

DCN: 12313

**Baxter, Kristen, CIV, WSO-BRAC**

**From:** Scoggins Frank MajGen HQWAANG [Frank.Scoggins@wataco.ang.af.mil]  
**Sent:** Monday, August 22, 2005 1:14 PM  
**To:** 'Kristen.Baxter@wso.whs.mil'  
**Subject:** Fairchild BRAC inputs  
**Attachments:** Fairchild Org Charts.ppt; Draft Associate CONOPS.pdf

Ms Baxter, Gen Fig Newton asked me to send this e-mail to you in order that you could forward it to him. If you have a color printer, the print out will make more sense in color for both the Org Chart powerpoint and this message.

Thanks,  
Frank Scoggins

General Newton,

I have pasted a portion of the Regional BRAC testimony below in order to offer some thoughts on why I personally think the commission should overturn the proposed Fairchild actions. My primary concern is this proposed BRAC movement would have the unintended consequence of diminishing the ability of the nation to go to war and to operate in peace. When you review the testimony below, you will see the end result of the KC-135 movements. A post BRAC assignment of such a large percentage of the remaining refueling force to the Midwest and away from the Pacific routes does not fit into the best interests of the nation. Even if one does not buy into the reasons to keep a unit equipped ANG unit in each state, leaving 38 tankers within a 600 mile radius of Fairchild while placing 158 R models within 600 miles of McConnell cannot be in the best interest of America. Basing a mere 30 aircraft at Fairchild, four of which will be tied to alert, will put a huge strain on the Pacific routes.

I am also attaching an AMC proposed straw man and a DRAFT XO CONOP for how an associate unit at Fairchild would be organized. As you will see, it isn't proposed to be an Associate Unit as we have traditionally thought of them. Because of the deployable nature of the KC-135, a traditional reserve model doesn't fit into the Strategic Air model. If a unit is going to be able to support the AEF, it will need to be able to field a full maintenance package and have intact leadership. As you will see from the DRAFT CONOP, this is solved by taking away all unit structure in ops and maintenance. This proposal would give the ANG an administrative only role. All daily ops and maintenance responsibilities would be active duty, and the AEF scheduling would be done through the active wing. There are no apparent leadership positions in the ANG. At the current time, the 141 ARW is 100% manned with a waiting list of 50 potential KC-135 pilots. Following an "Association" such as the one on this straw man, the WA ANG would be fillers in the active wing, and this "Golden Goose" would cease to exist. I would suggest you read the attachments first prior to reading the text below.


Frank Scoggins

Portion of Portland BRAC testimony:


My third point for you today is to request a reconsideration of the KC-135 basing recommendations as it applies to Fairchild Air Force Base and the entire Northwest. As you know, the air refueling capability

8/22/2005

of the USAF sets this country apart with a Global Reach capability not approached by any other nation. This capability is what allows all other aircraft to be so effective. It allows C-17s to fly non stop to anywhere in the world. It allows us to deploy fighters, bombers, and surveillance aircraft to locations not reachable in any other fashion, and it allows the United States Navy and Marines to operate their aircraft from extended distances. Slides 4 and 5 illustrate the migration of air refueling capability away from the west coast if this BRAC proposal is adopted. As you can see the number of KC-135 unit equipped wings in the western third of the US decreases markedly.



Slide 4




Slide 5

From a military value perspective it is our concern that it is not in the best interest of the United States of America to move these KC-135 force multiplying aircraft away from the west coast. The next illustration demonstrates the impact of flying air refueling missions from McConnell AFB, KS, the other large tanker base, instead of from Fairchild AFB, WA, when going into the Pacific Area of

Responsibility.

