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Sent: Wednesday, November 02, 2005 3:46 PM
To: Principi, Anthony, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Battaglia, Charles, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Schaefer, James, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Cirillo, Frank, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: TALKING POINTS OCEANS AND BRAIN DRAIN
Attachments: Brain Drain Talking Points 2 NOV (2).doc; Oceana Talking Points 2 NOV (2).doc

Mr. Chairman

Below and attached are talking points for the two press interviews tomorrow on Oceana/Cecil Field and the "brain drain" issues.

Two packages will be delivered to you this afternoon, one on each subject. The Oceana/Cecil Field package includes the talking points, Recommendation #193, the draft ltr to Gov Warner, the two oped pieces you have authored, and the schematic showing actions taken and required RE Oceana and Cecil Field.

The "brain drain" pkg has the talking points, a DoD point paper on intellectual capital, and an early August paper on the subject prepared by folks in R&A.



Brain Drain Talking
Points 2 N...



Oceana Talking
Points 2 NOV (2...

David

**Talking Points Regarding "Brain Drain"
November 2, 2005**

Q1. Did the BRAC Commission consider the impact of loss of "Intellectual Capital" in its deliberations?

A2. The potential for losing key scientists, researchers, medical personnel and experienced technicians was of significant concern to the Commissioners. It was an issue we examined closely and a factor we took into account in evaluating the military value of all proposed consolidations/relocations involving **intellectual capital**.

Impact on military value was the **key** we used in our analysis and final deliberations. There is obviously a tipping point where the loss of too many key personnel might make a move undesirable, or in BRAC-speak, "have low military value."

Our assessment is that we will not lose significant numbers of employees in the instances where we concurred with the DoD recommendations that effected **intellectual capital** movement.

Q2. How difficult was it to assess the potential "brain drain" of a specific DoD recommendation?

A2. Whether there would be a "brain drain" and how significant it would be, were **very difficult to assess** because you're trying to predict the future decisions of a very diverse group of individuals. There are many factors that might lead someone to decide to relocate or not. Many factors aren't even directly tied to the employee's position i.e. children's schools, spouse's career, family and climate to name a few.

We looked at many sources of information to make the best assessment possible. We considered the impact of past relocations on research labs, the information provided by the political leadership, community members and

the experience of the Commissioners as well as DoD certified data.

The **potential loss of intellectual capital** existed in many of the DoD recommendations and was seriously taken into account by the Commissioners in our final deliberations.

Q3. Where you concerned about the future employment of the effected individuals?

A3. Yes, however, almost universally, we found that these individuals were highly employable and greatly sought after by private industry. If they decided to leave government, they would be able to choose where they wanted to work.

Our primary concern was the **potential for a negative impact on National Defense** if these key people were placed in circumstances where they decided to leave government service. Their work is vital to our defense in the case of scientists/researchers or our ability to provide quality health care in the case of doctors.

The loss of any significant number of these key individuals could be a **blow to readiness** and was very carefully considered in our deliberations.

Q4. DoD's efforts to create "Centers of Excellence" was but one facet of the issue related to the relocation of "Intellectual Capital" and the potential "Brain Drain" concerns expressed by communities and reviewed by the Commission. Please explain the Centers of Excellence issue as observed during BRAC.

A4. The DoD Technical Joint Cross-Service Group used a strategic framework to establish Centers of Excellence to provide scientific and technical advances to enable DoD to develop capabilities and weapons technologies superior to those of potential adversaries. The Centers are intended to allow more rapid transition of technology and enhance integration of multiple technologies.

Centers were established in three areas:

- (1) Defense Labs,
- (2) Integrated Research, Development and Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation Centers (RDA&T&E). These include Ground, Maritime, Air, and Space Platforms; Weapons and Armaments; and Chemical-Biological Defense Systems, and
- (3) Integrated Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Centers for land, maritime, air and space.

In reality, the large existing centers consolidated like technical tasks from smaller activities. Usually, tasks from two Services were involved but true "purple" (all Services like functions incorporated into mega centers) was not achieved.

