental Quality, at 40 C.F.R. 1502.9(c)(1), "... require agencies to supplement an EIS if the agency makes substantial changes to the proposed action or significant new circumstances or information arise bearing on the proposed action or its impacts."
- It is clear that the Air Force will be required to supplement the RBTI EIS to reflect the impacts associated with the increase in use of the RBTI training areas. The potential increase of required sortie-operations will only exacerbate the complaints raised by plaintiff, thereby leading to further litigation delaying and jeopardizing the final approval of the RBTI project.
 - While the failure of the Air Force to inform the court of these issues is a matter for the court to address, the failure of the Air Force to apprise the Base Closure Commission of the limitations on use and challenges to the RBTI represents a serious omission and should be sternly addressed by the Commission in the context of its evaluation of the Air Forces credibility in preparing their military value assessments.
 - Of particular note, the Air Force's analysis of the environmental implications of the recommended closure of Ellsworth and the movement to Dyess reflects that "... flight operations at Dyess have been diverted, delayed or rerouted because of noise. Additional operations may further impact this constraining factor and

² It should be noted to the Commission as a matter of significance, the State of Texas submitted an Amicus Curiae brief in support of Plaintiffs in their successful appeal before the Fifth Circuit.

therefore further restrict operations.” This particular comment is noteworthy for three reasons:

- By placing it in the analysis for environmental implications of the recommendation, the Air Force has relegated this constraining factor to a category of the statutory criteria that does not pertain to military value, thereby avoiding the clear implication of the constraint on readiness;
- The language used is similar to that reported for other gaining bases, thereby masking the constraint and implying that this limitation on use is not worthy of special attention as a matter embroiled in litigation;
- By commenting on the need for analysis under NEPA in a routine manner, the Commission would not be alerted to the predictable contentiousness of the addition of significantly more sortie-operations in these range areas.³

CONCLUSION

In assessing the military value of IR-178 and Lancer MOA, the analysis performed by the Air Force for the purposes of BRAC 2005 implies that these training assets will be available to Dyess AFB without limitation or qualification. As the facts suggest, the related USAF data and assumptions used were grossly incorrect. In fact, the continued use of these ranges is now under the aegis of the judicial system and is potentially subject to additional litigation that renders the future use of these ranges supporting Dyess AFB problematic, at best.

³ Although the Base Closure statute includes an exemption from NEPA for the recommendations of the Department of Defense and the actions of the Commission, this exemption does not extend to the implementation of the decisions of the Commission. Under ordinary circumstances, it would be appropriate for the Commission to assume that the Air Force can implement the decision of the Commission. However, no such assumption would be appropriate where, as here, there is a serious challenge to the closely related actions of the Air Force.




Figure 2.1-1
Training Airspace for Dyess AFB B-1s

M:\Military\Dyess_Elim\01\F2.1-1-Dyess_AirNew.rxd



Air Force to prepare supplement for training initiative

01/12/2005 - **LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (ACCNS)** – The U.S. Air Force will prepare a supplement to the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative Final Environmental Impact Statement as directed by the Oct. 12, 2004, decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The supplement will address the effects of wake vortices on ground structures associated with RBTI aircraft training. It will also address the effects of RBTI on civil and commercial aviation as specified in the court's ruling.

The draft supplement is scheduled to be released this spring. Two public hearings will be held in the West Texas area. Dates, locations and times for the public hearings as well as for the release of the supplement will be announced as they become available.

Currently, the Air Force continues to conduct training critical to national security on the route while awaiting further direction from the Court on its decision.


For more information, call 1st Lt. Jennifer Tumminio at (757) 764-8338.

Questions or comments about this article? [Send us an e-mail.](#)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION

DAVIS MOUNTAINS TRANS-PECOS)
HERITAGE ASSOCIATION, et al.,)
)
Plaintiffs,)
)
v.)
)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, et al.,)
)
Defendants.)

Civil Action No.
5:01-CV-289-C



ORDER

On this date the Court considered:

- (1) Plaintiffs' (DMTPHA) Motion and Brief for Hearing on Operating Conditions for RBTI Pending Completion of SEIS and Issuance of Agency Decisions on Remand, filed April 21, 2005, by Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Association, *et al.* ("Plaintiffs");
- (2) Defendants' Opposition and Brief in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Post-remand Hearing, filed May 11, 2005, by the United States Air Force, *et al.* "Defendants");
- (3) Plaintiffs' (DMTPHA) Brief Addressing Operating Conditions for RBTI Pending Completion of SEIS and Issuance of Agency Decisions on Remand, filed March 9, 2005;

- (4) Defendants' Corrected Brief on Remand, filed April 27, 2005;¹
- (5) Plaintiffs' (DMTPHA) Reply Brief Addressing Operating Conditions for RBTI Pending Completion of SEIS and Issuance of Agency Decisions on Remand, filed April 15, 2005; and
- (6) Defendants' Post-Remand Reply Brief, filed April 15, 2005.


After considering all the relevant arguments and evidence, this Court finds as follows:

- (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Hearing on Operating Conditions for RBTI Pending Completion of SEIS and Issuance of Agency Decisions on Remand is **DENIED** for the reason that adequate briefing on the issues has been completed by the parties;
- (2) The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Order issued January 31, 2005 On Petition for Rehearing allowed the operation of the RBTI to continue pending the outcome of the supplemental environmental impact statement. The Fifth Circuit directed this Court to set the conditions under which the RBTI may continue;
- (3) On January 12, 2005, the Air Force issued Flight Control Information File A05-01 ("FCIF A05-01"), titled "IR-178 and ANCER MOA Procedures," to Air Combat Command, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve Command units;

¹Defendants filed Defendants' Brief on Remand on March 10, 2005. Defendants filed their Corrected Brief on Remand because the declarations and exhibits filed in support of Defendants' post-remand brief did not conform to the appendix requirement of Local Rule 7.1(i).

- (4) FCIF A05-01 directs the following restrictions to be in effect until further notice: (a) Aircrews utilizing IR-178 will fly no lower than 500 ft. AGL, AP/1B altitude, or minimum altitudes set by the controlling airspace manager, whichever is higher, and (b) Aircrews utilizing the LANCER MOA will fly no lower than 12,000 MSL;
- (5) The RBTI may continue as previously conducted with the addition of the FCIF A05-01 restrictions, pending the completion of SEIS and issuance of agency decisions on remand;
- (6) The restrictions addressed by FCIF A05-01 adequately address the relevant issues until such time as the SEIS and agency decisions are completed; and
- (7) The RBTI is otherwise unchanged pending the SEIS and agency decisions on remand.

SO ORDERED this 29th day of June, 2005.


SAM R. CUMMINGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

DAVIS MOUNTAINS TRANS-PECOS
HERITAGE ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE,
et. al.

Defendants-Appellees.

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Case No. 03-10506

**ADDITIONAL DECLARATION
OF MAJOR GENERAL
KENNETH M. DECUIR**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare as follows:

1. I am Major General Kenneth M. DeCuir. Since March of 2004, I have served as the Director of Air and Space Operations for the Air Combat Command (ACC) at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. Before that I served in various flying and staff positions within the United States Air Force (USAF) over the past 30 years. I make this declaration based on my own personal knowledge and experience, as well as information made available to me during the course of my commissioned service with the Air Force.
2. I am familiar with the types of airspace used for training aviators throughout the Air Combat Command. I am familiar with the airspace and training assets associated with the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (RBTI), which includes Instrument Route 178

(IR-178) and the Lancer Military Operations Area (MOA). I understand the strategies and tactics employed by B-1 and B-52 aircrews. I am familiar with the litigation, *Davis Mountains v. USAF*. It is my personal and professional opinion that losing the ability to use IR-178 and the Lancer MOA as currently configured will cause grievous and irreparable harm to Air Force training and the ability of the Air Force to meet its national defense objectives.