## Strategic Significance




### **1,025 Fewer Nautical Miles To Fly Means Greater Capability For Pacific Missions**

- Each Fairchild KC-135 Has Approximately 28,000 Lbs More Fuel To Offload
- Enroute Times Are Approximately 2 Hours, 30 Minutes Shorter

### **Slide 6**

Since much of the Strategic Airlift deploys from McChord AFB, WA and Travis AFB, CA, it would seem prudent to keep more Air Refueling capability in the Northwest. Another factor is the concentration of receivers that utilize the KC-135 aircraft for training on a regular basis. McConnell AFB, KS and Fairchild AFB, WA are slated to be the two large air refueling bases remaining after BRAC. Slide 7 shows the number of receivers and tankers based within the 600 mile overlapping rings of the two bases. Again, it appears that the distribution that is proposed under the current plan does not properly address training needs, Pacific deployments, and Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) responsibilities. Adding to this problem is the alert air refueling requirements in the Northwest. Currently, between the KC-135s based at Portland and Fairchild, there are four airplanes that are required to be on alert at all times. If this BRAC proposal is implemented, over thirteen percent of the aircraft assigned to Fairchild will be tied to an alert line on any given day. In fact, crews of the Washington Air National Guard are providing two of the unit assigned alert aircraft and three of the crews for the alert lines at the current time. Loss of these aircraft would place an even larger burden on the already overstressed active duty fleet at Fairchild AFB. It is apparent that this information was not taken into consideration when the BRAC recommendations were made. With a force of only thirty aircraft, it would be very difficult to provide four airplanes for alert while covering the Pacific deployment and receiver training responsibilities, and still providing aircraft for the Air Expeditionary Force. It is requested that the Commission examine data from the USAF as to how the requirements can be met. Three of these alert aircraft are tied to Homeland Defense. All of these missions are being done with ANG and Air Force Reserve crews and planes. With those assets scheduled to leave, it is essential to ensure that this mission will not suffer under the USAF recommendation.

**Fairchild and McConnell KC-135/Receiver Ratios: 600 NM**



**Slide 7**

The USAF BRAC proposal indicates that Fairchild will be the first base to accept the KC-X follow-on air refueling tanker. The BRAC proposal indicates a basing plan that would place ten of the new aircraft at Fairchild by 2011. This aircraft will undoubtedly bring new capabilities, however, a design has not even been submitted yet, and it is very much an unknown as to when the aircraft will actually be available for basing. It is our contention that it would be unwise to remove aircraft from Fairchild AFB, WA in the beginning stages of BRAC prior to the actual fielding of a new aircraft. If the aircraft is fielded at a later date and it offers new flexibility the reassignment could then be made. In our opinion, it would be detrimental for both cost and efficiency reasons to diminish the Fairchild AFB, WA capacity at this time.

Such a move would serve only to further skew the imbalance. It is our recommendation that the commission direct that the eight unit equipped KC-135s assigned to the Washington Air National Guard be left in place until there is a production delivery and fielding plan for the follow-on aircraft is in place. Fairchild AFB has a capability to accommodate up to eighty-seven KC-135s, and the eight suggested to be left in place aircraft are currently stationed there and fully operational. The unit is fully combat capable and is contributing at full rate to the nation's defense. There would be no cost to this proposal. As this Slide 8 shows, the trend at Fairchild is going in the opposite way than is prudent.

## Fairchild Will Lose nearly 50% Of Its Primary Assigned KC-135s

FY	Active Duty	ANG
2004	36	8
2005	30	8
2006	30	8
•		
•		
•		
2011	30 +?? KC-X	0

### Slide 8

We recommend that the Commission overturn the USAF BRAC recommendation and direct that the eight WA ANG unit equipped KC-135s be left at the 141 Air Refueling Wing, Fairchild AFB, WA. This would adequately solve all three of the issues raised today. That action would maintain a unit equipped flying unit in Washington. This would be in line with keeping the citizen Airman connection with American citizens. The solution would provide an emergency airlift capability to the governors of the Northwest for use in Homeland Security events. While not detracting from their federal use, this would make aircraft available for Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) missions. Finally, this solution would help to offset the projected imbalance of KC-135s based in the Pacific Rim area. This would serve to provide a much better capability to accomplish real world Pacific AOR missions, receiver and tanker training requirements, and projected alert requirements.

