

The following would be needed for the Coast Guard resources (CG Station, 3 179' Patrol Boats, 210' Medium Endurance Cutter) that are currently located on NAVSTA Pascagoula to remain in the event the NAVSTA is Closed:

1. Physical Security Improvements (fence, lighting, etc.) - \$600K
2. Roadway/access modifications -\$400K
3. Utility modifications (if required) - \$300K
4. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with local fire department

Total cost - \$1.3M non-recurring

Estimate \$1M per year in recurring funding for facility management (i.e. security, grounds maintenance, etc.)

CAPT TODD GENTILE

(504) 495 - 2304

Command Brief for

Commissioner H.W. Gehman, Jr.


ADM (Ret), USN


Base Realignment and Closure Commission

16 June 05



**NAVAL STATION
PASCAGOULA**





LAKESIDE SUPPORT FACILITY VISITORS' QUARTERS
7-1/2 MI FROM BASE: 33 ACRES; 434 PERSON CAPACITY (514 MIL NECESSITY SURGE CAPACITY)

ON-ISLAND PERMANENT PARTY BO
200 PERSON CAPACITY
(INCLUDES 100 "SAILORS ASHORE")

LAKESIDE SUPPORT FACILITY & ON-ISLAND BQS

- \$25.4 mil MILCON project H-596 for 160 units underway
- PPV conversion expected Sep 06

- Design/construct awarded Jun 02



UNITS

- 74 - 3BR JR ENLISTED 1,342 SQ FT
- 20 - 3BR SENIOR PERS 1,536 SQ FT
- 6 - 4BR JR ENLISTED 1,610 SQ FT
- 60 - 4BR SENIOR PERS 1,802 SQ FT

160 UNIT FAMILY HOUSING COMPLEX (I-10 & HWY 57; 18 MI FROM BASE) - 75 ACRES

NAVSTA PASCAGOULA MISSION CAPABILITIES

**Enable Warfighter readiness by providing support
to the Fleet and to Sailors**

- **Ship support**
 - 680’ double-deck pier (utilities on lower deck), east and west wharfs
 - Built in ’92, expanded in ’00; can support 5.5 cruiser equivalents
 - “Hotel” services include power, water, sewerage, certified steam, oily waste, hazardous waste disposal, phone, cable TV, fiber data lines, truck/barge fueling (from Mobile)
 - Pierside berth rated 30,000 lb net explosive weight (NEW) Class 1.1 ordnance w/o waiver; 2 - 30,000 lb NEW Class 1.1 mags; 1 - 5,000 lb NEW Class 1.3 small arms mag; safe haven; not VLS certified
 - Turning basin/sea detail are LHD (Amphibious Assault Ship (Multi-Purpose)) capable; 11.6 nautical mi (NM) to open sea; 38’ x 350’ channel
 - Ship repair capabilities include Navy’s Southeast Regional Maintenance Center (SERMC) and 20 major shipyards/repair facilities w/in 150 miles; 3 CG (Guided Missile Cruiser) capable drydocks w/in 60 miles
 - Helo pad

NAVSTA PASCAGOULA SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

Enable Warfighter readiness by providing support
to the Fleet and to Sailors

- **Other support areas**
 - Fleet & Family Support Center
 - Morale Welfare & Recreation
 - Bachelor Housing
 - Family Housing/Rental Referral
 - Navy Exchange
 - Religious Programs
 - Career Counselor
 - Navy College Programs
 - Video Teletraining/Classroom Facilities
 - Security/Military Working Dog
 - Hazardous Waste (HAZWASTE) Disposal
 - Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Management/Consolidated Hazardous Material Reutilization and Inventory Management Program (CHRIMP)
 - Limited Legal Services
 - ID Card Facilities
 - Telephone/Cable TV
 - Public Works
 - Safety Programs
 - Environmental Compliance

STATS & DEMOGRAPHICS

- **Physical plant**

	<u>On Island</u>	<u>Lakeside</u>
- Plant value:	\$110 mil	\$30 mil
- Critical backlog:	\$112 K	\$1.1 mil
- Building sq ft:	324 K	211 K
- CBQ racks:	200 (100 Sailors Ashore)	434 (could surge to 514)

- **Personnel**

	<u>MIL(Navy)</u>	<u>MIL(USCG)</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>NAF</u>	<u>CONT</u>
- NAVSTA	166		100	55	20
- Tenants	266	44	12	7	13
- Homeported ships	<u>763</u> (3 ships)	<u>156</u> (4 ships)	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
On-island pop	1,195	200	112	62	33
- SUPSHIP/Precoms	<u>483</u> (avg)				
Total area pop	1,678				

HOMEPORATED UNITS

- **DESRON-14 Homeported units**
 - USS THOMAS S. GATES (CG 51)
 - Decommissioning FY06
 - USS STEPHEN W. GROVES (FFG 29)
 - Navy Reserve Force, Active (NRFA)
 - USS JOHN L. HALL (FFG 32) - *Capt present*
- **USCG Atlantic Area Command Homeported units**
 - USCGC DECISIVE (WMEC 629)
 - USCGC SHAMAL (WPC 13)
 - USCGC TORNADO (WPC 14)
 - USCGC TEMPEST (WPC 2) Crew
 - Expected ship arrival Oct/Nov 05

CG - Guided Missile Cruiser

FFG - Guided Missile Frigate

WMEC - Medium-Endurance Cutter

WPC - Patrol Coastal Cutter


TENANTS & SUPPORTED UNITS

- **Tenants ashore**
 - Destroyer Squadron SIX (DESRON - 6)
 - Southeast Regional Maintenance Center (SERMC)
 - Navy Distributed Common Ground System – Unit TWO (DCGS-N 2)
 - USCG Multi-Mission Station
 - USCG WPC Maintenance Augment Team (MAT)
 - Branch Health Clinic (BRHEALTHCLINIC)
 - Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Jax Det
 - Multiple Unit Tactical Training System (MUTTS)
 - Navy Exchange Retail Store & Gas Station
- **Other supported units**
 - DESRON - 14 (Mayport)
 - Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, U.S. Navy (SUPSHIP) Gulf Coast
 - Precommissioning units (PCU) of ships constructed at Northrop Grumman Ship Systems (Ingalls Operations)

STATION MILESTONES

- 1985 - Approved as strategic homeport
- 1988 - Construction begins
- 1991 - First on-island facilities occupied
- 1992 - Base becomes operational w/ first ship (USS GALLERY)
- 1994 - BRAC-93 gains (DESRON, NAVSTA Mobile FFGs)
- 1996 - AEGIS cruisers (CGs) homeported
- 1997 - Smart Base demo
- 1998 - USCG relocations to NAVSTA (multi-mission base and cutter)
- 1999 - Lakeside Support Facility transfer from SUPSHIP
- 2000 - West wharf extension becomes operational berth
- 2001 - USS COLE weapons offload
- 2003 - Acquired deed to entire Singing River Island
- 2004 - USS TICONDEROGA and USS YORKTOWN decoms; WPCs homeported

SUPPORTED MIL POPULATION



- ACT NAVSTA
- ACT SS/PRECOM
- PROJ NAVSTA
- PROJ SS/PRECOM
- FY05+ REDUCTIONS DRIVEN BY CG DECOMS (-1,111)
- SLIGHTLY MITIGATED BY USCG GAINS (+100)

FACILITIES PROJECTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION

160 Unit Family Housing	H-596	\$23.4 mil	FH,N&MC	90%
✓DCGS-N Facility	P-390	\$6.6 mil	MC,NR	10%
IDS/IR Perimeter Security	C2-01	\$755 K	OM,N	98%
USCG MAT Facility	08-M04233	\$580 K	USCG	50%

ENVIRONMENTAL

- **Relatively recent construction minimizes environmental issues**
 - Designed and constructed to current standards
 - 99.99% asbestos free
- **Island has no sites of archeological/historical significance**
 - Island created by dredge material disposal – mostly beginning late-60s
- **No on-island disposal sites, past or present**
 - Base construction began late-80s (post-NEPA)
- **Approx 188 acres of wetland along base shoreline**
 - 3 acres are mitigation areas established to offset wetland development
 - Wetland areas taken into consideration in base development plan
- **Base located within an air quality attainment area**
 - All point-source emissions have been permitted
 - No other emission levels established

DESRON - 6

MISSION STATEMENT: DEDICATED SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, AND EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR COMBATING AND COUNTERING NARCO TERRORISM (CNT). DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS AND PROCEDURES TO ASSIST IN OUR NATION'S WAR ON DRUGS.

FUNCTIONS/TASKS:

- EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR COUNTER NARCOTICS
 - CNT YEARLY SUMMIT
 - CNT QUARTERLY WORKSHOPS (MAYPORT)
 - CNT OPS DEPLOYER READINESS TRACKING
- UNITAS ATLANTIC
- UNITAS PACIFIC
- PANAMAX
- UNITAS AMPHIBIOUS PHASE
- HEXALATERAL WAR GAME
- TEAM WORK SOUTH
- CONTINGENCY PLANNING
- MULTINATIONAL PASSEX(S)
- SOPA PASCAGOULA

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DESRON-14 WARSHIPS

- **Strategic Arm of Naval Station Pascagoula**
 - USS THOMAS S GATES (CG 51) – decom FY06
 - USS JOHN L HALL (FFG 32)
 - USS STEPHEN W GROVES (FFG 29)
- **Missions**
 - Maritime Homeland Defense platforms for Gulf of Mexico
 - Support to Operation NOBLE EAGLE
 - Independent Deployers for:
 - Fleet Response Plan
 - Counter Narco-terrorism
 - Standing NATO Maritime Group
 - UNITAS

★

NAVAL STATION PASCAGOULA SUPPORT TO DESRON-14 WARSHIPS

- **Naval Station Pascagoula Ship Support**
 - Medical / Dental
 - Hazmat / Supply
 - Public Works (Pier Services and Support)
 - SERMC (Maintenance)
 - Security (Pier / Waterborne)
 - Firefighting (Quick Response)
- **Manpower in the community**
 - 3 crews of approximately 800 Sailors
 - New Orleans to Pensacola


SERMC PASCAGOULA

MISSION

- **Provide intermediate level maintenance (between Ship's Force capability and Shipyard capability) to units assigned and passing through the Gulf Coast Region**
- **Tasked by Memorandum of Agreement btwn DESRON-14 and SERMC Mayport to function as DESRON-14 executive agent in Pascagoula**
 - Administer/manage transient personnel
 - Provide material and tech assistance to DESRON-14 staff
- **Maintain repair capability equal to ship loading**
- **Disestablish when determined by higher authority (roll back to SERMC Mayport)**

DCGS-N 2

- **Navy Distributed Common Ground System – Unit TWO**
 - Hardware procured in FY03 defense bill (\$14 mil)
 - Reserve project P-390 funded in FY04 MILCON (\$6.6 mil; includes SCIF)
- **USNR Space and Network Warfare Program (SNWP) provides TS/SCI cleared operators to fuse national and tactical data for congressionally mandated Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)**
- **Gulf Coast MDA demonstration in Aug 05**



DCGS-N 2

DCGS-N is the ISR&T component of FORCEnet that supports all levels of the Command and Control decision process

MISSION/FUNCTIONS:

- OPNAV and FFC have stated there is no Navy reqmt for a Reserve DCGS-N system
- DCGS-N program is Navy component of overall DoD DCGS architecture
- Merges ISR&T, mission planning, and situational-awareness functions into a web-enabled, net-centric, joint-interoperable architecture
- Architecture includes Littoral Surveillance System (LSS) per congressional direction:
 - Manned by USNR and sponsored by OPNAV N71
 - Currently two LSS systems manned by USNR SNWP
 - DCGS-N 1 located Whiteman AFB, MO
 - Systems focused on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)

BRANCH HEALTH CLINIC

MISSION -- Force Health Protection: Promote and restore the health of our Sailors and Marines, families, retired veterans and all others entrusted to our care, anytime, anywhere.

FUNCTIONS & TASKS

- Military Dental and Medical
- Family Health Service
- Occupational Health
- Health Promotions
- Basic Radiology
- Moderate Complexity Lab
- TriCare
- Pharmacy
- Medical Boards

SUPPORTED UNITS

- NAVSTA and shore tenants
- Homeported ships
- USCG units
- SUPSHIP and PCUs
- NOAA

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FISC JAX DET PASCAGOULA

- **Mission: Deliver combat capabilities through logistics**
- **Products & services**
 - Warehousing (DTO only)
 - Material Receipt
 - Simplified Acquisition
 - GSA Scheduling
 - Material Expediting
 - DLR Support
 - Subsistence Prime Vendor
 - Medical Prime Vendor

FISC JAX DET PASCAGOULA

- **Customers**
 - New Orleans, LA to Panama City, FL
 - USS THOMAS S. GATES (CG 51)
 - USS STEPHEN W. GROVES (FFG 29)
 - USS JOHN L. HALL (FFG 32)
 - Precommissioning Units (DDG, LHD, LPD)
 - Coast Guard Cutters & Station
 - USCGC DECISIVE (WMEC 629)
 - 3-WPC's leased from Navy
 - SERMC
 - Naval Station
 - SUPSHIP

SUPSHIP

MISSIONS

- **ADMINISTER NAVY SHIPBUILDING CONTRACTS**
- **DELIVER SHIPS**
 - Administer Navy And Other DOD Shipbuilding, Design, Conversion and Facility Contracts
 - Provide on-site Project Management for Shipbuilding Programs
- **LIFE CYCLE SUPPORT FOR SHIPS IN SERVICE**
 - Provide Planning SUPSHIP Services for CG 47 Class Ships
 - Administer Expanded Planning Yard Support Services Contract for CG 47 and LPD 17 Class Ships
- **SHIP PROGRAM OFFICE ON-SITE REP**

SUPSHIP/PCU SUPPORT

LAKESIDE SUPPORT FACILITY

- **1963 – Constructed as union retirement home**
- **1979 – “A” Bldg leased by SUPSHIP/NAVSEA to house PCUs**
 - Lower cost alternative to per diem
 - Crew integrity and administrative control
- **1987 – Navy purchases entire facility**
 - SUPSHIP owns and operates in addition to shipbuilding mission
- **1998 (FY99) – Ownership transferred from SUPSHIP to NAVSTA**
 - Installation claimant consolidation (ICC) rollup reduced number of major claimants owning/operating BOS functions
 - SUPSHIP mission management no longer distracted by BQ issues
 - NAVSTA and regional program directors provide BOS expertise:
 - Force Protection program resourced increased post-9/11 security requirement
 - BQ program attains Zumwalt 5-Star accreditation
- **2005+ – Continuing ship construction in FYDP creates ongoing requirement for PCU berthing and protection**
 - DDG, LHD, LPD, possibly USCG

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USCG STATION

- **Personnel: 36 active duty, 11 reserves**
- **Boats:**
 - 1 - 47' Motor Lifeboat
 - 1 - 41' Utility Boat
 - 1 - 25' Response Boat
- **Facilities:**
 - Station:
 - Previous station destroyed by Hurricane Georges
 - 20K sf facility completed in 1999
 - Duty section berthing, work spaces, galley, training areas, operations center
 - Includes covered boat docks (~8K sf)
- **Coast Guard Operational Missions:**
 - Responds annually to:
 - 100 Search and Rescue Cases
 - 180 legacy law enforcement boardings annually
 - 100 High Interest Vessel arrivals
 - Protects Maritime Critical Infrastructure of Port of Pascagoula

USCG STATION AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY



USCG CUTTERS (WPC)

WPC 179's (Patrol Boats)

- USCG TORNADO (LEASED FROM USN UNTIL FY08)
- USCG SHAMAL (LEASED FROM USN UNTIL FY08)
- USCG TEMPEST – CUTTER ARRIVAL EARLY FY 06

Personnel:


- Crews of 26
- 9 Pers Maint

Augment Team

Area of Operations:

- Gulf of Mexico
- Caribbean Basin

Missions: Living Marine Resources, Counter Drug Operations, Migrant Interdiction, Homeland Security Operations



USCG CUTTER (WMEC)

USCG DECISIVE - 210' MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTER

Personnel:


- 83 Active Duty
- 1 Reserve


Area of Operation:

- Gulf of Mexico
- Caribbean Basin

Missions:

- Living Marine Resources, Counter Drug Operations, Migrant Interdiction, Homeland Security Operations





**DECISIVE
PREFERRED BERTH**

**STATION
PIER**

**WPC 179s
PREFERRED BERTH**

**WPC 179 MAT
NEW FACILITY SITE**

**WPC 179 MAT
TEMP FACILITY**

STATION

**LOCATIONS OF USCG
UNITS & FACILITIES**

QUESTIONS





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Infrastructure Analysis Group

Scenario DON-0002
Close NS Pascagoula, MS;
Relocate to NS Mayport, FL;
Enclave Options for
Lakeside Support Facility
and DCGS-N2
Criterion 5 – COBRA

20 December 2004

Jack Leather

CDR Ed Fairbairn



Scenario Description

- **Close all base operations at Naval Station Pascagoula, MS.**
- **Relocate 2 FFGs to Naval Station Mayport, FL to include required personnel, equipment, and support.**
- **Consolidate SIMA Pascagoula, MS with SIMA Mayport, FL.**
- **Consolidate FISC Jacksonville, FL, function FISC Jacksonville DET Pascagoula, MS with FISC Jacksonville, FL.**
- **Disestablish NAVDENCEN Gulf Coast Pensacola, FL, function Branch Dental Clinic NS Pascagoula, MS.**
- **Disestablish NAVHOSP Pensacola, FL, function Branch Medical Activity Pascagoula, MS.**
- **CGs at Naval Station Pascagoula will remain until decommissioned through FY06.**

Enclave Options:

- **None**
- **Lakeside Support Facility**
- **DCGS-N2**
- **Both**



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DON-0002 Enclave Scenarios Summary

Scenario	One-Time Costs	Steady-State Savings	ROI Years	20 Year NPV
No Enclave (DON-0002)	11.16	-47.42	Immediate	-651.14
Lakeside Support Fac.	10.23	-45.78	Immediate	-637.89
DCGS-N2	12.01	-41.93	Immediate	-574.94
Both	11.04	-43.76	Immediate	-610.08

All Dollars shown in Millions

Notes:

Recurring cost difference without Lakeside Support Facility Enclave includes \$4.5M for per-diem for pre-commissioning Crews.

Overall Limited One-time Costs due to small transfer of personnel (2 FFGs and support)



Disposition of Billets/Positions

Scenario		OFF	ENL	CIV	STU	TOT
DON-0002*	Eliminate	34	398	108		540
	Move	30	382*	2	0	414
Lakeside*	Eliminate	34	398	79		511
	Move	30	382*	2	0	414
DCGS-N2	Eliminate	34	398	80		512
	Move	30	370	2	0	402
Both	Eliminate	34	398	51		483
	Move	30	370	2	0	402

Notes:

Eliminate Base Operating Support

Move Shipboard Personnel

Partially Move FISC (2 Civilians)

*Transfer 12 Full-Time Reservists to man DCGS-N2 (formerly JFNU-2)



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One-Time Costs/Savings Summary

One-Time Costs/Savings FY 06 - FY 11									
Scenario	Const	Pers	Ovhd	Move	Other	Total Costs	Svgs	Net Costs	
DON-0002	0	4.78	2.30	2.45	1.63	11.16	0.74	10.42	
Lakeside Supp. Fac.	0	4.01	2.36	2.23	1.62	10.23	0.74	9.49	
DCGS-N2	0	4.01	2.34	2.17	3.58	12.10	0.72	11.38	
Both	0	3.25	2.27	1.96	3.56	11.04	0.72	10.32	

All Dollars Shown in Millions

Notes: PERS – Civilian RIF, Eliminate Military PCS

OVHD – Program Mgmt Costs

Move – Military and Civilian Personnel

Other – HAP

ENV (air permit for paint/blast booth)

MOA with USCG for Maint of PCs. (.2M/yr 06-08)

1-Time Savings: Military Moves

Enclaves: Both - Establish DSN Keys and switches.

DCGS-N2 – Secure connectivity to Bellsouth switch; Fence Upgrade



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MILCON Summary

Scenario: DON-0002	NAVSTA MAYPORT FL			
All Enclave Options		NONE		

Note: All Dollars Shown in Millions

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Recurring Costs/Savings Summary

Recurring Costs/Savings FY 06 - FY 11						
Scenario	O&M	Mill Pers	Other	Total Costs	Svgs	Net Costs
DON-0002	5.37	12.36	28.46*	46.20	-284.23	-238.03
Lakeside Supp. Fac.	5.37	12.36	1.49	19.22	-258.17	-238.95
DCGS-N2	5.38	12.36	28.46*	46.21	-258.03	-211.82
Both	5.38	12.36	1.49	19.23	-249.31	-230.08

All Dollars Shown in Millions

Notes:

*Estimated cost of Per-Diem for pre-comm crews that would use the Lakeside Facility



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Enclave Issues

- **Lakeside Support Facility**
 - **COBRA Summary**
 - The Lakeside Support Facility Enclave appears less cost effective than per-diem option by \$1.5M/year
 - COBRA calculations for enclaves result in peculiar nuances
 - **Per-diem Option**
 - NAVSTA Ingleside indicates an adequate quantity of lodging is available if the Lakeside Support Facility Closes.
 - The Quality of Service impacts of closing this facility should be weighed
 - Unit Cohesion – Morale of pre-comm crews may be impacted if they are spread all over town
 - **Establishing the Enclave will allow future non-BRAC decision**
 - Privatize / Contract the entire operation
 - PPV
 - Future closure as newer smaller crewed ships (DD(X), LCS) start being built
- **DCGS-N2 Facility**
 - **MILCON Appropriated; contract award Sep 04; construction not started**
 - **Operationally, appears this can be relocated, except for possible synergy with other local assets (FBI, MS State Ports authority, USCG)**
- **Retention of enclave(s) may result in undesired growth**



Key Elements of Recurring Savings

Scenario: DON-0002		
Element	Description	Total Recurring Savings (\$M) FY06-FY11
(* Indicates recurring savings will occur to year 2025)		
SRM*	Closed 0.46M SF of facilities	11.1
BOS*	Closed the base Deactivated base(Enclave Options)*	19.5 2.1/2.1/2.0
MIL/CIV Salaries/BAH*	Eliminated 540 Billets Eliminated 511/512/483 Billets (Enclave Options)	254.7 243.1/243.0/234.3
Misc Recurring*	Dredging every 18 months no longer required -SIMA Mayport no longer has to send personnel TAD to Pascagoula for Availabilities	1.2 0.3

Notes:

MIL/CIV Salaries/BAH vary due to personnel left behind (not eliminated)

*BOS savings vary due to enclave costs – note that COBRA model adds back fixed BOS with enclave options; this is a significant portion of BOS on a very small base such as NAVSTA Pascagoula.



