

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES CONGRESS



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ROB SIMMONS, MEMBER OF CONGRESS



August 19, 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 S. Clark St., Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

Attached is a rebuttal to the position paper regarding the proposed closure of Submarine Base New London, provided to you by Under Secretary of Defense Michael Wynne on August 16 (Tab C, #3).

We strongly dispute and strenuously object to the paper's conclusion that the closure of Submarine Base New London "maintains a viable nuclear attack submarine presence and dispersal on the East Coast, reduces costs and revitalizes infrastructure."

Our analysis has shown the closure would create serious readiness problems at Norfolk and require significantly higher costs than the Navy has estimated, particularly for construction at Kings Bay. Rather than revitalizing infrastructure, closure would sacrifice the modern and capable infrastructure at New London. Most of all, closure would break apart a center of excellence in undersea warfare unmatched in the world.

Thank you for your continued consideration of our position

Sincerely,

M. Jodi Rell
Governor

Christopher J. Dodd
United States Senator

Joseph Lieberman
United States Senator

Rob Simmons
Member of Congress

Connecticut Rebuttal to DOD Position Paper August 19, 2005

DOD Position #1

"The large savings associated with the closure of New London is realized from the ability to close a large installation and accommodate the forces at other existing installations. DON is confident that the costs included in COBRA are a fair representation of the full cost of closure."

Response #1

Connecticut's analysis shows that closure would not save money, but actually *cost* DOD \$641 million over 20 years. GAO has stated that the COBRA "does not provide budget quality data" (GAO letter to BRAC Commission Aug. 10, 2005). However, in critical areas Connecticut's analysis went beyond the COBRA's standard default factors, using known quality data. Significantly:

- After reviewing only a small portion of the Navy analysis, GAO found \$400 million over 20 years in overstated savings, confirming issues raised by Connecticut.
- The Navy's Submarine Learning Center identified significant military construction costs overlooked by the Navy in its plan to move the facility to Kings Bay. The finding confirmed arguments made by Team Connecticut that the cost to move the Submarine School is understated by \$105 million.
- The Navy's own BRAC staff confirmed \$100 million over 20 years in additional costs under Tricare for military retirees' health expenses if the base closes, which was not included in the Navy COBRA.

Summary: Every review of the Navy analysis to date has shown that the Navy COBRA costs/savings are materially different from the actual numbers. Its is not "a fair representation of the full cost of closure."

DOD Position #2

"Basing SSNs on the east coast at two locations, Naval Station Norfolk and SUBASE Kings Bay, accommodates the desire for strategic dispersal of the submarine assets."

Response #2

The Navy plan hurts readiness by overcrowding Norfolk and requiring significant and costly military construction at Kings Bay. This was the concern of Fleet Forces Command during BRAC deliberations. Berthing the additional submarines at Norfolk and Kings Bay, even with new pier construction, requires nesting the submarines. This is a suboptimal configuration that will impair readiness. The need for dredging at Norfolk and Kings Bay will also hurt readiness. Closure would throw away the modern New London base, which the Navy estimates has a replacement value of over \$1 billion. In fact, the Navy has spent more than \$200 million in new construction at SUBASE New London in the past ten years. Three former CNOs have argued these same points.

DOD Position #3

“The analysis used to develop the recommendation was based on the 20-year Force Structure Plan (FSP) submitted in 2004, which had 55 SSNs in 2024. The revised 20-Year FSP, updated in 2005 as allowed by the BRAC legislation, reduced the numbers of SSNs to 45 in 2024. Therefore, even with a force structure of 55 submarines, there was enough excess capacity at DON surface/subsurface installations to allow for the closure of SUBASE New London. The update to the force structure, which reduced the number of submarines projected for 2024, only validated the determination that sufficient capacity existed to accommodate the 20-year force structure plan.”

Response #3

Connecticut never argued that the Navy could not *possibly* berth 55 SSNs without New London. Instead, Connecticut has consistently argued that the Navy cannot base its East Coast submarines without New London *unless* it accepts a high level of operational and readiness risk associated with congestion at Norfolk and inadequate infrastructure at Kings Bay.

Such less-than-ideal conditions would come at the expense of a base where submarine berthing (modern piers), maintenance (Naval Submarine Support Facility), design and manufacturing (Electric Boat), training (Submarine School), warfare development (Submarine Development Squadron 12), innovation (Naval Undersea Warfare Center) and medical research (Submarine Medical Research Laboratory) are all done within a collaborative 40-mile axis. Closure would also eliminate the East Coast submarine base that is closest to the Pacific and the Middle East. The result would be a significant deterioration of military value. (New London’s military value was substantially underscored as a result of a flawed process the community earlier documented and detailed.)

