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Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Bill Porter [wbpmfp@iwvisp.com]
Sent: Monday, August 08, 2005 7:32 PM
To: Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: Phil Arnold
Subject: BRAC Realignments To China Lake

Attachments: BRAC Recommendations Overview.doc; T&E Issues.doc; EW July 18. Rev



BRAC
Recommendations Overvi



T&E Issues.doc (29
KB)



EW July 18. Rev
(62 KB)

The Honorable Anthony Principi, Chair

Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Principi:

We wish to express our support for the BRAC recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense to create a Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center at China Lake and to realign the Sensors, Electronic Warfare and Electronics RDAT&E from Point Mugu to China Lake. These forward looking recommendations fully support the BRAC goals to position the country's base infrastructure to meet our armed forces needs for the 21st century.

Issues have been raised concerning realignments from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. We sent papers on the issues to the Commission staff and to Philip Coyle. Mr. Coyle replied and suggested that we arrange for all Commissioners to receive our papers.

The papers are attached.

We thank you and all the Commission members for your commitment to a very important and difficult assignment.

Bill Porter
Co-chair China lake Defense Alliance
760-446-1034

--- Forwarded Message
From: Philip Coyle <martha.krebs@worldnet.att.net>
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2005 12:09:07 -0700
To: Bill Porter <wbpmfp@iwvisp.com>
Cc: Phil Arnold <phil@iwvisp.com>
Subject: Re: BRAC Issues

Dear Bill: Many thanks for the attachments. I was unable to join the BRAC Commission staff when they visited China Lake due to a commitment to visit another base the same day outside of California. Also, given the time available, Commissioners have had to give priority to bases proposed to lose personnel due to realignment or closure, while the staff has visited bases proposed to gain.

Having visited China Lake several times over the years, I believe I have an appreciation for the fine work done at China Lake. When I was in the Pentagon and since, I have done my best to champion China Lake and other test ranges whose work is so vital. The quality and scope of the work at China Lake is world class. The people and facilities at China Lake are indeed impressive, and the people there can be justifiably proud of their work.

If you haven't already done so, please arrange for all Commissioners to receive your

attachments. Since the staff already have these attachments, perhaps they could print them out for all Commissioners, and save you a few steps.

Thanks again and best regards,

Phil

July 29, 2005

**China Lake Defense Alliance Summary Comments to the Commission Staff
on BRAC Recommendations Affecting China Lake**

After plowing through the issues and allegations on the Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center and the consolidated Sensors, Electronic Warfare and Electronics RDAT&E Center, we think there can be a danger that the main thrusts of the recommendations can get lost in the details. At least, we were concerned that we might allow ourselves to get so caught up in the minutia that we would lose the big picture that the Technical Joint Cross Service group was painting. Hence, this paper.

To us, the best outcome of the BRAC assessments would have been recommendations for full joint service use of the existing service RDT&E centers, particularly in aviation where the services develop joint requirements and develop joint systems. In the arena of most interest to us, the recommendations to create integrated aircraft and weapon RDAT&E centers in each service was the next best outcome in our opinion. At least at the service level, the assets would coalesce into capable, competent centers able to tackle the problems of applying advanced technology to the military problems of a difficult future. These centers would contribute to the transformation of our military capability for the new century. The Joint Cross Service Group's concerns about nurturing competition of ideas would be served by maintaining centers in each service.

This coalescing of capability is particularly needed in the Navy, which has scattered its weapon RDT&E capability at many facilities despite a long-term reduction in funds for research and technology and development of fewer new systems. One of the pillars of transformation is application of advance technology to meet new threats. Creating the integrated centers focuses resources, but more than that, it focuses the limited funding and supply of brainpower on the problems at hand.

Most people don't want to move, and most organizations don't want to lose people. Everybody is creative in finding reasons why something they see as unpleasant can't or shouldn't be done. During the Commission review phase of BRAC, we're sure that you've heard a hundred reasons why the recommendations shouldn't be accepted, or that the data calls weren't properly formulated or properly interpreted, or why their product is essential to the war effort, and so on. We suggest stepping back and asking the question for each major recommendation, "Does this make sense?" Not each nit, not each difficulty in implementing. Does forming integrated RDAT&E centers make sense? If it does make sense, in our case is China Lake the place to form the integrated weapons and armaments center?

