


Epstein



**Electronic Warfarefare (EW)
Center of Excellence
at
NAVAIR Point Mugu, CA**

Briefing to BRAC Commission Staff

Mr. Les Farrington

Mr. David Epstein

July 2005

**Dr. Ronald Smiley
Director, EW/Combat Systems/
Avionics (WD)**


Executive Summary

- **Naval Aviation's Center of Excellence for EW Exists at NAVAIR Point Mugu and is Delivering High Military Value Products & Services Directly Supporting the Warfighter**
- **Our EW Expertise and Products Are Saving Lives Today**
- **Integration of our EW Knowledge Resources at Point Mugu and China Lake Combined with Our Transformational, Linked Laboratory Network Infrastructure, Has Resulted in Increased Synergy and Efficiencies, While Eliminating Un-necessary Duplication**

Outline

- **Discussion Framework and Context**
 - What is EW?
 - Establishment and Growth of Naval Aviation EW at Point Mugu, CA
- **Overview of EW Mission Support at NAVAIR Point Mugu, CA**
 - How We Operate and Support the Warfighter
- **Section 10: Recommendations – Technical Joint Cross Service Group Regarding Realignment of EW**
 - Tech 54 Recommendation
- **Tech 54 Implementation Challenges**
- **Summary**

Framework and Context



Distinct from sensors and electronics research areas, briefing focuses on EW function and mission support capabilities resident at Point Mugu, CA

What is Electronic Warfare (EW)?

- **Military Action Involving:** (1) the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack an enemy's combat capability, (2) protection of friendly combat capability against undesirable effects of friendly or enemy deployment of electronic warfare, or (3) surveillance of the electromagnetic spectrum for immediate threat recognition in support of electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing (CJCS MOP 30).
- **Systems and capabilities that enable our warfighters to execute their missions and return home safely.**

Establishment and Growth of Naval Aviation EW Center of Excellence at Point Mugu, CA

- **1950**
 - Testing of missiles for vulnerability to radio frequency interference and countermeasures
- **1951**
 - Countermeasures Division formally established at Point Mugu, CA. Responsible for:
 - Testing and evaluating missiles under development for countermeasures susceptibility
 - Development/utilization of required vulnerability test and measurement facilities and equipment
 - Providing technical support to contractors in missile design improvements (i.e., vulnerability performance)
- **1956**
 - Critical mass of countermeasures expertise and capabilities accumulated led to expanded mission role of providing Naval Aviation aircraft with EW devices to thwart enemy radars

Establishment and Growth of Naval Aviation EW Center of Excellence at Point Mugu (cont.)

- **1973**

- Establishment of EA-6B System/Software Supt Activity

- **1979**

- Establishment Of TACAIR EW Software Support Activity

- **1985**

- EW Systems Laboratory MILCON Approved

- **1992**

- Consolidation of Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, CA and Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, CA Commands to Form Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division.
- Mission and Function of EW Center Of Excellence at Point Mugu, CA kept intact in New Command Structure

- **1994**

- NAVAIR Systems Command Reorganization Realigned EW Dev and Mission Support People and Resources at Point Mugu and China Lake under Single Organizational Entity Headquartered at NAVAIR Point Mugu, CA

- **1994 to Present**

- Navy's Center of Excellence for Naval Aviation EW
 - Refinement of new EW Organization to Improve Overall technical Capabilities, Reduce Response Time for Fleet EW Support Requirements, and gain Continuous Improvement of Operating Efficiencies
 - Vulnerability Assessment Expertise and Functions Aligned into Threat/Targets Department Headquartered at NAVAIR Point Mugu, CA

Overview of EW Mission Support at NAVAIR Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA

EW Mission Support At NAVAIR Weapons Division Organization and Leadership

- **EW Development, In-Service Engineering and Life Cycle Support functions Managed within an Integrated, Functional Department (encompassing people based at Point Mugu and China Lake) Headquartered at NAVAIR Point Mugu**
 - Under Singular, SES-level Leadership and Direction (Director, EW/Combat Systems/Avionics)
 - EW Workforce Currently Includes ~369 civil service personnel Located at Point Mugu and ~12 at China Lake, CA
- **EW Development and Support Facilities at NAVAIR Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA and China Lake, CA under Common Management Since 1994**
 - Has precluded unnecessary duplication and investment
- **Naval Aviation Aircraft Development T&E EW Mission Area Assigned to NAVAIR Patuxent River, MD**

How We Operate

- **EW Mission Work Performed Using Our Own Organic Labs, Other Service Specialized EW Lab Facilities, and Navy/Air Force Open Air EW Ranges as Requirements Dictate**
 - **EW Countermeasures Development & OFP/UDF Software Development (Point Mugu)**
 - **F/A-18 Aircraft/Weapons Integration (China Lake)**
 - **Advanced Weapons Laboratory fully integrated with Point Mugu EW Laboratory Complex via Cyberlink to support EA-18G Development**
 - **EA-6B Weapon System Support Activity (Point Mugu)**
 - **Systems Integration Laboratory for 89A, ICAP-II, ICAP-III**
 - **Electronic Combat Range (China Lake)**
 - **Used principally for combined DT/OT support**
 - **UDFs Validated in ECSEL (Point Mugu)**

Value to the Warfighting Forces


Types of Assets Our EW COE Mission Support Includes

- Self-Protection/SA Capabilities For TACAIR Platforms

- EA-6B/AEA Protection Capabilities For Fleet/Joint Forces Warfighters/Ground Troops

- F/A-18A/B/C/D/E/F
- F-14D
- AV-8B
- E-2C
- MH-60R/HH-60H
- AH-1W/Z
- CH-53E
- MV-22
- KC-130F/R/T
- ALL-NAVY STRIKE GROUPS
- AIR FORCE STRIKE GROUPS
- JOINT FORCES STRIKE GROUPS
- SPECIAL OPS
- PSYCHOLOGICAL OPS

Example: EA-6B EW/AEA Mission Navy Strike Group



Typical Strike OIF Mission:

(source: Navy/Air Force Internet Fact Sheets)

Duration: 7 ½ hours

1st Cycle: Full Escort

1 F-14 TARPS Mission >\$ 45 Mil

2 F/A-18 Strike @ >\$57 Mil >\$114 Mil

2nd Cycle: Escort

1 B-1 Bombing Run >\$ 73 Mil

1 B-52 Bombing Run >\$ 30 Mil

2 F-15 Fighters @ >\$30 Mil >\$ 60 Mil

Total Value Protected for 1 mission = >\$322 Mil

Total Sorties Flown in OIF: 41,404

**Warfighter Protection and Support Role Enabling
“Mission Accomplishment”**

EW Mission Support at NAVAIR Point Mugu, CA

- **Applied Research & Experimentation**
 - OSD/HLS support for Counter-MANPADS
 - Countermeasure techniques development
 - Joint EW signature measurements
- **Threat Analysis & EW Database Support**
 - Electronic Warfare Database Support (EWDS)
 - EA-6B Tactical Information Report Management System (ETIRMS)
 - USMC Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES)
- **Airborne Electronic Attack**
 - EA-6B ICAP II
 - EA-6B ICAP III
 - EA-18G AEA System
 - Jammer Techniques Optimization (JATO)

EA-6B is sole DOD EW/AEA
Mission Asset Supporting
Joint Operations Forces



EW Mission Support at NAVAIR Point Mugu, CA

- **EW for Tactical Aircraft (Rotary & Fixed Wing)**

- Radar Warning Receivers
- Missile Warning Systems
- Jammers
- Dispensers/Expendables
- Turn-Key Reprogramming Labs/FMS support

**OFPs, UDFs,
Fleet &
Joint Service
Support**

- **EW Suite/Systems Integration**

- **EW Mission Planning**

- JMPS (Joint Mission Planning System)
- TEAMS (Tactical EA-6B Mission Planning System)

- **High Fidelity EW Simulation Development & Support**

- Threat Radars

- **EW Support Equipment (SE)**

- EW Test Program Set (TPS) Software Development and Fleet Support
- EW SE Development and Fleet Support
- Systems Supportability Analyses Services

NAVAIR POINT MUGU,CA EW Center Of Excellence

WHAT DO WE DO FOR THE FLEET AND JOINT WARFIGHTING FORCES

Provide Reach Back EW Technical Expertise and EW Threat Data Products Required 24/7/365 by the Military Operational Community for:


- Reacting and Adapting to Changing & Dynamic Electromagnetic Environment**
- Aircrew Situational Awareness**
- Aircraft Self Protection**
- AEA Real-Time Mission Support**



Electronic Warfare Database Support: 24/7/365 Fleet Reachback

Fleet Help Desk Responses include:

- SIPRNET E-Mail Responses
- Hotline Phone Support
- Rapid Reaction Files
- Jamming Techniques & Tactics Analysis



* Wartime Preparation

EXAMPLES OF DIRECT SUPPORT TO FLEET/WARFIGHTING FORCES (FY01 to 05)

EW Suite/System Updates

- **FA-18E/F Second Deployment - ECP-90 (Delivered Dec 02)**
 - ALR-67(V)3 OFP/UDF 3503/3505
 - ALE-47 OFP/MDF 1125/1703
 - ALE-50A OFP/UDF 2.2.4/36
- **EA-6B Operational Flight Program (OFP)**
 - ICAP-2 AEFIS CDNU 09.01.02 Released to the Fleet in Sep 03
 - ICAP-2 SSA-5.4 & 89A-2.1 Released to the Fleet in Jul 04
 - EA-6B HARM Control Panel (HCP) OFP 05.05.03 Released to the Fleet in Jul 04
- **Developed rapid-reaction Mission Planning Support tool (ECAPS) for the USQ-113 Communications Jammer prior to OEF.**
- **EA-6B Block 89A-3.0 (integration of new AEA avionics) delivered early to meet OIF requirements.**

EXAMPLES OF DIRECT SUPPORT TO FLEETWARFIGHTING FORCES (FY01 to 05)

EW Suite/System Updates

- Standalone ALQ-126B OFF/UDF (Delivered Feb 03)
 - Focused UDF technique update for in-theater threat
- CY2000 Suite Update (Delivered Mar 03)
- ALR-67(V)2 UDF for AV-8B (Delivered Mar 03)
 - UDF built, tested and released within 29 hours
- CY2002 EW Suite (Delivered Oct 03)
- CY2004 EW Suite (Delivered Mar 05)
- APR-39A/B(V)2 VCD OFF 213.3 (Dec 03)
- APR-39 EIDs 214 (Dec 03), 201 (May 04), and 740 (Nov 04)
- ALR-67(V)3 OFF 3505 UDF 3508 (May 04)
- ALR-67(V)3 OFF 4604 UDF 4601 (Dec 04)

EXAMPLES OF DIRECT SUPPORT TO FLEET/WARFIGHTING FORCES (FY01 to 05)

EW Support Equipment Updates/Services

- OIF Rapid Action Solution to F/A-18C/D community for a Configuration change to the RWR. Software issued to the fleet within 2 weeks of problem identification.
- OIF and Afghanistan Ops Rapid Action Solution to the AV-8B community for a configuration change to the RWR. Software issued within 4 weeks.
- Pre-deployment training for the Navy/Marines on the USS Nimitz and the USS Carl Vinson in support of the VFA-41, VFA-14, VFA-115, VFMA-252.

EW Threat Intelligence Support


- Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): On Sept 11th, 2001 we delivered 1 HARM Theater update, 1 RRF, and 2 JTATs by 1500 PST
- Provide Threat Data to all deployed Carrier Air Groups, Intel Agencies, EA-6B, E-2C, MH-60R, HARM, F-117, B-2, USMC USQ-146
- Updated EW Threat Data Files in response to OIF Operational request to handle new threat. From request to reprogramming aircraft in less than 1 hour (May 03)

EW Center of Excellence: Nationally Recognized Unique Capability

INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL



HOW IT'S APPLIED




ITS VALUE

- **300+** Civil Service Employees


- Avg **20** Yrs of Specialized Exper.

- SSAs at CMM Level 3+



**Direct
Fleet/Joint
Coalition
Support**

- 24/7/365 Fleet Reachback
- EA-6B OFPs
- TACAIR EW OFPs/UDFs
- EWSE TPS's





Clifton B Evans
EW Systems Laboratory

- DoD's Only EA-6B/AEA Development and Support Labs
- Threat Simulator Data Development for DT/OT Ranges
- AEA Portion of EA-18G Distributed Laboratory
- MILCON For Dedicated EW Laboratory Complex Completed 1988

EW COE Workforce Demographics


Age, Education, Retirement System

Age Distribution




83% Bachelor Degree or higher

Retirement System




EW Mission Workload/Business Data



\$81.2 Million Business

- EA6B
- TACAIR
- SUPPORT EQUIP
- EWDS
- EW R&D/SPECIAL



Section 10: Recommendations – Technical Joint Cross Service Group Regarding Realignment of EW

Section 10: Recommendations – Technical Joint Cross Service Group

- **Recommendation (Tech 54) Title:**

- Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, & Electronic Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

- **Recommendation:**

- “Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.”

- **Justification:**

- “Consolidating the sensors, EW and electronics RDAT&E functions at China Lake will eliminate redundant infrastructure between Point Mugu and China Lake, providing for the more efficient use of the remaining assets including the Electronic Combat Range and other integration laboratories at China Lake.”

Tech 54 Implementation Challenges

- **Relocation and Reconstitution of Existing Dedicated EW Mission Support Capabilities While:**
 - Providing Uninterrupted 24/7/365 EW Reach Back Services and Threat Data Products to Warfighters
 - Ensuring minimal disruption to Naval Aviation Acquisition Programs (e.g., EA-6B, EA-18G, IDECM)
 - Managing Transition of Critical Skills and Experience Required to Perform EW Mission Support Functions

Summary

- **Naval Aviation's Center of Excellence for EW Exists at NAVAIR Point Mugu and is Delivering High Military Value Products & Services Directly Supporting the Warfighter**
- **Our EW Expertise and Products Are Saving Lives Today**
- **Integration of our EW Knowledge Resources at Point Mugu and China Lake Combined with Our Transformational, Linked Laboratory Network Infrastructure, Has Resulted in Increased Synergy and Efficiencies, While Eliminating Un-necessary Duplication**

Point Mugu EW Center Of Excellence Major Facilities & Tour Plans

Visit/Tour Planned

Clifton B. Evans EW Systems Laboratory Complex

❖ EA-6B-ICAP II	X
❖ EA-6B/AEA ICAP III	X
❖ EA-18G/AEA	X
❖ EWDS/ETIRMS	X
❖ ECSEL	X

Bldg 351

- ❖ EW IRON CROW

Bldg 3015

- ❖ TERPES



Bldg 36

- ❖ TACAIR EW SW Development Stations
& Personnel

AEA Facilities Building 3008/3009



Cyber link to
F/A-18 AWL
NAVAIR CL



BUILDING 3008 OFFICE AND LABORATORY COMPLEX

**Building 3009
HANGAR**

BACK-UP CHARTS

NAWCWD CORE EW FACILITIES COMPLEMENTARITY

• PT MUGU

- **Electronic Combat Simulation & Evaluation Laboratory (ECSEL): System UDF/OFP Development**
- **Iron Crow: Support Equipment Development & TPS**
- **EA-6B ICAP II BLK 89: Development and Integration**
- **EA-6B ICAP III: Development and Integration**
- **EA-18G AEA: Development and Integration**
- **Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Evaluation System (TERPES): Mission Planning & Processing**
- **Electronic Warfare Database Support (EWDS): Threat Intelligence Support**
- **Jamming Technique Optimization (JATO): Technique Development**

• CHINA LAKE

- **Electronic Warfare Integration Laboratory (EWIL): Flight Test Support & Data Analysis**
- **Electronic Combat Range (ECR): Open Air Range**

Definition..... “Sensor- (DOD*)”

“A technical means to extend man’s natural senses; an equipment which detects and indicates terrain configuration, the presence of military targets, and other natural and manmade objects and activities by means of energy emitted or reflected by such targets or objects. The energy may be nuclear, electromagnetic, including the visible and invisible portions of the spectrum, chemical, biological, thermal, or mechanical, including sound, blast, and earth vibration.”

*Standardized Definition for Use Within the
Joint Services and Department of Defense

Source: *The Strategy of Electromagnetic Conflict*,
Edited By LT COL Richard E. Fitts

Our Customer's Thoughts...

"The contributions of JATO to the EA-6B community are immeasurable. The professionals at JATO provide continuous support for our front-line combat operations ... This organization is the focal point for all EA issues and provides the Prowler community with timely and accurate information and data support--simply stated, we could not do our mission without them. "

-- LT Kyle Baker / Capt Jeff Long (USAF), VAQ-134

"No one goes into harms way without us...no one."

-- Captain John P. Cryer, COMVAQWINGPAC, 1999

"The Software, Test, Design, and data gathering that Pt. Mugu does is saving lives."

-- Captain Chris Fields, COMVAQWINGPAC, 2005

"Pt Mugu is the reason we have fully functioning EA-6B's and working software. I don't know where to begin in my laudable appreciation of those very talented folks. From developmental testing all the way through operational work continuing on through fleet introduction and beyond. They are always willing to go the extra mile... They have a 24 hour hotline during war and peace time and I've used it during many conflicts including our current det."

-- LCDR Robert "KY" Croxson, VAQ-140




Airborne Electronic Attack



EA6B Music Video Pgm.wmv


Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA): "Deny, delay, degrade the acquisition of friendly forces by enemy air defenses systems."

- Less exposure time to threat
- Less time for threat to react
- Less shots taken by threat
- Self-protect equip responds to less engagements
- Mission success



*Increases combat survivability of strike force aircraft & weapons.
Communications EA to enhance ground forces.*

DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES, DIFFERENT APPLICATION OF TALENT/EXPERTISE



MILITARY JUDGMENT: NECESSARY — BUT NOT SUFFICIENT
Issue # 11-15-04-01

Issue: The Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) has registered 29 closure / realignment scenarios on the Department's Scenario Tracking Tool.¹ But 20 months after the TJCSG's first deliberations in March 2003, and with the Cost of Base Closure and Realignment (COBRA) data calls set to launch in a matter of days — not one scenario is the output of the Linear Optimization Model (LOM), not one is driven by data on excess capacity, and not one reflects data-derived military value. *In short, not one scenario is the result of quantitative analysis.* All are instead the product of "military judgment."

Military judgment is a critical part of our process, but it is subjective by nature and strongly dependent on the mix of individuals within the TJCSG. The process was designed to be *data-driven* for those very reasons, but it has drifted into one that will be, at best, *data-validated*, and at worst, *data-rationalized*. Without proactive measures, the scenarios will be difficult to defend before the BRAC Commission.

Point of Contact: Don DeYoung, Capabilities Integration Team (Alternate), U.S. Navy

Issue Summary

1. *Background*

Military judgment is a filter through which all closure / realignment proposals must pass in order to gauge their practicality and prudence. An extreme hypothetical example would be a scenario that would close Pearl Harbor. Military judgment would doubtless reject it on the grounds of strategic and tactical interests. Strictly speaking, however, *military* judgment is not the province of the TJCSG, whose considerations are different from those that focus on force structure and basing requirements. The TJCSG's area of competence is, instead, *technical* judgment. For simplicity, the phrase "expert judgment" will be used hereafter.

2. *Drifting Away From a Data-Driven Process*

After 20 months, we have not accomplished two critical requirements: (a) confirming the assertion that there is excess capacity within the DoD's in-house system (and if so, where and to what extent), and (b) determining a score for each sites' military value. Both sets of data are needed for the LOM.

As described in the issue paper, "Decision Criteria for Scenario Proposals," (dated 8 September), the LOM has two advantages. The first is as a decision-aid that limits the number of options produced from a very large universe of potential options. For example, given any 10 sites, there are 175 possible alternatives that close 1, 2, or 3 of them.² The second advantage is that *the LOM provides an objective means by which to defend our chosen few scenarios when so many other possibilities existed but were never considered.*

The drift away from a data-driven process began on 23 July with the request for notional scenarios by the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG). The issue paper, "Notional Scenarios," (dated 28 July) argued that the ISG's request would risk fueling perceptions that the Department created the answers before the data was in. In fact, at that time, the field sites were still in the process of responding to the

120
 $\binom{10}{3} =$
 $\binom{10}{2} = 45$
 $\binom{10}{1} = 10$

¹ The Infrastructure Steering Group set 1 November as the deadline for the "vast majority of scenarios declared by JCSGs and MilDeps" (ref: USD(AT&L) memo, subj: "BRAC 2005 Scenario Data Calls and Revised BRAC Timeline", 23 September 2004).
² DON IAT Briefing, "Proposed Optimization Methodology: Generating Alternatives."

military value and capacity data calls. In our 30 July TJCSG meeting, the OSD BRAC Office gave clarifying guidance that these scenarios were to be notional, but nevertheless “useful,” a somewhat mixed message. OSD also asserted that scenario development is “the front-end of the analytical process,”³ which was a departure from its guidance, issued a year ago, that called it “the final step.”⁴

One month after the ISG’s request, the JCSGs began providing scenarios that identified “gainers” and “losers.”⁵ The TJCSG initially kept its scenarios at a general level, specifying only the impacted sites,⁶ but soon followed suit when the ISG: (a) required that all JCSGs begin registering scenario proposals into the Scenario Tracking Tool by 20 September⁷ and, (b) scheduled the TJCSG to brief its scenarios (with “gainers” and “losers”) to the ISG on 1 October.⁸

The moment we produced our first scenarios without the benefit of capacity and military value data, we lost the right to call the TJCSG process data-driven. It instead became *judgment-driven*.

3. *Not Mission Impossible*

It is difficult to measure capacity and assign military values, and do it in time to run the LOM — but not impossible, especially in 20 months time. In fact, during BRAC-95, the Navy derived the necessary data and used the LOM to generate scenarios in 10 months’ time,⁹ in a process that was data-driven from start to finish. As a member of the Navy’s BRAC-95 Base Structure Analysis Team, I can attest to that fact. The following items give more evidence of the sound, analytical nature of that process:

- During BRAC-95, the General Accounting Office (GAO) examined the closure process and decisions of each Service, including their capacity and military value analyses, and found that the Navy’s data-driven process and recommendations were sound.¹⁰
- The DoD honored C. P. Nemfakos, the architect of the Navy process, as a “Defense Career Civilian of Distinction.” His plaque, featured in the Pentagon’s A-Ring exhibit, “Career Civil Servants in the Nation’s Defense,” states that he “oversaw the department’s base closure process so effectively that his methodologies were adopted¹¹ by the GAO and the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.”

Even BRAC-95’s much criticized Laboratory and T&E cross-service studies took only 9 months to produce capacity data and military value rankings (though the military value scoring was flawed by some bizarre results in the T&E arena). The two studies even ran the LOM.

To be fair, ten years later, some profoundly different circumstances have had a significant effect on our current process. First and foremost, the Pentagon is fighting a war. There are three other causes for progress’ glacial pace, of even greater effect than the first, but they lie outside the scope of this paper.

³ TJCSG Meeting Minutes of 30 July 2004

⁴ USD(AT&L) memo, subj: “BRAC 2005 Guidance for the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group”, 16 July 2003.

⁵ Briefing to the Infrastructure Steering Group, 27 August 2004

⁶ DDR&E memo, subj: “Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) Notional Training Scenarios”, 4 August 2004.

⁷ USD(AT&L) memo, subj: “BRAC 2005 Scenario Data Calls and Revised BRAC Timeline”, 23 September 2004.

⁸ USD(AT&L) memo, subj: “Template and Briefing Schedule for BRAC 2005 Scenarios”, 17 September 2004.

⁹ BSAT memo RP-0445-F8, subj: “Report of BSEC Deliberations on 16 November 1994,” 16 November 1994.

¹⁰ GAO, “Military Bases: Analysis of DoD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment”, p.87.

¹¹ Use of the word “adopted” is probably inaccurate, since neither the GAO of the Commission would have the occasion to employ these closure methodologies. Perhaps the word meant here was “endorsed.”

4. *The Problem — Defensibility of Our Recommendations*

Lately, our process has been described as “strategy-driven,”¹² because the scenarios generated by that process conform to the TJCSG’s overarching strategy. That strategy is to:

“Reduce excess capacity and reduce the number of technical sites through combined Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Centers aligned for functional and technical efficiency and synergy.”¹³

The epithet, “strategy-driven,” while technically correct at a superficial level, is hard to support. For one, we have not proven there is any excess capacity to reduce, which is one objective of the strategy. The other is to reduce the number of sites in a way that aligns them for efficiency and synergy, but how does one align them successfully without objective data on their military value?

A strategy-driven process would be if we were reducing proven excess capacity while enhancing vertically integrated platform work, or co-locating a broad range of multidisciplinary sciences, at sites *shown by data to possess the best people, state-of-the-art facilities, and an established record of success in making scientific advances and creating new warfighting capabilities*. By contrast, realigning work to sites that merely have the most people working in what are large, wide-ranging technology areas (e.g., Sensors) is not strategy. It is expedience, at best.

Defensibility problems will almost certainly result from the belated use of data because our judgment-driven scenarios now have two sub-optimal futures. The best-case has them *data-validated*; and in the worst-case, *data-rationalized*. In either case, without corrective action, notions that we marshaled data to support preexisting judgments, or preferred outcomes, will be difficult to dispel.

5. *A Remedial Plan of Action*

(a) Consult Other DoD Studies

The TJCSG does not have a monopoly on expert judgment, so it will be difficult to explain why we did not calibrate with the findings of high-level expert panels — *especially those that, unlike our study, actually examined projects at the sites*. Fortunately, there is still time to use the expert judgment of other DoD panels as a solution to our problem.

The issue paper, “Decision Criteria for Scenario Proposals,” proposed that we, where possible, assess each scenario for whether it conforms or conflicts with any judgment(s) of a DoD study, like those of the Service Science Boards, Tri-Service RDT&E Panels, or any other DoD/Federal board of scientific and engineering experts. Conformance to other panel findings would enhance the credibility of our judgment-driven scenarios. Conflicts with other findings, while not a show-stopper, should be cause for re-examination.

Some may claim this approach compromises objectivity because such studies can be biased (a legitimate concern), or that such information is not certifiable because it draws from sources outside the closure process. These arguments are not convincing for the following reasons:

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- Other studies are unlikely to be any more subjective than our judgment-driven process. *The more objective studies will be those that examined the R&D work itself, which we have not done.*
- These would be official reports, authorized and approved by the DoD / Services. *If this information cannot be considered authoritative and certifiable, then why does the DoD continue to charter such studies — at considerable public expense — and provide them to Congress?*
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In short, what rationale could be offered for why OSD entertained ideas from the private sector, even as the TJCSG ignored expert judgments made in DoD’s own studies — many of which have been provided to Congress and the Secretary of Defense?

(b) Derive Valid Military Value Scores — ASAP

Even if we decide to consult other DoD studies, the fact remains that judgment alone cannot substitute for the objective data necessary for deriving military value. In fact, OSD policy, established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF), directs us to:

“...determine military value through the exercise of military judgment *built upon a quantitative analytical foundation* (emphasis added).”¹⁴

Deriving scenarios, without the foundation of quantitative analysis, causes problems. First, *it ignores the DEPSECDEF’s policy and risks compromising the integrity of the BRAC process.* It was for this reason, at the 3 November CIT meeting that I abstained from ranking the 31 proposed scenarios by their order of importance.¹⁵ How can one make such determinations, in an objective way, without the analytical foundation provided by military value (MV) scores or capacity data?