Despite the Navy’s new position on the force structure plan, GAO in its July report to the Commission found that the recommendation to close New London was “based on projected decreases in the number of submarines in the future force structure,” but that “there is uncertainty over the number of submarines and surface ships required for the future force.” We cannot know whether using the 2005 FSP and its lower submarine figure would have made attractive an alternate scenario to *move* submarine assets to New London.

DOD Position #4

“The synergies between New London and Electric Boat are recognized; however, the overall cost savings of the recommendation cannot be ignored.”

Response #4

(i) The synergy between the base and EB has critically important operational and financial dimensions; but, it is only part of a larger expanse of mutually supportive

relationships (see Response #3, above) that would be destroyed if New London closes. Together, these institutions form a subsurface center of excellence unmatched in the world. Also, the Navy gave no military value points to New London for synergy, and the Navy did not consider synergy in its cost/savings analysis. This includes the anticipated increase in the cost of new submarine construction by EB due to the loss of maintenance contracts that absorb EB's overhead costs. In its August 10 letter to the Commission, GAO found "no evidence that the Navy included these additional potential costs in its BRAC analysis."

(ii) There are no savings that justify the breakup of the submarine center at New London. In fact, Connecticut's analysis shows that closing the base will cost the taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars.

DOD Position # 5

"BRAC military manpower savings are real whether the actual personnel are retained or eliminated"

Response # 5

The DOD position on military manpower savings does not address the fact that, as described generally in the GAO report of July 1, 2005 (GAO-05-785, p. 104), many SUBASE New London billets were already scheduled for elimination. For example, SUBASE New London has already experienced a reduction of non-medical billets from 1,223 as of September 30, 2003, to 994 today; but the Navy takes credit for these as BRAC savings. The Navy COBRA results in an erroneous overstatement in recurring savings of \$19 million that should not be attributed to BRAC. Further significant reductions are already planned at New London through 2011. These plans are current, assume continued operation of the SUBASE, and are not related to BRAC.

J. Dennis Hastert
Fourteenth District
Illinois



(202) 225-0600

Office of the Speaker
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

August 17, 2005

The Honorable Anthony Principi
BRAC Commission
Polk Building, Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

As you and your Commission head into the final weeks of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, I ask that you strongly consider the case made by Team Connecticut against closing Naval Submarine Base New London.


Over the past months, Team Connecticut has put forth a multi-pronged case against the Navy's plan to close SUBASE New London. One of the strongest arguments is recent data suggesting there is no real cost savings involved in the closing of SUBASE New London.

According to Team Connecticut data, the closure of SUBASE New London would actually cost the nation \$641 million over the next 20 years. As a fiscal conservative, I cannot support a base closing that does not provide taxpayer savings.

Moreover, closing SUBASE New London would eliminate a center of excellence for undersea warfare in which Congress has invested hundreds of millions of dollars over the last decade. Since my election to Speaker of the House in 1999, I have personally seen Congress invest more than \$120 million into the New London Navy base. Our nation's taxpayers would be ill-served if these investments in our national security are wasted.

Congress authorized the 2005 BRAC round to strengthen our Armed Forces. As the Speaker of the House, I take this responsibility seriously. Having listened carefully to Team Connecticut's arguments, I firmly believe that including Naval Submarine Base New London in the 2005 BRAC round would weaken our homeland and national security while providing no savings to our Nation's taxpayers. I urge you to remove New London from the BRAC closure list at your earliest opportunity.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. Dennis Hastert". The signature is stylized with a large initial "J" and a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker

DUNCAN HUNTER, CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN
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GEOFF DAVIS, KENTUCKY

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

August 16, 2005

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CYNTHIA MCKINNEY, GEORGIA
DAN BOREN, OKLAHOMA

ROBERT L. SIMMONS, STAFF DIRECTOR

The Honorable Anthony Principi
BRAC Commission
Polk Building , Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Tony:


We are closely following the debate over the recommendation to close Naval Submarine Base (SUBASE) New London. In addition to reiterating our concern that closure of SUBASE New London would lock the Navy into a dangerously low submarine force level and cede valuable surge capacity, we write to express additional concerns about the accuracy of Navy cost estimates for closure of the base.