We think the answers to these questions for weapons and armaments are yes. If the answers are yes, the BRAC Commission should approve the recommendation and let the Navy fight out the details, and respond to the naysayers during implementation. There is no doubt that the implementation phase will have plenty of roadblocks and controversy,

but the big decision will have been made to create one integrated center, and the outcome will be an improved capability.

We believe that the Technical Joint Cross Service Group also had a vision for improved integration of the next generation combat aircraft by recommending the relocation of the Point Mugu electronic warfare capability to China Lake. China Lake's record speaks for itself in identifying key problems and creating effective, affordable solutions. This move brings problems that all realignments bring in dealing with a loss of intellectual capital. We strongly believe that the existing electronic warfare capability at China Lake shouldn't be overlooked, but we don't want to give the impression that Point Mugu's team isn't needed for the near term, particularly while the EA-6B remains our main electronic warfare asset.

We think that we should focus first on the long-term goals of BRAC, and if we do, the electronic warfare realignment not only makes sense, but plays an important part in supporting our future air warfare capability – transformation, if you will. We are certain that there are many mechanisms to support the present needs – maintaining personnel at Point Mugu during an extended transition, offering rehired annuitant positions, contracting, etc. while the team is building up in China Lake. The new team would be made up of Point Mugu personnel who move, China Lake electronic warfare experts who have been working in other areas after the work moved from the Lake to Point Mugu, and new hires at the journeyman and entry levels. Remember that China Lake has a superior recruitment record than Point Mugu for reasons discussed in earlier papers, also important for maintaining future capability.

The point is, at the end, if the recommendations hold, a full-spectrum, integrated RDAT&E center will be established at China Lake that is competent in all aspects of weapons and weapons technology, and fully capable of all aspects of aircraft weapon system integration including weapons, sensors, electronic warfare and mission avionics. The integration team will be operating at the very peak of software development competency, Level 5, as rated by the independent Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon Institute.

While it's important to examine every allegation and every assertion, the key is to decide what ultimately makes the most sense for the future. We believe that the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense for weapons and armaments and electronic warfare make the most sense for the future. Don't let issues such as Sea Range personnel stationing or near-term support of the EA-6B obscure the vision of a truly integrated Weapons and Armaments and Electronic Warfare RDAT&E Center to support the joint forces of the future.

Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center Issues on Sea Range Staffing and Support

August 1, 2005

Introduction

The Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) proposed and Secretary of Defense accepted creating an Integrated Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition and Test & Evaluation Center in each service. The recommendation for the Navy was a complex one, affecting 10 bases and creating two specialty centers as well as the integrated center.

Ventura County challenged the recommendation in testimony at the Los Angeles Regional Hearing held by the BRAC Commission on July 14, 2005. The Ventura County challenge alleged significant military value and cost analysis errors, mostly based on an assumption that all or most of the Sea Range personnel and all of the equipment except instrumentation will be moved from the shore installations of the Sea Range to China Lake.

China Lake Defense Alliance Position

The creation of an Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center consolidates human, laboratory and range RDAT&E assets instead of scattering them in enclaves around the country. Consolidation will save money, but more importantly, will efficiently focus the Navy's weapons technological resources at a site with the assets best able to produce advanced weapon systems for the future. Naval aviation weapon systems are one beneficiary of this recommended consolidation because, with the complementary recommendation to focus sensors, electronic warfare and electronics RDAT&E, a closely knit, co-located team will be established to support the fully integrated air combat platforms of the future – the EA-18G, Joint Strike Fighter and versatile uninhabited air vehicles with their weapons, sensors, electronic warfare and other avionics integrated by a close-knit team.

China Lake has the staff, laboratories and ranges to cover most of the needs of an integrated RDAT&E center, but the installation lacks a sea range. The Point Mugu Sea Range, the world's best offshore range, is a vital DOD asset for joint testing of weapons and platforms at sea and must be preserved. Personnel and equipment must be located on shore at Point Mugu and San Nicolas Island to support test needs for air and sea platforms as well as space launches at nearby Vandenberg Air Force Base. The issue is what can move to China Lake to realize greater efficiencies and improved coordination and what must stay at Point Mugu-San Nicolas Island.

