

General Lloyd W. Newton, USAF (Ret)
Commissioner

**BASE CLOSURE AND
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**



HEARING

MAY 16, 2005

**Presentation of Department of Defense
BRAC Recommendations and Methodology**



BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

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**Statement
of
Anthony J. Principi**

**Chairman
2005 Base Closure and Realignment
Commission**

Hearing of the Commission

**1:30 PM
May 16, 2005**

**216 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington D.C.**

Good Afternoon,

I'm Anthony J. Principi, Chairman of the 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission, or BRAC. I'm pleased to welcome Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, and General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to this afternoon's hearing.

There can be few burdens heavier than the responsibility of waking up each morning knowing that you are answerable to the American people, and to history, for the defense of America's 229 year experiment in democracy.

Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, I commend you both for your decades-long careers of public service and for the vigor and energy you demonstrate daily in the exercise of your responsibilities.

The Congress entrusts our Armed Forces with vast, but not unlimited, resources. Your responsibilities to our nation, and to the men and women who bring the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps to life, demand that you make the best possible use of the limited resources available to you.

As I observed in the Commission's first hearing: Every dollar consumed in redundant, unnecessary, obsolete, inappropriately designed or located infrastructure is a dollar not available to provide the training that might save a Marine's life, purchase the munitions to win a soldier's firefight, or fund advances that could ensure continued dominance of the air or the seas.

The Congress recognized that fact when it authorized you to prepare a proposal to realign or close domestic bases. However, it is important to remember that the Congress did not give you a blank check. The Congress insists on an independent, fair, and equitable assessment and evaluation of both your proposal and the data and methodology used to develop that proposal. This Commission will provide that assessment -- openly and transparently, applying the criteria set forth in the statute.

If your proposals are accepted, their implementation will not be exercises in sterile cost-accounting. If accepted by the President and the Congress, what you propose will have profound effects on communities and on the people who bring them to life. They will also shape our military capabilities for decades to come.

That is why the Congress and the President look to us for an unbiased assessment and clear-eyed reality check.

The Congress, in establishing this Commission and in setting forth the standards against which we are charged to measure your proposal ensured these decisions would not be made in a vacuum and that your proposals, and their rationale and supporting data, would be subject to independent, objective analysis and assessment.

The members of this Commission accepted the challenge, and necessity, of providing that assessment.

We committed to the Congress, to the President, and to the American people, that our deliberations and decisions would be based on the criteria set forth in statute.

We will examine the proposed plan and measure it against the criteria for military value set forth in law, especially the need for surge manning and for homeland security.

We will assess your proposal's ability to support military force structure, including the 70,000 military personnel anticipated to return to our shores.

We also committed that our deliberations and decisions would be devoid of politics and that we would address our own conflicts of interest should any arise.

In addition, we will be open, independent, fair and equitable, and, we will ensure the people and communities affected by your proposals have, through our site visits and public hearings, a chance to provide us with direct input on the substance of your proposal and the methodology and assumptions behind it.

We will seek a consensus in our decisions by integrating the views of all members of the Commission.

And, perhaps most challenging of all, we will adhere to the rigid timeline for completing our deliberations and provide our report to the President by September 8, just over four months from now.

Mr. Secretary, and General Myers, in turn we look to you, your staffs, the leadership of the Department of Defense and of the military services, to provide us with complete and accurate information and expedited responses to our requests for additional data.


This hearing, your statements, and your responses to our questions, will be the first steps in that process..... but surely not the last.

I look forward to our discussion this morning and to a continuing cooperative relationship as the Commission embarks on the very arduous independent assessment that we will complete before the summer is ended.

Following the testimony of Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, the Commission will hear witnesses from the Office of the Secretary of Defense describe the methodology used to arrive at the decisions on realignment or closure embodied in the Secretary's proposal.

I now request our witnesses to stand for the administration of the oath required by the Base Closure and Realignment statute. The oath will be administered by Mr. Dan Cowhig, the Commission's Designated Federal Officer for administering oaths and opening and closing our hearings.

Mr. Cowhig.





BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Presentation of Department of Defense BRAC Recommendations and Methodology OPEN SESSION

Monday, May 16, 2005
1:30 p.m.
216 Hart Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

Panel I

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

General Richard B. Myers, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Panel II

The Honorable Michael W. Wynne
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics

The Honorable Philip W. Grone
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations
and Environment

SWEARING IN OATH

Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give, and any other evidence that you may provide, are accurate and complete to the best of your knowledge and belief, so help you God?






DONALD H. RUMSFELD

Secretary of Defense



Donald H. Rumsfeld was sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense on January 20, 2001. Before assuming his present post, the former Navy pilot had also served as the 13th Secretary of Defense, White House Chief of Staff, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, U.S. Congressman and chief executive officer of two Fortune 500 companies.

Secretary Rumsfeld is responsible for directing the actions of the Defense Department in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The war is being waged against a backdrop of major change within the Department of Defense. The department has developed a new defense strategy and replaced the old model for sizing forces with a newer approach more relevant to the 21st century. Secretary Rumsfeld proposed and the President approved a significant reorganization of the worldwide command structure, known as the Unified Command Plan, that resulted in the establishment of the U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. Strategic Command, the latter charged with the responsibilities formerly held by the Strategic and Space Commands which were disestablished.



The Department also has refocused its space capabilities and fashioned a new concept of strategic deterrence that increases security while reducing strategic nuclear weapons. To help strengthen the deterrent, the missile defense research and testing program has been reorganized and revitalized, free of the restraints of the ABM treaty.

Mr. Rumsfeld attended Princeton University on academic and NROTC scholarships (A.B., 1954) and served in the U.S. Navy (1954-57) as an aviator and flight instructor. In 1957, he transferred to the Ready Reserve and continued his Naval service in flying and administrative assignments as a drilling reservist until 1975. He transferred to the Standby Reserve when he became Secretary of Defense in 1975 and to the Retired Reserve with the rank of Captain in 1989.

In 1957, he came to Washington, DC to serve as Administrative Assistant to a Congressman. After a stint with an investment banking firm, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Illinois in 1962, at the age of 30, and was re-elected in 1964, 1966, and 1968.

Mr. Rumsfeld resigned from Congress in 1969 during his fourth term to join the President's Cabinet. From 1969 to 1970, he served as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity and Assistant to the President. From 1971 to 1972, he was Counsellor to the President and

Director of the Economic Stabilization Program. In 1973, he left Washington, DC, to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, Belgium (1973-1974).

In August 1974, he was called back to Washington, DC, to serve as Chairman of the transition to the Presidency of Gerald R. Ford. He then became Chief of Staff of the White House and a member of the President's Cabinet (1974-1975). He served as the 13th U.S. Secretary of Defense, the youngest in the country's history (1975-1977).

From 1977 to 1985 he served as Chief Executive Officer, President, and then Chairman of G.D. Searle & Co., a worldwide pharmaceutical company. The successful turnaround there earned him awards as the Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry from the Wall Street Transcript (1980) and Financial World (1981). From 1985 to 1990 he was in private business.

Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Instrument Corporation from 1990 to 1993. General Instrument Corporation was a leader in broadband transmission, distribution, and access control technologies. Until being sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman of the Board of Gilead Sciences, Inc., a pharmaceutical company.

Before returning for his second tour as Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld chaired the bipartisan U.S. Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, in 1998, and the U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization, in 2000.

During his business career, Mr. Rumsfeld continued his public service in a variety of Federal posts, including:

- Member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control (1982 - 1986);
- Special Presidential Envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty (1982 - 1983);
- Senior Advisor to the President's Panel on Strategic Systems (1983 - 1984);
- Member of the U.S. Joint Advisory Commission on U.S./Japan Relations (1983 - 1984);
- Special Presidential Envoy to the Middle East (1983 - 1984);
- Member of the National Commission on Public Service (1987 - 1990);
- Member of the National Economic Commission (1988 - 1989);
- Member of the Board of Visitors of the National Defense University (1988 - 1992);
- Member of the Commission on U.S./Japan Relations (1989 - 1991); and
- Member of the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission (1999 - 2000).

While in the private sector, Mr. Rumsfeld's civic activities included service as a member of the National Academy of Public Administration and a member of the boards of trustees of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the National Park Foundation, and as Chairman of the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, Inc.

In 1977, Mr. Rumsfeld was awarded the nation's highest civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom.



GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



General Richard B. Myers became the fifteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Oct. 1, 2001. In this capacity, he serves as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. Prior to becoming Chairman, he served as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 19 months.


General Myers was born in Kansas City, Missouri. He is a 1965 graduate of Kansas State University, and holds a Masters Degree in Business Administration from Auburn University. The General has attended the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; and the Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.



General Myers entered the Air Force in 1965 through the Reserve Officer Training Corps program. His career includes operational command and leadership positions in a variety of Air Force and Joint assignments. General Myers is a command pilot with more than 4,100 flying hours in the T-33, C-37, C-21, F-4, F-15 and F-16, including 600 combat hours in the F-4.

As the Vice Chairman from March 2000 to September 2001, General Myers served as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, and as a member of the National Security Council Deputies Committee and the Nuclear Weapons Council. In addition, he acted for the Chairman in all aspects of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System including participation in the Defense Resources Board.

From August 1998 to February 2000, General Myers was Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Space Command; Commander, Air Force Space Command; and Department of Defense manager, space transportation system contingency support at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. As commander, General Myers was responsible for defending America through space and intercontinental ballistic missile operations. Prior to assuming that position, he was Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, from July 1997 to July 1998. From July 1996 to July 1997 he served as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon; and from November 1993 to June 1996 General Myers was Commander of U.S. Forces Japan and 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base, Japan.



**Suggested Commissioner Questions
Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

Panel I

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
and
General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
May 16, 2005

PROCESS

1. As I understand it, the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, has played an important role in overseeing the BRAC process. Please outline for us the role of the IEC in BRAC and how often it has met within the past year.
 - a. To what extent did you or Secretary Wolfowitz participate in the meetings of the Infrastructure Executive Council as it deliberated over specific BRAC recommendations?
 - b. How often were you otherwise briefed on progress of the BRAC process within the past year?
 - c. To what extent did you and/or the members of the IEC take an action either adding or deleting specific bases as candidates for closure or realignment within the past 2-3 weeks? To the extent you did act in this regard, what was the basis for those individual actions? To what extent did you or the IEC change any candidate closure actions to a realignment action instead? If so, what was the basis for those decisions?

2. The November 2002 BRAC kick-off memo outlined several goals for BRAC 2005 including reducing infrastructure and achieving savings, maximizing jointness among the military services, and furthering transformation efforts.
 - a. Could you briefly describe how well you think the proposed recommendations achieve your goals, particularly in the areas of maximizing jointness and furthering transformation?
 - b. What were the various metrics that you established to help you determine the extent to which the goals would be achieved?

3. The Department is proposing what appears to be over 200 recommendations but, within that number, the number of proposed closures and realignments are much, much larger—over 800 recommended closures and realignments--a number that dwarfs all other BRAC rounds combined. The overwhelming majority of them are minor closures and realignments. But, if we exclude the reserve BRAC actions and other below threshold actions from the Department's list of BRAC closures, it seems that some of the services are limited players in this BRAC round in terms of active bases.
 - a. Are you satisfied with the Army's and Air Force's consideration of active component bases for this BRAC round? What percent of the active component excess capacity is being reduced?
 - b. To what extent do you think an additional BRAC round will be needed in the future? If so, when?
 - c. Given that significant savings are realized through complete closures; and given that there are many realignments but relatively few closures, the anticipated BRAC savings seem somewhat high. Would you care to comment?

4. To further jointness, we understand that you established 7 joint cross service groups to analyze common support functions across the department.
 - a. How successful do you think the groups were in developing recommendations, and the recommendations being accepted by the military services?
 - b. Could you highlight the most significant recommendations that were proposed by these groups and what impact they might have on transformation and jointness?
5. A number of your recommendations seem to suggest some degree of jointness is to be achieved through implementation of the recommendations. To what extent will those recommendations achieve meaningful breakthroughs toward joint operations or simply reflect collocation of activities with business as usual? How much progress are we really making in terms of jointness in your recommendations?
6. More so than in prior BRAC rounds, this year's round appears to shift various organizations and bodies of work from one base to another without closing many active component bases. How does emptying space on a base that remains open create savings in overall costs of maintaining those facilities, particularly when we know that when there is vacant space on base, someone will usually fill it?
7. Your recommendations include a reduction in the number of Air National Guard bases and aircraft and the realignment of others.
 - a. What are your plans for the Guard's current end-strength?
 - b. What analysis was done to examine the most efficient unit size in the active and reserve component?
 - c. Given the fact that Guard units are often less expensive to operate than active units partly because they often operate at civilian or state-owned facilities, will the consolidation of Guard units achieve enough savings to justify the personnel turmoil associated with consolidating units?

- d. To what extent do the proposed BRAC realignments and closures retain sufficient flexibility in reserve and guard facility capacity to meet unanticipated future needs?
 - e. What plans does the Department have for utilizing the personnel that are going to be without a mission as a result of these recommendations?
8. As you know, there has been some resistance to BRAC given today's security environment and at a time when the U.S military is involved in two major operations.
- a. How can we ensure that BRAC decisions in CONUS do not negatively affect ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
 - b. How will any potential risks be mitigated?
9. As we discussed at a previous hearing with a member of your staff (Principal Deputy of Defense for Policy, Ryan Henry), the ongoing QDR and BRAC are interrelated. We are concerned that there is a possibility that decisions made as a result of the ongoing QDR may contradict some of your BRAC recommendations to the Commission.
- a. Did you attempt to integrate QDR and BRAC analyses and decisions?
 - b. How can we ensure that decisions made in the ongoing QDR do not contradict?
 - c. Can you or your staff keep us routinely informed on QDR activities and whether any QDR recommendations may appear to contradict your BRAC recommendations?
10. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 23 Sep 04, Secretary Rumsfeld, you noted that "U.S. forces in the next century must be agile...[and] readily deployable...[and] must be able to project our power over long distances, in days or weeks, rather than months."

- a. Has DOD's BRAC submission accounted for results of the recent department-wide Mobility Capabilities Study? If so, how?
 - b. If not, how can we ensure that our decisions on base closure and realignment do not conflict with these studies findings?
11. Mr. Secretary, we cannot review and analyze your recommendations for base closures and realignments without the certified data on which they were based. We have yet to receive that data from you. Time is of the essence since we have so much to accomplish between now and September 8th when our report must be submitted to the President. When can we expect that data from you?
12. If all the BRAC 2005 recommendations are implemented, can you tell us what the overall capacity reduction is projected to be for the Department of Defense, in terms of actual operational forces reduced, military and civilian support personnel positions reduced, square miles of bases and training ranges reduced, storage space eliminated, etc?
13. Until shortly before the report was issued, we and the rest of the country understood that the BRAC would close 20-25% of the bases, yet only about one-third of the amount is reported to be the current figure. What changed?
14. After optimum base realignment scenarios were run and costs developed, were the Services allowed to adjust the final recommendations by removing, adding or realigning their base infrastructures? If so, what were those changes and what was the rationale for allowing them?
15. The initial DOD BRAC impact by state report shows fewer than 15,000 personnel, including 668 civilians, returning from Germany and Korea while we understand that the number returning to the US will be closed to 70,000. Where to you intend to base the other 55,000? When will we know this? How does this affect your recommendations and be projected savings of \$49Billion?

FORCE STRUCTURE

16. DOD recently provided Congress with an updated 20 year force structure plan to be used in developing BRAC recommendations.
- a. What key assumptions was the Air Force's force structure plan based on?
 - i. For example, what assumption does it make regarding replacement of existing aircraft—one for one replacement, or something smaller?
 - ii. What assumption does it make regarding the future of UAVs relative to other aircraft?
 - b. Does the force structure plan submitted in March 2005 reflect OSD's decision to reduce the number of F-22s that will be bought?
 - c. To what extent is the force structure likely to change as a result of the QDR and how much flexibility will the Air Force have to accommodate a different and potentially larger force structure under the proposed BRAC closing and realignment plan?

COST

17. Your report indicates that the level of projected annual recurring savings from this BRAC round is almost as much as the last four rounds combined. What are the major areas of savings?
- a. To what extent are those savings related to reductions in costs of facility maintenance and repair and recapitalization?
 - b. To what extent are those savings related to civilian personnel reductions?

- c. To what extent are those savings related to reductions in military personnel end-strength levels? To what extent will authorized military personnel end-strength levels be reduced? If not, why not?
18. With the cost of implementing BRAC, overseas rebasing, the global war on terrorism, and the cost of several big ticket acquisition items such as F22, JSF, and Army modularity competing for funding, how does the Department plan to pay for all of these investment needs?
19. Historically, one way of measuring the magnitude of savings expected from BRAC is the net present value of savings for a 20-year period. In that regard, the Department seems to be making two different 20-year savings projections from this BRAC round, one of which suggests the savings are about \$ 50 billion and another which suggests the figure would be \$64.2 billion if you include anticipated savings from overseas basing realignments around the world. Given what appear to be significant uncertainties regarding the level of costs and savings from yet to be finalized changes planned in overseas basing, isn't it a bit unrealistic to be trying to add \$14 billion more to your projected domestic BRAC savings.

RECOMMENDATION / FUNCTION SPECIFIC

20. So many of your recommendations pertain to reserve component activities, where the applicable personnel levels would seem to be below the personnel threshold levels (i.e. 300 authorized civilians) where closure action under the BRAC law would be required. In fact, the number of reserve actions proposed is so great one is almost inclined to call this the "2005 Reserve BRAC Round."
- a. Why are you proposing these reserve component actions under BRAC when BRAC is not needed to authorize them? If we were to look closely at each of these reserve actions, how many of them actually save money?
 - b. To what extent have you assessed the potential impact of these reserve component recommendations on recruiting and retention of reserve personnel?

21. Your Headquarters Cross-Service Group has proposed creation of a number of joint bases whereby a single military service is being given responsibility for installation management functions for two or more bases located in close proximity to each other. How do you envision this working and where do you see savings occurring?
 - a. Historically, the Air Force has been known for maintaining a higher standard of living, services, etc. on its bases than the other military services. That aside, will the joint service bases use the standards of the service that has the lead in managing the facilities of the other military services and will this result in the quality and standards being upgraded or possibly degraded for everyone? If so, what are the impacts on savings?
 - b. For those instances where installation management for an Air Force base will be the responsibility of the Army or Navy, how will the Air Force standard be upheld or will the level of services be equivalent to existing practices of the Army or Navy?

22. There are many BRAC recommendations that would relocate military activities out of leased space and onto military bases where new construction will be required. To some extent these relocations are being justified in terms of meeting new force protection requirements.
 - a. To what extent has this been coordinated with GSA in terms of impact on their costs and impact on their portfolio of facilities?
 - b. To what extent do your intelligence assessments indicate a greater threat to DOD tenants in leased space compared with other government civilian tenants given today's threat environment? Would GSA and the Department of Homeland Security agree with your assessment?
 - c. How realistic is it to expect that force protection requirements would be enacted at the affected sites in the absence of BRAC?

23. Your recommendations also include the closure of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. With Portsmouth being only 1 of 4 remaining major Navy shipyards that perform depot maintenance work—primarily on nuclear-powered submarines—can you assure us that the closure of this non-reconstitutable asset is in the best interest of DOD. We further understand that Portsmouth is considered by many to be one of the more efficient of the Navy shipyards.
 - a. In your analysis of realigning Portsmouth's projected workload to other shipyards, what is your assessment of the amount of overall surge capability you have in the short and long term if you close this facility?
 - b. What is your assessment of the impact of losing Portsmouth workers who are experienced in the highly technical field of maintaining nuclear-powered Navy vessels and how quickly do you think it would take to train personnel or acquire the needed capability at the other shipyards?
24. Your package of recommendations includes a realignment of Walter Reed Army Hospital. Yet, for all intents and purposes, it looks like a closure to us. Would you care to comment?
25. There are several BRAC recommendations that support Joint and Cross-Service objectives. Was consolidating the Service Senior War Colleges into a Joint Center of Excellence for War Colleges considered?

ENVIRONMENTAL

26. In authorizing the 2005 BRAC round, Congress required the department to consider the impact of environmental restoration costs in its BRAC decision making process. Could you please explain how these costs were considered in the decision making process, particularly in assessing costs and savings, and whether those costs affected any BRAC decisions?

ECONOMIC

27. To what extent were considerations of economic impact, or regional impact in general, factors in final decisions of which bases would be recommended for closure or realignment?




MICHAEL W. WYNNE

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics



Michael W. Wynne is the Under Secretary Of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. He was named to this position May 23, 2003.

In this role, Mr. Wynne is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to the DoD Acquisition System, research and development, advanced technology, developmental test and evaluation, production, logistics, installation management, military construction, procurement, environmental security, and nuclear, chemical, and biological matters.



Mr. Wynne came to the Department of Defense as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L. He continues to hold this position to which the Senate confirmed him on July 12, 2001, along with his Under Secretary duties.

Before joining the Bush Administration, Mr. Wynne was involved in venture capital. He nurtured small technology companies through their startup phase as a member of the NextGenFund Executive Committee, and served in executive positions of two of those companies.

In 1999, Mr. Wynne retired as Senior Vice President from General Dynamics (GD), where his role was in International Development and Strategy. He spent 23 years with General Dynamics in various senior positions with the Aircraft (F-16's), Main Battle Tanks (M1A2), and Space Launch Vehicles (Atlas and Centaur) Divisions.