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BACK-UP SLIDES

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Lakeside Facility Community Impact Data

HOUSING PCU CREWS FULLY ON THE ECONOMY: It appears that housing full PCU crews will have a noticeable, but not drastic, impact on the local community's short-term housing market. There are 2,205 rooms in Jackson County's hotel/motel facilities. The Chamber of Commerce reports vacancy rates running between 15% and 35%. Assuming 95% of the rooms are suitable, there will be 314 to 733 rooms available at any given time. If Lakeside is closed, transient personnel needing to be housed on the economy will vary from 104 to 456 personnel. They will exceed the minimum excess capacity (314 rooms) over half the time during FY06-FY11, but this will be a problem only when the vacancy rate has been driven below 22% by normal market forces. So, in general terms the impact can be characterized as noticeable but not drastic.



Agency Impact Data

- **US Coast Guard**
 - **NAVSTA Pascagoula**
 - Several U.S. Coast Guard units are located onboard NAVSTA Pascagoula - specifically, a multi-mission USCG station and three USCG cutters.
 - The units pay only for the direct costs they generate (utilities, tugs, building maintenance, etc.).
 - If NAVSTA were to close and the property revert to the local community, the USCG units could experience increased costs due to the policies of the new "landlord."
 - **THESE COSTS, HOWEVER, CANNOT BE ASSESSED WITHOUT INVOLVING THE COMMUNITY DIRECTLY IN A BRAC DISCUSSION**
- **SIMA Pascagoula, MS**
 - In July 04, VCNO and USCG Vice Commandant signed an MOA to transfer five Navy coastal patrol craft (PC) to USCG custody and operational control.
 - The transfer occurred at the beginning of FY05 and will remain in effect at least through FY08.
 - One element of the agreement is that the Navy will continue to fund and accomplish maintenance, including maintenance performed by SIMAs (now SERMCs) at the crafts' homeports.
 - Two of these craft (with a third to follow) have been homeported at NAVSTA Pascagoula.
 - If NAVSTA is closed and SIMA realigns, some renegotiation of the agreement may be required to clarify SIMA-accomplished maintenance responsibilities.



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Scenario Issues

- **Navy is in process of establishing Defense Common Ground Station-Navy 2 (DCGS-N2) (Formerly JFNU-2)**
 - Unit outfitting funded and construction commenced (not broken ground)
 - Staffed by reserve personnel. RESFOR will have to revisit home basing plans for this deployable unit.
 - Recommendation follows
- **Lakeside housing area support for Pre-comm Unit Crews**
 - Existed prior to NS Pascagoula establishment. Taken over by NS Pasc.
 - 33 acre area provides low-cost BQ housing alternative for pre-comm crews
 - Recommendation follows
- **Additional facilities on line since 03 baseline would increase total SF**
 - Must maintain same baseline of data for BRAC
- **Disposition of USCG Assets – MOA for Maintenance (0.2M FY 06-08)**
 - Addressed as one-time cost through FY08
- **CFFC**
 - Prefers scenario option to send ships to Mayport (DON-0002)
 - Limited excess capacity in Norfolk, more excess in Mayport
 - Mission operations mainly in Caribbean; Mayport closer to OPAREAS.



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Defense Common Ground Station-Navy 2

- **Proposed Reserve Maritime piece of Homeland Defense**
- **Units are scalable command posts which network with multiple information sources at all security levels for homeland defense**
- **DCGS-N not specifically required to be at a particular location**
 - System designed to be deployed in response to a threat or attack
- **The Navy requirement for this mission has not been defined**
- **FY-04 MILCON P390 (\$6.1M) establishes a Littoral Surveillance System (LSS) Facility to house DCGS-N2**
 - Facility includes Vehicle and other storage, classrooms, SCIF and admin spaces. Also includes a phased array antenna area.
 - Award in Sep 04, has not broken ground
 - Temporary facility just completed with SCIF to accept DCGS-N2 unit
 - “Long Range plan for Pascagoula has Navy, Coast Guard, MS Port Authority and FBI using the JFNU-2 (DCGS-N2) facility”
- **Recommendation**
 - High interest in Homeland Defense Mission should be proactively addressed to ensure complete evaluation of this BRAC scenario
 - Flag level liaison with USCG and NORTHCOM to address future of USCG in Pascagoula and alternative locations for JHOC and DCGS-N2
 - Develop Scenario to enclave DCGS-N2 as alternative to relocation



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Lakeside Facility

- **Naval Station Pascagoula scenario data updated to reflect full impact of cost and savings associated with closing this facility.**
- **Approx. 290 Room BOQ facility – 490 personnel max capacity**
- **Partially utilized housing for Pre-comm crews at Ingalls Shipbuilding**
- **Reimbursable funding by NAVSEA (per-diem costs)**
- **Portion of NAVSTA manning supports facility**
- **Security (manning) requirements have increase since facility was first established (pre USS COLE and 9/11)**
 - **Per-diem option may now be more cost effective**
- **Recommendation**
 - **Develop alternate scenario to establish Lakeside Facility as an stand-alone enclave. Compare costs with the per-diem costs resulting from the complete closure scenarios**



Joint Fires Network Unit – 2

Data

- **The Navy is in the process of establishing the Naval Reserve mission Joint Fires Network Unit-2 (JNFU-2) at NAVSTA Pascagoula. Unit equipment outfitting has already been funded and construction of the facility is underway. If NAVSTA is closed, the reserve force will have to revisit its home-basing plans for this deployable unit. (Note: The unit will be staffed by reserve personnel except for a minimal staff that will be on-site full time.)**
- **Future location of Joint Fires Network Unit (JFNU) must be addressed. JFNU-2 is independent Tenant of NAVSTA Pascagoula and new MILCON facility is under construction. Unit is a component of FORCENET and is member of jointly fielded Tactical Exploitation System. Long-range plan at Pascagoula has Navy, Coast Guard, MS Port Authority and FBI using the JFNU-2 facility.**



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NAVSTA Pascagoula, MS Lakeside Facility



**Lakeside
Facility**

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
Recurring Costs/Savings Summary


Recurring Costs/Savings FY 06 - FY 11						
Scenario	O&M	Mil Pers	Other	Total Costs	Svgs	Net Costs
DON-0001 Norfolk Receives	1.46	15.3	33.00	49.80	-288.95	-228.48
DON-0002 Mayport Receives	5.37	12.36	33.00	50.73	-287.13	-225.97

All Dollars Shown in Millions

Notes:

Reflects rates for BAH, TRICARE, BOS computations which vary at the receiving bases
Estimated cost of Per-Diem for pre-comm crews that would use the Lakeside Facility







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Scenario
DON-0001 & DON-0002
Close NS Pascagoula, MS;
Relocate to NS Norfolk, VA(0001)
Relocate to NS Mayport, FL(0002)
Criterion 5 – COBRA
UPDATE

7 December 2004

Jack Leather

CDR Ed Fairbairn



Department of the Navy

Infrastructure Analysis Group

Scenario Descriptions

- Close all base operations at Naval Station Pascagoula, MS.
- Relocate 2 FFGs to Naval Station Norfolk, VA(Mayport, FL) to include required personnel, equipment, and support.
- Consolidate SIMA Pascagoula, MS with SIMA Norfolk, VA(Mayport, FL).
- Consolidate FISC Jacksonville, FL, function FISC Jacksonville DET Pascagoula, MS with FISC Norfolk, VA(Jacksonville, FL).
- Consolidate NAVDENCEN Gulf Coast Pensacola, FL, function Branch Dental Clinic NS Pascagoula, MS with NAVDENCEN MIDLANT Norfolk, VA(SOUTHEAST Jacksonville, FL).
- Consolidate NAVHOSP Pensacola, FL, function Branch Medical Activity Pascagoula, MS with NAVMEDCEN Portsmouth, VA(NAVHOSP Jacksonville, FL).
- CGs at Naval Station Pascagoula will remain until decommissioned through FY06.

NOTE – scenario now includes entire effect of closing the Lakeside Housing Facility



ROI Summary

Scenario	One-Time Costs	Steady-State Savings	ROI Years	20 Year NPV
DON-0001 (Norfolk Receives)	11.40	-55.77	Immediate	-652.4
DON-0002 (Mayport Receives)	11.40	-55.45	Immediate	-645.8

All Dollars shown in Millions

Notes:

Limited Costs due to small transfer of personnel (2 FFGs and support)



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Disposition of Billets/Positions

Scenario	OFF	ENL	CIV	STU	TOT
DON-0001	Eliminate	34	398	108	540
DON-0002	Move	30	382	2	414

Notes:

Eliminate Base Operating Support

Move Shipboard Personnel

Partially Move FISC (2 Civilians)

Transfer 12 Full-Time Reservists to man DCGS-N2 (formerly JFNU-2)



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One-Time Costs/Savings Summary

One-Time Costs/Savings FY 06 - FY 11								
Scenario	Const	Pers	Ovhd	Move	Other	Total Costs	Svgs	Net Costs
DON-0001 Norfolk Receives	0	4.78	2.30	2.73	1.59	11.40	0.74	10.66
DON-0002 Mayport Receives	0	4.78	2.30	2.45	1.63*	11.16	0.74	10.42

All Dollars Shown in Millions

Notes: PERS – Civilian RIF, Eliminate Military PCS

OVHD – Program Mgmt Costs

Move – Military and Civilian Personnel

Other – HAP

***ENV (air permit for paint/blast booth @ Mayport)**

MOA with USCG for Maint of PCs. (.2M/yr 06-08)

1-Time Savings: Military Moves



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MILCON Summary

Scenario: DON-0001	NAVSTA NORFOLK VA			
		NONE		
Scenario: DON-0002	NAVSTA MAYPORT FL			
		NONE		

Note: All Dollars Shown in Millions



Recurring Costs/Savings Summary

Recurring Costs/Savings FY 06 - FY 11						
Scenario	O&M	Mil Pers	Other	Total Costs	Svgs	Net Costs
DON-0001 Norfolk Receives	1.46	15.3	13.89	33.00	288.95	-255.95
DON-0002 Mayport Receives	5.37	12.36	3.54	33.00	287.13	-254.13

All Dollars Shown in Millions

Notes:

Reflects rates for BAH, TRICARE, BOS computations which vary at the receiving bases
Estimated cost of Per-Diem for pre-comm crews that would use the Lakeside Facility



Key Elements of Recurring Savings

Scenario: DON-0001 & 0002		
Element (* indicates recurring savings will occur to year 2025)	Description	Total Recurring Savings (\$M) FY06-FY11
SRM*	Closed 0.46M SF of facilities	11.1
BOS*	Closed the base	19.5
MIL/CIV Salaries/BAH*	Eliminated 540 Billets	254.7
Misc Recurring*	Dredging every 18 months no longer required	1.2
	-SIMA Mayport no longer has to send personnel TAD to Pascagoula for Availabilities	0.3

Notes:

MIL/CIV Salaries/BAH vary by receiving location

SRM & BOS savings increase from previous brief due to Lakeside Facility now being included in closure



Agency Impact Data

- **US Coast Guard**
 - **NAVSTA Pascagoula**
 - Several U.S. Coast Guard units are located onboard NAVSTA Pascagoula - specifically, a multi-mission USCG station and three USCG cutters.
 - The units pay only for the direct costs they generate (utilities, tugs, building maintenance, etc.).
 - If NAVSTA were to close and the property revert to the local community, the USCG units could experience increased costs due to the policies of the new "landlord."
 - **THESE COSTS, HOWEVER, CANNOT BE ASSESSED WITHOUT INVOLVING THE COMMUNITY DIRECTLY IN A BRAC DISCUSSION**
 - **SIMA Pascagoula, MS**
 - In July 04, VCNO and USCG Vice Commandant signed an MOA to transfer five Navy coastal patrol craft (PC) to USCG custody and operational control.
 - The transfer occurred at the beginning of FY05 and will remain in effect at least through FY08.
 - One element of the agreement is that the Navy will continue to fund and accomplish maintenance, including maintenance performed by SIMAs (now SERMCs) at the crafts' homeports.
 - Two of these craft (with a third to follow) have been homeported at NAVSTA Pascagoula.
 - If NAVSTA is closed and SIMA realigns, some renegotiation of the agreement may be required to clarify SIMA-accomplished maintenance responsibilities.



Scenario Issues

- **Navy is in process of establishing Defense Common Ground Station-Navy 2 (DCGS-N2) (Formerly JFNU-2)**
 - Unit outfitting funded and construction commenced (not broken ground)
 - Staffed by reserve personnel. RESFOR will have to revisit home basing plans for this deployable unit.
 - Recommendation follows
- **Lakeside housing area support for Pre-comm Unit Crews**
 - Existed prior to NS Pascagoula establishment. Taken over by NS Pasc.
 - 33 acre area provides low-cost BQ housing alternative for pre-comm crews
 - Recommendation follows
- **Additional facilities on line since 03 baseline would increase total SF**
 - Must maintain same baseline of data for BRAC
- **Disposition of USCG Assets – MOA for Maintenance (0.2M FY 06-08)**
 - Addressed as one-time cost through FY08
- **CFFC**
 - Prefers scenario option to send ships to Mayport (DON-0002)
 - Limited excess capacity in Norfolk, more excess in Mayport
 - Mission operations mainly in Caribbean; Mayport closer to OPAREAS.



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Defense Common Ground Station-Navy 2

- **Proposed Reserve Maritime piece of Homeland Defense**
- **Units are scalable command posts which network with multiple information sources at all security levels for homeland defense**
- **DCGS-N not specifically required to be at a particular location**
 - System designed to be deployed in response to a threat or attack
- **The Navy requirement for this mission has not been defined**
- **FY-04 MILCON P390 (\$6.1M) establishes a Littoral Surveillance System (LSS) Facility to house DCGS-N2**
 - Facility includes Vehicle and other storage, classrooms, SCIF and admin spaces. Also includes a phased array antenna area.
 - Award in Sep 04, has not broken ground
 - Temporary facility just completed with SCIF to accept DCGS-N2 unit
 - “Long Range plan for Pascagoula has Navy, Coast Guard, MS Port Authority and FBI using the JFNU-2 (DCGS-N2) facility”
- **Recommendation**
 - High interest in Homeland Defense Mission should be proactively addressed to ensure complete evaluation of this BRAC scenario
 - Flag level liaison with USCG and NORTHCOM to address future of USCG in Pascagoula and alternative locations for JHOC and DCGS-N2
 - Develop Scenario to enclave DCGS-N2 as alternative to relocation



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Infrastructure Analysis Group

Lakeside Facility

- **Naval Station Pascagoula scenario data updated to reflect full impact of cost and savings associated with closing this facility.**
- **Approx. 290 Room BOQ facility – 490 personnel max capacity**
- **Partially utilized housing for Pre-comm crews at Ingalls Shipbuilding**
- **Reimbursable funding by NAVSEA (per-diem costs)**
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 - **Per-diem option may now be more cost effective**
- **Recommendation**
 - **Develop alternate scenario to establish Lakeside Facility as an stand-alone enclave. Compare costs with the per-diem costs resulting from the complete closure scenarios**



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Scenario Comparison

Scenario:	DAG Reductions	One-Time Cost	ROI Years	Billets Eliminated	Total MILCON
DON-0001 & DON-0002					
DON-0001 Norfolk	TBD	11.34	Immediate	540	0
DON-0002 Mayport	TBD	11.16	Immediate	540	0

Note: All Dollars Shown in Millions

Notes:

CFFC Recommends DON-0002



Department of the Navy
Infrastructure Analysis Group

BACK-UP SLIDES



Joint Fires Network Unit – 2

Data

- **The Navy is in the process of establishing the Naval Reserve mission Joint Fires Network Unit-2 (JNFU-2) at NAVSTA Pascagoula. Unit equipment outfitting has already been funded and construction of the facility is underway. If NAVSTA is closed, the reserve force will have to revisit its home-basing plans for this deployable unit. (Note: The unit will be staffed by reserve personnel except for a minimal staff that will be on-site full time.)**
- **Future location of Joint Fires Network Unit (JFNU) must be addressed. JFNU-2 is independent Tenant of NAVSTA Pascagoula and new MILCON facility is under construction. Unit is a component of FORCENET and is member of jointly fielded Tactical Exploitation System. Long-range plan at Pascagoula has Navy, Coast Guard, MS Port Authority and FBI using the JFNU-2 facility.**



Department of the Navy
Infrastructure Analysis Group

NAVSTA Pascagoula, MS Lakeside Facility



**Lakeside
Facility**

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- 1. Data Call 2: Criterion Five, 17 June**
 - DOD1503 Personnel Involved in Sustainment**
 - DOD1504 Base Operating Support Non-Pay Obligations**
 - DOD1505 Number of Personnel Authorized**
 - DOD1506 Number of Personnel Authorized (Dod Tenants)**



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

09 August 2005

The Honorable Gene Taylor
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Taylor:

This is in response to your inquiry to Mr. Dionel Aviles, Under Secretary of the Navy, at your meeting on July 27, 2005 regarding Seabee housing. You inquired as to whether the Seabees could be assigned housing at closed or realigned naval bases in Mississippi. I am responding on behalf of the Under Secretary of the Navy.

I note that family housing assignments for sailors with dependents in Mississippi is managed by a central housing office located on board Construction Battalion Center (CBC), Gulfport. Presently, military personnel with dependents are assigned base housing at all locations, regardless of whether their duty station is Stennis Space Center, CBC Gulfport, or Naval Station Pascagoula. If required, Naval Station Pascagoula family housing will be available to military personnel assigned to Stennis Space Center, CBC Gulfport or remaining elements in the Pascagoula area. Single sailors are assigned to Bachelor Quarters at the installation they are assigned to since many of them do not have automobiles to get from home to base.

I trust you will find this information useful. If we can be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Anne Rathmell Davis".

Anne Rathmell Davis
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy
for Base Realignment and Closure



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

23 June 2005

The Honorable Gene Taylor
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Taylor:

This is in response to the June 13, 2005 inquiry of your Chief of Staff, Mr. Stephen Peranich, to Commander Hochberg of the Navy Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) concerning Naval Station (NS) Pascagoula as a follow-up to our meeting earlier that day. Our responses to your specific questions are provided below. We look forward to meeting with your staff to go over the Military Value determinations for Naval Station (NAVSTA) Pascagoula, Naval Air Station (NAS) Pensacola, and Naval Air Facility Key West as requested and to provide any additional details you may require.

1. How much MILCON (facility type and cost) is required in Norfolk and Mayport as a result of the recommendations?

The MILCON at NAVSTA Norfolk is \$183M for Aircraft Maintenance Hanger, Enlisted Unaccompanied Personnel Housing, General Administrative Building, Miscellaneous Operations Support Building, Recreation Center, Nursery and Child Care Facility, Piers, Applied Instruction Building, Marine Maintenance Support Facilities, Vehicle Maintenance Shop, and Vehicle Parking. The MILCON at NAVSTA Mayport is \$6.8M for Enlisted Unaccompanied Personnel Housing and Vehicle Parking. The details are contained in the enclosed COBRA report excerpts.

2. How does the condition (backlog not parametric estimate) and capability of the piers in Norfolk and Mayport compare to that in Pascagoula?

The details of the pier condition are contained in the Capacity Data Call. We will provide the results of this data call at the scheduled meeting as requested per Question #7, below.

3. What is the condition and capability of the waterfront facilities (pier, hotel services, magazines, berthing, repair, etc...) in Key West and Pensacola? What are the similarities and differences to what can be provided in Pascagoula?

The details of the pier condition and capability are contained in the Capacity Data Call. We will provide the results of this data call at the scheduled meeting as requested per Question #7 below.

4. It appears much of Navy's cost estimate is wrapped up in billet reductions. Stripping away the personnel piece, what is Pascagoula's MilVal/\$?

Department : NAVY
 Scenario File : C:\Documents and Settings\obornj\My Documents\COBRA - no milpers\Navy COBRA\67 - Naval Station
 Pascagoula, MS\DONCR0002rev7.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: DON0002
 Std Fctrs File : C:\Documents and Settings\obornj\My Documents\COBRA 6.10 April 21 2005\BRACC2005.SPF

Starting Year : 2006
 Final Year : 2007
 Payback Year : 2010 (3 Years)

NPV in 2025(\$K) : -87,094
 1-Time Cost(\$K) : 18,423

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
Net Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)								
MilCon	6,851	0	0	0	0	0	6,851	0
Person	-639	-2,754	-7,493	-7,493	-7,493	-7,493	-33,366	-7,493
Overhd	4,687	733	-143	-143	-143	-143	4,849	-316
Moving	2,146	1,211	0	0	0	0	3,357	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1,199	716	420	220	220	220	2,994	220
TOTAL	14,244	-93	-7,217	-7,417	-7,417	-7,417	-15,315	-7,589

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	31	79	0	0	0	0	110
TOT	31	79	0	0	0	0	110

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	47	17	0	0	0	0	64
Enl	627	153	0	0	0	0	780
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
TOT	676	170	0	0	0	0	846

Summary:

Scenario Number: DON-0002

Scenario Title: Close NS Pascagoula, MS; Relocate to NS Mayport, FL

For the purpose of this Scenario Data Call, the following BRAC Actions are being considered for analysis:

Action 1: Close all base operations at Naval Station Pascagoula, MS.

Action 2: Relocate 2 FRGs to Naval Station Mayport, FL, to include required personnel, equipment, and support.

Action 3: Consolidate SIMA Pascagoula, MS, with SIMA Mayport, FL.

Action 4: Consolidate FISC Jacksonville, FL, function FISC Jacksonville DET Pascagoula, MS with FISC Jacksonville, FL.

Action 5: Consolidate NAVDENCEN Gulf Coast Pensacola, FL, function Branch Dental Clinic NS Pascagoula, MS with NAVDENCEN Southeast Jacksonville, FL.

Action 6: Consolidate NAVHOSP Pensacola, FL, function Branch Medical Activity Pascagoula, MS with NAVHOSP Jacksonville, FL at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL.

ASSUMPTIONS: The purpose of this scenario is close Naval Station Pascagoula, MS and relocate surface ships to Naval Station Mayport, FL. Each action must reflect the transfer of support personnel and equipment as appropriate that results from all actions associated with this scenario. Allow waterfront operations to continue until final homeported CG is decommissioned in FY06. US Coast Guard receives transfer of property as necessary to maintain operations or relocates Coast Guard assets (at the discretion of US Coast Guard). All remaining activities/tenants at Naval Station Pascagoula, MS, to be closed and realigned/relocated as appropriate.

Individual input for SIMA Pascagoula, MS, SIMA Mayport, FL, FISC Jacksonville, FL, NAVDENCEN Gulf Coast Pensacola, FL, NAVDENCEN Southeast, Jacksonville, FL, NAVHOSP Pensacola, FL, and NAVHOSP Jacksonville FL, is to be provided by these activities as indicated in the Scenario Description.

Scenario Number: DON-0002M

Scenario Title: Medical Support to DON-0002

For the purpose of this Scenario Data Call, the following BRAC Actions are being considered for analysis:

Action 1: Close all base operations at Naval Station Pascagoula, MS.

Action 2: Realign medical and dental assets from Naval Station Pascagoula, MS to Naval Station Mayport, FL in order to support the realignments in DON-0002.

ASSUMPTIONS: General: This data call (DON-0002M) is issued to gather medical data in support of DON-0002. Response to this data call will supercede Actions 5 and 6 of DON-0002 pertaining to the dental

and medical clinics at Naval Station Pascagoula, completed by Naval Dental Center Gulf Coast and Naval Hospital Jacksonville, respectively. The response to Actions 5 and 6 were developed under a previous rule set.

