

BRAD

July 15, 2005

TO: BRAC Commissioners

FROM : Brad McRee, R&A Sr Analyst, JCS Team

SUBJ: Issues related to Air National Guard – Review of BCEG and Red Team Minutes

Chairman Principi desired for each of you to have a copy of this document in preparation for the Hearings next week.

It gives us a look behind the scenes of the Air Force BCEG as they were developing their plans. Granted that the Red Team comments were made during the process, at the end it appears many of their observations and suggestions were not heeded.

Copies of the full minutes are available if you need them.

Airframes: who do they belong to or how can AF just take C130s?
 In the museum they'd still be ANG assets only placed on active bases for active flyers
 to use? why not just TDY active flyers to base? and activate these planes in
 Enclaves: how do ECS troops who have no flying mission to train a crew?
 with or around... learn to work with flying units? full out
 Sqdn?

REVIEW OF AIR FORCE BASE CLOSURE EXECUTIVE GROUP (BCEG) AND BRAC “RED TEAM” MINUTES

Background: BCEG meeting minutes and comments from the BRAC Red Team¹ have been reviewed. This document describes issues which affect in a global sense the recommendations concerning the Air National Guard (ANG.) The impact to the Guard is significant. Of the 70 ANG installations in the country, 56 are affected by closure or realignment. Flying missions are eliminated at 26 ANG installations. Footnotes will elaborate on key topics.

(The issues will be presented in chronological order. “BCEG” or “RT” after the date denotes the source of the product. Times New Roman font indicates exact quotes from the minutes.)

31 Jan 05 - RT - BRAC Red Team Kickoff Meeting

The purpose of this meeting was to ensure that the charter, work products, and schedule for the group were understood by all.

22 Feb 05 - BCEG - Minutes

Discussion within the BCEG about “**potential for Future Total Force² initiatives using ANG assets** realigned under BRAC 2005.”

25 Feb 05 - RT - BRAC Red Team Discussion Topics

This was the Red Team review of all DoD BRAC work performed up to this point.

Key points follow:

¹ **Red Team Purpose:** In the latter stages of the DoD BRAC development, the Department engaged a small group of executive-level former government officials. Called the “Red Team,” this group was asked to provide an independent assessment of candidate recommendations. The Red Team met with each Military Department and JCSG. It reviewed candidate recommendations, report drafts, and supporting materials. The team’s insights provided valuable feedback and suggestions for improving the quality of the candidate recommendation packages relative to the standard by which the Commission may alter the Secretary’s recommendations.

² **Future Total Force (FTF):** The published objective of FTF is “to produce a smaller, more capable, more affordable Air Force composed of Active, Guard, and Reserve Airmen by recapitalizing the force and changing organizational constructs in a way that defends, deters, and defeats every adversary in any future challenge.”

Military Judgment - The Red Team said that all services should clearly explain military judgment when used to override military value. They noted at that time the frequent use of military judgment in overriding military value. The Red Team also wanted more guidance on what Military Judgment includes.

Weights determining Military Value - The Red Team noted that the weights³ determining Military Value are inconsistent - that they mix function value with installation value.

Consolidations with long paybacks - The Red Team said the following:

“Many consolidations have long paybacks and high MILCON requirements for new construction with weak justifications for receiving site selection and clear exclusion of other service potential receiving site consideration.

- o A payback of Never or 100+ years without a very strong argument/justification will threaten the credibility of the BRAC process.
- o Many realignments lack ties to force structure requirements or military value improvement and appear to only justify new MILCON.”

8 Mar 05 - BCEG - Minutes

This is the first reference found on the issue of **Manpower Savings**. A “given” going into BRAC was that net end strength for the ANG would remain the same. Thus it would be inappropriate to claim manpower savings through the realignments and closures. The recent **GAO Report**⁴ also has much to say on this issue.