3. Should this Court grant our petition for clarification, the Air Force can make the following temporary operational changes to the RBTI between the time the Court grants the petition and until the Air Force completes the Record of Decision for the Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) and the Federal Aviation Administration acts upon it:

a. Aircraft will fly no lower than 500 feet Above Ground Level (500' AGL) or the published minimum altitudes on IR-178 as set forth in the AP/1B, whichever is higher, while engaged in normal training operations on IR-178.

b. Aircraft will not fly lower than 12,000 feet Mean Sea Level (12,000' MSL) during normal training operations in the Lancer Military Operations Area.

4. These voluntary operational changes are designed to minimize the potential for impacts on civil aviation and ground structures, which the Court determined was inadequately analyzed. The changes to the bomber training program, which would be in effect while the Air Force completes the SEIS and the FAA takes action accordingly, do

not, in my opinion, allow aircrews to fully meet necessary realistic training objectives. However, should the Court allow these temporary measures, our aircrews will adhere to them in the interim to preserve the opportunity to continue training as realistically as possible.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on 5 JANUARY, 2005.


KENNETH M. DECUIR, Major General
Air Combat Command
Director of Air and Space Operations
Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665-2789

*Open***Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC**

From: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 12:13 PM
Subject: BRAC Inquiry Workflow
 Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
 OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0583/FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0547: Ellsworth AFB

Attachments: BI-0134,CT-0547, Ellsworth, 15 Jul 05.pdf

Please provide a response to the inquiry below and return to OSD BRAC Clearinghouse NLT noon **Wednesday, 20 July, 2005**, with the designated signature authority, in PDF format.

When contacting the Clearinghouse, please refer to OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker **C0583**.

Thank you for your cooperation and timeliness in this matter.

OSD BRAC Clearinghouse :

-----Original Message-----

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 12:06 PM
To: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
Cc: Sillin, Nathaniel, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cirillo, Frank, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cook, Robert, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Flood, Glenn, CIV, OASD-PA; Hoggard, Jack, CTR, WSO-OSD_DST JCSG; Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Breitschopf, Justin, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0547: Ellsworth AFB

Clearinghouse:

Please coordinate the following:

In response to the Air Force's comment "...We are unable to address the underestimated square footage capability at Ellsworth because it is not qualified as to type of square footage..." we are provide the following update:

"The square footage at Ellsworth is the total gross facility square footage (SF). It was estimated in the COBRA report as 3,684,000, but according to base officials the sq foot is 4,488,689 (excludes military housing). This is a decrease of 805,000 SF or about 18 percent SF."

Given this oversight we request an Air Force review of impacts to Ellsworth military value scoring. Thanks.

r/Art Beauchamp
 (703) 699-2934



BI-0134 CT-0547
 Ellsworth 15...

From: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
Sent: Friday, July 15, 2005 1:11 PM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Sillin, Nathaniel, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cirillo, Frank, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cook, Robert, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Flood, Glenn, CIV, OASD-PA; Hoggard, Jack, CTR, WSO-OSD_DST JCSG
Subject: FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0547: Ellsworth AFB

Attached is the response to your inquiry, OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker # C0547 (pdf file is provided).

OSD BRAC Clearinghouse

-----Original Message-----

From: Cook Jeannette J Civ SAF/IEBB **On Behalf Of** BRAC Inquiry Workflow
Sent: Friday, July 15, 2005 10:56 AM
To: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
Subject: RE: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0547: Ellsworth AFB

Attached is the answer to subject tasker.

<< File: BI-0134,CT-0547, Ellsworth, 15 Jul 05.pdf >> << File: BI-0134, CT-0547, Atch 1 Ellsworth - Airspace within 300NM (.pdf) >> << File: BI-0134, CT-0547, Atch 2 Dyess - Airspace within 300NM.pdf >>

JJ Cook

-----Original Message-----

From: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
Sent: Wednesday, July 13, 2005 3:26 PM
To: BRAC Inquiry Workflow
Subject: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0547: Ellsworth AFB

Please provide a response to the inquiry below and return to OSD BRAC Clearinghouse NLT noon **Friday, 15 July 2005**, with the designated signature authority, in PDF format.

When contacting the Clearinghouse, please refer to OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker **C0547**.

Thank you for your cooperation and timeliness in this matter.

OSD BRAC Clearinghouse

-----Original Message-----

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Wednesday, July 13, 2005 2:54 PM
To: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
Cc: Small, Jeanneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Sillin, Nathaniel, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Breitschopf, Justin, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: Ellsworth AFB

Clearinghouse:

1. During the recent BRAC Commissioners visit to Ellsworth AFB, SD it was discovered that the Air Force underestimated the square footage capability at Ellsworth by 80,000 sq feet. Please validate this?
2. Assuming that the square footage was underestimated, what is the impact, if any, on the MCI scoring for Ellsworth given this added capacity? Does it improve? If so, by how many points?
3. In discussion with Ellsworth personnel and the Ellsworth community, as well as our own analysis we determined that Ellsworth AFB has the basic capacity to beddown all 67 B-1 Bombers in the Air Force fleet with a MILCON investment of about \$60M. While the MILCON cost to prepare Dyess to receive the consolidated B-1 Fleet is \$124M. Can you also confirm this? If so, why not consolidate the B-1 fleet at Ellsworth given this cost savings?
4. The attached map provides a perspective on placement of the B-1 on the Ellsworth flightline, as you can see the capacity is there for all 7 B-1s.

Art Beauchamp
Senior Analyst, Air Force Team
BRAC Commission R&A Staff

DCN: 11986
(703) 699-2934

<< File: EllsworthF imp.ppt >>

7/16
Sent new
request

Sir, Below is my proposed response to Mr. Art Beauchamp.

_____ Cut line _____

Mr. Beauchamp,

1.) The attached COBRA report lists Ellsworth's gross facility square footage (SF) as 3,684,000. The SF for Ellsworth as per the GSF BRAC Question 28-445 was 4,488,689 as adjudicated. Ellsworth's GSF excluding military family housing continues to be 4.4M SF. That is a decrease of 805,000 SF or 18%. HQ AF has been unable to answer why or from where the report decreased our facility square footage.

2.) Yes, Ellsworth has the capability to bed down the entire B-1 fleet. With the extra docks we have in the south ramp, our excellent airfield pavements, the space that the 37th BS just vacated last month, the extra simulator building that will be available in spring '06, and the extra capacity in our support facilities such as housing, dormitories, and the medical facility we have from previously having 4 Wings, we can absorb the entire fleet today. We have prepared a list of future MILCON facility projects for \$49.5M to support long term sustainment of the B-1 in attachment two for your consideration if needed.

V/r,
Mark H. Wheeler, PE, MS
Deputy Base Civil Engineer
Ellsworth AFB, SD
Ph. 605-381-2660

Attach:

1. COBRA SF.PDF
2. Future MILCON.doc

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC [mailto:Arthur.Beauchamp@wso.whs.mil]
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2005 9:40 AM
To: Rollins, Jennifer A Capt 28 BW/XP
Cc: Garrett, Dave S LtCol 28 BW/DS
Subject: Questions

Capt Rollins,

A follow-up to our phone conversation.