List any medical billet eliminations under Action 1. Any personnel not relocated in support of Action 2 are to be listed as eliminations. Limit the total of the medical personnel and assets distributed to those associated with Pascagoula in the table below. In question 47, elaborate the general scheme selected to produce the response to this data call, i.e., increased outsourcing to the TRICARE network vs. increased in-house care, etc.

Department : NAVY
 Scenario File : C:\Documents and Settings\obornj\My Documents\COBRA - no milpers\Navy COBRA\67 - Naval Station
 Pascagoula, MS\DONCR0002rev7.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: DON0002
 Std Fctrs File : C:\Documents and Settings\obornj\My Documents\COBRA 6.10 April 21 2005\BRAC2005.SFF

	Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)						Total	Beyond
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011		
MilCon	6,851	0	0	0	0	0	6,851	0
Person	4,144	6,641	4,528	4,528	4,528	4,528	28,899	4,528
Overhd	7,074	6,811	5,934	5,934	5,934	5,934	37,623	5,934
Moving	3,345	1,527	0	0	0	0	4,872	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1,199	716	420	220	220	220	2,994	220
TOTAL	22,612	15,696	10,883	10,683	10,683	10,683	81,239	10,683
Savings in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	4,783	9,395	12,022	12,022	12,022	12,022	62,265	12,022
Overhd	2,386	6,078	6,078	6,078	6,078	6,078	32,774	6,250
Moving	1,199	316	0	0	0	0	1,515	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	8,368	15,788	18,099	18,099	18,099	18,099	96,554	18,272

**RETENTION OF
NAVAL STATION PASCAGOULA
JACKSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI**



www.jcedf.org

**Presented by
Singing River Island Diversification Committee**

June 2005

RETENTION OF NAVAL STATION PASCAGOULA **JACKSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI**

Jackson County, Mississippi will be significantly adversely affected not only by the closing of Naval Station Pascagoula, but also by the proposed closing of the In-Patient facility at the Keesler AFB hospital in nearby Biloxi, located in adjoining Harrison County. Ocean Springs, a highly preferred residential community across the bay from Biloxi, is the home to more than 800 active duty medical personnel stationed at Keesler. The local community benefits not only by having these personnel residing here, but they are also a source for recruitment of local medical needs when Air Force members are retiring or otherwise leaving the service. Significantly, Jackson County and particularly Ocean Springs also benefit by the many service personnel who decide to retire here, in large part, because of the quality of the hospital facilities (including in-patient care).


Jackson County has suffered, and is only now in the process of recovering, from large industry closures and layoffs that occurred in 2001 and 2002. A total of 425 employees were laid off when International Paper Company, which had been located here for more than 80 years, closed its paper manufacturing plant. That plant has now been demolished. A total of 125 employees were laid off when chemical manufacturing facilities - Rohm and Haas and Shipley closed. Since that time Jackson County has taken significant steps to define its own future in economic development. But the closing of Naval Station Pascagoula and the partial closing of the Keesler AFB Hospital pose further challenges to a community that is just now seeing improvement in its economic outlook.

While the military case for Keesler AFB is being made in separate documents, the case for Naval Station Pascagoula will be made here as follows:

THE MILITARY CASE FOR NAVAL STATION PASCAGOULA

Naval Station Pascagoula has significant military advantages:

- Naval Station Pascagoula is a “forward deployed” base, the only one in the Gulf, closest to the Panama Canal and Central and South America.




Northrop Grumman Ship Systems and Naval Station Pascagoula

- Naval Station Pascagoula provides rapid access to help protect seaways that carry more than 63% of US commerce by volume.
- Naval Station Pascagoula is next to the largest Chevron refinery in the US, which has additionally applied for regulatory approval of an LNG facility.
- Naval Station Pascagoula is close to the 3 major Gulf ports of New Orleans, Gulfport and Pascagoula.



Port of Pascagoula

- Naval Station Pascagoula is small and efficient by design, one of the lowest cost and most capable bases on a “dollar/cruiser equivalent” (CGE)
- Naval Station Pascagoula, by virtue of its island design, is a secure facility and continues to evolve as one of the first nodes for a joint “Maritime Norad” concept with the Littoral Surveillance System, Coast Guard Patrol Boats and National Guard Civil Support Team.
- Naval Station Pascagoula is close to many other major military installations for training and interoperability, including Gulf Coast Training Range Complex to provide realistic training; Camp Shelby; CBC Gulfport; Trent Lott National Guard Facility; Keesler Air Force Base; Naval Air Station Pensacola.



Artist Rendering of Northrop Grumman's Unmanned Systems Center

- Naval Station Pascagoula is close to Northrop Grumman Unmanned Systems Center.
- Naval Station Pascagoula is located on deep water, only 11.6 miles from 100 Fathom curve.
- There will always be significant Navy presence because of the ships being built by Northrop Grumman's Ship Systems facilities in Pascagoula, including

SupShip and pre-commissioning crews. In fact, in the recommendation for closing of Naval Station Pascagoula, Department of Defense assumed that closure of Lakeside generates \$4.7M annually in additional cost to house pre-commissioning crews on the economy.

The community considers this cost to be greatly understated, because these numbers are destined to see significant increases. Department of Defense estimates of cost to house pre-commissioning crews assigned to new ships under construction at Northrop Grumman Ship Systems' Ingalls Pascagoula facility, and other local shipyards under the jurisdiction of SUPSHIPS Gulf Coast, are based on 104-456 personnel being housed. The data from the Station indicates a historical average of 650 personnel. It is highly likely that this number will greatly increase in the near future as Northrop Grumman consolidates integration, testing and delivery of all ships built in its facilities (whether New Orleans, Gulfport or Pascagoula) in Pascagoula. Ships built by Northrop Grumman Ship Systems include LHDs, DDGs, and Coast Guard Deepwater and LPD 17 class ships. As an example, 1-LHD, 2-DDGs, 2-LPDs and 1-NSC may overlap in the launch to commissioning phases. This could result in as many as 1800 Sailors and Coast Guardsmen needing housing and administrative support at one time. Note that this is only crew members, and does not include additional SUPSHIPS personnel transferring from New Orleans, government program office personnel, or government and contractor test teams, all of whom would need additional workspace and administrative support. Based on these numbers there are not sufficient hotels in Jackson County to accommodate pre-commissioning crews and they would need to move to increasingly outlying areas. Without using Navy-owned facilities at Lakeside and NAVSTA, the cost estimate should be more in the \$9-12M range.

COST ESTIMATES UNDERSTATED; SAVINGS OVERSTATED

Navy cost estimates indicate a new savings to DOD of \$220.0M during the implementation period with a \$47.4M annual savings thereafter. The community disputes these figures for the following reasons:



ASSUMPTION: Military personnel not being relocated to Mayport /Jacksonville are eliminated. Estimated savings as per DOD: \$17.4M annually.

DISCUSSION: The savings numbers are mythical. Although the billets are eliminated (i.e. CO NAVSTA), the personnel who currently fill those billets are not going to be "laid off" by the Navy, but rather redeployed elsewhere in the Fleet. Unless the actual manpower level of the Navy is reduced, there are no military personnel savings. And even if there is an intent to initiate Navy-wide eliminations, they are not dependent specifically on closing Naval Station Pascagoula.

ASSUMPTION: DOD civilian employees not relocating would be eliminated. Estimated savings as per DOD: \$10.4M annually.

DISCUSSION: Savings are exaggerated, for the same reasons as above, albeit to a smaller degree. Civil Service employees have preferential re-employment rights, meaning that many would not be eliminated, but rather redeployed. NAF funded positions would be eliminated, but these are relatively a small percentage.



ChevronTexaco Pascagoula Refinery

ASSUMPTION: Closure generates \$259K in dredging cost avoidance annually.



DISCUSSION: Because the numbers are based on an 18 month dredging requirement and ocean disposal, they are inflated. Actual cost avoidance is negligible, to wit: maintenance dredging of the channel has been performed once since the installation opened, not every 18 months. In addition, the community has arranged for NAVSTA to take a portion of the Pascagoula River Dredged Material Plan, and thus deposit dredge spoils in an upland site, rather than the offshore disposal which is 4-5 times more expensive, cited in the estimate.

ASSUMPTION: The Coast Guard will assume ownership of all/part of the installation, relieving the DOD of carrying costs and allowing DCGS-2 as a tenant.

DISCUSSION: This assumption has not been validated by USCG. If, in fact, the Coast Guard does not assume ownership, the Navy will have recurring costs estimated in the \$2M range to place the facility in a caretaker status, as well as one-time costs to relocate the DCGS. Alternatively, if the Coast Guard elects to stay, it will have to pick up costs that the Navy is currently paying to maintain the entire facility or at least the portions of the Naval Station that the Coast Guard would retain. While this may save cost for DOD, that cost is simply shifted to USCG and must still be born by the US government.



BP Pascagoula Gas Processing Plant



COMMUNITY ECONOMIC IMPACT

ASSUMPTION: The only community impact is the loss of 1761 direct and indirect jobs in an area with a labor force of 68,520.

DISCUSSION: The loss of jobs, while significant, is not the only potential impact to the community. The community and the State of Mississippi invested \$40M in Singing River Island, where Naval Station Pascagoula is located, and access to it from the mainland. The County continues to maintain debt service for the \$20M it invested in preparation of the Naval Station site, and the State Highway Department continues to maintain the access causeway that was constructed, and is owned, by the State of Mississippi. The community would also need to assume the Navy's portion of the cost of the DMMS. Furthermore, the Navy characterized the impact on the community of housing 100-450 sailors on the community as "noticeable but not drastic." Housing the true number of more than twice that number is drastic.

Pascagoula and Jackson County, besides being the home to Naval Station Pascagoula, also has the largest and most efficient shipyard in the US for production of US Navy and USCG non-nuclear surface combatant ships (Northrop Grumman Ship Systems' Ingalls operation), the largest and most modern oil refinery east of the Mississippi River (ChevronTexaco facility), BP's natural gas processing plant, and the nation's 18th largest port. Additionally, Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems is currently building its unmanned aerial vehicle assembly and testing facility in Jackson County for Fire Scout unmanned helicopters and Global Hawk unmanned high-altitude surveillance aircraft. And, two new LNG re-gasification facilities have been proposed and are currently undergoing regulation approval. If the DCGS-2 is relocated because the USCG does not, or cannot, assume ownership, the 18th largest port complex in the US with its strategic shipbuilding, unmanned aerial vehicle construction, evaluation and testing, and refining and energy resources, loses its homeland defense capability. A USCG relocation also would further heighten the economic and homeland security impacts on the community.



CONCLUSION

The DOD has understated costs and community impacts, and overstated savings associated with the closure of Naval Station Pascagoula. The community's calculations indicate a virtual wash to DOD after implementation. By DOD's own numbers, without the elimination of personnel costs (which can be gained by reducing personnel at any facility) the cost of operating Naval Station Pascagoula is only \$6,034,000 annually, including the \$4.7M cost of berthing pre-commissioning crews on the economy. Without this cost, it's \$1,290,000 to operate the base.

O&M Budget	\$6M
Less carrying cost	(\$2M)
<u>Less added PC crew</u>	<u>(\$9M)</u>
	(\$5M)

Net DOD savings appear to be negative—without including the additional cost which would be shifted to the Coast Guard, other federal and local agencies outlined above, and the community. Pascagoula is a low cost base with a low cost of living and high quality of life for personnel, and new and efficient buildings and infrastructure. Because Pascagoula is the headquarters for Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, the largest surface shipbuilder in the world, and the most important surface shipbuilder to the US Navy, there will always be a large navy contingent in Pascagoula that needs and deserves support. Beyond the significant military value outlined above, and the support to SupShip Gulf Coast and pre-commissioning crews, there are also Homeland Defense and Homeland Security roles. Other missions can be located to Naval Station Pascagoula to take advantage of its strategic location in the Gulf, and its proximity to Northrop Grumman Ship Systems. Based on the low cost and negligible savings, and the current and future military value, it does not appear to be either an economic or strategic advantage to give up the flexibility in the Gulf of Mexico that Naval Station Pascagoula provides.



Memorandum Regarding Substantial Deviation from BRAC Law of Department of Defense
Recommendation to Close Naval Station Pascagoula

Introduction

The Department of Defense's (DoD) recommendation regarding closure of Pascagoula Naval Station is in contravention of the BRAC statute, and should not be ratified. The Department's analysis inappropriately relied on transformational factors and priorities other than section 2914(f) selection criteria, failing to consider current missions, future missions, and homeland defense missions. Specifically, the 2005 Navy's data call was substantially similar that that utilized for the 1995 BRAC assessment, reflecting an unreasonable bias towards eliminating all homeports in the Gulf of Mexico by consolidating surface/subsurface operations in Fleet concentration areas. However, unlike the 1995 BRAC round, the Navy's bias towards fleet concentration was not mitigated in their 2005 analysis by the tenets of the Strategic Dispersal Homeport Program which mandates that Naval homeports be dispersed from main fleet concentration areas, implementing the militarily sound principles of dispersal, battlegroup integrity, and increasing the naval presence in the geographic flanks.

Further, DoD contravened section 2913(e) of the BRAC law by failing to evaluate the cost efficiency of Pascagoula Naval Station at supporting and delivering littoral and homeland defense capability in the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, DoD failed to evaluate the value, efficiency, synergy, and surge capability afforded by robust berthing, industrial, and training capability of Ingalls shipyard which is immediately proximate to the Naval Station.

I. The Recommendation

Close Naval Station Pascagoula, MS. Relocate its ships along with dedicated personnel, equipment, and support to Naval Station Mayport, FL; Relocate the ship intermediate repair function to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Mayport, Florida. The justification for this recommendation is:

Reduce excess berthing capacity while allowing for consolidation of surface ships in a Fleet concentration area. Sufficient capacity and Fleet dispersal is maintained with East Coast surface Fleet homeports of Naval Station Norfolk and Naval Station Mayport, FL. Gulf Coast presence can be achieved as needed with available Navy ports and Naval Air Station Key West, FL and Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL.

II. DoD's Recommendation Regarding Naval Station Pascagoula Substantially Deviates from Requirements of the BRAC Law

1. DoD relied on transformational factors and priorities other than section 2914(f) selection criteria.

The military value criteria of section 2914(f) requires that the Department consider: (1) The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force; and (2) The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace

(including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.

- a. The Navy did not perform any analysis regarding the cost/benefit analysis of abandoning the tenets of the “Strategic Dispersed Homeport Program,” a current mission requirement that was codified in 1986, and was supported in subsequent budgets for Naval Station Pascagoula as recent as the President’s Budget request for 2005.

The Navy and Congress significantly debated the “Strategic Dispersed Homeport Program” between 1982 and 1985, and the Congress approved the program in 1986 in the Fiscal Year 1987 National Defense Authorization Act and respective Appropriations Act for that year. The Navy’s rationale for the program, revalidated when the Navy and Congress reconsidered the Program in 1991, was as follows:

- i. Avoid Overcrowding - Dispersing the ships to the 13 selected sites was necessary to avoid overcrowding at the Navy’s homeports as the Navy grew towards the 600-ship goal (CRS Report IB90077).

While there is a relationship between size of the Navy and the infrastructure that supports it, the decline in the quantity of ships from that era (approximately 600) to today’s projected level of 325 – 375 does not necessarily mean that overcrowding is not an issue. Rather, since the Navy continued to support military construction at dispersed homeports as recent as Fiscal Year 2005, it is arguable that fleet concentration areas have the space but not the right or sufficient infrastructure to support ships that would be relocated from the dispersed homeports.

- ii. Reduce Vulnerability to Pearl Harbor-like Attack – This argument focused on the threat of torpedo or cruise missile attacks from new, quieter Soviet submarines operating near U.S. ports, or a mining campaign by either those submarines or Soviet-bloc merchant ships (CRS Report IB90077).

While it is arguable that the Soviet threat has been significantly reduced, it is clear that a robust submarine threat from China is emerging. In addition, worldwide proliferation of highly capable and stealthy diesel submarines exacerbates the vulnerability of critical assets in the Gulf of Mexico.

In this regard, the Commission is strongly encouraged to receive a classified threat and vulnerability assessment of Fleet concentration areas to better understand the emerging threats from traditional and asymmetric opponents.

- iii. Move Closer to Operating Areas – Dispersing ships would move some of the Navy’s surface ships closer to operating areas in the northern North Atlantic, the North and Northwest Pacific, and the Caribbean. To the extent that the focus of US defense policy shifts away from the scenario of a war with the Soviets, and toward non-Soviet, non-NATO military contingencies, the importance of being closer to the Northern North Atlantic and the North and Northwest Pacific would appear to be reduced,

while the importance of being close to the Caribbean would appear to be strengthened. (CRS Report IB90077).

Movement of Pascagoula based ships to Norfolk and Mayport clearly relocates critical Navy assets away from the Caribbean. But even more troubling is that DoD's BRAC recommendations move ships significantly further away from the newest and highest priority operating area - homeland defense in the Gulf of Mexico.

- iv. Improve Training and Recruiting – Dispersing ships would give the Navy better access to more diverse training environments (CRS Report IB90077).

Since the implementation of the Strategic Diverse Homport Program in 1986, the Navy has predominately consolidated training at Great Lakes Training Center and Fleet Concentration Areas. However, the Navy has not consolidated all training.

Specifically, Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula still performs specialized and familiarization training for most surface combatants and all amphibious ships. In addition, specialized training is provided by the 2nd Air Force at Keesler Air Force Base and Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) at Pensacola. Riverine training and small boat maintenance training is also conducted proximate to Pascagoula by Special Operations Command and Naval Small Craft Training School located in the Stennis Space Center Buffer Zone.

- v. Expand Infrastructure and Preserve Industrial Base – Dispersing surface ships would enhance the Navy's overall readiness for a major war by expanding its infrastructure and preserving the Navy's supporting industrial base (CRS Report IB90077).

Naval Station Pascagoula is immediately proximate (across the channel) from Ingalls shipyard where 50% of surface combatants and all Navy amphibious ships are designed and constructed. The Naval base is uniquely situated to leverage and preserve this core national industrial capability and further reduce operating costs by relying on the hundreds of subcontractors proximate to Ingalls that support in-service ships.

As recently demonstrated during the repair of USS COLE, there is a natural synergy between the Naval Station's Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity and Ingalls with regard to maintenance and repair of in-service ships. The ships homeported at the Naval Station, particularly the "Smart Ship" USS TICONDEROGA, leveraged the latest technology from Ingalls to reduce manning and decrease ship operating costs.

To be clear – this memorandum does not dispute that the BRAC Law affords flexibility to consider closure of homeports. To be certain, Section 2911 of the FY1991 defense authorization bill as reported by the House-Senate conference committee (H.R. 4739) inserts "homeport facility for any ship," in to 10 U.S.C. 2687(e) (1), making it clear that ship home ports are included under 10 U.S.C. 2687, which outlines procedures and conditions for carrying out military base closures and realignments (*Congressional Record*, daily ed., Oct 23, 1990).

Rather, it is asserted that the Navy contravened the military value criteria of section 2914(f) by omitting any analysis regarding the current mission tenets of the Strategic Dispersal Program, and the impact of eliminating strategically dispersed homeports on the operational readiness of the total force.

- b. The Navy's military value criteria for the 2005 BRAC round is substantially similar to the military value criteria utilized for the 1995 BRAC round, and does not appropriately consider "future mission capabilities."

Navy Infrastructure Evaluation Group (IEG) minutes of 25 March 2004 reflect deliberations regarding the establishment of criteria and weighting for the surface/subsurface operations review. The 5 "surface/subsurface attributes" approved by the group included operational infrastructure, operational training, port characteristics, environmental encroachment and personnel support.

Upon examination of *Attachment (1)*, it is evident that the data call regarding the surface/subsurface attributes are highly biased towards facility size, proximity to capabilities uniquely found in Fleet concentration areas, and nuclear ship/submarine berthing, operation, and maintenance. Specifically, 52% of "Operational Infrastructure" questions are biased against smaller installations; 42% of "Operational Training" questions indicate a similar bias; and 30% of questions regarding "Port Characteristics" also reflect this bias.

The Navy's military criteria ignore future mission capabilities of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), solely relying on the "Cruiser Equivalent" as the principal metric. As noted by *Attachment (2)*, the primary factors for consideration include linear feet of berthing, pier and slip width, shore power, and hotel/support services. By using these criteria, the Navy disadvantages Naval Station Pascagoula by ignoring the base's cost and mission efficiency of supporting smaller future ships such as the LCS and future frigates.

By example, a primary enabler of LCS is the Fire Scout Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. Pascagoula Naval Station received no credit for being proximate to the Fire Scout assembly plant, which will support maintenance, repair and training for the vehicles. Nor did the Naval Station receive credit for being proximate to multiple LCS subcontractors that are located in Pascagoula (e.g., Lockheed, Raytheon, Bofors).

- c. The Navy's military value criteria utilized for the 2005 BRAC round does not appropriately consider "homeland defense missions."

The only reference to "homeland defense" in the Navy's data call is the question (*Attachment 1*, question SEA -15), "Does your activity perform any of the following missions? (y/n) – Homeland Defense? (y/n)"

On its face, question SEA-15 only reflects the declaration of "Homeland Defense" missions that are currently performed, and makes no attempt to consider or value prospective homeland defense mission requirements.

Further, there is no evidence that the Navy's data call for surface/subsurface operations, or subsequent deliberations by the Navy IEG ever reflected specific homeland defense and homeland security recommendations articulated by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in their letter of 29 Oct 2004 (Attachment 3).

In particular, the NORTHCOM/NORAD letter urges that:

“DoD BRAC recommendations should consider homeland defense and homeland security requirements identified in the emerging DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. We want to ensure that impacts to our missions and possible unintended consequences to our capability are taken into account in any BRAC adjustments.”

Specific NORAD/NORTHCOM recommendations of 29 Oct 2004 that affect current and prospective missions of Naval Station Pascagoula include:

- i. Providing a secure operating environment for focused strategic, asymmetric, counterterrorism, counterintelligence and law enforcement sensitive intelligence and information fusion efforts in support of homeland defense, maritime analysis, and civil support operations. The “Joint Fires Network Unit” (also known as LSS and DCGS-N) located at Naval Station Pascagoula performs this function.
- ii. Department of Homeland Security's provision of homeland security. The USCG presence at the Naval Station directly supports this mission.
- iii. Quick reaction force, rapid reaction force, and JTF-CS responses. This is a mission that LCS could execute from Naval Station Pascagoula to protect high value shipping lanes, ports, oil/gas reserves, and oil production in the gulf. Currently, USCG has asserted that they can only protect 12 of over 4000 oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico for a period of 8 days.
- iv. Homeland defense-related intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, to include over the horizon radar sites. The “Joint Fires Network Unit” located at Naval Station Pascagoula performs this function.

