

TESTIMONY OF
MAJOR GENERAL ROGER LEMPKE
ADJUTANT GENERAL, NEBRASKA
BRAC COMMISSION HEARING
ATLANTA, GA
June 30, 2005

INTRODUCTION

I am Major General Roger Lempke, Adjutant General for Nebraska, and president of the Adjutants General Association of the United States (AGAUS). The purpose of this panel of Adjutants General today is to summarize key BRAC issues from the collective perspective of the fifty four Adjutants General. Our testimony will focus on that portion of the BRAC list that deals with the Air National Guard because we believe it to be seriously flawed and potentially harmful to the security of the nation.

The Adjutant General in each state and territory is responsible for the readiness of their respective Army and Air National Guard units. A state employee, the Adjutant General may also be responsible for emergency management and homeland security. In fact, twenty three Adjutants General have this responsibility.

It is important to note that two voices are associated with the National Guard. The Chief, National Guard Bureau, LTG Steve Blum is a Title 10 officer charged with administering the National Guard and providing a link of communications between the states and Department of Defense (DOD). Each Adjutant General works for the state or territorial governor and in this capacity speaks independently. The Adjutants General Association of the United States

(AGAUS) brings together Adjutants General of the several states to deal collectively with issues and speak with one voice to the Chief, National Guard Bureau, and the nation.

This afternoon I want to make three points very clear:

1. The AGAUS supports the overall BRAC process as legislated by Congress. We understand and support the need to transform the military and adapt to changing threats and conditions. From our perspective much fine work has gone into the BRAC process.
2. We support the process used by the Army to prepare its recommendations. The process has been inclusive from the beginning. Most importantly, the Army recognized the National Guard's vital role in homeland security while understanding that changing population demographics demanded that armory and reserve center locations be updated and that greater use of joint facilities saves money and promotes training and readiness.
3. The Adjutants General were not involved with the Air Force BRAC process. Until very recently the Adjutants General were excluded from the deliberations to develop the Air Force Future Total Force (FTF) plan, the overarching guide used to develop the Air Force BRAC plan. In fact, the Adjutants General were only asked to participate in the FTF process in November 2004 and the first meeting which included our representatives was held in December 2004. Reviewing the information set released by the Department of Defense has revealed that Air National Guard capabilities and operational efficiencies were not properly assessed resulting in flawed recommendations.

I introduce into the record the following documents that buttress the testimony we will give today.

- A hard bound full report on BRAC Criterion #2, Condition of Infrastructure
- Statement of Governor Ruth Ann Minner, State of Delaware to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.
- Statement of Senator Kit Bond, Missouri, Co-chairman of the Senate National Guard Caucus.

In addition to me this panel consists of other Adjutants General here to testify on key issues.

They are:

Major General Bruce Tuxill (TAG-MD) who will provide an overview of unique Air National Guard capabilities,

Major General Greg Wayt (TAG-OH) who will discuss recruiting and retention,

Major General Mike Haugen (TAG-ND) who will discuss optimum aircraft assigned for ANG sites (called Primary Aircraft Assigned or PAA)

Major General Allen Tackett (TAG-WV) who will discuss infrastructure criteria assessment and considerations,

Major General Frank Vavala (TAG-DE) who will discuss potential impacts from the realignment enclave concept presented by the Air Force, and

Major General Martha Rainville (TAG-VT) who will discuss community basing.

I will conclude with a discussion of homeland defense/homeland security considerations and recommendations.

(Other Adjutants General testify)

HOMELAND DEFENSE/HOMELAND SECURITY

Our enemies' intentions and resolve are very clear. At his sentencing for a life term of imprisonment for masterminding the destructive 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman (spiritual leader of Jama'at al-Jihad) declared, "God will make America disappear from the surface of the earth as He has made the Soviet Union disappear."

The American homeland has become a central and indisputable part of the 21st Century battle field - an unrestricted and global field of engagement with transnational terrorists. We can no longer focus our military resources on the "away game", to use a sports metaphor. The security of our homeland can no longer be taken for granted or relegated to a "lesser included" military priority.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security signed by President Bush in July, 2002, makes homeland security a shared responsibility for which the federal government and the several sovereign states are jointly accountable.

Since the founding of our nation, the states' federally recognized militias (today's National Guard) have been a military force shared by and available to the state Commanders-in-Chief (the Governors) for state missions and the federal Commander-in-Chief (the President) for federal missions and to both the Governors and the President for shared state and federal purposes.

In recent decades, the Air and Army National Guard have been enhanced as a fully operational "dual-missioned" force. Dual missioning is a function of our federal and state constitutions and a conscious and prudent objective of our national security policy. Equipping and providing resources to the National Guard is the responsibility of the federal government and, more specifically, the Department of Defense. Training, disciplining and maintaining the readiness of the force is the responsibility of the states. To be effectively dual-missioned, the

National Guard must be equipped and deployed for both homeland defense and homeland security missions.

Having Unit Equipped (UE) aircraft such as C-130s or KC-135 tankers in National Guard units (tankers can be used for air transport sorties in addition to or in lieu of air refueling) gives Governors direct access to tactical airlift capabilities that are critical in preparing for or responding to natural and man-made disasters. Air National Guard flying units, deployed under the authority of their Governors, were instrumental in getting emergency workers and supplies to New York City and Washington DC in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. They were equally critical, and once again deployed under the authority of their Governors, for getting emergency workers and supplies to the storm ravaged areas of Florida and surrounding states during last year's hurricane season. In addition to the Governors' access to ANG aircraft, the specially trained and equipped personnel that are part of the force structure of every flying unit give every governor a trained and disciplined reserve of emergency responders to call upon in time of domestic crisis. This is true regardless of the type of aircraft (i.e. F-15, F-16, KC-135, A-10, C-5, C-17, or C-130) in that all Air National Guard flying units have engineers, firefighters, medical personnel and a host of other emergency response specialists in their unit force structure.