In between his assignments at GD, Mr. Wynne spent three years with Lockheed Martin (LMT), selling the Space Systems division to then-Martin Marietta. He successfully integrated the division into the Astronautics Company and became the General Manager of the Space Launch Systems segment, combining the Titan with the Atlas Launch vehicles.

Prior to joining industry, Mr. Wynne served in the Air Force for seven years, ending as a Captain and Assistant Professor of Astronautics at the US Air Force Academy, where he taught Control Theory and Fire Control Techniques. Mr. Wynne graduated from the United States Military Academy, holds a Masters in Electrical Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a Masters in Business from the University of Colorado. He has attended short courses at Northwestern University (Business) and Harvard Business School (PMD-42). He is a Fellow in the National Contracts Management Association, and has been a Past President of the Association of the United States Army, Detroit Chapter and the Michigan Chapter of the American Defense Preparedness Association. He has published numerous professional journal articles relating to engineering, cost estimating and contracting.



PHILIP W. GRONE
Deputy Under Secretary for
Installations and Environment



Mr. Philip W. Grone was appointed as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations & Environment on November 1, 2004, after having served as that post's principal assistant deputy since September 2001. Mr. Grone has management and oversight responsibilities for military installations worldwide, which have a land area covering over 46,000-square miles and containing 587,000 buildings and structures valued at more than \$640 billion. His responsibilities include the development of installation capabilities, programs, and budgets; base realignment and closure; privatization of military housing and utilities system; competitive sourcing; and integrating installations and environment needs into the weapons acquisition process. Additionally, he has responsibility for environmental management, safety and occupational health; environmental restoration at active and closing bases; conservation of natural and cultural resources; pollution prevention; environmental research and technology; fire protection; and explosives safety. Mr. Grone also serves as the Department's designated Senior Real Property Officer as well as the DOD representative to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.



Mr. Grone came to the Pentagon in 2001 with more than 16 years of Capitol Hill experience. He served as the Deputy Staff Director and the Assistant Deputy Staff Director for the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) from 2000-2001, where he managed all committee hearing, mark-up, floor, and conference activities, including the production of the annual defense authorization bill.

From 1995-2001, Mr. Grone served as Staff Director of the HASC Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities. In that position, he led the staff development of the annual military construction authorization bill. The legislative accomplishments of that subcommittee during his tenure included the Military Housing Privatization Initiative, the privatization of defense utility infrastructure, reform of the Sikes Act (concerning natural resource management on military installations), and various withdrawals of the public lands for military training and readiness.

Mr. Grone also served as the Subcommittee Professional Staff Member for the HASC Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations; Professional Staff Member for the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress; and Legislative Assistant to U.S. Representative Willis D. Gradison, Jr. of Ohio.

Mr. Grone graduated from Northern Kentucky University, *summa cum laude*, with a B.A. and earned his master's degree from the University of Virginia.



**Suggested Commissioner Questions
Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

Panel II

The Honorable Philip W. Grone, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment
and

The Honorable Michael W. Wynne, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

May 16, 2005

PROCESS

1. The legislation authorizing the 2005 BRAC round required the department to consider homeland defense and surge requirements as part of the BRAC decision making process. Could you highlight how these issues were considered in the department's deliberations?

2. The Army is bringing home various units from overseas and will be stationing them on some bases that historically have had limitations on the level of maneuver training that could be conducted at home station or otherwise suffer from the effects of encroachment. The Army is also creating new Units of Actions at several of its bases which may have some space limitations for training—bases such as Forts Benning, Carson, and Riley. To what extent do you envision the Army needing to buy up land around these bases in the coming years to expand the available training space? If so, shouldn't those costs be included in the costs of the BRAC actions?
 - a. Are you concerned that retention levels will suffer at these major receiving installations if adequate infrastructure is not immediately available?

3. The Army, alone among the services, seems to be implementing results of the integrated global basing review in its domestic BRAC process.
 - a. When will the other services be implementing changes as a result of the global basing review or are those changes no longer planned?
 - b. Do you have an overall schedule of the movement of troops and units from overseas back to the states for each of the affected military services?
4. Base closure criterion #3 addresses the need to consider surge.
 - a. How did this requirement effect your determination for selecting bases for closure and or realignment?
 - b. What metrics were used to measure installation surge capabilities?
 - c. Are there particular areas where potential surge capacity is needed most?
5. How was this complex process coordinated? In the materials we have been provided to date, we have seen some apparent disconnects. For example, the recommended closure of NAS Atlanta indicates how many personnel losses were projected, but not specifically where those realigned personnel actually (by number) went. How do you recommend that the Commission reconcile the conflicting data to get a more accurate picture of the complex, multi-service realignments that have been recommended?
6. If all of your BRAC recommendations were approved, would there still be excess infrastructure within DOD? Infrastructure capacity is sometimes “in the eyes of the beholder.” Are you confident with the post BRAC capacity projections?
7. Were there some closing and realignment recommendations made independently of the Services? If so, what was the rationale for allowing

such decisions?

8. How will these BRAC recommendations posture the Services to better respond to future surge requirements? To what extent did surge requirements factor into the overall set of recommendations?
9. We understand that three principal analytical tools were used during the 2005 BRAC process, an Optimization Methodology, an Installation Visualization Tool, and the updated COBRA. How were these analytical tools used in identifying and prioritizing the merger of military operations and functions (service jointness), and in applying the military criteria for selecting bases for closure or realignment. Will those tools and corresponding backup analysis be made available to the Commission?
10. If, after this BRAC round, significant excess infrastructure is found to still exist, do you anticipate the need for another round after the next QDR is completed. Do you have a timeframe for when the next BRAC process should be implemented?

FORCE STRUCTURE

11. What were the security factors considered when geographically consolidating military installations? Are you concerned about centralizing too many assets in one location? For example, Defense Finance and Accounting Service will now be operating from three locations. Is there a risk in such an organizational configuration?

COST

12. Clearly the maximum savings in the BRAC process is achieved through complete closures and manpower reductions. Since there are relatively few complete closures and a significant number of realignments, does the report overstate savings in that personnel end strength is not being reduced significantly?
13. A number of the bases that will be beneficiaries of new missions appear to be poised for a significant influx of new personnel—posts like Forts Benning, Bliss, Carson, and Riley. To what extent do your BRAC costs and savings analyses take into consideration DOD or other federal funding to assist those communities with infrastructure improvements that may be needed such as for schools, roads, and other services?
14. As you know, we must consider costs across the entire federal government, not just DOD, in the BRAC process? How would you characterize the interagency coordination and consideration in the BRAC process?

15. To what extent has the Department fully calculated the costs of implementing its overseas rebasing initiative, including need for new facilities overseas, new training range requirements, as well as mobility and prepositioning requirements?
- a. To what extent will there be any overall net savings from the overseas rebasing initiative considering the upfront costs of implementing that effort as well as changes in future operating costs that will be associated with that effort?
 - b. When you look at the upfront costs of implementing this domestic BRAC round, the costs of implementing the overseas rebasing initiative, and other large infrastructure costs associated with the Army's modularity program, can you give us a ballpark estimate of what that translates to in terms of Military Construction funding requirements over the next 6 years?
 - i. How does that MILCON funding requirement compare with the department's MILCON funding requests each of the previous 6 years?
 - ii. What impact will these new MILCON requirements have on the Department's ability to fund other MILCON needs at bases not subject to a BRAC action?
16. Many of the smaller recommendations deal with the replacement of a Reserve Center by a new building. For example, Reserve Center Transformation in Arkansas includes building a new facility in the same city (Arkadelphia) where an Army Reserve Center is closed. (In some cases, it was observed that the National Guard might also use the new facility). Does the estimated cost of the new buildings include the space for the National Guard? Will the cost of such buildings be partially borne by the state in question? With which states, if any, have discussions been held relating to collocating the Guard with the Reserves and/or a sharing of appropriate costs and what were the results of those discussions if any?

17. When discussion of a potential joint facility took place, who made the final decision? How were funding responsibilities established?
18. What assumptions were made regarding the need and cost for community infrastructure support such as access roads, additional parking garages, additional public schools, etc.? Please describe the assumptions relating to the impact on the local community around a closing base considering costs of unemployment insurance, reduced value of real estate, reduced property tax collection, etc.
19. During prior rounds of BRAC, nearly \$1.9 billion was spent for economic planning, redevelopment assistance and for coordinated grant assistance. What lessons should the Commission be aware of in terms of indicators for the likely need for large amounts of such spending as a result of 2005 actions which perhaps could cause us to reevaluate a proposed action? For example, did past actions at places such as K I Sawyer Air Force Base in Michigan result in disproportionately large economic planning, redevelopment assistance, and coordinated grant assistance funding? Just as K I Sawyer was the largest employer in Michigan's Northern Peninsula, NAS Brunswick is one of the largest employers in Maine. Should we be factoring in those costs, as well as the impact on unemployment levels, as we evaluate places such as NAS Brunswick and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard?

RECOMMENDATION / FUNCTION SPECIFIC

20. The Department is in the midst of trying to establish a new National Security Personnel System (NSPS) based on recent legislation authorizing DOD to establish a more flexible civilian personnel management system. As I understand it, once the design is finalized, it will likely include changes in the way civilian jobs are graded and classified (a shift to Pay Bands), in the way the employee and manager performance objectives are set, managed and rewarded (Pay for Performance), in the way the Department works with its unions (Labor Relations), in the way the Department hires, promotes and adjusts its workforce size (Staffing Flexibilities) and in the way the Department addresses personnel issues, discipline and appeals.
- a. How would implementation of the Department's BRAC recommendations affect timing and implementation of NSPS?
 - b. How would NSPS impact rights of employees affected by BRAC?
21. Please discuss the concept of core workload as it pertains to capabilities and work that must be kept organically within the defense depot system to meet wartime requirements and how it was addressed in BRAC decision making?
22. As you know, the law requires that no more than 50 percent of the department's depot maintenance workload can be contracted out in order to retain a viable organic base to perform this work. What assurances can you provide us that implementation of your recommendations will not violate the "50/50" provision?
23. Our initial review of recommendations from the Joint Cross Service groups, indicates that one from the Industrial group that creates fleet readiness centers within the Navy and another from the Supply and Storage to consolidate some service Inventory Control Point (ICP) functions under the Defense Logistics Agency generate substantial savings, yet it does not seem that savings are related to the closure of facilities. Could you please elaborate on the basis for the savings from these two recommendations and how one would validate them?

24. Your recommendations include the closure of a major Army maintenance depot, the Red River Army Depot in Texas. Yet, it would appear there is a growing backlog of equipment needing repair due to the wear and tear of damage being inflicted on military equipment in Afghanistan and Iraq. How does that square with the recommendation to close a major depot facility like Red River?

- a. We understand that the main justification for closing Red River is that other depots can absorb the work—but only if available capacity is measured at one and one half shifts as opposed to the current DOD approach of measuring capacity at one shift. Please explain the rationale for this change and how you plan to implement it.
- b. Your recommendation to close the Army's Red River depot and move the work to remaining Army depots seems to carry with it the assumption that such consolidation will reap gains and efficiencies and reduced overhead. Yet, the recommendations leave open two Marine Corps depots that also work on ground combat vehicles. Is this a missed opportunity for the Marine Corps to consolidate work at one depot or even to improve jointness with the Army?

25. Concerning the Walter Reed Army Hospital, what makes this realignment different from a closure?
- a. Given the prominent role that Walter Reed is now playing in caring for troops critically wounded in action, how can you justify to the American people action to close this hospital?
 - b. Much publicity has been given this past year to private fund raising for the Fisher House program which provides homes away from home for families of injured service members at hospitals such as Walter Reed. If Walter Reed closes, what happens to those Fisher House residences on or near Walter Reed? Will DOD pay to provide replacement homes at other hospitals that absorb the Walter Reed caseload? Are those costs factored into your BRAC costs and savings analyses?
 - c. Has the Department completed an assessment of medical needs related to future warfighting requirements based on lessons learned from recent conflicts, or to support homeland defense? If not, how can it justify proposing closure of medical facilities at this time?
26. Please comment on the military value of installations like Fort McNair and Fort Meyer. Did you give consideration to closing such facilities and realigning their functions in places such as Fort Belvoir, Fort Meade, or Fort Leavenworth?

ENVIRONMENTAL

27. In authorizing the 2005 BRAC round, Congress required the department to consider the impact of environmental restoration costs in its BRAC decision making process. Could you please explain how these costs were considered in the decision making process, particularly in assessing costs and savings, and whether those costs affected any BRAC decisions?

ECONOMIC

28. To what extent were considerations of economic impact, or regional impact in general, factors in final decisions of which bases would be recommended for closure or realignment?



BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION

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Statement of Chairman Anthony J. Principi
2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Hearing of the Commission
May 18th, 2005
1:30 PM
106 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington D.C.

Good Afternoon,

I'm Anthony J. Principi, Chairman of the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission, or BRAC. I'm pleased to welcome several individuals who are representing the Joint Cross-Service Groups whose recommendations make up an extremely important part of the total Defense Department base closure and realignment package.

Our witnesses are: the Honorable Michael W. Wynne, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, who will be addressing Joint Industrial functions; Vice Admiral Keith W. Lippert, Director of the Defense Logistics Agency, who will discuss Joint Supply and Storage issues; the Honorable Charles S. Abell, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness, who will present testimony about Joint Education and Training missions; and finally, Ms. Carol A. Haave, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Counterintelligence and Security, who will cover the Joint Intelligence elements in the DoD BRAC report.

Today's hearing will help shed more light on the Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations for restructuring our nation's defense installations, and how this process was harnessed to advance long-term transformation goals. Clearly, the work of the Joint Cross Service Groups was much different – and much more extensive – than any prior round of BRAC analysis conducted by the Department of Defense.

I am aware that the Joint Cross-Service Groups have exerted an enormous amount of time, energy, and brainpower into the final product that is the subject of our hearing. It is only logical and proper that our witnesses be afforded this opportunity to explain to the American public, and to our independent Commission, what they've proposed to do to the various types of infrastructure that supports Joint military operations.

I now request our witnesses to stand for the administration of the oath required by the Base Closure and Realignment statute. The oath will be administered by Mr. Dan Cowhig.

Mr. Cowhig. [witnesses to swear required oath]



BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

**Presentation of Recommendations
and Methodology
DOD's Joint Cross-Service Groups
OPEN SESSION**

Wednesday, May 18, 2004
1:30 p.m.
106 Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

The Honorable Michael W. Wynne
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics

Vice Admiral Keith W. Lippert
Director, Defense Logistics Agency

The Honorable Charles S. Abell
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel & Readiness

Ms. A. Haave
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
Counterintelligence and Security

SWEARING IN OATH

Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give, and any other evidence that you may provide, are accurate and complete to the best of your knowledge and belief, so help you God?



MICHAEL W. WYNNE

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics



Michael W. Wynne is the Under Secretary Of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. He was named to this position May 23, 2003.

In this role, Mr. Wynne is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to the DoD Acquisition System, research and development, advanced technology, developmental test and evaluation, production, logistics, installation management, military construction, procurement, environmental security, and nuclear, chemical, and biological matters.

Mr. Wynne came to the Department of Defense as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L. He continues to hold this position to which the Senate confirmed him on July 12, 2001, along with his Under Secretary duties.



Before joining the Bush Administration, Mr. Wynne was involved in venture capital. He nurtured small technology companies through their startup phase as a member of the NextGenFund Executive Committee, and served in executive positions of two of those companies.

In 1999, Mr. Wynne retired as Senior Vice President from General Dynamics (GD), where his role was in International Development and Strategy. He spent 23 years with General Dynamics in various senior positions with the Aircraft (F-16's), Main Battle Tanks (M1A2), and Space Launch Vehicles (Atlas and Centaur) Divisions.

In between his assignments at GD, Mr. Wynne spent three years with Lockheed Martin (LMT), selling the Space Systems division to then-Martin Marietta. He successfully integrated the division into the Astronautics Company and became the General Manager of the Space Launch Systems segment, combining the Titan with the Atlas Launch vehicles.

Prior to joining industry, Mr. Wynne served in the Air Force for seven years, ending as a Captain and Assistant Professor of Astronautics at the US Air Force Academy, where he taught Control Theory and Fire Control Techniques. Mr. Wynne graduated from the United States Military Academy, holds a Masters in Electrical Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a Masters in Business from the University of Colorado. He has attended short courses at Northwestern University (Business) and Harvard Business School (PMD-42). He is a Fellow in the National Contracts Management Association, and has been a Past President of the Association of the United States Army, Detroit Chapter and the Michigan Chapter of the American Defense Preparedness Association. He has published numerous professional journal articles relating to engineering, cost estimating and contracting.

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KEITH W. LIPPERT

Director, Defense Logistics Agency



The Defense Logistics Agency, headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Va., is responsible for providing the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and other federal agencies with a variety of logistics, acquisition and technical services in peace and war. These services include logistics information, materiel management, procurement, warehousing and distribution of spare parts, food, clothing, medical supplies and fuel, reutilization of surplus military materiel and document automation and production. This worldwide mission is performed by approximately 23,300 civilian and military personnel.

Prior to coming to DLA, Vice Admiral Lippert was the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command and 41st Chief of Supply Corps since August 1999. From 1997 to 1999, he served as Vice Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command.



Vice Admiral Lippert is a native of Chicago, Ill., and graduated from Scotch Plains-Fanwood High School in Fanwood, N.J. in 1965. He earned his commission through the regular Navy ROTC Program, graduating from Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Mathematics in 1968. Additionally, he holds Master's Degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School in Management and in Operations Research (with distinction). In 1994, he attended the Senior Executive Program in National and International Security at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Vice Admiral Lippert's sea duty tours include Supply Officer, USS Queenfish (SSN 651), Assistant Supply Officer, USS Simon Lake (AS 33), and Supply Officer, USS Canopus (AS 34). Shore duty tours include assignments as Assistant Comptroller, Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Operations Research Officer at the Navy Ships Parts Control Center, Mechanicsburg, Pa.; Inventory Analysis Staff, Naval Supply Systems Command, Washington, D.C.; Executive Officer, Naval Supply Center, Jacksonville, Florida.; and Director, Spares Programs and Policy Branch in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics.

In 1990 he rejoined the Naval Supply Systems Command as the Deputy Commander for Financial Management/Comptroller, with budget responsibility for a worldwide, multibillion-dollar supply system. While serving as Comptroller he was also responsible for Navy's successful Inventory Reduction Program.

From July 1993 to July 1995, Vice Admiral Lippert served as the Commander, Defense General Supply Center, Richmond, Va. In August 1995, he became the first Commander, Naval Inventory Control Point, with offices in Philadelphia, Pa., and Mechanicsburg, Pa.

His personal awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, three Legion of Merits, four Meritorious Service Medals, two Navy Commendation Medals, Navy Achievement Medal, and Submarine Supply Dolphins. He is the recipient of the Society of Logistics Engineers 1992 International Award for outstanding performance in financial management/inventory control.



CHARLES S. ABELL

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness



Charles S. Abell was appointed by the President as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on November 15, 2002. A Presidential appointee confirmed by the Senate, he is the primary Assistant of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness providing staff advice to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of the Defense for total force management as it relates to manpower; force structure; program integration; readiness; reserve component affairs; health affairs; training; and personnel requirements and management, including equal opportunity, morale, welfare, recreation, and quality of life matters.



Prior to his appointment as the Principal Deputy, Mr. Abell served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy beginning on May 8, 2001. In this capacity he was responsible for policies, plans and programs for military and civilian personnel management, including recruitment, education, career development, equal opportunity, compensation, recognition, quality of life and separation of all Department of Defense personnel.

Before joining the Department of Defense, Mr. Abell served as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Mr. Abell joined the Armed Services Committee staff in 1993, after a 26-year career in the Army. He was the lead staffer for the Subcommittee on Personnel, responsible for issues concerning military readiness and quality of life. His responsibilities also encompassed manpower; pay and compensation; and personnel management issues affecting active duty, reserve and civilian personnel; and organization and functions within the Department of Defense.

In recent years, Mr. Abell has had the primary Committee responsibility for a broad array of important initiatives aimed at restoring cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) equity for military retirees and survivors; improving the military health care program; upgrading Survivor Benefit Plan coverage; and enhancing pay, allowances and retirement programs for active duty and reserve members and TRICARE for Life, guaranteeing all retirees coverage within TRICARE and the military health care system. He also worked on codification of the homosexual conduct policy and legislation concerning the assignment of women within the Department of Defense.

Mr. Abell entered active duty service as an enlisted soldier and concluded his Army career by retiring as a Lieutenant Colonel. He served two tours in Vietnam in various positions; Infantry Platoon Leader, Company Commander and Cobra Attack helicopter pilot. His career progressed through increasingly responsible positions at every level of Army operations. His decorations include the Legion of Merit, (2) Bronze Stars (Valor), Purple Heart, the Meritorious Service Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters), 14 Air Medals (two for Valor), the Army Commendation Medal (for Valor), and the Combat Infantryman's Badge.

Mr. Abell holds a Master of Science from Columbus University in Human Resource Management and a Bachelor of Science in Political Science from the University of Tampa.

**Written Statement
of the Chairperson,
Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group
Before the
BRAC 2005 Commission**

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and distinguished committee members. I am Carol Haave, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Counterintelligence and Security). I am honored to appear before you today in my role as the Chairperson of the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) that was chartered as part of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics).