The Navy and China Lake-Point Mugu technical managers have the best understanding of Sea Range needs, and they can and will sort out the work requirements during the BRAC implementation phase. They can make transfer decisions that will maintain the Sea Range's operational capability with an efficient division of labor and equipment

between China Lake and Point Mugu. We agree with the Navy official's answer to a General Accountability Office question reported in their July 2005 report on BRAC, "If the recommendation is approved, the Navy will decide the best way to manage the range, including the appropriate number of employees to retain at Point Mugu, during implementation."

Responses to Ventura County Allegations

The Ventura County witnesses made many allegations at the Los Angeles Regional Hearing concerning the percentage of people who will be willing to move, alleged cost errors, and a reference to transformation. Most of these allegations are without merit and don't need to be answered here. A detailed response to each allegation and assertion is contained in another paper submitted to the BRAC Commission Staff on July 28, 2005. Of course the assertion that people won't move is irrelevant since we agree that those personnel needed to operate the ranges should stay where they are.

Assertions. The range cannot function with all of its personnel located at China Lake. The test and evaluation function at the Sea Range covers a variety of missions beyond simply testing weapons with a variety of customers. It makes no sense to base the large patrol aircraft needed to support range operations at China Lake nor to merge the test squadron with the squadron at China Lake at an inland location far from the range.

Responses.

- It is correct that range operating personnel should not be moved from the range. At the present time there are 550 - 600 civil servants and military personnel at Point Mugu assigned to T&E operations, T&E support functions, or T&E management functions. We have made a cursory review of a possible personnel breakout between Point Mugu-San Nicolas Island and China Lake, and the split might be on the order of half at each location. However, it makes sense for the location assignments to be made after careful review and discussions between the technical managers at Point Mugu and China Lake. The decisions can best be made by the technical leadership most familiar with range operations in the context of the overall organization. These decisions should be the first order of business in the implementation phase after BRAC decisions are final.

- Although the Radar Reflectivity Laboratory is not part of the range organization at Point Mugu, we state for the record that we believe this facility should stay at Point Mugu for as long as it can meet the Navy and joint service needs. We don't advocate rebuilding facilities when it makes economic sense to leave them where they are and there aren't long-term military value benefits.

- We take no issue with the statement that the Sea Range has many customers other than weapons and armaments testing. For that matter, China Lake has customers in areas other than weapons and armaments and electronic warfare. Creation of an Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center doesn't preclude Point Mugu Sea



Range personnel from supporting all of the customers they presently serve. The issue is who and what needs to remain at Point Mugu to do the job.

- The several P-3S and C-130S aircraft perform a variety of missions – range safety, surveillance and clearance, target launches, telemetry, command destruct, photometrics, and logistics. While siting these aircraft at China Lake with the high performance test aircraft will provide cost savings by consolidating maintenance operations, it might make more sense to keep the large aircraft closer to their operating area. That decision, like locating T&E personnel, should be made by the China Lake-Point Mugu technical managers at the start of the implementation phase.

- VX-30 and VX-31 were established to support the missions of the two installations when China Lake and Point Mugu were realigned into the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division. In the early years the F-14 was still operational and the test load at Point Mugu was larger than it is today. The VX-30 squadron is much smaller today, and if the two C-130 and three P-3 aircraft are excepted, there are only 6 F/A-18 aircraft of the oldest F/A-18A variety left in the squadron. VX-30 and VX-31 form a small test wing with a staff commanded by a Navy Captain. The administrative burden of an air wing staff is unneeded and costly. The more modern F/A-18 aircraft are stationed at China Lake in larger numbers with a heavier test and evaluation workload. Most tests on the Sea Range can be accomplished from China Lake based aircraft without refueling, but for longer endurance operations, refueling can be accomplished at the Point Mugu airfield from Air National Guard assets or by airborne tankers furnished by the Air National Guard. Merging VX-30 and VX-31 will save money and consolidate assets while eliminating the unnecessary air wing staff. If the decision is made to leave the P-3 and C-130 aircraft at Point Mugu, a detachment can remain there. If the Navy decides a wing organization is needed, the squadron at China Lake can be assigned to the larger test wing headquartered at Patuxent River.

