

Sarkar, Rumu, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Hague, David, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 2:38 PM
To: Sarkar, Rumu, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: RE: Summary of Discussion: 6/7/05

Rumu -- #2 would apply only to civilians. #5 The best such map is likely to be in the SJA's office and the facilities office.

You can test out the questions in Alaska. They are the type of questions to be asked one-on-one with the appropriate staff folks at the bases (SJA, etc.)

Check beforehand with the team handling the AK visit. They may already have such information. They will also have views of the value of the information.

David


From: Sarkar, Rumu, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2005 7:03 PM
To: Hague, David, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Cowhig, Dan, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: Summary of Discussion: 6/7/05

A quick summary of the legal points that may be raised during or in preparation for site visits follows:

- 1 Is there any legal exposure or liability (and associated costs) with privatized hosing initiatives or other types of contractor-built and operated facilities?
- 2 Are there outstanding potential legal liability in relation to paying benefits or entitlements to civilian or uniformed personnel, or are all benefits and coverage fully transferable?
- 3 Were any aspects of DoD's data call (e.g., training ranges use) misleading, or should such aspects be considered in a different light?
- 4 Are there any environmental remediation issues (e.g., encroachment, storage of hazardous materials) that should be considered?
- 5 Please share the facilities "map" of how property and realty were acquired and may be disposed of.
- 6 Are there hardware disposal issues that pose difficulties (especially in terms of conflicting with NDAA prohibitions on the disposal or retirement of such property)?

I m sure there will be more questions as we go along, Rumu

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Wither the Abrams Doctrine: good or bad policy? - H - Reserve Forces Review

Gary Khalil

INTRODUCTION

In just over a generation, there are many who have forgotten the pertinent and painful lessons of Vietnam. One of those lessons was the importance of the connection between use of military force and the political requirements in a liberal democracy to maintain public support for that use of force, which directly led to the development of the Abrams Doctrine. (1)

Many key policy-makers and senior leaders have demonstrated historical myopia in the stated and unstated reasons behind the Abrams Doctrine. More serious, however, is the fact that the vast majority of uniformed personnel and citizens employed in the defense community do not even know what this doctrine is. Confusing the issue even more, we have articles like "Silencing the Reserves" (2) that attempt to analyze the issue in a partisan manner, when it is a complicated issue that transcends partisan politics. In a nutshell, the Abrams Doctrine came about because:

During the entire ten-year war in Vietnam, the military only called up [deployed] approximately 3,000 Reservists. Following American defeat in that war, however, Army General Creighton W. Abrams enunciated a policy (the "Abrams Doctrine") that "[the nation should never] go to war again without calling up the spirit of the American people, and you do that by calling up the National Guard and Reserve" (3)

This article will investigate whether the Abrams Doctrine is consistent with American history; look specifically at the Abrams Doctrine and how it evolved; focus on current issues; and analyze the pitfalls of Abrams Doctrine elimination while providing conclusions and recommendations. Conflict about the role, mix, and employment of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces has existed since the Revolutionary War. (4) The latest debate appears to put the Abrams Doctrine and the existing Total Force Policy in the cross hairs of a showdown at the OK Corral. A cadre of AC general officers from all services in a variety of forums (over the last 12 months) have openly questioned the wisdom of and need for the Abrams Doctrine in the current global war on terrorism (GWOT). More importantly, they have questioned its future.

Historically, the Guard and Reserve were warfighting forces trained and held in reserve for low-probability/high-intensity conflicts. Guard and Reserve members provide this support in a variety of ways: voluntary and involuntary orders to active duty, two-week annual tours in the United States and overseas, inactive duty (training category), additional training periods, and active duty for special work (either AC or RC). From the beginning of the 1990s, RC units and service members became increasingly employed in higher-probability/low-intensity contingencies such as humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, and to relieve AC operations and deployment tempo in military deployments. That change in mobilization and deployment models was one of steadily increasing utilization--until the GWOT. (5) The greatest growth in RC utilization, until recently, has been in operational support. As the 21st

Don DOL
Sum
Good read and relevant to our time.