Governors can deploy Air and Army National Guard personnel and aircraft within hours of an in-state or interstate domestic emergency. Under the congressionally-chartered Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), 48 of the 50 states have a standing arrangement for supporting one another in such emergencies. By contrast, deployment of National Guard equipment and personnel under federal authority and federal control typically takes weeks or even months to negotiate and ultimately implement.

When states use National Guard aircraft or personnel for state-directed missions, the states bear sole responsible for the cost of using the equipment and personnel. If the emergency qualifies for a Presidential Disaster Declaration, the federal Department of Homeland Security (FEMA) reimburses the state(s) for these expenses. Whether the deployment is solely at state expense or is ultimately reimbursed by FEMA under the Stafford Act, the Department of Defense bears none of the cost of these deployments even though use of the Guard enhances our domestic security and overall national defense.

Distributing aircraft and related assets among the 54 states and territories also achieves the strategic objective of critical asset target dispersal. When defending against the threat of nuclear attack throughout the Cold War, we pursued a strategy of disbursement of domestic military targets. Now that our homeland is part of the Global War on Terrorism battle space survival of our military infrastructure also requires prudent, strategic disbursement of high value military assets in National Guard units.

Many of the DoD BRAC recommendations strip the governors of access to Air National Guard aircraft, equipment and personnel that are vital to our national defense and security and central to each state's ability to support the central government and all other states. The Air Force proposals concentrate Air National Guard aircraft and other critical assets in federal control and in a limited number of federal enclaves, thereby undermining our national policy of shared state and federal responsibility for homeland security.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

What you have received today is not new information. You have heard this from Governors, Adjutants General, and community leaders at the regional hearings conducted by the BRAC Commission. The message is consistent and clear about the portion of the BRAC list

dealing with Air National Guard sites and facilities. The dramatic reduction and consolidation of Air National Guard flying missions to a few sites will do irreparable harm to the fabric of the nation's militia forces. Experience and capability essential to homeland defense and homeland security will be lost at a time when it is needed the most.

The aircraft moves and other programmatic actions that make up the Air National Guard portion of the BRAC list are inexorably intertwined. To suggest a few changes would simply cause the entire plan to unravel. The only reasonable approach is to deal with all the pieces at once.

The Adjutants General Association of the United States strongly recommends that the BRAC Commission collect all BRAC actions intended for the Air National Guard and vote to set them aside in total. This action will permit the Adjutants General, National Guard Bureau, and United States Air Force to work together in developing a cogent plan that will secure and defend the homeland and provide forces in depth to defeat the enemy abroad. This action will also relieve the Commission of having to address true programmatic actions and concentrate instead on infrastructure assessment to save money.

On behalf of the Adjutants General Association of the United States and the fifty four Adjutants General I thank you for this opportunity to present our case.

TESTIMONY OF
MAJOR GENERAL BRUCE F. TUXILL
ADJUTANT GENERAL, MARYLAND
BRAC COMMISSION HEARING
ATLANTA, GA
June 30, 2005

Good Afternoon, I am Major General Bruce F. Tuxill, Adjutant General of the Maryland National Guard, testifying today in my state capacity. I will present facts relative to the **CAPABILITIES** of the Air National Guard.

The Air National Guard brings capabilities and relationships to the Nation, State, and local communities that are unique and critical to our security, safety, and national interest.

OVERVIEW

1. **COST EFFECTIVE:** The Air National Guard provides 40% of the United States Air Force's Combat capability for **only 7.3% of the budget.**
2. **EFFICIENT & RELEVANT:** The Air National Guard's current force structure and basing ensures our nation is ready to meet current and future challenges.
3. **EXPERIENCED & SKILLED:** The ANG captures and retains specialized, high value, commercial skills that might not otherwise be attracted to government service.
4. **OMNIPRESENT NATURE:** When you call out the Guard - You call out America! The Guard connects the military with our communities.
5. **DUAL ROLE:** - The National Guard is the only military organization with a State Mission.

1. **COST EFFECTIVE:** The Air National Guard provides **40%** of the Air Force's combat capability for **only 7.3%** of the budget. Consider the Air National Guard's support of the National Defense Strategy and our ability to support operational surge requirements:

A. The Air National Guard:

- 1 Has a Force size to defend the homeland
 - 100% of CONUS Air Defense Mission
 - 49% of tactical airlift
- 2 Can deter forward "in and from" four regions
 - 45% of tanker support

Since September 11, 2001, more than 225,000 Army and Air Guardsmen and women have been mobilized

 - FY 05 YTD ANG Direct Contribution to GWOT

- >30,000 Sorties Flown
- > 41,000 Optempo Days

B. We leverage Volunteerism better than anyone

- The vast majority of Guard forces supporting GWOT is accomplished through “volunteerism”.
- Force-wide retention remains at an impressive 93.3%.

C. Infrastructure. Also, ANG units realize financial savings by their locations at civilian airports by sharing costs thereby reducing costly “city-like” infrastructure and personnel costs.

2. EFFICIENT AND RELEVANT: The Air National Guard’s basing ensures our nation is ready to meet current and future challenges.

A. Defense in Depth. ANG dispersal of aircraft at civilian airports throughout our nation is sound military strategy and very practical given the current threat.

- BRAC recommendations to close 29 flying units increases the threat to our infrastructure by centralizing assets and negatively affecting response times to natural or man made disasters

B. Familiarity. Through our relationships and associations with state and local authorities, we are able to meet critical demands during an emergency or other unforeseen contingency.

3. EXPERIENCE & SKILL: We compare very favorably to our sister services.

A. Experience (Average Years of Service for ANG vs. Active Duty:)

Officer:	ANG:	17.1 years
Enlisted:	ANG:	13.9 years

B. Specialized Skills

1 **Competitive Advantage.** We capture and retain civilian skill sets and a level of maturity that simply are not available on a full-time basis. This relationship with the private sector is what makes us a unique force multiplier.