- It is important that issues regarding Sea Range personnel and support not cause distraction from the primary purpose of creating the Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center to consolidate and focus the Navy's scattered weapons and armaments assets.

In summary, range personnel and equipment are and should be based on T&E needs. A BRAC decision to form an Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center will not change the basic needs to support the Sea Range or any other functional element of the center. Decisions and assignments will be made by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N4) in consultation with the Naval Air Systems Command and the management of the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division. The analyses and final recommendations should be made by the China Lake and Point Mugu technical managers best qualified to make good decisions.

July 18, 2005

Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics RDAT&E Relocation from Point Mugu to China Lake

Introduction

The Technical Joint Cross Service Group's (TJCSG's) analysis led to a Secretary of Defense recommendation to relocate the electronic warfare (EW) and related RDAT&E functions from Point Mugu to China Lake. The TJCSG justifies the recommendation with the statement, "Consolidating the Sensors, EW, and Electronics RDAT&E functions at China Lake will eliminate redundant infrastructure between Point Mugu and China Lake and provide for the more efficient use of the remaining assets including the Electronic Combat Range and other integration laboratories at China Lake."

This recommendation has been challenged by the Ventura County Community with assertions that significant errors were made in calculating the costs of the move and that the operating forces would be adversely affected because of major losses of experienced technical experts residing at the Point Mugu site.

Summary of China Lake Defense Alliance Position

BRAC has basically two purposes – (a) reduce excess base infrastructure, and (b) restructure the base infrastructure to best meet future needs. The China Lake Defense Alliance believes that the proposal to consolidate aircraft sensors, electronic warfare and electronics RDAT&E at China Lake supports both BRAC purposes. Consolidating weapons and armaments RDAT&E and combat aircraft system integration including electronic warfare at a single site will enhance both efficiency and effectiveness for a future in which aircraft weapons, sensors, electronic warfare and other mission avionics will be far more tightly integrated than with present combat aircraft systems.

At the present time the Navy's air weapon system integration site for combat aircraft except the EA-6B Prowler is located at China Lake. Electronic Warfare RDAT&E is now sited at two facilities - Point Mugu for most of the electronic warfare development and acquisition (D&A) including the EA-6B and China Lake for most of the sensors and electronics RDAT&E, some of the electronic warfare D&A, and all the sensors and electronic warfare range testing and evaluation.

The Navy has entered development of the EA-18G Growler aircraft, a highly integrated aircraft based on the F/A-18F platform-sensor-electronics suite which will replace the EA-6B. China Lake will be the systems integration center for the new aircraft. Flight testing at China Lake is scheduled to begin in late Fiscal Year 2006, and introduction into service will occur early in Fiscal Year 2009. The EA-6B will be phased out of service as

EA-18G aircraft are produced. The next generation fighter-attack aircraft, the Joint Strike Fighter, is also under development with a highly integrated avionics suite.

Consolidation of sensors, EW and electronics at China Lake will yield a tightly knit, fully integrated team prepared to support development, test, and engineering support for the Navy's combat aircraft. Weapons, sensors, electronic warfare suites, and the software that binds them together will be a fully integrated product for the future. The Technical Joint Cross Service Group had the vision to understand this in offering the recommendations for creation of a Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center and a consolidated Sensors, EW and Electronics RDAT&E Center at China Lake.

By co-locating all elements of the team at one site, operating costs will be reduced, time wasting travel between sites will be eliminated, and superior products will be assured.

Responses to Ventura County Allegations

Allegation. The TJCSG made significant errors in calculating the cost of a move to China Lake and the payoff that would be realized from such a move. The challenge to the costs and payoff summarized in the COBRA analysis was based on a series of assertions.