We would like to know the specifics on the square footage shortage. At the visit, it was mentioned that the square footage shortage for Ellsworth was 80,000 sq feet. Can you confirm this? If true, please what specifically does the shortage entail—land, flightline, hanger, etc.,.

Also, does Ellsworth have the capability to beddown the entire fleet of B-1s? If I remember correctly I was told yes. If so, what are the MILCON shortages or issues in general regarding facilities and infrastructure.

Tks.

Art Beauchamp

COBR PERSONNEL/SF/SUSTAINMENT/RECAP/HOS DELTAS REPORT (COBRA v6.10)
 Date : 05/19/2005 10:54:39 AM, Report Created 05/19/2005 10:54:59 AM

Department : USAF
 Scenario File : N:\IEB Files\IEBB\COBRA Team\USAF 0018V3 (200.3)\USAF 0018V3 (200.3).CBR
 Option Pk Name : USAF 0018V3 (200.3) Close Ellsworth
 Std Pkrs File : N:\IEB Files\IEBB\COBRA Team\COBRA 6.10\BKAUC2005.SPF

Base	Personnel			
	Start*	Finish*	Change	%Change
Ellsworth FB	3,753	0	-3,753	-100%
Eyass AFB	0,173	6,151	374	6%
Elmendorf FB	9,218	9,475	257	3%
Peterson AFB	7,155	7,618	463	6%
Little Rock AFB	5,588	6,770	1,182	21%
Francis E. Warren AF	3,998	3,998	0	0%
TOTAL	25,482	34,015	-1,474	-4%

Base	Square Footage				Chg/Per
	Start	Finish	Change	%Change	
Ellsworth FB	3,684,000	0	-3,684,000	-100%	362
Eyass AFB	2,676,000	3,076,144	400,144	15%	1,072
Elmendorf FB	6,403,000	6,403,267	4,267	0%	17
Peterson AFB	2,544,000	2,599,355	46,355	2%	190
Little Rock AFB	3,193,000	3,239,650	136,650	4%	115
Francis E. Warren AF	2,284,000	2,284,000	0	0%	0
TOTAL	20,784,000	17,607,416	-3,096,584	-15%	2,101



Base	Base Operations Support (20055)				Chg/Per
	Start*	Finish*	Change	%Change	
Ellsworth FB	20,533,723	0	-20,533,723	-100%	5,471
Eyass AFB	25,171,731	26,240,437	1,068,705	4%	2,857
Elmendorf FB	61,371,819	65,733,309	4,361,490	7%	6,855
Peterson AFB	66,948,570	69,991,349	3,042,816	5%	6,573
Little Rock AFB	23,983,645	26,052,232	2,146,587	14%	2,657
Francis E. Warren AF	23,446,257	23,446,257	0	0%	0
TOTAL	242,995,509	231,463,564	-11,511,924	-5%	7,810

Base	Sustainment (20056)				Chg/Per
	Start	Finish	Change	%Change	
Ellsworth AFB	14,387,069	0	-14,387,069	-100%	3,833
Eyass AFB	14,329,624	15,137,205	807,581	6%	2,159
Elmendorf AFB	47,474,642	47,491,961	17,319	0%	67
Peterson AFB	9,838,285	10,026,620	188,335	2%	191
Little Rock AFB	11,271,323	11,529,132	258,008	2%	216
Francis E. Warren AF	6,697,754	6,697,754	0	0%	0
TOTAL	104,098,259	90,882,691	-13,215,567	-13%	8,966

The following table identifies future MILCON facilities at Ellsworth AFB to support long term sustainment of the B-1.

Priority	Building/MILCON issue	Estimated Cost (\$M)
1	Landing Hangar (7504) (modify)	3.0
2	Lock 42 (modify)	2.5
3	Lock 43 (modify)	3.0
4	Update doors/fire suppression in 6 Docks (\$1.5M each)	9.0
5	Aerospace Ground Equipment Facility (new)	15.0
6	Armament Facility (new)	10.0
7	Fuel Tank (12,000 BBL) (new)	1.0
8	Aircraft Maintenance Unit Facility (new)	6.0
	Total	49.5

Closed

Beauchamp, Arthur CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2005 1:45 PM
Subject: Brennan Timothy Ctr SAF/IEBB
RE: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0547: Ellsworth AFB

Tim,

I have inquiries to Ellsworth on the square footage. r/Art

From: Brennan Timothy Ctr SAF/IEBB
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2005 8:48 AM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: FW: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0547: Ellsworth AFB

Art--

I need some additional information to answer your questions below:

1. Square footage: what is referred to? Ramp space? Hangar space? If you can provide what you calculated we may be able to comment.
2. Square footage was reported by the installation with an as of date of 30 Sep 03. Why was the amount of square footage under-reported?
3. I understand the area of the map to show aircraft can fit. Is there accompanying information that describes PCN, condition of ramp etc.?

Thanks.

Tim Brennan
SAF/IEBB
(703) 692-6331
DSN 222-6331

-----Original Message-----

From: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
Sent: Wednesday, July 13, 2005 3:26 PM
To: BRAC Inquiry Workflow
Subject: OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker C0547: Ellsworth AFB

Please provide a response to the inquiry below and return to OSD BRAC Clearinghouse NLT noon **Friday, 15 July 2005**, with the designated signature authority, in PDF format.

When contacting the Clearinghouse, please refer to OSD BRAC Clearinghouse Tasker **C0547**.

Thank you for your cooperation and timeliness in this matter.

OSD BRAC Clearinghouse

-----Original Message-----

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Wednesday, July 13, 2005 2:54 PM
To: RSS dd - WSO BRAC Clearinghouse
Cc: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Sillin, Nathaniel, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Breitschopf, Justin, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: Ellsworth AFB

Clearinghouse:

1. During the recent BRAC Commissioners visit to Ellsworth AFB, SD it was discovered that the Air Force underestimated the square footage capacity at Ellsworth by 80,000 sq feet. Please validate this?
2. Assuming that the square footage was underestimated, what is the impact, if any, on the MCI scoring for Ellsworth given this added capacity? Does it improve? If so, by how many points?
3. In discussion with Ellsworth personnel and the Ellsworth community, as well as our own analysis we determined that Ellsworth AFB has the basic capacity to beddown all 67 B-1 Bombers in the Air Force fleet with a MILCON investment of about \$69M. While the MILCON cost to prepare Dyess to receive the consolidated B-1 Fleet is \$124M. Can you also confirm this? If so, why not consolidate the B-1 fleet at Ellsworth given this cost savings?
4. The attached map provides a perspective on placement of the B-1 on the Ellsworth flightline, as you can see the capacity is there for all 67 B-1s.

Art Beauchamp
Senior Analyst, Air Force Team
BRAC Commission R&A Staff
(703) 699-2934

<< File: EllsworthRamp.ppt >>



Beauchamp, Arthur ; CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2005 5:38 PM
To: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: Threat Assessment and Risk Mitigation Plan Request on Consolidation of B1 Bomber Fleet

Ken, request the following be sent to the Clearinghouse. This is a big concern with everyone involved with the consolidation of all B1 (7) at one location. Tks. Art

Clearinghouse,

As part of its BRAC recommendations, the Air Force has recommended to close Ellsworth AFB, SD and move all B1 Bombers assigned at Ellsworth AFB to Dyess AFB, TX. This is part of the Air Force's plan to consolidate all Air Force B1 Bombers at Dyess AFB TX.