- Example: Many Mid East countries had antiquated electrical systems before our Air Guard civil engineers arrived. In a particular instance, an air guardsman was able to assist in the repair of a major electrical supply system due solely to experience he “brought to the fight” as a function of his civilian role within a major U.S. electrical supply company.

2 The Air National Guard has the appeal and stability to attract professionals and skilled technicians who have made the personal decision to remain in one state. Often, the members are prior-service military who remain in their prime and are willing to serve. The National Guard offers an alternative form of service to country which preserves taxpayer investment in military training and simultaneously ensures the retention of a service member’s experience and expertise.

4. **OMNIPRESENT NATURE:** When you call out the Guard - You call out America! The Guard connects the military to over **3,600** of our communities.
 - 1 We take great pride in being "The Hometown Air Force."
 - 2 The ANG maintains continuous sustainment through outstanding community support.
 - o Community support translates into a better understanding by the American public of our military objectives - the members of that community are immediately involved in our nation's national strategy and will.
 - o The Air National Guard is largely responsible for the positive public image of the military through involvement with the community through Youth programs, Civil Air Patrol, Junior ROTC and State Partnerships.

5. **DUAL ROLE:** The National Guard is the **only** military organization with a State Mission.
 - A. The National Guard maintains the legal authority, dispersion across the nation, and infrastructure to support civil authorities at a moment's notice.
 - B. In 23 of our 50 States, Adjutants General have responsibility for the State Emergency Management Agency
 - C. State relationships forged solely by the National Guard allow timely response to disasters; natural and otherwise. The Guard will continue to respond to Hurricanes, Floods, Forest Fires, Earthquakes, and other natural and man-made disasters
 - D. Each FEMA region is currently positioned with National Guard tactical airlift, BRAC recommendations would remove all tactical airlift capability from FEMA Region III, which includes the DC to NYC corridor (the center of our government and our nation's financial center). This gap would affect the corridor from Washington DC to New York City which includes 20% of the U.S. Population, some 60 Million Americans. NCR C-130 tactical airlift support would be replaced by airlift in locations hundreds of miles away.

In Conclusion:

- A. The Air National Guard model is one that has proven itself effective - **it works**. On any given day, our citizen soldiers find themselves:
 - in **Title 10** status - Deployed in support of a major combat operation, or
 - in **Title 32** status - Supporting the Home Land Defense mission, or
 - in **State Active Duty** Status - Responding to Home State requirements

- B. We are a militia nation; dependent on our citizen soldiers. Americans willing to serve their communities and nation is our heritage and the "Citizen-Soldier" will always be a critical part of our security construct.



BRUCE F. TUXILL, Maj Gen, MD NG
The Adjutant General

TESTIMONY OF
MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL HAUGEN
ADJUTANT GENERAL, NORTH DAKOTA
BRAC COMMISSION HEARING
ATLANTA, GA
June 30, 2005

I am Major General Michael Haugen, Adjutant General of the North Dakota National Guard, here testifying in my capacity as a state employee. I will present information relative to the distribution of Air National Guard primary aircraft assigned (PAA) by the US Air Force through the BRAC process. As you will see, the elimination and reassignment of air assets assigned to the Air National Guard creates significant gaps in homeland defense capabilities and also negatively impacts the ability of Governors to respond to state emergencies.

The Air Force plan makes assumptions regarding Air National Guard aircraft that is not supported by facts. The overall plan creates a dispersal of Air Guard/state resources clearly based on offensive operations (Air Expeditionary Force/AEF). Such a dispersal negatively impacts immediacy of response, effectiveness and reliability of the National Guard to respond to both state and federal missions. The defensive capabilities are nearly eliminated in some regions of the country as evidenced by the slides showing pre and post BRAC assets. We need to ask a fundamental question; is our primary goal to protect our civilians or is it to have a more streamlined way to go to war? With the stated #1 goal of our national defense strategy being defense of the homeland, that question has already been answered but has clearly not been adequately considered in the recommendations for Air National Guard assets. Even without the current strategy goal, defense of the homeland is a constitutional guarantee:

"We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, **provide for the common defense**, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." (US Constitution, Preamble)

"The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence."
(US Constitution, Article IV, Section 4)

The Air Force PAA model was not coordinated with the Adjutants General of Governors of the states. Eliminating or downsizing Air National Guard assets in states without considering state or homeland defense needs creates serious problems. A close look at the regional security assets reveals strong support for large cities and minimal, if any, support for less populated areas. There are significant security risks along our northern border, particularly in the remote areas, so removal of regional defense assets as proposed appears unwise at best. Canada is very engaged in world-wide peacekeeping initiatives so their forces, in addition to being very regional, are typically unavailable. More important, do we now rely on other countries for our homeland defense? The following is a short list of examples of where air assets either were necessary, or are potentially required in the future:

- Sioux City Airline crash 1989 FLT 232
- Civil Support Team movement
- National Pharmaceutical Location Security and Movement
- 9.11
- SCATANA – Security Control of Air Traffic and Navigation Aids
- ADUS –Air Defense of the United States
- Gulf of Mexico Protection of National Oil Reserves
- Nuclear Facilities/Nuclear Weapons/Nuclear Weapon Sites
- Random, unscheduled Air Defense taskings geographically separated
- Defense of Canada
- Terrorist airborne threat (see northern tier post-BRAC)

You have heard already the potential negative impact on recruiting and retention with the current plan. Increase in aircraft to fewer areas will also negatively impact airspace utilization. 1 additional pilot adds 8 sorties per month (minimum). 17 additional pilots adds 136 sorties per month (minimum). This is for inexperienced pilots; less than 500 hours.