With regard to further definition of the prospective homeland defense mission in the Gulf, *Attachment 4*, presents the unclassified testimony of FBI Special Agent Jarboe before the US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations. Of particular note, Agent Jarboe states:

“The high volume of maritime traffic in the large ports, both commercial and noncommercial, provide ample cover for the movement of illicit goods. Eleven of the top 15 ports in trade volume in the United States and 6 of the top 10 ports in volume of foreign trade are located on the Gulf of Mexico. It is a concern that terrorist organizations could take advantage of well-established, well-known criminal patterns to further their own objectives, such as concealing money laundering operations,

transport and distribution of explosives and/or hazardous materials, or illegal entry into the United States.”

Agent Jarboe’s comments are very unique in that they unclassified; the Commission is strongly encouraged to receive a classified assessment regarding emergent threats, vulnerability, and prospective response in the Gulf of Mexico.

By **Attachment 5**, pertinent statistics are presented regarding the diversity and extent of vulnerable assets in the Gulf of Mexico, for which the homeland defense mission requirements are still under development. Of particular note, the Gulf contains 4021 energy production platforms, accounting for 93% of US offshore oil production and approximately 98% of US gas production. Further, as noted previously, the Gulf Coast includes the Nation’s busiest ports, and even one terrorist attack would seriously injure our nation’s economy.

2. DoD contravened section 2913(e) of the BRAC law by failing to evaluate the cost efficiency of Pascagoula Naval Station of supporting future missions in the Gulf of Mexico, including homeland defense.
 - a. The Navy erred in not evaluating any scenarios that considered the merit and cost of supporting future missions at the Pascagoula Naval Station in lieu of Key West and Pensacola.

The Infrastructure Steering Group briefing of 8 October 2004, “Department of the Navy Strategy/Initial Scenarios,” includes only 1 scenario: (1) Close NAVSTA Pascagoula and relocate ships to NAVSTA Norfolk or NAVSTA Mayport; consolidate shore intermediate maintenance activity with SIMA Norfolk or SIMA Mayport.

The justification for this recommendation is that money would be saved by closing the installation (largely from elimination of military and civilian billets); NAS Key West and Pensacola allow for presence in the Gulf (assuming NAVSTA Ingleside is closed); and Mayport better supports ships’ mission in support of JIATF south Operations.

There is no evidence that the Navy considered the cost efficiency of realigning current and future missions to Naval Station Pascagoula – 1 of only 2 “Smart Bases.” In addition, it is not evident that the Navy considered the facilities cost of upgrading and/or building-new infrastructure at Key West or Pensacola to allow for continuation of a Gulf Coast presence.

By the Navy’s own data, Naval Air Station Key West has no capability to handle ordnance pierside. Further, ship support capability at Naval Air Station Pensacola is extremely limited due to the age and condition of pier facilities, and limited pier services.

- b. The Navy erred in not evaluating the merit and cost of continuing and growing presence at Naval Station Pascagoula to address homeland defense requirements in the Gulf of Mexico, particularly with regard to homeporting LCS.

It is troubling that the Navy has performed no analysis regarding the cost/benefit of its de facto decision to base LCS Flight 1 ships at Little Creek, as compared to other locations, including Naval Station Pascagoula.

LCS was specifically designed to perform a full range of littoral homeland defense missions to address emerging threats in coastal waters, such as the Gulf of Mexico. Specifically, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) John Young recently noted in an interview with *Defense Daily*, published August 9, 2005:

“The LCS was pushed forward rapidly because it is needed to meet threats in coastal waters, where much of the fighting in the 21st century will occur.”

“The three chief LCS missions are hunting enemy submarines, detecting and neutralizing underwater mines, and intercepting and destroying tiny “swarm” boats piloted by terrorists.”

As the 1997 Smart Base demonstrator, it is arguable that Naval Station Pascagoula is tailor made to homeport an LCS squadron. The base is highly efficient, reflecting state of the art and optimally-sized facilities for ships and crew, with minimal manning. In addition, the Naval Station reflects the “city base” concept, effectively leveraging existing infrastructure in the community, industry, and other military installations to provide a full range of mission and family services with no additional overhead cost to the Navy.

- c. The Navy erred in not evaluating the merit and cost of enclaving the “Joint Fires Network Unit,” and only proposes to relocate the system to the Mayport Area.

As an element of Navy Force Net, the Joint Fires Network was specifically located at Naval Station Pascagoula to provide a secure operating environment for focused strategic, asymmetric, counterterrorism, counterintelligence and information fusion efforts in support of homeland defense, maritime analysis, and civil support operations.

The Navy’s analysis did not consider that the Joint Fires Network was purposefully located and centered on the Gulf coast to support missions of Navy, USCG, and other agencies in the Gulf of Mexico. Further, the Navy did not assess the cost of conducting this critical mission in the Gulf of Mexico from an unspecified location in Mayport, FL.

The Commission should be aware that the Maritime Domain Awareness Asymmetric Warfare Initiative, to be conducted 15-19 August 2005, was designed to demonstrate and refine system capabilities at Pascagoula. Participants include the Navy, Coast

Guard, NORTHCOM, FBI, other federal agencies, first responders, and the Mississippi Civil Support Team.

The Commission is strongly urged to receive a classified briefing regarding the Joint Fires Network, including the associated investment for highly secure facilities.

3. DoD contravened section 2913(e) of the BRAC law by failing to assess the value and efficiency of surge capability afforded by robust berthing, industrial, and training capability of Ingalls shipyard which is immediately proximate to the Naval Station.
 - a. The Navy erred in failing to evaluate the cost, merit, and strategic surge value of being located across the channel from Northrop Grumman Ship Systems – Ingalls Shipyard.

Notwithstanding Northrop Grumman – Newport News shipyard, Ingalls is the larger of the 2 remaining shipyards in the United States that builds complex surface ships for the U.S. Navy. In the aggregate, Ingalls has the industrial and waterfront capability to simultaneously build and berth over 15 large surface ships.

In calendar year 2000, Ingalls, with weapons offload and other support provided by Naval Station Pascagoula, repaired the USS COLE, following the US Navy's policy to repair significantly damaged ships at the ship's original building-yard. Ingalls possesses the only US Navy certified drydock in the Gulf of Mexico, and is only 1 of 2 docks east of the Mississippi that can drydock a large deck amphibious ship (LHD or LHA, 900 feet in length, 42000+ tons).

Ingalls offers robust surge capability for the Navy to berth all types of surface ships, excluding aircraft carriers. And, in view of Ingalls former role as builder of nuclear submarines, it is arguable that submarines could at least be berthed at Ingalls if surge requirements warranted.

It is not evident that the Navy assessed the value and efficiency of using Ingalls as proximate surge capability for Naval Station Pascagoula. To the contrary, the military value criteria (*Attachment 1*), SEA 1 through SEA 9, give preference for CVN capable facilities, nuclear capable shipyards, homeporting of SSBNs, and pierside capability resident only at the Naval Station.

In the aggregate, the Navy afforded little or no military value for world class berthing, docking, repair, training, and maintenance capability that is a mere 100 yards from Naval Station Pascagoula.

III. Conclusion

The nation requires a permanent Naval presence in the Gulf of Mexico to protect over 90% of US offshore oil and gas production, 30% of our gas and oil reserves, more than 50% of our busiest ports, and critical defense infrastructure that builds and supports more than 50% of our Naval Fleet.

Naval Station Pascagoula is the Navy's "Smart Base," the most highly efficient, appropriately sized, cost effective, and geographically proximate base from which the Navy should execute current missions, future missions, and homeland defense in the Gulf of Mexico.

DoD substantially deviated from the BRAC statute in developing the recommendation to close Naval Station Pascagoula by its failure to consider and analyze the tenets of the Strategic Dispersed Homeport Program, future LCS missions in the Gulf of Mexico, and Homeland Defense missions articulated by NORAD and NORTHCOM.

DoD substantially deviated from the BRAC statute by failing to fully assess the cost of maintaining a permanent surface ship presence in the Gulf from remote locations at Mayport and Norfolk.

DoD substantially deviated from the BRAC statute by failing to fully assess the cost of maintaining a permanent surface ship presence in the Gulf of Mexico from Naval Air Station Pensacola and Naval Air Station Key West.

DoD substantially deviated from the BRAC statute by failing to fully to fully assess the cost and readiness implications of losing synergy and robust surge capability afforded by the proximity of the Naval Station to Ingalls shipyard.

In the aggregate, these substantial deviations from the BRAC statute are sufficient and compelling, and serve as a valid basis upon which the BRAC Commission may set-aside DoD's recommendation to close Naval Station Pascagoula.



Naval Packaging Handling Storage and Transportation Center

Home
Capabilities
POCs
Container Expertise
MHE
OHE
OHE Certified Sites
HAZMAT Trans
Acquisition
Web Straps
Awards
Milestones
DesDevProc
TestEvaluation
History
Configuration Mgmt
TMDE
Search

HAZMAT Transportation...

The Naval PHST Center has vast knowledge related to the transportation of hazardous materials.

The Center coordinates all efforts related to the certification of ordnance packaging with regard to the regulations imposed by DOD, the Department of Transportation (DOT) and other international agencies/modal regulations. The Center is the Navy's focal point for Performance Oriented Package (POP) testing of Ammunition and Explosive Packaging.

The Center has reviewed current and proposed law and regulations governing the packaging, testing, and shipment of hazardous materials in order to develop policy and provide technical guidance to managers, field activities, other engineering organizations within DOD. The Center is responsible for prescribing tests, preparing test reports, engineering drawings, hazard classifications, and other technical data which would support and demonstrate the adequacy of the packaging design to conform to prescribed DOT and international regulations.

For further information contact DSN 449-2821

last updated: Thursday, June 05, 2003 04:39:51 PM

Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts

DON scenario, DON-0002R

Action 1: Close all base operations at Naval Station Pascagoula, MS.

Action 2: Relocate 2 FFGs to Naval Station Mayport, FL, to include required personnel, equipment, and support.

Action 3: Consolidate SIMA Pascagoula, MS, with SIMA Mayport, FL.

Action 4: Consolidate FISC Jacksonville, FL, function FISC Jacksonville DET Pascagoula, MS with FISC Jacksonville, FL.

Action 5: Disestablish NAVDENCEN Gulf Coast Pensacola, FL, function Branch Dental Clinic NS Pascagoula, MS.

Action 6: Disestablish NAVHOSP Pensacola, FL, function Branch Medical Activity Pascagoula, MS.

General Environmental Impacts

Environmental Resource Area	NAVSTA Pascagoula (Installation Closed)	NAVSTA Mayport (Installation Gaining Functions)
Air Quality	Installation is in attainment for all criteria pollutants.	Installation is in Maintenance for 1-Hour Ozone. Conformity Determination is not required.
Cultural/Archeological/Tribal Resources	No impact.	No impacts expected.
Dredging	Elimination of dredging requirement.	No impact.
Land Use Constraints/Sensitive Resource Areas	437 total acres.	Installation reports having 158 unconstrained acres out of a total of 3587 acres. Mayport does not expect an impact due to the addition of 2 FFGs.
Marine Mammals/Marine Resources/ Marine Sanctuaries	No impact.	Installation is currently impacted by laws & regulations pertaining to

		MMPA, which may impact ship ops in the surrounding area, however current ops covered by a biological opinion. Under current consult requirements, it appears at this time that no further consultation will be required to implement this scenario.
Noise	No impact.	Noise contours extent off base. Of the 993 acres off base, 64 acres have incompatible land uses. Scenario will not impact existing noise concerns.
Threatened& Endangered Species/Critical Habitat	Installation has TES. No impact in closure.	Installation has TES, but additional ops will not impact existing situation.
Waste Management	No impact.	Installation has a permitted TSD. No impacts.
Water Resources	No impact.	Increases Water Usage. Installation discharges to impaired waterway. Installation has groundwater permits. No impacts.
Wetlands	Installation has 34% of total acres restricted by wetlands.	Installation has 63% wetland restricted acres on base. New mission will not impact wetlands.

Impacts of Costs

Selection Criterion 8 Environmental Points	NAVSTA Pascagoula (Closed)	NAVSTA Mayport (Gaining Function)
Environmental Restoration	No DERA costs.	Installation has spent \$16.5M through FY03 for environmental restoration. Estimated CTC is \$13.1M.
Waste Management	None.	None.
Environmental Compliance	None.	\$20K for Air Permit for Paint/Blast Booth

No Criterion 8 impacts with regard to Actions #4-6.



ISSUE

DoD POSITION

COMMUNITY POSITION

R&A STAFF FINDINGS

Current and Future Mission

Single DON Mission homeport no viable given reduction in FSP & excess berthing capacity. Consolidates ships and personnel in fleet concentration area.

Ability to increase DOD and homeland security presence, expand multiple homeland defense/security missions. Potential future home for LCS. Military value based on proximity to Northrop Grumman's Shipyard.

Scored 16 out of 16 on DON's Military value scale for surface ships. Established to homeport 5 Aegis cruisers but only used now to homeport 2 smaller frigates. Consolidates ships and personnel with commands and training facilities located at NS Mayport - ships currently spend 30% of time in Mayport. No Deviation

Impact on homeland defense or security

Physical presence of surface battle force ships can be maintained in Gulf region, when needed, at Navy ports at NAS Key West and Pensacola.

Elimination of battle force ships in Gulf Coast exposes vital civilian energy production infrastructure and commercial shipping to potential threats. Maritime and littoral surveillance or reaction compromised.

Maintaining NS not critical to continued regional maritime protection or force projection. USCG mission and assets likely to stay and perhaps expand at Pascagoula. Minimal strategic or tactical capabilities lost in AOR.





ISSUE

DoD POSITION

COMMUNITY POSITION

R&A STAFF FINDINGS

<p>Closes off-station bachelor housing complex (Lakeside) And New off-station 160-unit family housing complex</p>	<p>Fence line closure including off-stations activities makes operational and economic sense. Economy can handle temporary housing for pre-com crews. Management of Family Housing can be shifted to N Gulf Port during implementation</p>	<p>Demand for temporary housing for Pre-con crews will continue and stress local economy. Should be kept open for other Navy and DHS regional demands for affordable housing.</p>	<p>Demand for Lakeside pre-existed NS and will continue Lakeside averages 400 sailors per year but number fluctuates due to ship building activity. Increases DON's annual recurring costs by \$4.7M. Enclave scenarios rejected due to costs. SUPSHIPS Gulf Coast mission is unaffected by closure. Navy has</p>
<p>Abandons to USGC Homeported ships and station</p>			
<p>Impact on local economy and infrastructure</p>			



Military Value Scoring Surface-Subsurface Function

Ranking	DoN Activity - Active Bases Only	Military Value
1	NS PEARL HARBOR HI	74.50
2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
3	SUBASE KINGS BAY GA	63.51
4	NS BREMERTON WA	63.25
5	SUBASE BANGOR WA	62.98
6	NS SAN DIEGO CA	61.43
7	NAS NORTH ISLAND CA	59.68
8	SUBASE SAN DIEGO CA	58.29
9	NAB LITTLE CREEK VA	55.90
10	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
11	NS EVERETT WA	50.68
12	SUBASE NEW LONDON CT	50.68
13	COMNAVMARIANAS GU	47.67
14	NS INGLESIDE TX	42.23
15	WPNSTA EARLE COLTS NECK NJ	39.07
16	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Summary Stats:	
Max:	74.50
Min:	37.08
Range:	37.42
Mean:	55.64
Median:	57.10
Std Dev.	10.12147

**Military Value Scoring
Surface-Subsurface Function**

Ranking	DoN Activity	Military Value
1	NS PEARL HARBOR HI	74.50
2	NS NORFOLK VA	67.51
3	NAVSHIPYD NORFOLK VA	64.03
4	SUBASE KINGS BAY GA	63.51
5	NS BREMERTON WA	63.25
6	SUBASE BANGOR WA	62.98
7	NS SAN DIEGO CA	61.43
8	NAS NORTH ISLAND CA	59.68
9	SUBASE SAN DIEGO CA	58.29
10	NAVMAG PEARL HARBOR HI	58.24
11	NAB LITTLE CREEK VA	55.90
12	NS MAYPORT FL	55.71
13	NS EVERETT WA	50.68
14	SUBASE NEW LONDON CT	50.68
15	NAVSHIPYD PORTSMOUTH NH	48.21
16	COMNAVMARIANAS GU	47.67
17	NAS PENSACOLA FL	45.85
18	BLOUNT ISLAND CMD JAX FL	45.78
19	WPNSTA YORKTOWN VA	44.91
20	WPNSTA CHARLESTON SC	43.31
21	NS VENTURA CTY FT MCGU CA	42.86
22	NS NEWPORT RI	42.36
23	NS INGLESIDE TX	42.23
24	NAS KEY WEST FL	40.59
25	WPNSTA EARLE COLTS NECK NJ	39.07
26	NAVORDTESTU CARE CANAVERAL FL	37.71
27	NS PASCAGOULA MS	37.08
28	NSA PANAMA CITY FL	33.73
29	WPNSTA SEAL BEACH at CONCORD CA	30.82

Summary Stats:	
Max:	74.50
Min:	30.82
Range:	43.68
Mean:	50.64
Median:	48.21
Std Dev.	10.97

Shaded Activities Represent "Non-Active" Bases

Keesler Hospital, Biloxi

Deviations from Criteria

*Wm. J. ...
from ...*

Military Value

- Formula was heavily biased against older facilities; did not consider several expansions & upgrades
- Ignores value of Graduate Medical Education on scope and quality of available care
- Ignores value of retiree population disease burden on quality of Graduate Medical Education
- Affords only marginal value to the quality and efficiency of actual medical care (only 6.4% of score came directly from actual inpatient care services)
- Military dependent and retiree population served by Keesler is significantly understated

Cost

- Costs of medical and dental supplies are significantly overstated
- Savings of transferring inpatient care of dependents and retirees to community hospitals is significantly overstated
 - Written response from Medical JCSC admitted that the "inpatient admission cost factor" figure of \$4,314.25 per admission used for Keesler was in error. Applying the correct cost, \$6,790 per admission, reduces the annual savings by \$10 million to a total of \$20 million.

Other Considerations

- DoD Used BRAC process to fundamentally alter the manner, priority, cost, and quality of medical services for dependents and military retirees – this is a policy change, inappropriate for the BRAC process
- Elimination of inpatient capability will result in termination of Keesler's Graduate Medical Education program
- Elimination of Keesler inpatient capability significantly undermines recent decisions by CARES Commission regarding closure of the Gulfport VA and Tricare regional restructuring
- All other affected hospitals have military or civilian hospitals close-by to absorb the patient load – Gulf Coast DOES NOT
 - Keesler had 5407 admissions last year; only Andrews was close with 4190 admission; remaining 7 hospitals had only 8 – 30% of Keesler's inpatient load.
 - NO other military hospitals are proximate to Keesler to pickup inpatient load
 - Community hospitals DO NOT have excess beds or doctors to pickup inpatient load
- DoD ignored
 - Significant cost increase of medical co-payments for dependents and veterans
 - Refusal of many physicians and hospitals to accept Tricare
 - Keesler is the primary source of highly specialized medical care for the community hospitals

*

Naval Station, Pascagoula

Deviation from Criteria

Spill Files - FORD

*Future demand
USM*

*Lakeside
Passa*

- **Military Value**
 - Formula was heavily biased towards force structure consolidation at mega bases
 - DoD failed to consider enclaves for "Lakeside" crew berthing/messing facility, the Distributed Common Ground Station, and brand-new military housing
 - DoD Ignored
 - Value of the base's secure design in support of emerging Homeland Maritime Defense mission
 - Value as the ONLY naval base in the Gulf with multi-cruiser capable pier, deepwater channel, ammunition load/offload capability, and full-service surface combatant SIMA
 - Value of synergy with Ingalls to load/offload weapons, provide SIMA support, and support commissioning crews
 - DoD failed to consider the strategic value of maintaining at least 1 Navy base in the Gulf of Mexico
 - Over 63% of the United States trade by volume transits the Gulf of Mexico
- **Cost**
 - DoD ignored the cost efficiency of supporting "cruiser equivalents" from the ONLY naval base that was specifically designed for that purpose and features virtually brand-new infrastructure
 - DoD incorrectly projected "savings" associated with elimination of military and civilian billets
 - Military billets will be transferred and not eliminated
 - Civilians will have priority placement elsewhere
 - DoD did not consider the MILCON associated with constructing equivalent facilities elsewhere
- **Other Considerations**
 - DoD ignored the integrated vulnerability of the Gulf Coast
 - Proximate to largest Chevron refinery in the US, Ingalls shipyard, and 3 Major Gulf Coast ports

186th Air Refueling Wing, Meridian

Deviations from Criteria

- Military Value

- DoD Ignored:

- BRAC grows fighter basing and training in Southeast while substantially decreasing tanker coverage in same region
- 80% of pilots, aircrews and maintenance crews will not move with aircraft from MS (300+ people)
- Facility capabilities
 - Incorrectly considers capacity for only 8 tankers. Current capacity is 17 KC-135R or other large body aircraft (able to surge to 19).
 - No differentiation in contiguous and distributed ramp space
 - No consideration for taxi-in/taxi-out and tow-in/tow-out requirements.
 - All required facilities constructed specifically for the tanker mission
- Full inventory of all required facilities - no MILCON build out – virtually new infrastructure
- Uniqueness of “one-of-a-kind” facilities (i.e. twin tail hanger, fuel cell hanger, and full motion trainer).


- Cost

- Ignored additional flying time required to service new and existing receivers in the Southeast (\$9,000/sortie or \$90M over twenty years).
- Omitted cost to retrain or replace lost pilots, aircrew and maintenance crew (Air Force Pilot Cost Model: ~\$4.4M/pilot).
- Omitted MILCON cost of relocating one of Air National Guard's four full motion simulators.
- Ignored the cost of upgrading standard facilities at receiving sites.
 - Over 50% of DOD Facility Condition Indices are C-3/C-4.
- No consideration for conversion costs at sites recommended to transition from KC-135Es to KC-135Rs.
- Cost savings is never achieved – realignment actually results in cost growth**

- Other Considerations

- Less than 20% of Guard will move with mission
- No business case analysis exist to support increasing KC-135R Permanently Assigned Aircraft (PAA) from 8 to 12/16.
- Impact of DOD recommendation is greater than 175 full-time guardsmen. Additional impact to 327 traditional guardsmen.

The 186th ARW with 12 KC-135R's



Sign-in Sheet July 16, 2005

<u>Name</u>	<u>Office</u>
Stephen Peranich	Rep Taylor
Myrtis Frank	Sen. Lott
Bill Gentry	Miss DeJ. Ketterly Gen. Liaison
John Tenaglia	USAF Legislative Liaison
Charity Brandy, 1Lt	81 TRW/PA
Clay Williams	Senator Lott
Brian Martin	Rep. Taylor
Parah Gatchell	Senator Cochran
MITCH WALDMAN	Sen. Lott
Brian McDaniel	BRAC Com. Analyst
Gen. Cord	
Gen. Yancy	
Com. Gehman	

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

BASE SUMMARY SHEET

Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi

MISSION

- Installation Mission: “Advance Critical Mission Capabilities of the Air and Space Expeditionary Force...Warriors...Training Warriors...For Warriors!”
- Medical Mission: Medical Readiness is the primary mission of the 81st Medical Group that operates Keesler Medical Center, the second largest medical center in the entire Air Force.