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century unfolds, the AC is increasingly taking proper advantage of the experience and unique civilian skills that RC personnel bring to their respective services.

IS THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE CONSISTENT WITH AMERICA'S HISTORY?

Articles of Confederation and Militia

A review of the history of the armed forces of the United States, and in particular the nation's land forces, reveals that the Abrams Doctrine was not a break from past practices, but may accurately be described as a return to them. Indeed, the greatest difference between historic precedence and the force structure choices contained in the Abrams Doctrine are that with the latter the choices were rationally made due to limited resources and political-military concerns, and not as a matter of default to prior practice.

When the nation was first established, there was among the Founding Fathers a significant fear of standing land forces. This was due in part to the actual experiences of many of the former colonists, who had experienced the quartering of troops in their own homes, and the requisition of supplies. In addition, many believed that history was ripe with examples of where the standing armies of a nation presented greater threats to the liberty of its people than did any outside threat. Perhaps this balance between liberty and security was made easier by the fact that the United States did not share borders with any nation presenting a significant military threat.

Fears of the threats to liberty from standing land forces first were manifested in the Articles of Confederation, where Articles VI and VII clearly limit not only the respective states' ability to maintain and employ land and naval forces, but they also limit the composition of the federal forces:

... every state shall always keep up a well regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage. (6)

When land forces are raised by any state for the common defense, all officers of or under the rank of colonel, shall be appointed by the legislature of each state respectively by whom such forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such state shall direct, and all vacancies shall be filled up by the state which first made the appointment. (7)

The defense of the nation was clearly a central matter, however, the drafters of the Articles of Confederation foresaw that the bulk of forces would come not from the central government but from the states. Those forces would be led, in the main, by officers appointed by the states. Use of those forces to threaten internal individual rights or state authorities would be difficult given that the central government could no rely on such state-appointed officers answering directions from a central government.

Land Forces under the Constitution

For myriad reasons, however the Articles of Confederation failed, and the Founding Fathers replaced them with the Constitution, ratified in 1789. Despite that failure, the fears of large standing federal land forces remained and were addressed in the new document as well: "The Congress shall have the power

to ... raise and support Armies, but no appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years." (8)

By maintaining a short leash on the funds used to raise and support land forces (a similar constitutional restraint was not placed on those funds used to raise and support the Navy), the Founders hoped to prevent a Praetorian Guard (the elite bodyguards of the Roman emperors) from dictating terms to the civilian government.

In addition, despite Hamilton's condemnation to the contrary, (9) the Founders continued to rely heavily on the concept of state militias to provide land forces to defend the nation. Specifically, article I, Section 8, provides that Congress may "organize, arm and discipline" the militia, and that the states may "establish ... (and) appoint the officers of ... and train the militia," and provides that Congress' power over such militia is limited during peacetime, in that it reserves "to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the authority of training the Militia according to the discipline provided by Congress." (10)

As the nation moved through its formative years, the practice of heavily relying on militia forces to provide the bulk of forces to defend or pursue the young nation's interests continued. In the War of 1812, many of the forces employed were militia forces raised from the states, a practice that continued in the Mexican American War (when then-Col. Jefferson Davis led a force of Mississippi militiamen in the Battle of Buena Vista), and of course in the American Civil War, where the vast majority of the forces raised by the North and South comprised militia and volunteer regimental formations raised by and from the states, with officers appointed by the respective governors. (11)

Experiences with militia forces during the Spanish--American War led national leaders to consider seriously for the first time a revamping of the militia system and the reliance of the nation on militia forces from the states. (12) As a result, the Dick Act of 1903 identified the state militias as the primary Reserve force of the nation. Thereafter, facing the likely entry of the United States into World War I, the government passed the National Defense Act of 1916, which achieved two things. First, it created the U.S. Army Reserve, a wholly federal force designed to make available to the federal government a rapid non-standing capability to augment its standing regular military, and essentially guaranteed the federal government access to the militias as a reserve force for federal forces. (13) Second, it answered a concern regarding the use of non-federal officers overseas by providing for federal recognition of state militia officers' commissions, (14) and by funding drill pay for state militias with federal dollars. Further, the Act mandated for the first time the use of the term "the National Guard" for referring to the state militias.