Organization and Charter

The Intelligence JCSG was one of the seven functional groups established by the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) as part of the BRAC 2005 process. The Intelligence JCSG was responsible for a comprehensive review of the intelligence function, less those intelligence activities that were evaluated by the Military Departments and other JCSGs. The Intelligence JCSG was comprised of senior members from the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, each Military Department, the Joint Staff, J2, and included representation from the Director, Central Intelligence Community Management Staff. The Counterintelligence Field Activity and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence elements were represented by me in my role as the Chair of the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group.

Analytical Process

This was the first time that the Department of Defense intelligence function was reviewed within a BRAC JCSG process. As a result, we had to develop a methodology for analysis. The Intelligence JCSG only had one function – intelligence. Within this function, there were four Analytical Frameworks utilized

by the Intelligence JCSG to provide the construct for evaluating the intelligence function:

- Locate and upgrade facilities on protected installations as appropriate;
- Reduce vulnerable commercial leased space;
- Realign selected intelligence functions/activities and establish facilities to support Continuity of Operations and Mission Assurance requirements;
- Provide infrastructure to facilitate robust information flow between analysts, collectors and operators at all echelons and achieve mission synergy.

Capacity Analysis

In developing our analytical process, the Intelligence JCSG established procedures to facilitate its review of the intelligence function. The Group identified 267 buildings/facilities performing the intelligence function and developed attributes, metrics and questions for analysis. Data calls were issued to the defense intelligence agencies and military departments to gather certified data on intelligence buildings/facilities. The Intelligence JCSG capacity analysis identified a shortage of 277,315 square feet as of 30 September 2003.

Military Value Analysis

The Intelligence JCSG approach to military value led to the development of a scoring plan for the intelligence function consistent with the final BRAC 2005 Military Value Selection Criteria (1 - 4). Military value scores were computed for each of the 267 buildings/facilities as of 30 September 2003. The Group then identified strategy-based, data supported, realignment or closure scenarios consistent with the Analytical Frameworks and with the 20-year Force Structure

Plan. Once scenarios were registered, the remaining BRAC selection criteria (5 – 8) were assessed using Department of Defense standard procedures and models.

Scenario Development

The Intelligence JCSG developed a total of eighteen scenario proposals. From these initial proposals, thirteen scenarios were selected for further evaluation. After considerable analysis and deliberation, the number of scenarios was further reduced, and six fully-developed candidate recommendations were subsequently presented to the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG). Three Intelligence JCSG candidate recommendations were cleared by the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) and approved by the Secretary of Defense. During the integration process, one of these recommendations was incorporated into a recommendation authored by the Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG. Our recommendations are summarized as follows:

Defense Intelligence Agency

(A classified version of this recommendation identifies specific functions to be moved.)

Recommendation

Realign Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling Air Force Base, DC, by relocating select Defense Intelligence Agency intelligence analysis functions to a new facility at Rivanna Station, VA. Realign Crystal Park 5, a leased facility in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Defense Intelligence Agency analysis function to the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling Air Force Base, DC.

Justification

This recommendation is a realignment of select personnel, equipment and intelligence analysis functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency. It co-locates

select intelligence analysis functions and personnel with the National Ground Intelligence Center into a new facility at Rivanna Station. This recommendation improves information flow/mission synergy; addresses capacity shortage at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center; meets the spirit of the Secretary of Defense's guidelines for relocation outside the National Capital Region, and improves Continuity of Operations (COOP)/Mission Assurance by locating functions on a secure Department of Defense-owned location. The realignment of personnel from Crystal Park 5 to the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling Air Force Base, DC, reduces vulnerable leased space while addressing Antiterrorism/Force Protection deficiencies by locating functions onto a secure Department of Defense-owned location. This recommendation accommodates current and surge requirements and is consistent with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 20-year Force Structure Plan.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Activities

Recommendation

Close National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Dalecarlia and Sumner sites, Bethesda, MD; Reston 1, 2 and 3, leased installations in Reston, VA; Newington buildings 8510, 8520, and 8530, Newington, VA; and Building 213 a leased installation at the South East Federal Center, Washington, DC. Relocate all functions to a new facility at Fort Belvoir, VA. Realign the National Reconnaissance Office facility, Westfields, VA, by relocating all NGA functions to a new facility at the Fort Belvoir, VA. Consolidate all NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence College functions on Fort Belvoir into the new facility at Fort Belvoir, VA.


Justification

This recommendation is a strategic consolidation of the personnel, equipment and functions of NGA's 22 legacy organizations into a new geospatial intelligence consolidated campus. It consolidates multiple NGA National Capital Region-based intelligence community activities now occupying small, government facilities and privately-owned leased space, to a secure Department of Defense-owned location, reducing excess capacity and increasing overall military value. It optimizes mission efficiencies, improves readiness, and enhances mission partner coordination, while addressing Antiterrorism/Force Protection deficiencies. This recommendation accommodates current and surge requirements and is consistent with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 20-year Force Structure Plan.

Conclusion

The Department of Defense Inspector General has reviewed our processes and data integrity. Their draft report indicates that they are satisfied that we established and have maintained sufficient controls to ensure compliance with the BRAC statutes. We expect their final report to show a similar level of satisfaction with our deliberative process.

Mr. Chairman, I hope this brief overview provides you and your fellow Commissioners an overview of the Intelligence JCSG over the past two years. I am hopeful that you will find our recommendations sound and concur with them as presented. The Intelligence JCSG stands ready to assist you, the other Commissioners and your staff as you review these recommendations. Thank you for allowing me this opportunity and I would be happy to answer any questions that you or the distinguished Commission members may have at this time.



**Suggested Commissioner Questions
Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

Hearing on Joint Cross-Service Recommendations and Methodology

Witnesses:

Industrial: The Honorable Michael W. Wynne,
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics;
Supply & Services: Vice Admiral Keith W. Lippert,
Director, Defense Logistics Agency;
Education and Training: The Honorable Charles S. Abell,
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness;
Intelligence: Ms. Carol A. Haave,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Counterintelligence and Security

May 18, 2005

Industrial

1. The 2005 BRAC recommendations do not appear to address Cross-Service Aviation Depot Maintenance.
 - a. Did you consider excess capacity at the Air Force and Navy Aviation Depots in your deliberations?
 - b. Did you consider establishing any Joint Centers of Excellence in Aviation Depots or movement in the direction of a Joint use Aviation Depot?
2. How was the 50 percent rule for contracting out depot maintenance work taken into account in the depot recommendations? Is this law/policy still viable or does it need to be modified due to increased workloads and contractor support?
3. How were surge requirements considered in decisions to realign depots? Are you concerned about capacity vs. requirements in the new aligned structure?

4. How will jointness be supported in the depot maintenance arena by implementing these recommendations? Please provide specific examples of your future vision in this area. Are you satisfied that out year capacity in depot maintenance will be adequate to support normal and surge operations?
5. Please explain the rationale, cost categories, and methodology for computing savings utilized to measure the reported cost savings in creating the Navy fleet readiness centers.
6. Industrial/maintenance support is increasingly being required in the battlefield. What flexibility have you incorporated in your evaluations to support fighting requirements?

Supply and Storage

7. In any complex organization, efficiencies in one part may reduce overall mission effectiveness. We recognize that DoD strives to reconcile efficiency in its support functions with battlefield effectiveness.
 - a. What feedback did you get from operational commanders of cases where what made sense in CONUS was not optimal in the battle area?
 - b. How was that information incorporated into the department's closure and realignment decisions?
 - c. How is this feedback reflected in your recommendations?

8. In 1990, the GAO identified DoD's inventory management as a high-risk area. Over a decade later, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the supply system encountered problems, such as backlogs at distribution points, a billion-dollar plus discrepancy in material shipped to - and received by - Army units, and millions of dollars in penalties to lease or replace storage containers.

Recent analyses, such as one by Business Executives for National Security in 2002, disclosed the Defense Department trails the private sector by 10 years – or more – in its supply chain practices.

Currently, the GAO, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of Defense are developing an action plan to improve DoD's supply chain management.

In your recommended closures and realignments, how have you reconciled DoD's need to both urgently modernize its supply chain system and support ongoing wartime operations with your mandate to rationalize infrastructure with defense strategy?

9. What supply and storage facilities were removed by the Secretary of Defense from your recommendations? Were any of the removed facilities in your opinion important to the support of units deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan? If so, please elaborate.
10. Your recommendations focus on CONUS-based management of commodity items, such as tires and lubricants, selected Depot Level Repairables, and the reconfiguration of selected supply storage and distribution facilities. Your submission indicates your closure and realignment recommendations will provide improved support when troops are deploying and operating in theatre. Keeping in mind that an improved CONUS metric may not always translate into logistics effectiveness at the operational and tactical level, what specific quantitative improvements in supply performance to deployed forces do you project from your recommended closures and realignments?

11. What challenges has the department identified that will be encountered while implementing the recommended BRAC actions which can be attributed to the fact that the budgeting process is service oriented and controlled. Do we have the requisite financial strategies and requirements identified to ensure successful implementation, and if so, what are they?
12. The Logistical support of many of our systems is increasingly becoming an important issue as we continue to use our platform and system assets in a long term sustained conflict. Some of the Services have now started to include Performance Based Logistics as part of their acquisition strategy. How did the Department assess these shifting trends and requirements during its assessments, and have we ensured that base?

Education and Training

13. In March the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released the revised Force Structure Plan to be used in finalizing 2005 base realignment and closure decisions. The plan emphasizes transformation to a capabilities-based approach for meeting our defense needs.
 - a. Have DoD's proposed closure/realignment recommendations identified the training changes needed for this transformation as well?
 - b. Which specific 2005 closure/realignment recommendations are designed to improve training between the services to enhance our joint capability to counter the current and future range of threat challenges?

14. The revised Force Structure Plan emphasizes the need to maintain our capability to address traditional threat challenges and identifies the need to also define our military capabilities to flexibly counter less traditional threat challenges posed by our war on terrorism.

How are your 2005 closure/realignment recommendations going to improve training so that traditional and new capabilities can be developed and maintained?

15. It has been commonly reported that about 70,000 troops are coming home. The return to the U.S. of forces that have been stationed overseas for years is going to create a significant increase in training requirements at many bases. Staffing and space for maneuver room, ranges, schools, and training in new strategies to deal with the ever changing threat environment represent examples of training needs. To what extent, and how, were these increased training requirements considered in developing the 2005 closure/realignment recommendations?
16. Given the increased mobilization of the Guard and Reserves and the training integration challenges experienced, what efforts have been made to co-locate more Guard and Reserves with their active counterparts especially for training purposes?
17. DoD has made strides in consolidation of duplicative functions. What are the main challenges remaining to accomplish joint training and mission effectiveness? Have they been prioritized?
18. The Department has stated that in its evaluation of education and training, one of its objectives was to "enhance jointness while preserving Service unique training and culture." Since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986, this has been a stated objective but results have been difficult to identify. What measures will DoD use to ensure that the objectives are met?

Intelligence

19. Is there an overlap of intelligence functions within the different services and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)? If so, has DoD considered how this overlap could be reduced?

20. How does moving the intelligence analysis functions & personnel with the National Ground Intelligence Center to a new facility in Rivanna Station, VA enhance the need for collaborative intelligence within U.S. and international agencies?

What thought has been given to additional co-location of intelligence functions to improve coordination and improve efficiencies?

21. During a recent study, one of the Combatant Commander's priorities was to have intelligence more integrated in training and mission/operational readiness. What changes in your BRAC recommendations are in support of this priority?



BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

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Statement of Anthony J. Principi
Chairman, 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Hearing of the Commission
May 17th, 2005, 9:30 AM
G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington D.C.

Good Morning,

I'm Anthony J. Principi, Chairman of the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission, or BRAC. I'm pleased to welcome Michael L. Dominguez, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, and General John P. Jumper, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. They are joined by Gerald F. "Fred" Pease Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Basing and Infrastructure Analysis, and Maj. Gen. Gary W. Heckman, who is the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs. These two individuals are not delivering formal remarks, but are prepared to comment on the methodology employed by the Air Force.

The Congress entrusts our Armed Forces with vast, but not unlimited, resources. Every dollar consumed in redundant, unnecessary, obsolete, inappropriately designed or located infrastructure is a dollar not available to provide the training or research that could ensure continued dominance of the sea, air and land -- the battle space -- in which our service members fight.

Today's hearing will help shed more light on the Air Force recommendations for restructuring our nation's defense installations, and harnessing this process to advance long-term transformation goals.

In support of that objective, we will hear testimony today from several key Air Force infrastructure decision-makers and analysts. I know that the Air Force has poured an enormous amount of time, energy, and brainpower into the final product that is the subject of our hearing. It is only logical and proper that our witnesses be afforded this opportunity to explain to the American public, and to our independent Commission, what they've proposed to do to the active duty and Reserve Component Air Force infrastructure that supports Joint military operations.

As I have previously stated publicly, this Commission takes its responsibility very seriously to provide an objective and independent analysis of these recommendations. We will carefully study each Air Force and Department of Defense recommendation in a transparent manner, steadily seeking input from affected communities, to make sure they fully meet the Congressionally mandated selection criteria. Those recommendations that substantially deviate from the criteria we will either modify or reject as the facts and circumstances warrant.

I now request our witnesses to stand for the administration of the oath required by the Base Closure and Realignment statute. The oath will be administered by Mr. Dan Cowhig.

Mr. Cowhig. [witnesses swear required oath]



BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Presentation of Recommendations
and Methodology-Air Force
OPEN SESSION

Tuesday, May 17, 2005
9:30 a.m.
G-50 Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

Panel I

The Honorable Michael L. Dominguez
Acting Secretary of the Air Force

General John P. Jumper, USAF
Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Mr. Gerald F. Pease, Jr.
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Basing and Infrastructure Analysis

Major General Gary W. Heckman
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for plans and Programs

SWEARING IN OATH

Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give, and any other evidence that you may provide, are accurate and complete to the best of your knowledge and belief, so help you God?



MICHAEL L. DOMINGUEZ
Acting Secretary of the Air Force



Michael L. Dominguez is the acting Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C. In this role, he is responsible for the affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including the organizing, training, equipping and providing for the welfare of its more than 360,000 men and women on active duty, 180,000 members of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, 160,000 civilians, and their families. Mr. Dominguez also serves as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Washington, D.C. A political appointee confirmed by the Senate, Mr. Dominguez heads a four-division department that deals at the policy level with Air Force manpower and Reserve affairs issues. His areas of responsibility include force management and personnel, equal opportunity and diversity, Reserve affairs and Air Force review boards.



As an Air Force dependent, Mr. Dominguez grew up on bases around the world. After graduating in 1975 from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army, reported to Vicenza, Italy, then worked varied assignments with the 1st Battalion, 509th Infantry (Airborne) and the Southern European Task Force. After leaving the military in 1980, Mr. Dominguez went into private business and attended Stanford University's Graduate School of Business. In 1983 he joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense as an analyst for Program Analysis and Evaluation.

Mr. Dominguez entered the Senior Executive Service in 1991 as PA&E's Director for Planning and Analytical Support. In this position he oversaw production of DOD's long-range planning forecast and its \$12 billion in annual information technology investments. He also directed the PA&E modernization of computing, communications and modeling infrastructure. He joined the Chief of Naval Operations staff in 1994 and assisted in the Navy's development of multi-year programs and annual budgets. Mr. Dominguez left federal government in 1997 to join a technology service organization. In 1999 he began work at the Center for Naval Analyses where he organized and directed studies of complex public policy and program issues. In 2001 he rejoined the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations where he worked until his appointment.

EDUCATION

1975 Bachelor of Science degree, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.

1983 Master's degree in business administration, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

1989 Program for Senior Officials in National Security, Harvard University

CAREER CHRONOLOGY

1. June 1983 - September 1988, program analyst, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.
2. October 1988 - September 1991, executive assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.
3. October 1991 - September 1994, Director for Planning and Analytical Support, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, Washington D.C.
4. October 1994 - April 1997, Associate Director for Programming, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.
5. April 1997 - September 1999, General Manager, Tech 2000 Inc., Herndon, Va.
6. September 1999 - January 2001, Research Project Director, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va.
7. January 2001 - August 2001, Assistant Director for Space, Information Warfare, and Command and Control, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.
8. August 2001 - March 2005, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Washington, D.C.
9. March 2005 - present, acting Secretary of the Air Force and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Washington, D.C.

AWARDS AND HONORS

- 1980 Army Commendation Medal
- 1988 and 1994 Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Medal
- 1993 Defense Medal for Civilian Service
- 1997 Medal for Superior Civilian Service, Department of the Navy
- 1998 Meritorious Executive Presidential Rank Award




JOHN P. JUMPER

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force



Gen. John P. Jumper is Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. As Chief, he serves as the senior uniformed Air Force officer responsible for the organization, training and equipage of 710,000 active-duty, Guard, Reserve and civilian forces serving in the United States and overseas. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the general and other service chiefs function as military advisers to the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council and the President.



General Jumper was born in Paris, Texas. He earned his commission as a distinguished graduate of Virginia Military Institute's ROTC program in 1966. He has commanded a fighter squadron, two fighter wings, a numbered Air Force, and U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Allied Air Forces Central Europe. Prior to assuming his current position, the general served as Commander of Air Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base, Va.

General Jumper has also served at the Pentagon as Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, as the Senior Military Assistant to two secretaries of defense, and as Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Roles and Missions. A command pilot with 4,000 flying hours, principally in fighter aircraft, General Jumper served two tours in Southeast Asia, accumulating more than 1,400 combat hours.

EDUCATION

- 1966 Bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington
- 1975 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
- 1978 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
- 1979 Master of business administration degree, Golden Gate University, San Francisco, Calif.
- 1982 National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. June 1966 - July 1967, student pilot, 3550th Student Squadron, Moody AFB, Ga.
2. July 1967 - September 1967, C-7 upgrade training, Sewart AFB, Tenn.
3. October 1967 - October 1968, C-7 pilot, 459th Tactical Airlift Squadron, Phu Cat Air Base, South Vietnam
4. November 1968 - July 1969, F-4 upgrade training, 431st Tactical Fighter Squadron, George AFB, Calif.
5. July 1969 - May 1970, instructor pilot, weapons officer and fast forward air controller, 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Udorn Royal Thai AFB, Thailand

6. June 1970 - July 1974, instructor pilot, flight examiner and standardization and evaluation chief, 81st Tactical Fighter Wing, Royal Air Force Bentwaters, England
7. July 1974 - August 1977, flight instructor, later, flight commander, U.S. Air Force Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
8. August 1977 - June 1978, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
9. June 1978 - August 1981, Staff Officer for Operations and Readiness, Tactical Division, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
10. August 1981 - July 1982, student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
11. July 1982 - February 1983, Chief of Safety, 474th Tactical Fighter Wing, Nellis AFB, Nev.
12. March 1983 - July 1983, Commander, 430th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Nellis AFB, Nev.
13. July 1983 - August 1986, Special Assistant and Executive Officer to the Commander, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Va.
14. August 1986 - February 1988, Vice Commander, later, Commander, 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing, Eglin AFB, Fla.
15. February 1988 - May 1990, Commander, 57th Fighter Weapons Wing, Nellis AFB, Nev.
16. June 1990 - April 1992, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, the Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
17. May 1992 - February 1994, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.
18. February 1994 - July 1994, Special Assistant to the Air Force Chief of Staff for Roles and Missions, Washington, D.C.
19. August 1994 - June 1996, Commander, 9th Air Force and U.S. Central Command Air Forces, Shaw AFB, S.C.
20. June 1996 - November 1997, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
21. December 1997 - February 2000, Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and Commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany
22. February 2000 - September 2001, Commander, Headquarters ACC, Langley AFB, Va.
23. September 2001 - present, Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot

Flight hours: 4,000

Aircraft flown: C-7, C-20, T-37, T-38, F-4, F-15 and F-16

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster

Distinguished Service Medal

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster

Distinguished Flying Cross with two oak leaf clusters

Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters

Air Medal with 17 oak leaf clusters

Vietnam Service Medal with five service stars

DCN: 12062

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant Jun 12, 1966

First Lieutenant Dec 12, 1967

Captain Jun 12, 1969

Major Jan 1, 1978

Lieutenant Colonel Oct 1, 1980

Colonel Oct 1, 1985

Brigadier General Aug 1, 1989

Major General Feb 1, 1992

Lieutenant General Sep 1, 1994

General Nov 17, 1997




GERALD F. "FRED" PEASE JR.

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Basing and Infrastructure Analysis



Gerald F. "Fred" Pease Jr., a member of the Senior Executive Service, is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Basing and Infrastructure Analysis, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Installations, Environment and Logistics, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. Mr. Pease plans, directs and coordinates the Secretary of the Air Force's fiscal 2005 base realignment and closure process. He is responsible for conducting infrastructure analysis supporting the Air Force's BRAC effort and co-leads the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group.



Mr. Pease entered the Air Force in 1972. While on active duty, he served as an F-15 squadron commander and flew more than 2,900 hours in the F-4C/E and F-15A/C, including 31 combat missions during Operation Desert Storm. Mr. Pease also held several key staff positions, including assignments to the U.S. Embassy in Paris; the Joint Chiefs of Staff delegation to the NATO Military Committee in Brussels, Belgium; Headquarters 7th Air Force, South Korea; and the Air Staff. Following his appointment to the Senior Executive Service in 2000, Mr. Pease was Associate Director for Ranges and Airspace, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force.

EDUCATION

- 1971 Bachelor of arts degree in French, San Diego State University, San Diego, Calif.
- 1976 Master of science degree in international relations, Troy State University, Troy, Ala.
- 1977 Squadron Officer School
- 1984 Air Command and Staff College
- 1993 Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
- 2001 Leadership for a Democratic Society, Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Va.