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- Realign Keesler Air Force Base, MS, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at the 81st Medical Group; converting the medical center to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Note: This is one of nine hospitals that DoD is recommending be disestablished and converted to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center under the Convert Inpatient Services to Clinics Recommendation.

(The other facilities are: Naval Hospital Cherry Point, NC; Ft. Eustis Medical Facility; Ft. Carson Medical Facility; Andres AFB, MD 89th Medical Group; MacDill AFB, FL 6th Medical Group; Fort Knox, KY; Scott AFB, IL 375th Medical Group; and Naval Hospital Great Lakes, IL.)

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- The Department will rely on the civilian medical network for inpatient services. This recommendation supports strategies of reducing excess capacity and locating military personnel in activities with higher military value with a more diverse workload, providing them with enhance opportunities to maintain their medical currency to meet COCOM requirements. Additionally, a robust network with available inpatient capacity of Joint Accreditation of Hospital Organizations (JCAHO) and/or Medicare accredited civilian/Veterans Affairs hospitals is located within 40 miles of the referenced facility.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

Note: These cost considerations are for all 9 inpatient conversions.

- One-Time Costs: \$ 12.9 million
- Net Savings (Cost) during Implementation: \$ 250.9 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 60.2 million
- Return on Investment Year: Calendar Years (20 Years)
- Net Present Value over 20 Years: \$ 818.1 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

	Out		In		Net Gain (Loss)	
	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
This Recommendation	(181)	(31)	0	0	(181)	(31)
Other Recommendation(s)						
Total	(181)	(31)	0	0	(181)	(31)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- No specific environmental impacts were listed for Keesler AFB, MS. Additionally, DoD's report states there are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.

REPRESENTATION

Governor: The Honorable Haley Barbour
 Senators: The Honorable Thad Cochran
 The Honorable Trent Lott

Representative: The Honorable Gene Taylor

ECONOMIC IMPACT

- Potential Employment Loss: 352 jobs (212 direct and 140 indirect)
- MSA Job Base: Gulfport-Biloxi, MS
- Percentage: percent decrease
- Cumulative Economic Impact (Year-Year): ___ percent decrease

MILITARY ISSUES

- (Include pertinent items)

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES

•
ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

- (Include pertinent items)

~~Office~~ -

causeway owned by the
State -

USCG -
Housing

170 approx in the

600 ft port housing deficiency
of 54 units

" originally
Sep. 06/11

conversion to PPV

Built in 1992

PCV crews function
of FY
Ships - awarded to N. Green
LPD

Assumes ships built in -
Company moved to Pasigaya
Sequencing
Insufficient hotel space in
town

- assumption
 - unpredictability of fluctuation
- Contract awarded -

Ships - slides -

Av. Hull num "110"
DDG - 2010
1 ship
LCS - 5 ships awarded
two hulls in mobile
50 each crew LHD8 - 2008 - possible
1 every 10

699-2470
Implementation -

Infrastructure -
- many families

"FY08"

25-30% Mayport

comfortable w/ marina

* ^{biggest} Training @ Mayport -

* Transition to Mayport
minimal

* Craves - had spent 35%

- 8 operators
 - LRC - Tray - 03
 - ↳ 2 computer Lab
-

SIMA

43 K SF

Entirely military

New Breweries

USO

built in / State

BOS contract
for MIT

1250 ave
QDARC

No maintenance
checking in
15 years!

Cost effective to
operate

Supships - we have
an base - had been
in least space

Coast Guard -
station

- New (water) function
Coast Guard

Phase I -
6-16-85

"Phase II" - ^{emphasis} Confirmed data

Sign-in sheet

- Confirmed data

- Sworn statements

Focus on public officials

JDed as sworn testimony
auto trigger review

(8:34) | - visit to HQ welcome
- point out weaknesses

Command Brief (8:38)

Nothing other than latitude
2nd question? - Capt question
15-01
11-01

How large is your office?

How do crews at the ashore

- to duty sections

Capt. They have the
John Hull barracks
E-3 and below

In this unique at
Pasadena - ?

Don't have land to
put all crews

SAH - available

for E-1 and above

Camp report has a housing
deficiency

There is picture of March
last 15 to 2000 of
Seymour Co.

- ✓ Chevron USA
- ✓ LNG - possibly
- ✓ Comm - building an union

Fire stout

Assembly - global bank
many from SO CAL

Keesler impact -

Ocean Springs -

30/40% medical personnel
live in Ocean Springs

(good schools)
Retirees -

USAF

BRAC - 11,000

30,000 - Retiree

Military Value

Commissions -

Delegations -

Bias to major base

Value - unique

- Southian

- interdiction missions

63% by volume of

- US commerce transit Gulf

- Strategic missions to

Algorithms disint - force
protection

Threat perspective

↳ risk assessment

* Classified Threat Assessment
relevance

A Efficiency \int
#/CGE

Synergy

* role played by overall
capability

USCG -

Relation w/ Navy

- Reason for its existence
 - More input -
-

• USD - state + Local funds

• Coast Council - state new

• less than 12 miles -

closes to deep ~~via~~ water

100' fathom

Historical average
Lakeside

approx. 2000 rooms in
Jackson county

takeaway credit for billings

* Long term maintenance
2008 - for base

* Same maintenance -

* Contingency costs

Argument = no savings
or + costs.

Shifting cost for HR,
not a real savings,

Question cost of
contingency?

Strategic assets in the
region !!
oil

How land defense 1

Port - 18th largest in US

High military value

Impact on the
Community

- Aggressive economic
efforts

- Impact -
\$

5.5 CCE

↳ current capacity

11.10.1991 etc

Do not allow two way traffic - its block level

John L Hull -

(FF632)

~~3~~ Skipper present

Is there a LPD-17
5 pre-con units
New!

Data call
certified

Questions for
Navy?

LPD-19

DPB - sea
300'

DPB - plus
30' Kiel

Meet

BRAC

- 1240 people - design

Q Long Term viability
of Navy lease until
CE - ? (CE)

A - until CE

Q Most bldgs are pilings?

A No - 2/3 are pilings, most are
"swathinged" bldgs

Electricity - off (P)
Drinking water - on
Sewerage - off

You pay utility -

well = yes
↳ BOB

to call codes
P - you go over Air
Units - and you
have
staff of 30 on base

Maintainance have found
defence in the

- ~~Some in house - SIMIA~~
- ~~Some contracted out~~

yes

• Calibration - yes

• ~~Calibration -~~

ISRT compliance files

Maintainance awareness

Tell me what DGS are
is? - (A)

Ships coming in and
leaving

Base X or envelope
(Cost to stay or move) @ PH

- Moves to some other place?
- Do surveys?
- Stays - cost
- Moves -
↳ cost to re-allocate

CR 2015 - Ship initial
load out

It has now -

↳ would have to
replace ~~the~~ FISC facility
at Station, would have
to be leased or
built on shipyard

LCS

- Q potential add'l ship type
- Q crew's will need
- mobile base far away
- A 30 miles away

BRAC cluster call -

(comment)

↳ interside issues -
start to work on

Core
structure

Get them out of
industrial environment
critical!
ADMI

Keep crews together -
Important

3 parts

- NS
- ~~AP~~
- ID

Different
use &
responsibilities

Does Navy provide
housing for CG -

- West Ave & all family

(2)

In the data calls
when you submitted
did you

- 1st - move to Nov
- 2nd - move to May 2011
- etc.

As far as you yourself
did not own data call
that respond to a
data call about
consolidation

(3) Savings -

Are associated w/
open pay life base?

All BOS Savings

DHM coming in Station
on 444 p

- Does the number look

Ⓢ COBRA Data matches
data ~~at~~ call? yes

com

Lakeside -

Revert back to
SUSSTIP

Need is there!

(-> what is most cost
effective)

Transverse useful
purpose

Date call for including
expenses in
source lakeside

Commanding Capt
Area of operations

Caribbean Basin

Diff in transit times
tactically insignificant

(A) South America
Eastern Pacific -
through source

Random point
south of KC / west

~~1. Jue~~

~~2. Jue~~

3. JJ - 228-371-1391

4. JJ -

can not use media
- event on installation

Downtime @ 143€

150€

9:41

Base Team

318 5174

Janis - Eric - David

Friday -

312 1013 0021

1099 -

Kristen -

How are things going on
with the kids, working -

Inside SIMA

no adhd - 77 Mobile

Any reserve units?

Yes -

CO will provide
for his own
tenant work

Can't do opt out
further down
look for...

Penalty repair -

- Dedication yes
- ownership of electrical c
- AK for...
- ... - yes

20 - ~~people~~ people
mobile

34

~~35~~ DCS -

Reserve -

(DC)

Naval Fires Network

100% spread - req

kill - land target

IFCS - Army system
based

5yr - Navy Budget

Maritime Data Fusion

customer -

no navy/customer

* Ret cost. included -
\$ 15 BOM

System - deployment

currently deployed by
Mentimeter

Military operations billets
on US.

Amc -

- brought in by truck
- military operations
ammo fact -

ESTDARIS

USCIS - land

- no cost - One of the things
Area of the country
- South/DIC/Kee/estafic

NIFFR

range of - facte

2-3 M seen as fast const

= total - changed fuels
two a day?

May 06
natural gas
heat -

10 = 34

Adm Braun
one realignment
Gulf Coast + Regional
Southwest Region

O+M Budget for a
year?

class consolidated
and consolidated request

dollars value
from (NAT
(Action, whatever))

funds come down to
station by program ^{and}
Casper
budget over dollars

12.5 M - just to operate
share (skill)
→ per year (1111)
~~BS~~ - contract
value of contract

Q - Hardest question
of all -
Evel straight
where does that savings

were not accounted in
the COBRA -

Is Navy carrying
~~the~~ end strength in
COBRA Savings?

check w/
Question Navy -

Maya -

~~_____~~

Demilitarized (not
accounted for in BRAC)

Cape - FL
reliance support
US + British
Wallops. Inst
(sheet in manual)

6-16-05

Naval Battle Force Units

• Panama City
(Foreign)

- Pensacola - carrier
 - Key West - ^{carrier} ^{submarine} ^{group}
- ^{missile} ^{group}
-

tactical equipment

- wave ships out of
Gulf?

- wave airplanes to
the Gulf?

Tactical balance?

- icicles -

Transparency

Trust

ripple effects

- Data call

- certifiable data

Network - capacity

Challenges of accuracy / ?

Implementation

Within chapter if
implementation changes
the "net net"

50 years old
blocks.

Entitlement -
Hospital is there
only

10-16-05 Keester -

Com. Gehrman site visit
now w/ by 75 most impacted
Orientation of the commission

JACHO -

etc infrastructure?

- Certified Issue

- "1000 of analysts"

- Be subjective"

1.0M SF - 2nd largest
approaching 50 years

Medical Data

- 95 beds staffed

How do you count beds -
changes over time

- 1.2 m from Biloxi VAMC

Fisher House - yes

Readiness -

Medical Equip - BRAC Savings
perhaps

Federal Anchor - ?

(specialty / subspecialists?)

→ why not VA?

Gen. Taylor -

where should GME
should be done

AF - primary factor - ^{acc &}

Gen. Taylor | Lesia |
savings = \$ 23M Expense

Local command not sure how
savings

'02 calculation
Av. Consus -

1 anesthesiologist + provider
Bilox health care
market

Is Tricare cost
in COBRA

GME - "producing Doctors
How many USAF
teaching hospital

Residents -

USAF - suff. capacity
available

Teaching Hospitals in USAF

• Brooks - ~~BARAC~~

• Wright Pat - (bigger - BARAC)

• Travis - Family Practice

training

Radio

How
big

←
summary
CA - many
doctors

Scott + Andrews -
converted

Investment of
Capital Investment Profile
last 10 years

- health care - VA
metric

↑ RUU - outpatient
RWP - raw weighted
product

↑

one time cost?

• include new million?

1000 vs 2200

6-11-05 Maya & B. Lexi

A. J. Hollaway

Fact Frunkhaus

Brian - Facilitate -

Keester -

- Retirees -

Data

Keester -

Very different - unique

• larger

• GMRE

• specialities

Mayer -

• Gulfport

Colver's -

Gen. Taylor

Impact on reality of
• GME or region

• TRICARE acceptance
providers

• Active duty -
• students

• Number

JCST -

• inpatient

• outpatient

• trainees

(Over of retirees)

impact
on the patient

Medical peace -
fundamental shift
enabled through
Sen. Left - says "foul"
Legislative

1) Gen. Yang Tientai
leader -
• But no military value

BASE VISIT REPORT

Naval Station Pascagoula, Pascagoula, MS

16 June 2005

LEAD COMMISSIONER: Admiral Harold H. Gehman (RET)

COMMISSION STAFF: Brian A. McDaniel, Senior Analyst, Navy/Marine Corps Team


LIST OF ATTENDEES:

ADM Annette Brown – Commander, Navy Region Southeast
CDR Robert Benjamin -- Commanding Officer, Naval Station (NS) Pascagoula
LCDR Sabra Kountz -- Executive Officer (XO), NS Pascagoula
CMC Laurel Davis – Command Master Chief, NS Pascagoula
CAPT Costa - Commodore, Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) Six
CAPT David Bella – Commanding Officer, SUPSHIPS and PRECOM Units, Pascagoula, MS
CAPT William Overman – Staff Liason Officer, Navy Distributed Common Ground System – Unit 2.
CAPT (USCG) Todd Gentile -- Chief of Resources, United States Coast Guard (USCG)
CDR George Diktaban – Executive Officer, Branch Medical/Dental Clinic
CDR Eric Young -- Commanding Officer, USS John L. Hall
CDR John Zollo – Supply Officer, Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, JAX Detachment
LCDR Neil Smith – XO, Southeast Regional Maintenance Center (SERMC), NS Pascagoula
LT David Byrd – Combat Systems Officer, DESRON 14
HMCS Cliff Moudy – Fleet Liason, Branch Medical/Dental
Mr. Brian Silas – Business Manager, NS Pascagoula
Ms. Gwen Leeman – Management Program Analyst, NS Pascagoula
Mr. Matt Schultz – Program Analyst, NS Pascagoula
Chief James Bryant – CBH Officer, NS Pascagoula
JO1 Kimberly Dejong, PAO, NS Pascagoula
GSCM Charles Simpson – CMC DESRON 6
LCDR David Baker – Emergency Management Officer, NS Pascagoula
Mr. Mitchell B. Waldman – National Security Advisor, Senator Trent Lott's Office
Ms. Perah Gatchell – Staff Assistant, Senator Cochran's Office
Mr. Steven Peranich – Chief of Staff, Rep. Taylor's Office
Mr. Brian Martin – Policy Director, Rep. Taylor's Office
Mr. Bill Crawford – Deputy Director of Community Assistance, Gov. Barbour's Office
Ms. Kay Beason – Delta Metro Director, Pascagoula, MS
LT COL Mark Laviolette – USMC Congressional Liason, DoD Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA)
LT COL John Tenaglia – Legislative Liason, DoD OLA

NAVAL STATION'S PRESENT MISSION:

- Located on the Singing River Island -- a 437-acre man-made, government-owned island located in the Mississippi Sound at the mouth of the Singing River -- the Naval Station, established in 1992, provides shore facilities and related services needed to support fleet

forces and sailors assigned to the Naval Station. The Naval Station's on-island real estate portfolio is comprised of over 320,000 square feet of piers, office space, maintenance shops, warehouses, ammunition bunkers, and on-shore bachelor housing, developed on 190 acres. The Navy's capital investment in the NS Pascagoula is valued at approximately \$110 million. The island is connected to the mainland by a 3-mile long, state-owned vehicular causeway.



Primary ship support facilities include a 680 foot long, 80 foot wide, double-deck ("cold-iron" utility services located on lower deck) pier as well as east and west wharfs with a total capacity equal to 5.5 "cruiser equivalents", and related weapons/ordnance handling and storage facilities. Both the pier and wharfs are classified by the Navy as being functionally "Adequate", having a design dredge depth of 37 feet.

Additionally, the ship turning basin is large enough to accommodate an Amphibious

Assault Ship (LHD). Singer River Island is approximately 11.6 nautical miles from open sea.

Other significant support "on-island" facilities and services include intermediate ship maintenance and repair, a Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, bachelor housing, family support, Morale, Welfare and Recreation facilities, and limited Navy Exchange services.

Currently, the Station supports approximately 1,195 (including 763 crew members assigned to 3 ships) active duty military members and 200 (including 156 crew members assigned to 4 ships) Coast Guard personnel, plus 112 Navy civilian employees, 62 Non-Appropriated Fund (NAF) employees, and 33 government contractors. The Station also supports about 850 reservists and 4,000 military retirees living in the Pascagoula and Jackson County, MS area.

- Major Tenant Commands and Activities

Homeported Navy Warships and Homeland Security Ships:

Destroyer Squadron 14 Units –

- Guided Missile Cruiser USS Thomas Gates (CG-51)
(Scheduled for decommissioning prior to Fiscal Year 2006)
- Guided Missile Frigate USS John L. Hall (FFG 32)
- Guided Missile Frigate USS Stephen W Groves (FFG 29)
(Navy Reserve Force, Active (NRFA))
- Provides Maritime Homeland Defense platforms in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean in support of operation Noble Eagle, counter narcotics, standing NATO Maritime Group, and UNITAS.
- DESRON 14 Commanding Officer/Headquarters located at Naval Station Mayport, FL.

US Coast Guard Atlantic Area Command Units

- Medium-Endurance Cutter USCGC Decisive (WMEC 629)
- Patrol Coastal Cutter USCGC Shamal (WPC 13)
- Patrol Coastal Cutter USCGC Tornado (WPC 14)
- Patrol Coastal Cutter USCGC Tempest (WPC 2) Crew
(Ship Expected to arrive Oct/Nov 2005)

Shore Activities (located on Singing River Island):

Commander Destroyer Squadron 6 – Headquarters staff (no warships assigned) provides dedicated support to operations in the Southern Command Area of Responsibility (AOR), including combating and countering narco-terrorism.

Southeast Regional Maintenance Center (SERMC): Provides intermediate level maintenance (i.e., between ship's forces and shipyard capabilities) to warships assigned to NS or passing through the Gulf Coast Region. The SRMC also supports DESRON 14 by serving as its executive agent in Pascagoula by managing transient personnel and providing material and technical staff assistance. Originally, a Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity or SIMA (see DoD recommendation), the name was changed to SERMC in 2004.

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) JAX Detachment: Provides combat logistics support, inventory management and storage, and acquisition services to local navy customers including the Naval Station, home ported warships, Pre-commissioning Units, SUPSHIP, SERMC, and the Coast Guard Cutters and Station.

Navy Reserve Distributed Common Ground System - Unit 2 (NR DCGS-N2) Mobile units capable of merging ISR&T, mission planning, and situational awareness functions as well as providing littoral surveillance. The Naval Reserve's Space and Network Warfare Program (SNWP) provides classified military operators to fuse national and tactical data for congressionally mandated Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) program. New \$6.6 million dollar facility and secure compound is currently under construction on the NS.

Branch Health Clinic: Provide primary health care services to sailors, marines, military families, and retirees.

United States Coast Guard Multi-Mission Station: Provides homeland security to the Port of Pascagoula as well as search and rescue and law enforcement interdictions from Mobile Bay, AL to Gulfport, MS. Station is manned by 36 active duty Coast Guardsman and 11 reserves.

Shore Activities (located off Singing River Island):


Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP) Gulf Coast: Located at the Northrop-Grumman Shipyard on the mainland in Pascagoula, MS (across the channel from the Naval Station), the Navy's SUPSHIP Gulf Coast is responsible for managing and overseeing the construction or overhaul of Navy warships at the Northrop-Grumman shipyard and approximately 250 sailors and Navy civilians as well as the Pre-Commissioning

Units (PCUs) or crews assigned to the Navy ships under construction at the shipyard.

Lakeside Support Facility: A Navy-owned 33 acre bachelor housing facility located on the mainland about 7 miles east of the Naval Station. Operated by the Naval Station, the facility provides berthing for 400 to 500 sailors, and is occupied primarily by PCU crews assigned to SUPSHIP Gulf Coast. The Navy capital asset value of the Lakeside complex is \$30M.



Family Housing Complex: A Navy-owned 75 acre family housing development site located on the mainland about 18 miles west of the Naval Station, the \$25.4 MILCON project is designed to provide 160 family housing units. The Navy plans to privatize management and operation of the housing in FY 2006.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION:

Close Naval Station Pascagoula, MS, and relocate its two remaining ships (FFGs) along with dedicated personnel, equipment, and support to Naval Station Mayport, FL. Relocate the ship intermediate repair function to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Mayport, FL

This recommendation will reduce excess berthing capacity while allowing for consolidation of surface ships in a fleet concentration area. Sufficient capacity and fleet dispersal is maintained with East Coast surface fleet homeports of Naval Station Norfolk and Naval Station Mayport, FL. Gulf Coast presence can be achieved as needed with available Navy ports at Naval Air Station Key West, FL and Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL

The Guided Missile Cruiser (CG-47 Class) at Naval Station Pascagoula [is] scheduled for decommissioning prior to FY 2006 and will not relocate. This recommendation also supports mission elimination at Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Pascagoula and reduces excess repair capacity.

The Defense Common Ground Station-Navy 2 facility can be relocated to another Naval activity or remain in its present location as a tenant of the U.S. Coast Guard, if the Coast Guard elects to assume property ownership of some or all of the Pascagoula facility.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

- After a Command Brief presented by the Naval Station's Commanding Officer, CDR Robert Benjamin, Commissioner Gehman was given a "windshield" tour of the Navy Station property and facilities including the piers, on-island Bachelor Quarters, magazines, public work shops, and MWR facilities as well as a walking tour and inspection of the SERMC facility. After the Command's windshield tour of the on-island Naval Station facilities, Commissioner Gehman and Mr. Brian A. McDaniel were escorted off-island to the new Navy Housing Complex where the Commissioner was provided an inspection tour of a newly completed family housing unit. In addition to the formal tours and inspections, Commissioner Gehman and Mr. McDaniel stayed overnight at the Lakeside bachelor housing complex.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

- Pier capacity substantially underutilized; station was originally designed to accommodate approximately 5 AEGIS class cruisers, and is now being used to homeport 2 cruisers and one Spruance Class destroyer.
- Recommendation to close NS Pascagoula (including Lakeside facility) would require the Navy's SUPSHIP Gulf Coast to again either take control of Lakeside or depend on the private sector to provide required housing for PCU crews assigned to SUPSHIP.
- Station shore facilities are well planned, relatively new, free of environmental issues, and maintained with little or no deferred maintenance.
- Regional Navy, DoD, and USGC demand for Family Housing Complex (MILCON) including Navy and other DoD activities in nearby Biloxi and Gulfport, MS.
- NS Pascagoula responded to DON scenarios to enclave the Lakeside Support Facility or the Navy Reserve Distributed Common Ground System - Unit 2, but neither scenario was included in DoD's final BRAC recommendation.