The most critical error in the Air Force plan is the assumption that pilots and maintainers will follow the aircraft. This is simply not the case in the Air Guard. Our airmen have local jobs, their spouses have jobs, and their children are established in the local community and schools. In North Dakota, for example, we have conducted an informal survey of our pilots and believe that at most no more than 20% of our trained fighter pilots will leave North Dakota. The most telling result of the survey is that the pilots most likely to leave are the most junior pilots. Our experienced pilots (senior Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels) with ties to the community indicate they will not move. In addition to the loss of our most experience pilots from the force this will create additional stress on the gaining units due to increased flying requirements and training costs. The Air Force estimates the cost to train a fighter pilot at \$4.8 M. In North Dakota the elimination of the fighter flying mission will cost, at a minimum, \$119M in lost human capital (pilots only).

The experience pool of other highly trained Air Guard members will also be gravely impacted and the training deficit that occurs will take years to stabilize. The USAF has acknowledged the advantages of leveraging the experience of our pilots and maintainers and yet they have created a plan that will likely decimate that core competency by eliminating the very strength that they want to leverage. In 28 locations they will potentially lose that critical experience. The trained pilots of today, who are community based, will be replaced by new pilots in new locations – the result is a huge loss of expertise.

The Adjutants General and Governors are united in their concern over the Air Force plan to eliminate or reassign Air Guard assets. Failure to collaborate has lead to a plan that fails to consider the needs of the states to meet their emergency management missions and also fails to address the issue of homeland defense. Just as important we have a plan that ultimately will not save money and will decrease efficiency. Defense of the homeland and state emergency management in addition to forward operations must be considered. Each state should also have an Air Guard flying mission to meet recruiting, retention and regional defense needs. We believe that by working together and following these key tenets we can create a model that will increase efficiency, reduce costs, and maintain both state and national defense capabilities.

For example, we could create a model Air Wing with geographically separated squadrons. To the Air Force it can be relied upon as a cohesive, full strength unit to draw on for AEF and other operational commitments. However, with a consolidation of some Support functions, maintaining units with less aircraft per location in the Air National Guard can be done with what we believe is an actual decrease in cost over the current plan. The resulting benefit is a presence in more geographic locations, providing better options to meet the needs of Homeland Defense, better local capability for State emergencies, and continued recruiting opportunities in communities which would otherwise be lost. This is just one example of a potential solution that would much better meet the needs of all concerned. The current plan does not meet those needs.

The recommendations of the Air Force are also, in many instances, force structure changes not intended for this process. Legislating programmatic changes and movement of air assets needlessly limits our ability to respond to ever-changing world situations and makes no sense tactically, strategically, or economically. Let the CEOs (Governors, TAGs, Guard Bureau, USAF) make an informed decision that considers the critical needs of all concerned. The Air Force establishes the equipment requirements, funded and approved by congress. Where to put it and how to meet the needs of the military, to include the Air Guard and the individual states, needs to be a collaborative effort. The Air Force focus since the cold war has been largely offensive or expeditionary in nature and doesn't effectively consider state and homeland defense requirements.

In conclusion, we request the commission reject the DOD recommendations relative to the Air National Guard PAA and direct the Department of Defense and the Air Force to communicate and collaborate as did the Army with the Army National Guard with the National Guard, Adjutants General and Governors to create a model for Air Guard assets that adequately considers the needs of the states and homeland defense.

Thank for your consideration. I would be glad to answer any questions the commission may have.

**Military Value
BRAC Criterion #2
Condition of Infrastructure**

The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.

My staff focused the review of Criterion #2 Value Elements in the Airlift Mission Area due to our efforts supporting the 130th Airlift Wing in Charleston; however, upon further research we found consistent results in the seven other measured Mission Areas as well.

For illustrative purposes measurement of value for Criterion #2 in the Airlift Mission Area is broken down as follows:

	Effective %
Condition of Infrastructure	41.50
Key Mission Infrastructure	33.20
Fuel Hydrant Systems Support Mission Growth	4.32
Ramp Area and Serviceability	5.98
Runway Dimension and Serviceability	5.98
Hangar Capability – Large Aircraft	3.32
Level of Mission Encroachment	1.66
Installation Pavements Quality	11.95
Operating Areas	8.30
Airspace Attributes of DZ/LZ	8.30

The scoring system for infrastructure, as noted in the Air Force (AF) Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) meeting minutes, is slanted toward large active duty bases. For many of the questions in this criterion a base had to have an excessively large size in order to score any points at all. Obviously, this strongly favors large active duty installations and is biased against smaller Air National Guard bases. In the Airlift Category the scoring matrix awards no points for runway lengths less than 7,000 feet, ramp areas less than 137,000 square yards, bases with no fuel hydrant dispensing system, or bases not located within 150 miles of an approved drop zone or assault landing zone. Such scoring obviously encourages infrastructure larger than necessary for Air National Guard missions – a wasteful allocation of resources. According to the scoring matrix, this value counts for 41.5 percent of the overall unit military value; the heavy emphasis on this physical infrastructure minimizes focus in other areas like mission capable rates, low operating costs, aircrew proficiency, aircraft maintenance experience, and strength and retention levels. Our Air National Guard Wings are “right sized” to accomplish their missions today and most can easily expand without the excess requirement of maintaining over 137,000 square yards of ramp space and 7,000 feet of runway.

Other areas measured in Criteria #2 are Hangar Capability, Mission Encroachment, and Installation Pavements Quality. Again, for pavement quality if total ramp area is less than 137,000 square yards you receive 0 points regardless of the age, specification, or construction standard of ramp pavements.

As an example, an eight PAA C-130 unit is only authorized a maximum of 73,230 square yards of serviceable ramp space by Air National Guard Handbook (ANGH) 32-1084, ANG Standard Facility Requirements and would be in violation of standards in order to score any points in this measurement. But the other point that we feel needs to be made is that we **DON'T NEED** 137,000

square yards of ramp space to accomplish our mission with 8 aircraft. Nor, do we need 137,000 square yards to park 12 aircraft. In fact we can park 12 C-130s on our ramp space based on the standard for 8 aircraft. This is a qualitative element missing from the data in criterion #2. The runway criterion is another example of flawed measurement. Airlift units **DON'T NEED** a 7,000 foot runway as the 130th has proven by safely operating C-130s out of Yeager Airport since 1975. We've also had C-17s and C-5s regularly operate in and out of Yeager in support of multiple deployments and exercises.