CAREER CHRONOLOGY

1. November 1972 - November 1973, student, Undergraduate Pilot Training, Columbus AFB, Miss.
2. January 1974 - August 1974, F-4C training, Luke AFB, Ariz.
3. August 1974 - July 1979, F4E/F-15A pilot, 22nd Tactical Fighter Squadron, Bitburg Air Base, West Germany
4. July 1979 - December 1982, F-15A instructor pilot, and standardization and evaluation flight examiner, 71st and 94th tactical fighter squadrons, Langley AFB, Va.
5. January 1983 - August 1985, assistant air attaché, U.S. Embassy, Paris, France
6. August 1985 - December 1986, aide-de-camp to the U.S. military representative to NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
7. January 1987 - January 1989, F-15C assistant operations officer and chief of wing

inspections, 94th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Langley AFB, Va.

8. January 1989 - January 1990, Director of Tactical Operations and Assistant Director of Operations, Headquarters 7th Air Force, Osan AB, South Korea

9. January 1990 - June 1992, operations officer and Commander, 27th Fighter Squadron, Langley AFB, Va.

10. June 1992 - June 1993, student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

11. July 1993 - September 2000, Chief, Ranges and Airspace Division, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

12. September 2000 - June 2004, Associate Director for Ranges and Airspace, Directorate of Operations and Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

13. June 2004 - present, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Basing and Infrastructure Analysis, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Installations, Environment and Logistics, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

AWARDS AND HONORS

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster

Defense Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster

Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters

Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters

Aerial Achievement Medal with three oak leaf clusters

Army Commendation Medal





MAJOR GENERAL GARY W. HECKMAN

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs



Retiring effective Oct. 1, 2005.

Maj. Gen. Gary W. Heckman is Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. He is responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff for planning and programming, and for manpower activities within the corporate Air Force. He develops, integrates, and analyzes long-range and strategic plans, the more than \$520 billion Future Year Defense Program, manpower and organizational requirements, and management innovation to support national security objectives and military strategy. His primary areas of focus are Air Force play in the Base Realignment and Closure process and the Quadrennial Defense Review.



The general received his commission from Officer Training School in 1973. His flying tours in both special operations and air mobility weapon systems include command of the 16th Special Operations Group, consisting of 10 squadrons at Hurlburt Field, Fla. A charter joint specialty officer, he has extensive special operations and air mobility staff experience in plans, programming, operational requirements, and policy and strategy at the unit, numbered air force, major command, Air Staff and unified command levels.

EDUCATION

- 1972 Bachelor of Arts degree in education, University of Northern Iowa
- 1978 Squadron Officer School
- 1981 Master of Public Administration degree, Troy State University
- 1981 Air Command and Staff College, by seminar
- 1984 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
- 1989 Air War College, by correspondence
- 1992 Master of Arts degree in national security and strategic studies, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
- 1995 Program for Senior Officials in National Security, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
- 1999 Program for Senior Managers in Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
- 2003 National Security Studies Leadership Course, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, N.Y.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. February 1973 - February 1974, student, undergraduate navigator training, Mather Air Force Base, Calif., later, student, C-130 upgrade training, Little Rock AFB, Ark.
2. March 1974 - September 1976, C-130E navigator and instructor navigator, 21st Tactical Airlift Squadron, later, assistant chief for tactics and techniques, 374th Tactical Airlift Wing, Clark Air Base, Philippines
3. September 1976 - September 1979, AC-130H gunship navigator, instructor navigator and flight examiner, 16th Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
4. October 1979 - October 1980, readiness initiatives officer, Air Staff Training Program, Readiness Analysis and Initiatives Group, Directorate of Operations, later, ASTRA airlift force development staff officer, Directorate of Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Readiness, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

5. October 1980 - July 1983, plans officer, Directorate of Plans, 1st Special Operations Wing, later, Chief of Contingency Plans, 2nd Air Division, and AC-130H instructor navigator, 16th Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
6. August 1983 - January 1984, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
7. February 1984 - August 1987, force plans staff officer, Directorate of Plans and Policy, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, West Germany
8. August 1987 - October 1989, Director, Directorate of Plans and Policy, Headquarters 23rd Air Force and Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
9. October 1989 - July 1991, Deputy Director of Programming and Policy, Headquarters Military Airlift Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
10. August 1991 - June 1992, student, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
11. July 1991 - August 1994, Chief, Mobility, Training and Special Operations Requirements Division, Directorate of Operational Requirements, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Readiness, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
12. September 1994 - June 1996, Commander, 16th Special Operations Group, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
13. June 1996 - December 1997, Assessment Director, Directorate of Plans, Programs and Strategic Assessments, later, Director of Resources, Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.
14. December 1997 - August 1998, Chief of Staff and Director, Center for Command Support, Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.
15. August 1998 - October 2001, Director, Center for Force Structure, Resources and Strategic Assessments, Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.
16. October 2001 - present, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Master navigator

Flight hours: More than 3,000

Aircraft flown: AC-130H/U, C-9A, C-130B/E, E-3A, EC-135, MC-130E/H/P and various civilian aircraft

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster

Defense Meritorious Service Medal

Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters

Air Medal

Joint Service Commendation Medal

Air Force Commendation Medal

Air Force Achievement Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant Jan. 17, 1973

First Lieutenant Jan. 17, 1975

Captain Jan. 17, 1979

Major Nov. 1, 1982

Lieutenant Colonel March 1, 1985

Colonel Feb. 1, 1991

Brigadier General Sept. 1, 1997

Major General Aug. 1, 2001

**Suggested Commissioner Questions
Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

Hearing on Air Force Recommendations and Methodology

Witnesses:

The Honorable Michael L. Dominguez, Secretary of the Air Force
and

General John P. Jumper, Air Force Chief of Staff

May 17, 2005

General

1. The Air Force has recommended closure of 3 major bases in its Active component. Many of your BRAC recommendations are either in the Reserve Component or results in only minor closures and realignments, below threshold for actions required by BRAC. This is particularly surprising considering earlier projections of excess capacity.
 - a. Are you satisfied with the consideration of active component bases for this BRAC round?
 - b. What percent of the active component excess capacity is being reduced?
 - c. More so than in prior BRAC rounds, this year's round appears to shift various organizations and bodies of work from one base to another without closing many active component bases. How does emptying space on a base that remains open create savings in overall costs of maintaining those facilities?
2. Historically, the Air Force has been known for maintaining a higher standard of living, services, etc. on its bases than the other military services. Obviously the other services might not agree. That aside, will the joint service bases use the standards of the service that has the lead in managing the facilities of the other military services and will this result in the quality and standards being upgraded or possibly degraded for everyone? If so, what are the impacts on savings?

Air Force Selection Process

3. According to your summary of the selection processes, the Air Force's rebasing strategy among other things "retained those Air Force bases that, by virtue of location or other difficult to reconstitute attributes, had the highest military value" Can you please provide some examples of these attributes which would lead to a high military value, e.g. ranges, airspace, etc.?
4. Your summary of the selection process also indicated that the Air Force's rebasing strategy "supported joint basing initiatives where feasible".
 - a. Can you please describe your joint basing initiatives?
 - b. What types of specific Air Force activities will be integrated with another Service, e.g. installation management, operations, etc.?
 - c. Please provide specific examples where this was accomplished.
5. According to the Air Force summary, the concept of joint operational basing will be advanced by the reassignment of the Army's Seventh Special Forces Group to Eglin AFB, where it will collocate with the center of Air Force Special Operations. Initial graduate-level pilot training on the Joint Strike Fighter for the Navy, Marines, and Air Force will be conducted jointly at the same base.
 - a. Can you please expand on your rationale and implementation of this "joint operational basing" concept?
 - b. How much does it cost to implement?
 - c. What are the projected savings?

6. Your summary of the selection process also indicated that the Air Force's rebasing strategy included actions that would generate savings within a reasonable period.
 - a. Please describe "included actions."
 - b. What constitutes a reasonable period?
 - c. If savings were not achieved, would an action be made for another reason? Please provide some examples?

7. Your summary of the selection process also indicated that "Air Force flying units will be restructured into a smaller number of fully equipped squadrons to increase operational effectiveness and efficiency. In the process, aircraft of like configuration (i.e., block) will be based together. In selected cases, personnel from Reserve Component units will be transferred into blended units similar to the well-proven Reserve Associate concept that has long been common in the strategic airlift mission area."
 - a. Can you please expand on your rationale and provide some examples of these restructurings?
 - b. What analysis was done to examine the most efficient unit size?
 - c. Please explain how effectiveness and efficiencies exist in creating a larger number of smaller squadrons?

8. Your summary of the selection process also indicated that "forces across mission areas will be based to enhance their capability to provide a global response to the needs of combatant commanders around the world".
 - a. Can you please provide some examples?
 - b. How were these decisions coordinated with the combatant commanders?

9. Did your community infrastructure assessments indicate that a base or community was at risk of not being able to adequately receive additional units and personnel?
 - a. Please provide some examples of any "red flags" raised?
 - b. Please explain your process for these assessments?

Cost savings

- 10.** You have indicated that the annual recurring savings of the Air Force recommendations will be approximately \$2.6B, and the net present value of these savings over twenty years will be \$14.5B.
- a. Do these costs include environmental remediation costs?
 - b. Do these costs include the costs of rebasing of Air Force units from overseas?
 - c. Do these costs include potential costs across the federal government?
 - d. Based on GAO reviews, DOD's savings estimates are rough approximations of the likely savings. Please explain what, if anything, DOD has done for this BRAC round to improve the method for determining Air Force savings or Air Force cost avoidances.
 - e. The base closure criteria address "the cost of operations and manpower implications" as part of "military value". Roughly, how many of your recommendations will not yield savings in terms of cost of operations and manpower reductions? Why are these recommendations being made?

Air Force Transformation

- 11.** The Air Force's Transformation Flight Plan states that in order to play its part in transformation in support of the Joint Forces Commander, the Air Force will work with other Services, the Joint Staff, other DOD agencies and allies/coalition partners to "enhance joint and coalition war-fighting."
- a. As you prepared your BRAC submissions to DOD, how specifically did you work with other Services, the Joint Staff and other Federal agencies to ensure that your proposed force structure "enhanced joint and coalition war-fighting?"
 - b. How does your F/A-22 and Joint Strike Fighter force structure account for, and enhance the Navy's air operations?

Force Structure Plan

- 12.** The legislation authorizing this BRAC round required that DOD develop a 20-year force structure plan to help guide BRAC recommendations. However, there appears to be much uncertainty regarding future force structure requirements.
- a. How do your BRAC recommendations relate to your force structure plan?
 - b. How did you deal with the uncertainties of planning your force structure over the next 20 years? How were those uncertainties taken into consideration in developing the BRAC recommendations?
 - c. What key assumptions influenced the Air Force's force structure plan? For example, what assumption does the Air Force make regarding replacement of existing aircraft—one for one replacement, or something smaller? What assumption does it make regarding the future of unmanned aircraft (UAVs) relative to replacing other manned aircraft?
 - d. Does the force structure plan submitted in March 2005 reflect the December 2004 decision by the Office of Secretary of Defense to reduce the number of F-22s to be bought?
 - e. How did F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter basing plans impact your BRAC recommendations?
 - f. Given uncertainties regarding future force structure requirements, how can the BRAC Commission be confident that it isn't being asked to approve reductions at installations where future requirements may grow?
 - g. To what extent is the force structure likely to change as a result of the QDR and how much flexibility will the Air Force have to accommodate a different and potentially larger force structure under the proposed BRAC closing and realignment plan?

Impact of BRAC ongoing operations

13.As you know, there has been some resistance to BRAC given today's security environment and at a time when the U.S military is involved in two major operations.

- a. How can we ensure that BRAC decisions in CONUS do not negatively affect ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
- b. How will these potential risks be mitigated?

Excess/surge capacity

14.Base closure criterion #3 addresses the need to consider surge requirements.

- a. How did this requirement effect your determination for selecting bases for closure and or realignment?
- b. What metrics were used to measure installation surge capabilities?
- c. Are there particular areas where potential surge capacity is needed most?

15.The Overseas Basing Commission has made recommendations concerning the Department's plan to move units from overseas to the Continental United States.

- a. What effect would implementation of the Overseas Basing Commission recommendations have on the capacity of the proposed basing structure after implementation of this round of the BRAC?
- b. To what extent has the Air Force fully calculated the costs of implementing the overseas rebasing initiative, including need for new facilities overseas, new training range requirements, as well as mobility and prepositioning requirements?

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

16. As we discussed at a previous hearing, the ongoing QDR and BRAC are interrelated. We are concerned that there is a possibility that decisions made as a result of the ongoing QDR may contradict some of your BRAC recommendations to the Commission.

- a. Did you attempt to integrate QDR and BRAC analyses and decisions?
- b. How can we ensure that decisions made in the ongoing QDR do not contradict?

Mobility Capability Study

17. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 23 Sep 04, Secretary Rumsfeld noted that "U.S. forces in the next century must be agile...[and] readily deployable...[and] must be able to project our power over long distances, in days or weeks, rather than months."

- a. Has DOD's BRAC submission accounted for results of the recent department-wide Mobility Capabilities Study? If so, how?
- b. If not, how can we ensure that our decisions on base closure and realignment do not conflict with these studies findings?
- c. How can the Air Force justify the reduction of airlift and air refueling aircraft before the results of the Mobility Capabilities Study have been released?

Environmental Issues

- 18.** Are there any specific environmental issues that we should carefully consider? Are there any specific actions/recommendations where environmental issues stand out? Are you aware of significant environmental impacts at receiving bases?

- 19.** The Department of Defense is responsible for remediating contamination on its facilities whether they remain open or closed. However, contaminant remediation at closing bases is likely to be expedited using current dollars versus future dollars. Additionally, uncontaminated parcels of property could conceivably be transferred more rapidly and with greater values than contaminated parcels.
 - a. Was the differential between present and future remediation costs and rapid versus delayed property transfer considered as an economic factor in deciding what bases to close?

- 20.** Were the costs associated with improving existing infrastructure and support to satisfy environmental requirements at realigned or gaining installations included in estimates of potential savings associated with selecting bases for closure?

21. Volume I of the Base Closure and Realignment Report is remarkably silent on the general topic of ranges, whether the range be used for firing, bombing, supersonic flight, electronic warfare, strafing, or other military exercises. The usefulness of a range is constrained by airspace use, the ground environment including private development, and transit time to and from the ranges.

- a. Would you please comment on the military value of the Barry M. Goldwater Range (associated with Luke AFB) and Melrose Range (associated with Cannon AFB)? Will the recommended actions improve the use of the range complex in general while continuing to allow good stewardship of the environment?
- b. What impact will continued use of these two ranges have on the management of these protected resources including endanger species?
- c. What impact will the closure of Cannon AFB, NM have on Melrose Range?
- d. What impact will the Joint strike Fighter and Special Forces realignment have on the environment in Florida and the Gulf of Mexico?

Homeland Defense

22. The homeland defense mission has placed additional demands on the military. According to the Air Forces summary of its BRAC selection process, "forces will be rebased to fully support the homeland security-related air sovereignty taskings of the US Northern Command."

- a. Can you please describe how the demands of this mission were factored into your BRAC recommendations?
- b. Can you elaborate on the coordination that occurred with the Department of Homeland Security and/or local governments as part of your BRAC deliberations?
- c. Can you please provide some examples of BRAC decisions that were made to benefit homeland security?

Air Reserve / Air National Guard Components

- 23.** Your recommendations include reductions in the number of Air National Guard bases and aircraft and the realignment of others.
- a. What analysis was used to determine the most efficient unit size that is mentioned in the Base Realignment and Closure Report?
 - b. Given the assertion that Guard units are often less expensive to operate than active units partly because they often operate at civilian or state-owned facilities, will the consolidation of Guard units achieve enough savings to justify the personnel turmoil associated with consolidating units?
 - c. Since some of the recommended closures / realignments fall below the threshold (>300 people), why were the recommendations made via the BRAC process?
- 24.** As you know, a legal issue has been raised over the role of states and their governors in approving the closure or relocations of guard units. Please tell us the extent to which state governors, adjutant generals, or other state officials have been consulted in advance regarding your proposed BRAC recommendations.

25. Most of the Air Forces recommendations address Air National Guard installations. While only 4 of these installations will close, nearly 20 Guard installations will lose aircraft and personnel leaving only an “expeditionary combat support” unit remaining. Many of these aircraft will relocate to other distant locations, which may negatively impact personnel retention. Also, many of these units reside on local airports who will lose Guard firefighter positions when the installation is realigned.

- a. Many of these moves seem to assign defense of the homeland to the Guard units. Do you agree that the reserve component is as equally prepared for expeditionary use as the active component? What homeland defense role do you envision for the active component?
- b. What is the mission of these expeditionary combat support units? How can they support the Homeland Defense mission? What manpower will be associated with them? How can they train without be collocated with aircraft? If the base remains open – but in a limited capacity without a flying mission, how does this reduce excess base infrastructure?
- c. Do you have any concerns that this will impact recruiting and retention if these members (many of whom are traditional, or part-time) are faced with either a decision to move – or who have no decision to relocate at all if their mission goes away? How was retention factored into your decision-making?
- d. Were these decisions coordinated with State Adjutant Generals?
- e. Were the implications with respect with airport firefighting requirements taken into consideration?

Cannon AFB, NM

26.DOD has made a recommendation to close Cannon Air Force Base and to distribute the 27th Fighter Wing's F-16 aircraft to other bases. The projected economic impact to the Clovis, New Mexico community is substantial with an approximate loss of 20 percent of the jobs in the Clovis community. (A loss of 2,824 direct and 1,956 indirect jobs within an economic area employment of 23,348).

- a. What emphasis was given to economic impact this closure would have on the Clovis community?
- b. How did Cannon AFB compare to other small aircraft bases?
- c. Was the proposed New Mexico Training Range Initiative (NMTRI), which would establish expand airspace for supersonic flight training considered in your decision to close Cannon? If not why not?

27.The Recommendation for Cannon AFB notes that the three F-16 squadrons are currently equipped with three different series (that is "blocks") of F-16 aircraft. The report says that the Block 50 (most current series) is being relegated to a spares role, while the older aircraft are going to other locations with higher military value. Please explain how this fits into the 2025 Force Structure Plan?

Pope AFB, NC

28. The Air Force proposes to realign Pope Air Force Base, NC by distributing 25 C-130E aircraft to Little Rock AFB, AR and replacing them with 16 C-130H aircraft: eight from Yeager Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), WV and eight from Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station (ARS), PA. Additionally, 36 A-10 aircraft will be moved to Moody AFB, GA and not replaced. Finally, the Army intends to increase manpower at Fort Bragg, NC by adding another airborne brigade.

- a. Could you please explain how the Air Force will be able to support a presumed increase in airlift requirement with nine fewer aircraft?
- b. Will the command and control associated with an AFRC provide sufficient joint planning capabilities for integration with rapid deploying forces within XVIII Airborne Corps?
- c. Also, what impact will moving the 36 A-10s to Moody AFB, GA have on joint services training and support?

Eielson AFB, AK

29. The Air Force's realignment of Eielson AFB, Alaska includes leaving an Air National Guard unit in place and keeps the base open in a "warm" status.

- a. Can you explain what you mean by keeping the base open in a "warm status"? How will the base be used?
- b. How much of the base will be maintained in "warm status"?
- c. Does this really present savings or does it pass on additional installation management costs to the Air National Guard?

Economic Impact

30. Many of the hardest hit communities as a result of BRAC recommendations are results of Air Force closures. Communities impacted by Air Force BRAC recommendations include the communities of Clovis, NM (20.5% job loss); Rapid City, SD (8.5%); Fairbanks, AK (8.6%); Grand Forks, ND (7.4%); and Mountain Home, ID (6.2). Please explain how the economic impact criteria played in your decisions?

Depot Maintenance

- 31.** As you know, the law requires that no more than 50 percent of the department's depot maintenance workload can be contracted out in order to retain a viable organic base to perform this work.
- a. What assurances can you provide us that implementation of your recommendations will not violate the "50/50" provision?
 - b. How will the Air Force's consolidation of intermediate and depot level maintenance activities affect its ability to accurately account for depot level maintenance under 50/50 reporting requirements?
 - c. What excess capacity will be available if the maintenance requirements increase through increased operations or unplanned maintenance or upgrades?

Technical/contractor base considerations

- 32.** The military often depends on civilian contractors to perform critical and highly specialized functions such as research, engineering development, and technical support.
- a. How did you measure the impacts on mission and workforce when you considered units and installations that are highly dependent on the civilian and contractor employees?
 - b. Are there any installations where these considerations were especially prominent?

**Joint Cross Service Group Related Questions
Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

Hearing on Air Force Recommendations and Methodology

Witnesses:

The Honorable Michael L. Dominguez, Secretary of the Air Force
and

General John P. Jumper, Air Force Chief of Staff

May 17, 2005

1. Will the Air Force have excess supply or logistics capacity if the Secretary of Defense's recommendations are accepted by this Commission? Please elaborate.
2. A number of Air Reserve Component bases are being significantly impacted, but not fully closed – such that in some cases the aircraft are being removed and an “Expeditionary Combat Support” (ECS) package remains. (Question with a follow-on...) What does an ECS consist of? If the base remains open – but in a limited capacity without a flying mission, how does this reduce excess base infrastructure?
3. Your proposed actions related to the Air National Guard and Air Force reserve seem to impact units containing seasoned and highly skilled personnel. Even if a base is not closed, in many cases the aircraft are being removed. Do you fear this will impact recruiting and retention if these members (many of whom are traditional, or part-time) are faced with either a decision to move – or who have no decision to relocate at all if their mission goes away?
4. Did you or the Office of the Secretary of Defense remove any installations from the recommendations solely for reasons of environmental or economic impact? Please elaborate.