Given this recommendation, the BRAC would like a Threat Assessment completed on this action. Specifically, **"what is the vulnerability to national security and operational risk of placing all B1 Bombers in the Air Force at one location"**. The response should also address any threat mitigation actions.

If response is classified we have personnel cleared up to Top Secret, SCI. My POC is Art Beauchamp, (703) 699-2934.

Tks.

Ken Small
BRAC, AF Team Lead

17 June 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-00 3 (CT-0342) Dyess AFB Letters - Sen Hutchinson (15 Jun 05)

Requester : Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson
Senator John Cornyn
Representative Randy Neugebauer

Question 1 What are the ramp capacities for Dyess, Ellsworth, and Little Rock?

Response: Ramp capacities are contained in the responses to question 008 Ramp/Apron Space, in Section 28, Real Property (*Sections 21-30 (13.1MB)*) and can be accessed on the BRAC web site http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/minutes/brac_databases.html. Organization identifiers from the installation list (Installation List (38KB)) are as follows: Dyess-38, Ellsworth-39, and Little Rock-68.

Question 2 Please provide copies of all studies concerning the ramp capacity at Dyess, Ellsworth, and Little Rock.

Response: The capacity analysis for Dyess and Ellsworth are contained in the BCEG minutes of 4 August 2004. No formal capacity analysis was accomplished for Little Rock AFB by the Air Force because Little Rock AFB fell under the purview of the Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group. During the scenario phase of the Air Force analysis the Air Education and Training Command was asked if Little Rock had adequate capacity to bed down additional C-130 aircraft. Their informal analysis confirmed that adequate capacity existed to accommodate the Dyess C-130 aircraft.

Question 3 In recommending the transfer of the C-130s from Dyess to Little Rock, did the Air Force intend to preserve a certain amount of Dyess' ramp capacity to accommodate future missions?

Response: The Air Force maintains additional capacity throughout its basing structure to accommodate surge requirements to support its operational requirements.

Question 4: The available COBRA analysis concerns only the DOD's recommendations. Please provide the DOD's COBRA analysis for the scenario under which the B-1s at Ellsworth would be transferred to Dyess, and Dyess would retain its two C-130s squadrons. If the DOD did not perform this analysis, please provide the basis for deciding not to do so. Also, if this COBRA analysis has not been done, I would appreciate if the Air Force would prepare such an analysis and provide a copy to me.

Response: The Air Force did not perform a COBRA analysis for a scenario for all B1-Bs and two Squadrons of C-130 aircraft at Dyess. The Air Force philosophy emphasized consolidating like mission design series aircraft at the same location to enhance

operational and maintenance efficiencies. In addition, the capacity analysis for Dyess showed that such a scenario would result in significant additional MILCON costs.

Question 5: Please provide any COBRA analyses that were done for the consolidation of all B-1s at Ellsworth.

Response: There was none accomplished.

Question 6: How many B-1s will be transferred from Ellsworth to Dyess?

Response: The 24 PAA assigned to Ellsworth will be transferred to Dyess.

Question 7: Will all 67 B-1s be based at Dyess after the transfer? If not, how many B-1s will be based at Dyess and where will the remaining B-1s be based?

Response: All B-1Bs will be assigned to Dyess except for two test coded B-1Bs based at Edwards AFB CA.


Question 8: What are the classifications of the B-1s at Dyess, i.e., the number of aircraft that are combat-coded, training-coded, test coded and BAI/Attrition Reserve?

Response: This data was provided in the classified Future Force Plan provided to Congress on 5 March 2005 by the Joint Staff in accordance with Public Law 101-510 Section 2912 a)(94) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.

Question 9: How will the B-1s be classified upon their transfer to Dyess?

Response: The mission coding of aircraft in the B1-B fleet will be based on training and operational missions needs. This coding may vary, over time, as mission needs, maintenance requirements, and attrition factors affect the aircraft fleet.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

June 15, 2005

The Honorable Michael L. Dominguez
Acting Secretary
Department of the Air Force
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330

Dear Secretary Dominguez:

I am writing to request information concerning the Defense Department's recommendations that the B-1s at Ellsworth AFB be transferred to Dyess AFB, and the C-130s at Dyess AFB be transferred to Little Rock AFB, Elmendorf AFB and Peterson AFB. Specifically, please provide written information concerning the following:

1. How many B-1s will be transferred from Ellsworth to Dyess?
2. Will all 67 B-1s be based at Dyess after the transfer? If not, how many B-1s will be based at Dyess and where will the remaining B-1s be based?
3. What are the classifications of the B-1s at Dyess, i.e., the number of aircraft that are combat-coded, training-coded, test coded and BAI/Attrition Reserve?
4. How will the B-1's be classified upon their transfer to Dyess?

Since the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission is currently reviewing data for upcoming regional meetings, I respectfully request a response as soon as possible.

Thank you for your attention in this matter. If you should have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,


Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison


Senator John Cornyn


Rep. Randy Neugebauer

DCN:11986

Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Taylor, Bob (Thune) [Bob_Taylor@thune.senate.gov]
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2005 1:52 PM
To: Beauchamp, Arthur, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: FW: Excerpt of DIA testimony from March 17, 2005

Art, good testimony by the Director, DIA, on strategic strike capability of a number of countries...China, N. Korea, Iran, India, Syria, etc.

<http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/statement17.html>

Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States

Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

**Statement For the Record
Senate Armed Services Committee
17 March 2005**

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION

Nuclear Weapons. Immediately behind terrorism, nuclear proliferation remains the most significant threats to our nation and international stability. We anticipate increases in the nuclear weapons inventories of a variety of countries to include China, India, Pakistan and North Korea.

Iran is likely continuing nuclear weapon-related endeavors in an effort to become the dominant regional power and deter what it perceives as the potential for US or Israeli attacks. We judge Iran is devoting significant resources to its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. Unless constrained by a nuclear non-proliferation agreement, Tehran probably will have the ability to produce nuclear weapons early in the next decade.

With declining or stagnant conventional military capabilities, we believe North Korea considers nuclear weapons critical to deterring the US and ROK. After expelling IAEA personnel in 2002, North Korea reactivated facilities at Yongbyon and claims it extracted and weaponized plutonium from the 8,000 spent fuel rods. Earlier this year, Pyongyang publicly claimed it had manufactured nuclear weapons. Kim Chong-il may eventually agree to negotiate away parts of his nuclear weapon stockpile and program and agree to some type of inspection regime, but we judge Kim is not likely to surrender all of his nuclear weapon capabilities. We do not know under what conditions North Korea would sell nuclear weapons or technology.

India and Pakistan continue to expand and modernize their nuclear weapon stockpiles. We remain concerned over the potential for extremists to gain control of Pakistani nuclear weapons. Both nations may develop boosted nuclear weapons, with increased yield.

Chemical and Biological Weapons. Chemical and biological weapons pose a significant threat to our deployed forces, international interests and homeland. Numerous states have chemical and biological warfare programs. Some have produced and weaponized agents. While we have no intelligence suggesting these states are planning to transfer weapons to terrorist groups, we remain concerned and alert to the possibility.