As the nation entered World War I, Army National Guard divisions and regiments fought alongside federal divisions. The performance of these units in major combat actions was on a par with that of the federal forces. Indeed, there was no reason they should not have been, given that many of the soldiers, regardless of component, had not been in the military before the outbreak of the war. At the end of the war, alongside the many regular soldiers who served, the National Guardsmen were mustered off active duty. Unlike the federal soldiers, however, they were not cashiered, but instead returned to a militia status, providing some coherence to the nation's military during the interwar years. During this same time, the standing federal force was drawn down to a precipitous level.

In 1933, the National guard Mobilization Act provided greater federal access to the National Guard for

mobilization purposes, making the state militias a component of the Army. This allowed the National Guard to be integrated into the regular forces upon a presidential declaration of a national emergency.

As the nation looked with concern over events in Europe, many National Guard soldiers were mobilized into federal service in 1940-41. (15) Upon the entry of the nation into World War II, these Guard traits began to serve alongside their AC counterparts. A significant proportion of the Army during the war was made up of National Guard units and soldiers. And once again, upon achieving victory, the nation mustered the vast majority of its threes, federal and state militias, off active duty. In the period from 1946 to June 1950, the nation again had drawn down its standing force significantly, relying upon the National Guard to serve as a reserve force should the nation be confronted by a threat to its security.

Unfortunately, in June 1950 the nation was surprised by the sudden and violent attack by North Korea against South Korea. The Army threw unprepared forces against this surprise attack, and until the culmination of the North Korean offensive, followed by the U.S. landings at Inchon, the Army was facing annihilation in the Pusan Perimeter. This experience is what led many force planners to believe that the concept of relying so heavily on state militias (with their inherently long lag time to mobilize and train to effective levels) and federal Reserve forces to provide the expansion capability needed by the standing regular forces was dangerous in an era of rapid troop transport and force projection. One of the developments that flowed from this experience was the decision during the Truman Administration to maintain conscription, a decision that was continued in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, and which was to have significant effects under the presidency of Lyndon Johnson.

By focusing on the need for rapid response to threats, the force planners ignored the concerns cited by the Founders regarding the dangers inherent in a large standing force. In particular, as practice during the Vietnam War revealed, the reliance upon a ready, standing regular force allowed disposal of the brake upon executive foreign adventurism the traditional militia-reliant force structure presented. This brake existed in two fashions. The first was structural, in that the use of the militias involved an inherently political process of working with state governors (the peacetime commanders in chief of the militias) to mobilize the Guard and Congress to notify Reserve Component units in their districts or states. This political factor was interwoven with the second brake upon use of such a force, the inherently political process of involving state senators and representatives in Congress, as well as their constituents at home whose family members were the members of the Reserve Component.

By avoiding the use of the Reserve Component, the Johnson administration was acting contrary to established doctrine and was breaking with the practice followed in nearly every use of force in the nation's history. The administration also required use of a large conscript Army to wage the effort in Vietnam, a decision that revealed significant inequities in actual operation of the draft, providing for significant student and other deferments that tended to favor the privileged, and placed the burden of service on the collective shoulders of the nation's working-class families. Finally, the Reserve Components in some cases became a haven for those who wanted to avoid the draft and avoid going to war. The demand for positions in RC units caused accusations of favoritism in who was actually selected and assigned for such units, further creating the impression that upper- and upper-middle-class men were not subjected to the same burden of service that working-class families had to bear in the Vietnam campaign.

After the political debacles flowing from the Vietnam War that directly led to the downfall of the Johnson Administration, GEN Creighton W. Abrams determined that the practice followed by the

United States in Vietnam was politically flawed and at odds with established national precedent and political realities in a liberal democratic republic.