5. With reference to Depot Maintenance facilities, the Air Force's shift toward a two-level maintenance program has resulted in savings through civilian/military manpower reductions. Yet these net savings have not translated into a commensurate reduction of infrastructure, particularly at the intermediate maintenance level. What further specific steps toward infrastructure reductions can you recommend?

Introduction

This is an overview of the Department of the Navy's Report to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, provided as a roadmap with which to review the report. The report constitutes our response to the requirements of the Base Closure Act for the 2005 round of base realignment and closure (BRAC 2005). The Department of the Navy employed a multi-pronged strategy for BRAC 2005 that sought to rationalize and consolidate infrastructure capabilities to eliminate unnecessary excess; balance the effectiveness of Fleet concentrations with anti-terrorism / force protection desires for dispersion of assets and redundancy of facilities; leverage opportunities for total force laydown and joint basing; accommodate changing operational concepts; and facilitate the evolution of force structure and infrastructure organizational alignment.

In developing BRAC 2005 recommendations, the Department of the Navy (DON) adhered to the principles that the recommendations must eliminate excess capacity, save money, improve operational readiness and jointness, and maintain quality of service. Developing recommendations in BRAC 2005 was challenging given that the recommendations must be based on a 20-year Force Structure Plan, a much longer range view than has been done before. This requirement to fully consider the future and its inherent uncertainties resulted in retaining more infrastructure than analysis supported, in order to ensure we do not eliminate anything we thought we might need in the future.

General comments about the BRAC process

The purpose of the Base Closure Act is to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.

- Statutorily mandated process
- Recommendations objectively based on selection criteria
- 20-year Force Structure Plan focus

The BRAC 2005 proposal is the most comprehensive approach to BRAC thus far.

Like all previous BRAC rounds, elimination of excess physical capacity is one of the objectives for BRAC 2005.

BRAC 2005 also serves to rationalize infrastructure with defense strategy.

BRAC 2005 is the means for reconfiguring the current infrastructure into one in which operational capacity maximizes war-fighting capability and efficiency.

A focus is to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity. Therefore, BRAC 2005 analysis was divided in two pieces:

- Joint Cross-Service Groups analyzed common business-oriented functions
- Military Departments analyzed all Service unique functions.

Department of Navy Report

The Department of the Navy report describes the Department of the Navy process to analyze Service unique functions, the analyses from which its recommendations were derived, and the considerations that led to particular decisions.

Department of the Navy Process and Methodology

The Department of the Navy built its process and methodology to support its BRAC 2005 strategy.

- Scrupulously followed the process laid out in the Base Closure Act
- Conducted a fair and unbiased analysis of each installation
- Based on future force structure requirements and certified data
- Most in-depth and inclusive BRAC process ever utilized by the Department of the Navy

Legal Requirements

- All installations were considered equally
- Only certified data was used in our analysis
- Recommendations were based on the 20-year Force Structure Plan
- Recommendations were based on the legally mandated selection criteria

Leadership and Organizations

To satisfy the responsibility for making sound and timely base closure and realignment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that were in compliance with the Base Closure Act and Department of Defense (DoD) guidance, the Department of the Navy established several BRAC organizations:

- Infrastructure Evaluation Group
 - Nine members
 - Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Special Assistant for BRAC were designated as Co-Chairs
 - Members had experience in logistics, planning, requirements, and / or operations
 - Developed closure and realignment recommendations for approval by the Secretary of the Navy
 - Ensured concerns of operational commanders were considered in any recommendations
- Department of the Navy (DON) Analysis Group
 - Eleven members
 - Special Assistant for BRAC was designated as Chair

- Conducted analyses of Department of the Navy unique functions and developed closure and realignment recommendations for consideration by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group
- Ensured concerns of operational commanders were considered in any recommendations
- Functional Advisory Board
 - Membership consisted of Navy and Marine Corps principal members of the seven Joint Cross-Service Groups
 - Ensured Department of the Navy leadership was thoroughly briefed and prepared on Joint Cross-Service Group matters
 - Coordinated with the Infrastructure Evaluation Group to ensure that the Department of the Navy position on common business-oriented support functions was clearly articulated and understood
 - Established to ensure the Navy and Marine Corps vision of the future, based on the 20-year Force Structure Plan, was clearly articulated, understood, and supported throughout the BRAC 2005 Joint Cross-Service Group process
- Infrastructure Analysis Team
 - Provided staff support to the Infrastructure Evaluation Group and DON Analysis Group
 - Composed of military and civilian analysts and supporting staff from throughout the Department of the Navy and from the Center for Naval Analysis
 - Team members represented a broad spectrum of expertise and capability, with emphasis on senior officers with operational experience

Scope of Effort

The first step in the process was to categorize and aggregate activities for analysis. For BRAC 2005, the Secretary of Defense directed that the analysis would be divided into two categories of functions with seven Joint Cross-Service Groups analyzing common business-oriented support functions and the Military Departments analyzing all Service unique functions.

- Department of the Navy Unique Functions
 - Operations (Surface / Subsurface Operations, Aviation Operations, Ground Operations, and Munitions Storage and Distribution)
 - Education and Training (Recruit Training, Officer Accessions Training, and Department of the Navy Unique Professional Military Education)
 - Headquarters and Support (Reserve Centers, Recruiting Districts / Stations, and Regional Support Activities)
 - Other Support (Organizational Followers, Dependent Activities, Stand Alone Activities, and Specialized Functions Activities).

- 889 activities in the Navy and Marine Corps Universe
 - 469 analyzed by one or more of the Joint Cross-Service Groups
 - 590 analyzed by the Department of the Navy
 - Some activities analyzed by Department of the Navy and one or more Joint Cross-Service Groups
 - Every activity fell under the analytic purview of either the Department of the Navy or a Joint Cross-Service Group
 - Totality of activities analyzed covered the universe of Department of the Navy bases.

Data Collection

The next step in the BRAC 2005 process was the development of requests for information, or data calls, for the purpose of collecting all types of information required for development of the base structure database and use in subsequent analyses.

- Data calls went to DON activity level
- Joint Cross-Service Groups and Military Departments developed joint capacity data call that was sent to all Department of the Navy activities
- Supplemental capacity data calls were issued to targeted Department of the Navy activities
- A second series of data calls was issued to targeted activities to obtain information necessary for military value and other selection criteria analyses
- Most Department of the Navy activities received multiple data calls
- Additional data calls were issued during the scenario analysis phase
- Department of the Navy BRAC Information Transfer System (DONBITS) was used for the distribution of data calls and collection of activity responses and supporting documentation

DONBITS, a secure web-based data collection and management tool, was the sole and authoritative base structure database.

- Served as the baseline for evaluation of all Department of the Navy installations
- Only certified data could be entered into DONBITS
- Data was certified as accurate and complete by the officer or civilian employee who initially generated data in response to a request for information, and then at each succeeding level in an established certification chain

Capacity Analysis

Capacity analysis compared the current Department of the Navy base structure to the future force structure requirements to determine whether excess base structure capacity existed within a given functional area.

- Capacity analysis was conducted on a functional basis (e.g., ship berthing) rather than by installation category (e.g., Naval Stations)

- Measures of capacity were selected which reflected the appropriate "metric" for that function
- If total current capacity in a function was greater than the capacity required to support the future force structure, excess capacity was deemed to exist

Military Value Analysis

Except for a limited number of activities, each activity performing a given function was subjected to a military value analysis.

- Used a quantitative methodology that was as objective as possible
- Foundation of the analysis was the military value selection criteria
- Assessed relative military value of activities performing a given function
- Enabled comparison of one activity within a function against another in that function

Configuration Analysis

The purpose of configuration analysis was to identify for each function that set of activities that best meets the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps in light of future requirements, while eliminating the most excess capacity.

- Configuration analysis used a mixed-integer linear programming solver
- Generated multiple solutions for an optimization model
- Allowed DON Analysis Group to explore tradeoffs between eliminating excess capacity and retaining sites having high military value

Scenario Development

The configuration analysis solutions were used by the DON Analysis Group as the starting point for the development of potential closure and realignment scenarios that would undergo analysis to determine return on investment.

- Iterative process in which results of the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analyses and inputs from senior Defense leadership were used to generate additional options
- The Fleet, major claimants (including the System Commands), and the Department of the Navy civilian leadership played integral part of scenario development
- The DON Analysis Group/Infrastructure Evaluation Group developed and analyzed 187 scenarios involving 344 activities

Scenario Analysis

COBRA analyses were conducted on all of these scenarios, using certified responses to scenario data calls from affected installations and their tenants.

- COBRA used as a tool to ensure that Department of the Navy recommendations were cost effective
- DON Analysis Group aggressively challenged cost estimates to ensure both their consistency and reasonableness
- DON Analysis Group ensured that out year requirements were appropriately reduced in terms of personnel, facilities, and capacities of remaining facilities
- DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group sensitive to up-front costs and the length of time required to obtain a return on investment
- Significant majority of the Department of the Navy recommendations will obtain a return on investment within four years, with savings offsetting costs of closure within the closure implementation period

Economic impact on the local economic area for each Department of the Navy installation considered for closure or realignment was assessed during the scenario analysis process

- Economic Impact Tool provided a uniform methodology for estimating the total direct and indirect job changes associated with a closure or realignment scenario
- Department of the Navy made every effort to fully understand the economic impacts its recommendations might have on local communities

The Department of the Navy also considered the ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel

- Reviewed ten community attributes: demographics, child care, cost of living, education, employment, housing, medical providers, safety / crime, transportation, and utilities
- No significant community infrastructure impacts were identified for any of the Department of the Navy proposed closure or realignment actions

Environmental impacts of different closure and realignment scenarios were also considered

- Reviewed ten environmental resource areas: air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; and wetlands
- Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts provided an overview of the certified data, including the costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities, and summarized the environmental impacts associated with a particular scenario
- Summary of Cumulative Environmental Impacts was prepared for each gaining installation
- Environmental impact analysis permitted the Department of the Navy to obtain a comprehensive picture of the potential environmental impacts arising from the recommendations for closure and realignment

- No environmental impacts that would preclude implementation were identified for any scenario

The DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group utilized two assessment tools at two different points during the scenario development and analysis process to frame their deliberative discussions.

- Alignment Assessment graphically portrayed how well a scenario aligned with the Department's BRAC strategy and compared it against the military value for the activity being evaluated, allowing the deliberative bodies to discuss whether a scenario was consistent with the capacity and military value analyses prior to issuance of a scenario data call
- Candidate Recommendation Risk Assessment provided a mechanism for the DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group to logically discuss Selection Criteria 5 through 8 analyses to assess warfighting / readiness risks, to compare alternative recommendations, and to assess whether the recommendations should be forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy for consideration

Results

Build upon the substantial reductions in infrastructure resulting from prior rounds of BRAC and the organizational changes made in the years since BRAC 1995.

Will allow us to better afford the capital investments and modernization required in the future.

Recommendations both reduce excess capacity and balance force and base structure in a way that will foster operational flexibility, synergistic readiness support, and joint opportunities wherever possible.

The proposals in BRAC 2005 balance base structure to support future force structure in the following ways:

Operational Bases

- Maintain sufficient flexibility to meet future military commitments while effectively utilizing existing capacity
- Recommendations result in retention of capacity to house more ships and aircraft squadrons than will exist in our future force structure in order to retain the capability to adjust to operational tempo changes and to achieve the desired strategic laydown and presence
- Our analysis led to the determination that there is no significant excess capacity in Department of the Navy ground force bases, particularly given the planned increase in Marine Corps force structure
- Recommendations maintain Fleet dispersal and viable anti-terrorism/force protection capability while simultaneously supporting optimal power projection, rapid force deployment and expeditionary force reach-back

Close Submarine Base New London, Connecticut. Relocate its assigned submarines, Auxiliary Repair Dock and Nuclear Research Submarine to Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia and Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. Relocate the intermediate submarine repair function to Shore Intermediate Repair Activity Norfolk, at Naval Shipyard Norfolk, Virginia and Trident Refit Facility Kings Bay, Georgia. (Refer to page A-7 of the DON Report).

- Existing berthing capacity at surface / subsurface installations exceeds the capacity required to support Force Structure Plan
- Closure reduces excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining bases
- Sufficient capacity and fleet dispersal is maintained with the East Coast submarine fleet homeports of Naval Station Norfolk and Submarine Base Kings Bay
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$679.64 million with net present value (NPV) savings to the Department over 20 years of \$1.58 billion

Close Naval Station Pascagoula, Mississippi. Relocate its ships to Naval Station Mayport, Florida. Relocate the ship intermediate repair facility to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Mayport, Florida. (Refer to page A-9 of the DON Report).

- Reduce excess berthing capacity while allowing for consolidation of surface ships in a fleet concentration area
- Sufficient capacity and fleet dispersal is maintained with East Coast surface fleet homeports of Naval Station Norfolk and Naval Station Mayport
- Gulf Coast presence can be achieved as needed with available Navy ports at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida and Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida
- Guided Missile Cruisers (CG-47 Class) at Naval Station Pascagoula scheduled for decommissioning prior to FY 2006 will not relocate
- Total estimated one-time cost to this recommendation is \$17.94 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$665.69 million

Close Naval Station Ingleside, Texas. Relocate its ships to Naval Station San Diego, California. Relocate ship intermediate repair function to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity San Diego. Consolidate Mine Warfare Training Center Justification with Fleet Anti-submarine Warfare Training Center, San Diego, California. Realign Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, Texas. Relocate Commander Mine Warfare Command and Commander Mobile Mine Assembly Group to Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Center, Point Loma, California. Relocate Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron (HM-15) to Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. (Refer to page A-11 of the DON Report).

- Moves mine warfare surface and aviation assets to major fleet concentration areas and reduces excess capacity
- Gulf Coast presence can be achieved as needed with available Navy ports at Naval Station Key West, Florida and Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida
- Minehunter Coastal ships at Naval Station Ingleside are scheduled for decommissioning between FY 2006 and FY 2007 and will not relocate

- US Coast Guard presence is expected to remain in the Gulf Coast region
- Creates a center of excellence for Undersea Warfare in San Diego area
- Single sites all Mine Warfare aircraft in a Fleet Concentration Area
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$178.39 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$822.23 million

Close Naval Air Station Atlanta, Georgia. Relocate its aircraft to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, Louisiana; Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, Texas; and Robins Air Force Base, Robins, Georgia. (Refer to page C-9 of the DON Report).

- Reduces excess capacity while maintaining reserve forces in regions with favorable demographics
- Aviation assets will be located closer to theater of operations and / or will result in increased maintenance efficiencies and operational synergies
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$43.03 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$910.87 million

Realign Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine to a Naval Air Facility and relocate its aircraft to Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida. Consolidate Aviation Intermediate Maintenance with Fleet Readiness Center Southeast Jacksonville, Florida. (Refer to page C-11 of the DON Report).

- Reduces operation costs while single siting the East Coast Maritime Patrol community at Naval Air Station Jacksonville
- Retains an operational airfield in the northeast to support the homeland defense mission, as needed, and maintains strategic flexibility.
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$147.16 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$238.77 million

Close Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, Pennsylvania. Relocate all Navy and Marine Corps squadrons to McGuire Air Force Base, Cookstown, New Jersey. Realign Cambria Regional Airport, Johnstown, Pennsylvania, by relocating Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 775 Detachment A to McGuire Air Force base. (Refer to page C-13 of the DON Report).

- Reduces excess capacity while creating new joint opportunities in the McGuire Air Force Base / Fort Dix / Naval Aviation Engineering Station Lakehurst military concentration area
- Leverages maintenance and operational efficiencies within Marine Corps Reserve Aviation and maintains reserve forces in areas with favorable demographics
- Realignment of Cambria Regional Airport allows the assets currently housed there to be collocated with a Major Marine Reserve Aviation Headquarters at McGuire Air Force Base
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$125.25 million with NPV and savings to the Department over 20 years of \$714.97 million

Close the Inland area of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment, Concord, California. The Tidal area of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord, along with the retained portion of the Inland area, will be transferred to the Army. (Refer to page D-7 of the DON Report).

- Department of the Navy weapons stations have no excess capacity for loading and distribution of munitions
- Department of the Navy weapons stations have excess munitions storage capacity.
- Inland magazine field has been in a reduced operating status since 1999
- Inland area is excess to Department of the Navy / DoD needs and is severable
- Closure of the Inland area will save money and have no impact on mission capability
- City of Concord requested closure of both the Inland and Tidal portions of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord
- Transfer of the property to the Army aligns with property holder with the property user
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$13.95 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$199.72 million

Education and Training activities

- Recommendations retain capacity and flexibility to meet current and future force structure and surge requirements
- Department of the Navy—unique professional military education activities were determined to be properly sized and sited to support their target populations
- Retention of two Marine recruit training depots is considered necessary to maintain flexibility sufficient to accommodate surge and increased operational tempo
- Prior rounds of BRAC concentrated on the consolidation of Navy recruit training. BRAC 2005 sought to extend that consolidation effort to Navy officer accession training

Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida by relocating Officer Training Command Pensacola, Florida to Naval Station Newport, Rhode Island and consolidating with Officer Training Command Newport, Rhode Island. (Refer to page E-13 of the DON Report).

- Consolidation of Officer Training Commands at Officer Training Command Newport will reduce inefficiencies inherent in maintaining two sites for similar training
- Supports the Department of the Navy initiative to create a center for officer training at Naval Station Newport
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$3.5 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$10.0 million

Reserve activities

- Overriding objective was to maintain a demographically sound Reserve establishment while providing balanced recruiting opportunities
- Sought to consolidate reserve units to active-duty or joint Service Centers where they could more effectively support the Fleet without impacting recruiting demographics
- Facilitate the downsizing of the Department of the Navy Reserve infrastructure by consolidating Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers while maintaining a geographically appropriate structure

Close Navy Reserve Centers in Tuscaloosa, Alabama; St Petersburg, Florida; Pocatello, Idaho; Forest Park, Illinois; Evansville, Indiana; Cedar Rapids and Sioux City, Iowa; Lexington, Kentucky; Bangor, Maine; Adelphi, Maryland; Duluth, Minnesota; Cape Girardeau, Missouri; Lincoln, Nebraska; Glens Falls, Horseheads and Watertown, New York; Asheville, North Carolina; Central Point, Oregon; and in Lubbock and Orange, Texas. Also, close the Navy Reserve Facility in Marquette, Michigan and the Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers in Grissom Air Reserve Base, Peru, Indiana and Tacoma, Washington. (Refer to page F-7 of the DON Report).

- Reduces excess capacity through the consolidation of 23 Navy Reserve Centers / Navy Reserve Facilities and Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers with other reserve centers in the effected areas
- Reserve centers will close and their drilling population supported by other existing centers thereby reducing management overhead
- Sufficient capacity for drilling reserves is maintained throughout the United States, and all states will continue to have at least one Navy Reserve Center / Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$1.97 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$236.51 million

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers in Encino and Los Angeles, California; Moundsville, West Virginia; Reading, Pennsylvania; Akron and Cleveland, Ohio; Madison and Lacrosse Wisconsin; Dubuque, Iowa; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Mobile, Alabama. Close Inspector-Instructor Rome, Georgia and Inspector-Instructor West Trenton, New Jersey. (Refer to page F-15 of the DON Report).

- Reduces excess capacity through the consolidation of 12 Navy Reserve Centers and Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers with other reserve centers in the effected areas or into Armed Forces Reserve Centers
- Relocates two Inspector-Instructor activities to existing reserve facilities aboard active duty bases
- Sufficient capacity for drilling reserves is maintained throughout the United States, and all states will continue to have at least one Navy / Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$62.39 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$76.87 million

Recruiting

- Focused on the elimination of excess management capacity and reduction of lease costs
- Maintains sufficient recruiting management oversight to support Department of the Navy accession requirements

Close Navy Recruiting Districts in Montgomery, Alabama; Indianapolis, Indiana; Kansas City, Missouri; Omaha, Nebraska; and Buffalo, New York. (Refer to page G-7 of the DON Report).

- Achieves economies of scale and scope by reducing excess capacity in management overhead and physical resources in the Navy Recruiting District functional area
- Recommendation is consistent with the Commander, Navy Recruiting Command's Transformation Plan, which envisions consolidation of active and reserve recruiting functions and supports the reallocation of management oversight over all Navy recruiting functions
- Does not impact the storefront recruiting offices currently assigned to the closing Navy Recruiting Districts
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2.44 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$214.5 million

Regionalized support structure

- Recommendations continue the move toward a regionalized support structure
- Reducing the number of Installation Management Regions
- Aligns other service commands to those Regions saving costs relating to facilities and fostering beneficial consolidations and efficiencies planned for the future

Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida by consolidating Navy Region Gulf Coast, with Navy Region Southeast at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida. Realign Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, Texas by consolidating Navy Region South with Navy Region Midwest at Naval Station Great Lakes, Illinois and Navy Region Southeast at Naval Station Jacksonville, Florida. (Refer to page H-9 of the DON Report).