INSTALLATION CONCERNS RAISED

- Loss of Military owned and operated family and bachelor housing needed to support ongoing SUPSHIP Gulf Coast presence/mission and PCU crews. Concerns expressed about potential loss of PCU crew integrity due to billeting sailors in geographically scattered civilian hotels in the future if both NS Pascagoula and Lakeside Facility are closed. SUPSHIP provided information showing the average-on-board number of PCU sailors assigned to SUPSHIP is 480, but is projected to vary from a low of 175 in 2006 to a high of over 900 sailors in 2011, and is highly dependent on the number and type of Navy warships being constructed or overhauled at the Northrop-Grumman shipyard in Pascagoula, MS.
- Coast Guard representative presented planning information indicating the Dept. of Homeland Security would need to invest an additional \$1.3M in physical improvements, and incur an additional "O&M" cost of \$1.0M (physical security, ground maintenance, utilities, etc.)

every year in order to take over "jurisdiction and control" of Singing River Island from the Navy.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

- Loss of a strategic asset needed for Homeland Defense and/or Homeland Security of the Gulf Coast Region and surrounding critical civilian infrastructure.
- Existing or planned supply of "market" hotel rooms not large enough to absorb additional Navy demand (i.e., PCU crews) due to closing Lakeside facility along with NS Pascagoula.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

- A staff site visit and community meeting was conducted by Commission's staff analyst, Mr. Brian A. McDaniel on June 15, 2005 - one day prior to the Commissioner's visit. The Commanding Officer made no requests for additional visits after Commissioner Gehman's base visit.

Analysis of Pascagoula COBRA Report

DOD Cost and Savings Estimates for Closing Naval Station Pascagoula, Relocating Some Activities to Naval Station Mayport, Some to Base X, and Eliminating Others

One-Time Costs:	
NAVSTA Pascagoula	11,068,784
NAVSTA Mayport	\$6,870,675
Combined	\$17,939,460
One-Time Savings:	
NAVSTA Pascagoula	\$743,599
Net One-Time Costs:	
NAVSTA Pascagoula	\$10,325,185
NAVSTA Mayport	\$6,870,675
Combined	\$17,195,861
Recurring Costs:	
NAVSTA Pascagoula	\$4,744,000
NAVSTA Mayport	\$2,851,000
Base X (Navy)	\$8,000
Combined	\$7,603,000
Recurring Savings:	
NAVSTA Pascagoula	\$54,820,000
NAVSTA Mayport	\$45,000
Combined	\$54,865,000
Net Recurring Costs/Savings:	
NAVSTA Pascagoula	-\$50,076,000
NAVSTA Mayport	2,806,000
Combined	-\$47,261,000
Total Net Savings Through 2011:	\$220,017,000
Annual Savings After 2011:	47,434,000

One-time Costs at Pascagoula:

Civilian RIF	\$2,582,921
Civilian Early Retirement	\$107,901
Eliminated Military PCS	\$1,929,174
Unemployment	\$200,295
Program Overhead	\$1,995,187
Support Contract Termination	\$118,600
Mothball/Shutdown	\$82,440
Civilian Moving	\$50,908
Civilian Priority Placement (PPP)	\$780,912
Military Moving	\$1,255,238
Freight	\$288,518
Information Technologies	\$83,400
Housing Assistance Program	\$993,290
One-Time Unique Costs	\$600,000

DOD proposes to eliminate of 33 officer billets, 396 enlisted billets, and 110 civilian positions, relocate 31 officer billets, 372 enlisted billets, and 2 civilian positions to Mayport, and assign 12 enlisted positions assigned to the DCGS-N2 (Distributed Common Ground Station) to a place to be determined, possibly remaining in Pascagoula as a tenant of the Coast Guard. DOD employs a standard model using DOD-wide average salaries of officers, enlisted, and civilians, averages of the percentage of civilians who will retire, move, take priority placement, or draw unemployment, DOD-wide averages of the weight of household goods and the distances to be moved for the military PCS leaving the service, in order to estimate the one-time costs of eliminating and realigning positions. The "one-time unique costs" of \$600,000 is \$200,000 per year described as "travel costs in support of MOA with USCG for each fiscal year (06-08)." In 2004, the Navy signed an MOA to transfer five Navy coastal patrol craft to Coast Guard custody and operational control. Navy agreed to fund and perform maintenance at the crafts' homeports. MOA in effect through FY 2008.

One-Time Costs at NAVSTA Mayport:

Military Construction	\$6,850,675
Environmental Mitigation Costs	\$20,000

MilCon projects are listed as 39,050 sq. ft. barracks for \$6,548,000 and 5,985 sq. ft. parking lot for \$303,000.

One-time Savings at Pascagoula:

Military Moving	\$743,000
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No detailed explanation, but must be cost avoidance for personnel moves to Pascagoula that would be cancelled because of BRAC action. Of course, if those military personnel move elsewhere, the moving costs are not avoided.

Recurring Costs at NAVSTA Pascagoula:

Miscellaneous Recurring	\$4,744,000
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This is the estimated cost of berthing precommissioning crews in the community rather than in Lakeside Support Facility, computed from the difference between per diem rate and average Lakeside charges.

Recurring Costs at NAVSTA Mayport:

Sustainment	\$137,000
Recapitalization	\$55,000
Base Operating Costs (BOS)	\$532,000
TRICARE	\$392,000
Housing Allowance	\$1,734,000

Sustainment and recapitalization, are estimated by formula based on the new square footage. BOS cost is estimated by formula based on the new personnel. TRICARE and housing allowance estimates are based on the higher costs in Mayport.

Recurring Costs at Base X (Navy):

Base Operating Costs (BOS)	\$13,000
TRICARE	-\$5,000

Base X is the BRAC process designation for personnel or costs whose destination is unknown. In this case, the 12 enlisted positions assigned to the DCGS-N2 (Distributed Common Ground Station) will not be eliminated and will not move to Mayport, but their destination is uncertain. They might remain on Singing River Island as tenants of the Coast Guard. The estimate for BOS and TRICARE costs came from formulas.

Recurring Savings at NAVSTA Pascagoula:

Sustainment	\$979,000
Recapitalization	\$954,000
Base Operating Costs (BOS)	\$3,840,000
Civilian Salary	\$7,314,000
Officer Salary	\$4,124,000
Enlisted Salary	\$32,630,000
Housing Allowance	\$4,718,000
Miscellaneous Recurring	\$259,000

This confirms that almost all of the projected savings actually come from reducing military and civilian personnel. Military salaries and housing allowance account for \$41,472,000 of the projected annual savings and \$7,314,000 come from civilian salaries. The figures are based on the DOD-wide average salary for officers, enlisted, and civilians. The sustainment, recapitalization, and are estimated by formula based on the square footage eliminated. The BOS costs are based on the number and type of personnel being eliminated. The miscellaneous recurring savings are the estimated cost avoidance of dredging the Navy Channel.

Recurring Savings at NAVSTA Mayport:
Miscellaneous Recurring \$45,000

Scenario Data Call says that relocation of frigates to Mayport would save SIMA Mayport \$45,000 in travel costs of sending personnel and equipment.

NAVAL STATION PASCAGOULA PERSONNEL SUMMARY

NAVSTA Pascagoula Base Population FY 2005:

Officers	115
Enlisted	1,432
Civilians	112
TOTAL	1,659

Non-BRAC Changes Programmed for FY 2006 & FY 2007:

Officers	-51
Enlisted	-652
TOTAL	703

Base Population Baseline Prior to BRAC Action:

Officers	64
Enlisted	780
Civilians	112
TOTAL	956

Personnel Realigned to NAVSTA Mayport:

Officers	31
Enlisted	372
Civilians	2
TOTAL	405

Personnel Realigned to Base X (Navy):

Enlisted	12
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Scenario Position Changes (i.e. Positions Eliminated):

Officers	33
Enlisted	396
Civilians	110
TOTAL	539

On page 3 of the "Total COBRA Realignment Detail Report" the following information is available: Of the recurring Net Savings (\$47M), \$47M is military and civilian personnel costs. Sustainment, Recapitalization, and Base Operations and Support (BOS) net savings (\$5.2M) is almost completely offset by the annual recurring cost of per diem for pre-commissioning units (\$4.7M).

5. Could you provide a side-by-side of area cost factors for Mayport, Norfolk, Key West, Pensacola and Pascagoula?

Mayport - 0.91; Norfolk - 0.94; Key West - 1.24; Pensacola - 0.87; Pascagoula - 0.84

6. Could you provide a detailed economic analysis of why divestiture of the Pascagoula Lakeside facility makes sense? Was a market survey done to show if there was an adequate number of affordable, quality units are available in the economy?

The economic analysis is contained in the CORBA report for the recommendation. The estimated \$4.74M per diem cost to house pre-commissioning units was included in the COBRA analysis. An alternative scenario in which the Lakeside facility was retained in an enclave was evaluated and showed approximately the same net result in terms of costs, savings, and 20-year Net Present Value (NPV). The COBRA analysis for the scenario maintaining the Lakeside facility as an enclave is enclosed. Naval Station Pascagoula provided information that there were sufficient units available in the economy to house the pre-commissioning units.

7. Lastly, at some point, it would be helpful to get a detailed brief on the military value calculations for Pascagoula, Pensacola, and Key West.

We are coordinating a meeting to conduct this brief.


The enclosed CD contains data supporting answers to questions one and six. To the extent that information on the disk has been redacted, it is so marked. I trust you will find this information useful. If we can be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,



Anne Rathmell Davis
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy
for Base Realignment and Closure

Enclosures:
As Stated



PERSONNEL/SQUARE FOOTAGE/SUSTAINMENT/BOS CHANGES

Personnel Changes

NAVSTA Pascagoula	-956
NAVSTA Mayport	405
Base X (Navy)	12
TOTAL	-539

Square Footage Changes

NAVSTA Pascagoula	-458,000
NAVSTA Mayport	39,370
TOTAL	-418,630

Base Operating Support Changes (2005\$/year)

NAVSTA Pascagoula	-\$3,840,177
NAVSTA Mayport	\$532,492
Base X (Navy)	\$12,681
TOTAL	-\$3,295,005

Sustainment Changes (2005\$/year)

NAVSTA Pascagoula	-\$1,151,705
NAVSTA Mayport	\$136,918
TOTAL	-\$1,014,786

Recapitalization Changes (2005\$/year)

NAVSTA Pascagoula	-\$954,517
NAVSTA Mayport	\$55,132
TOTAL	-\$899,386

Sustainment + Recapitalization + BOS Changes (2005\$/year)

NAVSTA Pascagoula	-\$5,946,400
NAVSTA Mayport	\$724,542
Base X (Navy)	-\$12,681
TOTAL	-\$5,209,177

Plant Replacement Value Changes

NAVSTA Pascagoula	-\$108,815,000
NAVSTA Mayport	\$6,285,023
TOTAL	-\$102,529,977



11-11-11



**Statement of Hon. Gene Taylor
Presented to the
BRAC Commission Regional Hearing
New Orleans, LA
July 22, 2005**

Good morning General Newton and General Turner:

I represent the South Mississippi, which is home to several military installations—three of which are adversely affected by the BRAC recommendations of the Department of Defense (DOD). As most of you are aware, I strenuously opposed authorization for the 2005 round of BRAC because in past rounds projected savings were not realized and several bases were closed that the services and DOD later regretted closing. NAS Cecil Field is a perfect example of this. After reviewing the recommendations in this round, I see that my continued opposition to BRAC is equally well-founded.

As commissioners, you have a unique opportunity to take a hard look at the DOD's analysis and recommendations. I urge you to question everything. Take nothing for granted. With proper scrutiny, I am certain that you will reach the same conclusions that we, in South Mississippi, have. I am hopeful that you will then take action to correct the gross mistakes made by the DOD in its recommendations. The evidence that my fellow Mississippians and I will present will demonstrate that the DOD's recommendations contained egregious flaws, substantial deviations from the BRAC criteria, and in some instances went well beyond the scope of authority provided under the BRAC statute.

The proposal to eliminate inpatient care at Keesler Medical Center is one of the most outrageous items on the entire BRAC list. DOD made an inexcusable error in calculating

Keesler's military value. An incorrect figure in a spreadsheet resulted in Keesler receiving zero points for the condition of the facility when it should have received 11.25 points out of a possible maximum score of 12.5. After we pointed this out, the Secretary of the Medical Joint Cross Service Group admitted the error verbally, but we are still waiting for the written response. The DOD's shoddy work caused Keesler Medical Center to rank 44 places lower in health care services than its correct place. That poor ranking had been cited as the main justification for closing the Keesler hospital. So, essentially, DOD has proposed to close the Keesler hospital, cripple its graduate medical education programs, and force military personnel, their families, and retirees off-base where there is a severe shortage of physicians, all because someone in the Pentagon apparently hit the wrong key on his computer.

Keesler should be the model for the military health care system. The medical center fulfills every major requirement of military health care. It provides outstanding medical care for active duty personnel, helping to ensure their readiness. It provides comprehensive care to military families, contributing to the quality of life that is so important to recruitment and retention. The medical center has exemplary medical education programs that trains surgeons, specialists and other medical personnel for military missions. Keesler fulfills the military's promise of medical care to thousands of retirees, and those retirees provide the complex case mix that is needed to hone the clinical and surgical skills that military specialists need in their mission to support warfighters.

Keesler Medical Center has benefited from excellent leaders who have carefully established a patient mix that perfectly matches the graduate medical education and medical readiness missions of the 81st Medical Group. The elimination of inpatient services would destroy the graduate medical education programs and would decimate the medical care of more than 56,000 military personnel, family members and retirees. There is no civilian medical capacity to absorb so many new patients. In fact, South Mississippi has a severe shortage of primary care and specialty care physicians. The Biloxi-Gulfport metropolitan area has only 72 percent of the US average of specialists per population and only 64 percent of the US average of family and general practice physicians per population.¹ The VA medical facility has no excess capacity or personnel to treat the thousands of retirees who would be thrown out of Keesler. In fact, the VA CARES Commission proposed a reorganization that is heavily dependent on the promise of expanding the existing cooperative arrangements with Keesler.² The Medical Joint Cross-Service Group made no attempt to communicate with the VA, with any local hospital or with local physicians about inpatient capacity, about the availability of surgery and specialty care, or about hosting Keesler's graduate medical education.³

The proposal of the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group to eliminate inpatient services is the product of a seriously flawed process using incorrect and misleading data. It is clear that the Air Force is using the BRAC process to close hospitals and eliminate graduate medical education well beyond the authority of the BRAC statute. Back in June of 2004, the Air Force Surgeon General tried to get the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group to approve Transformational Options

¹ Congressional Research Service, *Health Care Resources in the Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula Metropolitan Area*, June 20, 2005.

² CARES Commission Report to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, February 2004, p. 5-239.

³ Col. Mark A. Hamilton, USAF, *Memorandum for BRAC Clearinghouse*, June 27, 2005

that included a goal to "Close all hospitals/retain clinics/outsource GME." The representatives from the other services correctly objected that the proposals exceeded their authority under BRAC law.⁴ After the questionable military value formula placed many military hospitals at risk for closure or realignment, the other services had several facilities removed from the list for concerns about civilian capacity, medical education, or maintaining control of trainees, all factors that are present in Keesler's case.⁵ The Air Force representatives, in contrast, showed little concern for the effects that hospital closures would have on medical care, medical education, or the training environment. The Air Force obviously hopes to dump its medical responsibilities onto TRICARE, the VA, Medicare, and the local community without regard for the consequences.

Any reasonable rating based primarily on the quality of the medical treatment and the medical education programs would award very high marks to Keesler, but the military value formula used by the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group is horribly flawed. It gives little credit to the graduate medical education programs, which are an essential part of any accurate accounting of the true military value of Keesler Medical Center. Their formula gives no credit at all for the treatment of retirees who are 65 and older, despite the fact that treating those retirees is essential to provide the complex cases for training surgeons and clinicians. Their formula gives very little weight to the actual medical care being performed at Keesler.⁶ Their flawed process tries to compare comprehensive medical centers like Keesler that receive complex cases from other hospitals with the costs at much smaller hospitals that transfer all their serious cases elsewhere. The savings estimates are way off the mark because DOD used absurdly low assumptions about

⁴ *Minutes of the July 6, 2004 Meeting of the MJCSG Principals.*

⁵ *Minutes of the January 4, 2005 Meeting of the MJCSG Principals.*

⁶ Office of Rep. Gene Taylor, *Analysis of Keesler COBRA Report.*

what TRICARE would pay civilian hospitals for the complex case mix that would be tossed out of Keesler.⁷ Then, they compounded that mistake by assuming that treatment of retirees would cost the same amount per patient as treatment of active-duty personnel and their families, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

We are a nation at war. The Pentagon has had to increase bonuses and other incentives to try to recruit surgeons and other medical professionals into the military.^{8,9} Yet the DOD is proposing to decimate the kind of program that is proven to be valuable in the recruitment and retention of military doctors. Almost every study of military medical care has documented the desire of military physicians to perform the full range of procedures within their specialties. A GAO report on implementation of the Medicare Subvention Demonstration project found that "treating seniors helps indirectly with the readiness mission and ...treating the more complex cases indirectly aids the retention and recruitment of doctors."¹⁰ Another GAO report determined that "the services view (Graduate Medical Education) as the primary pipeline for developing and maintaining the required mix of medical provider skills to meet wartime and peacetime care needs. They also view GME as important to successful recruitment and retention."¹¹ The need to match a diverse mix of patients with the medical education and training requirements of military medical personnel is a substantial factor in medical readiness, but was completely ignored by the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group.

⁷ Col. Mark A. Hamilton, USAF, *Memorandum for OSD BRAC Clearinghouse, June 14, 2005.*

⁸ Atul Gawande, M.D., *Casualties of War-Military Care for the Wounded from Iraq and Afghanistan*, New England Journal of Medicine, Dec. 9, 2004, pp. 2471-2475

⁹ Michael Moran, *Military looking for a few good medics...and surgeons, and RNs, and radiologists, too*, MSNBC, June 10, 2005.

¹⁰ *Medicare Subvention Demonstration: DOD Start-up Overcame Obstacles, Yields Lessons, and Raises Issues*, GAO/GGD/HEHS-99-161, p. 18.

¹¹ *Defense Health Care: Collaboration and Criteria Needed for Sizing Graduate Medical Education*, GAO/HEHS-98-121, p. 4.

I am especially bothered by the manner in which the Keesler facility was presented to the full Medical Joint Cross-Service Group on January 4, 2005. The background information presented by the Air Force staff contained major misstatements of fact. Keesler is described as having 154 beds when it actually has 95 staffed beds. Worse, the VA is described as having 552 beds with an average daily census of 394. These figures give the impression of excess capacity at Keesler and enormous inpatient capacity at the VA facility. In fact, this is how the Department of Veterans Affairs described its facilities in Biloxi and Gulfport:

The Biloxi VAMC is a 48-bed acute medical and surgical inpatient unit including intensive care. Biloxi VAMC provides health care for 124 nursing home and intermediate care beds, 171 domiciliary beds, and outpatient mental health. ... The Gulfport VAMC serves as an inpatient psychiatric care unit with 144 operating beds. ... The Gulfport VAMC has a 56-bed nursing home and dementia unit.¹²

The VA has 48 acute care beds, not 552 as suggested by the Air Force staff presentation to the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group deciding Keesler's fate. The other beds are psychiatric beds, nursing home beds, and domiciliary beds. I believe that the Air Force representatives knew or should have known that they were including nursing home beds and domiciliary beds in the VA capacity that they implied would be available for active duty personnel, families, and retirees. The Air Force and the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group also should have known that the VA plans to close the aging Gulfport facility, but that plan is contingent on expanding collaborative arrangements with Keesler and new construction at the Biloxi VA campus.

¹² CARES Commission Site Visit Report, Biloxi and Gulfport, Mississippi, July 2, 2003.

Although I disagree with the VA's decision to close the Gulfport facility, I do appreciate that the CARES Commission under then-Secretary Principi made site visits to the VA facilities and to Keesler, held open hearings, and made the reorganization proposal contingent on assurances that the patients would be treated at Keesler or a new VA facility. The DOD recommendation's total disregard for the obligations to active-duty personnel, their families, and retirees stands out as especially callous in comparison. I implore the commission to disapprove the recommendation to close the hospital at Keesler.

The decision to close Naval Station Pascagoula is another example of significant deviation from the BRAC criteria related to military value. You know and I know that the BRAC recommendations are completely biased in favor of the mega-bases. NS Pascagoula isn't Norfolk or Mayport. Rather, it is precisely what the Navy's strategic homeports were intended to be—strategically-located in relation to the Navy's area of operations, dispersed from large fleet-concentration areas, and lean, efficient, and cost-effective to operate. The mega-base bias was evident in our examination of data calls and minutes of the DOD's Navy Analysis Group. This body considered only two scenarios regarding NS Pascagoula—neither of which considered retaining the facility. This very limited approach prevented a proper evaluation of the military value of permanently stationing Navy surface assets at a port in the Gulf of Mexico.

Let me be clear, if the DOD's BRAC recommendation remains unchanged, there will be no Navy homeport in the Gulf of Mexico. Abandoning the Gulf of Mexico will create a huge gap in US national security and homeland defense capability. This is a decision of tremendous strategic importance, and should only be debated by the Congress and the President. It certainly

should not be decided as part of a bureaucratic process intended to reshape DOD infrastructure. How important is the Gulf of Mexico? Sixty-three percent of the U.S. commercial shipping trade transits through the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf is home to 14 of the top 25 U.S. ports and represents 35 percent of the nation's tidal coastline. The Gulf is populated with thousands of critical infrastructure sites, including oil and gas production platforms and refining facilities, vital sea lanes, and important elements of the US' defense industrial capability. Knowing all this, what is the military value of the last pier at the last homeport in the Gulf of Mexico compared to one more pier at a mega-base on the Atlantic?

The DOD's BRAC recommendation also fails to address the emerging requirements of the homeland defense mission through the closure of the Navy's Gulf Coast homeports. According to the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support released late last month, it is now DOD policy to have an active and layered defense capable of defending the maritime approaches to the U.S. and possessing maritime interception capabilities necessary to maintain freedom of action and protect the nation at a safe distance.¹³ It is unimaginable that the DOD could accomplish this critical mission with no naval homeport in the Gulf of Mexico. In fulfillment of its homeland defense mission, the DOD must work together with the Coast Guard to strengthen the security in our ports and littorals and expand maritime defense capabilities further seaward.¹⁴ It is painfully obvious that the BRAC analysis did not consider the DOD's role in homeland defense when NS Pascagoula was considered for closure. NS Pascagoula is centrally located in the Gulf and possesses the ideal capabilities to accomplish the core DOD requirements of homeland defense and jointness.

¹³ Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, June 2005, pp. 24-25.

¹⁴ Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, June 2005, p. 25.