As you know, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the State of Connecticut recently released separate reports that call into question the Navy's cost and savings estimates for closure of SUBASE New London. GAO's review indicates that closure of the base will result in significantly less savings than estimated by the Navy, while the state's review predicts no savings in the next 100 years. These new reviews raise significant uncertainties about the Navy's cost analysis supporting the closure recommendation.

We continue to believe that the recommendation to close SUBASE New London does not meet selection criteria requirements to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force needs. In addition, the GAO and state reviews of SUBASE New London closure costs raise questions about whether the closure meets selection criteria requirements to consider the cost of operations, extent and timing of potential costs and savings, and the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration. We are also concerned that GAO found no evidence that the Navy considered in its analysis the possibility of additional costs to the service from disrupting the unique partnership between SUBASE New London and the Electric Boat Corporation. As such, we believe the Secretary's recommendation to close SUBASE New London substantially deviates from the selection criteria.

The 2005 BRAC round must result in fiscally responsible closure and realignment decisions that support the current and future requirements of our military forces. Not only would closure of SUBASE New London limit the contingency, mobilization, and surge capacity of our Navy, but it is now uncertain that closure of the base will result in any savings at all. Based upon these substantial deviations from the selection criteria, we urge you to reject the recommendation to close SUBASE New London.

With best wishes,



Duncan Hunter
Chairman



Roscoe Bartlett
Chairman, Projection Forces Subcommittee

DCN: 7742



BRAC Commission

AUG 18 2005

Received

JIMMY CARTER

August 15, 2005

To Chairman Anthony J. Principi

I have just returned from King's Bay, where my wife and I enjoyed an overnight cruise on the USS JIMMY CARTER. As a former submariner, I obviously was thrilled, honored, and pleased to examine the superb support facilities in my home state. Although the decision to establish this extensive submarine base in Georgia was made while I was Commander-in-Chief, there was no political influence exerted from the White House. The decision was made on the merits of the base location, and those qualities are still evident.

As a Georgian and, at heart, a lifetime submariner, I would like to express my opinion about one of the key judgments that you and other BRAC members will have to make about the current Pentagon proposals.

My understanding is that the purpose of assessing possible changes is primarily to enhance the effectiveness of our military forces, and secondarily for possible cost savings. I don't profess to speak for other active and retired submariners, but I believe that, overwhelmingly, the consensus would be that transferring the submarine forces from New London would be militarily deleterious. Abandonment and rebuilding facilities would be disruptive, there would be a great loss of the services of civilian personnel who have devoted their lives to the submarine force, and the move might overly concentrate our forces. The long, narrow, and exposed access routes from shore bases to the open seas are always vulnerable to potential closing - by nature or saboteurs.

Without access to confidential data concerning projected cost savings, I understand that there will be immediate major expenditures, and that long-term savings are largely predicated on workforce reductions. This assumes that the number of military personnel would be reduced and that civilian employees in other locations would provide their services more efficiently. Both of these premises are doubtful.

King's Bay could certainly be expanded to accommodate a larger contingent of ships and personnel, and this region would welcome the additional jobs that may be transferred from Connecticut. However, I am concerned about the adverse economic impact on the New London area, the abandonment of a huge installation of facilities, and, less quantitatively, a loss of some of the proud submariners' heritage of our historic association with service and training in New London.

I appreciate your considering my opinion.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi, Chairman
BRAC Commission
2521 Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, Virginia 22202

cc: Base Realignment and Closure Commission members

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

July 21, 2005

The Honorable Anthony Principi
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
Polk Building
Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Tony:

We are seriously concerned that the Department of the Navy used unacceptable assumptions about the future nuclear attack submarine force to justify its Base Realignment and Closure recommendation to shut down Naval Submarine Base New London. A decision to close SUBASE New London would lock the Navy into an artificially low force level and damage the national security of the United States.

On May 17, 2005, the Chief of Naval Operations testified to Congress that the subsurface fleet has too much structure because the future SSN force level will be in the low-40s. The CNO said he believes the future SSN number is 41. Such a force level could not safely address the growing undersea warfare threats facing the United States.

