

# **Base Realignment and Closure Commission**



**May 4th, 2005  
9:30 AM Hearing**

Chairman Question to DASD Regarding Certified Data  
May 4, 9:30 AM Hearing

Mr. Henry - Given the intensity of our efforts to be initiated upon receipt of the Secretary's recommendation, it is essential that the Commission receive all legislatively and process required information, back-up material and certified data in as timely a fashion as possible after the release of the recommendations. As you know, early access to that material will enable the Commission to immediately begin our analysis, in the best interest of Military Value.

Please bring back to the Secretary our emphatic request for him to do everything within his power to provide the necessary certified data to the Commission and to the Congress as close as possible to 24 hours after release of his recommendations.

(Background: Staff recalls some delays in this delivery in past Commissions - even beyond the 7 day legislative requirement - a situation that started a bow wave. We believe it is in the best interest of the process for OSD, the impacted Defense Agencies and the Services to deliver such items sooner rather than later and trust you concur.)

I list below some representative items delivered in previous rounds and essential to the analysis and public process:  
Relative COBRA runs; Cross-Service, Defense Agencies and Service executive group minutes (previously TABS, BSAT, BSEC, BCEG, etc.); Installation Data Calls; Capacity Analysis Summaries; Databases; Scoring Sheets/Results; Economic Models; Environmental Data/Cost; etc.)

**Chairman's  
Suggested Questions for 9:30 AM, May 4, 2005 Hearing  
Force Structure Plan, Global Posture Review, Quadrennial Review  
(Testimony from the Office Secretary of Defense and Office of the  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)**

1. The President announced the return of up to 70,000 troops from overseas. Some of these movements may begin soon. Since the BRAC list is about to be released, what has the DOD done to ensure that the returning forces and their families have adequate facilities upon their arrival?
2. How can the Commission evaluate the BRAC recommendations before the 2005 QDR is completed? Will we need another BRAC after that study is completed?
3. Please discuss the significance of a force structure plan based on a 20-year vs. a 6-year period of probable threats to national security had in regards to the Departments BRAC recommendations for 2005.
4. Does the current Force Structure approach for the U. S. Army, restructuring into smaller, lighter, more mobile forces, allow greater joint cross-service basing options in this BRAC round?
5. Secretary Rumsfeld discusses "new concepts" of how the Department will align itself, including, "Troops should be located in places where they are wanted, welcomed and needed; in environments hospitable to their movements; and in places that allow them to be usable and flexible." How has DOD specifically addressed those concepts as you have prepared your recommendations to the Commission?

## BRAC Roles and Priorities

Since we are about to receive the recommendation of the Department of Defense, most of the analysis and internal decisions by the Services have been completed and recommendations are most likely in the office of the Secretary of Defense.

Without compromising any potential decisions or preempting the Secretary of Defense, can you describe your role in the BRAC process to date?

Did you establish, and can you share any specific goals that you thought from a policy perspective, were important for the Department to consider?

## Overseas Basing Plans

The Department of Defense is in the process of negotiating U.S. military force structure moves in Europe and Asia to support recommendations in the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy released by the President in September, 2004. Some of these moves will result in a change in defense capabilities, as major units are returned to the United States and new requirements for strategic mobility emerge to meet time critical requests for forces by our Combatant commanders around the globe.

**Does the force structure plan prepared as a part of the BRAC process account for the changes in the posture of our forces around the world? As an example, would the location of the homeports of our aircraft carriers world-wide affect the number of carriers we needed to meet requirements?**

## Quadrennial Defense Review

As required by law, the Department is in the process of initiating a quadrennial defense review (QDR) that will assess national security objectives, our national defense strategy, and then will review our military capabilities to determine what requirements should be addressed to maximize the effectiveness of our military forces. From a layman's perspective, we probably should have completed the QDR before embarking upon the BRAC process and, as part of the BRAC, a submission of a force structure report.

In your opinion will the QDR supercede the BRAC force structure report or even worse, render it obsolete?

How is the Department ensuring that a recommendation made in the BRAC process will not be undercut or affected by the QDR?