We anticipate the threats posed by biological and chemical agents will become more diverse and sophisticated over the next ten years. Major advances in the biological sciences and information technology will enable BW agent – both anti-human and anti-agricultural - development. The proliferation of dual use technology compounds the problem. Many states will remain focused on “traditional” E W or CW agent programs. Others are likely to develop nontraditional chemical agents or use advanced biotechnology to create agents that are more difficult to detect, easier to produce, and resistant to medical

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countermeasures.

Ballistic Missiles. Moscow likely views its strategic forces, especially its nuclear armed missiles, as a symbol of great power status and a key deterrent. Nevertheless, Russia's ballistic missile force will continue to decline in numbers. Russia is fielding the silo-variant of the SS-27 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and is developing a road-mobile variant and may be developing another new ICBM and new Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). It recently developed and is marketing a new Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM). Russia also is trying to preserve and extend the lives of Soviet-era missile systems.

China is modernizing and expanding its ballistic missile forces to improve their survivability and war-fighting capabilities, enhance their coercion and deterrence value and overcome ballistic missile defense systems. This effort is commensurate with its growing power and more assertive policies, especially with respect to Taiwan. It continues to develop three new solid-propellant strategic missile systems--the DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile ICBMs and the JL-2 SLBM. By 2015, the number of warheads capable of targeting the continental United States will increase several fold.

China also is developing new SRBMs, Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBMs), and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBMs). They are a key component of Beijing's military modernization program. Many of these systems will be fielded in military regions near Taiwan. In 2004, it added numerous SRBMs to those already existing in brigades near Taiwan. In addition to key Taiwanese military and civilian facilities, Chinese missiles will be capable of targeting US and allied military installations in the region to either deter outside intervention in a Taiwan crisis or attack those installations if deterrent efforts fail.

We judge Iran will have the technical capability to develop an ICBM by 2015. It is not clear whether Iran has decided to field such a missile. Iran continues to field 1300-km range Shahab III MRBMs capable of reaching Tel Aviv. Iranian officials have publicly claimed they are developing a new 2000-km-range variant of the Shahab III. Iranian engineers are also likely working to improve the accuracy of the country's SRBMs.

North Korea continues to invest in ballistic missiles to defend itself against attack, achieve diplomatic advantage and provide hard currency through foreign sales. Its Taepo Dong 2 intercontinental ballistic missile may be ready for testing. This missile could deliver a nuclear warhead to parts of the United States in a two stage variant and target all of North America with a three stage variant. North Korea also is developing new SRBM and IRBM missiles that will put US and allied forces in the region at further risk.

Pakistan and India continue to develop new ballistic missiles, reflecting tension between those two countries and New Delhi's desire to become a greater regional power. Pakistan flight-tested its new solid-propellant MRBM for the first time in 2004. The Indian military is preparing to field several new or updated SRBMs and an MRBM. India is developing a new IRBM, the Agni III.

Syria continues to improve its missile capabilities, which it likely considers essential compensation for conventional military weakness. Syria is fielding updated SRBMs to replace older and shorter-range variants.

Several nations are developing technologies to penetrate ballistic missile defenses.

Cruise Missiles. Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) and Lethal Unmanned Aerodynamic Vehicles (LUAVs) are expected to pose an increased threat to deployed US and allied forces in various regions. These capabilities are already emerging in Asia.

The numbers and capabilities of cruise missiles will increase, fueled by maturation of land-attack and Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) programs in Europe, Russia, and China, sales of complete systems, and the spread of advanced dual-use technologies and materials. Countering today's ASCMs is a challenging problem and the difficulty in countering these systems will increase with the introduction of more advanced guidance and propulsion technologies. Several ASCMs will have a secondary land-attack role.

China continues developing LACMs. We judge by 2015, it will have hundreds of highly accurate air- and ground-launched LACMs. China is developing and purchasing ASCMs capable of being launched from aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and land that will be more capable of penetrating shipboard defenses. These systems will present significant challenges in the event of a US naval force response to a Taiwan crisis.

In the next ten years, we expect other countries to join Russia, China, and France as major exporters of cruise missiles. Iran and Pakistan, for instance, are expected to develop or import LACMs. India, in partnership with Russia, will begin production of the PJ-10, an advanced anti-ship and land attack cruise missile, this year.

Major Exporters. Russia, China and North Korea continue to sell WMD and missile technologies for revenue and diplomatic influence. The Russian government, or entities within Russia, continues to support missile programs and civil nuclear projects

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in China, Iran, India and Syria. Some of the civil nuclear projects can have weapons applications. Chinese entities continue to supply key technologies to countries with WMD and missile programs, especially Pakistan, North Korea and Iran, although China appears to be living up to its 1997 pledge to limit nuclear cooperation with Iran. North Korea remains the leading supplier of missiles and technologies. In recent years, some of the states developing WMD or ballistic missile capabilities have become producers and potential suppliers. Iran has supplied liquid-propellant missile technology to Syria, and has marketed its new solid-propellant SRBM.

We also are watching non-government entities and individual entrepreneurs. The revelations regarding the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network show how a complex international network of suppliers with the requisite expertise and access to the needed technology, middlemen and front companies can successfully circumvent international controls and support multiple nuclear weapons programs.

NATIONS OF INTEREST

Iran. Iran is important to the US because of its size, location, energy resources, military strength and antipathy to US interests. It will continue support for terrorism, aid insurgents in Iraq and work to remove the US from the Middle East. It will also continue its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. Iran's drive to acquire nuclear weapons is a key test of international resolve and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Iran's long-term goal is to see the US leave Iraq and the region. Another Iranian goal is a weakened, decentralized and Shia-dominated Iraq that is incapable of posing a threat to Iran. These goals and policies most likely are endorsed by senior regime figures.

Tehran has the only militia in the region that can threaten its neighbors and Gulf stability. Its expanding ballistic missile inventory presents a potential threat to states in the region. As new longer range MRBMs are fielded Iran will have missiles with ranges to reach many of our European allies. Although Iran maintains a sizable conventional force, it has made limited progress in modernizing its conventional capabilities. Air and air defense forces rely on out-of-date US, Russian and Chinese equipment. Ground forces suffer from personnel and equipment shortages. Ground forces equipment is also poorly maintained.

We judge Iran can briefly close the Strait of Hormuz, relying on a layered strategy using predominately naval, air, and some ground forces. Last year it purchased North Korean torpedo and missile-armed fast attack craft and midget submarines, making marginal improvements to this capability.

The Iranian government is unstable, exercising control through its security services. Few anti-government demonstrations occurred in 2004. President Khatami will leave office in June 2005 and his successor will almost certainly be more conservative. The political reform movement has lost its momentum. Pro-reform media outlets are being closed and leading reformists arrested.

Syria. Longstanding Syrian policies of supporting terrorism and relying on WMD for strategic deterrence remain largely unchanged. Damascus is providing intelligence on al-Qaida for the War on Terrorism. Its response to US concerns on Iraq has been mixed. Men, material and money continue to cross the Syrian-Iraqi border likely with help from corrupt or sympathetic local officials.

Damascus appears to be responding to calls from Lebanese anti-Syrian political forces and international pressure, including fellow Arab states, to remove its troops and security forces from Lebanon. Regardless, Damascus will attempt to influence Lebanese events through its connections with Hizballah and other Lebanese political leaders and defense and security officials.