- Reduces the number of Installation Management regions from twelve to eight, streamlining the regional management structure and allowing for opportunities to collocate other regional entities to further align management concepts and efficiencies
- Sufficient Installation Management capability resides within the remaining regions
- Navy Reserve Forces Command installation management function and Navy Region Northeast are also consolidated into the remaining regions as part of the closures of Naval Support Activity New Orleans, Louisiana and Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut
- Supports the Department of the Navy establishment of Commander, Navy Installations in order to align shore assets in support of Navy requirements
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$3.21 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$34.55 million

Close Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division South leased space in Charleston, South Carolina. Consolidate Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division South, Charleston with Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Southeast, Jacksonville, Florida at Naval Air Station Jacksonville; Naval Facilities Midwest, Great Lakes, Illinois at Naval Station Great Lakes; and Naval Facilities Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia at Naval Station Norfolk. Close Naval Facilities Engineering Filed Activity Northeast leased space in Lester, Pennsylvania. Consolidate Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Northeast, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania with Naval Facilities Atlantic, Norfolk at Naval Station Norfolk and relocate Navy Crane Center Lester, Pennsylvania to Norfolk Nava Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia. (Refer to page H-11 of the DON Report).

- Enhances the Navy's long-standing initiative to accomplish common management and support on a regionalized basis by consolidating and collocating Naval Facilities commands with the installation management Regions in Jacksonville, Great Lakes and Norfolk
- Collocation aligns management concepts and efficiencies and may allow for further consolidation in the future
- Achieves savings by moving from leased space to government-owned space
- Increases average military value for the remaining Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division / Engineering Field Activity activities
- Relocates the Navy Crane Center to a site with functional synergy
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$37.85 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$81.81 million

Realign Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, Texas by consolidating Navy Reserve Readiness Command South with Naval Reserve Readiness Command Midwest at Naval Station Great Lakes, Illinois. Realign Naval Station Newport, Rhode Island and the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC by consolidating Naval Reserve Readiness Command Northeast with Naval Reserve Readiness Command Mid-Atlantic and relocating the consolidated commands to Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia. (Refer to page H-13 of the DON Report).

- Enhances Navy's long-standing initiative to accomplish common management and support on a regionalized basis, by consolidating and collocating reserve readiness commands with the installation management Regions
- Aligns management concepts and efficiencies and ensures a reserve voice at each region as well as enabling future savings through consolidation of like functions
- Increases average military value for the remaining Naval Reserve Readiness Commands and ensures that each of the installation management Regions has an organization to manage reserve matters within the region
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2.56 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$91.69 million

Other Support

Realign Naval Station Newport, Rhode Island by relocating the Navy Warfare Development Command to Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. (Refer to page I-9 of the DON Report).

- Navy Warfare Development Command performs the functions of warfare innovation, concept development, fleet and joint experimentation, and the synchronization and dissemination of doctrine
- Relocation to Norfolk better aligns the Navy's warfare development organization with those of the other joint force components and Joint Forces Command, as well as places it in better proximity to Fleet Forces Command and the Second Fleet Battle Lab it supports
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$11.75 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$2.06 million

Fenceline Closures

The Joint Cross-Service recommendations impacted numerous Department of the Navy activities and installations. In some instances, the Joint Cross-Service recommendation resulted in a realignment of the Department of the Navy installation. In other cases, the recommendation or series of recommendations removed the primary missions / functions and the majority of personnel from the installation allowing for closure of the installation fenceline, thereby generating additional savings and reductions in excess capacity. The Department of the Navy evaluated a number of fenceline closures that led to recommendations.

Realign Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, California. Disestablish the depot maintenance of Aircraft Other Components, Aircraft Rotary, and Strategic Missiles. Consolidate depot maintenance of Engines / Transmissions, Alabama. Consolidate the depot maintenance of Conventional Weapons, Engines / Transmissions, Material Handling, Powertrain Components, Starters / Alternators / Generators, Test Measurement Diagnostic Equipment, and Wire at Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, Georgia. Consolidate depot maintenance of Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), Electro-Optics / Night Vision / Forward-Looking-Infrared, Generators, Ground Support Equipment, Radar, and Radio at Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania. Consolidate depot maintenance of Tactical Missiles at Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania. Realign Fleet Support Division Maintenance Center Barstow and Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow operations to increase efficiencies and reduce infrastructure. Refer to page J-3 of the DON Report).

- Full closure was evaluated but disapproved in order to maintain a west coast depot maintenance presence at Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow to provide west coast operating forces with a close, responsive source for depot maintenance support
- Required capacity to support workloads and core requirements for the DoD is relocated to other DoD Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence, thereby increasing the military value of depot maintenance performed at these sites

- Results in utilization of DoD capacity to facilitate performance of interservice workload
- Optimizes the depot maintenance operations at Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$26.02 million with NPS savings to the Department over 20 years of \$230.61 million

Close Naval Support Activity Corona, California. Relocate Naval Surface Warfare Division Corona to Naval Base Ventura County (Naval Air Station Point Mugu), California. (Refer to page J-5 of the DON Report).

- Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona performs three required missions for Department of the Navy (Independent Assessment Capability, Metrology and Calibration Laboratories, and Tactical Aircrew Combat Training System Ranges)
- Relocation of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona to Naval Air Station Point Mugu collocates it with other Research, Development and Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation activities and with fleet assets at Naval Air Station Point Mugu
- Provides a more efficient organization with greater synergies and increased effectiveness. Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$70.18 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$0.36 million

Close the naval installation at Athens, Georgia. Relocate the Navy Supply Corps School and the Center for Service Support to Naval Station Newport, Rhode Island. (Refer to page J-7 of the DON Report).

- Closes a single-function installation and relocates its activities to a multi-function installation with higher military value
- Naval Station Newport has the capacity to support the Navy Supply Corps School training mission with existing infrastructure, making relocation of Navy Supply Corps School to Naval Station Newport desirable and cost efficient
- Supports Department of the Navy initiative to create a center for officer training at Naval Station Newport
- Center for Service Support is relocated to Naval Station Newport with the Naval Supply Corps School to capitalize on existing resource and personnel efficiencies
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$23.79 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$21.80 million

Close Naval Support Activity New Orleans, Louisiana. Relocate the Navy Reserve Personnel Command and the Enlisted Placement and Management Center to Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington, Tennessee and consolidate with the Naval Personnel Command. Relocate the Naval Reserve Recruiting Command to Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington and consolidate with the Navy Recruiting Command. Relocate the Navy Reserve Command to Naval Support Activity Norfolk, Virginia. Relocate Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, Louisiana and consolidate with Marine Corps Reserve Support Command element of

Mobilization Command, which is relocating from Marine Corps Support Activity, Kansas City, Missouri. (Refer to page J-9 of the DON Report).

- Collocation of the Navy Reserve Personnel Command, the Enlisted Placement Management Center, and the Naval Reserve Recruiting Command at Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington creates a Navy Human Resources Center of Excellence, improves personnel life-cycle management, and furthers active and reserve component total force integration and effectiveness
- Consolidates Reserve personnel and recruiting headquarters with like active component functions in a single location and eliminates stand-alone headquarters
- Relocation of the Navy Reserve Command to Naval Support Activity, Norfolk with its active component headquarters will enhance internal active and reserve component interoperability, significantly increase interaction between the two components, and produce a reduction in force size by eliminating duplicative staff
- Relocation of Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve Support Command element of Louisiana maintains a central location for management of widely-dispersed Marine Corps reserve elements and allows consolidation of Marine reserve management functions
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$164.59 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$276.42 million

Close the Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Kittery, Maine. Relocate the ship depot repair function to Naval Shipyard Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and Naval Shipyard Puget Sound, Washington. Relocate the Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement Command to Naval Shipyard Norfolk. (Refer to page J-13 of the DON Report).

- Retains one nuclear-capable shipyard on each coast, plus sufficient shipyard capacity to support forward deployed assets
- There are four Naval Shipyards performing depot-level ship refueling, modernization, overhaul and repair work and there is sufficient excess capacity in the aggregate across the four shipyards to close either Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor or Naval Shipyard Portsmouth
- There is insufficient excess capacity to close any other shipyard or combination of shipyards
- Naval Shipyard Portsmouth was selected for closure, rather than Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, because it is the only closure that could both eliminate excess capacity and satisfy retention of strategically placed shipyard capability
- Planned force structure and force positioning adjustments reflected in the 20-year Force Structure Plan led to the selection of Naval Shipyard Portsmouth as the preferred closure candidate between the two sites
- Naval Shipyard Portsmouth had a low military value compared to operational homeports and, its berthing capacity is not required to support the Force Structure Plan
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$448.43 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$1.26 billion

Close Marine Corps Support Activity, Kansas City, Missouri. Relocate Marine Corps Reserve Support Command element of Mobilization Command to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, Louisiana and consolidate with Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve. Retain an enclave for the 9th Marine Corps District and the 24th Marine Corps Regiment. (Refer to page J-15 of the DON Report).

- Relocation of Marine Corps Reserve Support Command and its parent command, Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans maintains a central location for management of widely dispersed Marine Corps Reserve elements and allows consolidation of Marine Reserve Management functions
- Consolidation with its headquarters will significantly increase interaction and operational efficiency as well as eliminate duplicative staff
- Location of this consolidated headquarters at a joint reserve base will enhance joint service interoperability concepts
- Total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$23.28 million with NPV savings to the Department over 20 years of \$49.83 million

Joint Cross-Service Group Contributions

A primary objective of BRAC 2005 was to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity. In this regard, BRAC 2005 is strategic. It is the next step in implementation of the principles set forth by Congress in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The inclusion of the joint cross-service process in the BRAC 2005 evaluations allowed the Department of the Navy to explore numerous innovative and transformational alternatives to current configurations of business lines and locations.

Joint Cross-Service Groups analyzed common business-oriented functions and evaluated them for ways to consolidate and eliminate excess infrastructure. We support their recommended actions and look forward to realizing the benefits they will provide to the Department of the Navy.

The recommendations developed by the Joint Cross-Service Groups benefit the Department of the Navy in the following ways:

Headquarters and support activities

- Develop joint enterprise-wide solutions for civilian personnel, correctional facilities, mobilization, investigative / adjudication and media activities, and establish joint basing arrangements affecting ten naval installations
- Virtually eliminate all Department of the Navy requirements for leased space near the Pentagon, thereby enhancing anti-terrorism / force protection posture and reducing leased space costs
- Relocate Navy and Marine Corps Reserve, personnel, recruiting, and training commands to optimize organizational alignment and location

Industrial activities

- Recommendations yield a smaller industrial base that is appropriately sized and positioned, flexible and multi-functional
- Complete ship maintenance consolidation in Fleet concentration areas
- Initiate aviation intermediate and depot maintenance consolidation into Aviation Fleet Readiness Centers

Education and training activities

- Recommendations create several joint schools
- Establish a joint initial training site for the Joint Strike Fighter
- Better align Service training functions, increase joint training
- Reduce infrastructure costs

Medical activities

- Recommendations leverage civilian opportunities by privatizing inpatient service facilities
- Optimize regional healthcare and joint healthcare options
- Consolidate enlisted medical education
- Create integrated full-spectrum research centers of excellence

Technical activities

- Recommendations build upon prior BRAC rounds to create integrated full-spectrum centers of excellence in functional areas
- Collapse major platform domains into integrated research, development, acquisition, test and evaluation centers for air, ground, sea, and space domains
- Eliminate redundancy

Supply and Storage activities

- Transition traditional military logistics linear processes to a networked, force-focused construct, which minimizes the number of sites and reduces excess capacity
- Provides for increased jointness, enhanced supply chain efficiency and leveraged DoD buying power

Conclusion

Recommendations support Total Force operational flexibility and readiness sustainability.

Taken in conjunction with the substantial closures and realignments in prior rounds of BRAC, these recommendations:

- Align the infrastructure of the Department of the Navy with the forces it must support
- Identify savings that can be used for recapitalization and force structure investments

**STATEMENT OF
HONORABLE GORDON ENGLAND
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
BEFORE THE
BRAC COMMISSON
17 MAY 2005**



BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

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Statement
of
Anthony J. Principi

Chairman
2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Hearing of the Commission

1:30 PM
May 17th, 2005

216 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington D.C.

**

Good Afternoon,

I'm Anthony J. Principi, Chairman of the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission, or BRAC. I'm pleased to welcome the Honorable Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, and General Michael Hagee, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. They are joined by Anne Rathmell Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Infrastructure Strategy and Analysis, who is prepared to comment on the methodology employed by the Navy and Marine Corps in arriving at the recommended list.

As I have noted in my public remarks, the Congress entrusts our Armed Forces with vast, but not unlimited, resources. Every dollar consumed in redundant, unnecessary, obsolete, inappropriately designed or located infrastructure is a dollar not available to provide the training or research that could ensure continued dominance of the sea, air and land - the battle space -- in which our service members fight.

Today's hearing will help shed more light on the Navy and Marine Corps recommendations for restructuring our nation's defense installations, and harnessing this process to advance long-term transformation goals.

In support of that objective, we will hear testimony today from the Department of the Navy's decision-makers. I know that the Navy and Marine Corps have poured an enormous amount of time, energy, and brainpower into the final product that is the subject of our hearing. It is only logical and proper that our witnesses be afforded this opportunity to explain to the American public, and to our independent Commission, what they've proposed to do to the Navy and Marine Corps infrastructure that supports Joint military operations.

As I have previously stated publicly, this Commission takes its responsibility very seriously to provide an objective and independent analysis of these recommendations. We will carefully study each Navy, Marine Corps, and Department of Defense recommendation in a transparent manner, steadily seeking input from affected communities, to make sure they fully meet the Congressionally mandated selection criteria. Those recommendations that substantially deviate from the criteria, we will either modify or reject as the facts and circumstances warrant.

I now request our witnesses to stand for the administration of the oath required by the Base Closure and Realignment statute. The oath will be administered by Mr. Dan Cowhig.

Mr. Cowhig.

[witnesses to swear required oath]



BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

**Presentation of Recommendations and Methodology
NAVY**

OPEN SESSION

Tuesday, May 17, 2005
1:30 p .m.
216 Hart Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

The Honorable Gordon England
Secretary of Navy

Admiral Vern Clark, USN
Chief of Naval Operations

General Michael W. Hagee, USMC
Commandant of the Marine Corps

The Honorable Anne Rathmell Davis
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Infrastructure Strategy & Analysis

SWEARING IN OATH


Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give, and any other evidence that you may provide, are accurate and complete to the best of your knowledge and belief, so help you God?






GORDON R. ENGLAND

Secretary of the Navy



Gordon England was confirmed as the 73rd Secretary of the Navy on 26 September 2003 and sworn in on 1 October. He becomes only the second person in history to serve twice as the leader of the Navy-Marine Corps Team and the first to serve in back-to-back terms. Prior to his return to the Navy Department he was the first Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Homeland Security was established on January 24, 2003, to integrate 22 different agencies with a common mission to protect the American people.

Secretary England served as the 72nd Secretary of the Navy from May 24, 2001, until he joined the Homeland Security in January 2003. As Secretary of the Navy, Mr. England leads America's Navy and Marine Corps and is responsible for an annual budget in excess of \$110 B and more than 800,000 personnel.



Prior to joining the administration of President George W. Bush, Mr. England served as executive vice president of General Dynamics Corporation from 1997 until 2001. In that position he was responsible for two major sectors of the corporation: Information Systems and International. Previously, he served as executive vice president of the Combat Systems Group, president of General Dynamics Fort Worth aircraft company (later Lockheed), president of General Dynamics Land Systems Company and as the principal of a mergers and acquisition consulting company.

A native of Baltimore, Mr. England graduated from the University of Maryland in 1961 with a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering. In 1975 he earned a master's degree in business administration from the M.J. Neeley School of Business at Texas Christian University and is a member of various honorary societies: Beta Gamma Sigma (business), Omicron Delta Kappa (leadership) and Eta Kappa Nu (engineering).

Mr. England has been actively involved in a variety of civic, charitable and government organizations, including serving as a city councilman; Vice Chair, Board of Goodwill, International; the USO's Board of Governors; the Defense Science Board; the Board of Visitors at Texas Christian University; and many others.

He has been recognized for numerous professional and service contributions from multiple organizations such as Distinguished Alumnus Award from the University of Maryland; the Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Award; the Silver Beaver Award from the Boy Scouts of America; the Silver Knight of Management Award from the National Management Association; the Henry M. Jackson Award and the IEEE Centennial Award.



VERN CLARK

Chief of Naval Operations



Born in Sioux City, Iowa, and raised in the midwestern states of Nebraska, Missouri and Illinois, Admiral Clark graduated from Evangel College and earned a Master's Degree of Business Administration (MBA) from the University of Arkansas. He attended Officer Candidate School and received his commission in August 1968.

Admiral Clark served aboard the destroyers USS John W. Weeks (DD 701) and USS Gearing (DD 710). As a Lieutenant, he commanded USS Grand Rapids (PG 98). He subsequently commanded USS McCloy (FF 1038), USS Spruance (DD 963), the Atlantic Fleet's Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Center, Destroyer Squadron Seventeen, and Destroyer Squadron Five. After being selected for flag rank, Admiral Clark commanded the Carl Vinson Battle Group/Cruiser Destroyer Group Three, the Second Fleet, and the United States Atlantic Fleet.



Ashore, Admiral Clark first served as Special Assistant to the Director of the Systems Analysis Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He later completed assignments as the Administrative Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare) and as the Administrative Aide to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. He served as Head of the Cruiser-Destroyer Combat Systems Requirements Section and Force Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer for the Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and he directed the Joint Staff's Crisis Action Team for Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Admiral Clark's first flag assignment was at the U.S. Transportation Command where he was Director of both Plans and Policy (J5) and Financial Management and Analysis (J8). While commanding the Carl Vinson Battle Group, he deployed to the Arabian Gulf and later served as the Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia. Admiral Clark has also served as the Deputy and Chief of Staff, United States Atlantic Fleet; the Director of Operations (J3) and subsequently Director, of the Joint Staff.

Admiral Clark became the 27th Chief of Naval Operations on July 21, 2000.

Admiral Clark's personal decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal (three awards), the Distinguished Service Medal (two awards), the Legion of Merit (three awards), the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal (four awards), the Navy Commendation Medal, and various service and campaign awards.



MICHAEL W. HAGEE

Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps



General Hagee graduated with distinction from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1968 with a Bachelor of Science in Engineering. He also holds a Master of Science in Electrical Engineering from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He is a graduate of the Command and Staff College and the U.S. Naval War College.

General Hagee's command assignments include:

Commanding Officer Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (1970); Platoon Commander, Company A and Commanding Officer Headquarters and Service Company, First Battalion, First Marines (1970-1971); Commanding Officer, Waikale-West Loch Guard Company (1974-1976); Commanding Officer, Pearl Harbor Guard Company (1976-1977); Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines (1988-1990); Commanding Officer, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (1992-1993); Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (1998-1999); and Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (2000-2002).




General Hagee's staff assignments include: Communications-Electronics Officer, 1st Marine Air Command and Control Squadron (1971); Assistant Director, Telecommunications School (1972-1974); Training Officer, 3d Marine Division (1977-1978); Electrical Engineering Instructor, U.S. Naval Academy (1978-1981); Head, Officer Plans Section, Headquarters Marine Corps (1982-1986); Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, 2d Marine Division (1987-1988); Executive Officer, 8th Marines (1988); Director Humanities and Social Science Division/Marine Corps Representative, U.S. Naval Academy (1990-1992); Liaison Officer to the U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia (1992-1993); Executive Assistant to the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (1993-1994); Director, Character Development Division, United States Naval Academy (1994-1995); Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.; Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence (1995-1996); Deputy Director of Operations, Headquarters, U.S. European Command (1996-1998); and Director Strategic Plans and Policy, U.S. Pacific Command (1999-2000).

His personal decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with palm, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with two Gold Stars, Bronze Star with Combat "V", Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with one Gold Star, Navy Achievement Medal with one Gold Star, the Combat Action Ribbon, and the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal.



ANNE RATHMELL DAVIS
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Infrastructure Strategy & Analysis



Anne Rathmell Davis was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Infrastructure Strategy & Analysis) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment) in January 2002. She is responsible for basing and infrastructure requirements and policy determinations for the Department of the Navy, with primary responsibility for reviews and analysis to support the Department's base closures and realignment (BRAC). In July 2004, Ms. Davis was appointed as the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for Base Realignment and Closure where she is a member of the BRAC Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) and a co-chair for the BRAC Infrastructure Executive Group (IEG).




Ms. Davis received her B.A. in Political Science from Denison University, Granville, Ohio, in 1975 and her J.D. from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law in 1978. Commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1975, her initial assignments were with the 3d Force Service Support Group and the 3d Marine Division, Okinawa, Japan. She subsequently served in a variety of legal and administrative positions, including Head of the Legal Assistance Branch, Head of Real Estate Branch, Manpower Officer, and Associate Counsel for the Commandant in land use and environmental law, all at Headquarters, Marine Corps. While an active member of the Marine Corps Reserve, she held reserve billets with the Judge Advocate Division, Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Warfighting Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. Retained on active duty after being activated for Desert Shield/Desert Storm, she was assigned to the Base Structure Analysis Team, part of the Department of the Navy's organization for the 1993 base closure process, as the recording secretary and legal advisor.

Upon release from active duty in 1993, Ms. Davis became the Senior Counsel (Installations) within the Navy Office of the Assistant General Counsel (Installations and Environment), where she provided advice and counsel within the Navy Secretariat on real estate, installation, natural resources, and base closure issues and served as primary legal advisor to the Base Structure Evaluation Committee for the 1995 Department of the Navy base closure process. She transferred to the Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia, where she was the Senior Associate Counsel for Environmental and Special Programs, with primary cognizance over base closure, privatization, facilities, and environmental matters. Ms. Davis then held a term SES appointment as the Director, Investigation and Analysis, within the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses. Responsible for collection and evaluation of all information related to Gulf War veterans' illnesses, she managed a large government/contractor team tasked with the investigation of possible causes of Gulf War illnesses and with reporting the results of those investigations to veterans, the Department of

Defense, Presidential oversight committees, and Congress. Prior to assuming her current position, she was assigned as Associate Counsel to the Naval Supply Systems Command, Mechanicsburg, PA, with responsibility for legal advice and support to the Command and field activities on a full range of business and commercial issues, including performance-based logistics contracts and strategic sourcing.

