

OPERATION KEEP CANNON

**Regional Hearing Presentation
BRAC Commission 2005
June 24, 2005**

**Presented by the Clovis and Portales Communities
and the State of New Mexico**

Agenda

8:30 AM

Posting of Colors
National Anthem
Prayer

Welcome
Senator Domenici
Senator Bingaman
Congresswoman Wilson
Congressman Udall
Lt. Governor Denish

Cannon Communities Presentation
Randy Harris
Hanson Scott
Chad Lydick

Closing Remarks
Governor Richardson

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Randy Harris

Randy Harris is a native New Mexican. He is President & CEO of The Bank of Clovis. He has served as a volunteer for the last 17 years for the Clovis Committee of Fifty, which is a non-profit community organization dedicated solely to the improvement and enhancement of Cannon Air Force Base and the men and women of the United States Air Force. He was directly responsible for obtaining ALCUZ airspace easements that were donated to Cannon, acquiring additional land donated to Cannon for expansion of the second runway, establishing an environmental working relationship with Cannon and New Mexico Environment Department, and establishing the New Mexico Training Range Initiative. Randy also serves on the New Mexico Military Base Planning Commission.

Randy Harris and other volunteers of the Clovis Committee of 50 have dedicated over 50 years of their lives, time, money, and other resources to take care of Cannon and men and women of the USAF. No other community has as long standing and great community relationship with a base, such as Clovis, NM. The base and the community are one and the same.

Cannon Air Force Base History


A major Air Combat Command installation continuously supporting DOD since 1951.

Home to the 27th Fighter Wing.

One of three active operational F-16 fighter bases in the USA.

Lies in the high plains of eastern New Mexico, near the Texas Panhandle.

Capable of day and night combat operations for commanders, world-wide, at any time.



Expeditionary Combat Successes

2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

- Nearly 1M lbs ordnance dropped...1,442 combat hrs/588 sorties in 30 days with just 12 aircraft
- #1 in AF for best OIF F-16 mission capable (MC) rate... our deployed rate was 84.9%...10% higher than standard for AF
- #1 F-16s in OIF theater to deliver first operational Joint Defense Attack Munitions (JDAM) at supersonic speed
- 10 Distinguished Flying Crosses earned for heroism
- Support personnel (CE, Comms, SFS, Transportation, etc) were deployed Throughout the theater as well

NOT A SCRATCH!



Almost 1/4 of the Wing was deployed at once
yet we received Excellent marks on
first ACC limited notice ORI

The World's Most Lethal Warfighting Team!






Expeditionary Combat Successes



2004: OIF Part 2...

- 27 MSG/CC selected to establish first EMSG in Balad
- Led 752+ mission supporters in bedding down 7 new Joint and AF mission valued over \$760M
- Moved 68K troops, 39K tons cargo, 350+ EOD responses 6.5+M gals of JP-8 to 1,200+ US/Coalition/transient a/c
- All this while under fire (170 rocket attacks – most heavily attacked US Base in Iraq)



The World's Most Lethal Warfighting Team!

Opening Remarks

The DOD recommendation to close Cannon deviated from BRAC selection criteria and should be overturned.

The Air Force failed to meet its own organization and BRAC principles by not appropriately considering encroachment, NMTRI, and force structure retention and quality of life.

The Air Force military value scoring did not look to the future.

Possible overseas retrograde actions do not appear to have been considered.

Opening Remarks

The Air Force understated economic impact.

Alternative scenarios should be considered that more realistically evaluate long term military value by closing those bases that have significant encroachment.

Airspace, range complex and base facilities are integral package supporting national security.

Cannon was not considered for other missions.

Military Value

Errors, gaps, and outdated data must be reconciled and corrected or Cannon could close for the wrong reasons.

Cannon appears to only have been considered for closure. There are alternatives.

A summary of 8 key military value follows.

Each military value category, when adjusted, makes it clear that Cannon was not provided a fair and balanced review.

Military Value Matrix

Question #	Title			Community Score	BRAC staff finding
MV1 1242	ATC Restrictions of OPS	5.98	3.99	5.98	+1.99
MV1 1245	Proximity: Airspace Supporting Mission	22.08	6.04	15.12	+9.08
MV1 1246	Proximity: Low Level Routes Supporting Mission	7.25	2.64	7.25	+4.61
MV1 1270	Suitable Auxiliary Airfields within 50 NM	5.18	0.00	3.89	+3.89

Military Value Matrix

Question #	Title	AFACE Score	Community Score	BRAC staff finding
MV2 1203	Access to Adequate Supersonic Airspace	6.72	5.04	+3.70
MV2 1266	Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission	11.95	8.19	+0.74
MV3 1205.1 1205.2	Buildable acres for Industrial Operations	1.96 1.96	1.96 1.96	+1.91 +1.89
MV4 1250	Area Cost Factor	1.25	1.25	+0.51
Total of all MCI scores		100	83.48	28.26

MV 1

ATC Restrictions

(Question 1242)

Scoring based on CAMS, a computerized aircraft maintenance system, designed to measure maintenance not Air Traffic Control Restrictions.

Cannon controls its own departures, arrivals, and airspace.

Cannon airspace is not shared with commercial air traffic.

Cannon has 329 days of flying weather and flight operations are rarely diverted for weather.



Question #	Title	Community Score	BRAC staff finding
MV1 1242	ATC Restrictions of Operations	5.98	+1.99

Proximity to Air Space Supporting Mission

(Question 1245)

Airspace Volume (15% of score): Only Bronco and Pecos reported, Talon and Mt. Dora not considered. (Tab H)

Nearly doubles available airspace.

Operations Hours (15% of score)
Reported as 12 hours because of self imposed limits; should be reported as 24/7 operations.

Scoreable Range (10% of score)
Melrose ranked #1 in ACC.



Proximity to Air Space Supporting Mission

(Question 1245)

Melrose Range should have been given the maximum score; it can drop all types of weapons including stand-off, precision-guided munitions. Other capabilities include:

- Low Angle Strafe (0.75% of score) **Full capability**
- Electronic Combat (5% of score) **Full capability**
- Laser Use Authority (10% of score) **Full capability**
- Lights Out Capable (10% of score) **Full capability**
- Flare Authority (5% of score) **Full capability**
- Chafe Authority (5% of score) **Full capability**

Question #	Title	Community Score	BRAC staff finding
MV1 1245	Proximity: Airspace Supporting Mission	15.12	+9.08


Proximity to Low Level Routes

(Question 1246)

Cannon should receive maximum points because it has four low level route entries and eight low level route exits less than 50 miles from Cannon.

Use of multiple legacy F-111 routes penalized Cannon.

Most bases don't have this many available routes because of commercial and private air traffic encroachment.



Question #	Title	Community Score	BRAC staff finding
MV1 1246	Proximity: Low Level Routes Supporting Mission	7.25	+4.61



Suitable Auxiliary Airfields (Question 1270)

>50 NM not counted by Air Force.
Cannon received zero points.

Data does not include Clovis Municipal Airport, < 20 NM away.
6,200 ft runway is extending to 8,600 ft in FY06.

Extension programmed to support 20 year Force Structure planning guidance.

Airport on the opposite side of Clovis away from the base to ensure no encroachment.



*will get 50% message for
AP*

Suitable Auxiliary Airfields (Question 1270)

Cannon has two fully equipped runways. 3-ILS approach systems installed by Fall 2005.

Cannon has 329 days of flying weather and flight operations are rarely diverted for weather.

Cannon diverts an average of 20 flights each year, which is low relative to other bases.

Question #	Title	Score	Community Score	BRAC staff finding
MV1 1270	Suitable Auxiliary Airfields within 50 NM	5.18	3.89	+3.89

MV 2 Ramp & Runway Condition (Question 8 & 9)

Cannon received maximum scores for pavement serviceability but data does not reflect recent upgrades.

Primary runway re-keeled in 2001.

Crosswind runway resurfaced in 2003.

Cannon has ample hangar space and ramp/taxiway/runways to accommodate increased operations.



Access to Supersonic Airspace


(Question 1203)

Operating hours (50%)
reflect self imposed flying
limits. Should be 24/7
operations.

Airspace (50%) exceeds
140 NM X 80 NM; meets
JSF requirements.

Cannon has four
supersonic airspace
operating areas, all within
100 NM of the base.
Neither Mt. Dora and
Talon were included in this
data. (Tab H)

NMTRI was not
considered.



Access to Supersonic Airspace

(Question 1203)

New Mexico Training Range Initiative (NMTRI) enhances this supersonic airspace volume. ?

Air Force weighting did not consider distance to supersonic airspace.

Question #	Title		Community Score	BRAC staff finding
MV2 1203	Access to Adequate Supersonic Airspace	6.72	1.34	5.04 +3.70

Range Complex Supports Mission

(Question 1266)

Air Force weighting of the critical component favored large over water airspace that is unrealistic in today's air to ground training and combat. (Tab L)

Comprehensive array of threat emitters.

Air Force weighting did not measure encroachment restrictions.

Melrose range has highest utilization in Air Combat Command.

Question #	Title		Community Score	BRAC staff finding
MV2 1266	Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission	11.95	8.19	+0.74


MV 3 Buildable Acres for Industrial Growth and Operation Growth (Question 1205)

Data submission in error; 368 additional buildable acres, not 10.5 as reported.

Cannon could double in size for about \$5 million.


Surrounded by farmland for over 50 years.

Prior home to 108 F-111's, almost twice the number of F-16's there today.



Question #	Title	Community Score	BRAC staff finding
MV3 1205.1	Buildable acres for Industrial Operations	1.96	+1.91
1205.2		1.96	+1.89

Cannon



Where else can you double the size of your base for \$5M?



Mobility/Surge Other Factors

MV #3

FY06 MILCON authorized \$13.2 million to increase fueling efficiency.

Water, power, and waste systems more than adequate for contingency and surge operations.

Secure, inland, year-round base ideal for many types of contingency operations, border security and other homeland defense missions.

Major rail connections in Clovis and high quality 4-lane highways connect the base to major metropolitan areas.

MV 4 Area Cost Factor

(Question 1250
1402)

Cannon has the lowest cost per flying hour of any ACC base.