³ **Weights and the MCI:** The Air Force developed what is known as a Mission Capability Index (MCI). The MCI was applied to each of the 154 bases in the Air Force inventory. Each base was evaluated based on a system considering the potential use of various weapon systems in mission categories such as tanker, fighter, bomber, airlift, etc. and weighted accordingly. Unlike the way the other services treated their reserve components with respect to BRAC... active, guard and reserve bases were all evaluated using the same criteria. The criteria favored larger bases. Several points are to be made here concerning the ANG. 1) ANG installations operate under National Guard Bureau (NGB) caps concerning ramp size, building square footage, acreage and the like. They are inherently “right-sized.” 2) Some of the questions dealing with airspace, routes and ranges are simply not appropriate to the way we train and fight today. 3) The questions had seemingly arbitrary thresholds and allowed for little differentiation between the smaller sized installations.

⁴ **GAO Report:** This July 2005 report from the GAO noted that the majority of the net annual recurring savings (60 percent) are cost avoidances from military personnel eliminations. The report further states “However, eliminations are not

The following is a quote from the BCEG minutes:

(Pease) “back-briefed the 4 March 2005 ISG. He raised the issue of whether manpower nominally assigned to Base X should be counted under BRAC as savings for reinvestment. He noted the ISG assigns manpower savings on active forces as available for reinvestment.”

9 Mar 05 - RT - First Meeting of the Red Team with the Air Force BCEG

This meeting began with a review of the Air Force goals:

“ • BRAC 2005 Goals were to maximize warfighting capability by **optimizing squadron size⁵**, **increasing crew ratios⁶** and **adjusting Active/ARC mix⁷**, to realign infrastructure to meet future defense strategy by **sustaining air superiority and air sovereignty⁸** and accomplishing mobility basing, to maximize operational capability by eliminating excess capacity, and to capitalize on joint activity opportunities.”

The following are questions from the Red Team followed by answers from the BCEG:

- “ • Why is 24 the optimal squadron size for fighters? (Salomon)
- Is the Guard on board?⁹ *Absolutely, we are freeing up manpower for new roles.*

expected to result in reductions to active duty, Air reserve, and Air National Guard end strengths, limiting savings available for other purposes.”

⁵ **Optimal Squadron Size:** There are apparently reports on this issue that the BRAC staff has not yet seen. The ANG units in the field do not think that the optimal number of aircraft in a squadron is the same for the ANG as compared to the active component.

⁶ **Crew Ratios:** The Air Force wants more access to ANG aircraft for active duty crews. In their BRAC proposal, this is being achieved by two ways. One way is to transfer ANG assigned aircraft to active units. The other way is to establish more associate units in which active personnel are assigned to Guard bases.

⁷ **Active/ARC Mix:** In a meeting with the BCEG co-chairs on 1 Jul 05, BRAC staff were told that the mix of the C-130 fleet was changing from 31% of the fleet Active to 43% of the balance Active after BRAC.

⁸ **Air Defense:** It is unclear to the BRAC staff what degree of knowledge NORTHCOM had about the final Air Force BRAC recommendation. Units in the field have raised concerns that the current proposal has significant risks.

⁹ **Is the Guard on Board?:** There was an ANG general officer on the BCEG. He was a representative of the National Guard Bureau (NGB). According to the Adjutants General, they had little to no knowledge of the plans being developed. The Governor's likewise were not consulted. They have claimed these plans will seriously hamper their capability to perform the State mission of the ANG. On 1

(Johnson)

- Why leave numerous ECS enclaves?¹⁰ *The ECS units are tasked separately from the fighter squadron and don't go with the mission. They provide general support – CSS.*

(Johnson)

- How do you define realignment? *If more than one-third of non-mission personnel is left, then it is a realignment. If remaining non-mission personnel is less than one-third, then that is considered an enclave. Did you exceed the rest of the base? Yes, and reducing the footprint sometimes created a cost.*¹¹ (Johnson)

- The Red Team has found it difficult to track goals, principles, imperatives, strategies, etc. and the application of military judgment. Be prepared to describe the dependencies or interrelationships between goals, principles, your strategy, and your military judgment. The candidate recommendations are supposed to be strategy-drive, data-verified and this needs to be apparent in your presentation and articulation.