Our research reflected the same results for all other Mission Areas. We looked at Criterion # 2 scores for every measured Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve Base in each of the eight mission areas: Airlift, Tanker, Fighter, Bomber, UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), SOF-CSAR (Special Operations Forces – Combat Search and Rescue), C2ISR (Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), and Space Operations and the results are very interesting. Following is a breakdown of the Top Fifty Bases rated on Criterion #2 by Mission Area. (keep in mind every base was rated in each mission area):

**DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOP FIFTY BASES
Rated on Criterion #2 Condition of Infrastructure**

<u>MISSION AREA</u>	<u>ANG</u>	<u>AFR</u>	<u>ACTIVE DUTY</u>
AIRLIFT	3	2	45
TANKER	2	2	46
FIGHTER	2	3	45
BOMBER	1	2	47
UAV	3	3	44
SOF-CSAR	3	3	44
C2ISR	4	2	44
SPACE OPS	2	1	47

As you see, regardless of Mission Area; small, compact Air National Guard bases were barely included in the top fifty ranking which is clearly dominated by Active Duty bases.

This data along with the analysis of AF BCEG minutes indicates that BRAC 2005 was aligned to the development of the USAF Future Total Force Plan rather than a true assessment of military value as legislatively mandated by the BRAC process. (Source: AF BCEG Minutes 10 Jul 03)

- Several times the AF BCEG received briefings on the Future Total Force Structure (Source: AF BCEG Minutes 12 Dec 03)
- During Maj Gen Heckman's briefing to the AF BCEG he refers to "expeditionary basing guidelines" and their relevance to military value (Source: AF BCEG Minutes 9 Jan 04)

-- Specifically, Maj Gen Heckman states the need to "enable us to fight early on without the non-volunteer ARC (Air Reserve Component)" and that the "ARC must invest in new missions to sustain relevance". These statements are curious in nature given the date they were made (9 Jan 04) is prior to the first BRAC data call being issued to the Air Force. How can the co-chairman of the AF BCEG make statements of this kind without any validated information to support it? Many of the goals outlined by Maj Gen Heckman in his briefing are Air Force goals under their Future Total Force. It was during the same briefing that Maj Gen Heckman first proposed the military value attributes to be used during the deliberative process.

- Weighting of each criteria data was first discussed by the AF BCEG on 22 Jun 04 with Criterion #1 and #2 favored

heavily from the outset. (Source: AF BCEG Minutes 22 Jun 04)

- A Cueing Tool was used to assist the AF BCEG in developing potential scenarios for base closures and realignments. This tool was populated with data presented during the two capacity analysis briefings and with the weighted scores from the MCI data. Considering that the capacity data presented by the ANG was incorrect and the extraordinarily heavy weighting given to Criteria #1 and #2 (which favored large active duty installation), the ANG had many units identified as candidates for closure or realignment. (Source: AF BCEG Minutes 1 Nov 04)

In summary, the primary point to take away is that the data used in Criterion #2 overwhelmingly favors active duty bases with large infrastructure and with a weighted value of 41.5%, this score significantly affects the overall military value rating. This measurement ignores the value added by "right sized" Air National Guard bases structured to avoid excess infrastructure (i.e., billeting, clubs, and commissaries, etc.) in addition to inherent cost saving measures such as long-term leases (some for a little as \$1.00 per year), use of commercial runways/taxiways, and FAA provided 24 hour Air Traffic Control. Even the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) admitted in their meeting minutes when looking at the pros and cons of these criteria that they overstated requirements and negatively impacted units with "right sized" infrastructure.

Col David Buckalew, Hq WVANG/ESSO
DSN 366-6111

**Statement of Governor Ruth Ann Minner, State of Delaware
To The Base Realignment and Closure Commission
Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005**

Statement to be entered into the record

Good afternoon, Chairman Principi, members of the BRAC Commission, and invited guests. I am Ruth Ann Minner, Governor of the State of Delaware. Thank you for convening this hearing today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DoD) BRAC recommendations as they pertain to impacts on homeland security and state militias. I am testifying today not only as the Governor, but also as the Commander in Chief of the Delaware National Guard.

We all know the value of the National Guard during war and in times of peace to protect our nation and contribute to each state's communities. These citizen-soldiers are deployed all over the world to protect our interests abroad and are routinely called up in response to domestic incidents. They and their families are integral parts of our community fabric, giving of their time to the betterment of their communities, our State and our nation.

DoD's process by which recommended closures and realignments were determined is flawed vis-à-vis the Air National Guard because it did not account for substantial impacts to the Guard's domestic homeland security missions. DoD did not consult me or my Adjutant General about these recommendations. If they had, we would have explained the geography of our State, our critical infrastructure, our emergency response plans, the dual mission of the National Guard and our reliance on their expertise to carry out their state mission of protecting the citizens of Delaware.

I hope the points I lay out in my testimony to explain the negative implications of realigning the Delaware Air National Guard will be carefully considered by the BRAC Commission during your open and transparent deliberations.

The Delaware Air National Guard

Today, in its fourth century of service to our State and nation, the Delaware National Guard is at its highest operations tempo in history. The Delaware National Guard has been continuously deployed in the war since September 11, 2001 and, as such, many officers and non-commissioned officers are combat veterans. They have proven their value to the nation again and again by putting their lives on the line and leaving behind their families, friends, employers and the comforts of home. Since 9-11, over 400 members have been mobilized, one or more times, in support of the combat operations in the Afghani and Iraqi regions and for Homeland Defense under Operation Noble Eagle. As of June 24, 2005, 93 men and women of the Delaware Air National Guard are currently working in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom and 25 in support of homeland defense missions.