End of copied BRAC testimony:

From my perspective, the DoD BRAC recommendation at Fairchild was well intentioned and began with clear objectives. The idea was apparently to keep Fairchild relevant as a premier refueling base as teh first KC-X base because of its large capacity and strategic location. The WA ANG was seen, I believe, as an integral part of the new KC-X mission, and an opportunity was seen to place the UE aircraft from the WA ANG into other units as part of the BRAC force beddown. If the arrival of the KC-X was imminent, that logic could be understood. Since the BRAC proposal was submitted, however, the USAF has announced that there is currently no money projected against the KC-X, and the fielding of any system to replace the KC-135R is years away. The result of that funding reality is the capacity of a very strategically important refueling base will be diminished by at least one-third of what is there today. (46 currently assigned vice 30 post BRAC). Therefore, what I believe began as a well thought out concept has changed because of the lack of a near term path to field the KC-X. When you remove that aircraft from capability stationed at Fairchild AFB, the end result is that the opposite effect of that intended occurs at the base.

One would assume the plan was to maintain the number of personnel at Fairchild in order to

be prepared to take on this new aircraft. The COBRA model numbers indicate the WA ANG will lose all operations and maintenance personnel and a manpower savings would occur. When asked for clarification, this has been explained by the DoD as a COBRA error. The indication was there would actually be no manpower savings. Assuming the ANG personnel remain in place, but no KC-X arrives, this means either the USAF will either decrease the number of active duty crews stationed at Fairchild (not disclosed in BRAC) or there will be the same number of total people at Fairchild maintaining and flying fewer aircraft. If this is the case, this would appear to run counter to BRAC goals because it would make the facility less efficient rather than more so. Even if the USAF programmed this action in the future rather than using the BRAC process, it would seem prudent to have the KC-X funded in the program with an established delivery date and a CONOP prior to taking the action of realigning the unit.

Additionally, the BRAC plan at Fairchild would indicate this action is a realignment because of the proposed movement of two Combat Comm GSUs into "available" facilities at Fairchild. Assuming the 141 ARW would continue to be an AEF deployable wing, there would be no facilities made available. Even if the XO CONOP was implemented, the only facilities that would be made available are on the flight line and not appropriate as Combat Comm facilities. The projected savings would not be realized in that the pre BRAC plan consolidated one GSU onto Fairchild, and the other GSU resides on WA State owned property with no lease costs and modern facilities. In either case, even though it might be a good idea to move the units onto the base in the future, there would be no BRAC cost savings by moving the GSUs as part of this BRAC.

Thanks for listening, and best of luck in this tough assignment.

Frank Scoggins

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# 92 ARW (30 PAA)

AD: 264 / 2074 / 386 / 2724  
 ANG: 14 / 27 / 223 / 264  
 Drill: 116 / 683 / 0 / 799  
 TOT: 394 / 2784 / 609 / 3787