F-16's are to be moved to bases with much higher costs:

Basic Operating Support (BOS)

Sustainment

Per diem

Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH)

Question #	Title	Community Score	BRAC staff finding
MV4 1250	Area Cost Factor	1.25	+0.51

Factors Not Appropriately Considered

Air Force weighting inaccurately represents Cannon's military value in specific areas such as:

1. Encroachment

Base facilities

Range space

Airspace

2. New Mexico Test Range Initiative (NMTRI)

Status

Airspace Volume

Encroachment

The Air Force weightings in the BRAC process (2.28% of MV) do not adequately emphasize the impact of encroachment on existing and future operations.

DOD stated goal to position its activities away from unfriendly environments-densely populated, noise sensitive, ATC restrictive, unsupportive populations.

All fighter bases received the maximum points regardless of encroachment. This should be an important discriminator.

Encroachment – Base Facilities

- Great expansion potential in its facilities.

- Clovis, Curry County, and the State of New Mexico purchased all airspace easements to meet AICUZ requirements and donated those to Air Force.

- Clovis purchased land and donated to the Air Force to build crosswind runway ILS to be completed this fall.

Encroachment – Range/Airspace

These encroachment issues that are severely impacting other ranges are not found at Cannon:

Community development Illegal immigration Unauthorized personnel	Endangered species Hazardous waste storage Cultural resources
--	---

- Airspace is only valuable if it is usable now and in future.
- DOD training airspace throughout the nation is encroached. Cannon airspace is key for future missions that include supersonic, stand-off, and unmanned systems.

Composite Map of Military Bases, Commercial Aircraft, Population Density and Average Climate Features



Cannon

Legend

Military Bases

- Air Force
- ▲ Army
- Navy
- Pentagon

Population Density (per Sq Mile)

- 1 Oct = 100
- Pop per Sq Mile

Climate: Mean Total Precip

- GT 30

Climate: Mean Extreme Minimum Temp

- /// LT -20 Degrees

Mean Num Cloudy Days (Sunrise-Sunset)


- GT 120

Mean Days Measurable Precip

- ✓ GT 105 Days

Mean Extreme MaxTemp

- GT 100



Alert Area
Boundary

Dear Valley
Airport

Glendale Airport

GA Near
Midair
Occurrences

Luke AFB
Radar Pattern

Luke AFB

New Mexico Training Range Initiative

NMTRI – Air Space

NMTRI was **NOT** included in Air Force data.

USAF and FAA confirm that NMTRI will be activated this year which increases supersonic airspace volume and links existing training areas.

Cannon offers unencumbered airspace 360 degrees around the base with no operating limitations.

Cannon's value essentially doubles with respect to overland supersonic training airspace. (Tab I)

Extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find this level of expansion anywhere else in the country.

Air Force Chief of Staff, General John Jumper's testimony. (Tab J)

Hanson Scott

Brigadier General Hanson Scott, USAF (Ret): Hanson is Director, Office of Military Base Planning and Support, State of New Mexico. His responsibilities include support of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor and the New Mexico Military Base Planning Commission. Hanson is a native of New Mexico, and, following one year at New Mexico State University, graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1961. He had a 30-year career in the Air Force, with assignments in strategic and tactical airlift, high altitude reconnaissance, and special operations.

His staff assignments included a tour at Military Airlift Command and Headquarters Air Force, the Pentagon. He was Vice Commander, 314th Tactical Airlift Wing, Little Rock AFB; Commander, 463rd Tactical Airlift Wing, Dyess AFB; Commander, 1st Special Operations Wing, Hurlburt Field, Florida; Vice Commander 23rd AF/Air Force Special Operations Command; and Commander, Special Operations Command, Pacific, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii. Following retirement, he was Director of Aviation for the City of Albuquerque, and Executive Director, New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization.


Force Structure

BRAC quality of life and retention guidance is ignored. (Tabs K&L)

Rotational base is exacerbated by BRAC F-16 recommendations 43% of F-16 squadrons based overseas.

Given other operational deployments, personnel will be overseas over 50% of the time.

BRAC recommended changes in F-16 force structure will likely result in multiple 3 year overseas assignments, which will negatively impact retention.



F-16s on ramp in Aviano, Italy


F-16 Overseas Squadrons		
	Today	Post BRAC
Kanjan	2	2
Osan	1	1
Misawa	2	2
Aviano	2	2
Spangdahlem	2	2
Eielson	1	0
CONUS	18	12

Force Structure

Cannon is ideal for 20 year force structure requirements and weapons systems.

Cannon is a model for resolving USAF and Navy encroachment issues.

Cannon is ideal for retrograde of forces.



BRAC Data Analysis

The Air Force apparently evaluated Cannon on the narrow basis of the F-16 platform rather than on the merits of the base. (Tab M)

Several alternative scenarios retaining Cannon as an active base while achieving the consolidation of F-16's with greater cost savings are possible.

BRAC Data Analysis

COBRA analysis reveals several questionable calculations.

“Close Cannon” scenario Net Present Value (NPV) went from \$1.3 billion to \$2.7 billion in a few weeks before release of the recommendations. (Tab M)

A realistic analysis retaining all eliminated personnel and reallocating them to receiving bases shows projected cost savings from closing Cannon do not exist. (Tab N)

DOD Transformation

The Secretary of Defense has directed DOD to engage in a process of transformation included in the BRAC process.

The DOD transformation plan is built upon four pillars:

Pillar I: Strengthening joint operations

Pillar II: Exploiting existing U.S. intelligence advantages


Pillar III: Innovating by developing new concepts

- Documenting and researching lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan

- Developing and refining new concepts through experimentation, wargaming, simulations, and field exercises

Pillar IV: Developing new transformational capabilities

NEW MEXICO'S 21st CENTURY OPERATIONS AND TRAINING COMPLEX



New Mexico Supports DOD Transformation

Focused on the specific elements of Pillar III, (DMOC, SNL, LANL) Concept Development and Experimentation

Takes advantage of the contiguous air and surface maneuver space in the State to support joint experimentation

Uses dispersed military installations to stage responding forces through

Enables a wide range of live, virtual, and constructive DOD assets to support joint experimentation.

New Mexico is ideal for Joint Force experimentation and military concept development.

Cannon plays a key strategic role.

Efforts were undervalued or ignored.

Status

New Mexico informally presented its concept to US Joint Forces Command.

New Mexico briefed to the Director of the Joint Staff.

Joint Forces Command has been tasked by the OJCS to evaluate the New Mexico proposal. ✓

A session with Joint Forces Command at Flag-Level in near term is scheduled.

*Not here
yes*

Chad Lydick

Chad Lydick is a native New Mexican and he graduated from Clovis Schools in 1967. He received his Bachelor of Science from New Mexico State University in 1972.

Chad is president of Lydick Engineers and Surveyors Inc., which was established in Clovis in 1961. He is a registered Engineer and Land Surveyor in four states. Chad serves as Chairman of the Board of Access Bank and has previously served the Clovis community as a City Commissioner for eight years. He is also a past President of the Chamber of Commerce.

Chad has served on the Washington Committee of the Clovis Committee of 50. He has worked with this committee for the past ten years and currently serves on the State of New Mexico Military Base and Planning Commission. Chad continues to devote his efforts to the betterment of this community and the welfare of its citizens.

Economic Impact- Historical

Walker AFB (Roswell, NM), Amarillo AFB (Amarillo, TX), and Reese AFB (Lubbock, TX) all impacted this area.

All are within 100 mile radius of this community.

Precedent tells us that closure of a large military installation in this region may never be fully recoverable.

After 38 years, the community of Roswell, NM, remains smaller in population today than it was in 1967, the year prior to closure of Walker AFB.

- 48,000 population in 1967; 34,000 three years later

- 6,000 of 18,000 homes were left vacant

- 45,293 population in 2000

Economic - Studies Comparison

An economic impact study conducted for the State of New Mexico by Keystone International shows considerable discrepancies with DOD documents.

DOD information states that closure of Cannon constitutes a regional job loss of 20%, or 1 in every 5 jobs. Keystone study shows a larger job loss in Curry County alone. This equates to 1 in every 3.5 jobs.

Cannon is responsible for annual payroll of \$343 million in the region.

Direct, indirect and reduced activity from base operations and procurement exceeds \$435 million.

Economic- Medical Services

Plains Regional Medical Center (PRMC) is largest acute care center in Eastern New Mexico/West Texas region.

PRMC receives 11% of its total annual revenue from Cannon personnel and dependants.

TRI-West contributes \$17 million in gross revenue per year.

Closure would result in a significant loss of medical and support staff. (60 employees for an annual payroll of \$3.5 million).

Total projected financial loss to PRMC expected to be \$84.8 million over the next 5 years.

Economic- Local Housing Industry

Housing Industry in Curry County alone contributes \$1.1 million annually in gross receipts and permit fee revenues to the City of Clovis.

2,000 homes in the Clovis market are directly controlled by the military or military personnel.

Closure would flat-line new housing starts for next 26 years.

Military members or civilian employers at the base account for 25% of total housing sales. Associated effect could approach 40% of the market.

Building Contractors Association of Curry County surveyed

- 38% of area businesses will fail.

- 42% of membership will be unable to repay existing debt.

Economic- Clovis Municipal Schools

Cannon contribution to the Clovis Municipal Schools is 15% (1,247 students out of total population of 8,147). (Tab O)

Immediate staff reduction of 15% (163 staff members reduced including 82 teachers)

Immediate loss in State and Federal funding of over \$8 million.

Closure would require probable closing 3 elementary schools in the District.

Economic-Regional Handicapped Citizens

Eastern New Mexico Rehabilitation Services for the Handicapped (ENMRSH) has 105 employees currently working at Cannon.

75 have severe disabilities.

105 jobs account for 25% of total jobs created for our Federal agencies within the entire State (\$2.5 million in annual payroll).

47 military dependents and 10 military retirees currently working for ENMRSH.

Economic- Minority Population

Minority and ethnic groups comprise 54% of Curry County population and 60% of Roosevelt County according to the 2000 census. (Tab P)

Clovis Municipal Schools report 63% of students are enrolled in free or reduced rate food program.

Cannon communities' poverty level will increase significantly.

Closure creates disproportionate impact on the minority and ethnic communities.

Economic – Closing Remarks


According to DOD's calculation the adverse impact on the Cannon communities is more than double that of any other BRAC community.

Keystone International shows actual economic impact to the Clovis community could be 3 times as great.

A decision to close Cannon would create an economic impact so severe as to be unrecoverable to the Clovis-Portales communities. It could be one of the most economically damaging decisions in the history of New Mexico.