Future defense requirements demand higher attack submarine numbers than those assumed by the Navy during the 2005 BRAC process – a gross departure from earlier plans. The last Quadrennial Defense Review specified a minimum force level of 55 SSNs necessary to fill the Combatant Commanders' high priority needs, with earlier and subsequent studies consistently placing acceptable SSN numbers well above 50. Vice Admiral Charles Munns, Commander, Naval Submarine Forces, recently testified to Congress that the attack submarine fleet should be kept at its current size of 54 because our Combatant Commanders already lack the vessels to complete priority operations. At the same hearing, Admiral Kirkland Donald, Director, Naval Reactors testified that a low procurement rate impairs the defense industry's ability to produce affordable, quality nuclear submarines for the United States Government, its only customer.

We are executing technology programs that may halve the size and cost of future attack submarines. The "Tango Bravo" (*technical barriers*) initiative is already yielding breakthroughs in submarine design and propulsion. These advances may soon allow the Navy to buy more SSNs with less funding; but closing SUBASE New London would prevent the Navy from exploiting these potential gains, because the service would lack the surge capacity to berth and maintain additional vessels.

Closing SUBASE New London would eliminate valuable berthing and facilities, locking the Navy into a dangerously low force level. Moving SUBASE New London's 18 homeported SSNs to Norfolk and Kings Bay — at great cost — would cede valuable surge capacity and squander the nation's leading submarine base.

The Navy's failure to use an adequate force level to produce its recommendation is a substantial deviation from the BRAC criteria. As you know, the first criterion of the BRAC process addresses the base's current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training and readiness. Another top criterion focuses on the base's ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.

The BRAC recommendation to close SUBASE New London does not conform to the Navy's true force needs. Closing New London will tie the SSN force to an insufficient force level and destroy the world's best submarine base in exchange for little or no savings. Please help us support the current and future needs of the Armed Forces by rejecting the Department of Defense recommendation to close Naval Submarine Base New London.


Sincerely,



Rep. Jerry Lewis
Chairman
House Appropriations Committee



Rep. Duncan Hunter
Chairman
House Armed Services Committee



Rep. C.W. "Bill" Young
Chairman
House Appropriations Committee
Subcommittee on Defense



Rep. Roscoe Bartlett
Chairman
House Armed Services Committee
Projection Forces Subcommittee

July 28, 2005

The Honorable Anthony Principi
BRAC Commission
Polk Building
Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

We respectfully urge you to remove Naval Submarine Base New London from the Base Realignment and Closure List. The Department of Defense's recommendation to close SUBASE New London is based on substantially flawed assumptions and analysis, as well as a force structure plan that assumes unacceptable risk. Closing SUBASE New London would critically injure the capabilities and readiness of the United States' submarine force, the Navy and the Armed Forces at large. The following text and attachment address some of our principal concerns about the recommendation to close SUBASE New London.

Force Structure Plan

The force structure plan used to justify closing SUBASE New London represents a substantial deviation from the BRAC criteria. A future force level of 37 to 41 attack submarines could not meet the United States national security needs without assuming unacceptable risks. Already, the Navy reports that U.S. Combatant Commanders are collectively asking for 150 percent of the critical mission days that the submarine force can provide. The Armed Forces should not depend on unproven conceptual operations and nonexistent weapon systems for missions twenty years from now. Similarly, we should not depend on an assessment of the threat environment in 2025. The U.S. intelligence community, we know, has consistently underestimated the military modernization programs of China, which will have three times as many attack submarines as the United States by 2025, given current trends.

Though long-range projections can help the Navy plan for the future, they should not be allowed to unilaterally eliminate force level options or flexibility in the fleet. Unfortunately, the 2005 BRAC recommendation on SUBASE New London appears to do just that, using a 21 percent reduction in the attack submarine fleet to justify an unwise and imprudent drawdown in subsurface infrastructure that will produce nominal savings at most.

The attack submarine is the best anti-submarine weapon; yet, while the rest of the world ramps up production, the 2005 Force Structure Plan would predetermine a dangerously small subsurface fleet if accepted. Fundamental questions remain about the optimal size and character of the U.S. submarine fleet. A decision to close SUBASE New London would eliminate the fleet's surge capacity, terminating the force level debate prematurely. This would prevent the Navy from taking advantage of exciting undersea warfare and propulsion technologies that could drastically reduce the size and cost of future submarines. These breakthroughs in design and

production could help the Navy procure more attack submarines with only modest spending increases.

Center of Excellence for Undersea Warfare

SUBASE New London is the nation's center of excellence for undersea warfare. The base is surrounded by the Electric Boat Corporation, Submarine Development Squadron 12, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, the Naval War College, the Institute for Undersea Exploration, and several universities with world-class research institutions. The area is also home to world-class subcontractors and a highly skilled labor force intimately familiar with submarine design, construction and maintenance. This convergence creates unique readiness and training opportunities for the Navy, military value wrongly dismissed in the Navy analysis.