The second problem is that *accurate MV scores are essential if we are to avoid closing, or realigning work from, sites that have greater value than ones we have selected to be the gainers.* Again, this situation was caused by developing scenarios before the MV scores were available to inform our selection of gainers and losers. The key task after deriving the scores will be to modify any defective scenarios as quickly as possible.

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Complicating matters is the fact that the COBRA calls will be launched soon, well before the MV scores are finalized. This is likely to waste dollars, time, and effort. Each defective COBRA squanders resources in the following ways.

- COBRA calls are expensive. Based on the cost of an actual BRAC-95 COBRA call, my estimated cost of a BRAC-05 TJCSG COBRA call, affecting 7 sites, might be roughly \$495,000.¹⁶ Assuming 20-30 COBRA calls, the total price tag could range between 10 and 15 million dollars.
- COBRA calls are labor intensive. Based on an actual BRAC-95 COBRA call, a BRAC-05 TJCSG COBRA call, affecting 7 sites, may generate 375 pages of data.¹⁷ Assuming 20-30 COBRA calls, the sub-groups may be swamped with between 7,500 and 12,000 pages of data. Analyzing this data and resolving the likely conflicts between “gainers” and “losers”, especially the inter-service conflicts, will take time that is in short supply. *Of all phases in our process, this is the most likely to be a “showstopper” (see issue paper, “Scenario Conflict Adjudication,” dated 13 September).*
- COBRA calls disrupt important work. Labs and centers perform critical missions, many in direct support of our armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the global war on terrorism. COBRA calls are major distractions and divert resources away from mission needs. *The fact that we are risking the launch of unnecessary and/or defective COBRA calls, due to a lack of objective data, after 20 months of work, is more than unfortunate. It is inexcusable.*

One last issue regarding military value is the question of, “what gets assigned a score?” — i.e., will it be a bin, a group of bins, or an organization? Confining the scores to individual bins makes the least sense because it does not conform to the synergistic nature of how good R&D is conducted. Moreover, our 39 bins do not have clean, mutually exclusive borders — both people and facilities are shared across multiple bins. A bin-to-bin analysis will lead to realignments of workload packets, which will *sever the connectivity of critical multidisciplinary projects and vertically integrated programs*. The way out of this box is to assign MV to groups of bins, or to more meaningful organizational units, such as an activity (e.g., laboratory or center).

(c) Simplify the Capacity Analysis

Every dollar spent on excess infrastructure robs our treasury and burdens our armed forces. Our first task was to determine whether that excess exists, and if it does, where it is and how much there is of it. As with military value, this task must be accomplished *objectively and accurately*, and should have been completed *prior* to the generation of any closure scenarios.

Reliable capacity data is still needed to confirm assertions made about the existence of excess capacity. After all, this was the primary reason given to justify another round of closures. Conventional wisdom after the 1995 closures held that substantial excess capacity remained. However the circumstances supporting that contention were profoundly altered by a foreign

¹⁶ The BRAC-95 COBRA call expended 1-2 WYs of effort in 48 hours (plus a weekend) at the “losing” site. Assume the level to be 1.5 WYs, at a fully-burdened compensation rate of a GS-13, and then the “losing” site spent approximately \$225K to respond. Then assume the “gaining” site expended 1/5 the effort, which is probably conservative, and the cost for that site was roughly \$45 K, *making the total for the COBRA call approximately \$270 K.* But, that was a scenario that involved only 2 sites. Our three “notional” scenarios would have affected 7, 9, and 9 sites respectively. Let us assume that our COBRA calls affect an average of 7 sites, with a conservative ratio of 1 “loser” and 6 “gainers” for each. By applying the response costs of \$225 K for the “loser” and \$45 K for each “gainer”, *the estimated cost for each scenario might be \$495 K.*

¹⁷ The BRAC-95 COBRA call generated 165 pages of data from the “losing” site. Again, assuming the “gaining” site expended 1/5 of the effort, about 35 pages may have been produced for a total data call response of 200 pages. Again, assuming the TJCSG data calls affect an average of 7 sites, with a ratio of 1 “loser” to 6 “gainers”, and the total amount of information might be roughly 375 pages.

attack on our homeland. As a result, (a) the nation's defense budget has risen (with an accompanying increase in DoD lab/center workload),¹⁸ (b) serious Congressional consideration is being given to increasing the size of the force structure, and (c) there are urgent wartime challenges that require extensive levels of RDT&E, such as finding reliable ways to detect, from a distance, everything from conventional explosives, to bio-agents, to nuclear material.

The TJCSG's approach to determining capacity is overly complicated. It uses too many metrics of dubious value. One is square footage, which has problems best addressed in the issue paper, "Notional Scenarios." A second, Force Structure Adjustment (FSA), is especially relevant here because of its total reliance on judgment. As explained in the issue paper, "Proposed Contingency Plan" (dated 4 August 2004), the FSA is intended to account for any current capacity that may not be necessary in 2025. Our individual judgments were merged into a collective judgment by means of a Delphi session, but it is unclear how to defend pure speculation about the world 20 years from now. Needless to say, the FSA is not certified data.

To be blunt, the third metric — extramural funding — is absurd. First, dollars given to external organizations is not a measure of on-site capacity. If it were, DARPA, with nearly \$2.7 billion in FY03, should have a sprawling infrastructure, but it occupies an office building.¹⁹ Second, it injects private sector infrastructure into an analysis of the public sector's capacity. Funding that goes outside of an installation's fence-line is immaterial to BRAC. Third, the issue paper, "Proposed Contingency Plan," predicted that we would risk multiple counts of the same dollar as it is passed around different organizations at the same location. The prediction was right. At the 1 November CIT meeting, the Analytic Team reported that a roll-up of capacity measures was necessary in order to compare apples-to-apples, but that this will also ensure double-counting (or worse). The Team's proposal to use only intramural funding, which would eliminate both the multiple-counting and private sector issues, was not adopted.

A fourth metric, ACATs (both count and funding), is analytically unsound. ACAT programs exhibit large variances in cost and complexity. This leads to big differences in personnel, funding, and infrastructure requirements between programs — even at the same ACAT level. ACATs are much too imprecise as a means for measuring capacity. As a diagnostic tool, it is not unlike using an oven thermometer to decide whether your child has a fever.

We need to simplify our analysis. Work-years and test hours were sufficient in BRAC-95's Lab and T&E cross-service analyses. And, work-years alone got the job done in the Navy's BRAC-95 process; a process that the GAO endorsed. The solution is clear. Instead, we are proceeding with COBRA calls — *even though no excess capacity has been proven to exist*. We owe it to the field sites and to our nation's security to determine whether there is in fact any excess capacity, and if so, where and by how much. If we fail to meet that obligation, then we owe it to ourselves to start working on some plausible explanations for the Commission.

Conclusion

There is an enormous difference between a closure process that is *data-driven & validated by judgment* and one that is *judgment-driven & rationalized by data*. The first approach, after proving excess capacity does indeed exist, can yield fair outcomes that reduces infrastructure and preserves an in-house system that meets long-term national interests. The second approach can heighten the risk to America's security.

¹⁸ Navy Laboratory Community Coordinating Group data show a 10% increase in the one year from FY01 to FY02 in reimbursable funding, and direct cites (including non-Navy funding sources).

¹⁹ <http://www.darpa.mil/body/pdf/FY03BudEst.pdf>

While we no longer have a data-driven approach, we may be able to avoid the pitfalls of the latter one. To do this we must first calibrate our judgment-derived scenarios against the findings of other defense studies. This will minimize the risk of errors in judgment and give our proposals more credibility. Then we need to validate those scenarios in two steps: use valid capacity data, derived through a simplified and more analytically sound process, to verify that there is excess capacity within the Department's system of labs and centers, and if such excess is proven, then use accurate MV scores, at a meaningful level of aggregation (e.g., organizations vice the artificial 39 bins) to make the best choices regarding "gainers" and "losers." Accomplishing less than those three steps will create unacceptable risks.

Much has been said about this BRAC being about transforming the Department for future threats. Much less is said about the fact that the very mission of the Department's laboratories and centers is one of constant transformation — both incremental and radical. Whatever we do in this BRAC, *their ability to make technical contributions to national security must be preserved*. One example is the contribution made by world-class chemists with the Navy's laboratory at Indian Head, Maryland, who developed and fielded the thermobaric weapon in only 67 days for use against al Qaeda and Taliban forces holed up in Afghanistan's mountain caves and tunnels. Another is that made by engineers with the Army's laboratory and test center at Aberdeen, Maryland and its Tank Automotive R&D center in Warren, Michigan, who developed and fielded, within two months, the Armor Survivability Kits that are now being rushed into Iraq to better protect U.S. ground forces.²⁰

Another in-house ability that must be preserved is its role as a *yardstick*,²¹ a term referring to the standard that it sets by providing authoritative, objective advice to governmental decisionmakers. This is critical to good government. The Federal Government must be able to choose among competing options offered by industrial producers. The need for profit makes each company an advocate of its own product, so, given those natural tendencies, the Government "requires internal technical capability of sufficient breadth, depth, and continuity to assure that the public interest is served."²²

A lot rides on our actions, much more so than ten years ago. America is engaged in a prolonged struggle with an opportunistic, fanatical enemy who has unlimited apocalyptic goals and is not deterred by traditional means. We need to identify and collect any potential BRAC savings — and our country needs all of the technological options it can get.

Recommendations: The TJCSG should require that the sub-groups: (a) calibrate the proposed scenarios against the findings of other DoD studies; (b) use capacity data, derived through a simplified and more analytically sound process, to verify that there is excess capacity within the DoD in-house system, and if so, then (c) use MV scores, at a meaningful level of aggregation, to *validate* the scenarios and make the best choices regarding "gainers" and "losers."

²⁰ RDECOM Magazine, "Vehicles in Iraq Go From Workhorse to Warrior with New Kits," February 2004.

²¹ H. L. Nieburg, *In the Name of Science* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966).

²² William J. Perry, *Required In-House Capabilities for Department of Defense Research, Development, Test and Evaluation* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1980).

Army Position: Non-Concur

AF Position:

- a) **Non-Concur** Calibrating against findings of other DoD Studies not required by the BRAC Law nor appropriate based on context and circumstances operative when those studies were conducted.
- b) **Non-Concur** Use the existing capacity methodology approved by the ISG
- c) **Non-Concur** Used Military Value to analyze TJCSG recommendations consistent with Mr. Wynne's guidance as opposed to using Military Value to validate TJCSG scenarios.

Issue Paper #07-28-04-01 Notional Scenarios - AF Non-Concurs as this has been overcome by events.

Issue Paper #08-06-04-02 Proposed Contingency Plan - AF Non-Concurs as this has been overcome by events.

Issue Paper #07-30-04-05 Decision Criteria for Scenario Proposals AF Non-Concurs Use TJCSG Decision Factors instead of Decision Criteria proposed in the issue paper.

Issue Paper #07-16-04-05 Scenario Conflict Adjudication AF Non-Concurs The TJCSG Chairman should adjudicate TJCSG scenario conflicts not the Service Vice Chiefs.

Navy Position: _____
Marine Corps Position: _____
JCS Position: _____

Final Resolution:

POC Signature: _____ Date: _____

CIT Chair: _____ Date: _____

MILITARY JUDGMENT: NECESSARY — BUT NOT SUFFICIENT
Issue # 11-15-04-01

Issue: The Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) has registered 29 closure / realignment scenarios on the Department's Scenario Tracking Tool.¹ But 20 months after the TJCSG's first deliberations in March 2003, and with the Cost of Base Closure and Realignment (COBRA) data calls set to launch in a matter of days — not one scenario is the output of the Linear Optimization Model (LOM), not one is driven by data on excess capacity, and not one reflects data-derived military value. *In short, not one scenario is the result of quantitative analysis.* All are instead the product of "military judgment."

Military judgment is a critical part of our process, but it is subjective by nature and strongly dependent on the mix of individuals within the TJCSG. The process was designed to be *data-driven* for those very reasons, but it has drifted into one that will be, at best, *data-validated*, and at worst, *data-rationalized*. Without proactive measures, the scenarios will be difficult to defend before the BRAC Commission.

Point of Contact: Don DeYoung, Capabilities Integration Team (Alternate), U.S. Navy

Issue Summary

1. *Background*

Military judgment is a filter through which all closure / realignment proposals must pass in order to gauge their practicality and prudence. An extreme hypothetical example would be a scenario that would close Pearl Harbor. Military judgment would doubtless reject it on the grounds of strategic and tactical interests. Strictly speaking, however, *military* judgment is not the province of the TJCSG, whose considerations are different from those that focus on force structure and basing requirements. The TJCSG's area of competence is, instead, *technical* judgment. For simplicity, the phrase "expert judgment" will be used hereafter.

2. *Drifting Away From a Data-Driven Process*

After 20 months, we have not accomplished two critical requirements: (a) confirming the assertion that there is excess capacity within the DoD's in-house system (and if so, where and to what extent), and (b) determining a score for each sites' military value. Both sets of data are needed for the LOM.

As described in the issue paper, "Decision Criteria for Scenario Proposals," (dated 8 September), the LOM has two advantages. The first is as a decision-aid that limits the number of options produced from a very large universe of potential options. For example, given any 10 sites, there are 175 possible alternatives that close 1, 2, or 3 of them.² The second advantage is that *the LOM provides an objective means by which to defend our chosen few scenarios when so many other possibilities existed but were never considered.*

The drift away from a data-driven process began on 23 July with the request for notional scenarios by the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG). The issue paper, "Notional Scenarios," (dated 28 July) argued that the ISG's request would risk fueling perceptions that the Department created the answers before the data was in. In fact, at that time, the field sites were still in the process of responding to the

¹ The Infrastructure Steering Group set 1 November as the deadline for the "vast majority of scenarios declared by JCSGs and MilDepts" (ref: USD(AT&L) memo, subj: "BRAC 2005 Scenario Data Calls and Revised BRAC Timeline", 23 September 2004).

² DON IAT Briefing, "Proposed Optimization Methodology: Generating Alternatives."

military value and capacity data calls. In our 30 July TJCSG meeting, the OSD BRAC Office gave clarifying guidance that these scenarios were to be notional, but nevertheless “useful,” a somewhat mixed message. OSD also asserted that scenario development is “the front-end of the analytical process,”³ which was a departure from its guidance, issued a year ago, that called it “the final step.”⁴

One month after the ISG’s request, the JCSGs began providing scenarios that identified “gainers” and “losers.”⁵ The TJCSG initially kept its scenarios at a general level, specifying only the impacted sites,⁶ but soon followed suit when the ISG: (a) required that all JCSGs begin registering scenario proposals into the Scenario Tracking Tool by 20 September⁷ and, (b) scheduled the TJCSG to brief its scenarios (with “gainers” and “losers”) to the ISG on 1 October.⁸

The moment we produced our first scenarios without the benefit of capacity and military value data, we lost the right to call the TJCSG process data-driven. It instead became *judgment-driven*.

3. *Not Mission Impossible*

It is difficult to measure capacity and assign military values, and do it in time to run the LOM — but not impossible, especially in 20 months time. In fact, during BRAC-95, the Navy derived the necessary data and used the LOM to generate scenarios in 10 months’ time,⁹ in a process that was data-driven from start to finish. As a member of the Navy’s BRAC-95 Base Structure Analysis Team, I can attest to that fact. The following items give more evidence of the sound, analytical nature of that process:

- During BRAC-95, the General Accounting Office (GAO) examined the closure process and decisions of each Service, including their capacity and military value analyses, and found that the Navy’s data-driven process and recommendations were sound.¹⁰
- The DoD honored C. P. Nemfakos, the architect of the Navy process, as a “Defense Career Civilian of Distinction.” His plaque, featured in the Pentagon’s A-Ring exhibit, “Career Civil Servants in the Nation’s Defense,” states that he “oversaw the department’s base closure process so effectively that his methodologies were adopted¹¹ by the GAO and the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.”

Even BRAC-95’s much criticized Laboratory and T&E cross-service studies took only 9 months to produce capacity data and military value rankings (though the military value scoring was flawed by some bizarre results in the T&E arena). The two studies even ran the LOM.

To be fair, ten years later, some profoundly different circumstances have had a significant effect on our current process. First and foremost, the Pentagon is fighting a war. There are three other causes for progress’ glacial pace, of even greater effect than the first, but they lie outside the scope of this paper.

³ TJCSG Meeting Minutes of 30 July 2004

⁴ USD(AT&L) memo, subj: “BRAC 2005 Guidance for the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group”, 16 July 2003.

⁵ Briefing to the Infrastructure Steering Group, 27 August 2004

⁶ DDR&E memo, subj: “Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) Notional Training Scenarios”, 4 August 2004.

⁷ USD(AT&L) memo, subj: “BRAC 2005 Scenario Data Calls and Revised BRAC Timeline”, 23 September 2004.

⁸ USD(AT&L) memo, subj: “Template and Briefing Schedule for BRAC 2005 Scenarios”, 17 September 2004.

⁹ BSAT memo RP-0445-F8, subj: “Report of BSEC Deliberations on 16 November 1994,” 16 November 1994.

¹⁰ GAO, “Military Bases: Analysis of DoD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment”, p.87.

¹¹ Use of the word “adopted” is probably inaccurate, since neither the GAO or the Commission would have the occasion to employ these closure methodologies. Perhaps the word meant here was “endorsed.”

4. *The Problem — Defensibility of Our Recommendations*

Lately, our process has been described as “strategy-driven,”¹² because the scenarios generated by that process conform to the TJCSG’s overarching strategy. That strategy is to:

“Reduce excess capacity and reduce the number of technical sites through combined Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Centers aligned for functional and technical efficiency and synergy.”¹³

The epithet, “strategy-driven,” while technically correct at a superficial level, is hard to support. For one, we have not proven there is any excess capacity to reduce, which is one objective of the strategy. The other is to reduce the number of sites in a way that aligns them for efficiency and synergy, but how does one align them successfully without objective data on their military value?

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In short, what rationale could be offered for why OSD entertained ideas from the private sector, even as the TJCSG ignored expert judgments made in DoD’s own studies — many of which have been provided to Congress and the Secretary of Defense?

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One last issue regarding military value is the question of, “what gets assigned a score?” — i.e., will it be a bin, a group of bins, or an organization? Confining the scores to individual bins makes the least sense because it does not conform to the synergistic nature of how good R&D is conducted. Moreover, our 39 bins do not have clean, mutually exclusive borders — both people and facilities are shared across multiple bins. A bin-to-bin analysis will lead to realignments of workload packets, which will *sever the connectivity of critical multidisciplinary projects and vertically integrated programs*. The way out of this box is to assign MV to groups of bins, or to more meaningful organizational units, such as an activity (e.g., laboratory or center).

(c) **Simplify the Capacity Analysis**

Every dollar spent on excess infrastructure robs our treasury and burdens our armed forces. Our first task was to determine whether that excess exists, and if it does, where it is and how much there is of it. As with military value, this task must be accomplished *objectively and accurately*, and should have been completed *prior* to the generation of any closure scenarios.

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attack on our homeland. As a result, (a) the nation's defense budget has risen (with an accompanying increase in DoD lab/center workload),¹⁸ (b) serious Congressional consideration is being given to increasing the size of the force structure, and (c) there are urgent wartime challenges that require extensive levels of RDT&E, such as finding reliable ways to detect, from a distance, everything from conventional explosives, to bio-agents, to nuclear material.

The TJCSG's approach to determining capacity is overly complicated. It uses too many metrics of dubious value. One is square footage, which has problems best addressed in the issue paper, "Notional Scenarios." A second, Force Structure Adjustment (FSA), is especially relevant here because of its total reliance on judgment. As explained in the issue paper, "Proposed Contingency Plan" (dated 4 August 2004), the FSA is intended to account for any current capacity that may not be necessary in 2025. Our individual judgments were merged into a collective judgment by means of a Delphi session, but it is unclear how to defend pure speculation about the world 20 years from now. Needless to say, the FSA is not certified data.

To be blunt, the third metric — extramural funding — is absurd. First, dollars given to external organizations is not a measure of on-site capacity. If it were, DARPA, with nearly \$2.7 billion in FY03, should have a sprawling infrastructure, but it occupies an office building.¹⁹ Second, it injects private sector infrastructure into an analysis of the public sector's capacity. Funding that goes outside of an installation's fence-line is immaterial to BRAC. Third, the issue paper, "Proposed Contingency Plan," predicted that we would risk multiple counts of the same dollar as it is passed around different organizations at the same location. The prediction was right. At the 1 November CIT meeting, the Analytic Team reported that a roll-up of capacity measures was necessary in order to compare apples-to-apples, but that this will also ensure double-counting (or worse). The Team's proposal to use only intramural funding, which would eliminate both the multiple-counting and private sector issues, was not adopted.

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We need to simplify our analysis. Work-years and test hours were sufficient in BRAC-95's Lab and T&E cross-service analyses. And, work-years alone got the job done in the Navy's BRAC-95 process; a process that the GAO endorsed. The solution is clear. Instead, we are proceeding with COBRA calls — *even though no excess capacity has been proven to exist*. We owe it to the field sites and to our nation's security to determine whether there is in fact any excess capacity, and if so, where and by how much. If we fail to meet that obligation, then we owe it to ourselves to start working on some plausible explanations for the Commission.

Conclusion

There is an enormous difference between a closure process that is *data-driven & validated by judgment* and one that is *judgment-driven & rationalized by data*. The first approach, after proving excess capacity does indeed exist, can yield fair outcomes that reduces infrastructure and preserves an in-house system that meets long-term national interests. The second approach can heighten the risk to America's security.

¹⁸ Navy Laboratory Community Coordinating Group data show a 10% increase in the one year from FY01 to FY02 in reimbursable funding, and direct cites (including non-Navy funding sources).

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While we no longer have a data-driven approach, we may be able to avoid the pitfalls of the latter one. To do this we must first calibrate our judgment-derived scenarios against the findings of other defense studies. This will minimize the risk of errors in judgment and give our proposals more credibility. Then we need to validate those scenarios in two steps: use valid capacity data, derived through a simplified and more analytically sound process, to verify that there is excess capacity within the Department's system of labs and centers, and if such excess is proven, then use accurate MV scores, at a meaningful level of aggregation (e.g., organizations vice the artificial 39 bins) to make the best choices regarding "gainers" and "losers." Accomplishing less than those three steps will create unacceptable risks.

Much has been said about this BRAC being about transforming the Department for future threats. Much less is said about the fact that the very mission of the Department's laboratories and centers is one of constant transformation — both incremental and radical. Whatever we do in this BRAC, *their ability to make technical contributions to national security must be preserved*. One example is the contribution made by world-class chemists with the Navy's laboratory at Indian Head, Maryland, who developed and fielded the thermobaric weapon in only 67 days for use against al Qaeda and Taliban forces holed up in Afghanistan's mountain caves and tunnels. Another is that made by engineers with the Army's laboratory and test center at Aberdeen, Maryland and its Tank Automotive R&D center in Warren, Michigan, who developed and fielded, within two months, the Armor Survivability Kits that are now being rushed into Iraq to better protect U.S. ground forces.²⁰

Another in-house ability that must be preserved is its role as a *yardstick*,²¹ a term referring to the standard that it sets by providing authoritative, objective advice to governmental decisionmakers. This is critical to good government. The Federal Government must be able to choose among competing options offered by industrial producers. The need for profit makes each company an advocate of its own product, so, given those natural tendencies, the Government "requires internal technical capability of sufficient breadth, depth, and continuity to assure that the public interest is served."²²

A lot rides on our actions, much more so than ten years ago. America is engaged in a prolonged struggle with an opportunistic, fanatical enemy who has unlimited apocalyptic goals and is not deterred by traditional means. We need to identify and collect any potential BRAC savings — and our country needs all of the technological options it can get.

Recommendations: The TJCSG should require that the sub-groups: (a) calibrate the proposed scenarios against the findings of other DoD studies; (b) use capacity data, derived through a simplified and more analytically sound process, to verify that there is excess capacity within the DoD in-house system, and if so, then (c) use MV scores, at a meaningful level of aggregation, to *validate* the scenarios and make the best choices regarding "gainers" and "losers."

Army Position: NC
AF Position: _____
Navy Position: _____
Marine Corps Position: _____
JCS Position: _____

Final Resolution:

POC Signature: _____ Date: _____

CIT Chair: _____ Date: _____

²⁰ RDECOM Magazine, "Vehicles in Iraq Go From Workhorse to Warrior with New Kits," February 2004.

²¹ H. L. Nieburg, *In the Name of Science* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966).

²² William J. Perry, *Required In-House Capabilities for Department of Defense Research, Development, Test and Evaluation* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1980).

MILITARY JUDGMENT: *NECESSARY — BUT NOT SUFFICIENT*
Issue # 11-15-04-01

Issue: The Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) has registered 29 closure / realignment scenarios on the Department's Scenario Tracking Tool.¹ But 20 months after the TJCSG's first deliberations in March 2003, and with the Cost of Base Closure and Realignment (COBRA) data calls set to launch in a matter of days — not one scenario is the output of the Linear Optimization Model (LOM), not one is driven by data on excess capacity, and not one reflects data-derived military value. *In short, not one scenario is the result of quantitative analysis.* All are instead the product of "military judgment."

Military judgment is a critical part of our process, but it is subjective by nature and strongly dependent on the mix of individuals within the TJCSG. The process was designed to be *data-driven* for those very reasons, but it has drifted into one that will be, at best, *data-validated*, and at worst, *data-rationalized*. Without proactive measures, the scenarios will be difficult to defend before the BRAC Commission.

Point of Contact: Don DeYoung, Capabilities Integration Team (Alternate), U.S. Navy

Issue Summary

1. *Background*

Military judgment is a filter through which all closure / realignment proposals must pass in order to gauge their practicality and prudence. An extreme hypothetical example would be a scenario that would close Pearl Harbor. Military judgment would doubtless reject it on the grounds of strategic and tactical interests. Strictly speaking, however, *military* judgment is not the province of the TJCSG, whose considerations are different from those that focus on force structure and basing requirements. The TJCSG's area of competence is, instead, *technical* judgment. For simplicity, the phrase "expert judgment" will be used hereafter.

2. *Drifting Away From a Data-Driven Process*

After 20 months, we have not accomplished two critical requirements: (a) confirming the assertion that there is excess capacity within the DoD's in-house system (and if so, where and to what extent), and (b) determining a score for each sites' military value. Both sets of data are needed for the LOM.

As described in the issue paper, "Decision Criteria for Scenario Proposals," (dated 8 September), the LOM has two advantages. The first is as a decision-aid that limits the number of options produced from a very large universe of potential options. For example, given any 10 sites, there are 175 possible alternatives that close 1, 2, or 3 of them.² The second advantage is that *the LOM provides an objective means by which to defend our chosen few scenarios when so many other possibilities existed but were never considered.*

The drift away from a data-driven process began on 23 July with the request for notional scenarios by the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG). The issue paper, "Notional Scenarios," (dated 28 July) argued that the ISG's request would risk fueling perceptions that the Department created the answers before the data was in. In fact, at that time, the field sites were still in the process of responding to the

¹ The Infrastructure Steering Group set 1 November as the deadline for the "vast majority of scenarios declared by JCSGs and MilDeps" (ref: USD(AT&L) memo, subj: "BRAC 2005 Scenario Data Calls and Revised BRAC Timeline", 23 September 2004).