**Regional Hearing Presentation
BRAC Commission 2005**

**Thank You
Commissioners & BRAC
Commission Staff**



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	4. Col.	Arnold Franklin & Phillip Frazee
	5. MSgt.	Julie Angle
	6. JAG	David Richards
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May 23, 2005

Commissioner, BRAC
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner:


I'm a retired USAF general, and I had the honor of serving in both Air Combat Command (numerous leadership positions including Vice Commander) and Air Education and Training Command (Commander). I'm a fighter pilot and understand employment of airplanes and air base management.

I can imagine the volume of these kinds of inputs you have gotten and will continue to receive regarding your assigned task. But that goes with your "territory" which I support. However, an input:

I believe it is ill advised to close Cannon AFB versus Columbus AFB when one considers the airspace and range-space measures of merit. I'm very familiar with both installations, and you obviously considered both in their "mission stovepipes". You can move types of airplanes around easily, but you cannot utilize encroached airspace and you sure can't get new range space in today's complicated environment.

My view is that you ought to take a re-look at this out of the mission category environment. Then, the measures of merit will lead you to the correct thing to do. The way it is now, you don't have it right in my view. Thanks for your consideration in your tough and challenging assignment.

Sincerely,



Joseph W. Ashy
General, USAF (Ret.)

23 May 2005

BRAC Commission
Arlington, VA


Commissioners,

I am shocked and dismayed to see Cannon AFB, New Mexico on the list of bases recommended to be closed ! The base facilities are certainly more than adequate to support continued, long term use. In addition, the nearby gunnery and bombing range is an asset that is practically irreplaceable anywhere in the country and the airspace available for most all types of training is unusually clear of other air traffic.

But beyond all of the above, in my 36 years of Air Force service, never did I witness community support as strong and sincere as that which exists from the proud , deeply patriotic citizens of Clovis, NM and Curry County. I am aware that significant local funds have been expended over many years to expand the gunnery range acreage and to expand family housing available to base personnel. A better relationship between a city and an airbase cannot be found—it is a family affair !My assignment there resulted in deep friendships with Clovis citizens that continue long after my retirement.

I urge you to go there and experience the base , its people, and the Clovis citizen support before making a decision.

Very respectfully,



James A. Knight, Jr
Lt Gen, USAF (Ret)

1 June 2005

Chairman Anthony Principi
Members of the BRAC Commission
2521 South Clark St
Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Subject: Cannon AFB

Dear Chairman Principi and Members of the Commission,

I write this letter with clear understanding and appreciation of the very serious task you have ahead of you. I also understand the time and effort expended by the Air Staff in developing closure recommendations. However, I simply can not leave unchallenged a decision that I know is not based on sound, first hand knowledge of the present and future military value resident in Cannon AFB. This letter presents my views, as former Commander of the 27th Fighter Wing, on the DoD BRAC recommendation to close Cannon AFB. Having commanded two fighter/bomber wings, including the 27th at Cannon, I believe my perspective may differ from the assessment of the Air Staff regarding the components of "military value". I am especially concerned with the weighting assigned those components when assessing the training environment of Air Force installations. It is, after all, the primary mission of our CONUS fighter bases to conduct combat training, and to do it in the safest, most cost effective and efficient manner possible. In my view the overall combat training environment at Cannon AFB is not equaled.

If the term "military value" is to have any credibility in its use as the final arbiter, it must have clear, unambiguous definition, and must not be influenced by "political value". It must also give appropriate weighted value to those components that contribute most significantly to the combat training mission. In the DoD recommendation, the Department stated that "all active duty F-16 Block 50 bases have higher military value than Cannon". For that to be true in any context of "military value", the following would have to be present at all active duty bases rated higher than Cannon.

1. Unencumbered airspace for 360 degrees around the base with no operating limitations
2. A 66,000 acre all weather tactical air to ground and electronic combat bombing range less than ten flying minutes from the base.
3. Multiple IFR/VFR low level training routes with wide variations in terrain, entry points within minutes of launch, and culminating at a fully instrumented bombing range.
4. Flying weather that yields over 320 good weather training days per year
5. No base encroachment from any direction and no operations limitations based on commercial/private development
6. Over \$200 million in new facility construction over the past ten years
7. First class operations, maintenance, services and family housing facilities
8. Lower overall flying hour costs than other installations in Air Combat Command

9. Based on the above, absolutely unlimited potential for future growth and adaptation to new and emerging missions
10. Unequaled community support – not just during BRAC, but every day in every way

All of the above exist at Cannon AFB today. If they are not the core components of "Military Value", I would challenge the basis of any criteria that is substantially different. In my experience, Cannon AFB has all the inherent characteristics that in combination make it the best training environment in the world. In a head to head comparison of components of "military value", I simply can not find justification for the comment that Cannon has less military value. For the above reasons, I urge the Commission to carefully weigh the factors that went into the DoD recommendation to close Cannon AFB.

Sincerely,

Richard N. Goddard
Major General USAF (Ret)

Thomas J. Hickey
20826 Cactus Loop
San Antonio, TX 78258

BRAC Commission
2521 South Clarke Street
Arlington, VA 22202

23 May 2005

Dear Sirs,

I am writing to voice my chagrin and concern over the Department of Defense decision to include Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, on their suggested closure candidate list. I am unable to understand how that decision fits into any logical set of circumstances concerning the factors which should be used in making such decisions.

I am a former member of the 27th Tactical Fighter Wing stationed at Cannon AFB. I served as the Wing Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations; the Deputy Commander for Operations, the Vice Wing Commander and as Wing Commander from 1874 to 1978. I think I know that base and the surrounding community. I also have considerable military experience, having served in the Air Force for over 34 years.

For these reasons I find it unbelievable that any thoughtful review would close that base. It has both an expansive Air to Air Range and a complete Air to Ground Range. There is an abundance of low-level training routes surrounding the base. The base itself is well contained, and easily protected and secured. In this time of 'dispersal', as described for the actions proposed for the Capital area, Cannon represents a perfect example of a separate, but total basing package.

In my years there, I found the local community to be the most patriotic, militarily supportive, and just plain friendly of any base I was assigned. They have a world-wide reputation for such support throughout the Air Force, and I would guess within the Defense department.

In considering the local economic impact of base closure on that community, some of Cannons military attributes are a distinct disadvantage to the City of Clovis. Cannon is the ONLY significant employer within 100 miles. There are no other large industries. I currently live in San Antonio, Texas. When the last closure effort closed Kelly AFB, there was a great hue and cry about the impact on San Antonio. As you may know, that loss has been significantly overcome by good aggressive salesmanship and ingenuity. Many business entities are now a part of 'Kelly USA'. Unfortunately, there are no alternative businesses within shouting distance of Clovis. Cannons' closure can only be described as a permanent financial disaster for the city. Is this how we reward loyalty and support from our local communities?

I can only hope that your members will have a more reasoned and reasonable approach to this process.

Sincerely,



Thomas J. Hickey, Major General, USAF, Ret'd.

BRAC Commission
2521 S. Clark St.
Arlington, VA 22202

May 31, 2005

Colonel (Retired) Arnold L. Franklin, Jr.
2098 Dillard Rd.
Bowling Green, KY 42104

To Whom It May Concern:

The purpose of this letter is to offer my strong support to remove Cannon Air Force Base from the latest list of possible base closings. I understand the need to downsize our infrastructure with the end of the cold war; however, I believe closing Cannon AFB as part of that effort would be the wrong move.


As a former Wing Commander at Cannon (1990—1992), I know first hand what an important role Cannon and Melrose Range have played in making our United States Air Force second to none. When you combine the excellent flying weather, the outstanding air space and range accessibility, the modern base facilities, and the superb support the local communities provide, I don't think you can find a better package anywhere in this great country.

I began my Air Force career at Cannon AFB. As a 2nd Lt, I entered F-111 training there in the Spring of 1968. And I ended my operational career there in 1992. During those 24 years I remained attuned to what was happening at Cannon, and can tell you that there did not then, and does not today, exist a better base/community relationship. Whatever the need, whatever the request, the community leaders are first in line to make sure it happens. During commander conferences, and during private conversations, I heard many horror stories about strained relationships wing commanders were experiencing with noise complaints, land encroachments, restricted flight operating hours due to "community concerns," etc. Not once did I face any of those types of problems.

In the near future, we are going to lose Luke Air Force Base near Phoenix, Arizona. I went to pilot training at Williams AFB near Phoenix. It is now closed. In those days, it was common to read/hear of community concerns over the "problems" of noise complaints and encroachment at Luke. This situation is much more severe today, and will only get worse in the future. In short, we will get tired of fighting the community, and will be forced to close Luke. When that day arrives, there will be no Cannon AFB to fall back on.

I thank you for your time. I know how busy you are. I also know how difficult and important your task. With that in mind, I respectfully request you remove Cannon AFB from further consideration for base closure. If I can be of further service, please do not hesitate to call me at 270-746-0289.

Respectfully yours,


ARNOLD L. FRANKLIN, JR
Colonel, USAF (Retired)

To: Chairman Anthony Principi and Members of the BRAC Commission
2521 S. Clark St. Suite 600
Arlington VA 22202

12 Jun 05

From: Philip J. Frazee
1709 Cain Ave
Clovis NM 88101

Subject -- Cannon AFB ranking against other "fighter" bases and inclusion on the closure list

A short background on myself -- 29 years active duty in the Air Force flying fighter aircraft. During the last 10 years I was a Fighter Squadron Commander at Hill AFB (1994), Operations Group Commander at Aviano AB (96), AGOS Commandant at Nellis AFB (98), and Vice Wing Commander at Cannon (2000). I retired from active duty in 2002 as AF Doctrine Center Advisor to Commanding General, US Army Combined Arms Center, Ft Leavenworth KS. Currently I'm instructing AF Junior ROTC at Clovis High School.

I'd like to start off by stating that I really have no dog in this fight. I currently live in Clovis New Mexico, but as this will not be my final retirement location, the closure of Cannon AFB really wouldn't effect me personally. My concern is more for the good of the service. I believe it's NOT in the best interest of the Air Force to close Cannon, and believe the computations somehow were misinterpreted, misunderstood or misguided in the first place.