- The decision process needs to be well documented and when you present to the Commission, you should have a chart that explicitly demonstrates how decisions were made.

- Make a chart that displays and rationalizes (with data support) optimum squadron sizes. For those recommendations where you do not reach the stated optimum, you need to explain why not in your justification. Failing to give such an explanation undermines your entire process.

- Numerous candidate recommendations, like the sample on Slide 38, used the justification that the action “enables future total force transformation”. This requires further explanation.

- May want to incorporate a before and after type slide into presentation that demonstrates which bases have new types of planes, which is significant from a maintenance perspective.¹²

Jul, BCEG officials told BRAC staff that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) likewise was not consulted or informed.

¹⁰ **Enclave:** This is a new term which describes an ANG base which no longer has a flying mission. This enclave sustains the remnant of a unit consisting of what is known as “**Expeditionary Combat Support**” or **ECS**. These are the security forces, engineers, and other support personnel who may be called upon to deploy to support Air Expeditionary Forces or AEFs.

¹¹ **Reducing the Footprint:** When asked what they knew about this proposal in the field, installation commanders had no knowledge other than the fact that NGB staff were visiting to verify dimensions of buildings and land. It was unclear what was meant by expressions such as “pulling back the fence line.”

- Create a backup chart that demonstrates how many pilots are affected by C-130 movements (Slide 45), how many pilots are assigned to a new base and how many have a new mission.¹³
- Review recommendations with large MILCON and “Never” paybacks.
- The purpose of BRAC is to reduce excess capacity. Strengthen rational and justification of all recommendations by explicitly linking actions to the Air Force’s overall strategy, to the Force Structure Plan, and/or to BRAC Selection Criteria. This is necessary to avoid the appearance of using BRAC money for new MILCON to get Air Force situated and to overcome the Commission’s potential hostility surfacing from small political actions.¹⁴
- Many of the recommendations include leaving expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements in an enclave. For many of them, they cite the need to “retain intellectual capital” as the justification for retaining an enclave. We need an explanation as to why these elements cannot be moved allowing for a total base closure. Especially as in the case of USAF-0033V2 (Slide 66) – where receiving location is 12 miles from losing location, and yet, an enclave is left behind.
- For those recommendations that involve the movement of aircraft from an installation with a high military value to one with a lower military value (e.g. USAF-0037 – Slide 72), we need a better explanation as to why this movement fits into the overall strategy. If “military judgment” was used, we need to know which aspect of military judgment.

¹² **Dissimilar Aircraft Types:** Consideration apparently was given to F-16 “Block” types although some units took exception here. Other units noted the consolidation of various types of aircraft with more subtle differences. For example, F-15s have two different types of engines and C-130 H2s and C-130 H3s have different maintenance and flight crew requirements.

¹³ **Pilot and Maintenance Personnel Retention:** Information from the field suggests that the impact on retaining trained personnel will be huge. Many say less than 20% of flight crews will follow the aircraft and even fewer maintenance personnel will. A Clearinghouse question is being answered now on exactly what cost estimates were used in COBRA models for this. This anticipated loss of seasoned and experienced personnel will place a significant demand on training schools. The time required to train these new personnel will likely degrade combat capability of the unit for some time.

¹⁴ **MILCON:** Base officials and political office holders have taken pains to note the significant MILCON being completed or recently completed at many of the bases visited. An example is a \$24M hanger at Nashville, TN. In the final stages of construction, it won an Air Force excellence award for its innovation.