Ventura County Assertions. The China Lake and Point Mugu organizations have been streamlined over the years for maximum efficiency and no overlap of function. In fact, because of these efficiencies the personnel efficiency factor that should have been used would be zero, rather than the standard 15 percent. Industry has shown the value of maintaining an organization on more than one site to gain a high efficiency.

China Lake Defense Alliance Response.

- The claim that an organization at two sites will be as, or more, efficient than one consolidated at a single site strains credulity to the breaking point. In industry and government, when the size of work forces shrink and product integrity can be enhanced, company sites are consolidated. The present size of the combined work forces of China Lake and Point Mugu is the same as or less than that of China Lake alone in 1990.
- It is true that the Naval Air Warfare Weapons Division has worked hard to improve efficiency and eliminate redundancy by eliminating functional duplication between sites. The common management between China Lake and Point Mugu and contacts between technical personnel across the sites will be a factor in making a smooth transition for relocating personnel.

There is cross-communications between sites, for example on the High Speed Antiradiation Missile (HARM) threat files and the aircraft system integration teams at China Lake. China Lake is responsible for integrating the electronic warfare software into the total operational software packages. On the other hand,

face-to-face discussions between China Lake and Point Mugu requires travel between sites, either by shuttle aircraft or automobile. Aircraft and travel costs are significant, but the loss in time by technical and management personnel is more significant. A trip between sites will cost a half to a full day for each person involved. Co-located personnel would consume only the time involved for the discussions. This cost in time and efficiency is in addition to the \$ 3.8 million per year expended in shuttle aircraft costs and per diem costs for overnight trips.

- The standard personnel efficiency factor of 15 percent was not used by the TJCSG in calculating the cost/payoff time for the move. A factor of 5.7 percent was used without comment on the reason for this inconsistency. We understand that this figure was arrived at jointly by China Lake and Point Mugu management. Using a 15 percent factor, consistent with other similar consolidations, the payoff would be 6 years instead of the 12 years. One may argue over the precise value of the efficiency factor for the EW relocation, but it most certainly was more than zero, and acceptance of a departure from consistency in applying standard factors to the COBRA analysis calls in question analyses of all other realignments.

Allegation. The move would result in an unacceptable loss of intellectual capital, putting our operating forces in danger. In the opinion of the China Lake Defense Alliance this is a much more serious charge than the cost argument since it impinges on military value. There is no question that the Point Mugu EW team is highly qualified, and any moves associated with BRAC must not threaten the continuity of support for the EA-6B platform and EW capabilities of other Navy aircraft.

Assertions. The Point Mugu EW team is a highly capable, experienced team that is needed to support the EA-6B and other EW capabilities in the Navy. Attempting to move these people to China Lake would result in the loss of most of the team, thereby jeopardizing joint forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. The TJCSG ignored important points made by Point Mugu in responding to Question 47 of the data call. Experience in moving personnel from Warminster to Patuxent River in the 1990s showed that most urban personnel are not willing to move to a rural setting.

Responses. This argument bases its logic solely on meeting current capability needs and ignores the BRAC goal of positioning the military base infrastructure for the future. Consolidation of EW capability at China Lake would better position the Navy to meet future needs:

- China Lake is the tactical aircraft system integrator for the F/A-18, AV-8B, AH-1J, has the lead for China Lake-Point Mugu for EW on the Joint Strike Fighter Integrated Product Team, and will be responsible for integration of the next generation Navy EW platform, the EA-18G. Placing the full EW RDAT&E function at China Lake consolidates all of the EA-18G aircraft integration team. The EA-6B is being phased out of service starting in Fiscal Year 2009, about the time that the changeover to China Lake is scheduled in the BRAC recommendations. The EA-18E avionics system will be highly integrated with its EW pod

interacting with the aircraft sensor-avionics suite, including the Active Electronic Steered Array (AESA) radar. The radar itself will be an EW component. The entire weapons, system integration and test team including the Electronic Combat Range (Echo Range) operations would be integrated at one site, China Lake.

The Joint Strike Fighter and any future aircraft will use multiple shared airframe apertures instead of single boxes for avionics systems. The old way of constructing black boxes and sending them to be integrated into the aircraft is not feasible for the future. Attempting to preserve the dual site approach of today will seriously hamper the integration process. Now is the time to prepare for the future.