We must also not forget that the Gulf of Mexico is a major gateway to Latin America and the Caribbean. By retaining NS Pascagoula, the nation would continue to have a permanent naval presence near the area of operations that is capable of responding in hours, not days, to threats in this hemisphere of escalating importance. The stability and prosperity of the SOUTHCOM AOR are threatened by transnational terrorism, narcoterrorism, illicit trafficking, forgery and money laundering, kidnapping, urban gangs, radical movements, natural disasters and mass migration.¹⁵

Another challenge to U.S. interests in this region is the emerging influence of extra-hemispheric actors, particularly China. In testimony provided before the House Armed Services Committee on March 9, 2005, General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, described the increasing presence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the region as, "an emerging dynamic that must not be ignored." In 2004, national level defense officials from PRC made 20 visits to Latin America and Caribbean nations, while Ministers and Chiefs of Defense from nine countries in our AOR visited the PRC.¹⁶ In short, a permanent U.S. Naval presence is required in the Gulf of Mexico because "virtual presence is actual absence." NS Pascagoula is the lowest cost option from which to project and maintain that presence.

One of the strange ironies of this BRAC is that while some installations are being recommended for closure because they are too old and maintenance intensive, the DOD is

¹⁵ House Armed Services Committee, Posture Statement of Gen. Bantz J. Craddock, US Army, Commander, US Southern Command. March 9, 2005. P.4.

¹⁶ House Armed Services Committee, Statement of Gen. Bantz J. Craddock, US Army, Commander of US Southern Command. March 9, 2005. P.7.

recommending closing NS Pascagoula—one of the nation's newest military facilities. It has many buildings newer than three years of age, including a recently completed \$25.4 million 160-unit DOD funded family housing area for which no credit was awarded by the DOD's BRAC analysis. NS Pascagoula was built with a significant investment from the local community and state. In fact, the State of Mississippi donated the land on which the facility sits and paid \$24 million to build the causeway to it. The citizens of Jackson County also financed the costs of running utilities to Singing River Island where NS Pascagoula is located. NS Pascagoula also has a significant amount of undeveloped acres capable of expansion to meet the DOD recognized increasing requirements regarding maritime homeland defense or for future Navy platforms like the Littoral Combat Ship. NS Pascagoula is a value for the Navy today, and in the future.

The installation has full weapons handling, transport and bunker capabilities, and a double-decker (ZULU) pier with full ship services dockside and on-site maintenance capabilities. These on-site capabilities are augmented by NS Pascagoula's close proximity to mature defense industrial base activities which support Navy shipbuilding and the manufacturing of UAVs. Pascagoula is home to Northrop Grumman's Ingalls Shipyard and several first and second-tier suppliers which provide great utility to the Navy. These industrial neighbors provide NS Pascagoula with capabilities such as heavy-lift dry docks, heavy-lift cranes, and repair parts without the Navy having to foot the bill for them. Why pay for these capabilities full-time when they are only required on a part-time basis?

My final point on NS Pascagoula is a critical one--closing this facility will not save money. In response to my inquiry about purported cost savings from this closure, the Navy

responded the COBRA report on NS Pascagoula showed that all of the "recurring net savings" estimated from this recommendation are a result of military and civilian personnel costs and the "Sustainment, Recapitalization, and Base Operations and Support (BOS) net savings" is almost completely offset by the annual recurring cost of per diem for pre-commissioning units that use the facility.¹⁷ One of the DOD's primary justifications for having another round of BRAC was to reduce excess capacity in military infrastructure and to direct the savings to other defense priorities. As you may be aware, a report recently released by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the DOD's BRAC process and recommendations (GAO-05-785) raises similar concerns. According to the report, "Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas..."

In summary, NS Pascagoula is the Navy homeport in the Gulf of Mexico, it is a value to the taxpayer, and closing it saves no money. I strongly urge you to overturn this decision.

Lastly, I would like to address the DOD recommendation to relocate the Navy Human Resource Service Center Southeast (HRSC-SE) from Stennis Space Center to the Naval Support Activity, Pennsylvania. This decision also is rife with flaws that easily meet the standard of a substantial deviation from the BRAC criteria.

¹⁷ Ms. Anne Rathmell Davis, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for Base Realignment and Closure, June 23, 2005. p. 1-2.

HRSC-SE is located within a secure federal installation the Stennis Space Center. This activity is in a building that was originally built by the U.S. Army to support the production of 155mm artillery rounds (Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant). This site was completely renovated in 1999 to accommodate HRSC-SE. Despite being in a new facility in a safe and ideal location for expansion, the DOD made an error in assessing the cost and military value of HRSC-SE. In its July 2005 report on the BRAC processes and recommendations, the GAO found that the Navy did not consider whether existing leases at Stennis met force protection standards. This led the Navy to apply \$2 million in cost avoidance, when in fact Stennis Space Center is as secure as any military installation.¹⁸ The Navy did not consider to consolidate the human resources activity at Stennis, which has nearly rent free-lease with NASA on a level 1 Force Protection Federal Facility.

I think that it is also worthwhile to provide a brief description of how unique the Stennis Space Center is. Although a NASA facility, Stennis exemplifies jointness and synergy. The HRSC-SE is co-located with several joint service tenants at Stennis including three other major Naval activities including the Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command and Commander, the Naval Oceanographic Office, and the Naval Research Laboratory. Additionally, there are two significant Special Operations Command activities at Stennis—the Special Boat Team 22 and Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School. Actually, Stennis has more military civilian employees and uniformed personnel than NASA has employees at this installation.

¹⁸ GAO/05-785 *Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignment*, p. 159.

I urge you to look carefully at the information my fellow Mississippians and I are providing you today, and I implore you to remove the realignment of inpatient care at Keesler AFB, the closing of NS Pascagoula, and the relocation of the Navy Human Resource Center at Stennis Space Center from the DOD BRAC recommendation lists. These Mississippi recommendations do not save the taxpayers the money claimed. Rather, they weaken our national security, ignore the emerging mission of homeland defense, and deviate significantly from the BRAC criteria and statute. Again, I want to thank you for allowing me to testify before you today.



GENE TAYLOR
4TH DISTRICT, MISSISSIPPI

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
AND INFRASTRUCTURE

<http://www.house.gov/genetaylor>

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2404

Rep. Gene Taylor
4th District of Mississippi

Base Realignment and Closure Commission Hearing
New Orleans, Louisiana
July 22, 2005

ATTACHMENTS FOR THE RECORD

- I. Responses to Requests for Additional Data Regarding Keesler Medical Center**
- II. Rep. Gene Taylor Analysis of Cost and Savings Estimates for Recommendation to Disestablish Inpatient Services at Keesler**
- III. Minutes of the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Meetings of July 2, 2004 and January 4, 2005**
- IV. Site Visit Reports, Minutes, and Recommendations from the CARES Commission Regarding Veterans Affairs Medical Facilities in Biloxi and Gulfport and Arrangements with Keesler Medical Center**
- V. Articles from the New England Journal of Medicine and from MSNBC Regarding Medical Personnel and Training Needs for Wartime**
- VI. Rep. Gene Taylor Analysis of Cost and Savings Estimates for Recommendation to Close Naval Station Pascagoula**
- VII. Department of Defense Report: Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005**
- VIII. March 9, 2005 Testimony of Gen. Bantz J. Craddock, Commander of U.S. Southern Command Regarding U.S. Interests in Latin America**
- IX. Rep. Gene Taylor Analysis of Cost and Savings Estimates for Recommendation to Realign Navy Human Resource Service Center**


2311 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-2404
(202) 225-5772

DISTRICT OFFICES:
2424 14TH STREET
GULFPORT, MS 39501
(228) 864-7670

701 MAIN STREET
SUITE 215
HATTIESBURG, MS 39401
(601) 582-3246

1314 GOVERNMENT STREET
OCEAN SPRINGS, MS 39564
(228) 872-7950

527 CENTRAL AVENUE
LAUREL, MS 39440
(601) 425-3905



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POSTURE STATEMENT OF
GENERAL BANTZ J. CRADDOCK, UNITED STATES ARMY
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

BEFORE THE 109TH CONGRESS

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

9 MARCH 2005



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Mr. Chairman, Representative Skelton and distinguished Members of this Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to report to you on the posture of United States Southern Command and our efforts to combat terrorism, strengthen regional stability, and protect U.S. security interests in Latin America and the Caribbean. I would also like to thank the Members of this Committee and the Congress for your continued outstanding support to the military and civilian personnel serving in this theater.

Since assuming command on November 9, 2004, I have traveled to 12 of the 30 countries in my assigned area of responsibility (AOR), visiting Andean Ridge nations four times. This year, the men and women of this Command supported operations at the Guantánamo Detention Facility, supported Colombia's successful prosecution of its war against three U.S. Government-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), and deployed to lead a multinational force that included Canada, Chile, and France to reestablish security in Haiti. SOUTHCOM, through its joint interagency task force (JIATF-South), in conjunction with multinational and interagency efforts, directly contributed to the seizure of over 222 metric tons of cocaine. SOUTHCOM units and components conducted hundreds of security cooperation activities in the United States and with partner nations abroad.

Mission and Vision. U.S. Southern Command's mission is to conduct military operations and promote security cooperation to achieve US strategic objectives. Our vision is that SOUTHCOM be the recognized partner of choice and center of excellence for regional security affairs within a hemisphere of escalating importance; organized to defend the homeland and deter, dissuade, and defeat transnational threats; focused on achieving regional partnerships with nations to promote commitment to democratic

values, respect for human rights, territorial security and sovereignty, and collective regional security.

Command Priorities. To accomplish our mission, our activities are prioritized as follows: First, prosecution of the War on Terrorism (WOT), to prevent terrorist groups from using the region as a sanctuary to prepare, stage, or conduct terrorist operations against the United States or our vital interests in the region. The fight against narco-terrorism, the epicenter of which is in the Republic of Colombia, has been a significant focus of our efforts related to the War on Terror. SOUTHCOM directly supports the WOT by conducting detainee operations at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. We commit significant time and resources to prepare for both natural and man-made contingencies. An important focus of our interaction with partner nations is to encourage a cooperative approach to regional problems. We are engaged in a process of transformation to allow us to respond to those missions more rapidly and efficiently. To maintain mission effectiveness, we work to ensure that our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen and civilians in Miami and in our missions abroad have the best quality of life that we can provide.

Sources of instability and insecurity in the U.S. Southern Command AOR.

Although Latin America and the Caribbean is generally free of the prospect of cross-border conventional military attacks between nations, it is the world's most violent region, with 27.5 homicides per 100,000 people. This lack of security is a major impediment to the foreign investment needed to strengthen Latin American and Caribbean economies to pull more of the population above the poverty line. To understand the sources of instability and insecurity, it is helpful to categorize them as threats; which US and partner nation security forces must actively combat in order to

protect citizens and property, challenges; which complicate our cooperative security efforts, and the underlying conditions of poverty, corruption, and inequality.

Threats. The stability and prosperity of the SOUTHCOM AOR are threatened by transnational terrorism, narcoterrorism, illicit trafficking, forgery and money laundering, kidnapping, urban gangs, radical movements, natural disasters and mass migration.

At this time, we have not detected Islamic terrorist cells in the SOUTHCOM AOR that are preparing to conduct attacks against the US, although Islamic Radicals in the region have proven their operational capability in the past. We have, however detected a number of Islamic Radical Group facilitators that continue to participate in fundraising and logistical support activities such as money laundering, document forgery, and illicit trafficking. Proceeds from these activities are supporting worldwide terrorist activities. Not only do these activities serve to support Islamic terrorist groups in the Middle East, these same activities performed by other groups make up the greater criminal network so prominent in the AOR. Illicit activities, facilitated by the AOR's permissive environment, are the backbone for criminal entities like urban gangs, narco-terrorists, Islamic terrorists, and worldwide organized crime.

Many of our partner nations in Latin America, and specifically the Andean Ridge, are threatened by regional terrorist organizations that are supported and funded by illegal drug trafficking and other forms of criminal activities. Ninety percent of the cocaine and 47% of the heroin that reaches the United States emanates from or passes through Colombia. The consumption of illicit drugs kills over 21,000 Americans annually and results in over \$160 billion worth of lost revenue. Colombia's three U.S. Government-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia, or FARC; the National Liberation Army, or ELN; and the United Self-Defense Forces, or AUC, are Department of State-designated foreign terrorist organizations.

Although the Colombian government has made tremendous progress against these groups over the past two years, the narco-terrorist groups still exercise some level of control over 40% of the country.

Kidnapping, a problem that has reached epidemic proportions in Latin America and the Caribbean, is used by criminal and narco-terrorist organizations to raise money and fund other illicit or terrorist activities. A Council of the Americas study from 2004 ranks the top ten countries with regard to kidnapping rate. The top five are all Latin American countries. One recently published study claims that Latin America and the Caribbean account for 75% of all kidnappings worldwide, a staggering figure when one considers that the region has less than 10% of the world's population.

Especially troublesome is the growth of gangs and drug related crime across Central America, portions of the Caribbean, and in some cities in Brazil. Unemployment and poverty make Central America a spawning ground for gangs. There are estimated to be at least 70,000 gang members stretched across Central America. The level of sophistication and brutality of these gangs is without precedent. One gang in Guatemala requires the murder of a teenage girl as an initiation rite. Surges in gang violence sometimes overwhelm local law enforcement capabilities. As directed by their civilian leadership, military forces are assisting police to check this growing tide of gang violence and insecurity in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. The tragic bus massacre that took place last December in Honduras claimed the lives of 28 men, women and children. This incident made international news, yet we hear little about the steady increase in

daily murders that have brought Honduras' homicide rate (45.7 per 100,000 persons) nearly to Colombia's level (47 per 100,000 persons).

There is also mounting evidence that many of those gang members have close connections with gangs in the United States, either from drug distribution networks or from immigration and deportation to their home countries. On January 14, 2005, police in Miami-Dade County, Florida arrested nine members of one of Central America's most violent gangs: Mara Salvatrucha. All of these individuals had outstanding arrest warrants for crimes ranging from larceny to murder. These arrests are just one recent example of the growing link of Central American gangs to their United States counterparts.

Challenges. While the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) provides welcome support in our efforts to seek safeguards for our service-members from prosecution under the International Criminal Court, in my judgment, it has the unintended consequence of restricting our access to and interaction with many important partner nations. Sanctions enclosed in the ASPA statute prohibit International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds from going to certain countries that are parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Of the 22 nations worldwide affected by these sanctions, 11 of them are in Latin America, hampering the engagement and professional contact that is an essential element of our regional security cooperation strategy. The IMET program provides partner nation students with the opportunity to attend U.S. military training, get a first-hand view of life in the U.S., and develop long-lasting friendships with U.S. military and other partner nation classmates. Extra-hemispheric actors are filling the void left by restricted US military engagement with

partner nations. We now risk losing contact and interoperability with a generation of military classmates in many nations of the region, including several leading countries.

I am also concerned with Venezuela's influence in the AOR. The capture of senior FARC member Rodrigo Granda in Venezuela, carrying a valid Venezuelan passport and his possible connection to the kidnapping and killing of the daughter of Paraguay's former president is of concern. Granda's capture caused a significant diplomatic impasse, which was later mended by Presidents Uribe and Chavez meeting face-to-face.

SOUTHCOM supports the joint staff position to maintain military-to-military contact with the Venezuelan military in support of long-term interests in Venezuela and the region. I believe we need a broad based interagency approach to dealing with Venezuela in order to encourage functioning democratic institutions.

An increasing presence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the region is an emerging dynamic that must not be ignored. According to the PRC publication "People's Daily" in the period of January 2004 through November 2004, the PRC invested \$898M USD in Latin America, or 49.3 percent of their overseas investment. The PRC's growing dependence on the global economy and the necessity of protecting access to food, energy, raw materials and export markets has forced a shift in their military strategy. The PRC's 2004 Defense Strategy White Paper departs from the past and promotes a power-projection military, capable of securing strategic shipping lanes and protecting its growing economic interests abroad. In 2004, national level defense officials from the PRC made 20 visits to Latin American and Caribbean nations, while Ministers and Chiefs of Defense from nine countries in our AOR visited the PRC. Growing economic interests, presence and influence in the region are not a threat, but

they are clearly components of a condition we should recognize and consider carefully as we form our own objectives, policies and engagement in the region.

Another challenge in this AOR is the perennial problem of weak governmental institutions. Unanswered grievances and unfulfilled promises to the indigenous and marginalized segments of society have resulted in deep-rooted dissatisfaction with most partner nation governments. In Bolivia, the violent unrest that led to the resignation of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada in 2003 still simmers below the surface of a deeply divided and disaffected population. Just two days ago on March 7th, President Mesa tendered his resignation to the Bolivian Congress. In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Perú distrust and loss of faith in failed institutions fuel the emergence of anti-US, anti-globalization, and anti-free trade demagogues, who, unwilling to shoulder the burden of participating in the democratic process and too impatient to undertake legitimate political action, incite violence against their own governments and their own people.

The Conditions of Poverty, Inequality and Corruption. The roots of the region's poor security environment are poverty, inequality, and corruption. Forty-four percent of Latin America and the Caribbean are mired in the hopelessness and squalor of poverty. The free market reforms and privatization of the 1990's have not delivered on the promise of prosperity for Latin America. Unequal distribution of wealth exacerbates the poverty problem. The richest one tenth of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean earn 48% of the total income, while the poorest tenth earn only 1.6%. In industrialized countries, by contrast, the top tenth receive 29.1%, while the bottom tenth earn 2.5%. Uruguay has the least economic disparity of Latin American and Caribbean countries, but its unequal income distribution is still far worse than the most unequal country in Eastern Europe and the industrialized countries. A historical climate of

corruption siphons off as much as 10 percent of the gross domestic product and discourages potential foreign investment.

These conditions are only made worse by natural disasters such as hurricanes, mudslides, floods, and earthquakes. Such disasters can strike the region at any time, resulting in thousands of dead or displaced persons. Natural or man-made catastrophes can trigger mass migration, which cause additional suffering and instability.

SOUTHCOM and Partner Nation Initiatives.

JTF-Guantánamo. This command has continued to support the War on Terrorism through detainee operations at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where approximately 550 enemy combatants in the Global War on Terrorism are in custody. A significant number of these enemy combatants are highly trained, dangerous members of al-Qaida, its related terrorist networks, and the former Taliban regime. More than 4,000 reports detail information provided by these detainees, much of it corroborated by other intelligence reporting. This unprecedented body of information has expanded our understanding of al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations and continues to prove valuable. Our intelligence and law enforcement communities develop leads, assessments, and intelligence products based on information detainees provide. The information delineates terrorist leadership structures, recruiting practices, funding mechanisms, relationships, and the cooperation between groups, as well as training programs, and plans for attacking the United States and other countries. Detainees have identified additional al-Qaida operatives and supporters and have expanded our understanding of the extent of their presence in Europe, the United States, and throughout the CENTCOM area of operations. Detainees have also provided information on individuals connected to al-Qaida's pursuit of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Recent exchanges with

European allies have supported investigations and apprehensions of Islamic extremists in several European countries.

In performing our intelligence mission, we continue to emphasize the U.S. government's commitment to treating detainees "humanely, and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva." Along these lines, we have a good working relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross. We take their recommendations seriously and act upon them when appropriate. All credible allegations of abuse have been investigated and appropriate disciplinary action was taken against those who have engaged in misconduct. It is important to recognize that there have been only a small number of substantiated allegations of abuse or misconduct at Guantánamo over the last three years. I recently directed an investigation into allegations of questionable conduct made by members of the FBI. That investigation is ongoing.

There are four different legal proceedings that JTF Guantánamo supports in one capacity or another: 1) habeas litigation in federal court, 2) combatant status review tribunals, 3) administrative review boards, and 4) military commissions. Let me briefly review them. Habeas litigation is the result of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions from last year that now allow civilian attorneys representing detainees to file habeas corpus petitions in federal court to challenge the basis for their detention at Guantánamo. As the habeas litigation proceeds, civilian attorneys have been given access to their clients at Guantánamo. In addition, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Secretary of the Navy to conduct combatant status review tribunals (CSRTs) on each detainee; these provide each detainee a one-time opportunity to contest their status as an enemy combatant. As of 14 February of this year, 558 CSRTs have been conducted and final

action has been taken in 422 of those cases. Of these, 12 detainees have been determined to be non-enemy combatants, who have or will be released. The Deputy Secretary of Defense also directed the Secretary of the Navy to conduct administrative review boards (ARBs) on each detainee determined to be an enemy combatant; this provides annual assessments of whether detainees should be released, transferred or continue to be detained depending on their threat to the U.S. As the CSRTs wind down, the ARBs are beginning. Both require extensive logistical support and information requirements from JTF Guantánamo. And finally, military commissions of four detainees commenced last fall. These are trials of detainees who the President determined there is reason to believe are members of Al Qaida or engaged in international terrorism against the United States. However a federal court ruling recently stayed the proceedings in one of the commissions. The Department of Justice is appealing that decision. The Appointing Authority for Military Commissions, Mr. Altenburg, suspended all military commissions pending the outcome of that appeal.

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). To counter the threat of transnational terrorism, we will continue to apply our human and material resources toward disrupting and defeating terrorist groups' illicit activities. The Joint Interagency Coordination Group is used as our forum for fusing together all elements of national power to achieve U.S. national security objectives in our AOR. Southern Command gains actionable intelligence on terrorist activities that is then used by U.S. law enforcement agencies and our partner nations to disrupt terrorist operations and their means of support. Narco-terrorists use the illegal drug trade to finance their activities. To further these efforts we enhance partner nation capabilities to control borders, eliminate safe havens, and project government presence.

Support to Colombia. The Colombian Government continues to make tremendous progress in the battle against terrorism and the restoration of security for the strengthening of its democratic institutions. Under a very courageous president, the government of Colombia has enacted the democratic security and defense policy to restore order and security while establishing a relationship of mutual trust with its citizens. In 2004, homicides decreased 16%; the lowest level since 1986. The year 2004 also saw a 25% decrease in robberies, a 46% decrease in kidnappings, and a 44% decrease in terrorist attacks nationwide. For the first time, there is a government presence in all of the municipalities in Colombia. Fundamental to this policy has been the military component of the Colombian government's Plan Colombia – Plan Patriota. SOUTHCOM is providing substantial resources to support this military campaign. U.S. training, equipment and logistical support have been vital to the success of Colombian Plan Patriota efforts to date and will continue to be needed into the future.

Military Progress in Colombia. The government's security policy has significantly diminished the FARC's ability to carry out offensive actions in a sustainable, coherent manner. Over the past two and a half years, the FARC has been reduced from 18,000 to an estimated 12,500 members. Numerous FARC leaders have been killed or captured by the Colombian military and police. Simon Trinidad is in a U.S. jail awaiting trial on drug trafficking charges. Nayibe "Sonia" Rojas, a key FARC narco-terrorist leader, was captured by the Colombian military, and the disposition of her case is pending. The Colombian military's Plan Patriota is slowly strangling the FARC's operations in southern Colombia. The ELN, with approximately 3,500 fighters, has been marginalized. The ELN struggles to survive as an organization as combat losses and leadership divisions take their toll. The AUC, with an estimated strength of 12,000

combatants, is currently negotiating peace with the Colombian government and the government has established a concentration zone to facilitate peace talks and demobilization. Over 4,600 AUC members have been demobilized to date, and the removal of these combatants from the fight represents a victory for the government. Significant issues, notably extradition to the U.S. and prison terms, remain for full demobilization of all AUC elements. Nonetheless, the Colombian government is making progress at removing combatants from the field and converting them into productive members of society. Once started, the Colombian government's demobilization program must succeed. The first combatants to demobilize are currently in the sunset phase of their demobilization and reintegration process and are ready to reintegrate themselves into Colombian society. Failure of this program will not only re-create the conditions for violence but also undermine current peace negotiations and incentive for further demobilization.