- Be careful when stringing recommendations together – commission will look at the recommendations individually.¹⁵
- Need to solidify/disentangle your strategy, goals, imperatives, and principles. Statements on the bottom of Slides 3 and 11 really seem to be your strategy – as opposed to the reduction of capacity or to save money. If this is true, Slides 48 and 49 are irrelevant as your stated goal was not to save money.
- Military value analysis is distinct from all other groups who determined military value by mission or function of an installation. USAF appears to do military value analysis by warfighting platform rather than by installation mission or function. Since military value is not based on installation value in support of the total force structure, there are several military values for a base depending on which platform one is using.
- Several of the recommendations include the movement of aircraft¹⁶ that seem to be tangentially related (at best) to the core of the recommendation. Why are these movements rolled up as part of a candidate recommendation? Can't they be done outside of the BRAC process?
- For the most part, the AF candidate recommendations seemingly do not involve the disposal of property. If property is excessed, it needs to be apparent in quad charts or at least in the one-page recommendation description. If property is not excessed, why not?
- USAF-0039: The wing is inactivating and all the aircraft are retiring, but there is MILCON, why? Why do the ECS elements remain? Why are Sioux Falls, SD and Gulfport-Biloxi, MS part of the community impact sheet when there is no mention of anything moving from/to those locations?
- USAF-0081: Review the legality¹⁷ of “realigning in place”.
- USAF-0086: What is the real rationale for moving out a ANG wing, and then transferring its aircraft to another wing at the same base? “Enables Future Total Force Transformation” is insufficient justification.”

¹⁵ **Stringing Recommendations Together:** These notes show how candidate recommendations were combined so that a closure saving a significant sum of money would carry other recommendations which on their own saved very little or were actually costs.

¹⁶ **Movement of Aircraft:** Many have noted that the Air Force recommendations are mainly about moving aircraft and not reducing excess infrastructure. The process of moving aircraft can be done in a “**Programmatic**” venue and does not need BRAC authority to accomplish it.

¹⁷ **Legality of Recommendations:** Certainly Governors, Legislators and even BRAC Counsel have noted legal concerns about the Air Force recommendations.

10 Mar 05 - BCEG - Minutes

Another discussion of **Manpower Savings**. Quote from minutes follows:

“Mr. Jordan briefed Manpower Savings and Reinvestment for information. (Slides 105-112) He noted the overall need for consistency in the categorization of manpower (slide 112)”

In this same meeting, it became evident that the BCEG was determined to do some realignments and closures even though standing alone they were a cost instead of a savings. A quote from the 10 Mar 05 meeting follows:

“Mr. Pease presented, for information, a strawman business model to justify non-payback Candidate Recommendations (Slides 138-142)”

As of 10 MARCH **32** closures or realignments were actually 20-year NPV **COSTS**. They included:

BRADLEY
PITTSBURGH
BEALE
CAPITAL
MARCH
ELMEDORF
WILLOW GROVE
RICKENBACKER
ROBINS
KEY FIELD
SPRINGFIELD-BECKLEY
NEW CASTLE
YEAGER
RENO
NASHVILLE
EGLIN
PORTLAND
SCHENECTADY
INDIAN SPRINGS
BIRMINGHAM
ANDREWS
DOVER
SELFRIDGE
LAMBERT
NEW ORLEANS
SEYMOUR JOHNSON
MOUNTAIN HOME
KULIS

HILL
LUIS MUNOZ
HANCOCK
AND MAXWELL.

14 Mar 05 - RT - Red Team Discussion Topics
The following quotes speak for themselves:

“ • Definitions

○ Enclaves – Size of enclaves differ. How small is small? (AF ECS-Expeditionary Combat Support units)

• Consistency of Approach

○ There is no consistency in approach taken in military value analysis.

Overall, some groups imbed military judgment within the military value calculation, while others apply military judgment to the results of military value calculation (i.e. – *ex ante* vs. *ex post* application of military judgment.)

USAF does military value analysis by platform rather than by installation mission or function. Since military value is not based on installation value for support of total force structure, there are several military values for a base depending on which platform one is examining. USAF would have been more consistent by using installation functions and/or missions.

○ There is no consistency in approach taken in capacity analysis.

USAF defines capacity based on the difference between actual squadron size and optimum squadron size.

Possible Actions:

• Definitions

○ Send out common definition of an enclave and limit the size without higher approval. The groups need to have a benchmark such as “less than 31 people” to help them define small.

• Differing Approaches

○ Capacity Analysis – carefully review Air Force use of capacity analysis and ensure it is converted to mission or function support capacity.