² DON IAT Briefing, "Proposed Optimization Methodology: Generating Alternatives."

military value and capacity data calls. In our 30 July TJCSG meeting, the OSD BRAC Office gave clarifying guidance that these scenarios were to be notional, but nevertheless “useful,” a somewhat mixed message. OSD also asserted that scenario development is “the front-end of the analytical process,”³ which was a departure from its guidance, issued a year ago, that called it “the final step.”⁴

One month after the ISG’s request, the JCSGs began providing scenarios that identified “gainers” and “losers.”⁵ The TJCSG initially kept its scenarios at a general level, specifying only the impacted sites,⁶ but soon followed suit when the ISG: (a) required that all JCSGs begin registering scenario proposals into the Scenario Tracking Tool by 20 September⁷ and, (b) scheduled the TJCSG to brief its scenarios (with “gainers” and “losers”) to the ISG on 1 October.⁸

The moment we produced our first scenarios without the benefit of capacity and military value data, we lost the right to call the TJCSG process data-driven. It instead became *judgment-driven*.

3. *Not Mission Impossible*

It is difficult to measure capacity and assign military values, and do it in time to run the LOM — but not impossible, especially in 20 months time. In fact, during BRAC-95, the Navy derived the necessary data and used the LOM to generate scenarios in 10 months’ time,⁹ in a process that was data-driven from start to finish. As a member of the Navy’s BRAC-95 Base Structure Analysis Team, I can attest to that fact. The following items give more evidence of the sound, analytical nature of that process:

- During BRAC-95, the General Accounting Office (GAO) examined the closure process and decisions of each Service, including their capacity and military value analyses, and found that the Navy’s data-driven process and recommendations were sound.¹⁰
- The DoD honored C. P. Nemfakos, the architect of the Navy process, as a “Defense Career Civilian of Distinction.” His plaque, featured in the Pentagon’s A-Ring exhibit, “Career Civil Servants in the Nation’s Defense,” states that he “oversaw the department’s base closure process so effectively that his methodologies were adopted¹¹ by the GAO and the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.”

Even BRAC-95’s much criticized Laboratory and T&E cross-service studies took only 9 months to produce capacity data and military value rankings (though the military value scoring was flawed by some bizarre results in the T&E arena). The two studies even ran the LOM.

To be fair, ten years later, some profoundly different circumstances have had a significant effect on our current process. First and foremost, the Pentagon is fighting a war. There are three other causes for progress’ glacial pace, of even greater effect than the first, but they lie outside the scope of this paper.

³ TJCSG Meeting Minutes of 30 July 2004

⁴ USD(AT&L) memo, subj: “BRAC 2005 Guidance for the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group”, 16 July 2003.

⁵ Briefing to the Infrastructure Steering Group, 27 August 2004

⁶ DDR&E memo, subj: “Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) Notional Training Scenarios”, 4 August 2004.

⁷ USD(AT&L) memo, subj: “BRAC 2005 Scenario Data Calls and Revised BRAC Timeline”, 23 September 2004.

⁸ USD(AT&L) memo, subj: “Template and Briefing Schedule for BRAC 2005 Scenarios”, 17 September 2004.

⁹ BSAT memo RP-0445-F8, subj: “Report of BSEC Deliberations on 16 November 1994,” 16 November 1994.

¹⁰ GAO, “Military Bases: Analysis of DoD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment”, p.87.

¹¹ Use of the word “adopted” is probably inaccurate, since neither the GAO or the Commission would have the occasion to employ these closure methodologies. Perhaps the word meant here was “endorsed.”

4. *The Problem — Defensibility of Our Recommendations*

Lately, our process has been described as “strategy-driven,”¹² because the scenarios generated by that process conform to the TJCSG’s overarching strategy. That strategy is to:

“Reduce excess capacity and reduce the number of technical sites through combined Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Centers aligned for functional and technical efficiency and synergy.”¹³

The epithet, “strategy-driven,” while technically correct at a superficial level, is hard to support. For one, we have not proven there is any excess capacity to reduce, which is one objective of the strategy. The other is to reduce the number of sites in a way that aligns them for efficiency and synergy, but how does one align them successfully without objective data on their military value?

A strategy-driven process would be if we were reducing proven excess capacity while enhancing vertically integrated platform work, or co-locating a broad range of multidisciplinary sciences, at sites *shown by data to possess the best people, state-of-the-art facilities, and an established record of success in making scientific advances and creating new warfighting capabilities*. By contrast, realigning work to sites that merely have the most people working in what are large, wide-ranging technology areas (e.g., Sensors) is not strategy. It is expedience, at best.

Defensibility problems will almost certainly result from the belated use of data because our judgment-driven scenarios now have two sub-optimal futures. The best-case has them *data-validated*; and in the worst-case, *data-rationalized*. In either case, without corrective action, notions that we marshaled data to support preexisting judgments, or preferred outcomes, will be difficult to dispel.

5. *A Remedial Plan of Action*

(a) Consult Other DoD Studies

The TJCSG does not have a monopoly on expert judgment, so it will be difficult to explain why we did not calibrate with the findings of high-level expert panels — *especially those that, unlike our study, actually examined projects at the sites*. Fortunately, there is still time to use the expert judgment of other DoD panels as a solution to our problem.

The issue paper, “Decision Criteria for Scenario Proposals,” proposed that we, where possible, assess each scenario for whether it conforms or conflicts with any judgment(s) of a DoD study, like those of the Service Science Boards, Tri-Service RDT&E Panels, or any other DoD/Federal board of scientific and engineering experts. Conformance to other panel findings would enhance the credibility of our judgment-driven scenarios. Conflicts with other findings, while not a show-stopper, should be cause for re-examination.

Some may claim this approach compromises objectivity because such studies can be biased (a legitimate concern), or that such information is not certifiable because it draws from sources outside the closure process. These arguments are not convincing for the following reasons:

¹² TJCSG Meeting Minutes of 25 October 2004.

¹³ DDR&E Briefing to the Infrastructure Steering Group, “Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG): Strategy / Initial Scenarios,” 1 October 2004.

14 November 2004

- Other studies are unlikely to be any more subjective than our judgment-driven process. *The more objective studies will be those that examined the R&D work itself, which we have not done.*
- These would be official reports, authorized and approved by the DoD / Services. *If this information cannot be considered authoritative and certifiable, then why does the DoD continue to charter such studies — at considerable public expense — and provide them to Congress?*
- BRAC-05 will use — for the first time in five rounds — closure ideas proposed by private groups outside the Government, such as the Business Executives for National Security. *Surely, if private sector opinions can be used for generating scenarios, then the official findings of DoD chartered and approved studies, must be acceptable and certifiable.*
- The DoD IG determined, after our 2 December 2003 off-site, when we first began our work on military value, that the use of DoD studies would be auditable, and therefore defensible.

If we can show that other DoD studies made similar judgments to our own, then the credibility, and defensibility, of our proposals are improved. One study of potential use is the Tri-Service “Fixed-Wing Aircraft T&E Reliance Study.” Another is the study by the National Defense University (NDU) on S&T in the areas of sensors, IT, and weapons (three areas we are examining). The NDU team included experts with impressive credentials: former Service Vice Chiefs (one was later appointed Chair of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board), former Commanders-in-Chiefs (one was later appointed as the President’s Special Envoy to the Middle East), a former DDR&E and Secretary of the Air Force, experts from academia, former lab directors, and a former National Security Council Special Assistant to the President.

In short, *what rationale could be offered for why OSD entertained ideas from the private sector, even as the TJCSG ignored expert judgments made in DoD’s own studies — many of which have been provided to Congress and the Secretary of Defense?*

(b) Derive Valid Military Value Scores — ASAP

Even if we decide to consult other DoD studies, the fact remains that judgment alone cannot substitute for the objective data necessary for deriving military value. In fact, OSD policy, established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF), directs us to:

“...determine military value through the exercise of military judgment *built upon a quantitative analytical foundation* (emphasis added).”¹⁴

Deriving scenarios, without the foundation of quantitative analysis, causes problems. First, *it ignores the DEPSECDEF’s policy and risks compromising the integrity of the BRAC process.* It was for this reason, at the 3 November CIT meeting that I abstained from ranking the 31 proposed scenarios by their order of importance.¹⁵ How can one make such determinations, in an objective way, without the analytical foundation provided by military value (MV) scores or capacity data?

The second problem is that *accurate MV scores are essential if we are to avoid closing, or realigning work from, sites that have greater value than ones we have selected to be the gainers.* Again, this situation was caused by developing scenarios before the MV scores were available to inform our selection of gainers and losers. The key task after deriving the scores will be to modify any defective scenarios as quickly as possible.

¹⁴ DEPSECDEF memo, subj: “BRAC 2005 Military Value Principles”, 3 September 2004.

¹⁵ D. DeYoung, Memo to DoD IG, subj: “Decision to Abstain from Scenario Prioritization”, 4 November 2004.

Complicating matters is the fact that the COBRA calls will be launched soon, well before the MV scores are finalized. This is likely to waste dollars, time, and effort. Each defective COBRA squanders resources in the following ways.

- **COBRA calls are expensive.** Based on the cost of an actual BRAC-95 COBRA call, my estimated cost of a BRAC-05 TJCSG COBRA call, affecting 7 sites, might be roughly \$495,000.¹⁶ Assuming 20-30 COBRA calls, the total price tag could range between 10 and 15 million dollars.
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While we no longer have a data-driven approach, we may be able to avoid the pitfalls of the latter one. To do this we must first calibrate our judgment-derived scenarios against the findings of other defense studies. This will minimize the risk of errors in judgment and give our proposals more credibility. Then we need to validate those scenarios in two steps: use valid capacity data, derived through a simplified and more analytically sound process, to verify that there is excess capacity within the Department's system of labs and centers, and if such excess is proven, then use accurate MV scores, at a meaningful level of aggregation (e.g., organizations vice the artificial 39 bins) to make the best choices regarding "gainers" and "losers." Accomplishing less than those three steps will create unacceptable risks.

Much has been said about this BRAC being about transforming the Department for future threats. Much less is said about the fact that the very mission of the Department's laboratories and centers is one of constant transformation — both incremental and radical. Whatever we do in this BRAC, *their ability to make technical contributions to national security must be preserved*. One example is the contribution made by world-class chemists with the Navy's laboratory at Indian Head, Maryland, who developed and fielded the thermobaric weapon in only 67 days for use against al Qaeda and Taliban forces holed up in Afghanistan's mountain caves and tunnels. Another is that made by engineers with the Army's laboratory and test center at Aberdeen, Maryland and its Tank Automotive R&D center in Warren, Michigan, who developed and fielded, within two months, the Armor Survivability Kits that are now being rushed into Iraq to better protect U.S. ground forces.²⁰

Another in-house ability that must be preserved is its role as a *yardstick*,²¹ a term referring to the standard that it sets by providing authoritative, objective advice to governmental decisionmakers. This is critical to good government. The Federal Government must be able to choose among competing options offered by industrial producers. The need for profit makes each company an advocate of its own product, so, given those natural tendencies, the Government "requires internal technical capability of sufficient breadth, depth, and continuity to assure that the public interest is served."²²

A lot rides on our actions, much more so than ten years ago. America is engaged in a prolonged struggle with an opportunistic, fanatical enemy who has unlimited apocalyptic goals and is not deterred by traditional means. We need to identify and collect any potential BRAC savings — and our country needs all of the technological options it can get.

Recommendations: The TJCSG should require that the sub-groups: (a) calibrate the proposed scenarios against the findings of other DoD studies; (b) use capacity data, derived through a simplified and more analytically sound process, to verify that there is excess capacity within the DoD in-house system, and if so, then (c) use MV scores, at a meaningful level of aggregation, to *validate* the scenarios and make the best choices regarding "gainers" and "losers."

Army Position: _____
AF Position: _____
Navy Position: _____
Marine Corps Position: _____
JCS Position: _____

Final Resolution:

POC Signature: _____ Date: _____

CIT Chair: _____ Date: _____

²⁰ RDECOM Magazine, "Vehicles in Iraq Go From Workhorse to Warrior with New Kits," February 2004.

²¹ H. L. Nieburg, *In the Name of Science* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966).

²² William J. Perry, *Required In-House Capabilities for Department of Defense Research, Development, Test and Evaluation* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1980).

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RELEASE UNDER FOIA
Revision 1 8 November 2004**

ISSUE: Resolution of proposal by W&A for a "platform integration" scenario

POINT OF CONTACT: Karen Higgins

DISCUSSION:

Goals of original proposal:

- 1) Achieve potential efficiencies through a joint and common approach to platform integration and
- 2) Ensure current synergies achieved by current ways of doing business are not unintentionally lost
- 3) Create Transformational path for integration in the Network Centric Warfare future

Background:

Point 1: In addition to desire for greater efficiencies and synergies, part of the impetus was that "integration" has been binned in one of two ways by various organizations. Some put this work in ALSS [as requested by data call] and some put it in W&A. This difference in binning caused a confusion factor that may not be noted in some of the scenarios, resulting in unintended consequences, i.e. undesired breaking of synergies without commensurate benefits. For example, Redstone and Eglin binned weapons integration work for air platforms with W&A, while China Lake binned it with ALSS. In addition, underwater weapons [Newport/ Keyport] and ship surfaced launched weapons [Dahlgren] were binned in W&A--also causing a confusion factor with some scenarios that propose to handle weapons integration separate from some W&A work.

Point 2: The issue has currently taken on an emotional wrap that needs to be removed, so issues [and non-issues] can be clearly seen.

Point 3: Discussion among W&A and ALSS subgroups notes the following:

a) There are many similarities among services in how weapons system integration occurs on platforms.

1) Funding and direction comes from platform program offices.

2) Both contractors and in-house government folks [e.g. Army Weapons Center/ Navy Warfare Centers/ Air Force ALCs] are engaged in all Services.

b) Major differences in how weapons system occurs include: the degree to which prime contractors are involved during the life cycle [more for the USAF in all phases]; and, the location at which integration occurs especially after IOC [Army-Weapons Centers; Navy-Warfare Centers; USAF--Prime Contractor sites, platform sites and ALCs].

c) After discussion and analysis among membership from ALSS and W&A subgroups, consensus was

1) A common process approach could be implemented [NOT part of BRAC] in a joint service environment so that software integration processes could become more efficient.

2) A single organizational solution [i.e. move all integration to either platform or weapons sites] could break more synergies than it could gain efficiencies or other benefits. Scenario proposals need to ensure changes to current integration approach for all services do not have unintentional consequences.

RECOMMENDATION(s):

1) W&A remove the encompassing integration scenario from consideration Comments: Concur.

2) ALSS proceed with considering ALCs in their scenarios that consolidate R, D&A, & T&E Mgmt at a few select sites across the services Comments: Concur: Army does not own Air Logistic Centers. However, Army develops missiles at Redstone, and integration on Air platforms occurs there as well. Army ground platform and gun integration is the subject of the Land Warfare scenario. Guns or missiles that cross these platforms are integrated at the platform development site.

3) ALSS ensure movement of platform work does not encompass moving weapons integration. Concur with comment. Unless both move together to the same installation, which is being entertained in the Army LW scenario.

4) W&A proceed with excursions that address ship platform/combat systems integration and underwater weapons system integration. Concur with comment. Do not support excursion for energetics. It appears to be a presolution without at least the 15 Decision Factor analysis, when other scenarios are possible.

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DATE: 17 November 2004, Revision 3

ISSUE: Resolution of proposal by W&A for a "platform integration" scenario

POINT OF CONTACT: Karen Higgins

DISCUSSION:

Goals of original proposal:

- 1) Achieve potential efficiencies through a joint and common approach to Weapons and Platform integration
- 2) Ensure current synergies achieved by current ways of doing business are not unintentionally lost
- 3) Create Transformational path for integration in the Network Centric Warfare future

Background:

Point 1: Inconsistent Binning

In addition to desire for greater efficiencies and synergies, part of the impetus for this issue paper is that "integration" has been binned in one of several ways by various organizations. Some put this work in ALSS [as requested by data call] while some put it in W&A. In addition, others have chosen to place weapon related combat systems work in W&A and higher level platform combat systems and/or Integrated Warfare Systems under Information Systems and thus are part of C4I subgroup scenarios. Given the DTAP structure and the widely varying approach each of the services used in allocating their FTE/workload, this difference in binning has caused a significant confusion factor that for most scenarios, will result in unintended consequences, i.e. undesired breaking of mission critical synergies without commensurate benefits. For example, Redstone and Eglin binned weapons integration work for air platforms with W&A, while China Lake binned it with ALSS. In addition, submarine and underwater weapons, sensors, combat systems and C4I systems [Newport/ Keyport] and ship surfaced launched weapons, sensors, combat systems, C4I and force systems [Dahlgren] were binned in W&A, and C4I

.Point 2: Discussion among W&A and ALSS subgroups notes the following:

a) There are similarities and differences among the services in how weapons system integration occurs on platforms. Some of the similarities include:

1) While often funding and direction comes from platform program offices, this is not always true. Funding and direction for new/upgraded weapon system, combat systems, C4I systems and other related missions systems can come from the weapon or equipment sponsors directly, especially for standardized, cross platform, cross service programs and requires close coordination with platform sponsors.

2) Contractors, University Labs, other FFRDC's, and traditional in-house government R/D&A/T&E personnel [e.g. Army Weapons Center/ Navy Warfare Centers/ Air Force ALCs] are essential elements in this process and are often involved in supporting weapon and platform integration for other Services as well.

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b) Some of the major differences in how weapons and platform development and system integration occurs include:

1) The degree to which prime contractors are involved during the life cycle [more for the USAF in all phases]; and, the location at which integration occurs especially after IOC [Army-Weapons Centers; Navy-Warfare Centers; USAF--Prime Contractor sites, platform sites and ALCs].

2) While there may be similarities for Air platforms (USAF and Navy Air, Navy and USA Helo) and Ground platforms (USA and USMC), Surface Ship and Submarine Weapons and Platform integration is more unique to the Navy and Maritime applications.

3) The hierarchy of systems engineering (element, subsystem, system, system-of-systems, force systems, and joint capability) must be supported by a professional development base of knowledge. To succeed at platform, force and joint levels, extensive professional development and experience must be supported within resident knowledge base extant in both government and industry. Varying models for how this is accomplished exist across the services. After discussion and analysis among membership from ALSS and W&A subgroups, consensus was

1) A common process approach could be implemented [NOT part of BRAC] in a joint service environment so that software integration processes could become more efficient.

2) A single organizational solution [i.e. move all integration to either platform or weapons sites] could break more synergies than it could gain efficiencies or other benefits. Scenario proposals need to ensure changes to current integration approach for all services do not have unintentional consequences.

RECOMMENDATION(s):

1) W&A remove the encompassing integration scenario from consideration

2) ALSS proceed with considering ALCs in their scenarios that consolidate R, D&A, & T&E Mgmt at a few select sites across the services

3) For Air-launched weapons, W&A recommends that other subgroups ensure that weapons/platform integration is not inadvertently relocated, thus breaking synergies referred to above.

4) For surface ship/ underwater platform integration, as part of its primary strategy, W&A has developed options to retain surface ship platform/ combat/weapons systems integration intact. W&A has also developed options to address submarine/underwater platform/combat/weapons systems integration, which may be remanded to the Navy. Gun integration with Navy surface ship platforms will be retained at existing sites.



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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3040

JUN 24 2005

The Honorable Elton Gallegly
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0001

Dear Congressman Gallegly:

Your staff asked for a clarification to the Technical Joint Cross Service Group, June 14, 2005 response (see attached) concerning relocations at Naval Air Warfare Center War Division (NAWCWD), Pt. Mugu and Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Port Hueneme. Specifically they asked:

In responding to the Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) data calls, the losing activities, NAWCWD Pt. Mugu and NSWC PIID, both tenants at Naval Base Ventura County, were asked to identify functions and numbers of personnel that were considered "inextricable" to the core missions of their respective commands. These functions and missions were clearly identified in Question #47 of their responses to the TECH-02B data call.

The Pt. Mugu Sea Range and Targets organizations support a large number of Non-Weapons Technology Research Development Acquisition Test and Evaluation (RDAT&E) missions, including: Air Platforms; Battlespace Environments; Information Systems Technology; Sea Vehicles; Sensors, Electronics and Electronic Warfare; and Space Platforms. As a result, NAWCWD Pt. Mugu appropriately identified Sea Range, Targets and other personnel in their Question #47 response. Apparently, the TJCSG ignored these Question #47 exclusions. The question, quite simply, is: Why? Many of these functions directly support the Mugu Sea Test Range and do not make logistical, economical or "support to the warfighter" sense to move 150 miles away.

As described in Part II of Volume XII of the Base Closure and Realignment Report, Analysis and Recommendations, May 19, 2005, the TJCSG used an analytic structure that divided work into major mission areas. These mission areas were Weapons and Armaments; Land, Sea, Air, and Space Systems; Communications, Command, Control, and Computers Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems; Enabling Technologies; and Innovative Systems. The document also details the overarching strategy to consolidate technical activity to multidisciplinary and multifunctional Centers of Excellence, because such alignment will enhance synergy among the activities.



**DEFENDING THE TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROPOSALS
OF THE 2005
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE ROUND**

Issue # 04-23-05-01

Issue: Our country is at war. A successful Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round will therefore depend on our ability to make the transition from four peacetime rounds to a wartime round. Doing so requires a shift from cost savings to military value as the primary consideration, from functional efficiency to mission effectiveness as the goal, and from “bigger is better” to “performance is paramount” as the basis for consolidations. This paper examines the process and proposals of the Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) to: gauge how well they satisfy the goals of this BRAC round, provide a sense of the degree to which they serve the interests of national security, and judge how well they can be defended to the Commission. The findings show considerable cause for concern. Corrective action is necessary and still feasible.

Point of Contact: Don J. DeYoung, Capabilities Integration Team (Alternate Representative), U.S. Navy

Issue Summary: Of the government defense functions analyzed by this closure round, the Technical function is the one most responsible for transforming the way America’s military fights. From the development of the first U.S. radar,¹ to the invention and launch of the first intelligence satellite,² to the concept and satellite prototypes of the Global Positioning System,³ to the vision technologies that “own the night,”⁴ to the crash development of the “Bunker Buster”⁵ and thermobaric weapon⁶ — *the Department’s in-house system of laboratories and technical centers have created dominant warfighting capabilities for our armed forces.* And, coupled with a well-trained all-volunteer force, the technologies produced by both the public and private sector have given America an unmatched ability to defend herself, protect her allies, and safeguard her global interests, for more than 30 years without a draft.

After the collapse of the Soviet threat, the U.S. responded in a fitting way for a liberal democracy by cutting military force structure judged to be in excess to its security needs. A significant amount of Department of Defense (DoD) infrastructure was no longer necessary. For the ensuing peacetime closure rounds, BRAC-I, II, III and IV, the primary consideration was *efficiency*, which meant saving money by eliminating what was considered excess to force requirements.

But BRAC-V is different. This is the first wartime BRAC. It also has a bigger agenda than the peacetime rounds. In addition to cutting excess capacity, it seeks to transform the Defense Department by maximizing warfighting capability and improving efficiency. According to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF):

“At a minimum, BRAC 2005 must eliminate excess physical capacity; the operation, sustainment, and recapitalization of which diverts scarce resources from defense capability. However, BRAC 2005 can make an

¹ U.S. Patents: No. 1,981,884 to Taylor, A.H., Hyland, L., Young L.C., “System for Detecting Objects by Radio,” 1934; No. 2,512,673 to Page, R.M., “Radio Pulse Duplexing System,” 1950; R.M. Page, Laboratory Notebook 171, Vol. III, March 1934; letter from NRL to the Bureau of Engineering, June 11, 1936, in File S-S67-5 #1, National Archives Building.

² Secretary of Defense McElroy letter to President Eisenhower, August 18, 1959; Technical Operations Group Report, October 13, 1960; D. Day, “Listening from Above: The First Signals Intelligence Satellite,” *Spaceflight*, Vol. 41, no. 8 (1999), 339-346; and D. van Keuren, “Cold War Science in Black and White,” *Social Studies of Science*, Vol. 31, no. 2 (April 2001), 207-229.

³ U.S. Patent No. 3,789,409 to Easton, R.L., “Navigation System Using Satellites and Passive Ranging Techniques,” January 29, 1974; Easton, R.L., “Optimum Altitudes for Passive Ranging Satellite Navigation Systems,” *Naval Research Reviews*, August 1970; Easton, R.L., “Role Of Time/Frequency in Navy Navigation Satellites,” *Proceedings of the IEEE*, Vol. 60, 557-563 (1972); and Easton, E.L., et al., “Contribution of Navigation Technology Satellites to the Global Positioning System,” NRL Report 8360, December 28, 1979.

⁴ “Night Vision Goggles,” (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ground/nvg.htm>).

⁵ “Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28) BLU-113 Penetrator,” (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/gbu-28.htm>).

⁶ “BLU-118/B Thermobaric Weapon,” (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/blu-118.htm>).

even more profound contribution to transforming the Department by rationalizing our infrastructure with defense strategy. BRAC 2005 should be the means by which we reconfigure our current infrastructure into one in which operational capacity maximizes *both* warfighting capability and efficiency.”⁷

Unlike the peacetime rounds, *mission effectiveness*, expressed as “military value,” is by law the primary consideration in the making of recommendations. A shift in emphasis, from efficiency to effectiveness, is right for a nation at war and a military that is transforming itself for the 21st century.

This paper examines the process and proposals of the TJCSG in order to: (a) gauge how well they satisfy the SECDEF’s goals for BRAC-V; (b) provide a sense of the degree to which the proposals serve the interests of national security; and, (c) judge how well they can be defended to the BRAC Commission and to the communities.⁸ Five “Red Flag” issues are identified in the assessment, each of which is sufficient to raise valid questions about the ability of BRAC-V to yield fair, accurate, and effective decisions with regards to the DoD’s laboratories and technical centers. The findings show cause for concern.

- Capacity data demonstrate a modest current level of excess infrastructure at 7.3%.⁹ The data also shows this excess disappears in the future to become a deficit of -2.2% — *without any BRAC actions taken*. However, with BRAC action, the 3,098 Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) eliminated by the TJCSG’s 13 proposed actions will increase the deficit to -3.9% and cut deeper into the surge allowance, an amount required to be held in reserve. Finally, FTEs are the Technical function’s link to the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, at a minimum, those actions taken within the eight Technical Capability Areas showing a future deficit may not be judged as conforming to the Plan.
- The proposed scenarios were developed by the TJCSG *before* the capacity and military value data were received and processed. Therefore the process was judgment-driven, not data-driven. Not one scenario was developed as a result of quantitative military value analysis or on the basis of excess capacity determinations.
- The scores for military value were driven by workload (numbers of people and dollars), not by metrics that could identify exceptional technical talent and accurately gauge operational impact.
- The study design promotes sub-optimal solutions that leave a large number of losing sites open, but weakens them by shredding the connectivity of their integrated programs and reducing their business base. This can lead to increased costs as overhead rates rise at the losing sites and additional infrastructure is built at the gaining sites. It is also likely to lead to the loss of top talent in the realigned workforces.
- Outside of the TJCSG, the HS&A JCSG proposes to assimilate the laboratories / centers into efficiency-focused, centrally-planned, management systems that do not recognize critical differences between, for example, a research laboratory and a shipyard. One of the proposed actions involves a direct challenge to civilian authority.