For decades the Air Force has tried to move its activities away from unfriendly environments -- the densely populated, noise sensitive, encroaching, ATC restrictive, unsupportive populations. The lack of any of these problems is precisely what has kept Cannon active for 50 years. It appears we have forgotten our past -- to the peril of our future.

I'd like to address a couple of the areas from the fighter list where Cannon did not do as well as I believe it should have.

Not getting max points for availability of airspace.

You'll be hearing all about the NM Training Airspace initiative, so I won't address that here. The basic airspace that is available to the base right now however, is excellent!

Is it the best airspace available anywhere? -- Certainly not! Nellis Ranges and the UTTR (for example) are much more extensive for Air to Air operations and better equipped with target sets for Air to Ground, but they come with a price that is probably not included in the computations.

It's not my purpose to point fingers at other bases, but I noticed that Keesler, Eglin, Hurlbert and Tyndall all ranked higher than Cannon when it came to airspace (obviously due to over water access). A question that needs to be asked, however is if they all received credit for *the same airspace*? Airspace that, by the way, is shared with Gulfport, Navy Whiting, Navy Pensacola, etc. Anyone who has been TDY to this area for a WSEP shoot or anything else, and tried to

schedule range time for a lowly 2 ship BFM sortie knows that the airspace is NOT sufficient to serve all the customers that are there -- yet they all ranker higher than Cannon -- ??

The same issue can be applied to the Nellis ranges, the UTTR, and White Sands airspace for that matter. Multiuse airspace is not always the best airspace for fighter operations! One of the great aspects of the airspace around Cannon is the fact it is controlled and scheduled through the base itself without having to share with test units, Red Flag, competing units, etc -- it belongs to Cannon and is always available. It's open when we need it, and we close it when we don't need it -- that population friendly approach should not count against the base.

Not getting max points for the proximity of airspace

The proximity issue is another matter that confounds me. When departing from the eastern edge of the tactical range at Melrose, an aircraft is an average of 15 nautical miles from Cannon's north and south VFR entry points. Typically flights will *voluntarily* hold on the range because there's not enough time to rejoin the flight, get a battle damage check, check out with the range, descent check, approach and landing check. Pecos is another 5 miles away, and the Bronco's aren't a lot further. Something is amiss when the base only receives 27% of the points available.

Non-availability of a "suitable auxiliary Airfield" within 50 miles.

I certainly don't know who developed this criterion, but this is one that I believe is misguided, penalizing bases in non-populated areas and giving an advantage to bases in large populated areas -- exactly where the Air Force has historically NOT wanted to be!

Salt Lake City International / Hill AFB, MaCarren International / Nellis AFB, Tampa International / MacDill AFB are examples of bases that have major conflicts with near by international airports -- I flew fighters from MacDill AFB before the Air Force closed the base to fighters *primarily because of it's proximity to a "primary aux Field"*. Under the current system this proximity is a bonus? -- Again, I'm confused.

Cannon's dual runways (you don't find that at Hill or Shaw), and the ability to get to Lubbock or Roswell are certainly adequate to the need -- which is NOT often with the great flying weather enjoyed by the base. The entire subject will become a mute point when Clovis Municipal (10 miles away, but a municipal rather than an international airport) lengthens their runway in the near future.

Availability of low level routes

Again, I don't know where the data came from, but can't imagine Cannon not scoring max points here. There are plenty of VFR and IFR routes readily available, they're close to the base, they're not typically used by other units, pilots can build their own low levels through the MOA's -- I'm just plain confused how the base scored so poorly in this category.

In closing, I'm simply amazed that Cannon ranked as the WORST base for fighters in ACC. Particularly when the list includes bases that previously hosted fighter operations *but*

...
disbanded those operations because of airspace / encroachment / ATC issues. Yet these same bases are ranked higher than Cannon on the current fighter list?? It simply defies logic unless you are inclined to believe that 50 years of Air Force leadership supporting the less populated, supportive atmosphere of bases like Cannon while closing bases like MacDills were somehow misguided.

There are things Cannon probably can't do. I'm a strong believer in joint operations -- as you can see by glancing at my previous jobs. Cannon being located a couple thousand miles away from the nearest aircraft carrier, and hundreds of miles away from large Army ranges has its drawbacks, but we **all** can't be joint! You can't drive an aircraft carrier or land an F-16 in Ft Leavenworth Kansas either, but that would be a really poor reason to close it down!

I've flown fighter aircraft from probably 100 different locations in my 29 years in the Air Force -- including virtually all the bases on the list. Cannon is **ABSOLUTELY** no where near the bottom of the list for fighter locations -- I'd personally rank it in the top 10. I believe we are about to lose an outstanding asset due to flawed reporting or computations. That would be a great loss for the Department of Defense as a whole, but more specifically for the Air Force fighter community.



Philip J. Frazee, Col USAF (ret)

BRAC commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, Va., 22202

May 21, 2005

MSgt Julie A. Angle, Retired, USAF
505 Wrangler Way
Clovis, NM 88101

Dear Members of the BRAC Commission

My name is MSgt Julie Angle, USAF Retired. If you would, please indulge me with a moment of your time, I would like to talk to you about my home of Clovis NM and Cannon AFB. My family and I were reassigned to Cannon three years ago after my husband retired from the Air Force and began working with the Civil Service at the base as the Chief of Protocol. We desired to move to a place we could call home when I retired in January 2005. When I saw a job at the Cannon Family Support Center, I knew this was where we were supposed to go. I have to say the time I spent as the Superintendent at the center greatly opened my eyes to the willingness and dedication of the men and women who serve at Cannon AFB. As a lead AEF wing, we processed hundreds of men and women several times a year to deploy to locations around the world. Cannon has been depended on for many years to produce top-notch war fighters, which they have done with ease, which brings me to my first point.

Training is the number one priority to any base, but as a lead AEF wing, it is even more paramount. With the location of our base, we offer many things. First, with the superior weather we have year round, our pilots can fly and meet sorties with ease. I have never lived anywhere in my 20 years of Air Force service that has the outstanding weather as Eastern New Mexico. Secondly, the ready access to the bombing and training ranges. With Melrose range and the White Sands Missile range being so close to the base, our war fighters spend more time practicing the scenarios than they do flying to get there using far less fuel going to a training sight than our sister bases do. Thirdly, being located close to our Southern most borders, Cannon can play a vital role in Homeland Security by providing close air support and working with our boarder patrols in the security of the United States.

Fourth, Cannon used to be host to two fighter wings allowing us to bring in any new mission with ease. We also have the ease and flexibility to expand Cannon due to the fact we suffer no encroachment issues as so many other bases due. Being located 10 miles from the city of Clovis gives us open fields and nothing but room to grow and grow and grow. You give us the mission and we will give you the space to facilitate it! Fourth, we have the supersonic initiative which has been approved and awaiting signature. How many places in the United States can you actually train at supersonic speed as you would in a war time environment? We need to train like we would fight. This brings me to the communities of Clovis and Portales. We have to think as well about our community and what impact of closing the base would have on it.

Cannon AFB employs roughly 4,000 active duty and civilian people. Imagine for a moment the impact of closing the base would have on the community of Clovis and Portales ... a


community of about 50,000 people many of which are armed service veterans who have retired here and depend on the base for commissary, Base Exchange and medical care. The Cannon family works very closely with both Clovis and Portales. The interaction shared between these two cities and the base is enormous. I have never experienced such love from two communities toward a base in the 20 years that I served in the military. Cannon Appreciation Days, days in the park to welcome home the troops from conflicts, to selling "support our troops" pins and turning the proceeds over to private organizations to use for the families of our deployed troops. The commitment of our communities as well as the Clovis Committee of Fifty and the Portales Military Affairs Committee is undying and to take the base away would be devastating to everyone who has supported and poured their heart and soul into Cannon AFB.

Clovis and Portales are two cities that have begun to expand, which is evident by the housing market. If Cannon were to close, this I'm afraid would come to a screeching halt. Who would want to come here and build a \$250,000 home when the value of the housing market and the economy is on the verge of collapse due to a base closure? What about those of us who are already here? With the initial announcement of the BRAC alone, the housing market is beginning to suffer. Many families have pulled out of housing deals for fear the base is going to close.

Education is also a factor to consider. We have a 12-year old daughter who has graciously, for many years, moved from school to school due to the fact we were both active duty. Yucca Junior High School is her fourth school in seven years. One of my primary concerns with any move is education and Clovis was no exception. She thrives as a straight-A student and has found her niche in the athletics program. We are extremely happy with the educational programs they have to offer here. Having to relocate her again, as many other families would, would cause a great deal of disruption to children who are entering such an impressionable and important time of their lives. Not to mention how school enrollments would suffer if the base were to close.

I thank you for your time and ask that you remove Cannon AFB from the BRAC list. Put yourself at our base and in our community and you will see what I say is true. Our community anxiously awaits your visit at the end of June, and we embrace the opportunity to prove to you that closing our base would be a mistake.

Sincerely



Julie A. Angle, MSgt, USAF Retired

Greig & Richards, P.A.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

DCN: 3526

OTTO SMITH (1893-1961)
ESTHER SMITH VAN SOELEN (Retired)

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June 14, 2005

BRAC Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and Commissioners:

I was amazed recently when, after weeks of delay, the Department of Defense released some of the data concerning the evaluation process that led to the recommendation that Cannon Air Force Base be closed. The Air Force has for many years told members of this community how important the encroachment issue was in the operation of bases throughout the country. Lowrey AFB (Denver, Colorado), Bergstrom AFB (Austin, Texas), Williams AFB (Phoenix, Arizona), Carswell AFB (Fort Worth, Texas) and many others were sited as bases that were closed in large measure due to encroachment. Many other bases were either closed or the flying operation curtailed because of encroachment. It is obvious that other existing bases face the same encroachment issues that will have to be dealt with in the next few years (Luke AFB and Shaw AFB). In the 1995 BRAC process the Air Force placed great importance on encroachment. Yet, after all the direct information on the impact to military value resulting from encroachment issues, the Department of Defense and the Air Force have assigned a weight to encroachment as 2% of total military value. The shortsightedness of this evaluation is astounding.

As a newly assigned Judge Advocate at Cannon Air Force Base in 1972, I was assigned to approach the Curry County Commission to adopt an AICUZ (Air Installation Compatible Use Zoning) ordinance to protect the approaches to Cannon. The County did not have a general zoning code (it still doesn't), so the County Commission was reluctant to adopt the ordinance. After long discussions and several public hearings, the County Commission did adopt zoning regulations around Cannon. As a result of a lawsuit in Federal Court, the zoning was ruled unenforceable.