Damascus likely sees opportunities and risks with an unstable Iraq. Syria sees the problems we face in Iraq as beneficial because our commitments in Iraq reduce the prospects for action against Syria. However, Damascus is probably concerned about potential spill-over of Iraqi problems, especially Sunni extremism, into Syria. We see little evidence of active regime support for the insurgency, but Syria offers safe-haven to Iraqi Baathists, some of whom have ties to insurgents.

Syria continues to support Lebanese Hizballah and several rejectionist Palestinian groups, which Damascus argues are legitimate resistance groups.

Syria is making minor improvements to its conventional forces. It is buying modern anti-tank guided missiles and overhauling some aircraft, but cannot afford major weapon systems acquisitions.

President Bashar al-Asad is Syria's primary decision-maker. Since becoming President in 2000 upon the death of his father,

Asad has gradually replaced long-serving officials. Potential domestic opposition to his rule – such as the Muslim Brotherhood – is weak and disorganized. We judge the Syrian regime is currently stable, but internal or external crises could rapidly threaten it.

China. We do not expect Communist Party Secretary and President Hu Jintao's succession to chairman of the Central Military Command (CMC) to significantly alter Beijing's strategic priorities or its approach to military modernization. The commanders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery (Strategic Rocket Forces) joined the CMC in September, demonstrating an institutional change to make China's military more "joint." The CMC traditionally was dominated by generals from PLA ground forces.

China remains keenly interested in Coalition military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and is using lessons from those operations to guide PLA modernization and strategy. We believe several years will be needed before these lessons are incorporated into the armed forces. We judge Beijing remains concerned over US presence in Iraq, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Beijing may also think it has an opportunity to improve diplomatic and economic relations, to include access to energy resources, with other countries distrustful or resentful of US policy.

China continues to develop or import modern weapons. Their acquisition priorities appear unchanged from my testimony last year. Priorities include submarines, surface combatants, air defense, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles and modern fighters. China recently launched a new conventional submarine and acquired its first squadron of modern Su-30/FLANKER aircraft for the naval air forces from Russia. The PLA must overcome significant integration challenges to turn these new, advanced and disparate weapon systems into improved capabilities. Beijing also faces technical and operational difficulties in numerous areas. The PLA continues with its plan to cut approximately 200,000 soldiers from the Army to free resources for further modernization, an initiative it began in 2004.

Beijing was likely heartened by President Chen Shui-bian coalition's failure to achieve a majority in the recent Legislative Yuan elections. We believe China has adopted a more activist strategy to deter Taiwan moves toward independence that will stress diplomatic and economic instruments over military pressure. We believe China's leaders prefer to avoid military coercion, at least through the 2008 Olympics, but would initiate military action if it felt that course of action was necessary to prevent Taiwan independence.

Beijing remains committed to improving its forces across from Taiwan. In 2004, it added numerous SRBMs to those already existing in brigades near Taiwan. It is improving its air, naval and ground capabilities necessary to coerce Taiwan unification with the mainland and deter US intervention. Last fall, for instance, a Chinese nuclear submarine conducted a deployment that took it far into the western Pacific Ocean, including an incursion into Japanese waters.

North Korea. After more than a decade of declining or stagnant economic growth, Pyongyang's military capability has significantly degraded. The North's declining capabilities are even more pronounced when viewed in light of the significant improvements over the same period of the ROK military and the US-ROK Combined Forces Command. Nevertheless, the North maintains a large conventional force of over one million soldiers, the majority of which we believe are deployed south of Pyongyang.

North Korea continues to prioritize the military at the expense of its economy. We judge this "Military First Policy" has several purposes. It serves to deter US-ROK aggression. Nationwide conscription is a critical tool for the regime to socialize its citizens to maintain the Kim family in power. The large military allows Pyongyang to use threats and bravado in order to limit US-ROK policy options. Suggestions of sanctions, or military pressure by the US or ROK are countered by the North with threats that such actions are "an act of war" or that it could "turn Seoul into a sea of fire." Inertia, leadership perceptions that military power equals national power and the inability for the regime to change without threatening its leadership also explains the continuing large military commitment.

The North Korean People's Army remains capable of attacking South Korea with artillery and missile forces with limited warning. Such a provocative act, absent an immediate threat, is highly unlikely, counter to Pyongyang's political and economic objectives and would prompt a South Korean-CFC response it could not effectively oppose.

Internally, the regime in Pyongyang appears stable. Tight control over the population is maintained by a uniquely thorough indoctrination, pervasive security services and Party organizations, and a loyal military.

Russia. Despite an improving economy, Russia continues to face endemic challenges related to its post-Soviet military decline. Seeking to portray itself as a great power, Moscow has made some improvements to its armed forces, but has not addressed difficult domestic problems that will limit the scale and scope of military recovery.

Russian conventional forces have improved from their mid-1990s low point. Moscow nonetheless faces challenges if it is to move beyond these limited improvements. Significant procurement has been postponed until after 2010 and the Kremlin is not spending enough to modernize Russia's defense industrial base. Russia also faces increasingly negative demographic trends

and military quality of life issues that will create military manning problems.

Moscow has been able to boost its defense spending in line with its recovering economy. Russia's Gross National Product averaged 6.7% growth over the past five years, predominately from increased energy prices and consumer demand. Defense should continue to receive modest real increases in funding, unless Russia suffers an economic setback.

Russia continues vigorous efforts to increase its sales of weapons and military technology. Russia's annual arms exports average several billion dollars. China and India account for the majority of Russia's sales, with both countries buying advanced conventional weapons, production licenses, weapon components and technical assistance to enhance their R&D programs. Efforts to increase its customer base last year resulted in increased sales to Southeast Asia. Russian sales are expected to remain several billion dollars annually for the next few years.

Russia's struggle with the Chechen insurgency continues with no end in sight. Chechen terrorists seized a North Ossetian primary school where over 330 people were killed and two Russian civilian airliners were bombed in flight last summer. Rebels continue targeting Russians in Chechnya and Chechen officials cooperating with Moscow. While Moscow is employing more pro-Russian Chechen security forces against the insurgents, the war taxes Russian ground forces. Although the Chechnya situation remains a minor issue to the average Russian, concerns over spreading violence prompted new government security initiatives and offered cover for imposition of authoritarian political measures.

Russian leaders continue to characterize Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and NATO enlargement as mistakes. They express concerns that US operations in Iraq are creating instability and facilitating terrorism. Russian leaders want others to view the Chechen conflict as a struggle with international terrorism and accuse those who maintain contact with exiled Chechen leaders or criticize Moscow's policies toward Chechnya as pursuing a double standard. Russian officials are wary of potential US and NATO force deployments near Russia or in the former Soviet states. Concern that Ukraine under a President Yushchenko would draw closer to NATO and the EU was a factor motivating Russia's involvement in Ukraine's presidential election.

Central Intelligence Agency
Director of Central Intelligence

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SPEECHES AND TESTIMONY

**Global Intelligence Challenges 2005:
Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a Long-Term Strategy**

**Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence
Porter J. Goss
Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence**

**16 February 2005
(as prepared for delivery)**

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee.

It is my honor to meet with you today to discuss the challenges I see facing America and its interests in the months ahead. These challenges literally span the globe. My intention is to tell you what I believe are the greatest challenges we face today and those where our service as intelligence professionals is needed most on behalf of the US taxpayer.