## Changes in Mobility Requirements

Both the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy released in September 2004, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) currently in process will have a significant impact on the requirements and resources for our military forces to move around the world. The Joint Chiefs are now engaged in a Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) that will shift to an Analysis of Alternatives (aoA) this summer as we attempt to determine what mixes of land, air and sea mobility assets we need to meet operational requirements.

Does the force structure report, and specifically the analysis of excess capacity, account for potential new requirements for transportation hubs and new ports of embarkment for our military forces?

How would you recommend the Commission address the issue of the infrastructure required to support future force structure if the Defense Department is still in the process of determining what is needed for mobility capabilities?

### Capabilities-Based Planning

The Force structure report states that the Department's force planning framework does not focus on specific conflicts, but instead determines capabilities required for a range of scenarios. "The Department analyzes the force requirements for the most likely, the most dangerous, and the most demanding circumstances."

Can you give the Commission a brief review of the capabilities considered vital to a full range of scenarios?

Can you explain how the Department assesses force requirements over a full range of scenarios?

Does the Department apply a ratio of probability to the scenarios?

Is there a measure of risk imbedded in the final force structure recommendations and to what extent?

### Capabilities-Based Planning

It would seem counterintuitive that in an era where the Department of Defense is stressing capabilities-based planning and the increased flexibility of our force posture world-wide by establishing dozens of new forward operating installations, we would want to constrict our basing and infrastructure in the United States, effectively limiting our flexibility and ability to respond.

How will the BRAC process actually contribute to the goals set forth in the force structure plan to transform the Armed Forces to meet the threats to our national security?

In what ways will the BRAC process result in realignments that contribute to an increase in the flexibility of our forces?

## Force Structure and Homeland Defense

Can you describe how the force structure report identifies and addresses requirements for homeland security?

What roles and responsibilities are assumed for military forces in scenarios centered around the protection of our population, national assets, and critical infrastructure?

Are the levels of proposed force structure proposed in the report for both the active and reserve components of our military based on an assessment or assumptions of future requirements for the protection of our borders and population?

## Force Structure Planning for Traditional Challenges.

This question focuses on traditional challenges from established states employing a full range of military forces in superior numbers. The Force Structure report states that "while traditional forms of military competition remain important, trends suggest that these challenges will receive lesser priority in the planning of adversaries vis-a vis the United States."

In what way does the proposed force structure respond to the scenario of traditional challenges?

If the United States today assigns a low priority to the response to traditional challenges, are we not identifying and telegraphing a future vulnerability to the adversaries of our national interest?

## Surge Requirements

One of the BRAC criteria refers to the ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and surge requirements.

Where in the force structure report is an estimate of the numbers of forces or major force units that would be considered a surge requirement?

If not specifically cited in the force structure report, how do you recommend this Commission take into consideration the planning for, and the physical plant required to support surge requirements?

**Suggested Questions for 9:30 AM, May 4, 2005 Hearing  
Force Structure Plan, Global Posture Review, Quadrennial Review  
(Testimony from the Office Secretary of Defense and Office of the  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)**

1. The Department has reportedly taken a "global" look at basing this time that was not evident during the 1990s. Why have you taken this approach, and can you explain that process?
2. Since some forces are already returning from overseas prior to the release of BRAC recommendations, can you explain the imperative to accomplish this now, before the Department has decided the final destination of CONUS-bound forces?
3. Secretary Rumsfeld told the SASC, "We do not expect our forces to fight where they are stationed. We know that our forces will need to move to the fight wherever it is." How has the Department integrated analysis and findings from the on-going Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) to ensure our mobility forces can get our troops to the fight?
4. How has the Department prepared for the returning troops and their families in such areas as military family housing and schools? What specifically is the Department doing to ensure that it does not degrade the quality of life of the troops and their families returning to bases in the US?
5. How is the Department ensuring that overseas-based troops do not rotate to the CONUS until the receiving bases and communities are ready for them? What oversight efforts are in place?
6. No list of overseas bases to be closed has been released to date, although we anticipate an interim list will soon be available. How will the Department coordinate this with the BRAC recommendation?