The local community did not abandon its efforts to protect what the Air Force claimed were invaluable air rights. The County and the local support organization (Committee of Fifty) worked with the New Mexico legislature to appropriate funds to purchase (or condemn, if necessary) air easements that provide a permanent protection for Cannon AFB. This is but one example of the local community's continuing efforts to do anything to enhance and protect Cannon AFB. The list is long and includes donations of land, expansion of Melrose Bomb Range, chaff and flare training capabilities, and the New Mexico Training Range Initiative.

Now, the Air Force has placed a 2% weight to encroachment in assessing military value. I have been unable to find any justification for this change of attitude. Such a dramatic reversal deserves an explanation and serious scrutiny. Frankly, I don't believe there is a rational explanation,

BRAC Commissioners
06/14/2005
Page 2

because the military value of an operational Air Force base depends directly on the ability to access and utilize the air space.

As both an active duty and reserve JAG, I was assigned to Cannon AFB for twenty-five (25) years. I have observed the transition of Cannon from a World War II facility to a modern operational fighter base capable of deploying combat air power worldwide, with distinction. To throw away an asset like Cannon ignores the long term needs of the Air Force and the future military needs of this country. There is simply no base that can offer the same combination of protected air space, flying weather and conditions, access to training facilities, and community support. I am confident our representatives will provide a detailed analysis to support these arguments and many others, both at the regional hearing on June 24th and in the supporting data that will be submitted. Please give careful consideration to our arguments. The country cannot afford to lose an asset like Cannon Air Force Base.

Respectfully,



David F. Richards

DFR/dnm




FIGURE 2-1. EXISTING NEW MEXICO AIRSPACE USED FOR APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL CRITERIA AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

FIGURE ES-1. EXISTING AIRSPACE WITH MULTIPLE AIRSPACE BLOCKS, BELOW IS A THREE DIMENSIONAL VIEW OF EXISTING AIRSPACE AS SEEN FROM THE SOUTHEAST LOOKING NORTHWEST.





FIGURE ES-2. SIZING AND CONFIGURATION OF AIRSPACE UNDER THE PROPOSED ACTION. BELOW IS A THREE DIMENSIONAL VIEW OF THE PROPOSED ACTION AS SEEN FROM THE SOUTHEAST LOOKING NORTHWEST.



USAF View on Supersonic Ranges

On Wednesday, April 6, 2005, Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper remarked on supersonic range space to Senator Domenici and the Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee.

Senator Domenici: I believe it's less likely that new sources of airspace will be available to the DoD, in addition to -- recapitalizing tactical air assets with the JSF and the F-22 will place greater demands on the need, as I understand it, for quality ranges. Is that correct?

General Jumper: Sir, that's absolutely correct.

Senator Domenici: Do you share my view that airspace for the Air Force will be at a premium in the future?

General Jumper: I do, indeed, sir.

Senator Domenici: All right. Why is it important that the Air Force of the future control large training ranges and the associated airspace?

General Jumper: Well, sir, **the very speed of the airplanes and the standoff distances of our weapons dictate ever-increasing demands for airspace, with a -- in an environment where the airspace is decreasing.** So, if you take, for instance, an F/A-22 that can supercruise at 1.5 Mach, or a small diameter bomb that when released, can glide out 65 miles to its target, those parameters are much different than anything we've seen with legacy airplanes in the past.

USAF View on Supersonic Ranges

Senator Domenici: And we hear a lot about training without having to do actual missions and actual in-the-field training, but do you believe that live, realistic training aircraft, like the JSF, will be critical to the combat success of those kind of aircraft?

General Jumper: We'll never be able to substitute for all of live training. There's no doubt about it...in the end, you can never substitute – and, **matter of fact, the great leverage that our airmen have is training, and the great leverage that we have over other air forces in the world is our ability to go out and do this live training, as you described.**

Senator Domenici: Well, I would assume, with all that, that it will be difficult to go out and obtain new facilities, new airspace, new ranges to do this. Is that correct, General?

General Jumper: Absolutely, sir.

Senator Domenici: I look out in the West, and I don't see where you'll get them.

General Jumper: ...**it's going to be very difficult to get more than we have, yes sir.**

Senator Domenici: And will not the JSF, which is a higher performance aircraft –will it not need supersonic ranges for it – to complete its overland training?

General Jumper: Sir, to a lesser extent than the F-22, but yes, similar to the F-16. **But, still that makes that supersonic airspace very precious.**

Prepared Statement
of
The Honorable David S. C. Chu
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)
Before the
Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee
“Active and Reserve Military and Civilian Personnel Programs”
April 5, 2005

Not for publication until released by the committee

Quality of Life in the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy

The quality of life of military members and their families is considered a priority as the Department moves forward with rebasing and BRAC. Unlike previous drawdowns when the Department lost almost a million troops, this integrated global and basing strategy will not reduce the number of troops.

To maintain the Department's commitment to families, the Secretary, in a March 2003 memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, directed that "Candidate strategies must not concentrate on the operational dimension alone, but also on how to best improve quality of life." Service strategies must consider access to schools, education centers/libraries, family support, child care, youth programs, morale, welfare and recreation and fitness programs. From a quality of life perspective, DoD's planning approach for rebasing and BRAC is based on two principles: first, adequate quality of life funding will be reprogrammed from the losing to the gaining installations; and second, the military will look to civilian communities to augment programs and services (since two-thirds of families live in off-base communities). Service plans at the losing and gaining installations will be evaluated using a model that takes into account program specific operational funding requirements (baseline and enhancement per capita), capital investment, deficiencies, community support structures, unique Service characteristics, and civilian manpower requirements. The Department's goal is to ensure quality of life for Service members and families is not diminished during transformation efforts.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I want to thank you and members of this Subcommittee for your advocacy on behalf of the men and women of the Department of Defense. Whether the

career of a member of the Total Force is measured in months or years, whether that career is spent in a Reserve component, an Active component, a combination of the two, or as a Department of Defense civilian, the nation's gratitude for dedicated service is proved in your continued support and funding for the programs that keep the force strong and healthy.

Talking Paper
on
The Personnel Implications with Proposed F-16 Basing

The Air Force's input to the BRAC process draws down F-16 Force structure and affects nearly every active duty and Reserve Component base

- The AF is retiring its older versions (Blocks) of the F-16
- The AF is returning to a proven concept of having 24 aircraft in each squadron
- Recently, because of having too few airplanes to fill every squadron, many were equipped with just 18 aircraft.
 - 3 squadrons of 24 aircraft = 72 aircraft, a "full wing"
 - 3 squadrons of 18 aircraft = 54 aircraft, a less than "full wing"
 - It takes 4 squadrons of 18 aircraft to get to 72 aircraft, a "full wing" size
 - However, 3 squadrons of 24 aircraft produce more sorties than 4 squadrons of 18

The AF's efforts to consolidate into 24 aircraft squadrons with only one "Block" of F-16s at each base will result in an unintended consequence of creating an imbalance of overseas assignments. Another way to think of this is that there will not be enough assignment opportunities in the USA for people who are tied to the F-16 (pilots and maintenance personnel) to take a break from overseas assignments.

The driving force in the AF's assignment practices is that the people returning from overseas have the right to come home and must be replaced.

- There are two types of overseas assignments: long tours (2-3years) and short tours (remote) of 12-15 months
- The AF has traditionally manned overseas outposts at the expense of stateside bases. The rationale is simple: troops in Korea, and other hot spots, must be "Ready to fight, tonight!"
 - The target is 100 percent manning at overseas locations
 - Any shortfall in personnel is then evenly distributed to stateside locations
 - During severe manning shortfalls, AF has taken overseas manning down to 90 percent, but stateside manning was even lower

On the day the AF assigns an individual overseas, he or she is given a Date Eligible to Return from Overseas (DEROS). The DEROS is the day that person has the right to return to the States. The individual knows, and the AF knows, when he or she is coming home. That individual's DEROS drives the requirement for a replacement

- By policy, the AF will not send an individual as a non-volunteer to another overseas location. However, some do volunteer to serve Consecutive Overseas Tours (COT). Therefore, most airmen come back to the states and stateside locations send replacements.
 - When filling the requirements for overseas positions, the AF looks for volunteers first
 - When there are insufficient numbers of volunteers to fill all the slots, the assignment folks compare individual DEROSs to see whose turn it is to go back overseas, i.e., "Who has been in the states the longest?" People who have not been overseas have a DEROS in the assignment system of the day they came on active duty.

The AF policy on remote assignments is: "Nobody will be forced to serve a second remote tour until everyone else has served one remote tour."

- Individuals returning from remote tours get a Short Tour Return Date (STRD) and a counter that counts the number of remote tours

- If everyone has already served one, then the AF compares STRDs to find the individual whose turn it is to go remote again

- You must have been in the USA at least one year before being sent remote

With this basic knowledge of the AF assignment system, let's look at where the requirements for F-16 specific people will be after the BRAC proposal (see Atch 1). The mix of 3 remote, 6 long tours overseas, and 12 CONUS assignments will cause a very high turnover of personnel from stateside assignments.

To over simplify the problem, let's assign 3 people to each squadron and look at the dynamics over a three-year period:

- The remotes will turnover 100 percent of personnel every year; therefore you'll need nine people initially, 9 more the second year, and 9 the last year. Those replacements will come from the states. **Remotes have triple the requirements of long tours!**

- The long tour locations will turnover 33 percent of their personnel every year. You'll start with 18 people to cover these. You'll need 6 more the second year and 6 again in the last year. These replacements will also come from the states

- Stateside locations are supposed to be the shock absorber in the assignment system. Those locations began with 36 people and had to send 18 to the remote assignments and 12 to the long tours in just two assignment cycles!

However, the assignment process is much more complex than this simple example. In reality, some people come into the AF for only one enlistment: 4-6 years. Some stay for a second term and leave. The decision to remain in the AF is made in the kitchen of the homes of AF personnel with an input from the spouse.

The results at Atch 2 are from a more sophisticated model which takes many of these factors into account. It replicates the AF's recruiting practice of replacing 10 percent of its force every year and assumes nominal retention figures for first term, second term, and career airmen. But the results confirm what you encountered in the simplified version. Airmen will spend nearly 50 percent of their time overseas and return to the states for only 2 ½ years between assignments to long and short tour locations.