The outcome of these problems is likely to be a number of closure and realignment proposals that, if implemented, will contribute toward a degradation of national defense capabilities. Recommendations are provided to address the identified problems and enhance the defensibility of those TJCSG proposals passing the more rigorous review advocated by this paper.

⁷ SECDEF memorandum, “Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure,” 15 November 2002.

⁸ The author was a member of the BRAC-95 Navy Base Structure Analysis Team and the BRAC-95 DoD T&E Joint Cross-Service Working Group. He is the Navy’s alternate representative on the BRAC-05 TJCSG Capabilities Integration Team.

⁹ The TJCSG calculated the percentage of excess capacity relative to *Current Required* capacity, which resulted in a slightly higher value — 7.8%. This paper calculates it relative to *Peak Capacity*, which is the basis for the above value of 7.3%. This latter method was chosen due more to an intuitive understanding than to a keen grasp of mathematics. For example, if a garage holds a maximum (i.e., “Peak”) of four cars, and one is wrecked, then the excess capacity of the garage is 25% (i.e., one space divided by the garage’s maximum capacity of four). Peak Capacity represents the maximum capacity of the total current configuration of the DoD in-house technical system (analogous to the garage). There are also slight discrepancies between the TJCSG Final Report’s Summary chart on p. A-18 and its Table 4-1 on p. A-11. This paper uses Table 4-1 to reach the above calculation of 7.3%.

1. Goal: Cutting Excess Capacity

With the SECDEF's guidance that, "At a minimum, BRAC 2005 must eliminate excess physical capacity," our first task was to determine whether that excess exists, and if so, where it is and how much there is of it. But the task is not a simple one. The unique and varied nature of technical infrastructure makes the measurement of capacity more difficult than that of other types of installations.

*"Excess capacity is a simple concept when applied to most installations, such as naval stations, air bases, hospitals, and test centers. Fewer ships need less berthing, fewer aircraft need less hangar space, fewer personnel need fewer hospital beds... But unlike conventional bases, there is no direct relationship between size of the force and that of Laboratory infrastructure (for example, buildings, roads, and utilities)."*¹⁰

Nevertheless, *we must be able to confirm there is excess infrastructure*, if only because the U.S. Congress approved BRAC-V on the premise that the Pentagon's "tail" is diverting resources from its "teeth."

DoD's Methodology. BRAC law, as amended, required that the DoD certify the need for an additional closure round in early 2004, as part of its FY05 budget submission. In doing so, the DoD made preliminary estimates of excess infrastructure within the Department's system of laboratories and technical centers. When the estimates were provided in a March 2004 report to Congress, the DoD cautioned that,

*"...only a comprehensive BRAC analysis can determine the exact nature or location of potential excess."*¹¹

DoD's report used *floor space* as the metric to estimate Army and Air Force infrastructure (the Navy's infrastructure was evaluated on the basis of *work-years*). TJCSG Issue Paper #07-28-04-01, "Notional Scenarios" (28 July 2004) explained how the report's approach and metric led to a likely over-statement of Army and Air Force excess infrastructure, pegged at a stunning 62% in the Army's case. The issue paper also showed why floor space is a poor choice of metric for technical infrastructure.

The direction of the capacity trends shown in the DoD report is surprising. FY09 floor space levels for Army and Air Force infrastructure are 5% and 22% *higher* than that of the baseline year (FY89)¹² — *despite three closure rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995*. If this data is valid, then it means the Army is building R&D infrastructure slightly faster than the rate by which it is eliminated, while the Air Force's construction rate is outpacing its closure rate by more than one-fifth. Another surprise is that the combined floor space for those two services alone is projected to be 96.6 million square feet (SF) in FY09, which is 64% more than the current level calculated by the TJCSG for all four Services and Defense Agencies (i.e., 58.9 million SF).

TJCSG's Methodology. In contrast to the DoD report, the TJCSG originally planned to use eight metrics: Full-time Equivalents (FTEs); funding for Acquisition Category programs (ACATs); number of ACATs; equipment use (in days); facility use (in days); test hours; funding; and floor space. This approach was evaluated by TJCSG Issue Paper #08-06-04-02, "Proposed Contingency Plan" (4 August 2004), and again, several months later, by Issue Paper #11-15-04-01, "Military Judgment: *Necessary — But Not Sufficient*" (14 November 2004).¹³ Both explained why work-years, or FTEs, are most appropriate for the task, and *each*

¹⁰ D.J. DeYoung, "The Silence of the Labs," *Defense Horizons*, No. 21 (January 2003), p.6. The paper can be found at: http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/defense_horizons.htm

¹¹ Department of Defense, "Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003," (March 2004), p. 3.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.47, 52.

¹³ The papers did not address equipment or facility use because the metrics were not clearly defined in terms that enabled the field sites to respond in a consistent fashion. The data was therefore not useful.

proposed that the TJCSG's methodology be simplified to focus on FTEs alone. One reason given to use work-years comes from the Navy's BRAC-IV report to the Commission:

“As with BRAC-93, workyears were chosen to serve as the units in place of other tools such as square feet. Budgeted workyears were used as a measuring tool for capacity because of its commonality within the functionally diverse Technical Centers whose products range from published scientific papers to the installation of a new piece of shipboard equipment to the live testing of a new warhead or airframe.”¹⁴

Another reason for using work-years is its defensibility. During BRAC-IV, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined the Navy's process, including its capacity analyses, and found that “the Navy's process and recommendations were sound,”¹⁵ and that,

“The configuration analysis for this subcategory (Technical Centers) involved complicated assessments of the existing capabilities and requirements for 29 functional categories...across four phases of work: RDT&E, acquisition, lifetime support, and general.”¹⁶

Work-years met the analytical requirements of all RDT&E functions, plus acquisition. In other words, it is a useful measurement unit for all three of the TJCSG's technical functions: Research (i.e., Research, Applied Research, and Advanced Technology Development), Development & Acquisition (D&A), and Test & Evaluation (T&E).

Focusing on Floor Space. The TJCSG received the capacity data from the field in late-September 2004. For the next six months the TJCSG operated on the assertion that the data were unreliable. Five metrics — ACATs (numbers and dollars), facility and building utilization, and funding — proved obviously unreliable, which was predicted months earlier by the issue papers. Rather than focus on FTE data,¹⁷ as advocated by those papers, the TJCSG chose to base capacity assessments on floor space.

- **Floor Space Data is Not Credible**

Like the DoD's March 2004 report, the TJCSG chose to focus on floor space. “Peak Capacity” was considered equal to a site's reported total floor space. “Current Capacity” was calculated by two averages. D&A and T&E FTEs were assumed to utilize a government-wide average for office space of 160 SF per FTE. Research FTEs were assumed to utilize 310 SF. The Research allowance was set higher to account for specialized equipment requirements.

After accounting for surge requirements, *the DoD's 58.9 million SF of technical infrastructure was shown to possess an excess capacity of 27.1 million SF, which translates into an excess capacity of 46%.* These are impressive numbers. The following exercise puts them in some perspective.

A total of 6.3 million SF was reported in excess Research floor space along with 20.8 million SF in D&A/T&E floor space. By applying the allowances of 310 SF per Research FTE and 160 SF per D&A/T&E FTE, then the DoD's technical infrastructure can accommodate an additional 150,323 FTEs. This means that the in-house system can still absorb — *after four BRAC rounds* — the technical

¹⁴ DoN, Report to the Commission: Department of the Navy Analyses and Recommendations, Vol. IV (March 1995), p. X-5.

¹⁵ GAO, “Military Bases: Analysis of DoD's 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment”, p.87.

¹⁶ DoN, Report to the Commission, p. 96-7.

¹⁷ Budgeted work-years and FTEs are similar, but not identical units. For example, one FTE in Air Platform D&A can be a composite of three engineers working 1/3 of their time in that area, with the rest in T&E. However, the differences between the units are not considered significant in light of the much larger differences in analytical utility between a work-year and ACAT funding, for example, or an FTE and square footage.

workforces of the Department of Energy’s three “weapons labs” (22,000),¹⁸ NASA HQ and its 10 centers (17,529),¹⁹ and the technical workforces of the Departments of Agriculture (19,056), Commerce (10,684), Health and Human Services (10,916), Housing and Urban Development (310), Interior (14,315), Justice (5,019), Labor (2,327), State (4,961), Transportation (6,169), Treasury (4,128), and Veterans Affairs (6,471), as well as the Environmental Protection Agency (8,598), National Science Foundation (407), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1,699), U.S. International Development Cooperation Agency (192), and all other federal agencies (5,621).²⁰ All this scientific and engineering talent could fill the DoD’s apparently cavernous infrastructure, with room to spare for 9,921 more.

The basic flaw at play here is that the analytical approach does not adequately account for space used by scientific equipment and technical facilities. For example, Eglin AFB no doubt reported its McKinley Climatic Laboratory, with its 65,520 SF main chamber.²¹ By our approach, the National Science Foundation’s 407 technical employees would fit nicely, but at -65 F degrees with 100 mph winds, they might find it hard to concentrate.

Course Correction. Over the last six months, the issue papers mentioned above urged that we simplify our approach by focusing on one proven metric — the work-year. It was used successfully in prior rounds, was found to be a sound analytical tool by the GAO, and is almost certainly the most auditable of the metrics. On 17 March 2005, the TJCSG decided that the FTE data are reliable.²² Since that date, FTE data have been used in tandem with the floor space data when reporting capacity values for each candidate recommendation. All proposals gained final approval based on both capacity metrics.

Measuring the Excess. The estimates of excess capacity based on floor space are, to be blunt, absurd. However, by using the FTE data as an indicator of technical capacity, we can reliably answer the most basic questions required of us — does excess capacity exist, and if so, where is it and how much is there? The U.S. Congress will no doubt ask these questions, as will the BRAC Commission and the communities. It is these calculations of excess capacity that raise the first “red flag.”

- **Red Flag #1 — Excess Capacity is disappearing without BRAC**

Current Excess Capacity = 7.3%,²³ well below pre-BRAC estimates of 35% and higher²⁴

Future Excess Capacity = - 2.2%, the level after factoring in future technical requirements and the DoD Force Structure Plan.

Several things are important to note about these numbers.

First, as approved by the ISG, the TJCSG does not count a 10% surge allowance within the excess. The reserved ability to accommodate surge requirements was required by Public Law 108-375 and was added to the Final Selection Criteria.

¹⁸ GAO, “DOE Weapons Laboratories,” (April 2002: GAO-02-391), p.7.

¹⁹ <http://naade02.msfc.nasa.gov/workforce>

²⁰ National Science Foundation, “Federal Scientists and Engineers: 1998-2002,” (NSF-05-304), Table 2: Federal Scientists and Engineers, By Agency (1998-2002).

²¹ <http://www.eglin.af.mil/TS/climlab/main.html>

²² TJCSG Meeting Minutes of 17 March 2005.

²³ See Footnote #9 for explanation as to why Current Excess is cited to be 7.3% when the TJCSG’s official reported value is 7.8%.

²⁴ GAO, “High-Risk Series: Defense Infrastructure,” (GAO/HR-97-7), February 1997, p. 16; and, Business Executives for National Security, “Tail to Tooth: Defense Research, Development, Test & Evaluation Needs to Rightsize,” 28 October 1998

[<http://www.bens.org/upd24.html>].

Second, the in-house infrastructure is more constrained than these top-line numbers indicate because the excess is not spread evenly across the 13 technical capability areas. In fact, only Biomedical, Chemical Biological Defense, Nuclear Technology, Space Platforms, and Weapons Technology show future excess infrastructure. Therefore, any BRAC cuts made in the other eight areas (i.e., Air Platforms, Battlespace Environments, Ground Vehicles, Human Systems, Information Systems, Materials, Sea Vehicles, and Sensors) will come at the expense of infrastructure to meet future DoD requirements.

Third, “Current Capacity” does not mean today’s level. The Current Capacity level is based upon an average of technical workforce levels over a three year period, FY01-03, which means it is a composite number representing a workforce level that is 2 to 4 years old. A number with more relevance and accuracy for representing today’s workforce would be the FY03 level of 158,826 FTEs. When using that level as an “operative capacity,” excess infrastructure drops to 4.4%. Therefore, given the trend in disappearing excess capacity, with almost two more years of combat operations in Iraq, the Current Excess is probably some value less than 4.4%.

These findings can be explained by the fact that in-house workload has been increasing due to the realities of the post-9/11 world. DoD R&D funding has grown by 56% since 2001; from \$41.1 billion to \$64.3 billion in 2004.²⁵ Furthermore, the TJCSG collected data only through FY03, so the current level of excess (derived from an average of FY01, FY02, and FY03 FTE levels) is based, only in part, on the first budget built from the bottom-up after the terrorist strikes. In fact, TJCSG capacity data reveal that the technical workforce grew by 9,700 or 6.5% in that short period, from 149,100 to 158,826 FTEs.²⁶

In July 2004, *before* the capacity data was collected and processed, the TJCSG Issue Paper, “Notional Scenarios,” questioned conventional thinking about excess infrastructure:

“Conventional wisdom after the last closure round in 1995 held that substantial excess capacity remained. However, the circumstances supporting that contention were profoundly altered by a foreign attack on our homeland. As a result, (a) the nation’s defense budget has risen steadily (with an accompanying increase in DoD lab/center workload)²⁷, (b) serious Congressional consideration is being given to *increasing* the size of the force structure, and (c) major technical challenges exist that require extensive levels of RDT&E, such as finding reliable means for the remote sensing of everything from conventional explosives, to bio-agents, to nuclear material.”

The following analysis offers evidence to show that *the TJCSG is on solid ground in its decision to use the FTE data.*

- **FTE Data is Credible**

Exhibit A: OSD Personnel Data. The TJCSG data show “**Peak Capacity**” to be 182,892 FTEs, and “**Current Capacity**” to be 154,152 FTEs.²⁸ With a rule-of-thumb that on-site contractors comprise about 50% of the workforce, we can then approximate the numbers of *Government positions* to be about **91,500**

²⁵ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/defense.html>.

²⁶ *Technical Joint Cross Service Group: Analyses and Recommendations* (Volume XII), 10 May 2005, p. 21.

²⁷ Navy Laboratory Community Coordinating Group data show a 10% increase in the one year from FY01 to FY02 in reimbursable funding, and direct cites (including non-Navy funding sources).

²⁸ TJCSG capacity data used in this paper is from *Technical Joint Cross Service Group: Analyses and Recommendations* (Volume XII), 10 May 2005. There are slight discrepancies between the Report’s Summary chart on p. A-18 and Table 4-1 on p.A-11. This paper uses Table 4-1.

for “Peak Capacity” and 77,000 for “Current Capacity.” These numbers appear to be within the ballpark when compared to official personnel data collected by OSD.²⁹

Using data from the Defense Manpower Data Center, an OSD briefing (see Attachment A) quantifies the downward trend for Service laboratory / center end-strength in *Government positions* through the 1990s. OSD’s data reveals a rate of decrease that was relatively constant at about 4,000 per year from FY90-99, and shows the level to have been 72,900 in September 1999. If that trend continued, then the total within the laboratories / centers may have bottomed out at roughly 65,000 by the time of the 9/11 terror attacks.

The TJCSG Current Capacity of 77,000 FTEs includes 9,400 FTEs within the Defense Agencies, so when the OSD and TJCSG data are normalized by removing the Defense Agency workforce, the TJCSG Current Capacity becomes 67,600 — a credible number when compared to the above rough estimate of 65,000 in September 2001 for the OSD data. The TJCSG estimate for Current Capacity makes sense given that it is an average over three years, FY01-03, with an increasing wartime workload since FY02.

The TJCSG’s Peak Capacity data also appear credible. OSD’s briefing shows a peak level of 114,000 in September 1990, which was after BRAC-I but before BRACs II-IV. TJCSG data reports Peak Capacity to be about 91,500 FTEs [Note: the field sites could report a peak within the FY01-03 timeframe, or choose a historical peak from any prior year for which there was auditable documentation]. A credible number must be substantially lower than 114,000 (i.e., OSD’s Peak in 1990 before BRACs II-IV) and greater than 77,000 (i.e., the TJCSG’s Current Capacity). The TJCSG’s Peak Capacity of 91,500 is just off the mid-point of those values.

Exhibit B: Service Audits. FTE data is arguably the most auditable of the capacity metrics. Verifying the on-board government personnel levels is straight-forward. Contractor data is more difficult to verify; however, the TJCSG stipulated that only contractors working on-site were to be counted. Each of the Services’ audit agencies were charged with verifying the responses, and to date, no significant discrepancies have been reported concerning the FTE data. Some will argue that Test Hours are just as verifiable as FTEs, but the very definition of a “test hour” is fuzzy. For example, when exactly does a test begin and end?

Exhibit C: Field Responses. There is field evidence corroborating the conclusion that there is little or no current excess at a number of sites. During the COBRA (Cost of Base Realignment Actions) phase of analysis, more gaining sites than expected reported that they required Military Construction (MILCON) in order to accept the increased workload. With little or no excess capacity, the need for new construction makes sense. The credibility of such responses is enhanced by the fact that large costs, like MILCON, reduce the gaining site’s odds of winning the workload by incurring long payback periods.

As a side note on COBRA, more caution than usual is necessary when excess capacity is limited. In particular, two extremes must be avoided. The first is getting too assertive with disallowances of MILCON requests. Every disallowed MILCON must have a valid, documented rationale, especially given the higher probability, with a more constrained infrastructure, that the requests are legitimate. The other extreme is becoming lax in the effort it takes to ensure that gaining sites do not “low-ball” the cost of accepting workload or “double-book” buildings to win workload from multiple scenarios. TJCSG Issue Paper #07-16-04-05, “Scenario Conflict Adjudication” (13 September 2004), suggested an approach to deal with problems associated with “busting” and “gaming” the COBRA analysis.

²⁹ Director, Plans and Programs (ODUSD), “DoD Laboratory Initiative”, (13 December 2000).

Exhibit D: Long COBRA Payback Periods. Circumstantial evidence that corroborates the finding of limited excess capacity is the fact that the payback periods for many of the TJCSG's 13 proposals are long, with eight being for 7 years or more. Three proposals have paybacks stretching for 12 years or more.³⁰ For the same reasons mentioned above, costs will be higher for BRAC actions that occur in an environment with insufficient excess infrastructure.

For comparison purposes, the Department of the Navy calculated an excess capacity of 27% (the normalized value is 17% because the Navy did not use a 10% surge allowance) within its technical center infrastructure in BRAC-IV, and proposed 19 closures.³¹ Of those actions, 17 yielded an expected return on investment of 3 years or less. Two of the actions showed a payback in 4 years. These data are additional evidence that the TJCSG estimate of 7.3% in current excess capacity is credible (although, as shown earlier, the more accurate level is likely closer to 4.4%), and that *this modest (and fast disappearing) excess is one major factor driving the longer payback periods shown by our COBRA analyses.*

In summary, the above discussion does not prove the FTE data are accurate. There are too many assumptions at play. But, it does reveal two important things. First, the evidence suggests that *the FTE capacity numbers are credible, and therefore defensible.* And second, this analysis *finds no basis for assertions that the FTE data are unreliable.*

- **The Ramifications**

Unlike the lower workload levels of the 1990s, the post-9/11 wartime workload will likely remain at considerably higher levels for as long as it takes to defeat terrorism and, at the same time, deal with emergent traditional threats. America's security will continue to rely heavily on new technological capabilities, just as it did throughout the Second World War and the Cold War.

If the above analysis is correct, then it will be hard to defend the TJCSG's proposed actions by an asserted need to cut excess infrastructure. *Even by taking no action* — future excess capacity of the in-house system disappears. Underneath that top-line trend, which aggregates all 13 Technical Capability Areas, eight of the areas (i.e., Air Platforms, Battlespace Environments, Ground Vehicles, Human Systems, Information Systems, Materials, Sea Vehicles, and Sensors) show excess capacity disappearing. At some point before 2025 the excess vanishes within each of these areas, and a continued decrease in required infrastructure will then cut into the legally mandated surge allowance. The 3,098 FTEs eliminated by the TJCSG's proposals will have that effect.

These facts raise basic questions about the legitimacy of BRAC action within the Technical function. In BRAC-IV, the Navy pursued an aggressive closure round. Even so, when there was no meaningful excess capacity in a subcategory, no installation in that subcategory was considered for closure or realignment.³² Of the 27 subcategories evaluated by the Navy, eight demonstrated little or no excess capacity. For example, the subcategory of Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Centers was exempted from further action due to the lack of significant excess infrastructure. As a result, individual sites like the Naval Oceanography Center at Stennis Space Center, Mississippi, and the Fleet Numerical Weather Center at Monterey, California were not subjected to closure analyses.

³⁰ *Technical Cross Service Group Analyses and Recommendations* (Volume XII), 10 May 2005, p 29-54.

³¹ DoN, Report to the Commission, p. X-5, X-13-54.

³² DoN, Report to the Commission, p. 21.

Are the TJCSG's closure and realignment proposals legitimate despite data that show excess capacity to be declining to a 2.2% deficit without BRAC action, and a 3.9% deficit with approval of all 13 proposals? Or, are the only legitimate actions those within the five Technical Capability Areas that demonstrate future excess capacity? These are important questions to answer,³³ especially in light of the role of the 20-year force structure plan.

The ISG directed that each JCSG "assess the relationship between the force structure plan and the capabilities required to support that plan."³⁴ Unlike other DoD functions that demonstrate a direct relationship with force structure, the Technical function's relationship is an indirect one. Whereas air bases might use hangar space and naval stations might use pier space, the relationship between the Technical function and the DoD force structure is made by using FTEs as the capacity metric. With ISG approval, the TJCSG anchored the FTEs to the DoD's force structure in 2025 by applying a Force Structure Adjustment, a growth or reduction factor determined by expert military judgment.

Therefore, *FTEs are the link to force structure in 2025.*

If the TJCSG's proposed actions are not validated by FTE data showing there to be a sufficient level of future technical infrastructure above the mandated surge allowance, could the Commission determine that the DoD "deviated substantially from the force structure plan"?³⁵ By BRAC law, a finding of that nature would risk at a minimum those proposals within the eight Technical Capability Areas showing no future excess capacity, regardless of whatever worth they may have in terms of military value.

³³ One answer suggested holds that increases in future program funding would allow the hiring of additional technical personnel to meet requirements. This idea has some flaws. The first is that the 3,098 personnel eliminations made by the TJCSG were, for the most part, based on the "15%" rule, where it was assumed that consolidations yield automatic efficiencies on that scale. If these efficiencies fail to materialize, then the problems presented by the deficits worsen, which will result in even more program funding being required. Second, COBRA analyses should reflect, as accurately as possible, the relative cost of performing the functions being realigned when compared to other options. If there is reason to expect the eliminations will result in the need to hire, then that cost should have been incorporated in the analyses.

³⁴ USD(AT&L) memo, subj: "20-Year Force Structure Plan and BRAC Recommendations," 23 September 2004.

³⁵ Department of Defense, "Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990", p.7.

2. **Goal: Maximizing Warfighting Capability**

This goal is vital to national security, and it finds expression in the closure process as “military value.” In fact, BRAC law underscores its importance by stipulating that military value is “the primary consideration in the making of recommendations.”³⁶ While military value has two components, judgment and quantitative, the basis for it is the quantitative value assigned to each site. DEPSECDEF policy directed us to:

“...determine military value through the exercise of military judgment *built upon a quantitative analytical foundation* (emphasis added).”³⁷

The BRAC background paper, “*Shadows on the Wall: The Problem with Military Value Metrics*,” written in its first version in February 2004, and its fourth (and last) version in June 2004, offered OSD a number of ideas aimed at: (a) accurately and fairly assessing the military value of the Services’ laboratories and technical centers, and (b) providing a credible way to judge their potential to create new warfighting capabilities. The paper took its title from Plato’s famous allegory in order to draw the analogy where, like the prisoners in Plato’s cave who could not see objects in their real form, we were making judgments about the laboratories and technical centers indirectly, by way of “shadows” cast by problematic metrics.

The paper started from the premise that the best metric for evaluating a laboratory’s effectiveness in meeting national security requirements is its *track record*, an admittedly difficult thing to assess given the many variables, such as the site’s precise contribution to any given innovation. Nevertheless, we routinely judge sports teams by their record, and not by surrogate means. What might the reaction be if we were tasked to determine the NFL’s top teams, and we responded by collecting data on stadium square footage, revenue expended, number of luxury box seats, proximity to other sports complexes, number of first round draft picks, tackles made/missed, or whether the stadium had a dome?

“Shadows on the Wall” predicted unsatisfactory outcomes if corrections were not made to what it considered to be inadequate military value (MV) metrics and a stove-piped study design. The corrections were not made and evidence shows that the paper was right about its concerns. What the paper did not anticipate was the level of influence given to military judgment relative to the “quantitative analytical foundation.”

● **Red Flag #2 — Premature and Excessive Use of Military Judgment**

The level of influence given to military judgment has created problematic outcomes. Not one proposed scenario was the output of the Linear Optimization Model (LOM), and not one was developed as a result of quantitative military value analysis or on the basis of excess capacity determinations. *In short, not one scenario was the result of quantitative analysis.*

Many of the scenarios were developed by the well-established but obsolete peacetime BRAC basis for consolidation where “bigger is better and biggest is best,” as measured by gross numbers of people and dollars. And, many of them were developed through the application of military judgment. In one example where military judgment took priority over “bigger is better,” Ft. Monmouth’s RDAT&E was sent to the Army Research Laboratory’s (ARL) two sites at Adelphi and Aberdeen, Maryland, despite the fact that the losing site is by far the “biggest” of the three when gross numbers of people or dollars are summed for Sensors and Information Systems Research, D&A, and T&E.

³⁶ Public Law 101-510, as amended through the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, SEC. 2913. (b)

³⁷ DEPSECDEF memo, subj: “BRAC 2005 Military Value Principles”, 3 September 2004.

Military judgment³⁸ is a critical part of our process, but it is subjective by nature and strongly dependent on the mix of individuals within the TJCSG. The official process was designed to be *data-driven* for those reasons. The drift away from a data-driven process began on 23 July 2004 with the request for notional scenarios made by the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG). The Issue Papers, “Notional Scenarios” and “Proposed Contingency Plan,” argued that the ISG’s request would risk fueling perceptions that the Department created the answers before the data was in. In fact, at that time, the field sites were still in the process of responding to the military value and capacity data calls. In a 30 July TJCSG meeting, the OSD BRAC Office gave clarifying guidance that these scenarios were to be notional, but nevertheless “useful,” a somewhat mixed message, and that scenario development was “the front-end of the analytical process.”³⁹ By contrast, in guidance issued the prior year, scenario development was called, “the final step.”⁴⁰

By direction of the ISG, the “vast majority” of the scenarios were to be registered by 1 November 2004.⁴¹ However, the TJCSG’s MV scores were not derived until late-November, with the MV analysis not scheduled for completion until 10 December.⁴² Issue Paper # 07-30-04-05, “Decision Criteria for Scenario Proposals” (8 September), was written when the MV and capacity data appeared likely to arrive too late for use in formulating data-driven scenarios. It proposed criteria to help apply some analytical rigor to what might otherwise become a “black box” without them. Unfortunately, the criteria were used in deliberative session on 8 December, four months after they were proposed and long after the judgment-driven scenarios had been formulated. Some of the COBRA data calls had already been issued.