7. What is the state of negotiations with the allies? Press accounts from Germany and Japan and other countries have highlighted local national impressions that information on DOD and central government intentions has been lacking. With whom within the various national governments have you been negotiating, and is it possible to identify issues that could delay or derail planned redeployments?
8. How would you characterize the interagency coordination and cooperation involved in these negotiations with foreign governments? For example, the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency, to name a few, have significant stakes in the adjustment of military bases and of US forces stationed overseas. What roles have these agencies played in planning the adjustment of the DOD footprint and in negotiations with Allied governments?
9. What is the state of planning for the redeployment of troops from overseas to the United States? Have the specific units been identified and a schedule developed? Can the schedule be made available to the BRAC Commission? Will these units be brought home individually as whole divisions, as whole brigades, or at some lower level of command?
10. How will the movement of these troops be funded? Do you expect the BRAC account to pay for this movement, or will funds come out of the defense appropriation? What is the magnitude and timing of the associated costs?
11. Will the bulk of the troops redeploy directly to the United States, or will they rotate home only after augmenting forces deploying to Iraq?

12. If there was another round of base closure activity in the next few years, do you feel it will be realistic to again base the recommendations of that round on a 20-year period?
13. Did the different approach in this cycle's force planning approach regarding a greater range of conflict scenarios vs. a established number of conflicts, allow you to consider more or less joint cross-service options as in past base closure rounds? If more options, please explain, if you can, why that was the case.
14. With the expected return of a great number of troops to the United States over the next several years, do you expect the terrorist threat against United States bases will increase or decrease?
15. Are the recent Army Transformation efforts in synch with those recommendations the Department will provide to this Commission in the next two weeks?
16. Please explain the thought process in reducing the Aircraft Carriers from 12 to 11, given what appears to be a great need than ever before in world wide presence,
17. Please explain how the reduction of aircraft carriers from 12 to 11 aligns with the ongoing transformation approach as well as with the current philosophy of not to focus on specific conflicts but rather a wider range of scenarios.
18. Given that the Air Force level of Air Expeditionary Forces remains constant over at least the next six years, does that indicate a great level of success with that number over the last five years.
19. With the development of the AEFs, the Air Force CONUS basing approach has changed measurably since the last round of BRAC.

Does this arrangement increase or decrease your basing requirements. Does this arrangement give the Department of Defense more or less Joint Cross Service options?

20. Will a greater emphasis on Joint Service assignment allow the Department to reduce previously independent infrastructure like training, research and logistics?
  
21. We anticipate bold recommendations to support, encourage and instill *Jointness* through realignment of forces and training. Will the Department's plans to improve joint interoperability be matched with an equally bold and innovative approach to establishing and stressing joint training? Assuming yes, please elaborate.

## Quadrennial Defense Review

Mr. Chairman, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will operationalize our new National Defense Strategy and shape the future force. The Department launched the formal review in March 2005, and the QDR Report will be submitted to Congress with the FY07 budget request.

The QDR will take a 20-year outlook. It will examine the capabilities that the Department and the nation need to contend with challenges in four focus areas:

- Building partnerships to hasten the demise of terrorist extremist networks;
- Defending the homeland in depth;
- Shaping the choices of key nations at strategic crossroads; and
- Preventing the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile state or non-state actors for when classic deterrence is ineffective.

A theme cutting across all of these focus areas – and a central element of the National Defense Strategy – is how we might help our allies and partners to develop their own capacities to confront security challenges that we have in common.

Mr. Chairman, rather than looking solely at weapons systems and force structure, the QDR will look at all aspects of the Department of Defense through the lens of the four focus areas, employing six separate, but complimentary lines of approach:

- The needed mix of warfighting capabilities;
- Joint enablers, such as logistics, space, and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance;
- Roles, missions, and organizations for the next two decades;
- Manning and balancing the force for a 21<sup>st</sup> -century “human capital strategy”;

# Wars Strain U.S. Military Capability, Pentagon Reports

and the Marines, the two services charged with conducting the ongoing wars. Along with the Army missing recruiting targets, the Marines missed contracting targets in February and March, though by relatively small amounts. The Army Reserve has also missed its recruiting targets each of the past four months, in some cases dramatically.