BRAC Background

OSD Baseline:

1. CJCS developed long term force structure
2. Used 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
3. "... capabilities-based, network-centric philosophy..."

OSD Imposed Constraints:

1. Called for 10 AEF's thru FY2011
2. Reduced AF Active Component endstrength from 360K by FY 2011
3. Maintained AF Reserve Component endstrength at 183K

Analytical Process

Defined Military Value:

1. Current and future, warring, readiness, and training...
2. Availability of land, airspace and training areas
3. Ability to support more
4. Cost of operations and manpower implications

Other Considerations:

1. Timing, costs, savings...
2. Economic impact
3. Infrastructure
4. Environmental impact-understated if Melrose closes

Outlined the "BRAC Principles"

1. Recruit and train the forces
2. Quality of life...enhances recruiting, training, and retention

Air Force Input

1. Transform the warfighting capacity of each squadron: 18 PAA to 24 PAA
2. AF strategy dictated by two factors;
 - AF will get smaller-fewer units
 - AF has too many small units (less than 24 PAA)

-
1. AF proposal guided by 12 “senior military and civilians”
 2. F-16 force structure change effected nearly every F-16 base
Built “the perfect world” for F-16 beddown: block integrity by location
Created an imbalance for the remote/overseas/CONUS locations for pilots and maintainers

Points of Attack

1. Clovis employment numbers may be inflated
Impact is understated: Death Sentence
 2. Military Value
Ranges and Airspace are growth industries in New Mexico
Cannon AFB’s ability to take on additional mission areas
Ramp space for 105 x F-111’s in 1993
NAS Oceana suffering from enrachment
CNO willing to look at alternatives
 3. Closure of a CONUS-based, active duty F-16 wing will have an adverse reaction on retention
Imbalance in remote and overseas assignments for pilots and maintainers
Against “BRAC Principle” on QoL and retention
-

Recommendation

Bring an overseas wing back to CONUS an maintain Block integrity of the F-16 fleet

Bring two F-16 block 50 squadrons to Cannon (form Misawa or Spangdahlem)

Distribute remaining Block 30 aircraft to other bases

Or

Bring two F-16 Block 40 squadrons to Cannon (from Aviano or Korea)

Distribute remaining Block 50 and Block 30 aircraft to other bases

F-16 Rotational Base

Remote/Overseas/CONUS

	Today	Post BRAC
<u>Remote squadrons</u>		
Kunsan AB	2	2
Osan AB	1	1
<u>Overseas squadrons</u>		
Elson AB	1	0
Missawa AB	2	2
Spangdahlem AB	2	2
Aviano AB	2	2
<u>CONUS squadrons</u>		
Cannon AFB	3	0
Hill AFB	3	3
Lake AFB	8	6
Mt Home AFB	1	0
Shaw	3	3
Totals:	3 Remote 7 O/S tours 18 CONUS	3 Remote 6 O/S tours 12 CONUS

Attachment 1

Post-BRAC Assignment Projections

Assumptions:

1. F-16 squadron distribution: 3 Remote
 6 Overseas squadrons
 6 CC-coded in CONUS
 6 TF-coded in CONUS

2. AF recruits 10 percent of its enlisted force every year

3. AF maintains its traditional retention targets: 55% of First Term
 75% of Second Term
 95+% of Career Airmen

Results:

1. High proportion of remote and overseas tours will drive a high assignment tempo

2. Airmen will average 2.5-3.0 years time-on-station in the USA between overseas assignments

3. Airmen will serve nearly 50 percent of their careers overseas

4. Airmen will serve two remote tours in a 20-year career

5. Experience levels will be low in CONUS and overseas

Conclusion:

Proposed mix of Remote/Overseas/CONUS squadrons will have an adverse impact on the retention of F-16 operations and maintenance personnel

**Training Value
of
Overland and Overwater**

Bombing Ranges and Military Operating Areas (MOAs)

Overland bombing ranges provide realistic replications of combat scenarios

- Targets may be built to any specification:
 - urban (corners of specific buildings)
 - industrial (staging areas, railroad yards, etc)
 - tactical (bunkers, airfields, etc)
 - mobile (remote controlled vehicles)
- Flying training scenarios can be multi-Service rehearsals for:
 - Close Air Support
 - Time Critical Targeting
- Network-centric target acquisition training can include use of other airborne platforms such as Predator, JSTARS, AWACS, ABCCC and ground-based and airborne Forward Air Controllers

Overwater bombing ranges are simple and limited to the use of rafts as targets

- The rafts allow pilots to activate weapons release switches but little more
- Target acquisition and recognition training cannot be done over water
- Multi-Service training opportunities would be a poor return on investment, because, in the end, everyone knows they are going to "bomb the raft" and every scenario would be reduced to a communications exercise

Overland MOAs have lateral limits defined by Jet Routes and Victor Airways; accordingly, MOAs near populated areas are generally smaller than in rural areas

- Vertical limits are also driven by Jet Routes
- Super-sonic restrictions are driven by the population distribution under the MOA
 - In high density areas, super-sonic flight is usually prohibited
 - Some overland MOAs in rural areas allow super-sonic flight

Overwater MOAs are defined by Jet Routes, Victor Airways and the coastline

- Vertical limits are also driven by the Jet Route structure
- Overwater MOAs typically allow supersonic flight

Finally, overland ranges and MOAs have a better flying safety record than their overwater counterparts. The terrain and horizon overland provide excellent, constant visual references for aircraft attitude and flight vector. By contrast, over water, the horizon is often obscured and the water provides limited altitudinal reference

11 March 2005

White Paper

Main Issues to Discuss:

- Integration of Military Department recommendations with JCSG recommendations and with each other has yet to begin. This process will be time consuming and the overall DoD story needs to be pulled together.
- Universe – the entire process is undermined, if the Department cannot say confidently and convincingly that all installations, functions, and activities were considered.
- Measure of success – PRV does not capture everything. Amount of lease space eliminated, infrastructure capacity reduced, etc. need to be included.
- Definitions
 - Enclaves – Size of enclaves differ. How small is small? (ECS-Expeditionary Combat Support units)
 - Transformational – groups are using this as justification in very different ways. Some are using “transformational” to support new mission development or recapitalization vice enabler of excess capacity reduction.
- Consistency of Approach
 - There is no consistency in approach taken in military value analysis.
 - USAF does military value analysis by platform rather than by installation mission or function.
 - USA did not calculate military value of Guard and Reserve or perform COBRA analysis on them.
 - There is no consistency in approach taken in capacity analysis.
 - USAF defines capacity based on the difference between actual squadron size and optimum squadron size.
 - There is no consistency in approach taken to determine surge requirements.
 - Transformational options – groups are citing these as guidelines and they seem to be in a draft form never to go final. Are groups supposed to follow or incorporate them or not?
- Documentation: Some additions and deletions of candidate recommendations are being done outside of the deliberative process before submission to ISG.
- Misuse of BRAC (i.e. never or 100+ year paybacks)
 - Standing-up new BCTs
 - JSF bed-down
 - Bed-down of returning overseas troops
 - Guard/Reserve Center reconstruction
- Intelligence JCSG

14 March 2005

Air Force Briefing Notes**Date:** Wednesday, March 9, 2005**Time:** 08:00-09:30**Place:** 3E808**Chairman:** Mr. Pease, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis**Executive Secretary:** Lt Col Johansen**Key Attendees:**

- Mr. Pease, DASAF, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis
- MG Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Plans and Programs
- Col Kapellas, Division Chief, Air Force BRAC Office
- Lt Col Laffey, Division Chief, Air Force BRAC Office
- Lt Col Milam
- Lt Col Johansen

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: Candidate Recommendation Briefing by the United States Air Force to BRAC Red Team**Presenter:** Mr. Fred Pease**Items of Import:**

- BRAC 2005 Goals were to maximize warfighting capability by optimizing squadron size, increasing crew ratios and adjusting Active/ARC mix, to realign infrastructure to meet future defense strategy by sustaining air superiority and air sovereignty and accomplishing mobility basing, to maximize operational capability by eliminating excess capacity, and to capitalize on joint activity opportunities.
- USAF liaisons to JCSGs were less effective than an actual Air Force representative JCSG member may have been.
- Air Force reduces capacity by about 17.8 percent but there are still recommendations coming in that need to be knitted together.
- Did not take savings for military personnel.
- MILCON is overestimated – there is a 20% fudge factor.

Questions that arose:

- Where in your organization were JCSG recommendations deconflicted? *Resolutions started at the DAS level and may have generated other recommendations. We also had bi-lateral conversations to resolve issues.* (Salomon)
- Why is 24 the optimal squadron size for fighters? (Salomon)
- What is a Center for Excellence? What did the JCSGs recommend with respect to Indian Springs? *E&T JCSG had a candidate recommendation, but did not send it forward. Air Force decided to go ahead with the recommendation.* (Johnson)

- Where is Indian Springs? *Nevada, near Ft. Irwin, CA and Nellis AFB, NV.* (Salomon)
- Why isn't a receiver considered a realignment (e.g. MacDill)? (Salomon)
- How was capacity defined? *The difference between actual squadron size and optimum squadron size. Excess capacity exists where a squadron can be added at no cost (Slide 18).* (Johnson)
- Did the Air Force Audit Agency validate capacity? *Yes, they are present at all deliberative meetings.* (Johnson)
- Do your military value weights really have the precision to the hundredths place (e.g. 3.92%)? (Salomon)
- Were the "Mission Essential Bases" (Slide 31) analyzed at all? *Yes, but only as receivers.* (Salomon)
- What happened to the OSD principles (they aren't explicit on Slide 35)? *We will relate ours to theirs.* (Salomon)
- Is the Guard on board? *Absolutely, we are freeing up manpower for new roles.* (Johnson)
- Why leave numerous ECS enclaves? *The ECS units are tasked separately from the fighter squadron and don't go with the mission. They provide general support – CSS.* (Johnson)
- What is the status of Los Angeles AFB? *JCSG took it off the table because it had highest military value. We had an enabling scenario.* (Johnson)
- Why move plans out of Indian Springs if you have capacity there? (Salomon)
- How do you define realignment? *If more than one-third of non-mission personnel is left, then it is a realignment. If remaining non-mission personnel is less than one-third, then that is considered an enclave. Did you excess the rest of the base? Yes, and reducing the footprint sometimes created a cost.* (Johnson)
- What are "quantifiable benefits" (Slide 49)? (Pirie)
- Where do you stand with your recommendations? *None have briefed to the IEC. We are all done with them, except a couple of recommendations that are "follow the fleet" type recommendations.* (Johnson)

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- The Red Team has found it difficult to track goals, principles, imperatives, strategies, etc. and the application of military judgment. Be prepared to describe the dependencies or interrelationships between goals, principles, your strategy, and your military judgment. The candidate recommendations are supposed to be strategy-drive, data-verified and this needs to be apparent in your presentation and articulation.
- The decision process needs to be well documented and when you present to the Commission, you should have a chart that explicitly demonstrates how decisions were made.
- Make a chart that displays and rationalizes (with data support) optimum squadron sizes. For those recommendations where you do not reach the stated optimum, you need to explain why not in your justification. Failing to give such an explanation undermines your entire process.
- Review argument for increased crew ratios to be consistent. Ensure reliability data supports argument.
- The point of slides 7-9 is unclear. Add bullet point to the slide so that it is obvious what audience is to take away from the slide.