ABRAMS DOCTRINE HISTORY

In 1958, then-COL Creighton W. Abrams testified before Congress in support of a major initiative by Army Chief of Staff GEN Maxwell D. Taylor involving the structure and role of the ARNG. (16) Abrams, who was to develop a force structure fully integrating the Reserve Components into the Army (discussed, *infra*), stated, "Army defense plans in case of war call for carefully integrated employment of the active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. All must be ready to mesh smoothly, quickly, and efficiently according to a calculated time schedule." (17) The next year, Abrams (now a newly minted brigadier general) again testified before Congress in a Taylor-led initiative to reorganize the Army's Reserve. (18)

Later serving as deputy commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), then commander, MAC-V North, then finally as commanding general, MAC-V, General Abrams returned to America in 1972 committed to changing the circumstances that led the United States into an unpopular, unsupported effort like Vietnam. In particular, Abrams was concerned that without mobilizing the Reserve Components, Vietnam had drained the Army worldwide, especially in Europe. (19) Abrams believed there were two central missions the Army served: defense of the homeland, and preservation of "freedom of action, which might be defined as immunity from coercion." (20)

Abrams believed "one of the most fateful decisions of the war in Vietnam had been Lyndon Johnson's refusal to call up the Reserves." (21) Based on this, upon his elevation to chief of staff, Abrams was determined to never allow the professional Army to slip away from its popular roots. He was "determined to ensure that never again would a President be able to send the Army to war without the Reserves maintained for such a contingency. The vehicle for doing this was a revised force structure that integrated Reserve and Active force elements so closely as to make the Reserve virtually inextricable from the whole. That was in turn an integral part of a larger package of initiatives. (22)

General Abrams announced plans to structure a 16-division Army. To accomplish that, he built in a reliance upon Reserve Components such that the Active Component "could not function without them, and hence could not be deployed without calling them up." (23) Abrams' purpose was to prevent a president from deploying significant military forces without a Reserve Component mobilization. (24)

Abrams did not intend to prevent the Army from deploying overseas; he deeply believed the Army and the United States had a global mission, especially as it applied to Europe. His intent was rather to ensure that the Army reflected the American people, and that the military deferred to the people as part of a representative democracy. His plan was announced on 13 August 1974. In it, he stated that the Army was committed to fielding 16 combat-ready divisions by the end of fiscal year 1978 and that, in order to accomplish this, the readiness of the Reserve Component of the Army would need to be bolstered, integrating them into a "total force." (25)

TOTAL FORCE POLICY HISTORY

In August of 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced the Total Force Policy. Several years later it was adapted to mitigate the move from a conscript military to an all-volunteer force (AVF).

Toward the end of the Vietnam War, President Nixon appointed Thomas S. Gates to "... study the prospects of ending the military draft and relying on an all-volunteer force for America's defenses." (26) Many in the military were repulsed by the framework of analysis dealing with manpower as a commodity. "... They were also concerned that the end of the draft would further weaken the bridge between the American public and their military...." (27) One of the byproducts of that debate, although criticism was shut down by putting a gag order on the military, was the total force concept or Total Force Policy. (28)

"The total-force approach to national defense is a fundamental milestone in the continuing evolution of the Guard and Reserve. The policy's basic intent is that the Guard and Reserve constitute the primary augmentation for the Active Component in a military emergency. Fully trained, adequately equipped, and combat-ready Guardsmen and Reservists, not conscripts, have thus become the initial source of additional military manpower if U.S. armed force must deploy and fight." (29)

The basic concept underlying Total Force Policy is that the lower cost of sustaining Reserve units in peacetime, compared to similar Active units, will result in budgetary savings that can sustain a larger Total Force and free up resources for other priorities such as modernization and recapitalization. (30) The Total Force Policy presumes that the Reserve Components can perform most or many peacetime missions in conjunction with training that reaps significant manpower and monetary savings over a for with a more robust Active mix. This is due, in part, by a flow of experience from the Active to the Reserve But the purpose of the Reserve Components is much more than mere cost effectiveness and budget savings. This country has a long history of citizen-warriors that begins before our early Revolutionary period, critical to a constitutional republic. (31)