The shortage of recruits has the Army's boot camps running at lower-than-usual capacity. The Army's basic training center at Fort Benning, Ga., is training seven companies currently, half of its maximum capacity of 14 companies, according to Col. Bill Gallagher, commander of the Basic Combat Training Brigade. Moreover, each company of fresh recruits is smaller than usual, with only 190 troops compared with a maximum possible of 220, he said.

The only way the Army can meet its annual recruiting goal is with a large surge of enlistments this spring and summer, leading Fort Benning officials to prepare for "a huge influx, in case it happens," Gallagher said. Last year, however, there was "no summer surge," he said.

As of the end of March, 7,800 infantry soldiers had been trained at Fort Benning, compared with a target of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

ed conflict across the globe, but the path to victory could be more complicated.

"There is no doubt of what the outcome is going to be," a top defense official said. "Risk to accomplish the task isn't even part of the discussion. The way we accomplish the task is."

A senior military official said, for example, that it is obvious that if another conflict arises while the United States does battle in Iraq and Afghanistan and fights the global war on terrorism, it would not be as easily accomplished as if the other three

conflicts did not exist.

"It wouldn't be as pretty," the official said.

Defense officials are also working to mitigate the risks by following through with plans to transform the military, making it more agile and less troops are positioned around the globe. By raising operational standards, officials say commanders can save lives by acting faster and by using fewer resources.

The military's need for manpower on the ground, however, continues to highlight demands on the Army

According to the Army, the recruiting effort is 16 percent behind where it should be at this point in the fiscal year, and current figures project a nearly 10 percent shortfall by the end of the fiscal year in September. Army recruiting officials believe enhanced recruiting efforts and incentives should increase their enrollment over the summer, but they would have to consistently beat monthly goals over the next five months to meet annual goals. While the Army should have had 42,585 new recruits for the year as of the end of April, it had 35,833. It hopes to have 80,000 new enlistments this fiscal year.

"We are still cautiously optimistic," said Col. Joseph Curtin, an Army spokesman.

Myers's risk assessment is a rare open acknowledgment that the stresses on the force and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could have an impact on other military operations. Although the assessment does not indicate a greater threat to the nation, or a greater threat to the military, it does indicate that additional conflicts could take longer, or eat up more resources, than expected.

Military and defense officials spoke to reporters on the condition of anonymity yesterday because the risk assessment is a classified document, but they wanted to emphasize that the heightened risk does not indicate vulnerability on the part of U.S. forces and that it should not be read by other nations as an opportunity to attack. The officials said the United States would win any project-

By Josh White  
and Ann Scott Tyson  
Washington Post Staff Writers


The Defense Department acknowledged yesterday that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have stressed the U.S. military to a point where it is at higher risk of less swiftly and easily defeating potential foes, though officials maintained that U.S. forces could handle any military threat that presents itself.

An annual risk assessment by Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded that commanders are having difficulty meeting the higher standards imposed on them by conflicts around the world, including the military effort against terrorism. Presented to members of Congress yesterday, the assessment found that the risk has increased but is trending lower, according to defense and military officials who briefed reporters at the Pentagon yesterday.

Underlining the stress facing the armed services, the Army reported separately yesterday that its recruiting efforts are continuing to slip, as recruiters nationwide obtained less than 60 percent of the April goal of 6,600 new recruits into the active-duty force. It was the third straight month in which the Army missed its recruiting goal, and it represents a significant downward trend.