- To not look at ranges is a missed opportunity – need to have supporting justification for taking ranges off the list.
- Check with OSD to determine whether you need separate candidate recommendations for receiver sites.
- Create a slide similar to Slide 13 that shows receiver sites.
- Show, on Slide 13, the reduction in capacity due to BRAC 2005 actions.
- Put development of goals and principles (i.e. your strategy) at the beginning of your process slide (Slide 14).
- Help DoD develop a DoD-wide metric for success.
- Rename Imperatives (Slide 27) and connect them not only to the OSD principles, but also to your stated goals (Slide 3) and principles (Slide 35) – create an explicit hierarchy.
- Typographical error on Slide 36 - # 5 was modeled and was not an imperative.
- Numerous candidate recommendations, like the sample on Slide 38, used the justification that the action “enables future total force transformation”. This requires further explanation.
- May want to incorporate a before and after type slide into presentation that demonstrates which bases have new types of planes, which is significant from a maintenance perspective.
- Create a backup chart that demonstrates how many pilots are affected by C-130 movements (Slide 45), how many pilots are assigned to a new base and how many have a new mission.
- Make UAV Group movement slide (Slide 47) consistent with other similar slides.
- Review recommendations with large MILCON and “Never” paybacks. Perhaps add a quad chart that links enablers (from other services and/or from JCSGs) together so that all savings can be counted. Use the Navy’s “Fenceline Closures Chart” as an example or a template.
- Help DoD define realign and show savings – there needs to be consistency across DoD.
- Have a crisp example prepared to explain “quantifiable benefits” (Slide 49).
- The purpose of BRAC is to reduce excess capacity. Strengthen rational and justification of all recommendations by explicitly linking actions to the Air Force’s overall strategy, to the Force Structure Plan, and/or to BRAC Selection Criteria. This is necessary to avoid the appearance of using BRAC money for new MILCON to get Air Force situated and to overcome the Commission’s potential hostility surfacing from small political actions.
- Many of the recommendations include leaving expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements in an enclave. For many of them, they cite the need to “retain intellectual capital” as the justification for retaining an enclave. We need an explanation as to why these elements cannot be moved allowing for a total base closure. Especially as in the case of USAF-0033V2 (Slide 66) – where receiving location is 12 miles from losing location, and yet, an enclave is left behind.
- For those recommendations that involve the movement of aircraft from an installation with a high military value to one with a lower military value (e.g. USAF-0037 – Slide 72), we need a better explanation as to why this movement fits into the overall strategy. If “military judgment” was used, we need to know which aspect of military judgment.

- Be careful when stringing recommendations together – commission will look at the recommendations individually.

Additional observations to consider:

- Box top scenario development and top down driven comments imply non-data driven candidate recommendations. Change wording to better describe scenario development process.
- Need to solidify/disentangle your strategy, goals, imperatives, and principles. Statements on the bottom of Slides 3 and 11 really seem to be your strategy – as opposed to the reduction of capacity or to save money. If this is true, Slides 48 and 49 are irrelevant as your stated goal was not to save money.
- Military value analysis is distinct from all other groups who determined military value by mission or function of an installation. USAF appears to do military value analysis by warfighting platform rather than by installation mission or function. Since military value is not based on installation value in support of the total force structure, there are several military values for a base depending on which platform one is using.
- Several of the recommendations include the movement of aircraft that seem to be tangentially related (at best) to the core of the recommendation. Why are these movements rolled up as part of a candidate recommendation? Can't they be done outside of the BRAC process?
- For the most part, the AF candidate recommendations seemingly do not involve the disposal of property. If property is excessed, it needs to be apparent in quad charts or at least in the one-page recommendation description. If property is not excessed, why not?
- Some quad charts say the base is being "realigned," but the one-pager describes it as a closure or vice versa. You need to be consistent.
- USAF-0035: Recommendation is to close, but the documentation shows units remaining (to fulfill Air Sovereignty Alert mission). Quad sheet says no natural resources infrastructure issues, but one-pager says there could be wetlands issues that restrict additional operations. What is the MILCON for?
- USAF-0039: The wing is inactivating and all the aircraft are retiring, but there is MILCON, why? Why do the ECS elements remain? Why are Sioux Falls, SD and Gulfport-Biloxi, MS part of the community impact sheet when there is no mention of anything moving from/to those locations?
- USAF-0051: What will the AF do to solve the potential housing shortage at Mt. Home? Moves F-15s from the base ranked #1 in mil value to the base ranked #23, in part because the weather is more predictable in ID than in NC. Can this be documented?
- USAF-0052: Follows from DON-0067 and DON-0084. Why does the Engineering Squadron remain as an enclave? What is the cumulative effect (costs/savings) of the recommendations involving Willow Grove?
- USAF-0053 & USAF-0114: Why include movement of Singapore F-16s (Block 52) from Cannon to Luke as part of these recommendations? Clarify that "B52" means "Block 52" vice the aircraft.
- USAF-0055: The one-pager states that environmental impacts at Nellis need to be evaluated, but there is no explanation regarding how Nellis is part of the scenario.
- USAF-0081: Review the legality of "realigning in place".

- **USAF-0086: What is the real rationale for moving out a ANG wing, and then transferring its aircraft to another wing at the same base? “Enables Future Total Force Transformation” is insufficient justification.**

18 April 2005

White Paper

Main Issues to Discuss:

- The BRAC Red Team believes the Air Force presentations give the perception that in many cases the Air Force is using BRAC only to move aircraft and gain MILCON funding rather than reducing excess infrastructure.
- Discussion within the Red Team has produced several potential routes to dispel such a perception and gain a more favorable reception for the Air Force package.

Causes of the Perception:

- Air Force goals for BRAC 2005 appear to focus on operational requirements rather than reduction of excess infrastructure capacity under the BRAC Law.
 - Military value analysis has uniquely been done by platform as opposed to by installation or supporting function—which results in multiple military values for the same installation and the need to override military value results.
 - Military capacity has been redefined to be the difference between current and optimum squadron sizes rather than functional support capabilities.
 - Proposals appear to use BRAC to determine where FYDP aircraft changes should be implemented and use BRAC funds to make the changes without including associated savings under BRAC.
 - Many of the aircraft changes are already reflected in the FYDP and any resulting savings have been taken.
 - BRAC actions should result in savings in installation and personnel costs.
 - As currently reflected, most Air Force actions do not result in savings and do not require the BRAC provisions.
- Proposals show personnel position savings while allegedly not reducing overall end strength.
- Even though number of aircraft is coming down, Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) groups are left almost everywhere with no defined mission.
 - Perception supported by answers to questions: ECS groups are used to maintain “end strength” in search of missions.
- In many cases, military value is being overridden by Air Sovereignty Alert requirements, Active Reserve Component (ARC) mix, and recruiting demographics—need to show how these are tied to the Force Structure Plan and/or the Final Selection Criteria.

Potential Solutions:

- Given that each installation has multiple military value rankings, it is imperative that recommendations that are inconsistent with the ranking of installations for the platform in question be fully justified.
- The underlying rationales for the Air Force's method of determining military value and capacity (including optimal squadron sizes) need to be carefully articulated and well supported.
- If the moves are accomplished under BRAC, all savings and costs must be reflected under BRAC—other mission and personnel requirements should be paid for outside BRAC (can use BRAC savings).
- Provide better explanation of the role of Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) units.
 - All savings must be part of BRAC—savings can then be applied to other missions.
 - Create a chart that shows:
 - what functions or MOSs ECSs cover,
 - how an ECS is allocated,
 - when they deploy,
 - what mission the ECS is charged with,
 - how ECSs support Homeland Defense,
 - and explains why DoD needs to have ECSs at numerous bases.
- Provide better explanation for need for Homeland Defense Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) Facilities.
 - Explain what the ASA sites are and why BRAC is required to make changes—why are they a new mission?
 - Create a chart that lays out the requirements for coverage.
 - Ensure that NORTHCOM agrees with sites and are on the same page.
- Recommendations citing maintenance of ARC mix need to be supported by documentation that explains why the ARC mix is important and how maintaining the proper mix supports the Force Structure Plan and/or Final Selection Criteria.
- Recommendations citing more suitable recruiting demographics in one location over another need to be linked to a supporting document with recruiting data across all installations.
- Closing leased facilities could improve Air Force story—recommend including these facilities on your closure list. Plus, by doing so, you will be consistent with other Services since they are including leased facilities on their closure lists.
- Justifications for Ellsworth AFB, SD and Grand Forks AFB, ND need to be stronger as these are closures in close proximity to each other with little other regional military presence. There also needs to be stronger rationales for other associated realignments.

19 April 2005

Second Air Force Briefing Notes**Date:** Monday, April 18, 2005**Time:** 08:30-10:30**Place:** 5C279**Chairman:** Mr. Pease, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis**Executive Secretary:** Lt. Col. Johansen**Key Attendees:**

- Mr. Pease, DASAF, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis
- MG Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Plans and Programs
- Col Kapellas, Division Chief, Air Force BRAC Office
- Lt Col Johansen

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: *Second* Candidate Recommendation Briefing by the United States Air Force to BRAC Red Team**Items of Import:**

- Since the first meeting with the Red Team the United States Air Force (USAF) has attempted to utilize BRAC language and terminology.
- USAF is completed with the bulk of its “laydown” in terms of candidate recommendations to be submitted, although further refinements are being made.
- USAF had not originally taken savings for people in the same way the other groups and services were, but we have since gone back and recalculated savings associated with manpower and personnel to be more consistent with the other groups.