The moment we produced our first scenarios without the benefit of excess capacity and MV data, we lost the right to call the TJCSG process data-driven. It instead became *judgment-driven*. A fundamental deviation from the analytical process, the premature and disproportionate role given to military judgment and the problems associated with it, are best covered in “Military Judgment: *Necessary — But Not Sufficient*,” and in TJCSG Issue Paper # 12-28-04-01, “Scenario Inconsistencies,” (23 December 2004).

“Scenario Inconsistencies” analyzed some of the strategies used to justify actions that realign workload to sites with lower MV scores than the losing site. Some scenarios showed an inconsistent application of rationales that raised concern about the defensibility of the actions. The paper therefore recommended that the TJCSG stratify its proposals into four categories: (A) *Data-Driven / Judgment-Validated* (no scenario qualifies for this category for reasons explained above), (B) *Judgment-Driven / Data-Validated*, (C) *Judgment-Driven / Strategy-Validated*, and (D) *Judgment-Driven / Strategy-Rationalized*.

This discussion should not be taken to suggest that all use of military judgment was premature and excessive. That would not be the truth. In fact, a number of proposals applied military judgment in a sound and appropriate manner. TECH-0014, which would close Los Angeles AFB, California and realign the workload to Peterson AFB, Colorado, is one example. Unsupported by the MV scores, the scenario’s origin was judgment-driven. However, the TJCSG principals analyzed and debated the merits of the asserted benefits, with the majority voting against the proposal based upon their military judgment of the total picture — the workforce, the Air Force business model, the mission, and the national interest.

TECH-0040 is another example. Collocating DARPA and the Service research contract offices creates an environment where the potential for innovative Joint technical interaction is enhanced. And, moving the workforces from expensive leased spaces and onto a military installation makes good business sense that

³⁸ Strictly speaking, *military* judgment is not the province of the TJCSG, whose considerations are different from those that focus on force structure and basing requirements. The TJCSG’s area of competence is, instead, expert *technical* judgment.

³⁹ TJCSG Meeting Minutes of 30 July 2004

⁴⁰ USD(AT&L) memo, subj: “BRAC 2005 Guidance for the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group”, 16 July 2003.

⁴¹ USD(AT&L) memo, subj: “BRAC 2005 Scenario Data Calls,” 3 November 2004.

⁴² Briefing to the Infrastructure Steering Group, “BRAC 2005”, 19 November 2004.

also addresses force protection needs that have become important in the post-9/11 world. Worries expressed over the additional effort required by non-DoD employees to visit the contract offices are not convincing. Good technical ideas in search of dollars will make the extra effort to go through installation security procedures. This proposal would lose its potential benefits if it were decided to relocate some, but not all, of the offices to the same location.

- **Red Flag #3 — Unsatisfactory Military Value Metrics**

The MV scores used by the TJCSG were strongly driven by *workload* (i.e., numbers of people and dollars). In this respect the scores support the established BRAC approach, used in every peacetime closure round, that “bigger is better” and “biggest is best.” These big ideas have reached their ultimate expression within the TJCSG’s Weapons sub-group where the three largest weapons sites (NAWC China Lake, Redstone Arsenal, and Eglin AFB) were called “Mega-Centers.”

In the peacetime rounds, the centralization of RDT&E to larger organizations was asserted to be justified by greater efficiencies and cost savings. The fairest response to that claim is that, it all depends. But the effect of *excessive* centralization on mission effectiveness is clearly negative. The Secretary of Defense recently spoke on this subject, stating,

“It seems to me there are two things you don’t want to centralize excessively. One is research and development because no one has a monopoly on innovation or creativity or brains.”⁴³

Instead of workload-driven metrics, BRAC-V needed metrics that measured mission effectiveness. With the nation at war, and the Department transforming its forces, the quality of technical personnel and the operational impact of their work are *the* vital characteristics to measure. This is difficult, but not impossible. “Shadows on the Wall” argued that the key to simplifying our analysis, and succeeding in our task, was finding the exceptional talent.

“...the best talent does not choose to work with lousy facilities. It does not choose to work for an organization with no record of success and no chance to make a difference. It does not choose to work with mediocre colleagues and poor leadership. And, it does not choose to work on yesterday’s problems. If we can find the exceptional talent, we will find state-of-the-art facilities, capable leadership, top colleagues, a record of impact on the nation’s security, a powerful desire for success, and a staff working on tomorrow’s challenges. *Find the best talent, and the rest falls into place.*”⁴⁴

However, the paper predicted that our *People Metrics* (i.e., Awards, Experience, and Education) would fail to discriminate the essential differences among the sites because they would lose important information in the noise of large aggregate populations. There were several causes for this. One was the decision not to give any value to some of the DoD’s best and brightest (i.e., ST personnel). Another was the severely compressed range of assigned point values (e.g., the point difference between the National Medal of Technology and an unidentified patent). On the other hand, there was essentially only one problem with the *Operational Impact Metrics* — the over-emphasis on dollars.

To confirm its theory about the metrics’ inadequacy, the final version of the paper (dated 18 June) reported the results of a test case to OSD before the TJCSG military value data call was issued to the field. Using the TJCSG’s official methodology, a bona fide world-class research group⁴⁵ at the Naval Research

⁴³ DoD News Transcript, “Secretary Rumsfeld Osan Korea Town Hall Meeting,” (18 November 2003).

⁴⁴ D.J. DeYoung, “Shadows on the Wall: The Problem with Military Value Metrics,” 18 June 2004 (*Version 4*), p. 27.

⁴⁵ Section 913 Report #1: *Sensors Science and Technology and the Department of Defense Laboratories*, (National Defense University: March 2002), p.31.

Laboratory (NRL) was scored (with real data) against two hypothetical groups to see how it would fare. The two hypothetical groups, Projects X and Y, had large budgets but were otherwise deliberately designed to be unexceptional and unproductive. *This was done to see if our analytical process could in fact recognize world-class talent and evaluate each site accurately for its military value.* A sound process would, of course, rank the world-class group highest.

The 15-person (13 PhDs – one of them a DoD ST), world-class research team — *with one technology transition to the U.S. Marine Corps, a successful rapid response project for the U.S. Fleet in Bahrain, a Homeland Security Award, a Presidential award, a Technical Society fellow, CRADA income, 3 patents and a license* — ranked second. Its score was little more than half of the top-ranked Project Y, a 35-million dollar budget. Even more disturbing, the world-class group ranked only slightly higher than Project X, an unexceptional, 2-person (both PhDs) contract shop, with no recognition, no product, and no impact. But like Project Y, it had a fat wallet. The results were also insensitive to large artificial increases of brilliant talent. For example, even if 10 Nobel Laureates were added to the world-class group, it would still finish second to Project Y. As a side note, in the time since these calculations were made, a member of the world-class research team was elected to the National Academy of Engineering.

The paper offered a revamped scoring plan that was shown to yield rational rankings when applied to the test case. If we had switched approaches, the effect of the changes would not have been uniform. Sites that scored well under the TJCSG's two quality-focused metrics (i.e., awards/patents/publications and project transitions), as did NRL in the above test case, could be expected to do better under the alternative. In general, of those sites that did well under the TJCSG approach, some would have done even better under the alternative, while those relatively more dependent on gross numbers of people and dollars might have fallen in ranking. Of those that did poorly, some would have done better, while others would have fallen even lower.

For instance, it is probable that NSWC Indian Head's cadre of world-class chemists would likely have lifted the site to higher Weapons MV scores. The same might have been true for other sites with track records for high-impact achievement, like ARL Aberdeen in Weapons and the Army Night Vision Laboratory in Sensors.

The bottom-line, is that the TJCSG's People metrics were blind to exceptional talent and driven by gross numbers, the Operational Impact metrics were captured by dollars, and the rest of the metrics for Physical Environment, Physical Structures and Equipment, and Synergy were, for the most part, non-discriminators. The methodology *did not reliably assess the military value of the Services' laboratories and technical centers, and it failed to provide a credible way to judge their potential to create new warfighting capabilities.*

- **Red Flag #4 — A Study Design with 39 “Stove-Pipes”**

Ten years ago, BRAC-IV's Laboratory JCSG conducted a 23-bin analysis⁴⁶ in parallel to the T&E JCSG's 18-bin analysis.⁴⁷ The result of this combined, 41-bin, stove-piped process was, by general consensus, a collection of sub-optimal RDT&E realignment proposals. According to the GAO,

⁴⁶ “Shadows on the Wall” incorrectly reported the BRAC-95 Lab JCSG approach as constituting 36 bins. The “Common Support Functions” were divided into two categories: product and pervasive. Product functions (e.g., Weapons) included S&T, engineering development, and in-service engineering. By contrast, the eight pervasive functions (e.g., advanced materials) included only S&T.

⁴⁷ DDR&E memorandum, “1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Laboratories Joint Cross-Service Group Guidance Package,” (30 March 1994); Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group, “Analysis Plan for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 95) Cross Service Analyses,” 3 August 1995.

“The groups chose analytical frameworks that broke work down into such small pieces that some of the sets of alternatives they suggested to the services proposed numerous transfers of small workloads from one facility to another. The services did not find most of these options feasible or cost-effective.”⁴⁸

BRAC-V has repeated the stove-piped approach, albeit with variations in taxonomy and larger realigned workloads. The result is again a collection of actions that are questionable in their cost-effectiveness. The bigger issue, and one that presents potential risks to national security, is the likely damage they will do to technical programs remaining at sites that stay open but lose workload.

Dr. Robert Frosch (former NASA Administrator, Deputy Director of ARPA, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development) once observed that,

“Great R&D must preserve the *connections* (emphasis added) between various kinds of knowledge...The problem of R&D management is, in a sense, the problem of the management of a variety of forms of knowledge that are deeply interconnected...It turns out to be a problem of *maximizing collision cross-sections among kinds of knowledge* (emphasis added): making sure people who need knowledge they don’t have—and may not even know they need—have a good chance of learning about it.”⁴⁹

The importance of R&D connectivity was cited in “Shadows on the Wall”, where concern was expressed that our 39-bin analytical approach would result in damaged synergies. The paper stated that,

“...there is an important feature that our process shares with BRAC-95 — pushing highly interconnected work through technical and functional stovepipes...*This will sever the connectivity of critical multidisciplinary projects and vertically integrated programs, as well as decapitate top talent from any realigned work.*”

The paper proposed a solution that called for comparing:

“...the whole R&D program at a corporate lab to that of another corporate lab, and the whole RDT&E program at a warfare/product center to another warfare/product center. This way the horizontal connectivity at multi-disciplinary corporate labs would be evaluated intact, and the vertically integrated connectivity at warfare/product centers would be treated likewise. In addition, the military value of sites that maximize ‘collision cross-sections among kinds of knowledge’ by performing significant levels of joint work would also be recognized. *This proposed solution means assigning Military Value at a higher level, such as at the activity / installation level, and not to the Rubik’s Cube ‘facilities’.*”⁵⁰

Metrics that accurately gauge technical talent and operational impact are critical to the success of this holistic approach. For instance, if a site scored below the cut line, then our ability to identify exceptional talent and high impact work at the losing site would ensure those specific functions are realigned to a gaining site that promises higher odds (by close physical distance or intellectual challenge) that the talented people move with the work.

The assignment of MV at a meaningful level of aggregation was proposed again, nine months after “Shadows on the Wall,” in the Issue Paper, “Military Judgment: *Necessary — But Not Sufficient.*” Again the idea was treated like the “third-rail” of our analyses. This resistance cannot be explained by insurmountable difficulties. In BRAC-IV, the Navy “rolled-up” a 1,386-bin workload “footprint,”

⁴⁸ GAO, *Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process*, April 1995, p. 45

⁴⁹ R. Frosch, “The Customer for R&D is Always Wrong!,” *Research•Technology Management*, (Nov-Dec 1996), p. 23-24.

⁵⁰ D.J. DeYoung, “Shadows on the Wall: The Problem with Military Value Metrics,” 17 February 2004, p. 12-13 (*Version 1*).

comprising 18 life-cycle phases and 77 functional support areas, into MV scores for whole organizations.⁵¹ By contrast, the TJCSG agreed only, after some debate, to “roll-up” the MV scores by zip code (i.e., where individual respondents, from the *same Service*, at the *same installation*, and within the *same bin*, are combined into one score).⁵²

MV roll-ups are feasible. Not only has it been done in previous BRAC rounds, but the TJCSG Analytic Team developed a workable methodology that the Capabilities Integration Team (CIT) was tasked to review on 1 November 2004. Opponents rightly argued that a simple roll-up would result in the double-counting (or worse) of extramural funding. But, the Analytic Team accounted for that by excluding such dollars for that reason, and because those dollars introduce a measure of private sector infrastructure into an analysis of the public sector. Months earlier, “Shadows on the Wall” had also proposed eliminating extramural funding, along with other metrics, like the number of ACAT programs, a diagnostic tool about as accurate as using an oven thermometer for a child’s fever.

On the other hand, the MV scores can apparently be “rolled-across.” MV scores for the DoD “open air ranges” were provided to the TJCSG by a third party (the Education & Training JCSG), and were simply added to the TJCSG T&E scores — across all 13 technical capability areas.⁵³

The MV “roll-up issue” is not a theoretical debate. It has real-world consequences. For example, one TJCSG proposal sends Fort Monmouth’s Sensors and Information Systems (IS) *Research* to ARL Adelphi. Its *D&A* for both technical areas goes to ARL Aberdeen, which then enables the closure of Fort Monmouth.⁵⁴ The Army’s Night Vision Laboratory would also lose its Sensors Research to ARL Adelphi under this scheme, and its sub-optimized Sensors *D&A* program would be left behind.

However, ARL Adelphi does not perform *D&A* in either Sensors or IS. So, if the Research and *D&A* bins for both Sensors and IS were “rolled-up” to achieve a single composite MV score for each *organization*, then one could justify sending ARL Adelphi’s *IS Research* to Fort Monmouth, which performs Research and *D&A* in both areas.⁵⁵ And, ARL Adelphi’s *Sensors Research* could be sent to the Night Vision Laboratory, which performs both Sensors Research and *D&A*. Those actions would enable the closure of ARL Adelphi, instead of Fort Monmouth. The Night Vision Laboratory’s integrated Sensors program, which has made a major impact on U.S. military capabilities, would also not be sub-optimized by having its business base reduced and its innovative connectivity shredded.

Finally, “Shadows on the Wall” observed that unless changes were made to both the study design and metrics, the 39 bins “will be populated with data providing no clue as to the actual impact or value of the work.” The following case study analyzes one proposed action in the Weapons area, and by doing so,

⁵¹ The workload “footprint” gave the Navy a detailed understanding of the types of work conducted at its sites. For example, unlike the TJCSG process where “Weapons Technology” allows no finer distinctions, the “footprint” made it possible to distinguish work related to missiles, torpedoes, mines, guns, and “other” before the development of scenarios. By contrast, the TJCSG relied on scenario cost-assessment, the last phase of analysis, to ascertain how much work at the targeted site was, for example, in energetics.

⁵² MV “roll-up” by zip code, an analytically sound and common-sense approach took until 9 December to be approved.

⁵³ The simple sum of the two sets of numbers led to at least one anomalous MV ranking (i.e., Eglin AFB, the Air Force’s *Weapons* test site, ranked higher in *Air Platforms* testing, than did Edwards AFB, where the Air Force does its *Air Platforms* testing).

⁵⁴ This recommendation realigns *IS Research* from higher-ranked Ft. Monmouth to lower-ranked ARL Adelphi based upon a strategy that *Sensors Research* is of higher value due to its more infrastructure intensive nature. ARL Adelphi has the higher score for *Sensors Research*, therefore both *IS* and *Sensors Research* are realigned from Ft. Monmouth to ARL Adelphi. But if this same strategy were applied to AFRL-Rome, then Rome’s higher ranked *IS Research* would go to AFRL-WPAFB, which had a lower *IS* score but a higher *Sensors* score. However, it goes instead to Hanscom AFB, which does no *IS Research* but has a higher *IS D&A* score. In other words, the gaining sites for *IS Research* vary according to the strategy. The proposal is analyzed in Issue Paper, “Scenario Inconsistencies.”

⁵⁵ Fort Monmouth has a higher MV score for *IS Research* than ARL Adelphi, and a simple sum of its *Sensors* and *IS Research* scores exceeds that of ARL Adelphi. ARL Adelphi has zero MV in both *Sensors* and *IS D&A* because it performs no work in those areas.

reveals how important it is to understand the impact and value of the work within each realigned bin. It also reveals the flaws in our excessive emphasis on military judgment, the unsatisfactory nature of our MV scores, and the incentives for sub-optimal solutions inherent in our stove-piped study design.

○ **Case Study: *Degrading DoD's World-Class Energetics Capability***

Background

The TJCSG proposes realigning 111 RD&A personnel from the Naval Surface Weapons Center (NSWC) Indian Head (and its detachment at the Seal Beach Weapons Station) to the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) China Lake, and 91 RD&A personnel from NSWC Indian Head (and its detachment at the Earle Weapons Station) to the Army's Picatinny Arsenal. Evidence shows that these actions risk serious damage to a laboratory that holds a proven record of success in meeting naval, Joint, and national mission needs.

A World-Class Capability

Energetic materials formulation is a critical weapons capability. NSWC Indian Head has the largest cadre of scientists and engineers dedicated to energetics, as well as the broadest spectrum of energetics facilities within DoD. It is the only activity in the country that has the demonstrated capability to go all the way from synthesizing new energetic molecules to developing energetic systems and providing them to industry and our warfighters. Built around a cadre of world-class chemists, this energetics capability is the foundation for the laboratory's synergistic work in explosives, propellant, and pyrotechnic material technologies.

A former president of the National Academy of Sciences once noted, "In science, the best is vastly more important than the next best." Indian Head's leadership in energetics was acknowledged in that manner when NRL, as a result of collaborating with Indian Head, realized that its partner's knowledge base was truly first-class and that it possessed the facilities and capabilities permitting experimentation not possible at NRL. Rather than be "next best" in this technical area, NRL voluntarily chose to transfer its energetics mission and scientists to the Indian Head laboratory in 2000.

Sustained Record of Warfighting Impact

Prior to the first Gulf War, *the Army came to Indian Head seeking development of a propellant with unprecedented performance to be used in the 105 mm gun of the M-1 main battle tank. Indian Head combined its unique resources from its gun systems design branch, pilot plant facility, and nitramine gun / high energy propellant facility with synergistic effect to produce the low-vulnerability ammunition (LOVA) M43 propellant. With an on-site pilot plant, its surge capabilities provided the Army with over 1 million lbs of propellant to support Operation Desert Storm.*⁵⁶

LOVA propellant was used in the "Silver Bullet," tank ammunition developed in a collaborative effort by ARL Aberdeen, the Department of Energy laboratories, and the Picatinny Arsenal.⁵⁷ When coupled with night vision devices from the Army's Night Vision Laboratory, the Silver Bullet made the M-1 main battle tank the most lethal weapon of the war. Consider the testimony of a captured Iraqi commander.

"On 17 January, I started with 39 tanks. After 38 days of aerial attacks, I had 32, but in less than 20 minutes with the M1A1, I had zero."⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Tara Landis, "Indian Head Support to Operation Enduring Freedom — Thermobaric Weapons Delivered to the Warfighter," *Swoosh and Boom Quarterly*, (Summer 2004), p. 3.

⁵⁷ Information validated in personal conversation with Dr. John W. Lyons, former Director, Army Research Laboratory and current Distinguished Research Professor with the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University.

⁵⁸ Comment by Iraqi Battalion Commander captured by U.S. 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment on April 16, 1991.

Tens years later, NSWC Indian Head made another warfighting contribution with the thermobaric explosive, PBXIH-135. After the 9/11 terror attacks, the thermobaric bomb was rushed into development for use against al Qaeda and Taliban forces holed up in Afghanistan's mountain caves and tunnels. With project leadership by DTRA, the efforts by Indian Head and the Air Force Armament Command at Eglin AFB had the weapon ready in only 67 days. According to a former Government official,

“The capability to produce the explosive for those weapons existed only at the Indian Head facility... No private firm had the ability to produce thermobaric weapons.”⁵⁹

When detonated, the thermobaric weapon generates extremely high, sustained blast pressures and temperatures in confined spaces. Dropped by warplanes of the U.S. Air Force, the weapon spared allied ground troops the prospect of bloody tunnel-to-tunnel combat. *If Indian Head's energetics program had been sent to China Lake by BRAC-IV, as was considered, it is possible that lives would have been lost.*

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. Marine Corps had an urgent need for a shoulder-launched enhanced-blast warhead. NSWC Indian Head teamed with the Marine Corps Systems Command, NSWC Dahlgren, and Talley Defense Systems. The result was a weapon (SMAW-NE) that includes a new warhead case design capable of penetrating brick targets and a thermobaric explosive fill that provides enhanced lethality. The Marine Corps received delivery of the SMAW-NE for their immediate use in Iraq.⁶⁰ This achievement spanned only nine months from concept development to weapon system fielding.

Shredding Connectivity to Achieve Navy Consolidation

In the TJCSG's TECH-0018 proposal, NSWC Indian Head loses its weapons simulation personnel to NAWC China Lake. These personnel were instrumental in developing a unique static rocket test capability that allows the performance of a Tomahawk missile to be monitored throughout its entire flight cycle, without ever leaving the ground. This capability saves the Navy the substantial costs of live testing when circumstances do not require it. In 2002, a static test was conducted to mitigate risks prior to the first live Tactical Tomahawk flight test at the NAWC sea test range. Due to the realistic nature of the ground test execution, design inadequacies within the propulsion, fuel and avionics sub-systems were identified and resolved.⁶¹ On 8 May 2003, the first live warhead test, launched by the USS Stetham in the waters of the NAWC sea range, was a success.⁶² It is not clear why test simulation personnel, who have performed successfully at their current site, should be relocated to the open air range that does the live testing.

NSWC Indian Head also loses its detachment at the Seal Beach Weapons Station to NAWC China Lake. Seal Beach performs the T&E of energetic and electronic components of strategic system reentry vehicles, and the radiographic and chemical analyses of energetic components of Marine Corps ammunition. This is a surveillance program that tests inventories to determine whether service life can be extended. If the viability of an item cannot be reliably assessed, then replacements must be purchased. The Seal Beach function is integrated into the energetics, propellant, and explosives expertise at Indian Head's main site. It is not clear what is gained by realigning this function to China Lake, especially in light of the costs to Indian Head resulting from shredded connectivity and the increased overhead due to a reduced business base.

This scenario also sends 147 NSWC Dahlgren personnel that perform warhead work to NAWC China Lake. But what is gained by moving Dahlgren's warhead work that seems closely coupled to high-quality energetics work only an hour away at Indian Head, an organization within the same systems command and one that performs work in underwater warheads (a mission it received in BRAC-III)? To substantiate this point, Attachment B provides a list of explosives developed by Navy technical centers. Indian Head has developed 13 of 15, and one can be found in 39 of the Navy's 50 explosive weapons.

⁵⁹ James Colvard, “The Numbers Game,” GovExec.com, “Federal Focus,” May 13, 2002, accessed at <<http://207.27.3.29/dailyfed/0502/051302ff.htm>>.

⁶⁰ Kevin Gessner, “SMAW-NE: A Teaming Success Story,” *Swoosh and Boom Quarterly*, (Summer 2004), p. 7.

⁶¹ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/bgm-109-var.htm>

⁶² <http://www.nawcwpns.navy.mil/~pacrange/s1/news/2003/TTomWarH.htm>

Shredding Connectivity to Achieve Joint Collocation

The second part of the TJCSG's proposal sends Indian Head's guns and ammunition functions (along with those of NSWC Dahlgren) to the Army's Picatinny Arsenal. Picatinny's expertise is in the mature technologies of conventional ammunition. By contrast, naval gun programs, like the Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM), rely on cutting edge technologies that need to be created with unique naval requirements in mind, such as an intense maritime electromagnetic environment and the fact that the "Navy sleeps on its ammunition." The Weapons sub-group justifies the realignment, in part, on the basis of "jointness." But what is gained when Indian Head's products, like the propellant for the Silver Bullet, are already extensively used by the Army?

In a more recent example, while ERGM is to be a key element of naval force projection, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratories concluded in its project assessment that, "ERGM will serve the Navy, the Marine Corps, *the Army*, and the Nation very well in the future."⁶³ Clearly, the gun and ammunition capabilities at Indian Head and Dahlgren already meet Joint needs, along with the vital naval requirement for insensitive shipboard munitions.

NSWC Indian Head also conducts extensive collaborative work with the Air Force, the predominant developer of air armaments. Its work with Eglin AFB on the thermobaric weapon is one example. Another is the fact that the Air Force relies on Indian Head's CAD/PAD (Cartridge Actuated Devices / Propellant Actuated Devices) program for the rocket catapult used in the ejection seats of *nearly all of its combat aircraft* (i.e., F-15, F-16, F-117, B-1, B-2, and A-10).⁶⁴ Indian Head is also collaborating with Eglin AFB on the development of the Integrated Maritime Portable Acoustic Scoring and Simulator. This system would provide an option to live-fire bombing ranges to address the increasing restrictions being placed on weapons training facilities.⁶⁵

NSWC Indian Head also loses its detachment at the Earle Weapons Station to Picatinny Arsenal. This detachment helps ensure that naval weapons, which are transported worldwide and subjected to environments from the arctic to the tropics, are shipboard-safe. Proper packaging and storage of naval weapons is one way to achieve insensitivity and prevent accidental detonations. Like the work at Seal Beach, the program at Earle is integrated into the energetics, propellant, and explosives expertise resident at Indian Head's main site. Therefore, it is not clear what value is gained by realigning this function to Picatinny Arsenal, especially in light of the costs to NSWC Indian Head that will result from shredded connectivity and the increased overhead due to a reduced business base.

Dismissing Capacity Data

An interesting aspect of the realignment to the Picatinny Arsenal concerns the FTE capacity data. No LOM run would have produced this option because Picatinny has no current excess capacity to accept the people and the work. This is likely why, in its COBRA response, Picatinny reported the need for 50,000 SF of new construction and a total MILCON cost of \$52.5 million — one reason why the realignment will not achieve a payback until 2021. Indian Head does have a lower MV score in Weapons Research and D&A, but as shown earlier, MV is strongly driven by numbers of people and dollars. Even assuming equivalent real-world intellectual talent and field impacts, the scores were likely driven by Picatinny's \$2.4 billion in funding compared to Indian Head's \$480 million, and its workforce of 1,000 more people.