# Security Challenges



**Capabilities-based planning should apportion risk across challenges**



# ***What is a QDR?***


---

- The QDR's principal purpose is to balance strategy with resources
  - Develops strategic planning guidance for the Defense Department
  - Lays out an agenda for developing needed capabilities and shaping the future force
- Takes a 20-year outlook
- Submitted to Congress with President's FY07 budget



# Periods of Fundamental Change

	1930s	1950s	1980s	2000+
Challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How to prepare for war with Japan?</li> <li>• How to prepare for a conflict in Europe?</li> <li>• How to develop new military technologies during the Depression /defense budget constraints?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How to fight in the time, place, and manner of our choosing in the atomic age?</li> <li>• How to leverage new nuclear “genie”?</li> <li>• How to employ “trip wires”?</li> <li>• How to reposture globally for the Cold War?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How to roll-back Communist expansion in the 3<sup>rd</sup> world?</li> <li>• How to impose costs on USSR in terms of technology?</li> <li>• How to restore the military balance on the Central European Front?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>☐ <i>How do we build partnerships to defeat terrorist extremism?</i></li> <li>☐ <i>How do we defend the homeland in-depth?</i></li> <li>☐ <i>How do we shape the choices of countries arriving at strategic crossroads?</i></li> <li>☐ <i>How do we prevent the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile state or non-state actors?</i></li> </ul>
Responses	<p><u>New Concepts of Warfare</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Amphibious warfare</li> <li>• Carrier aviation</li> <li>• Combined arms / mechanized warfare</li> <li>• Strategic bombing</li> </ul>	<p><u>“New Look” Strategy</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Doctrine of massive retaliation</li> <li>• Nuclear Triad (USAF, USN)</li> <li>• Pentomic Army</li> <li>• Nuclear-capable tactical aircraft (USAF, USN)</li> <li>• NRO</li> </ul>	<p><u>Reagan Doctrine</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Competitive strategies               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SDI</li> <li>• Maritime Strategy, horizontal escalation</li> <li>• Stealth / precision / technology</li> </ul> </li> <li>• AirLand Battle</li> <li>• SOF capabilities</li> </ul>	<p><u>Transformation</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>☐ <i>Capabilities Mix</i></li> <li>☐ <i>Joint Capability Enablers</i></li> <li>☐ <i>Roles, Missions &amp; Organizations</i></li> <li>☐ <i>Business Practices</i></li> <li>☐ <i>Human Capital Strategy</i></li> <li>☐ <i>Authorities</i></li> </ul>



# QDR Assumptions

---

- ❑ United States, allies and partners will be tested by major unforeseen, national security contingencies over the next decade
- ❑ QDR will be conducted in context of a Nation at war
  - *Global War on Terror has first priority*
  - *Strategic victory in Iraq and Afghanistan is part of the Global War on Terror*
- ❑ External & internal pressures on resources will impact DoD transformation
  - *Rising USG non-discretionary costs will increase pressure on DoD's top-line*
  - *DoD fact-of-life costs continue to grow (e.g., health programs, fuel)*
- ❑ Transformation is a work in progress
  - *Major initiatives now underway will continue (e.g., global posture changes, rebalancing the force, force modularization, capabilities-based planning)*
  - *There are other initiatives that need to be addressed (senior leadership input)*



# QDR Issues

## Capability Mix

**Overarching:**  
*How should DoD apportion resources & risk?*

**Focus Area #1:** *What capabilities are needed to build partnerships to defeat extremism?*

**Focus Area #2:** *What capabilities are needed to defend the homeland in-depth?*

**Focus Area #3:** *What capabilities are needed to shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads?*

**Focus Areas #4:** *What capabilities are needed to prevent the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile state or non-state actors?*

## Roles, Missions & Organizations

What changes to roles, missions, organizations and responsibilities in DoD are needed to meet 21st century challenges?

What recommendations should DoD make to better integrate and otherwise improve interagency operations across the U.S. Government?

What institutional changes are needed to address the 4 focus areas?

## Manning & Balancing the Force

What type of people and skill sets are required to address the 4 focus areas?

What is the appropriate Human Capital Strategy for the 21st century to attract, retain, and develop the right type of people and skill sets?

What is the appropriate Active-Reserve Component mix to address the 4 focus areas of the 21st century?

## Business Practices & Processes

How do we improve consumability of data across Components to support Capabilities-Based Planning?

*How should the Department control costs / address the growing cost of business?*

Reform its budgeting, contracting, auditing, and acquisition processes to better support wartime operations?