○ Transformational Options

Either decide on a formal list and publish it or take them off the table and direct groups to stop citing them.

29 Mar 05 - BCEG - Minutes

It is still clear that at this point that the BCEG was determined to do certain Candidate Recommendations (CRs) even though they offered only costs or little savings. This is a quote from that meeting:

“Pease back-briefed the 28 March IEC meeting. He noted sister service candidate recommendations costed as longer payback were inferred as undesirable.” (Heckman) “noted that candidate recommendations with no, or long payback should be rejustified with a clear statement providing a nexus to enable the candidate recommendations.”

31 Mar 05 - BCEG - Minutes

BCEG correctly recognized there is some distinction between programmatic and non-programmatic. See the following quote:

“Pease discussed manpower as non-programmatic BRAC action vs. programmatic regarding computation of savings (Slide 14). Note that references to deactivation of ANG wings are to be deleted, as BRAC is not relevant to the ultimate disposition of ANG wings.”

This is another example in the same minutes:

“Upon deliberation, the Rickenbacker Realignment was cancelled due to it being a purely programmatic vice BRAC action.”

6 Apr 05 - RT - BRAC Red Team Meeting with Infrastructure Executive Council

“ • Potential Weaknesses

- Many candidate recommendations do not need BRAC authority to implement
 - All candidate recommendations that have payback periods greater than 20 years could be considered substantially deviating from the final selection criteria in that the COBRA model only evaluates up to 20 years”
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7 Apr 05 - BCEG - Minutes

The decision was apparently made by the BCEG at this point to reverse their earlier position regarding manpower savings and to show it in the COBRA. The quote from the minutes follows:

“The BCEG discussed principles for the reexamination of scenarios. The BCEG noted that Base X savings results should be analyzed to capture cost savings. Manpower must follow iron in Active, Reserve, and Guard components.”

18 Apr 05 - RT - BRAC Red Team White Paper
Comments speak for themselves:

“Main Issues to Discuss:

- The BRAC Red Team believes the Air Force presentations give the perception that in many cases the Air Force is using BRAC only to move aircraft and gain MILCON funding rather than reducing excess infrastructure.

Causes of the Perception:

- Air Force goals for BRAC 2005 appear to focus on operational requirements rather

than reduction of excess infrastructure capacity under the BRAC Law.

- Military value analysis has uniquely been done by platform as opposed to by installation or supporting function—which results in multiple military values for the same installation and the need to override military value results.
- Military capacity has been redefined to be the difference between current and optimum squadron sizes rather than functional support capabilities.
- Proposals appear to use BRAC to determine where FYDP aircraft changes should be implemented and use BRAC funds to make the changes without including associated savings under BRAC.
- Many of the aircraft changes are already reflected in the FYDP and any resulting savings have been taken.
- BRAC actions should result in savings in installation and personnel costs.
- As currently reflected, most Air Force actions do not result in savings and do not require the BRAC provisions.

- Proposals show personnel position savings while allegedly not reducing overall end strength.
- Even though number of aircraft is coming down, Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) groups are left almost everywhere with no defined mission.
 - Perception supported by answers to questions: ECS groups are used to maintain “end strength” in search of missions.
- In many cases, military value is being overridden by Air Sovereignty Alert requirements, Active Reserve Component (ARC) mix, and recruiting demographics¹⁸—need to show how these are tied to the Force Structure Plan and/or the Final Selection Criteria.

Potential Solutions:

- Given that each installation has multiple military value rankings, it is imperative that recommendations that are inconsistent with the ranking of installations for the platform in question be fully justified.
- The underlying rationales for the Air Force’s method of determining military value and capacity (including optimal squadron sizes) need to be carefully articulated and well supported.

¹⁸ **Recruiting Impacts:** Units being closed or realigned note two key points in this regard. First, some of the units slated for reductions have over 100% actual strength. They have good demographics for recruiting. Secondly, a strength of having 88 dispersed flying units in the ANG is the related “hometown connection” and associated support of the **Abram’s Doctrine**. The Abram’s Doctrine philosophically strengthens the Total Force Policy, ensuring national resolve in a conflict.