The Delaware National Guard asks only for the opportunity to carry out its unique dual mission. The effectiveness of its voluntary recruiting and training methods has proven successful

by experience. In peacetime, our Guard serves at the service of the Governor whenever disaster or violence threaten the peace and security of the State. In case of war or national emergency, our Guard is trained and ready to assume the honorable position in the nation's first line of defense to which it is entitled, both by law and by its own record of accomplishment.

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense

In the 21st Century, homeland security and homeland defense must supplement each other in order to adequately protect our nation and its citizens. In the National Guard's federal and state roles, the Secretary of Defense can call upon the National Guard to protect the nation and I can utilize the National Guard to protect the citizens of Delaware during and after a natural or manmade emergency.

The DoD's process ignored this dual mission of the National Guard in homeland defense as well as homeland security, both of which are clear missions of the Guard, as provided under federal and state statutes. By focusing solely on federal defense duties and ignoring state missions and homeland security, the DoD failed to acknowledge the unique role of a critical group of citizen-soldiers that make up the Air National Guard and failed to uphold a long-standing partnership between the Governors and the federal government to provide for the security of our nation and its citizens.

Homeland Security Implications

The Delaware National Guard has proven a vital resource during severe weather events, heightened terror alerts, regional emergency training and response, and the safety of the New Castle County Airport. Their personnel, resources, and training are included in the Delaware Emergency Operations Plan and provide a level of service unlike any other first responder in the State and faster than federal response. By not consulting with the Department of Homeland Security or Governors and transferring the equipment and personnel out of the State, DoD's recommendation eliminates these vital response resources. The following are specific examples of unacceptable impacts of the DoD's BRAC recommendations.

First, under the recommendation, Delaware would lose all eight C-130H aircraft currently assigned to the Delaware Air National Guard. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the entire region from Rhode Island to North Carolina would be void of C-130s and the accompanying personnel. These are the same aircraft deployed in the war of terrorism, routinely train for response in conjunction with neighboring emergency response structures, and have been placed on high alert status in Delaware to support the region in homeland security matters. Key examples of the level of service provided include:

- The plan for emergency transportation of air-to-air missiles between Air Force installations immediately after September 11, 2001.
- FEMA's 2003 mass casualty exercise included the Delaware Air National Guard Aeromedical Squadron and Delaware's C-130s to evacuate casualties and interface with local hospitals and medical personnel to treat the wounded.

Second, the 300 full-time members of the Air National Guard stationed at the New Castle County Airport allow for the Governor to call up qualified personnel in a short period of time to respond to a disaster or protect critical infrastructure. The current response time for the National Guard is two to four hours to respond to an event within our own borders or to assist a neighboring state upon their request. This response time is 68 hours faster than the activation of federal resources under the Federal Response Plan. The quick response time of the Guard is assisted by the ability of the agile C-130 to transport large numbers of personnel and equipment close to the scene as well as the ability to quickly transport the wounded within the Critical Hour deemed necessary to increase their chances of survival. Losing this personnel base and equipment, as recommended by the DoD, decreases our ability to save lives.

Third, the Delaware Air National Guard's specialized training and resources are vital components incorporated into all of Delaware's emergency planning documents and exercises. The 142nd Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron, which consists of 102 highly trained emergency medical professionals and their specialized equipment, supports many medical emergency plans, including the Medical Needs Shelter Plan and the Catastrophic Evaluation Plan. Additionally, the New Castle County Airport is the State's certified reception site for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), if such a need arises to activate the plan to store and distribute vaccines needed to recover from biological terrorist attacks in our region. The proposed reduction in facilities and security would require this plan to be rewritten, with the possibility that our SNS site be less effective because it would be moved to a less populated part of the State.

Finally, the firefighters provide a service to the New Castle County Airport that surpasses the level at which the State and County could currently provide. The 166th Air Crash Fire Fighting Unit operates a 24-hour service for military planes and corporate jets, including unique training, specialized equipment and life-saving foam. No other fire department in Delaware has this capability to respond to the large number of calls currently responded to by the 166th throughout the State.

Conclusion

Thank you again for examining more in depth the implications of the DoD's BRAC recommendations on homeland security and state militias. Governors rely on our Guard's personnel, equipment and training to protect the citizens of our states and we applaud their contributions to the security of our nation. I am deeply disappointed that the DoD did not recognize the non-defense implications of the recommendations and hope that the BRAC Commission understands the breadth of the impacts. The calling of this hearing indicates that this is indeed true. Thank you again for allowing me the time to voice my concerns. I look forward to continuing our discussion and answering any questions you may have.

**GOOD AFTERNOON, I AM MAJOR GENERAL
VAVALA, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF DELAWARE.
THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO
YOU TODAY REGARDING THE U.S. AIR FORCE
PROPOSED ENCLAVE CONCEPT.**

**I MUST TELL YOU THAT ON 13 MAY 2005, WHEN I
FIRST RECEIVED WORD THAT THE DELAWARE AIR
NATIONAL GUARD WAS DESIGNATED TO BECOME AN
ENCLAVE, I WAS AT A TOTAL LOSS. AT NO TIME
PRIOR TO 13 MAY HAD ANYONE AT THE NATIONAL
GUARD BUREAU-LEVEL OR AIR FORCE-LEVEL EVER**

DISCLOSED THE CONCEPT OF ENCLAVE WITH ME OR MY FELLOW ADJUTANTS GENERAL.

MY IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS TO JUMP IN WITH BOTH FEET AND ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE DEFINITION OF AN ENCLAVE. WHAT'S THE MISSION OF AN ENCLAVE? HOW MANY PERSONNEL DOES IT REQUIRE?