## Joint Enablers

How should DoD improve key capability enablers to address the 4 focus areas?

## Global Defense Posture & BRAC

*How should DoD update its global defense posture to strengthen the operational capabilities of the joint warfighter?*

## Authorities

What changes are needed to address 21st century challenges? (Title 10, etc.)




# Cold War (1985)



- Legacy from the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century wars
- Forces were located and equipped to fight where they were based.



# Post-Cold War (1995-2002)



• US no longer assumes we know where our forces will have to operate —and no longer assumes they will fight where they are based.



# ***Global Defense Posture – Key Themes***


---

---

- Develop flexibility to contend with uncertainty
- Focus within and across regions
- Expand allied roles, build new partnerships
- Focus on capabilities, not numbers
- Develop rapidly deployable capabilities




# Global Defense Posture – Key Elements





# Global Defense Posture Changes



**BRAC IMPLICATIONS**

- Footprint, Presence, Surge, Force Mgmt, Prepo
- Reachback
- Rotational Presence for Crisis Response and Security Cooperation
- ~ 70,000 Military Personnel to U.S.

**\*\* Best Military Value \*\***

### Overseas Presence\*

*Net Changes*

Personnel ~ 60 to 70,000

Installations ~ 300

\*outside of US and its territories

# ***National Defense Strategy Quadrennial Defense Review Global Defense Posture***

---



## ***Briefing for the Base Realignment and Closure Commission***

***4 May 2005***

***Ryan Henry  
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy***

# ***National Defense Strategy Quadrennial Defense Review Global Defense Posture***

---



## ***Briefing for the Base Realignment and Closure Commission***

***4 May 2005***

***Ryan Henry  
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy***



# *Agenda*

---

## **BRAC's Relationship to:**

- National Defense Strategy**
  
- Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)**
  
- Global Defense Posture**



# **DoD Strategic Planning**

---

---

- **Since 9/11 we have updated our strategic thinking**
  - We have incorporated lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other operations.
  - BRAC's application of "best military value" plays a key role in leveraging lessons learned.
  
- **The National Defense Strategy, QDR Terms of Reference, and Global Defense Posture:**
  - *Acknowledge the limits of intelligence (in all senses of the term) and position us to handle strategic uncertainty;*
  - *Recognize the value of early measures to resolve problems before they become crises and crises before they become wars; and*
  - *Emphasize the criticality of building partnership capacity to address national security concerns.*



# National Defense Strategy

## □ Key ideas:

- Strategic uncertainty
- Increasing partnership capacity
- Value of early action (preventive measures)
- Active, layered defense (National Mil Strategy)

### Defense "Ends":

- Secure U.S. from direct attack
- Secure strategic access and retain freedom of action
- Strengthen alliances and partnerships
- Establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order

### Defense "Ways":

- Assure allies and friends
- Dissuade potential adversaries
- Deter aggression and counter coercion
- Defeat adversaries

### GWOT strategy:

- Protect the homeland
- Disrupt and attack terrorist networks
- Counter ideological support for terrorism

## □ Transformation:

- Changing the way we think about challenges and opportunities
  - *Continual reexamination of assumptions; willingness to adapt to new circumstances and to abandon preconceptions that don't comport with unfolding events*
- Adapting the defense establishment to post 9-11 perspective
- Refocusing capabilities to meet 21<sup>st</sup>-century challenges, not just those we are already most prepared to meet
- Integrated defense risk framework -- Operational, Future Challenges, Force Management, Institutional



# Four Focus Areas

---

1. Build partnerships to defeat terrorist extremism
2. Defend the homeland in-depth
3. Shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads
4. Prevent the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile state or non-state actors



***These 4 areas provide focus for new capabilities development***

# Wars Strain U.S. Military Capability, Pentagon Reports

By Josh White  
and ANN SCOTT TYSON  
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Defense Department ac-

knowledged yesterday that the wars

in Iraq and Afghanistan have

stressed the U.S. military to a point

where it is at higher risk of less swift

and easily defeating potential foes,

though officials maintained that U.S.

forces could handle any military

threat that presents itself.