The evolution of the Active and Reserve Components into a "Total Force" has been a great DoD success story. The "Total Force" concept was outlined in the early 1970s as part a post-Vietnam era strategy for dealing with changing national priorities that called for reductions in military spending and the end of conscription into military service, though it had the additional effect of initiating a clearer understanding of the respective roles of the Active and Reserve Components. More importantly, the Abrams Doctrine involved a change of force structure that required mobilization of the Reserve Component for operations, even at the low end of the spectrum of conflict. This became a de facto policy reinforced by a Total Force policy that was inextricably linked to Abrams Doctrine constructs. Although this was done almost exclusively in the Army, it has strategic impacts for the other services, even if their force structure is organized/utilized in a different manner.

The Abrams Doctrine and the Total Force Policy were insurance that we would not repeat the mistakes of Vietnam: the failure to garner and build national will before and during a conflict in order to abide by the spirit and intent of the Clausewitzian Trinity. "Thus the Reserves were the ideal instrument to revitalize the 'remarkable trinity' by stiffening the congressional backbone and ensuring Congress' active support for wartime operations" (32) Since the AVF, the Reserve Component has provided increased social utility by enhancing military-civilian connections critical to the effectiveness of our national military strategy (NMS).

CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE SINCE 9/11

This evolutionary transformation away from a wartime force in reserve that began with the Total Force Policy was accelerated following the Persian Gulf War. There was a rapid growth in the frequency of

Presidential Select Reserve Call-ups (PSRC) and Presidential Reserve Call ups (PRC) (33) authorities (five PRCs and PSRCs are still open--three active: Bosnia, Kosovo, SWA--as well as two partial Mobilizations--Desert Storm, inactive and 9/14, still open). In addition, there was a corresponding growth in Reserve Component volunteerism to support smaller scale contingencies and routine engagement operations. PRC authority was originally developed and approved by Congress to give the executive branch the capability of responding to an imminent major conflict. The focus of PRC changed after the Gulf War, however, in response to operations in places as diverse as Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo.

The number of duty days required of the Reserve Components has risen significantly from the mid 1980s through the 1990s, from fewer than 1 million duty days in the late 1980s, to between 5-6 million duty days after Desert Shield/Storm, doubling in the late 1990s to 12+ million duty days with no pause. Then there was the rapid rise in mobilizations and deployments following 9/11. Not only did the Reserve Component support (outside Operations Enduring Freedom, Noble Eagle and Iraqi Freedom) the regular military increase by 35 percent (to 17.2 million duty days), but Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle added some 24.1 million duty days. (34) It is expected that Operation Iraqi Freedom will easily require the largest number of mobilized Reserve Component duty days since the Korean War. Preliminary estimates are 60.3 million duty days, exceeding Desert Shield/Storm by some 35 percent. (35) But what is unprecedented will be the requirement to sustain this Reserve Component personnel-tempo (PERSTEMPO) for a period of years. In addition, many policy experts believe that the GWOT may last decades, possibly requiring a wholesale re-examination of our force structure that goes beyond rebalancing.

The initial responses to 9/11 and the global war on terrorism have seen Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom combined with the call-ups for Operation Noble Eagle--the largest call up of Reservists since the Korean War. The total number of Reservists mobilized has been 306,140 for the three combined, with the peak number mobilized during Operation Iraqi Freedom in April 2003, of some 221,452. (36) With a sea-change in the way we utilize Reserve forces, one wonders why there have been no significant adjustments to the national security strategy (NSS) or national military strategy (NMS) to adjust to their de facto use.

Most of the cacophony in the administration states that the Abrams Doctrine is outdated, needs significant revision, elimination, or that it really does not exist. Ironically, there has been no major study or commission stating the rationale for the suggested or proposed changes other than prima facie arguments. The 2001 QDR did not address Reserve Component issues until almost 15 months later in a follow-up report, "Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense" December 2002. (37) Although this report was widely praised as breaking new ground in a number of areas, it failed to address stone of the more problematic Reserve issues. The implication by some is that we need to make major farce mix changes to send capabilities and bodies back to the Active Component--but under a rubric of rebalancing. Virtually no one disagrees that rebalancing is required (after all, periodic reassessment of any plan is both prudent and doctrinal) The real question is the magnitude of the rebalancing. Skill and deftness, with the wisdom of Solomon, may be required so that rebalancing does not relegate the Reserve Component to the past.