**Talking Points Regarding NAS Oceana
November 2, 2005**

Q1. Why was NAS Oceana added for consideration to the BRAC list?

A1 The Commission first learned of the effects of encroachment on the military value of Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana when the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Vern Clark, testified on May 17, 2005. He acknowledged these encroachment issues at NAS Oceana and described his unsuccessful attempts to locate a suitable alternative site including use of U.S. Air Force bases.

On May 24th the Commanding Officer of NAS Oceana briefed the Commission on the detrimental effects of encroachment upon the installation.

The Commission concluded after thorough review and analysis that private and commercial development around NAS Oceana presents a real and present danger to naval aviators and the citizens living near the station. Furthermore, the Commission determined that danger will only increase as higher performance jet aircraft enter into service and congestion increases around the station and Fentress Outlying Landing Field.

In the best interest of our men and women in uniform and the safety of the citizens of Virginia Beach the Commission was compelled to consider if Atlantic Fleet Strike Fighter Wing's operational readiness was threatened by growing residential and commercial development.

Further, the Commission had to consider whether the Navy would be able to continue operating NAS Oceana as a Master Jet Base if the city of Virginia Beach and the state of Virginia did not act on the Navy's often-requested measures to significantly limit and roll back that encroachment.

Both the Navy and the Commission clearly recognized that there was a serious encroachment problem at Oceana that had to be addressed, and that the Navy did not have a solution.

The actions recommended by the Commission would roll back and prevent encroaching residential and commercial development in high-risk areas around Oceana and Fentress and would create satisfactory conditions for continued flight operations at both installations. The impact of such measures would mitigate current delimiting conditions and greatly increase the likelihood of NAS Oceana remaining as the home of the Navy's East Coast Master Jet Base for many years.

Q2. What strength do the BRAC Commission's recommendations have and who has the authority to implement those recommendations?

A2. Should the Congress fail to enact a joint resolution to strike the recommendations within 45 days (that is on or about November 8th) of the date the Congress received the recommendations from the President, the recommendations will have the force of law.

Commission Recommendation number 193 concerning NAS Oceana sets forth conditions that must be met for the installation to remain the Navy's East Coast Master Jet Base. If those conditions are not fulfilled the recommendation provides that the Master Jet Base will move to former NAS Cecil Field if certain conditions are fulfilled by the State of Florida and the City of Jacksonville. If those conditions are not fulfilled, the Master Jet Base remains at Oceana even if the State of Virginia and the cities of Virginia Beach and Chesapeake fail to take the actions required by Recommendation Number 193.

We will have to wait and see what develops.

Recommendation number 193 provides that the Department of Defense Inspector General must decide when and if prescribed conditions are met.

The Department of Defense is responsible for implementing the recommendations of the BRAC Commission.

Q3. What will happen, from here, depending upon whether or not Virginia Beach complies with the stipulations set forth by the Commission to retain the Master Jet Base?

A3. On March 31st of 2006, the Defense Department Inspector General will begin the evaluation and certification of Virginia compliance. The DoD IG report of compliance is to be completed by June 1st, 2006, and forwarded to the President and the oversight committees of Congress. Should Virginia be found compliant with the guidelines stipulated by the BRAC Commission for retaining the Master Jet Base, the Master Jet Base

will remain at NAS Oceana.

If Virginia Beach fails to take the strong, proactive measures necessary to cure the negative effects of encroachment, the men and women of Atlantic Fleet Strike Fighter Wings will continue to experience degraded operational training and readiness, and the local civilian population would suffer continued exposure to unnecessary risks.

From the very beginning of this Commission, we continually placed—as prescribed by law—the military value of each installation and the needs of our men and women in uniform at the forefront of each decision. The thorough training of these naval aviators can make the difference in a split moment when a pilot reverts to instinct in a decision determining the outcome of a mission or even his or her own survival. It is crucial that these instincts, which have been drilled in by countless hours of training, be 100 percent accurate. The better the conditions for training, the more certainty there is of safety and success in peacetime operations and combat. The Commission made the right decision in the interest of those putting their lives on the line for all of us and stopped the hindrance by agendas of a political motive.