- If the moves are accomplished under BRAC, all savings and costs must be reflected under BRAC—other mission and personnel requirements should be paid for outside BRAC (can use BRAC savings).
- Provide better explanation of the role of Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) units.
 - All savings must be part of BRAC—savings can then be applied to other missions.
- Recommendations citing maintenance of ARC mix need to be supported by documentation that explains why the ARC mix is important and how maintaining the proper mix supports the Force Structure Plan and/or Final Selection Criteria.”

18 Apr 05 - RT - Second Meeting of the Red Team with the Air Force BCEG Again, Comments speak for themselves:

“• USAF had not originally taken savings for people in the same way the other groups and services were, but we have since gone back and recalculated savings associated with manpower and personnel to be more consistent with the other groups.

Questions that arose:

• You have a lot of “Red” in the Northeast – losing sites or bases being closed – have you discussed this with NORTHCOM? *Absolutely, NORTHCOM is on board.*

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- Be careful when discussing people vs. billet savings vs. authorized positions. If you take savings for eliminated billets or authorized positions, should show that these positions go off the books or reprogrammed.
- “AF Goals for BRAC 2005” are not obviously linked to DoD BRAC goals (Slide 2).
- BRAC is about reducing excess capacity – your AF Installation map will look about the same after BRAC, which will open you and DoD up to criticisms.
- Explain up front that you are using BRAC to determine action for aircraft disposal in compliance with the Force Structure Plan. However, aircraft retirements really do not need to be BRAC actions.
- You want to make sure that you are not moving from installations with higher military value to lower ranked installations.¹⁹ Given that each installation has multiple military value rankings, it is imperative that recommendations that are inconsistent with the ranking of installations for the platform in question be fully justified.

¹⁹ **Military Value and MCI Rankings:** Even with the flaws of the MCI ratings, in some cases, decisions were made to plus up bases with lower rankings for questionable reasons.

- The underlying rationales for the Air Force’s method of determining military value and capacity (including optimal squadron sizes) need to be carefully articulated and well supported.

- Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS)
 - Need chart explaining
 - what functions or MOSs ECSs cover,
 - how an ECS is allocated,
 - when they deploy,
 - what mission the ECS is charged with,
 - how ECSs support Homeland Defense,
 - and explains why DoD needs to have ECSs at numerous bases.
 - If these are already programmed changes – why are they being done under BRAC? Need to explain up front that Military Value analysis done in BRAC aides the determination of where programmed reductions in aircraft occur. But also need an explanation for why people reductions are not occurring under BRAC.

- Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA)
 - Explain what the ASA sites are and why BRAC is required to make changes—why are they a new mission?
 - Create a chart that lays out the requirements for coverage.
 - Ensure that NORTHCOM agrees with sites and are on the same page.

- Recommendations citing more suitable recruiting demographics in one location over another need to be linked to a supporting document with recruiting data across all installations.

- Recommendations using maintenance of ARC mix need to be supported by documentation that explains why the ARC mix is important and how maintaining the proper mix supports the Force Structure Plan or Final Selection Criteria.

- “Capturing Intellectual Capital” is unusual terminology, use more descriptive wording.

Additional observations to consider:

- Should have a reason for why USAF is not reducing end strength as part of BRAC.

- Ensure that savings for FYDP actions completed as part of BRAC are accounted for in accordance with the BRAC statute and/or OSD policy.”

26 Apr 05- BCEG - Minutes

This again shows how the BCEG combined closures and realignments in such a way as to allow the big savers to compensate for the ones which on their own were NPV 20-year costs to the DoD. The quote follows:

“All Air Force Candidate Recommendations need to be complete by 1200 On April 29. The IEB staff is directed to complete remaining business cases for the “losers” with losers defined as candidate recommendations that fail to generate net present value cost savings within the BRAC timeframe.”

As an example, in the minutes it was shown how Ft Smith, AR and Luke AFB were “bundled” together to produce net savings. The justification was “common receiver location (Fresno).”

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