Military Value

The Department of the Navy underestimated the military value of SUBASE New London and, as a result, substantially deviated from the BRAC selection criteria. Attachment 1 provides detailed examples of flawed analysis used to incorrectly conclude that the base should be closed.

Other Criteria


Estimated cost savings appear to have driven the recommendation to shut down SUBASE New London. An independent review of the analysis clearly shows that the Department of Defense underestimated the costs of moving and reconstituting SUBASE New London's assets, while overestimating savings from the proposed closure.

Naval Submarine Base New London is a proven strategic asset. It would take the Navy generations to reconstitute its unique military value elsewhere. That is years the Armed Forces cannot afford to lose, even if the nation could pay the financial and readiness cost of scattering the base. A final decision to close SUBASE New London would undermine the subsurface fleet and predetermine a high-risk force level for little or no gain. We urge you to protect the nation from this mistaken recommendation.


Sincerely,



Carlisle A. H. Trost
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Former Chief of Naval Operations




James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Former Chief of Naval Operations
Former Secretary of Energy




Frank B. Kelso II
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Former Chief of Naval Operations



Frank L. Bowman
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Former Director of Naval Reactors



Kenneth M. Carr
Vice Admiral, U S Navy (Retired)
Former Commander Submarine Force, US Atlantic Fleet
Former Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission



George R. Sterner
Vice Admiral, U S Navy (Retired)
Former Commander, Naval Sea
Systems Command



Al Konetzni
Vice Admiral, U S Navy (Retired)
Former Commander Submarine Force, U S Pacific Fleet



N. Ronald Thunman
Vice Admiral, U S Navy (Retired)
Former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Submarine Warfare

Attachment 1

Substantial Deviation in Military Value Scoring:

In scoring the Submarine Base New London, the Navy analysis team did not grant extra points for hosting the nation's only submarine school, opting instead to treating it as a "tenant command." Naval Submarine School (SUBSCOL) is the premier subsurface educational center in the world. Its co-location with 18 home ported fast attack submarines affords the Navy significant readiness and training advantages largely because sailors can stay with their boats (and families) for months while they learn and practice. Additionally, the Navy gains from the institution's proximity to the Electric Boat Corporation, builder and maintainer of many SUBSCOL assets, including its most advanced trainers. Basic military judgment dictates that SUBSCOL is not comparable to a local damage control trainer; yet that is how the institution was valued.

The Navy also deviated from the BRAC criteria when it gave SUBASE New London a low military value score for its considerable berthing capacity. SUBASE New London has piers to safely and efficiently berth at least 20 attack submarines. Conversely, moving three squadrons to Norfolk Naval Station and Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay would necessitate an unprecedented level of nesting – an operational and readiness hazard – even after completing significant military construction projects. That SUBASE New London received more points for modern piers than Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, but zero points for cruiser length equivalents, highlights the irrationality of this scoring metric. Fleet Forces Command opposed any scenario to close SUBASE New London during the 2005 BRAC round deliberations because it would hurt the submarine force's flexibility, readiness, and capabilities on the East Coast. We agree with that assessment.

The Navy's use of pier space to measure extra capacity in the subsurface fleet is inherently flawed because attack submarines, though relatively compact in terms of displacement and length, require a high level of maintenance. At the same time, the crews of attack submarines are small compared with their surface counterparts, but need relatively intensive training and education. The infrastructure – nuclear waterfront certification, intermediate maintenance, training, etc. – to support attack submarines and their crews is sophisticated and expensive. Once lost, such assets are especially difficult to reconstitute. These realities also help explain why the Fleet Forces Command argued against closing SUBASE New London during BRAC round deliberations.

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE

7 August 2005

The Honorable Anthony Principi
BRAC Commission
Polk Building
Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202


Dear Chairman Principi:

On July 28, 2005 you received a joint-letter (copy attached) from Admirals Trost, Watkins, Kelso, Bowman, et. al. in which they respectfully urged you to remove Naval Submarine Base New London from the Base Realignment and Closure List.

We have carefully reviewed that letter and additional information developed since then and fully agree with their position that the Department of Defense's recommendation to close SUBASE New London is based on substantially flawed assumptions and analysis, as well as a force structure plan that assumes unacceptable risk. We agree with them that closing SUBASE New London would critically injure the capabilities and readiness of the United States' submarine force, the Navy and the Armed Forces at large.