Ms. Davis' civilian awards include a Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Award (1999), Department of the Navy Superior Civilian Service Awards (1996) (2004), and a Department of the Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Award (1995). Her military awards include a Legion of Merit (1993), two Meritorious Service Medals (1987, 1992), a Navy Commendation Medal (1983), and the Navy Achievement Medal (1985).



Suggested Questions from 2005 BRAC Commission to SecNav and CNO

Military Value of Nearby Shipyard

1. In some cases, the Military Value of a base is enhanced by the local presence of a large private firm, such as a shipyard.
 - a. When determining the Military Value of SUBASE New London, did you send the Electric Boat Corporation any "Data Calls" to determine the value of this close military-commercial relationship?
 - b. Was Electric Boat's proximity and capabilities factored into your evaluation of SUBASE New London?

Defense Industrial Base Value

2. Shipyard designers and engineers benefit from regular interaction with naval officers who can communicate directly their experiences and needs. Electric Boat's design and engineer workforce regularly consults with officers at SUBASE New London.
 - a. Did you consider the benefits of marrying U.S. sailors and shipbuilders?
 - b. Did you consider the impact divorcing this relationship at SUBASE New London will have for future undersea warfare developments at Electric Boat?

Skilled/Educated Workforce

3. Moving tenant commands will mean hiring civilian employees in new areas that may not have a workforce skilled or educated enough to support the transplanted mission. (500 Electric Boat employees play an important role in the day-to-day activities at the base).
 - a. Did you consider the employment challenge the Navy may face by moving missions away from thousands of civilian government and private sector workers already trained to support nuclear attack submarines.

On-Base Synergy

4. The Department of Defense sent individual "Data Calls" to multiple tenant commands collocated on each base and installation. SUBASE New London includes some 70 tenants, including the Naval Submarine School, the Submarine Learning Center, and Submarine Development Squadron Twelve, which is responsible for formulating and improving submarine tactics as well as for measuring the effectiveness of new boats and equipment.
 - a. Did you take into consideration the added value of synergistic relations on the bases?

**Suggested Commissioner Questions
Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

Hearing on Navy Recommendations and Methodology

Witnesses:

The Honorable Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy;
Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations; and
General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant, Marine Corps.

May 17, 2005

Force Structure

1. Describe the Navy in terms of the number of carriers, destroyers, and submarines that you used to identify the number of shipyards, naval stations, etc. that are needed. Please describe the future Marine Corps and the capabilities that will need to be supported.
2. How will the relocation of Mine Countermeasures Ships from Ingleside to San Diego affect support to U.S. east coast ports and deployment sites?

Shipyards

3. In the Navy recommendation for closure of the Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, ME, payback is expected within four years. Does this, as well as the "one-time" cost, take into account all costs associated with the proper movement and disposal of nuclear shipyard equipment and waste?

Depot Support

4. What are the most important changes in ship (Littoral Combat Ship) and aircraft (Joint Strike Fighter) design and capability that you see on the horizon that would impact naval depots?
5. A major part of the realignments consist of the integration of intermediate and depot level maintenance. What metrics were used in determining these consolidations?

Surge Capacity

6. If your recommendations are accepted, how much of a sustained increase in workload can our shipyards and Fleet Readiness Centers accept during a surge period without procuring additional equipment? Do you plan to move any major equipment from closing industrial facilities to those that are staying open?
7. Several justifications refer to a “maximum capacity of 1.5 shifts”. Why was that measure developed as shifts that are usually performed one, two or three times daily?

Environmental

8. For the record, what are the total environmental costs for the Navy under BRAC 2005 and how do these costs compare to the environmental costs of BRAC 93 & 95?
9. Were environmental remediation costs about what was expected? Are there any Navy or USMC bases that you will not recommend for closure because of environmental costs? Is there any indication that, with time, costs may be mitigated either through technological improvement or simply through the effects of time? If so, is the argument that the Navy has to pay the bill eventually still valid?

10. The Navy has performed Scenarios of Environment Impacts for each of the recommended closures and realignments and concluded that no environmental impacts would preclude implementing any of the recommendations. Since neither reuse plans nor studies to identify related environmental restoration requirements have been initiated, how were final restoration costs determined?
11. What were the environmental lessons learned from the previous BRACs that were incorporated into the 2005 recommended closures and realignments?
12. Were there opportunities to create joint functions that did not materialize? Did the Navy consider allowing other Services to become the DOD “center of excellence” for additional functions? ✓
13. Would the Navy consider leasing space to other Government agencies on bases where it has sufficient capacity if it were permitted to do so?
14. Based on the Navy’s list of recommendations there are numerous functions to be consolidated, reduced, transferred, relocated and realigned not only with joint services but more so within the Navy Department. Please tell the commission why so many of Navy’s functions are so misaligned now and were not resolved in previous BRACs? What assurance do we have that the closures and realignments recommended to the commission will improve the Navy’s effectiveness and efficiencies over what has not happen in prior BRACs?

Research & Development

15. Explain how the Navy defined capacity for laboratories and technical facilities. Is capacity a useful measure for such activities?
16. Do you perceive that the Navy and Marine Corps have been unduly hampered in its quest to reduce the number of Navy and USMC Reserve Centers by state and local issues? What states have resisted closure recommendations? Why did the Navy find it necessary to include the many, relatively small, Reserve centers in the BRAC process when the Department could have handled them independently?

Support Functions

17. There is a large move to China Lake in the Department's recommendations. Is there sufficient capacity to accommodate the influx of functions and personnel? If not, what are your plans to achieve such capacity?
18. Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow is transferring significant capability to a variety of other facilities. Will this move provide sufficient responsive capacity to properly support Marine Corps needs?

General Topics

19. Previous BRAC decisions appear to be reversed in the 2005 recommendations. For example, Officer Candidate School was moved from Newport, RI to Pensacola and now you're recommending sending it back to Newport. You are making sweeping changes to your Naval Aviation Depots and Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Facilities as well. How permanently do you view these current sweeping recommendations?
20. Have your BRAC recommendations provided for the Navy's ability to provide space and logistic support if it becomes necessary for ships to provide capabilities between the Atlantic and Pacific arenas?
21. Recently there has been renewed interest in agility and quick response. Are we at a disadvantage in places like Seattle and Bremerton where there are long "sea and anchor" details before ships reach the open sea? Does the San Francisco Bay area look more attractive as a homeport than it did ten years ago?
22. Please describe to us the "Sea Swap" initiative that keeps some of the Navy capability forward-positioned and explain how that affected BRAC deliberations on home porting, naval stations, and naval air stations.



BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION

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**Statement of Commissioner Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr.,
2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Hearing of the Commission
May 19th, 2005, 9:30 AM
216 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington D.C.**

**

Good Morning,

I'm Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., a Commissioner proudly serving on the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, or BRAC. Our Chairman of the Commission, former Department of Veterans' Affairs Secretary Anthony J. Principi, cannot be here this morning to chair today's hearing due to a previous and long-held commitment.

That said, I'm pleased to welcome The Honorable (Dr.) Ronald M. Sega, Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), Lieutenant General (Dr.) George Peach Taylor, Jr., Surgeon General of the Air Force, and Mr. Donald C. Tison, Deputy G8, US Army. These three individuals are the lead DoD officials for Technology, Medical, and Headquarters and Support Activities in the Joint Cross-Service Groups.

Today's hearing is intended to shed more light on the Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations for restructuring our nation's defense installations, and harnessing this process to advance long-term transformation goals. Clearly, the work of the Joint Cross Service Groups was much different – and much more extensive – than any prior round of BRAC analysis conducted by the Department of Defense.

As I noted at yesterday afternoon's hearing on Joint Cross Service issues, we are aware that you have devoted an enormous amount of time, energy, and brainpower into the final product that is the subject of our hearing. It is only logical and proper, therefore, that we afford you this opportunity to explain to the American public, and to our independent Commission, what you have proposed to do, how you propose to implement these plans, and the underlying rationale for your recommendations.

This Commission takes its responsibility very seriously to provide an objective and independent analysis of these recommendations. We will carefully study your recommendations in a transparent manner, steadily seeking input from affected communities, to make sure they fully meet the Congressionally mandated requirements.

I now request our witnesses to stand for the administration of the oath required by the Base Closure and Realignment statute. The oath will be administered by Mr. Dan Cowhig. Mr. Cowhig. [witnesses to swear required oath]





BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

**Presentation of Recommendations
and Methodology
DOD's Joint Cross-Service Groups
OPEN SESSION**

Thursday, May 19, 2004
9:30 a.m.
216 Hart Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

The Honorable Dr. Ronald M. Segal
Director of Defense
Research and Engineering (DDR&E)

Lieutenant General Dr. George Peach Taylor, Jr.
Surgeon General of the Air Force

Mr. Donald C. Tison
Deputy G-8, U.S. Army

SWEARING IN OATH

Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give, and any other evidence that you may provide, are accurate and complete to the best of your knowledge and belief, so help you God?





RONALD M. SEGA

Director of Defense

Research and Engineering (DDR&E)



The Honorable Ronald M. Segal, Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), is the chief technology officer for the Department of Defense and the principal technical advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD-AT&L) for scientific and technical matters, basic and applied research, advanced technology development, and advanced component development prototyping. Dr. Segal also has management oversight for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).



Dr. Segal has had an extensive career in academia, research, and government service. He began his academic career as a faculty member in the Department of Physics at the U.S. Air Force Academy. His research activities in electromagnetic fields led to a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from the University of Colorado. He was appointed as Assistant Professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs in 1982. In addition to teaching and research activities, he also served as the Technical Director of the Laser and Aerospace Mechanics Directorate at the F.J. Seiler Research Laboratory and at the University of Houston as the Assistant Director of Flight Programs and Program Manager for the Wake Shield Facility. Dr. Segal became the Dean, College of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs in 1996. Dr. Segal has authored or co-authored over 100 technical publications and was promoted to Professor in 1990. He is also a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), and the Institute for the Advancement of Engineering (IAE).

In 1990, Dr. Segal joined NASA, becoming an astronaut in July 1991. He served as a mission specialist on two Space Shuttle Flights, STS-60 in 1994, the first joint U.S. Russian Space Shuttle Mission and the first flight of the Wake Shield Facility, and STS-76 in 1996, the third docking mission to the Russian space station Mir where he was the Payload Commander. He was also the Co-Principal Investigator for the Wake Shield Facility and the Director of Operations for NASA activities at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center, Russia, in 1994-95.

Dr. Segal has also been active in the Air Force Reserves. A Command Pilot in the Air Force with over 4,000 hours, he has served in various operational flying assignments, including a tour of duty as an Instructor Pilot. From 1984 to 2001, as a reservist assigned to Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), he held positions in planning analysis and operational activities, including Mission Ready Crew Commander for satellite operations -- Global Positioning System (GPS) -- Defense Support Program (DSP), and Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX), etc. He was promoted to the rank of Major General in the Air Force Reserves in July 2001.

Written Statement
of the
Technical Joint Cross Service Group
Before the
BRAC Commission

Introduction

Good morning Commissioner Principi and members of the Commission. Thank you for the opportunity to explain the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process as viewed through the perspective the Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG). The TJCSG is one of seven functional groups formed by the Secretary of Defense following the Secretary's November 2002 announcement of BRAC 2005.

I am Ron Segal, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. I address you today in a different role; the role of Chairman of the Technical Joint Cross Service Group. The other TJCSG members were nominated by the Military Services and appointed by the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG), one from each of the Services and one from the Joint Staff. Our analyses and recommendations are found in Volume XII. These recommendations represent the unanimous position of the TJCSG.

Organization and Charter

The Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) was chartered to evaluate and make specific recommendations to close or realign technical facilities. The technical facilities were categorized into three functions:

- Research (R)
- Development and Acquisition (D&A)
- Test and Evaluation (T&E)

To organize the group's review and deliberations, five subgroups were established, each of which took responsibility for evaluating a set of technical activities. The subgroups were: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C4ISR); Air, Land, Sea, and Space Systems (ALSS);

Weapons and Armaments (Wpn); Innovative Systems (IS); and Enabling Technology (ET). As directed by the TJCSG, the subgroups conducted detailed analyses for capacity, military value, scenario development and analysis, and ultimately developed and evaluated candidate recommendations for submission to the ISG. At each stage of the analysis, the TJCSG reviewed subgroup findings and provided oversight and direction that shaped subsequent analysis. A Capability Integration Team (CIT) and an Analytical Team also supported the efforts of the subgroups. Figure 1 depicts the organization structure. This organization's approach encouraged different perspectives toward a future technical infrastructure for the Department.




Figure 1. TJCSG organizational structure

The TJCSG also coordinated with the other Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSG). The most frequent coordinations were with the Education and Training (E&T) JCSG; the Headquarters and Support Activity (H&SA) JCSG; the Medical JCSG; and the Intelligence (Intel) JCSG.

Overarching Strategy and Recommendation Framework

The TJCSG recognized the challenge of developing an RDAT&E infrastructure that would address the Department of Defense needs for the next 20 years in a global environment where knowledge and technology are changing rapidly. The needs for the next 20 years should be different than today. Technology development is becoming increasingly multidisciplinary and multifunctional in nature, with maturation time in many disciplines becoming shorter. Knowledge creation is increasing globally. These factors suggested the need for an end state with greater agility and surge capability across disciplines and functions, and led to an installation configuration that includes multidisciplinary and multifunctional Centers of Excellence. The multidisciplinary centers should provide an environment for innovation and the multifunctional centers should support reducing cycle times from the generation of ideas to the fielding of enhanced operational capabilities. The challenge for the future is depicted in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2. Transformed RDAT&E Capability

The TJCSG began by developing characteristics to identify facilities that currently perform RDAT&E work. The ability to enable technical warfighting capability, synergy with other organizations (both inside and outside the DoD), and execution of Congressionally appropriated R, D&A or T&E funds were primary discriminators to differentiate among facilities. The DoD organizations that have these characteristics cover a domain of approximately 650 technical facilities, located at 146 installations. These technical facilities employ approximately 159,000 full-time equivalent (FTE) government and on-site contractor personnel. DoD technical facilities executed approximately \$130 billion in funding for fiscal year 2003, and by their efforts produced a number of new and enhanced technical capabilities and systems.

Principles and Strategies

The TJCSG established two overarching principals and an overarching strategic framework. These two principles were:

- Provide efficiency of operations by consolidating technical facilities to enhance synergy and reduce excess capacity.
- Maintain competition of ideas by retaining at least two geographically separated sites, each of which would have similar combination of technologies and functions. This will also provide continuity of operations in the event of unexpected disruptions.

Consistent with these two principles, the TJCSG also developed a strategic framework centered on establishing multifunctional and multidisciplinary technical (RDAT&E) Centers of Excellence. This strategy emphasized developing synergies, either

crossfunctional (for example, combining research with development and acquisition or test and evaluation) and/or cross-technical (for example, coupling materials and electronics platforms). These Centers of Excellence are designed to maximize the synergies and efficiencies of the work these facilities produce.

Using these concepts and the strategic framework, the TJCSG provided recommendations that result in the following constructs:

- Defense Research Laboratories that conduct basic and applied (and in some cases more mature) research in multiple technology areas and co-locate research program managers that primarily contract to industry, academia, or other government laboratories.
- Integrated Research (R), Development and Acquisition (D&A), and Test and Evaluation (T&E) Centers across DoD technology areas that are involved with maturing platforms and capabilities.
- Integrated C4ISR Centers intended to enable an advanced joint battlespace awareness capability while initially emphasizing RDT&E domain centers for ground, maritime, air, and space. This recommended infrastructure should also enable a future joint management structure.

Strategic Framework

As the analytical process evolved, the TJCSG framed its analysis, consistent with the strategic framework, into the three constructs described above. The TJCSG further divided these three constructs into subsets, as depicted in Figure 3. This subdivision enabled the group to examine the DoD infrastructure required in two critical dimensions:

the first being the RDAT&E functions required for a specific capability area (e.g., employing air platforms, weapons, information systems, etc.); and the second being the disciplines and functions required to support multiple capability areas (e.g., human systems research for air, land, sea, and space platforms).




Figure 3. TJCSG Strategic Framework

In this way, a technical facility was evaluated both for military value for specific classes and types of weapon systems (corresponding to each of the 13 technical capability areas identified in the Defense Technology Area Plan) and military value for its cross-cutting technical value (corresponding combinations of more than one technical capability area and/or more than one of the three technical functions) to enable or enhance warfighting capabilities.

Throughout the process, the TJCSG interacted with the Services for single Service recommendations, plus the Intelligence JCSG for the Integrated C4ISR Centers, the

Headquarters and Support Agency JCSG for specific movement of headquarters elements, the Medical JCSG for Chemical Biological Defense and Defense Research Laboratories, and the Education and Training JCSG for Test and Evaluation capability, particularly for the open air ranges.

Recommendations and Conclusion

The Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) conducted a fair and comprehensive process consistent with Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, and in accordance with guidance from the Secretary of Defense. The TJCSG developed the recommendations through an Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) endorsed strategy-driven approach using the approved criteria and methodology described in TJCSG Analyses and Recommendations (Volume XII). These decisions were made carefully through a rigorous process. All recommendations represent a unanimous view from the TJCSG. We believe the implementation of these RDAT&E recommendations will enable the Department to provide advanced, agile and adaptable technical capabilities for our warfighters. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to represent the work of the Technical Joint Cross Service Group.



LIEUTENANT GENERAL
DR. GEORGE PEACH TAYLOR, JR.



Surgeon General of the Air Force

Lt. Gen. (Dr.) George Peach Taylor Jr. is the Surgeon General of the Air Force, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. General Taylor serves as functional manager of the U.S. Air Force Medical Service. In this capacity, he advises the Secretary of the Air Force and Air Force Chief of Staff, as well as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs on matters pertaining to the medical aspects of the air expeditionary force and the health of Air Force people. General Taylor has authority to commit resources worldwide for the Air Force Medical Service, to make decisions affecting the delivery of medical services, and to develop plans, programs and procedures to support worldwide medical service missions. He exercises direction, guidance and technical management of more than 42,400 people assigned to 78 medical facilities worldwide.



General Taylor was born in Birmingham, Ala., and graduated from Rice University with degrees in physics and Russian language. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Force Reserve through the Health Professions Scholarship Program. Following his graduation from Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, Texas, and subsequent internship in Greenville, S.C., General Taylor entered active duty in 1979 as a flight surgeon assigned to an F-15 squadron at Kadena Air Base, Japan. Subsequent assignments included flight test, depot and hospital command.

General Taylor is board certified in aerospace medicine by the American Board of Preventive Medicine. He was the Command Surgeon with U.S. Air Forces in Europe at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, where he served as the TRICARE Regional Director for Europe for one year. In addition, he was the Air Force Forward Surgeon during operations Allied Force and Shining Hope. He served as the Command Surgeon for Air Combat Command where he molded the Air Force medical response to Sept. 11, Operation Noble Eagle, and Operation Enduring Freedom. Prior to assuming his current position, General Taylor was the Assistant Surgeon General for Expeditionary Operations, Science and Technology, Office of the Surgeon General. As a Chief Flight Surgeon, General Taylor has more than 1,600 hours flight hours in a variety of aircraft. He has substantial experience in fighter and flight test operations, and has served as a military consultant to the Air Force Surgeon General for Aerospace Medicine.

EDUCATION

- 1977 Bachelor of Arts degree in physics and Russian language, Rice University, Houston, Texas
- 1978 Doctor of medicine, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas
- 1984 Master's degree in public health, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, Mass.
- 1985 Residency in aerospace medicine, U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, Brooks AFB, Texas
- 1993 National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. October 1979 - March 1981, Chief of Flight Medicine, U.S. Air Force Clinic, and Squadron Flight Surgeon, 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Kadena AB, Japan
2. April 1981 - August 1983, Chief of Aerospace Medicine, Detachment 3, Air Force Flight Test Center, Henderson, Nev.
3. September 1983 - June 1984, student, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, Mass.
4. July 1984 - June 1985, resident, U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, Brooks AFB, Texas
5. July 1985 - June 1988, Chief of Aerospace Medicine and Commander of the Air Transportable Hospital, U.S. Air Force Hospital, Torrejon AB, Spain

6. July 1988 - June 1990, medical inspector of active-duty forces, Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, Norton AFB, Calif.
7. June 1990 - July 1992, Chief of Aerospace Medicine, U.S. Air Force Hospital, Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, Calif.
8. August 1992 - June 1993, student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
9. July 1993 - April 1995, Commander and Director of Base Medical Services, 75th Medical Group, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill AFB, Utah
10. May 1995 - June 1996, Chief, Aerospace Medicine Division, later, Deputy Director, Air Force Medical Operations Agency, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.
11. June 1996 - June 1997, Associate Director, later, Director of Medical Programs and Resources, Office of the Surgeon General, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.
12. June 1997 - July 2000, Command Surgeon, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany
13. July 2000 - January 2002, Command Surgeon, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Va.
14. January 2002 - June 2002, Assistant Surgeon General for Expeditionary Operations, Science and Technology, Office of the Surgeon General, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.
15. July 2002 - September 2002, Special Assistant to the Surgeon General of the Air Force, Office of the Surgeon General, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.
16. October 2002 - present, Surgeon General of the Air Force, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Chief flight surgeon

Flight hours: More than 1,600

Aircraft: F-15D, F-16B/D, C-5, C-12, C-21, C-130, C-141, KC-135, T-37, T-38 and T-39

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster

Bronze Star Medal

Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters

Air Force Commendation Medal

Air Force Achievement Medal

Air Force Recognition Ribbon

Gold Cross of Honor of the Bundeswehr (Germany)

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

Malcolm C. Grow Award for Air Force's Flight Surgeon of the Year

Fellow, American College of Preventive Medicine

Medical license: Texas

Fellow and council member, Aerospace Medical Association

Former President, American Society of Aerospace Medicine Specialists

Former President, Society of U.S. Air Force Flight Surgeons

American Medical Association

Association of Military Surgeons of the United States

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Captain July 2, 1979

Major June 5, 1984

Lieutenant Colonel Sept. 30, 1989

Colonel May 31, 1994

Brigadier General April 1, 2000

Major General July 1, 2002

Lieutenant General Dec. 1, 2002

WRITTEN STATEMENT

To the

2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission

STATEMENT OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE P. TAYLOR

AIR FORCE SURGEON GENERAL

CHAIRMAN, MEDICAL JOINT-CROSS SERVICE GROUP

16 May 2005

As the Air Force Surgeon General, I had the privilege to Chair the Medical Joint Cross Service Group. Other Principal members of my Group were the Navy Surgeon General, the Deputy Surgeon General of the Army, the Joint Staff Surgeon, the Medical officer for the Marine Corps and the Chief Financial Officer for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.