Dubious Military Judgment

The narrative for the TECH-0018 recommendation states that it "preserves the sensitive intellectual capital in energetics at Indian Head." The recommendation also gives NSWC Dahlgren status as a specialty site for

⁶³ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/ergm.htm>

⁶⁴ C. Pfleeger and S. Jago, "Celebrating the Team That Kept the USAF Flying," *Swoosh and Boom Quarterly*, (Summer 2004), p. 12.

⁶⁵ T. Landis, "Indian Head's IMPASS System Proves to be Right on Target," *NAVSEA News Wire*, (13 December 2002).

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“Surface Ship Combat Systems Integration.”⁶⁶ Ironically, both sites will instead be weakened by shredding the connectivity among their various technical functions and sub-optimizing what is left behind. Both stay open, but with a smaller business base and less innovative synergy to draw upon. Almost symbolic of the proposal’s sub-optimal nature is the fact that the gun test range at Dahlgren stays open to accommodate tests of the work being realigned to Picatinny Arsenal, which has no range capable of meeting the requirements. In short, the only justification for this action would be if compelling data were provided that met the standard for “reproducible military judgment,” a higher standard for military judgment that is defined and discussed later in this paper.

A judgment-driven process, inadequate MV metrics that are blind to exceptional talent and use dollars as a surrogate for operational impact, and a stove-piped study design have contributed toward a set of proposals that risk serious damage to a laboratory with demonstrated high military value in energetics and energetic systems. To again quote Dr. Frosch,

“...you cannot measure the future; the only thing you can measure is past performance...*You have to measure R&D by what you have done.*”⁶⁷

What has been done by NSWC Indian Head has served the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and the Nation well. It would be a tragedy to lose it.

⁶⁶ Draft Narrative: Candidate Recommendation TECH-0018 Part 4.

⁶⁷ R. Frosch, “The Customer for R&D is Always Wrong!,” p. 27.

3. ***Goal: Improving Efficiency***

Improving efficiency means doing more with less. As important as this goal is to the Defense Department, *its pursuit cannot be allowed to compromise mission effectiveness*. Peter Drucker, considered to be the most important management thinker of our time, stressed the point this way,

“No amount of efficiency would have enabled the manufacturers of buggy whips to survive.”⁶⁸

The issue of cost-savings is tricky when dealing with R&D. Unlike a traditional “cost-center,” such as a shipyard, a laboratory can *generate* savings. In fact, the one innovation described below saved two-thirds of what all 86 closures and 59 realignments of BRAC-I accrue in one year’s time.⁶⁹

Nearly \$460 Million in Savings. In the 1990s, the DoD introduced a new narrowband voice-processing algorithm called the Mixed-Excitation Linear Predictor (MELP), for supporting tactical communications. NRL was asked to investigate means of converting MELP voice data into the Advanced Narrowband Digital Voice Terminal (ANDVT) voice data (and vice versa) so that these tactical secure phones could interoperate directly.⁷⁰ NRL took six weeks to develop an algorithm for the translation process, which has been widely disseminated within DoD and NATO forces.⁷¹ It provides direct interoperability, allowing the new and the legacy ANDVT phones to work together. The result was that 40,000 legacy phones did not have to be retired prematurely, and their *continued use resulted in a one-time savings of nearly \$460 million for the DoD.*⁷²

The TJCSG has approached efficiency in the same manner as the four peacetime closure rounds — by consolidating workload at larger sites. By contrast, the Headquarters & Support Activities (H&SA) JCSG has pursued “reengineering” concepts to save money. For instance, it proposes to create “super bases” where there currently are installations with shared boundaries. The idea is to consolidate the management functions of the component installations and have one Service operate them.

A few of the proposed “super bases” involve laboratories. This is probably an effective way to save money at operational bases, but the centralization of laboratory management is risky because R&D is different from operational functions and it thrives in a decentralized environment. Dozens of DoD reports have urged greater levels of decentralization, including the following DDR&E study that noted,

“The special needs of the RDT&E process are not recognized by ‘the system.’ Too often, procedures, controls and administrative devices that are effective in operations and logistics are also applied to R&D organizations. Support activities must assist rather than control line laboratory managers in their missions.”⁷³

Drucker also makes the points that,

“...innovation needs to be organized separately and outside of the ongoing managerial business...it has to be *autonomous and separate* from operating organizations”,⁷⁴ and [decentralization is] “...the most effective design

⁶⁸ Peter Drucker, *Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), p. 45.

⁶⁹ The closures and realignments of BRAC-88 generate annual savings of \$694 million. See Whitney, Bradley & Brown, Inc., “Base Realignment and Closure,” (5 February 2005), p. 11.

⁷⁰ Kang, G.S., and D.A. Heide, “Transcoding Between Two DoD Narrowband Voice Encoding Algorithms (LPC-10 and MELP),” NRL Formal Report 9921 (1999).

⁷¹ U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Research, Award of 2001 Vice Admiral Harold G. Bowen Award for Patented Inventions to George S. Kang and Larry J. Fransen, Naval Research Laboratory.

⁷² The following numbers are from SPAWAR’s ANDVT Program Manager and “Naval Advanced Secure Voice Architecture,” SPAWAR Systems Center, (Version 0.1) 26 February 2004, p. AV-68. Total deployment was approximately 40,000 units (29,512 ANDVTs at \$28,744/unit; 9,363 KY-99As at \$6,207/unit; 342 KY-100s at \$12,861/unit; and 700 Tacterm ANDVT Shore Systems at \$10,000/unit), of which 26,917 units went to the Navy, at a total procurement cost of \$917,807,531. Since 50% of the ANDVT life cycles are over, the DoD and Navy saved 50% of the total paid by avoiding replacement costs due to block retirement.

⁷³ DDR&E, “Task Group on Defense In-House Laboratories”, (1971).

principle for such [innovative] work...the autonomous organization should not have to depend on central service staffs...*Service staffs are, of necessity, focused on their functional area rather than on performance and results (emphasis added).*⁷⁵

There was a time when the DoD crusaded against centralization. Some 20 years ago, before the “reinvention” years, the Model Installation Program (MIP) urged installation managers to, “*Discourage conformity, uniformity, and centralization because they stifle innovation.*”⁷⁶ David Packard, chairman of the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, endorsed the value and work of the MIP.⁷⁷

In 1989, the DEPSECDEF was even more direct about decentralizing support functions, increasing the authority of the laboratory director, and treating R&D as a “profit-center” rather than a “cost-center.”

“Provide Laboratory Technical Directors greater authority over the organizations they direct. Their authority should be modeled on the separate ‘profit center’ concept of the private sector... Support-function personnel (Personnel, Procurement, etc.) are to be co-located at the laboratory and *under the direct supervisory control of the Director (emphasis added).*”⁷⁸

It is ironic that the DoD fought the Cold War using a more decentralized approach to managing its bases, but with victory it adopts the Soviet model — a management style not known for its innovative prowess. One reason for the failure of centralized control, especially when applied to R&D, is that too often fails to make rational business decisions, which “can occur only when managers receive adequate information on the effects of their decisions.”⁷⁹ Decentralization, on the other hand, fosters effective action based on adequate and timely information.

Despite warnings made by experts who understand the different requirements for R&D organizations, the Army and Navy centralized the management of their installation facilities over the last few years. The push to centralize laboratories and technical centers has been difficult to challenge, in part, because the RDT&E community cannot prove that today’s centralization prevents what would have otherwise been tomorrow’s new discovery or invention.

Instead of trying to prove what cannot be proven, it is possible to describe how a laboratory met a national-level mission by having control over its support functions, which in this unclassified (and therefore dated) example, was the ability to *rapidly reconfigure and modify facilities.*

Operation Earnest Will. During the Iraq-Iran “tanker-war” of the 1980s, NRL was tasked to solve the problems anti-ship missiles posed to U.S. Fleet operations in the confined waters of the Persian Gulf. Its simulations proved that an American naval escort of Kuwaiti oil tankers could succeed in the face of Iranian and Iraqi attacks, and were used to design the tactics for the successful operation to keep the Straits of Hormuz open. Special receiver technologies, hundreds of millions of times more sensitive than ordinary receivers, allowed detection of previously undetectable attack warning signals. Foreign military hardware was exploited in days, with new electronic warfare techniques developed and installed on warships within weeks. On a crash basis, NRL’s technical expertise and sophisticated facilities enabled a National-level goal. *NRL’s ability to modify its facilities on a crash basis to support this work was integral to success.*⁸⁰

⁷⁴ Drucker, p., 782- 803.

⁷⁵ Drucker, 582- 585.

⁷⁶ Principles of Excellent Installations, U.S. Department of Defense.

⁷⁷ David Packard, *A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to the President*, The President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (June 1986), xii.

⁷⁸ DEPSECDEF memorandum, “Laboratory Demonstration Program,” 20 November 1989.

⁷⁹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 93.

⁸⁰ From the supporting documentation for a 1999 Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Award, and http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/earnest_will.htm.

It remains to be seen if the H&SA JCSG's concept goes further than consolidated facility management, but it would not be surprising if it includes functions like supply and procurement. It should therefore be useful to survey the approach of the Navy's installations command to gauge how the H&SA JCSG's actions might affect the DoD laboratories and technical centers. *This issue must be addressed because, for at least the duration of BRAC-V deliberations, their long-term viability is the responsibility of the TJCSG.*

● **Red Flag #5 — Centralization of Facilities Management**

Commander, Navy Installations (CNI) was implemented on 1 October 2003, with a vision of, "*Nothing Extra...Nothing Missing*,"⁸¹ and a mission to "prioritize shore installation requirements in support of warfighter readiness."⁸² This excerpt is from implementation guidance on CNI's concept of service:

"CNI will establish a standard level of service to be provided to all Navy funded tenant activities that is consistent across all regions...*Requests from Navy tenants to exceed Navy level of service standards will be handled on a case basis, with CNI approval* (emphasis added)."⁸³

The Commander, Navy Installations, has described his command's approach in the following ways: "...the installation will be controlled by a central committee,"⁸⁴ and "...processes can be *a lot more standard than they have been for 225 years*."⁸⁵

Managing functions with "nothing-extra" efficiency, controlling by central committee, prioritizing projects by readiness requirements, and standardizing processes to levels not seen since the birth of the American Navy, are descriptions of an operating environment that is harmful to good R&D. In particular, the relatively more expensive technical facility requirements are at risk of being sacrificed for short-term, day-to-day operational needs.

A month after CNI's establishment, a draft paper titled "Labs Misérables" appeared on the website of the Federation of American Scientists.⁸⁶ It analyzed the CNI concept and how it might affect naval R&D. A review of the paper finds a fact-based analysis, well-documented evidence, informed speculation, some acerbic rhetoric, and only two errors. Therefore much of the information in this section is taken from that paper. The paper cites a battery of experts and studies that criticized the CNI concept and its application to Navy laboratories and technical centers. Some of the criticisms are as follows:

Center for Naval Analyses

[Note: CNA was commissioned by the Navy to assess the centralization of facility management. A single claimant structure was established despite CNA's strong arguments against it.]

"*There is a difference between RDT&E and upkeep and maintenance...the objective is different from that of fleets and requires a different type of thinking...we think scientific and research-focused organizations need their own claimants* (emphasis added)"⁸⁷

⁸¹ Facilities Management Panel, "Final Report for the Secretary of the Navy," 7 February 2003, p. 4.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁸³ "Guidance for Assimilating Divesting Claimant Activities into Regions," 22 May 2003, p. 4.

⁸⁴ JO2(SCW) Eric Clay, "Rear Adm. Weaver Explains Role of CNI," *Homeport*, (1 September 2003), p. 2.

⁸⁵ "Navy's Installation Commander Says Private Sector will Play Significant Role," *Defense Communities* 360, (7 August 2004).

⁸⁶ "Labs Misérables: *The Impending Assimilation of the Naval Research Laboratory and the Threat to Navy Transformation*," found at <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/nrl.pdf>

⁸⁷ Cesar A. Perez and Perkins Pedrick, "Number of Shore Installation Claimants — Revisited," (CNA, September 2001), p. 27.

“[R&D] facilities and equipment include costly, high-precision, delicate, and easily damaged instrumentation. *Risks are high, in that damage or failure can cause delay or setbacks that translate into huge amounts of money or shortfalls in readiness* (emphasis added). Perhaps most significant in making comparison with other installations perilous is that the products of the scientific installations are years into the future.”⁸⁸

“This approach (the working capital fund) provides their installations with incentives for cost visibility and savings. *No additional savings are expected from switching their shore installation responsibilities to the fleets; perhaps there would be additional costs* (emphasis added).”⁸⁹

RAND Corporation

“*Almost all the previous consolidation attempts and all the DMRDs (Defense Management Review Decisions) examined in a recent RAND study failed to create cost savings* (emphasis added).”⁹⁰

The Army and Navy built their approaches to facility centralization upon selected private sector experience, with the Army using Microsoft as a benchmark, and the Navy using General Motors as its model. “Labs Misérables” finds problems in the choice of an automobile maker as a model and uses Drucker’s description of GM as a starting point for assessing it. An expert on GM, Drucker states,

“General Motors is essentially a single-product, single-technology, single-market business.”⁹¹

The paper finds that centralized facilities management may work well in mono-technology environments like GM’s, where product innovation is marginal from year to year. That type of environment is a match for the characteristics of naval readiness requirements, which are *predictable, short-term, low-risk, and focused on efficiency*. Therefore, the paper posits that the GM model may work for shipyards and depots. But it argues that one cannot conclude it will satisfy R&D requirements, which are *unpredictable, long-term, high-risk, and focused on effectiveness*. It offered the following analogy to drive home the point.

“Naval warfighting requirements require innovative efforts across a wide range of scientific disciplines and technology areas. The Fleet’s operating environments, such as steel-crushing ocean depths, demand high levels of technical sophistication and reliability. GM makes cars. The U.S. Navy fights wars. The benchmark might have more validity if GM’s job was to police highways that are cruised by Fords firing pavement-skimming missiles, Chryslers launching strike aircraft, Toyotas laying mines, and Volkswagens rigged to ram and explode in Kmart parking lots.”⁹²

The paper argues that a company more closely resembling the Navy in both size and diversity of product lines is General Electric (GE), a company that grants independence to its product divisions (large appliances, aircraft engines, medical equipment, lighting products, locomotives, synthetic materials, etc.) to operate and manage their own facilities and support services. In fact, *GE Global Research — a world-class laboratory — owns its land and facilities and has an organic on-site facility capability. And, it contracts out the facilities work it cannot accomplish in-house*. This decentralized approach is effective for the R&D mission, as well as more efficient in that it has the flexibility to choose the best sources to do the job, the right way, and in the timeliest manner.

As predicted by the paper, the CNI did assume a central role in the Navy BRAC-V process. However, there is no evidence that the integrity of the process was compromised. Infrastructure data, as in previous

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 28.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 26 – 27.

⁹⁰ Marygail Brauner and Jean Gebman, “Is Consolidation Being Overemphasized for Military Logistics?,” RAND, IP-103, (1993); Michael Kennedy, “Report on DMRD Direct Assistance Effort,” RAND Briefing (December 1992).

⁹¹ Drucker, 521.

⁹² “Labs Misérables, p. 14.

BRACs, continued to be reported by the field sites, not by the CNI. But, the BRAC implementation phase gives the CNI budget, schedule, and execution authority with regard to the warfare centers now that it owns their facilities.⁹³ CNI need only *coordinate* with the “mission claimants” (i.e., NAVAIR, NAVSEA, and SPAWAR), the former owners of the warfare centers that remain responsible for meeting mission requirements.

“Labs Misérables” also predicted that the CNI would eventually outsource base support functions to the private sector in one package, like the Navy Marine Corps Internet, making it more difficult to get responsive support for R&D missions. This remains to be seen given that the command has been in existence less than two years.

The paper makes two factual errors. First, the expected savings from the Navy’s worldwide consolidation of base management was over-estimated. It is not \$250 million over the next six years, which the paper approximated based on a Navy briefing. The number is much less — \$65 million, according to the CNI’s Commander.⁹⁴ The second error is an over-estimation of savings from NRL’s voice-processing algorithm, described earlier. It saved the Navy \$272 million, not the reported \$375 million.

Other than the two cost errors, and concerns about two issues that have not yet fully played out, the analysis in “Labs Misérables” is solid and defensible by the evidence presented. The issues raised by it warrant serious attention by the DoD, including the one that involves the CNI’s efforts to assimilate NRL.

o **Case Study: *Challenging Civilian Authority***

Defying Navy Secretariat Policy. On 7 June 2003, NRL received a message from the Naval District Washington (NDW) Commandant informing it of imminent assimilation into the new facilities command.⁹⁵ But, unlike the Navy’s other 97 installations, NRL belongs to the Navy Secretariat in the civilian chain of command. By laying claim to NRL’s land, facilities, and BOS functions, the CNI action defies Secretariat policy set in 1997, during the first round of consolidation. The policy, provided as Attachment C, was set by the Assistant Secretary of Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), ASN(RD&A), and states,

“NRL is a Secretary of the Navy corporate activity that has been assigned unique Navy-wide and national responsibilities...*Real property and BOS functions imbedded inseparably* (emphasis added) with the research and industrial functions at NRL will remain with the Commanding Officer.”⁹⁶

The Navy Secretariat’s policy has not been rescinded, and there is no official document from the Secretariat that transfers ownership of NRL’s facilities to the CNI. In fact, after testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on 23 September 2003, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) answered a “question for the record” from Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS) as follows.

“It is not my intention to cede any functions considered essential to NRL’s research and development mission. However, I feel the transfer of certain facility and base operation support functions not essential to NRL’s mission is appropriate...”

...As part of this process, the CNI and NRL staffs worked together to identify additional functions or other economies and efficiencies not previously captured by earlier consolidations. The two staffs identified and transferred functions that provide for economies of effort, but do not infringe on NRL

⁹³ “Operating Agreement between Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations & Facilities) (DASN I&E) and the Commander, Naval Installations”, 3 March 2005.

⁹⁴ R.A. Hamilton, “Weaver Says Savings is Only One of the Impacts of New Shore Command,” *New London Day*, 7 December 2003.

⁹⁵ NDW msg 071401Z Jun 03

⁹⁶ ASN(RD&A) letter to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) of 2 Oct 97.

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responsibilities or authorities. *Those functions identified as inseparably imbedded within NRL's research mission will remain under the Laboratory's control* (emphasis added)."

It is important to note that the SECNAV not only reaffirmed, but reiterated the 1997 policy that functions "*inseparably imbedded* within NRL's research mission will remain under the Laboratory's control." Moreover, as the SECNAV stated, NRL did in fact identify appropriate additional non-essential functions that were not previously transferred in the 1992 Public Works Center (PWC) regionalization and the initial Installation Claimant Consolidation in 1997.⁹⁷ As a result, in October 2003, NRL transferred its guard services, some additional facility support functions, and the operation of its Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) facility and Non-Appropriated Fund Instrumentalities — each of which is a function that, in the SECNAV's words, were "not essential to NRL's mission."

But in March 2004, in spite of the SECNAV's stated position, the operative 1997 Secretariat policy, and the mutually agreed transfer in October 2003 of remaining non-essential support functions, NRL received a letter from the NDW Commandant (a regional command of the CNI) stating that *all* of its facilities and property had been transferred to NDW:

"As part of the Installation Claimancy Consolidation Two (ICC2) process, the Naval Research Laboratory became a tenant command of Naval District Washington on 1 October 2003. Class 1 and 2 property ownership transferred from NRL to NDW on that date."⁹⁸

Exceeding Orders Given by the Chief of Naval Operations

The CNO owns 97 Navy installations. His March 2003 directive, provided as Attachment D, established the new installations command for those 97 bases, and it *did not* include NRL within the CNI span of control.⁹⁹ The directive was therefore aligned with Navy Secretariat policy. Subsequent actions taken by subordinates swept NRL into the consolidation, which exceeds the CNO's orders. On the other hand, the CNO's two other exclusions have been obeyed: the Bureau of Medicine (which is under the CNO's command), due primarily to the tri-service mission of Navy hospitals, and U.S. Marine Corps installations.

More evidence that the CNO's orders were exceeded was the composition of the Executive Oversight Group, a group established by the CNO to guide implementation of the CNI. It was composed of representatives from each divesting command, but there was no representative from the Office of Naval Research (ONR); NRL's parent command (see Attachment E). The CNO would have specified ONR's participation if NRL was in his plans for consolidation.

Conflicting with U.S. Law

On 1 August 1946, Congress passed Public Law 588, Chapter 727, Sec. 7, by which Congress authorized the transfer of NRL's "buildings, facilities, and other property" to the Secretariat. It states:

"The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to transfer to the Office of Naval Research...such research and development functions as are now assigned to the various bureaus and other agencies and offices of the Navy Department, together with any or all personnel, *buildings, facilities, and other property used in the administration thereof, including without limitation the Special Devices Division and the Naval Research Laboratory* (emphasis added)."

A logical interpretation of this language is that the law must be amended before any legal transfer of NRL's land and facilities can be made from the Secretariat to the CNI.

⁹⁷ These prior transfers resulted in non-essential BOS functions and property appropriate for consolidation having already been transferred or otherwise being performed by NDW, PWC, or the Naval Facilities Engineering Command.

⁹⁸ NDW ltr, subj: "Additional Information for BRAC 2005 Capacity Data Call for Naval Research Laboratory," (March 2004).

⁹⁹ ADM Vern Clark, msg 271955Z Mar 03

Clashing with Interests of the U.S. Congress

Congress has expressed concerns about the CNI's relationship to NRL, stating that in a section titled, "Unforeseen Impact of Base Operations Funding on Future Naval Research Laboratory Activities" of the FY04 Defense Authorization Bill, that:

"The conferees are concerned about changes in the management of base operations funding and its potential to adversely impact on-going and emergent research activities. The conferees urge the Navy to be sensitive to the special nature of such research activities and to ensure sufficient flexibility to accommodate unforeseen research needs."¹⁰⁰

Wasting Navy and Taxpayer Money

As shown above, savings from the worldwide regionalization of the Navy's bases over six years is projected to be \$65 million, or about 10.8 million per year. Given that NRL has 1/2% of the Navy's total facility square footage,¹⁰¹ it is reasonable to estimate NRL's share of the savings to be about \$54,000 per year. However, over a 6-year period, the five NRL achievements cited in "Labs Misérables" (with the corrected savings for the voice processing algorithm) achieve roughly \$1.4 billion in Navy savings, nearly 22 times greater than CNI's worldwide savings — enough for the Fleet to purchase 25 new F/A-18 Super Hornets.¹⁰² Moreover, the recurring annual savings from three of the achievements total as much as 25% of the annual savings generated by the 86 closures and 59 realignments of BRAC-I.

Not only are these five innovations a small sample of a larger number of cost savers, they do not take into account new warfighting technologies that save lives and protect equipment. One example is NRL's ALE-50, an electronic warfare decoy that protects combat aircraft so well that it earned the nickname "Little Buddy" from our pilots.¹⁰³ In the Kosovo campaign alone, 1,479 were used and the system was credited with saving several aircraft.¹⁰⁴ It is now used on the Super Hornet and just one of them costs \$57 million.¹⁰⁵

The DoD has a responsibility to be a good steward of public funds. But what CEO would jeopardize a proven source of billions of dollars in savings to gain a theoretical \$54,000 a year?

Jeopardizing the Success of Naval Transformation

The greatest cost of assimilating NRL into CNI would not be financial; it would be the loss of NRL's ability to create technologies that help keep our naval forces the most formidable in the world. Rather than cite a list of the Laboratory's contributions, it may be best to survey the experts who made the following comments to honor NRL's 75th anniversary in 1998.

"What you do here [at NRL] is probably the biggest force-multiplier that we have in our military."
— **Senator John Warner**, (Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee)

"NRL has a reputation for clever solutions where others thought none were possible. NRL continues to be a national treasure."
— **VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski**, (USN, Ret.) (former Director, Force Transformation)

¹⁰⁰ 108th Congress, *Conference Report: Making Appropriations for the DoD*, (Report 108-283), 24 September 2003, p. 292.

¹⁰¹ According to the FMP report, "Enhancing Naval Readiness Through Effective Facilities Management," (p. 1) the Navy's total is 712 million square feet.

¹⁰² <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/f-18.htm>

¹⁰³ "Order for ALE-50 Doubles After Success in Kosovo," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 15 November 1999.

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/ewarfareqdr.htm>, and B. Lambeth, *Aerospace Power Journal*, Summer 2002, p. 21.

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030324-fa-1801.htm>

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“I know from experience that there are few other institutions—public or private—which have had a greater impact on American life in the 20th century, both in terms of military needs and civilian uses.”

— **Norman Augustine**, (CEO of Lockheed Martin)

“This efficient, relatively small government agency has had an enormous impact, touching the lives of just about every American...the Naval Research Laboratory is a national asset, not just a military asset.”

— **Peter Teets**, (Undersecretary of the Air Force / Director, National Reconnaissance Office)

“NRL is the equivalent of the most significant technology jewel in our country.”

— **Robert Galvin**, (Chair of the Executive Committee of Motorola, Inc.)

“NRL is important to all of us — to defense industry and to science.”

— **Dr. Charles Townes**, (Nobel Laureate, Inventor of the laser)

Under the proposed HS&A JCSG recommendation (#HSA-0013), NRL’s management functions (along with those of Bolling Air Force Base) would be assimilated into a “super base” that centralizes management functions within the Washington Navy Yard (headquarters for NDW and CNI). Not only are any asserted savings questionable, but a world-class laboratory is being placed at risk. To quote the last line in “Labs Misérables,”

“Tomorrow’s line between victory and defeat will likely be drawn by today’s science and technology. OpNav (N4) and CNI threaten that important work by their pursuit of efficiency at all costs. America’s vital interests and tomorrow’s Sailors and Marines must not pay the price.”

A More Defensible Approach: Two questions need to be answered by the TJCSG. Have we made a fair and defensible case for the proposed closures and realignments? And do we possess the confidence, rightly expected of us, that our actions will not jeopardize national security over the long term? *A substantial body of evidence indicates that we have failed to make the case, and that a number of our proposals are likely to weaken our country's defense.*

- Capacity data demonstrate a modest current level of excess infrastructure at 7.3%. The data also shows this excess disappears in the future to become a deficit of -2.2% — *without any BRAC actions taken*. However, with BRAC action, the 3,098 FTEs eliminated by the TJCSG's 13 proposed actions will increase the deficit to -3.9% and cut deeper into the surge allowance, an amount required to be held in reserve. Finally, FTEs are the Technical function's link to the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, at a minimum, those actions taken within the eight Technical Capability Areas showing a future deficit may not be judged as conforming to the Plan.
- The proposed scenarios were developed by the TJCSG *before* the capacity and military value data were received and processed. Therefore the process was judgment-driven, not data-driven. Not one scenario was developed as a result of quantitative military value analysis or on the basis of excess capacity determinations.
- The scores for military value were driven by workload (numbers of people and dollars), not by metrics that could identify exceptional technical talent and accurately gauge operational impact.
- The study design promotes sub-optimal solutions that leave a large number of losing sites open, but weakens them by shredding the connectivity of their integrated programs and reducing their business base. This can lead to increased costs as overhead rates rise at the losing sites and additional infrastructure is built at the gaining sites. It is also likely to lead to the loss of top talent in the realigned workforces. *The point of BRAC is to close sites when warranted, and to leave the rest in a stronger competitive and innovative position, not a weaker one.*
- The *dollar efficiencies*, which the HS&A JCSG seeks by centralizing management and standardizing business processes at "super bases," will degrade the *mission effectiveness* of laboratories and technical centers. In particular, the CNI's claim to NRL's property and facilities defies civilian authority, exceeds the CNO's orders, conflicts with U.S. law, wastes taxpayer money, clashes with concerns expressed by Congress, and threatens naval transformation.