We need to make tough decisions about which haystacks deserve to be scrutinized for the needles that can hurt us most. And we know in this information age that there are endless haystacks everywhere. I do want to make several things clear:

- Our officers are taking risks, and I will be asking them to take more risks--justifiable risks--because I would much rather explain why we did something than why we did nothing,
- I am asking for more competitive analysis, more collocation of analysts and collectors, and deeper collaboration with agencies throughout the Intelligence Community. Above all, our analysis must be objective. Our credibility rests there.
- We do not make policy. We do not wage war. I am emphatic about that and always have been. We do collect and analyze information.

With respect to the CIA, I want to tell you that my first few months as Director have served only to confirm what I and Members of Congress have known about CIA for years. It is a special place--an organization of dedicated, patriotic people. In addition to taking a thorough, hard look at our own capabilities, we are working to define CIA's place in the restructured Intelligence Community--a community that will be led by a new Director of National Intelligence--to make the maximum possible contribution to American security at home and abroad. The CIA is and will remain the flagship agency, in my view. And each of the other 14 elements in the community will continue to make their unique contributions as well.

Now, I turn to threats. I will not attempt to cover everything that could go wrong in the year ahead. We must, and do, concentrate our efforts, experience and expertise on the challenges that are most pressing: defeating terrorism; protecting the homeland; stopping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and drugs; and fostering stability, freedom and peace in the most troubled regions of the world. Accordingly, my comments today will focus on these duties. I know well from my 30 years in public service that you and your colleagues have an important responsibility with these open sessions to get information to the American people. But I also know all too well that as we are broadcasting to America, enemies are also tuning in. In open session I feel I must be very prudent in my remarks as DCI.

TERRORISM

Mr. Chairman, defeating terrorism must remain one of our intelligence community's core objectives, as widely dispersed terrorist networks will present one of the most serious challenges to US national security interests at home and abroad in the coming year. In the past year, aggressive measures by our intelligence, law enforcement, defense and homeland security communities along with our key international partners have dealt serious blows to al-Qa'ida and others. Despite these successes, however, the terrorist threat to the US in the Homeland and abroad endures.

- Al-Qa'ida is intent on finding ways to circumvent US security enhancements to strike Americans and the Homeland.
- It may be only a matter of time before al-Qa'ida or another group attempts to use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN).
- Al-Qa'ida is only one facet of the threat from a broader Sunni jihadist movement.
- The Iraq conflict, while not a cause of extremism, has become a cause for extremists.

We know from experience that al-Qa'ida is a patient, persistent, imaginative, adaptive and dangerous opponent. But it is vulnerable and we and other allies have hit it hard.

- Jihadist religious leaders preach millennial aberrational visions of a fight for Islam's survival. Sometimes they argue that the struggle justifies the indiscriminate killing of civilians, even with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.

Our pursuit of al-Qa'ida and its most senior leaders, including Bin Ladin and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri is intense. However, their capture alone would not be enough to eliminate the terrorist threat to the US Homeland or US interests overseas. Often influenced by al-Qa'ida's ideology, members of a broader movement have an ability to plan and conduct operations. We saw this last March in the railway attacks in Madrid conducted by local Sunni extremists. Other regional groups--connected to al-Qa'ida or acting on their own--also continue to pose a significant threat.

- In Pakistan, terrorist elements remain committed to attacking US targets. In Saudi Arabia, remnants of the Saudi al-Qa'ida network continue to attack US interests in the region.
- In Central Asia, the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), a splinter group of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has become a more virulent threat to US interests and local governments. Last spring the group used female operatives in a series of bombings in Uzbekistan.
- In Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) continues to pose a threat to US and Western interests in Indonesia and the Philippines, where JI is colluding with the Abu Sayyaf Group and possibly the MILF.

- In Europe, Islamic extremists continue to plan and cause attacks against US and local interests, some that may cause significant casualties. In 2004 British authorities dismantled an al-Qa'ida cell and an extremist brutally killed a prominent Dutch citizen in the Netherlands.

Islamic extremists are exploiting the Iraqi conflict to recruit new anti-US jihadists.

- These jihadists who survive will leave Iraq experienced in and focused on acts of urban terrorism. They represent a potential pool of contacts to build transnational terrorist cells, groups, and networks in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other countries.
- Zarqawi has sought to bring about the final victory of Islam over the West, and he hopes to establish a safe haven in Iraq from which his group could operate against "infidel" Western nations and "apostate" Muslim governments.

Other terrorist groups spanning the globe also pose persistent and serious threats to US and Western interests.

- Hizbullah's main focus remains Israel, but it could conduct lethal attacks against US interests quickly upon a decision to do so.
- Palestinian terrorist organizations have apparently refrained from directly targeting US or Western interests in their opposition to Middle East peace initiatives, but pose an ongoing risk to US citizens who could be killed or wounded in attacks intended to strike Israeli interests.
- Extremist groups in Latin America are still a concern, with the FARC--the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia--possessing the greatest capability and the clearest intent to threaten US interests in the region.
- Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Maghreb, the Levant, and the Gulf States are all areas where "pop up" terrorist activity can be expected.

AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan, once the safe haven for Usama bin Ladin, has started on the road to recovery after decades of instability and civil war. Hamid Karzai's election to the presidency was a major milestone. Elections for a new National Assembly and local district councils--tentatively scheduled for this spring--will complete the process of electing representatives.

President Karzai still faces a low-level insurgency aimed at destabilizing the country, raising the cost of reconstruction and ultimately forcing Coalition forces to leave.

- The development of the Afghan National Army and a national police force is going well, although neither can yet stand on its own.

IRAQ

Low voter turnout in some Sunni areas and the post-election resumption of insurgent attacks--most against Iraq civilian and security forces--indicate that the insurgency achieved at least some of its election-day goals and remains a serious threat to creating a stable representative government in Iraq.

- Self-determination for the Iraqi people will largely depend on the ability of Iraqi forces to provide security. Iraq's most capable security units have become more effective in recent months, contributing to several major operations and helping to put an Iraqi face on security operations. Insurgents are determined to discourage new recruits and undermine the effectiveness of existing Iraqi security forces.

- The lack of security is hurting Iraq's reconstruction efforts and economic development, causing overall economic growth to proceed at a much slower pace than many analysts expected a year ago.
- Alternatively, the larger uncommitted moderate Sunni population and the Sunni political elite may seize the post electoral moment to take part in creating Iraq's new political institutions if victorious Shia and Kurdish parties include Sunnis in the new government and the drafting of the constitution.

PROLIFERATION

Mr. Chairman, I will now turn to the worldwide challenge of proliferation. Last year started with promise as Libya had just renounced its WMD programs, North Korea was engaged in negotiations with regional states on its nuclear weapons program, and Iran was showing greater signs of openness regarding its nuclear program after concealing activity for nearly a decade. Let me start with Libya, a good news story, and one that reflects the patient perseverance with which the Intelligence Community can tackle a tough intelligence problem.

LIBYA

In 2004 Tripoli followed through with a range of steps to disarm itself of WMD and ballistic missiles.

- Libya gave up key elements of its nuclear weapons program and opened itself to the IAEA.
- Libya gave up some key CW assets and opened its former CW program to international scrutiny.
- After disclosing its Scud stockpile and extensive ballistic and cruise missile R&D efforts in 2003, Libya took important steps to abide by its commitment to limit its missiles to the 300-km range threshold of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

The US continues to work with Libya to clarify some discrepancies in the declaration.