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE

As Secretary Rumsfeld has noted, in the quote at the beginning of this article, the existing mobilization system and the processes utilized thereunder are less than efficient, but they also limit presidential

options in a new type of war that sometimes requires a quick response. Noteworthy is that each Reserve Component had a different record when it came to mobilization. Some did it very well, others not so well. Nevertheless, this causes a reviewer to first confront an important issue: Is this "inefficiency" actually an important check and balance on governmental action before going to war, even with a doctrine and national security strategy of pre-emption? While force planners strive to achieve maximum efficiency in their planning processes, policy-makers and political leaders should stop to consider the experiences of the nation in and after the Vietnam War, and as well consider the sources of national will and authority in a constitutional republic. Nonetheless, some salient arguments can be made--which cannot be ignored--that are service-specific regarding the Active-Reserve Component balance. Some services have their force mix about right; others may need more than minor rebalancing.

The involvement of the nation and its people during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm surprised many observers who predicted a Vietnam era like popular resistance to that war. The outpouring of popular support caught many pundits by surprise. In part, that public support was attributed to the causes of the conflict and the naked aggression of Saddam Hussein against the Kuwaiti people, lending itself readily to comparisons with Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler. However, it was also significantly due to the mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces and units required to properly conduct a campaign on such a large scale. As foreseen by Abrams and Defense Secretary Laird in the development and evolution of the Total Force Policy, the mobilization and deployment of so many Reserve Component soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, while causing great anxiety among their families, friends, and neighbors also was a source of pride and involvement in the campaign for the average citizen. The Total Force Policy, with a number of other DoD policy changes in the 1980s, had transformed the Reserve Component into an effective fighting force. As Colin Powell stated in reference to Desert Storm Reservists: "We could not have gone to war without them, and they were to perform superbly." (38)

That same civic pride and involvement has supported the deployment and involvement of active and Reserve Component service members in the missions since 1991. From Somalia, to Haiti, to Bosnia and Kosovo, to Afghanistan and Enduring Freedom, as well as guarding the nation's critical infrastructure in Noble Eagle, the involvement of the Reserve Components and members has tended to enhance popular support for those missions, while undercutting dissent and the erosion or political will by opponents to the nation's foreign and military policies. Further, the AVF that is intertwined in the Total Force Policy provides available forces in times of crisis and undercuts the potential for popular resistance to a conscript force and the inherent inequalities that involuntary military service entails.

An administration that ignores or abandons the Total Force Policy and the Abrams Doctrine will have some significant issues to deal with. First is the fact that under the Constitution, the Congress, and not the executive branch, dictates force caps and provides funding for standing forces. (39) If Congress does not participate in the decision to increase the size of the standing regular force, DoD will be forced to make painful choices about which types of forces and in what quantity it will place on active duty and still stay under the force caps mandated by Congress.

Second, if the Defense Department seeks to build a standing force that can be employed and fielded for long periods of time without reliance upon the Reserve Components, it will have to recruit and retain such a force. If that force is kept deployed for long periods of time, individual service member dissatisfaction caused by absences from families and homes may adversely affect retention, depriving the military of a skilled and experienced force that will require less in terms of funds and training to maintain a ready state.

Third, and perhaps most dangerously, the fielding of a large standing force, limited by force caps imposed by Congress, exhausted by an ever-accelerating deployment cycle, without connection to the communities of the nation instead of the relatively remote installations housing the standing regular forces, runs a risk of significant political opposition to use of U.S. military force. Such opposition led in a direct chain of events with the downfall of a sitting U.S. president 35 years ago. The exposure and resulting political turmoil any such administration laces is inherently unhealthy for the nation at-large.