92 ARW  
 AD 24 / 51 / 13 / 88  
 ANG 6 / 11 / 19 / 36  
 Drill 20 / 33 / 0 / 53

92 CPR Sq  
 AD 3 / 25 / 6 / 34

141 STU FT  
 Drill 4 / 4 / 0 / 8

92 OG  
 CC / Group Staff  
 AD 5 / 5 / 2 / 12  
 Drill 8 / 3 / 0 / 11

92 MX Gp  
 CC / Group Staff  
 AD 4 / 17 / 1 / 22  
 Drill 3 / 8 / 0 / 11

92 MSQ Gp  
 CC / Group Staff  
 AD 3 / 3 / 1 / 7  
 Drill 2 / 7 / 0 / 9

92 Med Gp  
 AD 2 / 2 / 3 / 7  
 ANG 0 / 0 / 3 / 3

92 OSS  
 AD 15 / 78 / 10 / 103  
 ANG 1 / 0 / 1 / 2  
 Drill 10 / 15 / 0 / 25

92 AMXS  
 AD 6 / 390 / 1 / 397  
 ANG 0 / 1 / 27 / 34  
 Drill 2 / 55 / 0 / 57

92 CES  
 AD 9 / 190 / 165 / 364  
 ANG 2 / 4 / 2 / 8  
 Drill 4 / 62 / 0 / 66

92 CMN Sq  
 AD 4 / 153 / 6 / 163  
 ANG 0 / 5 / 10 / 15  
 Drill 1 / 36 / 0 / 37

92 ADT Sq  
 AD 19 / 61 / 8 / 88

92 ARS  
 AD 57 / 49 / 0 / 106  
 ANG 5 / 0 / 27 / 32  
 Drill 33 / 34 / 0 / 67

92 MXS  
 AD 3 / 211 / 0 / 214  
 ANG 0 / 0 / 66 / 66  
 Drill 2 / 146 / 0 / 148

92 CON Sq  
 AD 2 / 17 / 18 / 37

92 LGR Sq  
 AD 9 / 297 / 33 / 339  
 ANG 0 / 0 / 38 / 38  
 Drill 5 / 98 / 0 / 103

92 MDO Sq  
 AD 23 / 51 / 17 / 91  
 Drill 16 / 37 / 0 / 53

93 ARS  
 AD 57 / 48 / 0 / 105

92 MXO  
 AD 2 / 56 / 1 / 59  
 ANG 0 / 0 / 15 / 15  
 Drill 1 / 23 / 0 / 24

92 MSQ Sq  
 AD 3 / 33 / 31 / 67  
 ANG 0 / 5 / 8 / 13  
 Drill 2 / 22 / 0 / 24

92 SEF Sq  
 AD 3 / 194 / 13 / 210  
 ANG 0 / 1 / 0 / 1  
 Drill 1 / 59 / 0 / 60

92 MDP Sq  
 AD 8 / 48 / 21 / 77

92 SER Sq  
 AD 3 / 95 / 36 / 134  
 ANG 0 / 0 / 1 / 1  
 Drill 2 / 41 / 0 / 43

# Fairchild SUMMARY

## **92 ARW**

92 ARW – 88

92 CPR Sq - 34

92 OG – 326

92 MX Gp – 692

92 MSQ Gp – 1321

92 Med Gp – 263

## **141 ARW/ANG**

141 ARW – 36

141 STU Ft - 0

141 OG – 34

141 MX Gp – 115

141 MSQ Gp – 76

141 Med Gp – 3

## **141 ARW/Drill**

141 ARW – 53

141 STU Ft - 8

141 OG – 103

141 MX Gp – 240

141 MSQ Gp – 342

141 Med Gp – 53

**Fairchild**

		Active	%	ANG	%	AFF	%
Fairchild AFB, WA	KC-135	30	AD	22.5	75	7.5	25

**BRAC Recommendation:** Realign Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington. The 141st Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will associate with the 92d Air Refueling Wing at Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 141st Air Refueling Wing's eight KC-135R aircraft are distributed to the 185th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Sioux Gateway Airport Air Guard Station, Iowa. The 256th Combat Communications Squadron and 242d Combat Communications Squadron, which are ANG geographically separated units at Four Lakes and Spokane, are relocated into available facilities at Fairchild Air Force Base.

**CONOPS:**

**General:** ANG manpower associating at Fairchild AFB will receive support from the Fairchild AFB host organization.

**Command Relationships:** There will be two distinct chains of command for administrative purposes; ANG and active chains of command will remain separate. Administratively, ANG members continue to report to their parent ANG organization.

**Force Management:** Operations and maintenance integration will occur day-to-day at the functional level through MOUs.

**Safety:** The active duty host unit will be responsible for safety programs involving ANG associate safety issues.

**AEF Rotation Responsibilities:** The active duty host unit will be responsible to meet AEF rotation responsibilities using both active duty and ANG members. The active duty and ANG will each support AEF requirements proportionately.

**BOS:**

**Host:** Fairchild will provide BOS support for all members (active duty and ANG) personnel.

**Financial Management & Comptroller:**

Training requirements for ANG members and all cost of business will be funded by the ANG. The active duty will be responsible for training requirements for active duty members.

Fairchild will be responsible for supporting professional equipment requirements. Funding stream(s) to support requirements to be determined within MOU and advocated for by the appropriate MAJCOM.