Questions that arose:

- What do you mean by infrastructure? *Operational areas as well as buildings connected to an installation.* (Salomon)
- What does the red, blue, or shading indicate on this map (Slide 5, middle map)? *White is a high speed area, shaded is where we are authorized to turn off the lights and operate. Red is ranges? Yes. How many ranges did you close? One, at Cannon AFB. There are 30 ranges that USAF uses, but most of these have other missions as well.* (Salomon/Johnson)
- Are all the Services in agreement with having a Joint Center of Excellence at Indian Springs? *No, we are pulling that candidate recommendation. That UAV Center of Excellence was originally Education and Training JCSG responsibility and they decided it was really a RD&A matter, so they passed it on to the Technical JCSG. We only had an enabling scenario to move stuff out of Indian Springs, which without the Center of Excellence is not necessary.* (Johnson)
- What point do you want the audience to take away from this slide (Slide 6)? Do you follow-up on these later in your briefing? *There are recommendations going forward for all these.* (Salomon)

- You have a lot of “Red” in the Northeast – losing sites or bases being closed – have you discussed this with NORTHCOM? *Absolutely, NORTHCOM is on board.*
- What does cumulative mean (Slide 46, USAF-1006V2 – EIT Summary)? *It is the total for the implementation period, but we can take it off this chart as it may be confusing.* (Salomon)

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- Be careful when discussing people vs. billet savings vs. authorized positions. If you take savings for eliminated billets or authorized positions, should show that these positions go off the books or reprogrammed.
- Be careful with your wording – the use of “infrastructure” on Slide 2 seems to be referring to aircraft, but later in your brief (Slide 9) “infrastructure” is used to mean installations and operating areas.
- “AF Goals for BRAC 2005” are not obviously linked to DoD BRAC goals (Slide 2). Make sure your subsequent slides are consistent with the “AF BRAC 2005 Goals” bullet points. (E.g. - The title of Slide 4 is more loosely linked to the second bullet point on Slide 2 than the titles of Slides 3 or 5 are linked to the first and third bullet points, respectively.)
- Add a legend for maps on Slide 5 so that the meaning of the color coding and shading is clear.
- BRAC is about reducing excess capacity – your AF Installation map will look about the same after BRAC, which will open you and DoD up to criticisms.
- Closing ranges – closed Cannon, but according to your explanation of your map, Cannon has one of the best locations. Other 30 ranges that are used by the AF have other associated missions. Similarly, if you overlay the civilian air traffic map on your AF Installations map – it would tell you to move everything to the Northwest, yet you close Ellsworth, SD and Grand Forks, ND. The story you would like to tell with these maps is really about tactical air, so consider highlight tactical aviation bases.
- Be consistent. If you are not going forward with the UAV Center of Excellence remove it from the “Joint Opportunities” slide (Slide 6) and from the “emerging needs” section of slide 4.
- Consider using BRAC terminology on your “Summary” slide (Slide 9) (I.e. – Discuss closures, realignments, and associated cost savings).
- Bullet two on your “Summary” slide (Slide 9) is really the only BRAC action— but these reductions are already programmed to take place in the FYDP. Explain up front that you are using BRAC to determine action for aircraft disposal in compliance with the Force Structure Plan. However, aircraft retirements really do not need to be BRAC actions.
- Justifications for the closure of Cannon AFB, NM Ellsworth AFB, SD and Grand Forks, ND need to be strengthened as well as the justifications for any associated realignments.
- Include the closure of any leased facilities on your closure list (Slide 10).
- Check military value of every site on lists on Slides 10 and 11. You want to make sure that you are not moving from installations with higher military value to lower ranked installations. Given that each installation has multiple military value rankings, it is imperative that recommendations that are inconsistent with the ranking of installations for the platform in question be fully justified.
- The underlying rationales for the Air Force’s method of determining military value and capacity (including optimal squadron sizes) need to be carefully articulated and well supported.
- Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS)

- Need chart explaining
 - what functions or MOSs ECSs cover,
 - how an ECS is allocated,
 - when they deploy,
 - what mission the ECS is charged with,
 - how ECSs support Homeland Defense,
 - and explains why DoD needs to have ECSs at numerous bases.
- If these are already programmed changes – why are they being done under BRAC? Need to explain up front that Military Value analysis done in BRAC aides the determination of where programmed reductions in aircraft occur. But also need an explanation for why people reductions are not occurring under BRAC.
- Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA)
 - Explain what the ASA sites are and why BRAC is required to make changes—why are they a new mission?
 - Create a chart that lays out the requirements for coverage.
 - Ensure that NORTHCOM agrees with sites and are on the same page.
- Recommendations citing more suitable recruiting demographics in one location over another need to be linked to a supporting document with recruiting data across all installations.
- Recommendations using maintenance of ARC mix need to be supported by documentation that explains why the ARC mix is important and how maintaining the proper mix supports the Force Structure Plan or Final Selection Criteria.
- “Capturing Intellectual Capital” is unusual terminology, use more descriptive wording.
- Add statement to candidate recommendation that ECS is remaining at Louis Munoz Marin IAP AGS (USAF-0069).

Additional observations to consider:

- Should have a reason for why USAF is not reducing endstrength as part of BRAC.
- Ensure that savings for FYDP actions completed as part of BRAC are accounted for in accordance with the BRAC statute and/or OSD policy.
- Some candidate recommendations are not in the correct format for submission. Ensure that all candidate recommendations are in the following format:

BRAC Action	where	by what	to where	and retaining what
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Close ● Realign ● Inactivate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● losing installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● moving ● relocating ● consolidating ● privatizing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● gaining installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● enclaves ● functions ● activities

- Justification phrases should be removed from candidate recommendation statements.
- Candidate recommendations should be organized in presentation in the following order:
 - Tier I: Traditional BRAC – Military value applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier II: Strategy Driven – Military judgment applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier III: Operationally Driven – Military judgment overrides, net savings.
 - Tier IV: Transformationally Driven – No military value justification, military judgment sole rationale, not cost effective, long paybacks.

COBRA Model Community Excursion June 12, 2005

On June 12, one community COBRA Excursion was completed by modifying the DOD Recommendation COBRA for Cannon's closure recommendation – COBRA USAir Force 0114V3 (125.1c2).CBR. The results are reported below.
Excursion Name: COBRA USAir Force 0114V3 (125.1c2) COMM 1 June 12 05.CBR.

Modification to Air Force COBRA assumptions: Retained all eliminated personnel to support force structure moves and relocated them to Nellis AFB as the most likely installation to receive the bulk of personnel.

Result: The changes in significant cost/savings data are displayed in the table below with the most significant presented in **bold** font. The Air Force Recommendation COBRA data is presented in the first row for comparison to the Excursion results displayed in the second row in **blue**.

Scenario	Payback Period (Years)	Costs/Savings (\$K)				Annual Total Recurring
		20 - Year NPV	1-Time	Personnel (2006 – 2011)	Total (2006 - 2011)	
Recommendation Scenario	Immediate	-2,706,756	90,101	-772,995	-815,558	-200,497
Community Excursion 1	>50 years	169,036	86,623	109,923	117,580	6,158


Talking Points

Cannon AFB Closure Impact

Clovis Municipal Schools

Cannon AFB Students

	Total Students	Military Students	Percentage
CHS	1473	192	13%
Gattis	520	53	10%
Marshall	600	78	13%
Yucca	775	134	17%
Barry	283	163	58%
Bella Vista	301	6	2%
Cameo	378	8	2%
Highland	365	17	5%
James Bickley	317	9	3%
La Casita	444	2	1%
Lincoln Jackson	157	18	11%
Lockwood	460	6	1%
Mesa	511	244	48%
Parkview	387	12	3%
Ranchvale	235	184	78%
Sandia	351	28	8%
Zia	439	61	14%
Los Ninos	151	32	21%
Total	8147	1247	15%



**Cannon AFB
Dependent
Employees
22**

**Food Service
Department
Revenue Impact
\$240,620**

**Special Education
Impact
\$109,440**

**State Equalization
Guarantee Impact
\$7,000,000**

**PL874 Regular
Education Impact
\$691,185
(District Retains 25% • \$172,797)**

Volunteer/Mentor Impact

- * CAFB Volunteer Areas – Student Reading Programs, Parent Activities, Class Projects, Site & District Science Fairs, Guest Speakers, Student Dental Program, "Adopt a School" Program, "Secret Santa" for Underprivileged Children, School Carnivals, Field Days, Donations, District Strategic Planning Team & Character Counts! Members, Career Lectures, "Family Fun Night," Renaissance Fair, Earth Day Activities, Game Nights
- * CAFB School Building Projects – Installation of Basketball Courts, Goals, & Pavilion, Tile Mosaic, Painting, Playground Equipment
- * CAFB Mentors – HOSTS Program, After-School Program, Tutoring Services

Summary Points

Criterion 1: Current and future mission capabilities....

Undervalued current capabilities

Does not appear to have considered Cannon for future operations

Lack of encroachment protects future capabilities

Criterion 2: Availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace....

Land, facilities, airspace and range undervalued

Realistic overland airspace without encroachment

Summary Points

Criterion 3: Ability of accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge and total future force requirements....

Previous bed-down – twice the number of bigger aircraft

Base can be easily doubled in size

Criterion 4: Cost of operations and the manpower implications....

One of the most efficient operations in the Air Force

Manpower savings grossly overestimated

Summary Points

Criterion 5: Extent and timing of potential costs and savings....
Our analysis suggests very little or no savings
Contrary to the basic goals of BRAC

Criterion 6: Economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity....

- 1 in 3 area jobs lost
- Area over 40% minorities
- Area will not recover

Summary Points

Criterion 7: Ability of the infrastructure of both existing and potential receiving communities....

Cannon can double in size


Melrose range can expand

Training airspace is increasing this year


Criterion 8: Environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration....

Restoration and clean up of Melrose range significant



U.S. Hispanic Population, 2003





Regional Hispanic Population, 2003



Roosevelt County Demographic Profile



Curry County Demographic Profile



United States Demographic Profile