Fourth, when Reserve Component forces are rebalanced as units and organizations that will rarely be used or used only in a limited fashion, they can become a neglected, demoralized force that can atrophy, leading to decreased effectiveness. (40)

Simply adding significant Active end-strength (41) will not solve this problem, as this would not address the need for experienced personnel in the short- to medium-term. The cost to do this is significant and large increases in personnel budgets for the services are problematic at best. With babyboomer retirements looming on the horizon (circa 2010), just as federal budget deficits are erupting and the economy is recovering, there will be increased downward pressure on DoD TOA for the foreseeable future as measurable progress in the global war on terrorism is achieved.

CONCLUSIONS/ RECOMMENDATIONS

Utilizing the Reserve Components properly in the NMS is a substantial link in effectively implementing the new NSS. Historic precedent illustrates that significant changes in the roles, missions, mix or rebalancing of the Reserve must include Congress, the secretary of Defense, the president, services, Reserve Components, and other important stakeholders to be successful and effective. In some cases when there has been significant torte mix or rebalancing, the nation has lost the Reserve Component capability as it waits years to gain Active Component capability. The converse is also true. These initiatives transcend mere PPBS and end-strength actions--sometimes making the problem(s) worse--and contribute to lust capability. The elimination of the Abrams Doctrine does not appear to be warranted or justified. However, we may need to "mend it not end it" with a review of the Total Force Policy, looking at both the positive and negative aspects and develop new options to address the vital concerns of OSD and others, consistent with our historic values and principles. But how we go about doing it may be just as critical.

Throughout its history, America has recognized the critical importance of the Reserve Components in the defense of America. It is incumbent upon this nation to thoughtfully and carefully analyze the Abrams Doctrine (and Total Force Policy) in conjunction with other critical issues regarding the Reserve Components. It cannot be done by executive or legislative fiat; it is far too vital. It is important enough to have a joint commission (executive and legislative branch members, et al.) with some of America's freest citizens to examine critical Total Force 21st century issues. The commission report should define the Reserve Component roles, mission and purpose in transformation for the first quarter of the 21st century. It would look at Total Force Policy adapted to future needs, (42) the Abrams Doctrine and other critical issues for the Reserve Components. The commission will recognize the unique differences of each Reserve Component and make recommendations consistent with those realities. Without a commission we could repeat the mistakes of the past: "... numbers of administrative measures and legislative proposals from a Pentagon ignorant of history will founder on the rocks of American military tradition, using up much political capital and energy that policy-makers can iii afford to lose." (43)

* The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

(1) General Abrams never envisioned that he instituted the Abram's Doctrine. This was a label given by others after the fact. Interview with Dr. Lewis Sorley, Creighton Abrams biographer, Telcon, 15 October 2003. See Winter 2003 issue of joint Forces Quarterly for a history of the Abrams Doctrine by Dr. Lewis Sorley. It has also been called the Laird-Abrams Doctrine because it followed the Total Force Policy announced in August 1970, See Col Randy Pullen, "Keep the Reserves in the Fight," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2003.

(2) Gegax, T. Trent, "Silencing the Reserves", 10 October 2003, <http://www.msnbcom/news/978175.asp>.

(3) Center for Strategic Leadership, Issues Papers 11-02, November 2002, p. 1.

(4) Gross, Charles J., *The Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995).

(5) Tempo refers to the rate of activity or use of military personnel and threes. There are three kinds of tempo: Deployment tempo (DEPTempo), which is caused by the deployment of individuals and units to meet the National Security Strategy (NSS); Operating tempo (OPTEM PO), which is caused by the demands of normal operations that service members Face day to day; and Personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO), caused by the service personnel system. From John C. F. Tillson, *Reducing the Impact of Tempo* (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1999) S-1-S 2.

(6) U.S. Articles of Confederation, Article VI (emphasis added).

(7) U.S. Articles of Confederation, Article VII (emphasis added). As Hamilton, a strong proponent of central authority, noted in Federalist 22, "The power of raising armies by the most obvious construction of the Articles of Confederation is merely a power of making requisitions upon the states for quotas of men. This practice in the course of the late war was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous and to an economical system of defense" *The Federalist No. 22*, at 117 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).