We join our colleagues in voicing in the strongest terms possible that the BRAC Commission rejects the Department of Defense recommendation to close the Submarine Base New London.

Sincerely,



William J. Crowe
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Former Ambassador to Court of St. James



Kinnaid R. McKee
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Former Director Naval Reactors



Thomas Fargo
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Former Commander, Pacific Command

GENERAL DYNAMICS

Electric Boat

John P. Casey
President

August 9, 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
BRAC Commission
Polk Building, Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

I was pleased to have the opportunity to testify before your commission on July 6 in Boston. I am writing this letter to reinforce the unique, tangible benefits provided to the United States by the co-location of Naval Submarine Base New London and the Electric Boat Corporation shipyard in Groton, Connecticut. Specifically, the failure of DoN-0033 base closure scenario to address the synergy between the SUBASE and our company will adversely impact the readiness and the future development of the submarine force, and our critical submarine industrial base.

Operational submarines and their crews, the tactical innovators of Submarine Development Squadron 12, and the instructors and training systems at Submarine School - all located in Groton - interact with Electric Boat's concept formulators, engineers, and designers on a daily basis. This Navy / industry synergy is critical to developing next-generation submarine designs as well as incorporating new technology into the existing fleet.

Specific examples of the synergies include but are not limited to:

- Approximately 300 skilled Electric Boat employees, who replaced over 500 military billets, are assigned to the Naval Submarine Support Facility, the Nuclear Regional Maintenance Department, and the floating dry-dock Shippingport to conduct cost-effective maintenance on the 18 nuclear submarines home ported in Groton. Electric Boat manages the Nuclear Regional Maintenance Department for the Navy, and maintains and operates the Shippingport. The co-location enables immediate surge capacity for specific engineering, planning and trade skills from the shipyard, as needed, to ensure fleet readiness.
- The availability of three nuclear certified graving docks at Electric Boat provides immediate access to the Navy for dry-dock services, a cost effective approach which eliminates the requirement to construct a new Navy-owned floating dry-dock. Electric Boat's dry-docks also enable the Navy to accomplish depot-level availabilities in the ships' Groton homeport, eliminating the costs to move sailors and their families, and greatly improving their quality of life.

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- The Navy crews of submarines built by Electric Boat are integral to the construction and test process and are generally assigned to a vessel two years prior to delivery. The local submarine squadron and group command structure coordinate the training and qualifications required to safely conduct sea trials required prior to delivery. I would like to emphasize that the undersea environment – where a nuclear-powered, acoustically invisible, shock tolerant submarine must operate – is an environment that cannot otherwise sustain human life. Shipboard training is complemented with training facilities and instructors at the Submarine School and on modules being tested at Electric Boat. This has both improved submarine force readiness and minimized the time required to deployment.
- The entire submarine construction approach at Electric Boat is centered on a Design/Build process, wherein the design team not only includes traditional engineers and designers, but also shipyard production personnel and Navy operators, to ensure that our submarines can be built affordably and will perform optimally. The daily interaction of Electric Boat engineers and SUBASE personnel has resulted in new submarine designs and major design modifications that are more capable, more user-friendly, more easily maintainable, and -- less expensive. Continuation of this relationship will be a key enabler in our efforts to develop the advanced capabilities and future ship designs that will ensure the U.S. submarine force is positioned to meet constantly evolving challenges.
- Electric Boat is actively engaged in submarine maintenance and modernization in Groton. This added volume of work absorbs some of the fixed overhead associated with operating our world-class shipyard. We estimate that this overhead absorption has effectively lowered the cost of new-construction submarines by at least \$50 million per year. Electric Boat's co-location with SUBASE New London is vital to our future participation in submarine maintenance and modernization, and the continued realization of these savings on future new ship construction.

Together, Electric Boat and SUBASE New London are the Nation's submarine center of excellence. The close inter-relationship between the designers, builders, and operators of the Navy's submarines is unique to Groton, and is the product of 90 years of co-location. As the Government contemplates the future of the SUBASE, I urge you to carefully consider the submarine design, construction, and life cycle support capabilities inherent with Electric Boat, the unique synergy between Electric Boat and the New London Submarine Base, and the value this region delivers to the United States Navy.

Sincerely,



John P. Casey
President

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xc: The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd
 The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
 The Honorable M. Jodi Rell
 The Honorable Robert R. Simmons