If the analyses presented in this paper are correct, then we are on the threshold of taking actions that bear risks to our country's security. We cannot do anything at this point to fix the MV metrics, or the stove-piped study design, but we can take analytical steps to mitigate the problems in an objective way.

One answer is to *run the LOM* to stratify the TJCSG's proposals into categories of defensibility.

The TJCSG should run the model as originally planned — but only for those five Technical Capability Areas that show future excess capacity (i.e., Weapons Technology, Biomedical, Chemical Biological Defense, Nuclear Technology, and Space Platforms). The LOM would drive workload to those sites having both the highest MV scores and the excess capacity in FTEs sufficient to accept the work.

- Proposals that match those of the model would comprise *Category B* because they are *Judgment-Driven / Data-Validated* (see Issue Paper, "Scenario Inconsistencies"). This group would have "Fair" defensibility because, even though validated by the model, they were not originally developed, assessed, and selected from among *the full range* of possible options. If that had been done, such actions would have "High" defensibility and be assigned to *Category A: Data-Driven / Judgment-Validated*.
- Proposals that fail to match the model's output would comprise *Category C* because they are *Judgment-Driven / Strategy-Validated*. This group is likely to have "Poor" defensibility because they

were developed by judgment and exhibit one or more of the following issues: the Technical Capability Area lacks future excess capacity, the workload goes from a site with a higher MV score to a site with a lower score, and / or the workload is sent to a site with little or no excess capacity.

Category C proposals should be cancelled — *unless compelling military judgment can be articulated as to why the action serves the national interest despite the risks indicated by the data (i.e., cutting required infrastructure in a technical capability area with no future excess capacity, sending workload to a site with a lower MV score and / or with insufficient excess infrastructure to accept it without major construction expenses). Military judgment that meets this standard must be supported with verifiable information of a nature making it probable that other teams of independent experts would reach the same judgment.* Military judgment that meets this standard can be called, “reproducible.”

Without reproducible military judgment, cancellation is justified on two grounds: (a) expensive actions with unknown and / or risky consequences do not serve the best interest of the DoD or the country, and (b) actions that are hard to defend will place the TJCSG’s more defensible actions at risk.

Admittedly, a significant number of TJCSG actions are likely to fall into Category C, but there are ways to add actions to Category B. Time is short, but proposals are still being modified at this late date. By using confirmable information on operational impact we can: (a) formulate scenarios that are based on reproducible military judgment, (b) validate the actions with LOM runs to verify that gainers possess the excess capacity to accept the work (MV scores are not necessary because the reproducible military judgment justifies the higher value assigned to the gaining site), and (c) adhere to the TJCSG principle of keeping a second site to provide for a competition of ideas. The following illustrates how this approach could work.¹⁰⁶

- **Test Case: A DoD Specialty Site for Energetics and Energetic Systems**

As shown earlier, Attachment B provides compelling operational impact data regarding the development of new energetic material. The list shows 63 explosive weapons in the Army, Navy, and Air Force inventory. For each one, the organizational source of the explosive material is identified. As the list reveals, NSWC Indian Head has developed 13 new explosives. One of them can be found in 3 of the Army’s 5 weapons, 39 of the Navy’s 50 weapons, and 5 of the Air Force’s 8 weapons. In short, Indian Head developed the explosives for 47 of the 63 weapons. This data is from NAVSEA / NSWC Indian Head, which means that it must be validated. As a start, the information below from GlobalSecurity.org supports it.

“In FY01, Indian Head added a 13th new explosive, PBXW-17, to the list of Navy-qualified explosives deployed in over 43 Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force weapons — *all within the last decade, an achievement unmatched by anyone in the field* (emphasis added).”¹⁰⁷

The TJCSG’s Weapons sub-group was also requested to review it.¹⁰⁸ The Air Force reported that the list is incomplete by missing AFX-757 (associated with 3 weapons systems in-service and/or being qualified), AFX-108 (associated with 3 weapons systems), PAX/AFX-196 (undergoing qualifications for U.S. Army grenades), AFX-760 (associated with 1 weapons system), and AFX-1100 (associated with 1 weapons system) — *all developed by the AFRL Munitions Directorate at Eglin AFB*. The list also did not include NAWC China Lake’s CL-20, an important energetic material discovered in 1987, which Thiokol Propulsion is working to scale up for commercial production and availability for military applications.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ The author is not a current or prospective employee of NSWC Indian Head or AFRL Eglin, and has no vested interest, financial or otherwise, in the potential outcomes of the proposed scenario.

¹⁰⁷ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/indian-head.htm>

¹⁰⁸ D.J. DeYoung email to TJCSG Weapons & Armaments Sub-Group (6 April 2005).

¹⁰⁹ <http://www.nawcwpns.navy.mil/r2/mj/Energet.htm#>

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Based on this sub-group feedback, Attachment B makes no errors of attribution on the sources of the explosive materials, misses some fielded Air Force innovations, and omits a number of Air Force and Navy innovations not yet deployed (which is to be expected given that the slide shows materials fielded in a weapons system).

Using this metric, a scenario can be developed to create a *DoD Specialty Site for Energetics and Energetic Systems* — on the basis of reproducible military judgment. Moreover, this approach, in effect, indirectly recognizes exceptional intellectual expertise, something our MV metrics could not identify or measure. With a Technical Capability Area as expansive as Weapons Technology, the relatively small Energetics sub-function, while militarily-critical, was lost in the sheer volume of FTEs and dollars associated with huge weapons programs.

Next, the LOM would be run for a two-site solution realigning all Navy and Army workload in Energetics (e.g., gun propellants, rocket and missile propellants, primary explosives, booster explosives, main charge explosives, reactive materials, and specialty chemicals) and Energetic Systems (e.g., air / surface warheads, underwater warheads, rocket / missile motors, gun projectiles and propulsion, mines and mine countermeasures, fuzes / ignitors / detonators, CAD / PAD, pyrotechnic devices) to NSWC Indian Head, the DoD Specialty Site. The second site retained for a competition of ideas, AFRL Eglin, would receive all related Air Force workload.

The objective of this approach is *mission effectiveness*, which is appropriate for a wartime closure round. So the rule of the Weapons sub-group, used in TECH-0018, (i.e., no “Mega-Center” should lose energetics workload by virtue of being a “Mega-Center”) would be ignored here as a vestige of the peacetime rounds. Mission-effectiveness is paramount. And, over the long-term, it is almost certainly less costly in dollars and lives.

NSWC Indian Head very likely already has the full-range of required facilities. This includes a pilot plant / prototype capability (which some wrongly call a production capability that competes with industry), a unique, and particularly expensive facility that is critical to successful scale-up investigations and short-term surge production. With data showing excess capacity at Indian Head, and in all likelihood, with little need for MILCON to accommodate work of a nature it already performs, the return-on-investment would probably be rapid. In this way, DoD energetics work would be consolidated at the site with a proven track record of success. It may also provide a recommendation with a payback period that is much more viable, which would address a concern voiced by the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC).

NSWC Indian Head, as the third Weapons specialty site, would join Picatinny Arsenal and NSWC Dahlgren as sites previously chosen by the TJCSG as specialty sites for “Guns and Ammunition” and “Surface Ship Combat Systems Integration”, respectively.

The Cost of Being Wrong: A healthy in-house system is a vital partner to the private sector. Both are indispensable to our nation's defense. President Harry S. Truman understood the importance of an effective balance in public and private R&D. His message to Congress at the end of World War II declared that,

“No government adequately meets its responsibilities unless it generously and intelligently supports and encourages the work of science in university, industry, and in its own laboratories.”¹¹⁰

Because of the special roles and responsibilities of the Government's military laboratories and technical centers, *it would be impossible for the private sector to offset serious damage done by BRAC-V.*

- **Roles of the DoD Laboratories and Technical Centers**

The DoD laboratories and technical centers are responsible for performing three roles: *performer* of long-term, high-risk projects free from excessive commercialization pressure; *quick responder* in national crises; and “*yardstick*,”¹¹¹ a term referring to the standard set by providing authoritative, objective advice to governmental decision-makers.

Our country needs Government laboratories and technical centers that are competent *performers*. Industry will not take on the full range of necessary defense work because many areas hold limited opportunities for profit. Specialized military technologies often have little or no applicability to commercial products, and the DoD market is often too small to justify a significant investment of capital. In addition, R&D is expensive, the time to achieve success is long, the work is often very risky, and the payoff (especially from research) is usually not immediate.

As for the role of *quick-responder*, the 67-day development of the thermobaric bomb by NSWC Indian Head and the 27-day development of the “Bunker Buster” by the Air Force Research Laboratory and Development Test Center at Eglin AFB are classic examples of how *strength as a performer enables a DoD laboratory to carry out its role as a quick responder in crises*. The DoD “Perry Report,” endorsed by then Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, William Perry, found that,

“...a cadre of highly skilled in-house specialists can best respond to situations of this nature.”¹¹²

The Perry Report also addressed the “*yardstick*” role, explaining that to be a smart buyer the Government must be able to choose among competing options offered by industrial producers. The need for profit makes each company an advocate of its own product, so given those natural tendencies, the Government,

“...requires internal technical capability of sufficient breadth, depth, and continuity to assure that the public interest is served.”

Conversely, deficient in-house expertise is what political scientist Harold Nieburg called “losing the yardstick.” When the yardstick is lost, the Government is forced to hire consultants to judge the work of its contractors. With its source of independent, objective technical expertise gone, the Government is forced to rely on advice from sources not insulated from commercial pressures to make a profit. This predicament was the subject of a recent article in the *Wall Street Journal*, “Can Defense Contractors Police Their Rivals Without Conflicts?” (28 December 2004).

¹¹⁰ President Harry S. Truman, Message to Congress on September 6, 1945.

¹¹¹ H. L. Nieburg, *In the Name of Science* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966).

¹¹² William J. Perry, *Required In-House Capabilities for Department of Defense Research, Development, Test and Evaluation* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1980).

More than 40 years ago, the need for strong in-house performers, quick-responders to crises, and a knowledgeable “yardstick,” led President Kennedy’s Commission on Government R&D Contracting to affirm the importance of maintaining in-house technical competence. In words echoed often by subsequent studies, the report cautioned that,

“No matter how heavily the government relies on private contracting, *it should never lose a strong internal competence in research and development* (emphasis added).”¹¹³

Unfortunately, after the Cold War, the DoD laboratories and technical centers have been increasingly viewed as illegitimate competition, and not as necessary partners to industry and academia. This trend was noted in a *Foreign Affairs* article that surveyed the institutional security arrangements that proved effective in winning the Cold War. It observed,

“These changes in relationships that worked so well in the Cold War are worrisome. Total reliance on private arsenals to develop weapons wastes money by encouraging continued investment in old systems while neglecting experiments with new designs.”¹¹⁴

When ARL Aberdeen and the Picatinny Arsenal (program manager) transferred the Silver Bullet to industry, General Dynamics produced more than 250,000 of them,¹¹⁵ which it sold back to the Army for a profit. That was an example of healthy public-private cooperation that capitalized on the strengths of each while providing for the common defense. That is the type of interaction that needs to be preserved by BRAC-V.

● BRAC-V and the New Threat

A common view expressed during the peacetime BRAC rounds was that a closure mistake could be corrected by reconstituting lost capabilities. With hopeful notions of a New World Order, and serious strategic threats believed to be decades away, we would have *time* to make corrections.

That changed on 11 September 2001.

We can no longer rely on time to fix our errors, if in fact that was ever true. Research needs time, often a lot of it. Back in 1945, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal said,

“Wars, long as they are, move much more swiftly than the research processes... It follows, therefore, that if a nation is to be scientifically prepared, its preparedness must be worked out in peace-time.”¹¹⁶

Much depends on our actions in this wartime BRAC. There are, and will continue to be, military threats from adversarial States, both the established and emerging, strong and failing, disciplined and reckless. But now America is engaged in a prolonged struggle with an opportunistic, fanatical enemy who has unlimited apocalyptic goals and is not deterred by traditional means. In *The Shield of Achilles*, Philip Bobbitt, writes about what he calls the end of the “Long War” and the start of a new threat.

“Deterrence, assured retaliation, and overwhelming conventional force enabled victory for the coalition of parliamentary nation-states in the war that began in 1914 and only finally ended with the Peace of Paris in 1990.

¹¹³ Report to the President of the United States on Government R&D Contracting, April 1962. The Study Team included Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, James Webb, NASA Administrator, and Dr. Jerome Wiesner, the President’s science advisor.

¹¹⁴ H. Sapolsky, E. Gholz, A. Kaufman, “Security Lessons From the Cold War,” *Foreign Affairs*, (July/August 1999), p.89.

¹¹⁵ General Dynamics Web site, accessed at <<http://www.rocket.com/lca.html>>.

¹¹⁶ Navy Press Release, “New Office of Research and Inventions Established by Navy Department,” (8 June 1945)

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These strategies cannot provide a similar victory at present because what threatens the states of the world now is too easy to disguise and too hard to locate in any one place...

...the onslaughts in the autumn of 2001 on a warm, summerlike day on the East Coast of the United States are both the herald of further savagery and the call for defenses that, if they are sustained, offer the world's best hope of avoiding a world-rending cataclysm."

The TJCSG's task is twofold: first, we need to collect savings from the closure of infrastructure that is confirmed to be excess to military requirements, and second, we must ensure that the DoD's in-house system of laboratories and technical centers are capable of providing, in collaboration with the private sector and our allies, the technological options necessary to prevail over our country's enemies.

And we have one responsibility. For every BRAC decision, we must ensure that the pursuit of savings does not compromise national preparedness.

Recommendations: It is proposed that the DDR&E / TJCSG:

- (1) Run the LOM to minimize excess capacity and maximize military value within the five Technical Capability Areas (i.e., Weapons Technology, Biomedical, Chemical Biological Defense, Nuclear Technology, and Space Platforms) that show future excess capacity;
- (2) Place the TJCSG proposals appearing among the LOM-generated scenarios into Category B: *Judgment-Driven / Data-Validated*;
- (3) Place all other TJCSG proposals in Category C: *Judgment-Driven / Strategy-Validated*;
- (4) Proceed with the Category B proposals because they should have Fair defensibility;
- (5) Cancel the Category C proposals because of Low defensibility, unless "reproducible military judgment" (i.e., military judgment that is supported with verifiable information of a nature making it probable that other teams of independent experts would reach the same judgment) can be articulated and provided;
- (6) Explore the development of alternate Category B scenarios (e.g., a DoD Specialty Site for Energetics and Energetic Systems) that are founded upon reproducible military judgment and run the LOM to demonstrate that the gaining sites possess adequate excess capacity to accommodate the workload;
- (7) Advise the IEC to protect DoD laboratories and technical centers from assimilation into "super bases" that would consolidate installation management and standardize business operations (Note: common force protection systems, MWR facilities, and other such functional consolidations are sensible and should be pursued), and in a related area;
- (8) Urge the DoN to enforce the Navy Secretariat's policy, uphold the SECNAV's stated position for Congressional testimony, obey the CNO's orders, and respect Congressional concerns, by enforcing a separation between NRL and CNI / NDW to ensure that as a "corporate activity that has been assigned unique Navy-wide and national responsibilities... real property and BOS functions imbedded inseparably with the research and industrial functions at NRL will remain with the Commanding Officer."

Army Position: _____
AF Position: _____
Navy Position: _____
Marine Corps Position: _____
JCS Position: _____

Final Resolution: <i>No Vote / No Action</i>	
POC Signature: _____	Date: <i>5/10/05</i>
CIT Chair: _____	Date: _____

DOD LABORATORY INITIATIVES


A Presentation to the Navy Laboratory/Center Coordinating Group



Mr. Bob Tuohy, Director Plans and Programs
 Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology

13 December 2000

What Were FY90-99 End Strengths at Service In-House RDT&E Activities?



Source: Defense Manpower Data Center

END STRENGTH FELL 36%, OR OVER 41K PEOPLE

- ☐ Services down-sized from 114.0K to 72.9K people, consisting of:
 - ↓ 43% in Navy (24K fewer people)
 - ↓ 34% in Army (-10.8K people)
 - ↓ 25% in Air Force (-6.3K people)
- ☐ Rate of decline generally steady

In-House RDT&E End Strength (in 000)*

End Strength	Sep 90	Sep 98	Sep 99	90-99 Delta
Navy	56.2	34.3	32.2	-24.0K
Army	32.2	22.6	21.4	-10.8K
Air Force	25.6	20.0	19.3	-6.3K
Total	114.0	76.8	72.9	-41.1K

* May not add due to rounding

ATTACHMENT A

A leader in the DoD's Energetics Enterprise

Navy Expl-Wpn

N-5 (Livermore) - APOBS, SM-80 ERGM, LAW, STD
Missile Initiator, ERGM,, Hellfire Booster
AFX-757 (EGLIN) - JASSM
N-112 (CL) - SLAM-ER, 76MM Projectile
N-107 (CL) - Harm, Tomahawk
N-7 (IH) - MK50 Torpedo, MK98 MND, Quickstrike, RAW
N-8 (IH) - APOBS, SABRE
N-9 (IH) - 5/54" Projectile, JASSM, APOBS, LAW, Hellfire
main charge
DXN-1 (IH) - APOBS, SABRE, ERGM, MK50 Torpedo,
MK48-2 DFD, MK24 DFD SEAL Weapon, SRAW,
MK98 MNS, MLRS etc.
W-11 (IH) - JSOW/BLU-108, ERGM, SABRE, AMRAAM, 5"
CARGO, etc.
N-10 (I&II) (IH) - Formerly known as PBXW17, went into
APOBS Main Charge (I), APOBS Booster (II)
N-103 (IH) - SABRE
N-109 (IH) - BLU-110, 111, & 116 GP Bombs, Tactical
Tomahawk
N-110 (IH) - STD Missile, AMRAAM, MK50 Torpedo
N-111 (IH) - MK98 Mod 0 MNS, Tomahawk
W-203 (IH) - DET
IH-135 (IH) - SMAW NE

Army Expl-Wpn

N-5 (Livermore) - Hellfire Booster
PAX-21 (ARDEC) - 60MM Mortar
N-9 (IH) - Hellfire Main Charge
N-110 (IH) - Carl Gustaf
DXN-1 (IH) - MLRS

Air Force Expl-Wpn

N-5 (Livermore) - AIM-9X Sidewinder
AFX-757 (EGLIN) - JASSM
N-112 MAC (CL) - Hellfire (TB)
N-9 (IH) - JASSM
W-11 (IH) - AMRAAM
N-110 (IH) - AMRAAM
IH-135 (IH) - BLU-118B
N-109(IH) - GP Bomb Family





THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(Research, Development and Acquisition)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

057 0 2 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (LOGISTICS)


Subj: INSTALLATION CLAIMANT CONSOLIDATION

Ref: (a) DCNO memo #N464C/197-97 of 29 Sep 97
(b) CNO memo #N464C/185-97 of 11 Sep 97

1. In response to your acknowledgment (reference (a)) of the unique mission Laboratory (NRL) the draft message, provided by reference (b), is acceptable. Naval Res. paragraph 21 is changed to read as follows:

"ONR - REAL PROPERTY AND BOS FUNCTIONS EMBEDDED INSEPARABLY WITH THE RESEARCH AND INDUSTRIAL FUNCTIONS AT NRL WILL REMAIN WITH THE COMMANDING OFFICER. TRANSFER ALL OTHER REAL PROPERTY AND BOS FUNCTIONS AT NRL TO THE CNO CLAIMANCY."

2. As you well know, NRL is a Secretary of the Navy corporate activity that has been assigned unique Navy-wide and national responsibilities. In this regard, I believe the foregoing change will both facilitate the achievement of your stated objectives and protect the unique corporate status of the NRL.


John W. Douglass

ATTACHMENT C
Attachment (3)

STREAMLINING SHORE INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

P 271955Z MAR 03 ZYB MIN PSN 885526I34
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//N00//
TO NAVADMIN
BT
UNCLAS //N02300//
NAVADMIN 072/03
MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC//
SUBJ/STREAMLINING SHORE INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT//
REF/A/RMG/CNO/082130ZAUG2000//
REF/B/DOC/CNO GUIDANCE FOR 2003/03JAN2003//
NARR/REF A IS NAVOP 010/00, THE WAY AHEAD. REF B PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR NAVY LEADERS
FOR 2003//

RMKS/1. REF A INFORMED YOU OF MY TOP FIVE PRIORITIES, INCLUDING A COMMITMENT TO IMPROVE NAVY-WIDE ALIGNMENT. SINCE 1997, THE NAVY HAS ADDRESSED IMPROVED SHORE INSTALLATION EFFECTIVENESS BY REGIONALIZING MANAGEMENT AND REDUCING THE NUMBER OF INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT CLAIMANTS FROM 18 TO 8. BY LATE 2000, WE BEGAN TO ASSESS THE VALUE OF FURTHER INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT CLAIMANT (IMC) REDUCTIONS WHILE USING INTEGRATED PROCESS TEAMS TO IDENTIFY BEST BUSINESS PRACTICES, SET NAVY-WIDE STANDARDS OF SERVICE, DEVELOP METRICS AND LINK THESE STANDARDS AND METRICS TO REQUIREMENTS AND FLEET READINESS.

2. PER MY GUIDANCE IN REF B, WE WILL CONTINUE FLEET AND ORGANIZATIONAL ALIGNMENT THROUGH **CONSOLIDATION OF THE EXISTING INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT CLAIMANTS (COMLANTFLT, COMPACFLT, COMUSNAVEUR, FSA, NAVSEA, NAVAIR, RESFOR, AND CNET) INTO A SINGLE IMC. A NEW COMMAND ENTITLED COMMANDER, NAVY INSTALLATIONS (CNI),** REPORTING DIRECTLY TO ME AS AN ECHELON II COMMANDER, WILL STAND UP EFFECTIVE 1 OCTOBER 2003. **CNI WILL BE A SINGLY FOCUSED INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION** WITH CORE RESPONSIBILITY TO **PROVIDE UNIFIED PROGRAM, POLICY AND FUNDING TO MANAGE AND OVERSEE SHORE INSTALLATION SUPPORT TO THE FLEET. CNI WILL BE THE BUDGET SUBMITTING OFFICE FOR INSTALLATION SUPPORT** AND THE NAVY POC FOR INSTALLATION POLICY AND PROGRAM EXECUTION OVERSIGHT. FUNDING FOR INSTALLATION SUPPORT WILL FLOW FROM CNO TO CNI, AND FROM CNI TO THE REGIONS.

3. CONUS REGIONAL COMMANDERS WILL REPORT OPCON TO CFFC; OCONUS REGIONAL COMMANDERS WILL REPORT OPCON TO THEIR RESPECTIVE NAVFOR. **ALL REGIONAL COMMANDERS WILL REPORT ADCON TO CNI FOR INSTALLATION SUPPORT FUNDING AND STANDARDIZATION OF PROCESS/POLICIES.**

4. ALL INSTALLATION COMMANDING OFFICERS WILL REPORT TO THE APPROPRIATE REGIONAL COMMANDER; SPECIFICS PROMULGATED SEPCOR. THE REGULAR REPORTING SENIOR FOR INSTALLATION COMMANDING OFFICERS WILL BE THE APPROPRIATE REGIONAL COMMANDER.

5. NLT 1 APR 03, OPNAV N4 WILL ANNOUNCE AN IMPLEMENTATION ORGANIZATION, ISSUE DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE, AND PROMULGATE A POAM TO STAND UP CNI.

6. I KNOW THAT HARD WORK AND A STRONG BOND OF TRUST AMONG CLAIMANTS, REGIONS AND INSTALLATIONS ARE REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THESE CHANGES. THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATIVE EFFORTS AND INNOVATIVE THINKING TO DATE. INITIATIVES AFFECTING INSTALLATIONS ARE SENSITIVE BOTH HERE IN WASHINGTON AND IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES. THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE CLEARLY COMMUNICATE THAT THE INTENT OF THIS CHANGE IS TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE SHORE INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION THAT WILL FOCUS ON INSTALLATION EFFECTIVENESS. OUR PAST SUCCESSSES IN THESE AREAS PROVE THAT WE CAN AND WILL SUCCEED AS WE CONTINUE TO ALIGN OURSELVES IN SUPPORT OF THE FLEET.

7. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. ADMIRAL VERN CLARK SENDS.//
BT #0798
NNNN

ATTACHMENT D
Attachment (1)



Executive Oversight Group (EOG)

- Flag/SES, Divesting IMCs plus experts
 - FSA - Mr. Victor H. Ackley
 - CPF - Mr. Michael G. Akin (N46A)
 - NAVSEA - Mr. Pete Brown
 - OPNAV - RADM Chris Cole (N46)
 - CLF - Mr. Thomas R. Crabtree (N46)
 - CNE/CNRE - RADM David Hart (Deputy)
 - USMC - Mr. Paul Hubbell
 - CPF - Ms. Maureen Kleintop (N1)
 - FMB - Ms. Linda Meadows
 - CNRF - RDML Roger Nolan
 - NAVAIR - Dr. Al Somoroff
 - NETC - RADM John W. Townes III (Vice Commander)
 - NAVFAC - Dr. Jim Wright (Chief Engineer)
- Bi-weekly meetings initiated 17 Mar 03

Shape

Anticipate

Innovate

Lead

22

Ventura County, California, Community Position

Regarding DoD BRAC 2005 Recommendations for Realignment of Naval Base Ventura County Activities

Reference: TECHNICAL JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (VOLUME XII) 19 May 2005

1. Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 5012 jobs (2250 direct jobs and 2762 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Community Position: We understand the concept of creating a Naval Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center and agree with the recommendation to establish that Center at the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake.

However, we take great exception to the number of positions and some of the functions to be realigned from Pt. Mugu, as identified in the TJCSG report. The specific details behind our objections follow:

(1) The Technical data calls received by NAWC WD Pt. Mugu directed that personnel, equipment and facilities that were within the Weapons and Armaments category, but were an “inextricable” part of the remaining core mission of the command, would be identified and explained in what was known as “Question 47.” In response to this direction, NAWC WD Pt. Mugu reported 851 positions in the Sea Range, Targets, Logistics and G&A activities that should have been subtracted from the total W&A personnel numbers under consideration.

(2) An identical situation occurred at NSWC PHD Port Hueneme, with approximately 300 positions being identified in Question 47 as being “inextricable.”

(3) In both Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme cases, per direction, the losing activity did not include dynamic or facility costs to relocate the functions identified in Question 47.