(8) U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Section 8, cl. 12.

(9) See, Note 12, supra.

(10) U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, cl. 16.

(11) More than 90 percent of the Union Army consisted of volunteers. See *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775 1945*, Center for Military History, Washington, D.C.: US Army, 1989.

(12) Among the reasons for this, along with professional jealousy from federal officers, was a political issue: By raising a volunteer militia force from New York, Theodore Roosevelt had propelled himself into the national spotlight and, in short order, to the White House.

(13) This was done in response to an attorney general opinion in 1912 to the effect that the president could not mobilize the state militias for overseas military duty, because the officers were not federal officers under the Constitution.

(14) See, Note 17, supra.

(15) As an example, the 116th Infantry Reg. of the Virginia Army National Guard, a component of the 29th Infantry Div., received orders in October 1940 that the unit would be mobilized in January 1941. Alex Kershaw, *The Bedford Boys* (Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2003), 15.

(16) Sorley, Lewis, *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times*, hereafter *Thunderbolt* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 137.

(17) *Ibid.*, pp. 137-38.

(18) *Ibid.*, p. 138. Abrams's belief in and expertise regarding Reserve Component affairs quickly became renowned not only in the Pentagon but with Congress. *Ibid.*, pp. 138-39.

(19) *Ibid.*, pp. 345-46.

(20) *Ibid.*, p. 347.

(21) *Ibid.*, p. 361.

(22) *Thunderbolt*, p. 361.

(23) *Ibid.*, pp. 363-64.

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 364.

(25) *Ibid.*, p. 365. General Abrams did not have to see his plan fulfilled, dying of cancer in late summer 1974. However, his successors, in particular General Vessey who went on to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, loyally ensured Abrams' plans for force structure innovation were fully implemented.

(26) Summers Jr., Harry G., *On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War* (NY: Dell Publishing, 1992), p.68.

(27) *Ibid.*, p. 69.

(28) *Ibid.*, p. 69.

(29) Philbin, Edward J., Gould, James L., "The Guard and Reserve: In Pursuit of Full Integration," in *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson III (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1985), pp. 46-47.

(30) Note: The process of incrementally upgrading and adding new capabilities to an existing system is

modernization. Recapitalization refers to the replacement of systems with similar or different systems to meet ongoing or emerging mission requirements. However, many times modernization is used as a catchall term that also includes recapitalization. Note: There are service differences with these definitions. For example, the U.S. Army considers the rebuild and selective upgrade to zero time/zero miles as recapitalization.

(31) Handel, Michael I., *Masters of War.* Classical Strategic Thought (London: Franklin Cass Publishers, 2001).

(32) Summers, p. 73.

(33) Note: Prior to circa 1998 it was Presidential Select Reserve Call up (PSRC); after 1998 it was PRC, allowing the president to tap into not just the Select Reserve (e.g., IRR). See Dallas D. Owens Jr., "AC/RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformation's Challenge" (Carlisle, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2001) 25, 57 (Note 48). Title 10, Chapter 10, Section 12304 modified by Public Law 105-261, 17 October 1998 as part of the FY99 Appropriations Bill. <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/12304.notes.html>.

(34) OSD-RA Mobilization Report Data, dated 20 October 2003.

(35) OSD-RA Mobilization Preliminary Report for FY03, October 2003.

(36) OSD/RA 20 October 2003.

(37) See <http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/secondary/annualreports.html>.

(38) Duncan, Stephen M., *Citizen Warriors* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1997), p. 109.

(39) U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, cl. 12.

(40) Pullen, Randy, *Op cit.*

(41) End strength is a manpower term that refers to the number of manpower "spaces" authorized (personnel numbers authorized). Note: Spaces may be authorized but not funded.

(42) Duncan, pp. 226-227.

(43) Goldich, Robert L., "Historical Continuity in the US Military Reserve System" in *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson III (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1985), p. 27.

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