The transition from Point Mugu to China Lake will be managed to assure that current needs are fully met while bringing the long-term capability on line at acceptable cost.

- The present EW D&A team at Point Mugu is a senior group, and many members of the team will be retiring in the coming years. Bringing new scientists, engineers and technicians on board will be needed whether the team moves or not. The capability of the existing team must be retained insofar as possible while reconstituting its membership with the next generation engineers and technicians. The task, then, is one of managing the transition from the EA-6B to maintain a high competency for the present and near future, transitioning the needed capability for the EA-18G and follow-on platforms, and carrying forward into the future with a highly integrated, highly competent RDAT&E integrated weapons-avionics-EW team for the future.

Responsibility for implementing BRAC realignments lies with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N-4). The Navy understands the importance of the EA-6B, and will not arbitrarily transfer the existing team to China Lake *en masse*, ignoring the losses of those who choose not to transfer. A transition plan will be developed that delays the move for some team members and provides temporary post-retirement employment for others as re-employed annuitants or contractors. In the next few years, as the EA-6B effort tails off and the EA-18G effort grows, the China Lake team will be built from Point Mugu transferees, engineers at China Lake, who have extensive EW and F/A-18 experience, and new hires.

- The responses to data calls, including Question 47, were reviewed by higher command, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). NAVAIR officially supported the relocation from Point Mugu to China Lake.

One must not assume that China Lake and Ridgecrest have little to offer new employees. China Lake has been highly successful over the years, meeting its recruiting goals for both new entry and experienced scientists and engineers. The chart on the next page shows recruiting results for China Lake and Point Mugu since new hiring began in 2001. Ridgecrest offers an environment that can't be found in urban life – low cost housing, low crime, ten minute commute times to work, public safety that is the envy of any city,

and a friendly, relaxed atmosphere. At the same time “big box” merchants and other amenities are located there.

China Lake’s retention rate by Fiscal Year is shown in Table 1. If the BRAC recommendations are accepted, in just a few years, even before the last of the present EW experts retire, the Navy will have one integrated Center of Excellence for all aspects of air weapon systems that operates more efficiently and effectively than at the present two sites. The expertise will extend to weapons and armaments for surface platforms.




Figure 1. Hiring experience for FY 2001 to 3/31/05. The upper part of bar represents experienced scientists and engineers, the lower part recent graduates at the bachelors degree and above.

Fiscal Year	Retention Rate
Present	93.1 %
2004	93.9 %
2003	92.7 %
2002	93.4%
2001	92.9 %
2000	92.5 %
1999	89.9%
1998	86.5 %
1997	89.7 %
1996	88.7 %
1995	90.7 %

Table 1. Retention Rates Since FY 1995.

- The Warminster to Patuxent River experience was cited as an example to show that urban employees would not move to a rural area. As a matter of fact, this interesting example demonstrates the contrary, showing that consolidation can build a strong, full spectrum capability.
 - Data on moves of this type indicate that somewhere between 20 and 35 percent of the employees decide to move. Analysis of this data show a very low percentage of clerical and other lower paid employees choosing to move and a higher percentage of scientists and engineers. Experience has shown that 65 to 75 percent of those who move are skilled professionals and another 10 percent are technicians.
 - Prior to the consolidation, Patuxent River was a T&E base. The skilled R&D personnel who transferred from Warminster formed the cadre who transformed Patuxent River into a full spectrum RDT&E base.
 - The Naval Air Systems Command touts the realignments to Patuxent River as a success story, as well they should. In the military value rankings for aircraft and C4SI RDT&E, Patuxent River ranked high in the BRAC 2005 analyses.
 - At the time the realignment was announced, most Warminster personnel said they would never move. Enough moved, that by transition management, consolidating key people with talented personnel at Patuxent River, and hiring new people, the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division is now a strong full spectrum center.
 - A similar experience applies for the closure of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory in Corona around 1970 with the transfer of personnel and functions to China Lake.

The experience with the Warminster realignment and Naval Ordnance Laboratory closure are examples of the payoff in military value of realignment for consolidation of complementary capabilities.