Colombian Civil Affairs Program. The Colombian government's efforts to reassert or establish governance in areas previously controlled by narco-terrorists are essential to build on recent military successes. Recognizing this and working within limitations of US law, USSOUTHCOM has worked with the Colombian Ministry of Defense to develop mechanisms to synchronize interagency planning needed to reestablish governance. To this end, the Government of Colombia established a Coordination Center for Integrated Action, which assembles representatives from 13 different ministries chaired by a board of directors that reports directly to the President of Colombia. The Center's responsibility is to develop policies and plans to ensure a coordinated and expeditious response that will re-establish government presence and services in territory reclaimed from narco-terrorists. To date, the Colombian Government

has committed over \$30 million to this effort. Related to this program, USSOUTHCOM is providing \$1.5 million in Fiscal Year 05 to develop the Colombian military's Civil Affairs capability. This capability will enable Colombian military to coordinate within their interagency, with NGOs, and integrate humanitarian assistance into military operational planning. In the departments of Arauca, Cundinamarca, Caquetá, and Guaviare, portions of which are in the former narco-terrorist controlled demilitarized zone, the Colombian military has provided basic medical care to over 30,000 civilians and has rehabilitated numerous educational and medical facilities. On 31 January 2004, the Government of Colombia announced subsidies for building 218 low-cost housing units, new projects benefiting over 530 families in the Caquetá department and the issuance of 17,000 land titles in Caquetá. Plan Colombia also has planned in this region the rebuilding of 81 houses affected by terrorism, an increase in alternative development, and \$2.5 million for small business loans. These activities build on military success to gain lasting confidence of the civilian population in the government and its institutions.

Eradication and Interdiction Gains. We have also made significant gains in attacking the illicit narcotics industry that provides nearly all of the world's supply of cocaine and about half of the US's supply of heroin. Through our close cooperation with the Government of Colombia, the eradication program in Colombia has had another record year. In 2004, over 342,000 acres of coca and over 9,500 acres of opium poppy were destroyed. Also in 2004, Colombian authorities seized 178 tons of cocaine, a 36% increase over the same period last year and over 1,500 pounds of heroin, a 67% increase.

In 2003 Colombia resumed a thoroughly vetted and robustly staffed Air Bridge Denial Program. Since then, 20 narco-trafficking aircraft have been destroyed and 6 have been impounded resulting in a total of 10.8 metric tons of seized cocaine.

Colombian Judicial Cooperation. The Colombian Judiciary and President Uribe have approved the extraditions of 154 Colombian major drug traffickers, terrorists, and corrupt legislators to the United States. Most recently, the government of Colombia extradited Simon Trinidad, a major FARC leader, to the United States to be tried. This action underscores to the global community that the FARC leaders are criminals and terrorists, not ideologically guided revolutionaries. All of these actions by the Colombian government have greatly assisted in the global struggle against illegal drug trafficking and narco-terrorism. With continued U.S. support and expanded authorities, I am confident that Colombia will win its 40-plus year battle against these narco-terrorist groups.

Colombia's War to Win. The government of Colombia understands that this is its war to win. Defense spending as a percentage of GDP rose from 3.5% to 5% in 2004. Colombia increased its tax revenue 17.4% in the first nine months of 2004, enabling the government to expand its security forces by nearly 80,000 uniformed security members in the past two and a half years. The Colombian military is a much better and more capable force in its operations against the FARC, the ELN and the AUC, nearly doubling the number of terrorists captured while also seizing the initiative on the battlefield.

Economic Indicators. Since assuming office in August 2002, President Uribe's emphasis on "Democratic Security" has aided Colombia's economic recovery. Colombia has seen growth in GDP since 2002 from 1.8% to 3.9% in 2003 and 2004. This comes after a severe economic crisis with a net GDP loss of more than 4% in 1999. The nation's unemployment rate eased from 15.1% in 2002 to 14.15% in 2003, to less than 13% in 2004. Inflation dropped from 7.1% in 2003 to 5.9% in 2004. Colombia's trade has also improved with exports outpacing imports by \$809 million in 2004

compared to \$437 million in 2003. Electrical Interconnections INC (ISA), Colombia's largest energy transport company reported a significant decrease in terrorist attacks on Colombia's utilities. Over the past five years, an average of 224 annual terrorist attacks occurred against Colombia's utilities. In 2004, thanks to government of Colombia initiatives and US government support for them, only 80 attacks occurred--down from 209 attacks in 2003 - the lowest number since 1998.

Regional Support for Colombia. The Colombian government's success has pushed the illegal armed groups to seek refuge across neighboring borders. Most of Colombia's neighbors have taken action to protect their sovereignty. The Ecuadorian military has placed many of its best troops on its northern frontier and has established cross-border communications with the Colombian military. Brazil has reinforced military presence along its border and has initiated an Airbridge Denial Program to prevent narco-trafficker use of Brazilian air space. Panamá continues to stress border cooperation due to the FARC's presence in Panamá's Darién border region. In February of 2004, Colombia, Brazil, and Perú signed a pact to improve border coordination, a superb example of regional cooperation against common threats. In April 2004, Peruvian President Toledo met with President Uribe to discuss border security and illegal drug trafficking among other topics. Among Colombia's neighbors, Venezuela's record of cooperation remains mixed. We remain concerned that Colombia's FTOs consider the areas of the Venezuelan border with Colombia a safe area to rest, transship drugs and arms, and procure logistical supplies.

Cooperative Security Locations/Forward Operating Locations (CSL/FOL) and Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B). El Salvador provides Southern Command the use of Comalapa Airport as a CSL/FOL for counter-drug surveillance flights throughout

Central America, the eastern Pacific, and the Western Caribbean. Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras continues to provide a logistical support base to the humanitarian missions in the region, as well as to counter illicit trafficking operations. Ecuador continues to host one of the Southern Command's CSL/FOL's in Manta, which has been especially critical in providing aerial coverage on the eastern Pacific vector of illicit trafficking. Since the establishment of the Manta CSL in 1999, the information resulting from its operations has resulted in the seizure of 75 tons of cocaine with a street value of \$3.4 billion. Finally, Aruba and Curaçao each continue to host one of the Southern Command's CSL/FOL's.

Partner Nation actions against support for Islamic Radical Groups. In the War on Terror, we have seen countries like Paraguay and Uruguay take decisive action to disrupt or deter terrorist related activities over the past few years.

In 2002, Paraguay arrested and sentenced Assad Ahmad Barakat, an alleged Hizballah chief in the Triborder Area (TBA), for tax evasion. According to the Paraguayan chief prosecutor, Barakat's remittances to Hizballah totaled about \$50 million since 1995. Subhi Mohammad Fayad, a member of Barakat's network was also convicted of tax evasion in Paraguay. In 2004, Paraguayan agents raided a money exchange house in the TBA, which was owned by Kassen Hijazi's, a suspected Hizballah facilitator. Hijazi's money house was suspected of running an international money-laundering scheme that moved an estimated \$21 million over three years. In 2003, Said Mohkles, who was wanted by the Egyptians in connection with the 1997 Luxor terrorist attacks, was extradited to Egypt from Uruguay. We will continue to strengthen our cooperative security efforts with all countries in the AOR that may be affected by Islamic

Radical Group activity. We will also work to increase information sharing agreements and explore all possible options for security cooperation in the future.

Regionalization. U.S. Southern Command hosts four annual regional security conferences. These conferences bring together the chiefs of defense throughout the AOR to build consensus on security issues. Through these conferences, SOUTHCOM fosters and participates in frank and candid dialogue among the Chiefs of Defense in each sub region, regarding regional security threats and ways to increase regional security. In November of 2004 I co-hosted the Andean Ridge Security Conference in Lima, Peru with the Peruvian Chief of defense. It was the first Andean Ridge conference to be co-hosted within the region. Previous security conferences for the Caribbean and Central American sub regions have been held within their respective regions and this is significant as it is symbolic of the effort to solve regional problems within the region. I plan to continue this focus with the objective of assisting in the development of regional security organizations, appropriate to the constitutional limitations of each country and the needs of each region. This May, SOUTHCOM will co-host a Southern Cone Defense Conference in Buenos Aires with Argentina.

Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua sent forces to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom. El Salvador has maintained continual presence in Iraq and sent a fourth contingent of troops last month. The Salvadoran troops have performed brilliantly in Iraq. In March 2004, Salvadoran troops saved the life of the Governorate Coordinator and five members of the Coalition Provisional Authority when they were ambushed in Al Najaf. In April, when the Salvadoran contingent was attacked during the Najaf uprising, the Salvadoran troops fought bravely against overwhelming odds. Private Natividad Méndez Ramos gave his

life that day and 10 Salvadorans were wounded. When they ran out of ammunition and were still being attacked, Corporal Toloza attacked ten enemy fighters with his knife. His actions were decisive and carried the day!

Haiti. In Haiti, the resignation and departure of former President Aristide, which resulted in a constitutional transfer of power to the interim government, presented the nations of the AOR with the opportunity to unite to help one of its neighbors. Following the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1529, we established the Multinational Interim Force-Haiti (MIF-H), consisting of forces from the United States, France, Chile, and Canada. Chile deployed a force to Haiti within 48 hours of the start of the crisis and continues to have troops deployed in support of the Multinational United Nations Stabilization Force in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The rapid reaction of our troops and those of our partner nations saved the lives of innocent Haitians, prevented a mass migration during a time of rough seas, and fostered regional and international cooperation to assist a nation in need. MINUSTAH stood up in Haiti in June of 2004 and is composed mostly of Latin American countries and led by Brazil. We currently have four personnel assigned to the MINUSTAH staff. To anyone familiar with Haiti, it is obvious that more than security is needed to rehabilitate Haiti. I believe that Haiti will require a significant investment of aid for the next 10 to 15 years to get back on its feet. When a new Haitian government is elected in November, the history of predatory institutions and “winner-take-all” political environment must end, to benefit all Haitians and reestablish faith in government.

Exercises. Exercises provide unique opportunities for military-to-military interaction, enhanced interoperability, and invaluable training for both partner nations and U.S. forces. SOUTHCOM conducts three types of exercises: US-only exercises that

test our contingency plans, bilateral and multilateral exercises with partner nations, and New Horizons - humanitarian assistance exercises which provide medical, dental, and veterinary treatment to underserved populations in remote areas. Components of SOUTHCOM conducted 16 joint exercises last fiscal year involving 5,675 US and 10,320 Partner nation troops. One of the most important exercises was PANAMAX, a multinational exercise focused on maritime interdiction and security of the Panama Canal. Chile, the fourth largest user of the Panama Canal, took an active leadership role in the Southern Command sponsored PANAMAX exercise designed to protect the Panama Canal. This year's PANAMAX exercise will include 15 participating nations. In 2004, New Horizons exercises completed 30 engineer projects consisting of constructing schools, medical clinics, community centers, sanitary facilities, wells, and road construction and repair. We had 69 medical readiness deployments (MEDRETE) that treated more than 290,000 people, some of whom walked for days to be treated by qualified doctors for the first time in their lives. During these exercises, our veterinary teams treated approximately 525,000 animals in varying livestock categories, which contributed significantly to sustaining local health and economic wellbeing. New Horizons exercises improve local infrastructure, strengthen the bonds of friendship between the US and partner nations, and provide unique and rigorous training opportunities to engineer, medical, and civil affairs units. Currently, we are conducting New Horizons exercises in Haiti, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama. The Haiti New Horizons will result in the construction of four wells, three schools, and a road and it will also include a Medical Readiness Training Exercise to provide needed medical care to the population in the Gonaives area – the site of devastating floods last year. The El Salvador New Horizons will construct three schools, two clinics, one well, and will conduct three

Medical Readiness Training Exercises. The New Horizons in Nicaragua will build three schools, three clinics, one well and will conduct three Medical Readiness Training Exercises. The Panamá New Horizons will construct three schools, three community centers, one well, and one road and will do three Medical Readiness Training Exercises.

Partner Nations' Support of UN Peace Operations. Many of our exercises are tailored to enhance partner nations' Peace Operations capabilities. These exercises provide real-world scenario-based training that hones the skills necessary to provide a significant contribution to United Nations and other peace operations. The success of these exercises is clear in the examples I've already mentioned; the MIF-H, MINUSTAH, and AOR nation participation in peace operations around the world. For example, a Chilean platoon, Paraguayan platoon, as well as personnel from Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay are serving under Argentine command in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Cyprus.

Central American Regionalization. Efforts toward regional integration made possible by organizations like the Conference of the Central American Armed Forces (CFAC) give me great confidence in the future of Central American regional security. An initiative of the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua for the purpose of regionalizing their security efforts, CFAC was established in 1997, this organization has since provided collective support for flood and hurricane relief, as well as assistance in combating outbreaks of dengue that have plagued the region. CFAC was quick to show its collective solidarity post 9-11, and has since taken steps to enhance regional cooperation in the global war on terrorism. Most recently CFAC has developed a plan of action to be implemented this year to strengthen their capacity to support international peacekeeping operations.

One of the most impressive aspects of CFAC is that it is a Central American initiative that has evolved with a Central American vision. With ownership comes commitment, and these armed forces are committed to serving their civilian democratic governments and their people.

On February 1, 2005, the presidents of the Central American nations held a summit in Honduras under the umbrella of SICA, which is the Central American Integration System.

Created in 1991 to develop common policies and strategies to serve the Central American public, SICA recognizes the changing nature of the threats to national security and socio-economic development. In this most recent summit declaration the presidents agreed to take concrete steps to deal with a broad range of transnational issues in a transnational way – from health, to trade, to security. Among the elements of this declaration, they agreed to create a regional rapid reaction force to deal with narco-terrorism and other emerging threats. They agreed to implement a common arms sale and transport policy. They agreed to a regional study to better understand the theme of high-risk youth. And equally important, they are holding themselves accountable, having set a 30-day suspense to stand up a joint and combined task force to include military and police forces, to deal with these emerging threats.

Strategic Capabilities. To address the security challenges and achieve U.S. national security objectives in our AOR, the Command has five overarching strategic mission requirements:

1. An improved ability to detect and support interdiction of illegal trafficking into the United States.
2. Continued detainee operations at Guantánamo.

3. Continued ability to provide partner nation Security Forces with equipment and training.
4. Improved interoperability between our Armed Forces and those of our partner nations.
5. Improved operational reach to rapidly respond to crises in the region.

Interdiction of Illicit Trafficking. We must enhance our ability to detect and interdict illicit trafficking at its source and in transit, preventing illegal drugs, weapons, and people from reaching our borders. As we have successfully done in the past, the Command will conduct these operations in concert with our interagency partners, principally the U.S. law enforcement community, and with our partner nations, whose participation and support for these operations are indispensable. Success in this mission area will not only stem the flow of illegal narcotics on U.S. streets, but also deny a source of funding that terrorist groups may use to finance their operations.

As with virtually all of our operations in the AOR, the interdiction of illicit trafficking depends on the timely collection and distribution of accurate intelligence information. We continue to employ our limited air-, sea-, and ground-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to detect, identify, and monitor illicit activities, particularly terrorist groups, their support network, and the criminal elements that serve terrorist purposes. Given the size and geography of the region, this is a formidable task. Furthermore, with the majority of ISR assets presently at our disposal focused on operations in Colombia, the means to achieve persistent ISR presence throughout the entire AOR remains a concern.

Guantánamo Construction. I would like to thank the committee and the Congress for their support of the construction of military facilities, which has resulted in

better security, and better quality of life for the troops at JTF-GTMO. I request your support in funding two construction projects on the FY05 Supplemental request that total \$42 million. The first project is Camp 6, which represents part of the way ahead for detention operations at Guantánamo and recognizes that some of the detainees there will remain a threat to the U.S. for the foreseeable future. The Camp 6 facility will be based on prison models in the U.S. and is designed to be safer for the detainees and the guards who serve at GTMO. The second project is the security fence with sensors that is required for security around the new facilities. This security fence would be an electronic "smart fence" to detect, deter and assess potential intrusions around the perimeter of the detainee camp. Both Camp 6 and the Security Fence will provide a reduction in approximately 300 soldiers currently required to guard the detainees.

Training and Equipping our partner nation Security Forces. We must continue to provide partner nation security forces with the equipment and training they need to ensure their territorial integrity and to defeat threats such as terrorist groups operating within or transiting their borders.

The center of the fight against terrorist groups is in Colombia and because of the transnational nature of the threat, it radiates throughout the Andean Ridge. We need to maintain support in Colombia and address the spillover effect in the rest of the Andean Ridge. Our continued support will leverage the Government of Colombia's recent successes, enabling the Government of Colombia to not only defeat narco-terrorist groups, but also to establish responsible governance for all Colombians.

IMET and ASPA Sanctions. Promoting security and enabling effective security forces among our partner nations will deny terrorists the safe havens they need to prepare or conduct operations, will hinder illicit trafficking, and will prevent internal conflicts

that may lead to the destabilization of governments. SOUTHCOM fully supports immunity from ICC prosecution for U.S. service-members serving overseas. However, using IMET to encourage ICC Article 98 agreements may have negative effects on long-term U.S. security interests in the Western Hemisphere, a region where effective security cooperation via face-to-face contact is absolutely vital to U.S. interests. IMET is a low-cost, highly effective component of U.S. security cooperation that builds and expands regional security forces' professionalism and capabilities, enables a cooperative hemispheric approach to meeting transnational threats to national sovereignty, and facilitates the development of important professional and personal relationships that provide U.S. access and influence to key players in the region. Once again, IMET provides SOUTHCOM with an invaluable tool that can be used to foster positive military-to-military relations with our partner nations.

Interoperability. Fourth, we must improve the interoperability among the armed forces of the United States and our partner nations by implementing mutually beneficial security agreements, regional and sub regional security organizations, military-to-military contacts, combined training exercises, and information sharing. Only by working together can the U.S. and our partner nations effectively address the common security challenges we face in this hemisphere.

Improving the command, control, communications, and computer (C4) architecture throughout the region has been, and will remain, a top investment priority for the Command. A particular challenge is our ability to share sensitive intelligence information with our U.S. interagency partners and with partner nations in a timely manner that supports combined efforts to interdict terrorist organizations and drug traffickers. We are, however, continuing to expand our partnerships with the Department

of Defense C4 community, and with other elements of the U.S. government and industry in order to identify, secure, and maintain robust, cost-effective means to communicate information and provide efficient and effective command and control of military operations throughout the AOR. Our current C4 infrastructure, while adequate for today's tasks, lacks the robust and flexible characteristics necessary to fully implement the network-centric warfighting capabilities we need to achieve.

Operational Reach. Another significant strategic mission priority seeks to enhance our ability to rapidly conduct time-sensitive military operations and to rapidly respond to humanitarian crises that may emerge on short-notice. We continue to explore alternative solutions that will enable us to rapidly position the right forces and materiel when and where they are needed. We are also evaluating and improving ways in which interagency resources and assets might be brought to bear in response to emerging humanitarian crises, such as those resulting from the annual stream of hurricanes that carom through the Caribbean. Since 1997, U.S. Southern Command headquarters has been located in Miami, Florida – the best strategic location for the SOUTHCOM headquarters. The future location of the headquarters will depend on the outcome of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure process. Throughout this endeavor we remain focused on properly supporting the Command's strategic requirements.

Conclusion. I have a slide in my command brief that shows which countries in the AOR were democracies in 1958, 1978, 1998, and the present. The slide depicts a very encouraging trend of governments turning from communist or authoritarian governments to democratically elected governments. Today, all 30 countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR are democracies, and SOUTHCOM has played a key role over the past 25 years in that remarkable achievement. However, if we in the US government are

honest with ourselves, we can look at the region today and see that we are not tending the fields with the same zeal we showed in planting the seeds of democracy. Too many of the democracies in our AOR are lacking some or all of the vital democratic institutions: a functional legislative body, an independent judiciary, a free press, a transparent electoral process that guarantees the rights of the people, security forces which are subordinate to civil authority and economic opportunity for the people.

Because a secure environment is a non-negotiable foundation for a functioning civil society, Southern Command is committed to building capabilities of the security forces of our region. The seeds of social and economic progress will only grow and flourish in the fertile soil of security.

We cannot afford to let Latin America and the Caribbean become a backwater of violent, inward-looking states that are cut off from the world around them by populist, authoritarian governments. We must reward and help those governments that are making difficult, disciplined choices that result in the long-term wellbeing of their people. The challenges facing Latin America and the Caribbean today are significant to our national security. We ignore them at our peril.

Your Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Department of Defense civilians are working to promote U.S. national security interests, regionalization as well as preserve the gains made in professionalizing and democratizing Latin American and Caribbean militaries. We believe that over time this work will bring about a cooperative security community advancing regional stability and establishing an environment free from the threat of terrorism for future generations. Southern Command is a good investment of American taxpayer's dollars and trust.

Thank you for this opportunity and I look forward to responding to the Committee Members' questions.

Section : Personnel Involved in Sustainment

DOD1503 For Officers, Enlisted, and Civilians, how many were authorized to perform sustainment based on the FY03 Unit Manning Document ?

Personnel	Personnel Authorized for Sustainment for FY03 (Pers)
Officer	0
Enlisted	0
Civilian	11

Section : Base Operating Support Non-Pay Obligations

DOD1504 What are your BOS non-payroll obligations for your installation and the number of personnel authorized to this function ?

FY	BOS Obligations (\$K)	Officer Personnel Authorized (Pers)	Enlisted Personnel Authorized (Pers)	Civilian Personnel Authorized (Pers)
FY01	3,342	12	79	95
FY02	4,030	11	81	91
FY03	4,176	10	156	95

Section : Number of Personnel Authorized

DOD1505 For your installation how many Officer, Enlisted, Student, and Civilians are authorized each year for FY05 through FY11?

FY	Officer Personnel Authorized (Pers)	Enlisted Personnel Authorized (Pers)	Civilian Personnel Authorized (Pers)	Students Authorized (Pers)
FY05	10	156	100	0
FY06	10	156	100	0
FY07	10	156	100	0
FY08	10	156	100	0
FY09	10	156	100	0
FY10	10	156	100	0
FY11	10	156	100	0

Section : Number of Personnel Authorized (DoD Tenants)

DOD1506 For the DoD Tenants within your installation how many Officer, Enlisted, Student, and Civilians are authorized each year for FY05 through FY11?

FY	Dod Tenant Officer Personnel Authorized (Pers)	DOD Tenant Enlisted Personnel Authorized (Pers)	DOD Tenant Civilian Personnel Authorized (Pers)	DOD Tenant Students Authorized (Pers)
FY05	105	1,276	12	0
FY06	81	960	12	0
FY07	54	624	12	0
FY08	54	624	12	0
FY09	54	624	12	0
FY10	54	624	12	0
FY11	54	624	12	0