NORTH KOREA

On 10 February 2005, Pyongyang announced it was suspending participation in the six-party talks underway since 2003, declared it had nuclear weapons, and affirmed it would seek to increase its nuclear arsenal. The North had been pushing for a freeze on its plutonium program in exchange for significant benefits, rather than committing to the full dismantlement that we and our partners sought.

- In 2003, the North claimed it had reprocessed the 8,000 fuel rods from the Yongbyong reactor, originally stored under the Agreed Framework, with IAEA monitoring in 1994. The North claimed to have made new weapons from its reprocessing effort.
- We believe North Korea continues to pursue a uranium enrichment capability drawing on

the assistance it received from A.Q. Khan before his network was shutdown.

North Korea continues to develop, produce, deploy, and sell ballistic missiles of increasing range and sophistication, augmenting Pyongyang's large operational force of Scud and No Dong class missiles. North Korea could resume flight-testing at any time, including of longer-range missiles, such as the Taepo Dong-2 system. We assess the TD-2 is capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear-weapon-sized payload.

- North Korea continues to market its ballistic missile technology, trying to find new clients now that some traditional customers, such as Libya, have halted such trade.

We believe North Korea has active CW and BW programs and probably has chemical and possibly biological weapons ready for use.

IRAN

In early February, the spokesman of Iran's Supreme Council for National Security publicly announced that Iran would never scrap its nuclear program. This came in the midst of negotiations with EU-3 members (Britain, Germany and France) seeking objective guarantees from Tehran that it will not use nuclear technology for nuclear weapons.

- Previous comments by Iranian officials, including Iran's Supreme Leader and its Foreign Minister, indicated that Iran would not give up its ability to enrich uranium. Certainly they can use it to produce fuel for power reactors. We are more concerned about the dual-use nature of the technology that could also be used to achieve a nuclear weapon.

In parallel, Iran continues its pursuit of long-range ballistic missiles, such as an improved version of its 1,300 km range Shahab-3 MRBM, to add to the hundreds of short-range SCUD missiles it already has.

Even since 9/11, Tehran continues to support terrorist groups in the region, such as Hizballah, and could encourage increased attacks in Israel and the Palestinian Territories to derail progress toward peace.

- Iran reportedly is supporting some anti-Coalition activities in Iraq and seeking to influence the future character of the Iraqi state.
- Conservatives are likely to consolidate their power in Iran's June 2005 presidential elections further marginalizing the reform movement last year.
- Iran continues to retain in secret important members of Al-Qai'ida-the Management Council-causing further uncertainty about Iran's commitment to bring them to justice.

CHINA

Beijing's military modernization and military buildup is tilting the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Improved Chinese capabilities threaten US forces in the region.

- In 2004, China increased its ballistic missile forces deployed across from Taiwan and rolled out several new submarines.
- China continues to develop more robust, survivable nuclear-armed missiles as well as conventional capabilities for use in a regional conflict.

Taiwan continues to promote constitutional reform and other attempts to strengthen local identity. Beijing judges these moves to be a "timeline for independence". If Beijing decides that Taiwan is taking steps toward permanent separation that exceed Beijing's tolerance, we believe China is prepared to respond with various levels of force.

China is increasingly confident and active on the international stage, trying to ensure it has a voice on major international issues, secure access to natural resources, and counter what it sees as US efforts to contain or encircle China.

New leadership under President Hu Jintao is facing an array of domestic challenges in 2005, such as the potential for a resurgence in inflation, increased dependence on exports, growing economic inequalities, increased awareness of individual rights, and popular expectations for the new leadership.

RUSSIA

The attitudes and actions of the so-called "siloviki"--the ex-KGB men that Putin has placed in positions of authority throughout the Russian government--may be critical determinants of the course Putin will pursue in the year ahead.

- Perceived setbacks in Ukraine are likely to lead Putin to redouble his efforts to defend Russian interests abroad while balancing cooperation with the West. Russia's most immediate security threat is terrorism, and counterterrorism cooperation undoubtedly will continue.
- Putin publicly acknowledges a role for outside powers to play in the CIS, for example, but we believe he is nevertheless concerned about further encroachment by the US and NATO into the region.
- Moscow worries that separatism inside Russia and radical Islamic movements beyond their borders might threaten stability in Southern Russia. Chechen extremists have increasingly turned to terrorist operations in response to Moscow's successes in Chechnya, and it is reasonable to predict that they will carry out attacks against civilian or military targets elsewhere in Russia in 2005.

Budget increases will help Russia create a professional military by replacing conscripts with volunteer servicemen and focus on maintaining, modernizing and extending the operational life of its strategic weapons systems, including its nuclear missile force.

- Russia remains an important source of weapons technology, materials and components for other nations. The vulnerability of Russian WMD materials and technology to theft or diversion is a continuing concern.

POTENTIAL AREAS FOR INSTABILITY

Mr. Chairman, in the MIDDLE EAST, the election of Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas, nevertheless, marks an important step and Abbas has made it clear that negotiating a peace deal with Israel is a high priority. There nevertheless are hurdles ahead.

- Redlines must be resolved while Palestinian leaders try to rebuild damaged PA infrastructure and governing institutions, especially the security forces, the legislature, and the judiciary.
- Terrorist groups, some of who benefit from funding from outside sources, could step up

attacks to derail peace and progress.

In AFRICA chronic instability will continue to hamper counterterrorism efforts and pose heavy humanitarian and peacekeeping burdens.

- In Nigeria, the military is struggling to contain militia groups in the oil-producing south and ethnic violence that frequently erupts throughout the country. Extremist groups are emerging from the country's Muslim population of about 65 million.
- In Sudan, the peace deal signed in January will result in de facto southern autonomy and may inspire rebels in provinces such as Darfur to press harder for a greater share of resources and power. Opportunities exist for Islamic extremists to reassert themselves in the North unless the central government stays unified.
- Unresolved disputes in the Horn of Africa--Africa's gateway to the Middle East--create vulnerability to foreign terrorist and extremist groups. Ethiopia and Eritrea still have a contested border, and armed factions in Somalia indicate they will fight the authority of a new transitional government.

In LATIN AMERICA, the region is entering a major electoral cycle in 2006, when Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela hold presidential elections. Several key countries in the hemisphere are potential flashpoints in 2005.

- In Venezuela, Chavez is consolidating his power by using technically legal tactics to target his opponents and meddling in the region, supported by Castro.
- In Colombia, progress against counternarcotics and terrorism under President Uribe's successful leadership, may be affected by the election.
- The outlook is very cloudy for legitimate, timely elections in November 2005 in Haiti--even with substantial international support.
- Campaigning for the 2006 presidential election in Mexico is likely to stall progress on fiscal, labor, and energy reforms.
- In Cuba, Castro's hold on power remains firm, but a bad fall last October has rekindled speculation about his declining health and succession scenarios.

In SOUTHEAST ASIA, three countries bear close watching.

- In Indonesia, President Yudhoyono has moved swiftly to crackdown on corruption. Reinvigorating the economy, burdened by the costs of recovery in tsunami-damaged areas, will likely be affected by continuing deep-seated ethnic and political turmoil exploitable by terrorists.
- In the Philippines, Manila is struggling with prolonged Islamic and Communist rebellions. The presence of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorists seeking safe haven and training bases adds volatility and capability to terrorist groups already in place.
- Thailand is plagued with an increasingly volatile Muslim separatist threat in its southeastern provinces, and the risk of escalation remains high.

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