MY RESEARCH FIRST LED ME TO A MEMORANDUM DATED DECEMBER 2004, ENTITLED SUBMITTAL OF BRAC 2005 CANDIDATE RECOMMENDATION, SIGNED BY MICHAEL WYNNE, CHAIRMAN, ISG. HE PROVIDED GUIDANCE ON

**SUBMITTING AND DOCUMENTING BRAC 2005
CANDIDATE RECOMMENDATIONS. NOTICEABLY
ABSENT FROM MR. WYNNE'S SET OF NINETEEN BRAC
2005 DEFINITIONS IS THE WORD ENCLAVE.**

**FURTHER RESEARCH LED ME TO THE GAO
REPORT DATED JUNE 2003, ENTITLED MILITARY
BASE CLOSURES: BETTER PLANNING NEEDED FOR
FUTURE RESERVE ENCLAVES. IT IS EVIDENT FROM
THIS REPORT AND SO STATED THAT THE "GAO
UNDERTOOK THIS REVIEW TO ASCERTAIN IF
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE THE DECISION-**

**MAKING PROCESSES USED TO ESTABLISH RESERVE
ENCLAVES.”**

**AFTER REVIEWING THE REPORT, I FELT I HAD
INCREASED MY KNOWLEDGE OF ENCLAVES TEN
FOLD, BUT STILL TO THIS DAY, 48 DAYS AFTER I
FIRST HEARD THE TERM APPLIED TO TWENTY
THREE AIR NATIONAL GUARD UNITS, THE
ADJUTANTS GENERAL ARE UNABLE TO STAND
BEFORE OUR AIRMAN AND PROVIDE A WELL
INFORMED PROFESSIONAL, LOGICAL, DETAILED
EXPLANATION OF WHAT AN ENCLAVE IS. I CANNOT
EXPLAIN TO MY BOSS, THE GOVERNOR OF THE**

**STATE OF DELAWARE, WHAT THE U.S. AIR FORCE IS
PROPOSING FOR THE DELAWARE AIR NATIONAL
GUARD BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW. OBVIOUSLY, THIS
LEAVES ME IN QUITE AN UNTENABLE POSITION. I
HAVE NO ANSWERS FOR THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO,
TO THIS VERY DAY, I AM SENDING INTO HARM'S
WAY.**

**GENTLEMEN, I REPRESENT APPROXIMATELY
1000 MEN AND WOMEN OF THE DELAWARE AIR
NATIONAL GUARD AS DO MY FELLOW ADJUTANTS
GENERAL IN THEIR STATES WHO HAVE UNITS
LABELED ENCLAVES, 23,000 MEMBERS OF THE AIR**

**NATIONAL GUARD AND WE HAVE NO ANSWERS FOR
THEM.**

**MY CONCERN IS WHY DON'T WE HAVE ANY
ANSWERS AT THIS LATE DATE? WHY ARE WE KEPT
IN THE DARK BEING TOLD TO STAND-BY FOR
EMERGING MISSIONS?**

**WITHIN DAYS OF RECEIVING WORD OF THE
BRAC RESULTS, ON 3 SEPARATE OCCASIONS, I SENT A
CONTINGENT OF DELAWARE AIR NATIONAL GUARD
SENIOR LEADERSHIP TO NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
AND TO HEADQUARTERS AMC TO DISCUSS
EMERGING MISSIONS.**

**ON ALL THREE OCCASIONS, THEY RETURNED
WITHOUT ANY DEFINITIVE ANSWERS. TO THIS DAY,
THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU HAS A WEBSITE UP
AND RUNNING THAT IS REMINISCENT OF WHAT
ACTIVE DUTY AIRMEN CALL A DREAM SHEET WHEN
THEY WANT TO PCS. THE NGB WEBSITE IS
VOLUNTEER SYSTEM WHEREBY YOU PUT YOUR
NAME IN AND THEY WILL CONSIDER YOU FOR A
MISSION.**

**GENTLEMEN, I ASK YOU, IS THIS ANYWAY TO
RUN THE GREATEST MILITARY MACHINE IN THE
ENTIRE WORLD?**

**AGAIN, I REPEAT THAT IN DECEMBER 2004, THE
TERM ENCLAVE DID NOT APPEAR ON THE LIST OF
BRAC DEFINITIONS AND YET 5 MONTHS LATER WE
HAVE 23 AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASES LABELED AS
SUCH, BEING TOUTED AS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY
FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF A STRONG, VIABLE AIR
FORCE. IF THAT IS TRUE, DOES IT NOT BEG THE
QUESTION – WHY IS IT THAT ONLY THE AIR
NATIONAL GUARD AND NOT THE AIR FORCE ARE
BEST SUITED TO BE ENCLAVES?**

**GENTLEMEN, I WILL TELL YOU, AND WE
SUPPORT BRAC.**

**WHAT WE DON'T SUPPORT IS AN ILL-
CONCEIVED, LAST MINUTE PLAN DESIGNED TO PUT
AIRCRAFT IN SPECIFIC LOCATIONS WITHOUT IN-
DEPTH, PROPER ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE
UNITS WHICH WERE STRIPPED OF AIRCRAFT.**

**WHAT WE BELIEVE IS THAT AN ENCLAVE IS
NOTHING MORE THAN THE RESULT OF A CLOSURE
GONE BAD. BRAC DATA INDICATES THAT**

**DELAWARE AND MANY OTHER ENCLAVES WERE
STAMPED CLOSED. IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO SAY THAT
I BELIEVE THAT THE BRAC PROCESS IS BEING USED
BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE TO RESOLVE AN AIRCRAFT**

**INVENTORY PROBLEM BUT THE ACTIONS
FLAGRANTLY VIOLATE THE TRUE PURPOSE OF BRAC
THAT IS- “TO DIVEST THE AIR FORCE OF
INFRASTRUCTURE IT NO LONGER NEEDS WHILE
IMPROVING THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR
AIR FORCES AND THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE
RETAINED PORTFOLIO OF INFRASTRUCTURE.”**