The MJCSG was charged with identifying, analyzing, and quantifying all functions within the DoD Healthcare System. These assigned functions included: Healthcare Education and Training, Healthcare Services, and Medical and Dental Research, Development, and Acquisition.

Today injured Marines can be moved from the streets of Fallujah to Bethesda in less than 48 hours. The Global War On Terrorism has emphasized the value of joint, interoperable, and highly trained medics. Jointly staffed medical treatment facilities exist today at Balad Air Base, Iraq, and have been in place for over 10 years at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany. We also are very mindful of our great commitment to the over nine million beneficiaries who depend on the Military Healthcare System for their care. With these clearly in mind, the MJCSG sub-group employed specific strategies for evaluating its functions.

Overseen by the General Accounting Office and the DOD Inspector General, we gathered certified data from the field to assess capacity and a create a quantitatively derived measure to inform our assessment of the military value of the entire military medical and dental infrastructure in the United States.

Our review of overall medical capacity revealed little excess in dental, primary care or subspecialty outpatient. However, we found substantial inpatient capacity, well in excess of current use, even with the casualty streams over the past three years. As a result, a threefold approach was developed.

First, the MCJSG analyzed data (using the DoD approved optimization model) to identify an optimal level of reduced excess capacity and improved average military value in the DoD Healthcare System as a whole, while maintaining sufficient workload to ensure provider currency and surge capability.

Secondly, we evaluated hospitals' efficiency at providing inpatient care in an effort to reduce excess capacity by disestablishing inpatient services at those facilities with very small inpatient activities, as long as adequate local civilian capacity existed. Third, the MJCSG assessed Multi-Service Markets (MSMs) to determine if excess capacity could be reduced in each MSM. For both the second and third approaches, the MJCSG's goal was to ensure services would be located where they would best meet the beneficiary demand.

The Medical and Dental Research, Development and Acquisition subgroup evaluated all aspects of DoD's ability to sustain those capabilities required to effectively discover, develop, acquire and field, medical solutions to address evolving warfighter needs. This evaluation included all aspects of medical and dental research and development from basic research to advanced demonstration, and encompassed both the initial procurement of developmental

OH, to align them with the Air Force's Aerospace Research, development and Acquisition activities. Along with other realignments, this will enable the military to completely leave the City-Base.

4. Close inpatient activities at nine hospitals, converting them to large ambulatory surgery facilities, leveraging the local civilian network for inpatient care; and
5. Create six new Centers of Excellence in Biomedical Research

The implementation of all of our recommendations will call for an investment of \$2.4B in new medical infrastructure, but again will result in over \$400M in enduring saving annually for the Department.

These MJCSG recommendations are our assessment of what is best for DoD as the Department moves forward into the 21st Century. I am pleased and gratified with the MJCSG's efforts. We look forward to the Commission's review of these, keeping, we hope, in their focus, the principles that have guided our deliberations to provide access to high quality healthcare to the war-fighter and our beneficiaries.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to address you. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have and to an ongoing dialogue we trust will move us all closer to our jointly held goal to serve those who have and are serving our country.



MR. DONALD C. TISON

G-8, Department of the Army



Don Tison currently serves as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, responsible for Army Programs, Force Development, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Army Studies Management, and the Concept Analysis Agency (CAA). In this capacity, he is the principal advisor to the G-8 with responsibility for providing professional advice to the G-8 on key issues to include formulating plans and programs, acquiring resources, developing communication networks, executing operations, and evaluating results



Prior to this position, Don Tison served as the Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PAED) from January 2001 to January 2003. He was responsible for Army planning, programming and budgeting matters. As the senior civilian in PAED, he was responsible for a broad range of independent and unique duties that revolved around the Army program development in support of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

Don Tison received his B.S in Business Administration from The Citadel and his M.B.A. (with distinction) from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. He is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the Program Managers Course at the Defense Systems Management College. In 1997, he completed the Columbia University Senior Executive Program. From December 1997 to January 2001, Don Tison served as the Director, Force and Infrastructure Cost Analysis Division for OSD, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). In that capacity, he was responsible for force structure and infrastructure costing, operations and support cost analysis including facilities and logistics assessments, defense agency performance contracts, and weapons systems costing as part of the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG). Before accepting this position, Don Tison had completed a distinguished career in the Navy Supply Corps rising to the rank of Captain. He has had extensive logistics, financial, manpower, and acquisition experience including afloat tours on submarines, tenders, cruisers and large deck amphibious warships. His financial experience includes serving as Deputy Comptroller at the Defense Logistics Agency. He served as Head of the Requirements Branch for the Naval Supply Systems Office of Personnel responsible for promotion, accession, and strength plans for the Navy Supply Corps. His acquisition experience includes his position as Business/Financial Manager, Defense Suppression Systems Program Office (PMA-242) and he has been designated an Acquisition Professional

Don Tison was raised in Silver Spring, Maryland and resides in Fairfax Station, Virginia, with his wife, Annette; daughter, Jennifer; and son, Daniel.

EDUCATION: B.S., Business Administration, The Citadel, 1975; M.B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1984

HONORS, AWARDS, AND SPECIAL ACHIEVEMENTS: Exceptional Civilian Service Award; Defense Superior Service Medal (2); Meritorious Service Medal (3)

Statement for the Record
of
Mr. Donald C. Tison
United States Army Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8
and
Chairman of the Headquarters and Support Activities
Joint Cross Service Group
before the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
May 19, 2005

Administration and Headquarters Subgroup, led by the Commandant of Naval District Washington, Rear Admiral Jan Gaudio. The other HSA JCSG members were Mr. Howard Becker, Deputy Director of Administration and Management for OSD, and Brigadier General (Select) Dan Woodward from the Joint Staff's, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J8.

The Geographic Clusters and Functional Subgroup analyzed the common functions of Financial Management, Communications/Information Technology, Personnel Management, Corrections, Installation Management, and the missions of selected Defense Agencies. The Mobilization Subgroup analyzed the function of Joint Mobilization. The Major Administration and Headquarters Subgroup analyzed all headquarters located within 100 miles of the Pentagon (the "DC Area"), selected headquarters outside the 100-mile radius, and common support functions (headquarters back-shop functions).

Strategy

The HSA JCSG was responsible for the comprehensive review of assigned functions, the evaluation of alternatives, and the development and documentation of realignment and closure recommendations for submission to the Secretary of Defense. In developing our analytical process, the HSA JCSG established internal policies and procedures consistent with: Department of Defense (DoD) policy memoranda, Force Structure Plan and installation inventory; BRAC selection criteria; and the requirements of Public Law 101-510 as amended. The HSA JCSG plan of action was to establish the scope of the effort, conduct an inventory of facilities performing the functions evaluated and use capacity analysis to narrow the focus in order to maximize potential results driven by military value.

Early on in the process, general guiding principles, that provided an overarching strategy, were debated and approved by HSA JCSG leadership. The principles are: improve

capacity analysis. They developed analytical models whose results became the foundation of our recommendations – military value analysis. The team implemented models to assist in the development of scenarios, and they provided quantitative methods to support consideration of the impacts of recommendations on costs, quality of life, economic issues and environmental factors. They also provided sensitivity analyses that supported our deliberations. In short, their objectivity and the supportive power of their analysis helped HSA JCSG build strong, robust recommendations.

Capacity Analysis

Capacity analysis identified the current inventory of administrative space on military installations and classified that space as either currently occupied or vacant. This information assisted in targeting for further investigation as potential relocation sites to consider in the scenario development process.

The amount of administrative space currently in use was the primary focus of analysis and was obtained through responses to Capacity Data Calls. Data call responses for current capacity, maximum potential capacity, current usage of space, and space required to surge provided data to determine the amount of excess administrative space in each of the functional areas assigned to the HSA JCSG. A single common standard was used in our analysis to facilitate direct comparison of excess across the Military Departments and other DoD organizations. Surge capacity requirements were determined from planning guidance, contingency and operation plans, Capacity Data Call questions or functional expertise.

Excess capacity was determined by using the maximum potential capacity less current usage and surge capacity requirements. For this analysis, excess capacity is reported as a percentage of the maximum potential capacity. For example, 35% excess capacity indicates that an entity currently has 35% more space than is required for its current and

cases where mitigating factors or other unique conditions may not have been adequately considered as a function of the JCSG strategy or quantitative models.

Force Structure Plan

The 20-Year Force Structure plan was considered, in general, through investigation of end strength levels and changes made to major operational forces, as well as three specific approaches to fully address HSA JCSG requirements.

The first specific approach involved Force & Infrastructure Category codes which are a framework for organizing the Program Elements from the Future Years Defense Plan.

The second approach to force structure analysis specifically addressed OSD-level entities. Each Defense agency, operating agency or activity, and the Joint Staff were sent memoranda requesting an independent assessment of the impact of the force structure plan on their organizations.

The third approach to force structure analysis was developed for the Corrections Team, because the other approaches did not provide sufficient resolution. A relationship between current inmate population and current end strength levels was developed and then projected to the end strength levels shown in the force structure plan to forecast inmate level requirements of the future.

Those specific approaches to force structure analysis ensured that the current suite of recommendations is consistent with and able to meet the requirements stipulated in the 20-Year Force Structure Report.

Surge Requirements

Because of the unique breadth of the functions under the charter of the HSA JCSG, we required a variety of approaches to consider surge requirements. The Installation

- Consolidation of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. This action accomplishes a major facilities reduction and business line mission realignment, transforming the current DFAS organization into an optimum facilities and business operations configuration, which includes strategic redundancy to minimize risk.
- Joint Basing. Installation management functions will be consolidated at twelve installations that share a common boundary or are in close proximity to each other. There is significant opportunity to reduce duplication of efforts with resulting reduction of overall manpower and facilities requirements capable of generating significant savings.
- Joint Corrections. This realignment and consolidation facilitates the creation of a Joint DoD Correctional system, improves jointness, reduces footprint, centralizes joint corrections training; builds new facilities which will provide significant improvements in terms of safety, security, efficiency and costs.
- Human Resources Centers of Excellence. On the military personnel side, we are recommending the creation of Centers of Excellence to consolidate active duty and reserve military personnel centers to better serve our personnel in a Total Force environment. On the civilian personnel side, we are taking advantage of the efficiencies that will be gained through improved technology and the transition to the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) to reduce our footprint. In addition, this recommendation supports the Administration's goal to consolidate and streamline government civilian personnel servicing.

In closing, our recommendations will ultimately enable the Defense Department to achieve substantial savings while improving common business-related functions and

**Suggested Commissioner Questions
Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

Hearing on Joint Cross-Service Recommendations and Methodology

Witnesses:

Technology: The Honorable (Dr.) Ronald M. Sega,
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E);
Medical: Lieutenant General (Dr.) George Peach Taylor, Jr.,
Surgeon General of the Air Force;
Headquarters & Support Activities: Mr. Donald C. Tison,
Deputy G8, US Army
May 19, 2005

Technical

1. Please explain your rationale to close Corona and why this expense in dollars and in human capital justifies making this decision. NSWC Corona's key mission is to provide:
 - a. Independent Assessment Capability with a senior, specialized staff (over 50% advanced degrees and Professional Engineers (PE)).
 - b. Metrology and Calibration Laboratories in a new, sophisticated calibration and specialized (one of a kind) machine shop in a totally environmentally controlled facility.
 - c. The closure and realignment of Corona to Naval Air Station Point Mugu, seems not to meet any military value criteria. There are basically no savings over the 20 year payback period (\$0.4M) for this closure. In addition, there is a "risk" of dismantling the Independent Assessment capability by "breaking-up" the human capital and aligning it where the independence could be lost. It appears to be cheaper and of more military value to do nothing in the case of Corona.
2. Why were no facility closures recommended by the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group to eliminate excess capacity?

China Lake

3. Test and evaluation facilities, including the formal development test and evaluation and operational test evaluation functions appear to have been blurred and not specifically addressed by the Technical Joint Cross-Service Groups.
 - a. Why were no specific recommendations made that address elimination of excess capacity among test and evaluation facilities?
 - b. What was the rationale behind the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group decision to retain duplicate capabilities at unspecified separated sites, each of which would have a similar combination of technologies and functions?

Is this duplication in capabilities intended to provide "surge" capability? If so, what is the nature of such needed surge capability?
 - c. Specifically how much excess capacity among laboratories and test facilities was identified and eliminated by the Joint Cross Service Group?
4. The BRAC report states that the Technical Joint Cross Service Group recommended nine closures and transferred those recommendations to the respective military services or other Joint Cross Service Groups for inclusion in their recommendations? What was the outcome of those transferred recommendations?
5. One of the Technical Joint Cross Service Group recommendations calls for realignment of Patrick Air Force Base functions and relocating nuclear test and evaluation to the Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Kings Bay, GA. What missions will remain at Patrick after this realignment and what consideration was given to closing Patrick? ✓

1 Economic Area

Crane Dndmg

6. Several laboratory realignments are included within the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations. To achieve greater jointness among the military departments and to eliminate excess capacity, why weren't "super labs" created that could accommodate the needs of all the military and other agency services within specific technical areas?

Medical

7. How will the military medical system under its new configuration be able to support readiness requirements particularly as it pertains to accommodating mobilization and surge capacity?
8. How will the proposed reconfigured medical functions enhance active duty soldiers, active duty family members, guard and reserve and their family members, and retirees capabilities of obtaining needed medical care?
9. Active duty soldiers, active duty family members, guard and reserve and their family members, and retirees have long sought and received medical care at locations (medical treatment facilities, community hospitals or clinics) that are losing medical functions through BRAC. They will have to seek care either through TRICARE, other private providers or Medicare? Have you developed costs for these changes in medical treatment? Please provide the magnitude of these costs. I assume they are contained in the data the commission will receive. Is my assumption correct?

9 mil folks in mil medical system
3 mil go to mil facilities VA Hospital

10. The Walter Reed Army Medical Center has assisted service members, their families and retirees for a very long time. Presently, the Walter Reed Health Center provides comprehensive health care for more than 150,000 soldiers, other service members, family members and retirees in the National Capital Area.

- a. How will relocating tertiary medical services to the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda and primary and specialty patient care to Fort Belvoir impact Walter Reed's current patient population?
- b. By moving patient care to two separate locations how can you be assured that those eligible for and needing medical treatment will be able to access that care?

11. The Walter Reed Army Medical Center in addition to providing medical care also has an education mission, and provides training to a wide range of medical professionals. How and/or where will training of those medical professionals take place in the future?

12. What services and/or functions will remain at Walter Reed? Why wasn't this action considered a closure?

13. It has been recommended in nine locations that hospitals be converted to clinics with ambulatory surgery centers and that the civilian medical network be relied upon for inpatient services.

How can active duty service members, their beneficiaries and retirees be assured that in those nine locations they will be able to access inpatient medical care in a timely manner?

14. To promote jointness and reduce excess capacity, it has been proposed that medical functions at McChord AFB, in WA be relocated to Fort Lewis, WA. This realignment is expected to shift about 169 military and civilian authorizations. Will this be an expansion of medical services at Fort Lewis? How would medical services/functions be combined?

15. We have heard much about how the joint cross-service teams worked with the other teams. In reviewing the Brooks City Base proposal, functions like AF Audit, the Recruiting Squadron and any remaining organizations were included along with the medical moves. It appears that this or portions of this proposal could have been part of their proposed recommendations. How did you coordinate this with the AF team?

Headquarters & Support Activities

16. Joint Cross Service (H&SA) recommendations include vacating all leased space in the National Capital Region – approximately 22,925 jobs, most of which are recommended for relocation to military installations in the National Capital Region. The number presumably covers the military departments and OSD agencies/offices and the thousands of military, civilian, and contractor employees currently residing in leased locations. Recommendations specific to Army, Air Force, National Guard and OSD identify affected agencies (so, actual numbers of jobs/personnel can be derived), leased locations including street addresses, and at least the general relocation site.

For example, Air Force offices/agencies currently in Northern Virginia leased locations are recommended to relocate to Andrews Air Force Base; Security Clearance Adjudication Activities in leased locations throughout the country are recommended to relocate to Ft Meade, MD; Army offices/agencies currently in Northern Virginia are recommended to relocate to Ft Belvoir, etc.

However, the recommendation for Navy leased space states only, "Relocate all Department of the Navy organizations to DoD owned space in the National Capital Region, " with the allowance that "the most likely relocation sites are the Arlington Service Center, Anacostia Annex, and the Washington Navy Yard."

Is there a list of specific Navy offices/agencies along with their currently leased space, and a recommendation for specific relocation sites? It appears the Navy is asking this commission for a "blank check." How did you cost the Navy moves if you can't say, with some specificity, where these navy organizations will move?

17. The unspecified Navy agencies/offices mentioned above are currently residing in approximately 228,000 gross square footage in Crystal Park 1, 3 and 5; Crystal Square 2 and 3; Crystal Gateway 3 and 4; Crystal Mall 2 and 3; 1400-1450 S. Eads Street, 2300 Clarendon Blvd; and 284,000 gross square footage in Federal Office Building 2 (fondly known as the Navy Annex), which is already scheduled for closure by a process other than BRAC. The sites recommended for consideration as potential relocation sites include Arlington Service Center and Washington Navy Yard, both of which have zero unconstrained acres for development, and Anacostia Annex, an installation with extremely restricted approaches along a heavily congested corridor and very high profile tenants. It's probably safe to assume that MILCON will be required to accommodate the recommendation to relocate All-Navy from leased space into DoD owned or leased space in the NCR.

The Navy Annex hosts Headquarters with staff elements residing at Naval Support Activity Midsouth in Millington, TN, the potential future home of Chief of Naval Education and Training, so it is intuitive that Millington has capacity. Please be specific in describing intended alignment and consolidation of like functions and recommended sites for relocation and why. Was NSA Midsouth considered as a relocation site for Navy offices/activities currently in NCR? Why would Navy consider moving out of leased space and back into DOD leased space? Did you consider using existing infrastructure for realigning Navy personnel out of leased spaces, even if it meant the jobs, people and functions relocated away from the NCR? If you did not consider this option, why not? If you considered this option, why was it dismissed?

18. There is a recommendation to co-locate Military Department Investigation Agencies, specifically Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), Defense Security Service (DSS), Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), and Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), and to consolidate CIFA and DSS into a new agency. Did you consider creating a single joint investigative agency from the three service agencies in an effort to further maximize efficiency and effectiveness? If not, why not. If you considered this option, why was it dismissed?
19. In your Reserve Component (RC) Transformations recommendations you seem to stipulate that the proposals are contingent upon the State's willingness to relocate National Guard units.
- a. What would happen to your proposals and "transformation" if the State does not relocate its units as planned?
 - b. Did you consider training/operational and retention impacts?
 - c. Is this issue involved with State Governor's assertion that guard units may not be closed without their concurrence?
20. We notice that many units are relocating from overseas locations; there are other units being newly formed through realignments. It appears that significant construction will be required at existing bases to accommodate these actions while, at the same time, we are closing installations. It would appear we could save significant money by using existing facility and forego new construction. Do you agree with my assessment? Would you comment on the pros and cons of the issue?
21. Defense Finance and Accounting (DFAS) Denver, one of the largest DFAS centers was not listed in BRAC realignment action. Could you elaborate on thinking behind that decision?

22. Prior BRAC evaluations have found local communities sensitive to environmental issues. Given the sensitivity of this issue why are environmental cleanup costs not included in the cost models used by DOD?


SH-216

ENTRANCE ON
1ST FLOOR

1ST STREET




CONSTITUTION AVENUE



C STREET

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ENTRANCE TO HOLD ROOM &
COMMITTEE ROOM FROM
DIRKSEN



4 ROWS OF SEATS

ROWS OF SEATS TO WALL

2 TABLES WITH
12 CHARIS



TO HART
BUILDING

PRESS TABLES
ROWS OF SEATS

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PRESS CONFERENCE

COMMISSIONERS



SEATED
PRESS



CAMERAS

SEATED
PRESS