An annual risk assessment by

Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded

that commanders are having difficul-

ty meeting the higher standards im-

posed on them by conflicts around

the world, including the military ef-

fort against terrorism. Presented to

members of Congress yesterday, the

assessment found that the risk has

increased but is trending lower, ac-

ording to defense and military offi-

cials, who briefed reporters at the

Pentagon yesterday.

Underlining the stress facing

the armed services, the Army report-

ed separately yesterday that its re-

cruting efforts are continuing to

shrink, as recruiters nationwide ob-

tained less than 60 percent of the

April goal of 6,600 new recruits into

the active-duty force. It was the third

straight month in which the Army

missed its recruiting goal, and it re-

presents a significant downward

trend.

According to the Army, the re-

cruting effort is 16 percent behind in

where it should be at this point in

the fiscal year, and current figures

project a nearly 10 percent shortfall

by the end of the fiscal year in Sep-

tember. Army recruiting officials be-

lieve enhanced recruiting efforts and

incentives should increase their en-

listments over the summer, but they

would have to consistently beat

monthly goals over the next five

months to meet annual goals. While

the Army should have had 42,585

new recruits for the year as of the

end of April, it had 35,833. It hopes

to have 80,000 new enlistments this

fiscal year.

"We are still cautiously optimis-

tic," said Col. Joseph Curtin, an

Army spokesman.

Myers's risk assessment is a rare

open acknowledgment that the

struggles on the force and the wars in

Iraq and Afghanistan could have an

impact on other military operations.

Although the assessment does not

indicate a greater threat to the na-

tional security, it does indicate that additional

conflicts could take longer, or eat up

more resources, than expected.

Military and defense officials

spoke to reporters on the condition

of anonymity yesterday because the

risk assessment is a classified docu-

ment, but they wanted to emphasize

that the heightened risk does not in-

dicade vulnerability on the part of

U.S. forces and that it should not be

read by other nations as an opportu-

nity to attack. The officials said the

United States would win any project-

ed conflict across the globe, but the

path to victory could be more com-

plicated.

"There is no doubt of what the

outcome is going to be," a top de-

fense official said. "Risk to accom-

plish the task isn't even part of the

discussion. The way we accomplish

the task is."

A senior military official said, for

example, that it is obvious that if an-

other conflict arises while the Unit-

ed States does battle in Iraq and Af-

ghanistan and fights the global war

on terrorism, it would not be as easi-

ly accomplished as if the other three

conflicts did not exist.

"It wouldn't be as pretty," the offi-

cial said.

Defense officials are also working

to mitigate the risks by following

through with plans to transform the

military, making it more agile and le-

thal, and by looking at how U.S.

troops are positioned around the

globe. By raising operational stan-

dards, officials say commanders can

save lives by acting faster and by us-

ing fewer resources.

The military's need for manpower

on the ground, however, continues

to highlight demands on the Army

and the Marines, the two services

charged with conducting the ongo-

ing wars. Along with the Army miss-

ing recruiting targets, the Marines

missed contracting targets in Febru-

ary and March, though by relatively

small amounts. The Army Reserve

has also missed its recruiting targets

each of the past four months, in

some cases dramatically.

The shortage of recruits has the

Army's boot camps running at low-

er-than-usual capacity. The Army's

basic training center at Fort Ben-

ning, Ga., is training seven compa-

nies currently, half of its maximum

capacity of 14 companies, according

to Col. Bill Gallagher, commander of

the Basic Combat Training Brigade.

Moreover, each company of fresh re-

cruits is smaller than usual, with a

maximum possible of 220, he said.

The only way the Army can meet

its annual recruiting goal is with a

large surge of enlistments this

spring and summer, leading Fort

Benning officials to prepare for "a

huge influx, in case it happens," Gal-

lagher said. Last year, however,

there was "no summer surge," he

said.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at


Fort Benning, compared with a tar-

get of 25,541 for fiscal 2005.

As of the end of March, 7,800 in-

fantry soldiers had been trained at

Fort Benning



# Linking Strategy to Global Defense Posture and BRAC