**(EXCERPT FROM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 9 MAY 2005,
VOL V).**

**THE ADJUTANTS GENERAL REPRESENTING
MANY OTHER ADJUTANTS GENERAL AND GUARD
MEMBERS, CANNOT UNDERSTAND OR EXPLAIN HOW**

**AN ENCLAVE SUPPORTS THE PURPOSE OF BRAC –
SOMETHING IS UNQUESTIONABLY WRONG.**

**THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD ANSWERED EVERY
CALL OF OUR NATION AND WE DESERVE A
THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE UNIQUENESS OF OUR
MILITARY VALUE (COMMUNITY, FAMILY,
HOMELAND DEFENSE) BEFORE WE ARE CAST ASIDE
BECAUSE OUR RUNWAYS AREN'T AS LONG OR OUR
APRON NOT AS WIDE AS ACTIVE BASES.**

**I RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT YOU FULLY
REVIEW THE ENCLAVE CONCEPT IN LIGHT OF THE
2003 GAO REPORT AND IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THE**

INFRASTRUCTURE STEERING GROUP DIDN'T EVEN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE THE TERM UNTIL LATE IN THE BRAC. WE NEED TO BE SURE, ABSOLUTELY SURE, THAT ENCLAVES ARE RIGHT FOR THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD, THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. I PROPOSE THAT THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM PLANNING, BUT SHOULD BE EQUAL PARTNERS AT THE TABLE WITH DOD AND THE U.S. AIR FORCE TO ENSURE THAT WE GET IT RIGHT.

OUR NATION, A NATION AT WAR CANNOT AFFORD TO GET IT WRONG. THE ENCLAVE

**CONSTRUCT IS A RESULT OF AN ILL CONCEIVED
PLAN WITH NO INPUT FROM THE TAGS OR THE
STATE GOVERNORS. THIS IS A CRITICAL EXAMPLE
OF A FLAWED PROCESS. THIS IS A QUESTIONABLE
CONCEPT AND IT BE CRITICALLY EXAMINED.**

THANK YOU

The Adjutants General Association of the United States Bullet Paper on Community Basing

In the future, more and more of today's personnel – Active Duty (AD), Guard, and Reserve – will operate within a single unit in all types of missions. AD personnel will routinely locate and operate on ANG installations. Community Basing is the organizational construct that provides the way ahead for the operational integration of Active Duty (AD) personnel within ANG flying units (fighter, transport and tanker) at an ANG installation. Under Community Basing, AD personnel work side-by-side with their ANG counterparts to allow for joint training and execution of assigned missions, while receiving through the community many of the support services that are normally found on an AD installation (medical, housing, gym, etc.).

As the Base Realignment and Closure Commission performs its independent analysis, military value and other criteria must be evaluated within the context of the organizational transformation which is now shaping the Total Force of the future. Community Basing enables the Total Force to leverage and sustain several benefits, specifically:

- **Community Basing Leverages the Vast Experience of the Guard Component.** For example, the majority of ANG maintenance personnel are skill level seven (7) or higher, while the majority of AD personnel are skill level three (3). Harnessing the extremely high experience levels throughout the ANG, ANG personnel will mentor and season AD personnel.
- **Community Basing Increases Combat Capability.** Community Basing can combine with BRAC increases in ANG unit Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory and result in a significantly larger percentage increase in unit aircraft with a smaller percentage increase in personnel required to support the additional aircraft.
- **Community Basing is Cost Effective.** The ANG is inherently cost effective per aircraft, given its significant numbers of traditional members combined with smaller base footprint, often at a joint-use field. Community Basing brings additional benefits by reducing the total cost of ownership to the Department of Defense with respect to AD infrastructure.
- **Community Basing Directly Contributes to Enhanced Operational Effectiveness.** Community Basing results in better understanding of each component for all Total Force members and more to seamless mission accomplishment by Total Force personnel, regardless of component.
- **Community Basing Increases Efficiencies to Address an Aging and Shrinking Aircraft Fleet.** The significant experience level of the ANG maintenance force enables increased crew ratios with AD pilots, and higher utilization rates of a smaller aircraft fleet.

- **Community Basing Ensures Effective Dispersal of Forces.** The benefit of having dispersed forces is a fundamental tenet of aerospace power. Further, dispersal of forces supports HLS/HLD missions in support of state Governors, as well as federal HLS/HLD missions such as Operation NOBLE EAGLE.
- **Community Basing Directly Benefits AD Recruiting and Retention.** Community Basing enables the AD Air Force to have a significantly increased community presence through the ANG units across the nation. Further, ANG units across the nation present additional attractive geographic assignment options for AD personnel, which will directly increase AD quality of life and retention.
- **Manpower Savings may be redirected toward Stressed Career Fields.** With the addition of AD personnel to an ANG unit, ANG positions may become available for immediate re-role to stressed AD career fields or sunrise missions throughout the entire ANG.
- **Community Basing has Buy-In from Stakeholders.** Community Basing has been fully staffed and approved by stakeholders, including HQ USAF, HQ ACC, and National Guard Bureau.
- **Community Basing Solutions Focus on People.** Community Basing as organizational transformation remains focused on our most valuable asset...our people, both active and reserve.

Community Basing is a new organizational construct characterized by two forces – one providing daily experience and continuity to support the mission, and one consisting of personnel who rotate to other locations, as US Air Force needs dictate. AD and ANG manpower resources are operationally integrated to enhance overall capability. Increased capability is built on the lower infrastructure costs of the ANG, and the long history of the ANG meeting all taskings. The result is optimized use of limited resources while focusing on capability-based warfighting. This is a blueprint for implementing transformational change in a model that we believe should be adopted in other locations, and we urge you to include Community Basing as a key issue in evaluating the Defense Department's closure and realignment recommendations.

AGAUS - 30 June 2005