(4) Somewhere in the TJCSG processes, however, the above Question 47 numbers identified in the original TECH2B scenario were not carried over to the eventual W&A R DAT&E scenario, called TECH18. The reasons for the broken process are not known, but could be categorized as either: (a) clerical error / inattention to detail, or (b) intentional, in disregard for the established procedures for deducting the number of "inextricable" positions. (At this date, 6/10/05, we are hearing that several other Navy facilities suffered the same error. Internal Navy questions requesting clarification have been forwarded, but resolution is not known.)

We also take exception to the recommendation to realign all VX-30 Test Squadron activities from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. This recommendation does not make operational sense and was at least partially based on an incorrect computation of savings. Specific details of our objections follow:

(1) VX-30 operates P-3, C-130 and F/A-18 aircraft. The P-3's and C-130's directly support Pt. Mugu Sea Range operations by providing surveillance, clearance, telemetry, flight termination, optics, communications, target launch and logistics support. These aircraft very rarely provide support to the Land Range at China Lake. Moving the P-3 and C-130 aircraft to China Lake would relocate them over 150 miles away from their primary operating area, thus increasing their response time to range tasking, reducing their on-range time and increasing their operating costs. Recurring costs of flying P-3's and C-130's from China Lake vice Pt. Mugu are estimated to be over \$2.3 Million per year. Additional flight hours on the aircraft would accelerate the expenditure of their fatigue lives, which would both reduce aircraft availability and increase depot level costs. Additionally, new hangar and parking apron MILCON costs would be required at China Lake, while none would be required at Pt. Mugu. Operationally, this recommendation simply does not make sense.

(2) Apparently, excessive gaining activity savings were claimed by eliminating the costs for operating and maintaining VX-30 F/A-18 aircraft. In fact, the decisions to divest the VX-30 F/A-18's and give the military billets back to the Navy were already made by Test Wing Pacific and the Naval Air Systems Command and were not BRAC decisions. Adding these savings to the BRAC analysis would be improper.

Community Recommendations:

(1) Reduce the number of Range, Targets, Anechoic Chamber, Logistics and G&A positions to be realigned from Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu by the number defined as being inextricable to the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

(2) Reduce the number of Weapons and Armament positions to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to

the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

(3) Reject the recommendation to move the VX-30 test squadron from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. Retain the Test Squadron Range Support Aircraft base of operations at Pt. Mugu.

2. Consolidate Maritime C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Base Ventura County, CA, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA, and Naval Station Newport, RI, by relocating Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, and consolidating with the Space Warfare Center to create the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 286 jobs (127 direct jobs and 159 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Community Position: In a manner identical to that discussed in Weapons and Armaments, above, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, identified a number of C4ISR positions as being inextricable to the core command mission. These positions and the rationale for identifying them were provided in a Question 47 data call response. Similar to W&A, these reduced numbers were apparently omitted from the final TJCSG roll-up in the reference document. Internal Navy questions requesting clarification have been forwarded, but resolution is not known.

Community Recommendation: Reduce the number of C4ISR jobs to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

3. Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1075 jobs (479 direct

jobs and 596 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area economic area.

Community Position: This recommended realignment of Electronic Warfare from Pt. Mugu to China Lake makes absolutely no sense. Rather than adding military value, such a move would put our Warfighters in harm's way. The specific details behind our objections follow:

(1) Pt. Mugu is the existing, recognized Center of Excellence (COE) for EW. A 2004 Naval Air Systems Command study was conducted to assess the abilities of both Pt. Mugu and China Lake to serve as a Joint EW COE. Due to the "black art" nature of the capability, which would be difficult to reconstitute at China Lake, Pt. Mugu was judged LOW risk and China Lake as HIGH risk. The NAVAIR recommendation was to support establishment of a Joint EW COE at Pt. Mugu.

(2) The Electronic Warfare activities at Point Mugu directly support the combat capability of the Navy and Air Force Warfighters. EW operates on a 24/7/365 basis. Engineers and analysts track the electronic signatures of potential threats gathered from the intelligence community, evaluate those electronic threats, develop solutions and issue hardware designs, data and software updates to operating forces on a response cycle often measured in hours. This capability has supported operational forces since the 1960's. EW personnel and laboratories reside in a state of the art secure facility at Point Mugu. The capability of this enterprise lies more in the expertise developed in the engineering cadre than in the facilities and equipment that are resident there. The EW workforce is very specialized, and while they do work with their aircraft software development counterparts at China Lake, they possess greatly different skills and experience. Quite simply, the majority of the existing Pt. Mugu EW workforce will not relocate to China Lake. Their "intellectual capital" will be lost and the ability of our Warfighters to counter threat systems will be significantly diminished.

(3) In response to the initial EW data call, the Pt. Mugu EW personnel estimated the costs to replicate their facility at China Lake, then dismantle the existing facility at Pt. Mugu. This approach was deemed to be the most practical in order to reduce the risk to operating forces. However, they were subsequently directed by their chain-of-command to reduce their BRAC costs by dismantling their existing facility, then moving it and re-establishing it at China Lake. The risk to the Warfighter is considered to be high in that the assumptions made for this revised submittal: (a) allow for no unforeseen costs nor schedule impacts, (b) disregard all ongoing program work, (c) assume all personnel will be readily available to assist in the move, and (d) assume that all current personnel will move to the new location. None of these assumptions are viewed to be justifiable or supported by historical data. In fact, it is believed that this approach will result in a significant negative impact to the Warfighter's electronic warfare capabilities in that emergency response capacity and time to respond will be degraded by an estimated 80% for a period of time during the transition (12 to 18 months), and at least 50% for the next decade with the loss of the talent base (which takes 8 to 10 years to develop) that would occur as a result of this action. At the very least, this impact would be measured in

hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, and at the worst it will be measured in lost lives of our Warfighters. The community assumes that the rationale for adopting the latter approach centered solely on making the proposed realignment satisfy target cost savings. In reality, it results in significant negative impact to the Warfighter.

(4) The cognizant weapons systems program managers played no significant part in the process. For example, Point Mugu is the primary organization for the in-house development of electronic countermeasures for the Navy and the Air Force. It is currently developing in house jamming technology in support of the Army to defeat improvised explosive devices in Iraq. Yet key DoD program managers in electronic warfare played no real part in the decision to destroy the intellectual capital at Point Mugu and move empty positions to China Lake. Similarly, Point Mugu is developing a countermeasure to hand-held anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADS), which will be disrupted by moving. The program managers, with the best view of EW systems requirements and the responsibility for EW systems development, do not concur with the DoD recommendation to move EW from Pt. Mugu to China Lake.

(5) The justification for this realignment, as stated in the reference document, is not supported by the facts. There is no “redundant infrastructure.” The approximately 480 Pt. Mugu EW personnel and approximately 30 China Lake EW personnel work in the same organizational structure with common management. The recommended realignment would not make “more efficient use” of the Electronic Combat Range at China Lake. The EW system development process makes little use of the ECR. In fact, the EW systems in the new EA-6B ICAP III are now so sophisticated, they can tell that the threat emitters on the ECR are not “real.” All significant testing is now performed in the laboratory environment.

Community Recommendations:

(1) Reject DoD’s recommendation. Retain Electronic Warfare RDAT&E functions at Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Pt. Mugu.

(2) Consider realigning the far lesser number of China Lake positions to Pt. Mugu to enhance the existing Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence at Pt. Mugu.

One University, Two Campuses. What does this mean? How does this work relative to Point Mugu and China Lake?

Background: In January 1992, the Navy put in place the concept of Warfare Centers. One manifestation of this “new, virtual” construct organizationally combined four NAVAIR sites (Pt. Mugu, China Lake, Albuquerque, and White Sands) into the Naval Air Warfare Center – Weapons Division. So, to begin with it was “One University with four campuses”. Over the years, two of those campuses, White Sands and Albuquerque, have been closed down as a result of reductions in workload and changes in mission with the resulting reductions in personnel. The analogy of “One University with four campuses” was used to illustrate how the new “One Command” was to function. Many things happened at China Lake and Pt. Mugu as a result of that, including:

- A daily air shuttle service began to move people back and forth between the two sites (annual cost \$4M)
- Reduced from two to one Command with one flag. That flag is at China Lake. At that time (January 1992), there were 5,362 civilian employees at China Lake and 4,445 civilian employees at Pt. Mugu.
- Theory was that all overhead functions would be cut in half. Reality is that there are still two personnel offices, two contracts shops, two budget departments, etc.
- Some consolidations occurred and some organizational efficiencies were realized in the Technical arena e.g. reduced to one systems engineering office, one software support branch, etc.. There was a cost associated, however, in that almost all consolidations resulted in a lead at one site and a deputy at the other site. This necessitates much more travel and challenges with communications.

Current State: The downturn in DOD during the 90’s resulted in decreases at both sites. At the time of the reorganization, the combined sites had 9,807 employees. Today the combined sites have less than half that number (4,207) but the same amount of infrastructure. They have half as many people with roughly half as much work and tremendous excess capacity. The drawdowns have been disproportional with Pt. Mugu decreasing by 66.1% while China Lake has decreased by 44.6%. The future vector is in the direction of China Lake with most new efforts gravitating toward the center at China Lake (e.g. weapon/sensor integration for EA-18G and JSF). To use the analogy of “One University with Two Campuses” is still true but now there is only enough “student loading” for one campus.

Conclusion: The experiment of “virtually” combining Point Mugu and China Lake has completed its course. The next step of transforming the way the Navy performs its weapons, armaments, sensors, electronic warfare and electronic equipment mission requires a co-located synergistic approach. Clearly, this is something that was not achievable under the limited authorities of a “virtual” multi-sited organization. BRAC is the opportunity to finish consolidating the organization. This is consistent with the TJCSG vision of an Integrated RDT&E Naval Weapons Center at China Lake. This meets the transformational goals of the DOD in this area and would very nicely position DOD for the future in the weapons and sensors/EW arena while significantly reducing excess infrastructure and saving the government money (\$71 M each year).

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Naval Base Ventura County (Point Mugu)

Installation Concerns Raised:

Electronic Warfare (EW) Tech-28

1. Movement of sensors, electronic warfare, and electronics RDA, T&E functions from Point Mugu to China Lake makes no sense, according to base officials. The EW workforce at Point Mugu is 369 vs. 12 at China Lake. Point Mugu is the birthplace and the existing Center of Excellence for EW over the past 50 years. Point Mugu's high military value in EW is unquestioned.
2. EW development and support facilities at Point Mugu and China Lake has been under common management since 1994 and this arrangement has precluded unnecessary duplication and investment. Personnel were reduced by 50%. Since Mugu and China Lake are industrially funded, they have a strong incentive to reduce duplication so they can keep their rates low and attractive to clients who pay for their services.
3. Integration of Point Mugu's EW knowledge resources and its transformational, linked laboratory network infrastructure has resulted in increased synergy and efficiencies, while eliminating unnecessary duplication. All of this would be lost with this move.
4. Threat and target system development at Mugu and testing on the sea range is critical to assessments of system performance. If the EW function were to be moved, China Lake personnel would have to operate the sea range and shuttle targets back and forth to Point Mugu. This is inefficient, costly and would have major impact on synergy. The additional cost of round trip transportation cost is about \$9000. In addition if something malfunctions with a target, corrections can be made on the spot at Point Mugu vs. the risk of having to return to China Lake –additional ship time, pilot time aircraft cost and delays in deploying to Iraq or other operating forces.

Weapons & Armaments RDA,T&E Center-TECH 15

5. Major problems with the number of people estimated to move from Point Mugu to China Lake. Personnel movements (and associated savings) are overstated by a factor of 3 and facilities support reductions are overstated. These errors result in approximately \$30M per year in overstated savings. Scenario was very vague and there was apparently confusion over what activities should and should not move. (Point Mugu to run a COBRA). Point Mugu has asked for scenario clarification but has not received a reply.
6. Loss of intellectual capital ("brain drain") is a major problem. Only 20-25% of Mugu's workforce will move to China Lake.


7. There is no business case for this move. Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 30 (VX-30) provides air support to the Sea Range. If move to China Lake is approved, additional MILCON & re-location costs of \$28.3M would be required (new hanger and ramp at China Lake and additional recurring costs of \$6.8M per year would be required because of transit time and required travel between Mugu and China Lake.
8. The Sea Range is an irreplaceable DOD asset with unencroached air and sea space. It is a large, instrumented area of open ocean and is critical to weapons test and evaluation. This capability cannot be replicated at China Lake .
9. Although the COBRA has not yet been run, base officials advised the DOD reported payback of 6 years will likely be 12 years. The \$48M recurring savings per year will likely be \$17-18M per year.
10. Joint Cross Service Group did not perform a proper analysis of the costs and savings associated with the recommended realignments. Specifically, extremely poor analyses were performed on the two major scenarios.
11. The scenario realigning weapons billets to China Lake fails to include the cost of moving the range and target functions to China Lake and does not include the additional recurring costs of conducting range and target operations from China Lake. The true cost must include the anticipated actual costs of moving the range and target functions to China Lake. The July 2005 GAO report found fault with the automatic 15% savings applied to civil service personnel and stated that a 5.5% savings would be more accurate. Making only this one change would result in a revised break even year xxx years in the future.
12. A significant amount of demographic data did not properly represent China Lake/Ridgecrest in areas such as medical care, housing availability, utility services, schools, etc.
13. The JCSG deviated from DOD guidance, which requires enhancement of transformation and jointness. Most of the recommendations made are Service-centric and not joint-centric.
14. JCSG did an extremely poor job of analyzing and managing the data which were submitted by Point Mugu. The most egregious example of this poor execution was in the JCSG handling of "question #47 data." More detail to be provided. - - -

Overall community bottom line is that the TJCSG did an extremely poor job of judging military value, considering jointness in transformation and in analyzing and managing the data;. A majority of their realignment recommendations simply do not make sense. Most of the affected positions are not synergistic with the armaments and weapons and electronic warfare work already at China Lake. Realigning impositions to China Lake would result in significant losses of intellectual capital, would adversely affect our war fighting capabilities, and would waste hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayer money. The community made detailed recommendations to be made to the DOD recommendations.

15.

Community Concerns Raised

- 1 DOD significantly deviated from BRAC criteria on military value, costs and savings, and receiving community infrastructure. DOD recommendations demonstrate poor data analysis and management.
- 2 In recommending that the Point Mugu Electronic Warfare (EW) Center of Excellence be realigned to China Lake, the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group significantly deviated from BRAC law.
 - Point Mugu has been Navy's Center of Excellence for over 50 years.
 - EW labs provide a wide range of synergistic support to many DOD activities.
 - Execution of the proposed EW realignment would cause significant disruption to warfighting capabilities of our deployed forces. Combined with the loss of intellectual capital, down-time would severely impact the nation's ability to counter enemy weapons and EW systems. The intellectual capital at Mugu has evolved over decades and cannot be moved without disruption to mission effectiveness. It takes 7-10 years to train an electronics engineer to become a functional EW systems engineer.
3. In recommending that the Sea Range, Targets and Range Support aircraft Relocate to China Lake, the Technical Cross-Service Group significantly Deviated from BRAC law.
 - The 36,000 sq. mile Sea Range is a unique national asset. It is used by Air Force, Navy, Missile Defense Agency, other DOD, Foreign Military sales, commercial activities and NASA.
 - No synergy would be gained by realigning the Sea Range to China Lake.
 - Movement of Sea Range jobs to China Lake would result in significant loss of intellectual capital.
 - This realignment decreases military value because it would not result in any increased synergy, but it would negatively impact cost, safety and operational efficiency of Sea Range operations.

NAV  AIR

VX-30 Sea Range Support Aircraft

CDR Thomas Bourbeau


Commanding Officer

Air Test and Evaluation Squadron THREE ZERO



Background

- In 1995, all NAVAIR Range and Target Support aircraft at the Point Mugu site were consolidated as VX-30
- Primary mission areas for VX-30 aircraft:
 - (3) NP-3D Range support aircraft (Airborne range instrumentation/optics)
 - (2) DC-130 Range support aircraft (Airborne drone launch and Sea Test Range logistics support)
 - (6) F/A-18 Range tactical support aircraft with RDT&E & Fleet training missions




VX-30 Aircraft Alignment

Facilitates the Military Value of the Sea Test Range

- **Range Support Aircraft at the Point Mugu site:**
 - Essential for Sea Test Range Operations
 - Provides co-located aircraft mission support for DoD, MDA, FMS and other DoD related customers on the Sea Test Range
 - **Telemetry receipt, display, recording and relay**
 - **Photometric receipt, display, recording and relay**
 - **Range safety, surveillance and clearance**
 - **Flight monitoring and commanded destruct systems**
 - **Airborne launch of subscale drones as targets for other systems under test**
 - **Tactical safety/photo chase and high speed targets**
 - **Logistics (Cargo) to/from San Nicolas Island and the mainland**
 - Military Value Customers include sea-based weapon systems (Aegis equipped ships, Trident missiles, Tomahawk, etc), air-based weapon systems (Sidewinder, AMRAAM, SLAM-ER, etc), and space-based systems testing (MDA systems)



Integrated Range Support Concept




Range Support Aircraft Sorties

P-3 / C-130

FY03- FY05

(Data through June 05)



* Off Range Operations are conducted in various over-water locations, worldwide




BRAC Relocation Implementation

- **BRAC Proposal to Re-Align Weapons and Armament from Pt Mugu to China Lake**
 - Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 30 (VX-30), also referred to as “Weapons Test Squadron” in BRAC data, is included in the proposed relocation of Weapons and Armament.
 - VX-30 does not test Weapons or Armament. The squadron provides range aircraft resources to the Sea Range in it’s support to a multitude of Navy, DoD and FMS testing and Navy/Marine Corps Fleet training.
- **VX-30 (Weapons Test Squadron) Aircraft Alignment Analysis**
 - VX-30 aircraft are mission aligned with the Sea Test Range and Targets Support (86%)
 - VX-30 provides minimal support of China Lake Land Test Range – 1% of sorties for “Big Wing” Aircraft (P-3 & C-130)
- **Implementation Requirements**
 - Aircraft hangar and ramp space MILCON required for “Big Wing” Aircraft
 - Relocation of aircraft support equipment, material and personnel required
 - Additional recurring annual transit and detachment costs required



Range Geography

- Point Mugu and China Lake geographically separated by 150 miles by plane, 190 miles by car
- Approximately 40 minutes transit each way from China Lake to the Sea Test Range for NP-3D and DC-130 aircraft, 25 min transit for FA-18 aircraft
- Non-direct route of flight required to avoid high volume Los Angeles Air Traffic Area



VX-30 Aircraft

Mission Completion Challenges

- **Challenges in providing Sea Test Range support**
 - Geographic separation from the Sea Test Range hinders communications for mission coordination, planning, briefing, execution and de-briefing
 - Increased transit and stop-over time at Pt Mugu to load and maintain range equipment and pick up range equipment operators (for many missions)
- **Test Operation completion risk**
 - Increased mission support complexity - greater risk of aircraft breaking down because of required interim stop at Pt Mugu site to pick up equipment for many range operations

Summary

Proposed Relocation of VX-30 from Point Mugu to China Lake

• **VX-30 Aircraft Mission Alignment**

- Mission of VX-30 aircraft is aligned with Sea Test Range and Targets at Pt Mugu, not with Weapons and Armament testing at China Lake Land Range
- Mission success complexity challenges:
 - Additional flights required for many missions (stopover at Pt. Mugu)
 - Geographic separation from the Sea Test Range complicates mission coordination, planning, briefing and execution

• **Economic Impacts**

- Additional MILCON & re-location costs
 - New aircraft hanger and ramp required to be built at China Lake
- Additional Recurring costs
 - Cost for additional aircraft transit time and required detachment travel



VX-30 Range Support Missions



Range Support Aircraft: Mission Requirements



• Primary Customers

- TOMAHAWK
- AIM-9X
- Titan II/IV
- AEGIS BMD
- MDA
- NASA
- Trident
- Fleet Support
- Numerous FMS

• Ranges/Facilities


- Sea Test Range
- Land Ranges at CL and Edwards AFB
- SPAWAR (San Diego)
- Vandenberg AFB
- Reagan Test Site (Kwajalein)
- PMRF (Barking Sands)
- All Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic Ocean areas

• Types of Tests


- Air to Air
- Air to Surface
- Surface to Air
- Surface to Surface
- Ballistic Launch, Intercept and Re-entry




Air-Launch Test Mission Support



Surface-launch Test Mission Support




Fleet Training Mission Support




TACAIR (F/A-18) Support for Test & Training


- Point Mugu adjacent to Sea Range and close to W-291 for TACAIR (F/A-18) support to Test and Fleet Training (63% of missions FY-05).
- Point Mugu based TACAIR (F/A-18) also support Fleet Training missions at Land Range (37% of missions FY-05).
- Many Fleet Training Support missions are late at night or on weekends when China Lake Airfield Closed (tower manning limitations).
- 25 minutes transit each way from China Lake to the Sea Test Range (55 minutes support on Sea Range).
0 to 5 minutes transit each way from Pt Mugu to Sea Test Range (95 minutes support on Sea Range).
40 minutes transit each way from China Lake to W-291 (25 minutes Fleet support at W-291 – only one tactical run).
15 minutes transit each way from Pt Mugu to W-291 (75 minutes Fleet Support in W-291 – three tactical runs).
- Non-direct route of flight required to avoid high volume Los Angeles Air Traffic Area



Highly Modified Range Support Aircraft




Long Range Missile Testing Support




HYPER-X

**SAN NICOLAS
ISLAND**


Tactical Weapon Testing Support




Missile Defense Testing Support



NASA Launch Support




Tomahawk Missile Testing Support



TOMAHAWK

Open Ocean Testing Support




Trident Testing Support



Strategic Weapon Testing Support

PEACEKEEPER



**MULTIPLE RE-ENTRY
VEHICLES IMPACTING
IN THE KWAJALEIN AREA**



Aircraft Alignment and Economic Analysis Data



Economic Analysis (based on COBRA data)

- **Non-Recurring Costs ~ \$28.3M Additional Cost**

- Costs for re-location of personnel, aircraft and associated equipment (\$5.6M)
- Costs for MILCON of a new (P-3/C-130) hangar to replicate existing hangar (\$16.3M)
- Costs for MILCON of a new (P-3/C-130) ramp area to replicate existing ramp area (\$6.4M)

- **Recurring annual increased cost of operations ~ 6.8M per year Additional Cost**

- Costs for additional transit time (P-3) to Sea Test Range from CL site (\$4.5M)
- Costs for additional transit time (C-130) to Sea Test Range from CL site (\$2.4M)
- Costs for required detachments at PM site from CL to support PM site operations (\$.33M)
- Approximate savings - lower wage rate at CL site (civilians & contractors) (\$0.43M)

- **Summary:**

- Relocating the VX-30 Range Support Aircraft from existing hangar and ramp facilities at the Pt Mugu site does not create any meaningful consolidation efficiencies, and generates a significant net cost increase, both initial and recurring.



Detailed ROI Data-Non Recurring Costs

- **MILCON costs**
 - Hangar - 53,536 sq ft = \$10.39M to \$16.25M (Cobra)
 - Ramp – 68,639 sq yd = \$3.33M to \$6.38M(Cobra)
- **Relocation costs: movement of aircraft & personnel**
 - Transit aircraft, equipment and materials = \$0.38M
 - Move personnel (194 military and 17 civilian persons) = \$3.24M
 - Move 55 contractor maintenance personnel excluded = \$0.00M
- **Labor costs: labor involved in executing re-location**
 - Military lost mission time costs = \$1.28M
 - Civilian lost mission time costs = \$ 0.17M
 - Contractor lost mission time costs = \$ 0.55M

Detailed ROI data-Recurring Costs

- **Increased distance to Sea Test Range Op Area adds transit costs**
 - Annual cost increase to Range customers = \$ 6.9M per year (BRAC scenario data)
- **Increased flight hours and takeoff/landings increase fatigue life costs**
 - Additional takeoffs & landings = approximately 400 per year
 - 880 added flight hours per year - uses up airframe quicker
 - Increased complexity for support adds risk to customer program & schedule
 - Additional takeoffs & landings (at PM site) increase risk to mission completion
- **Very minimal labor savings due to consolidation/location pay**
 - No military savings for P-3/C-130: military personnel are also minimum aircrew
 - No contractor maintenance savings: already at minimum staffing for 5 aircraft
 - 55 contract maintainers maintain 5 VX-30 “Big Wing Aircraft” (P-3 & C-130)
 - 150 – 175 active duty Sailors maintain 4 Fleet Squadron aircraft (E-2 or EA-6B)
 - 212 – 225 active duty Sailors maintain 9 Fleet Squadron aircraft (P-3C) (Ratio 118 –125 for 5 P-3C aircraft)
 - No additional civil service savings: Civilian manning tied to Range Support Aircraft minimum required for Range Support Aircraft operations
 - Very small labor rate delta = \$ 0.43M per year savings based upon assumed 10% lower wage costs for contractors and civilians

Range Support Aircraft Flight Hour and Sortie Summary Data



Range Support Breakdown By Location FY-03-FY05

	P-3				C-130				P-3/C-130 Combined			
	Hours	% hrs	Sorties	% sorties	Hours	% hrs	Sorties	% sorties	Hours	% hrs	Sorties	% sorties
FY03 Sea Range	630.7	73%	155	79%	79.3	43%	116	89%	710.0	67%	271	83%
FY03 Off Range	206.8	24%	34	17%	99.9	54%	13	10%	306.8	29%	47	14%
FY03 Land Range	31.0	4%	6	3%	6.0	3%	2	2%	37.0	4%	8	2%
FY03 Total	868.6	100%	195	100%	185.2	100%	131	100%	1053.8	100%	326	100%
FY04 Sea Range	925.7	78%	239	84%	224.2	93%	180	97%	1149.9	81%	419	90%
FY04 Off Range	252.3	21%	42	15%	10.7	4%	3	2%	263.0	18%	45	10%
FY04 Land Range	8.8	1%	2	1%	6.2	3%	2	1%	15.0	1%	4	1%
FY04 Total	1186.8	100%	283	100%	241.1	100%	185	100%	1427.9	100%	468	100%
FY05 Sea Range	340.9	68%	83	76%	83.6	88%	52	93%	424.5	72%	135	82%
FY05 Off Range	156.8	32%	26	24%	6.1	9%	3	5%	162.9	28%	29	18%
FY05 Land Range	0.0	0%	0	0%	3.4	4%	1	2%	3.4	1%	1	1%
FY05 Total	497.7	100%	109	100%	93.1	100%	56	100%	592.8	100%	165	100%
FY03-05 Sea Range	1897.3	74%	477	81%	387.1	74%	348	94%	2284.4	74%	825	86%
FY03-05 Off Range	616.0	24%	102	17%	118.7	23%	19	5%	734.7	24%	121	13%
FY03-05 Land Range	39.8	2%	8	1%	15.6	3%	5	1%	55.4	2%	13	1%
FY03-05 Total	2553.1	100%	587	100%	521.4	100%	372	100%	3074.5	100%	959	100%


- * FY-03 C-130 off range hours include one-time Iraqi Freedom Deployment
- * P-3 Off Range Flights include 11 detachments to Hawaii, 2 to Ascension Island, and 1 to Antigua
- * FY-05 data thru 7 June 05




Range Support Sortie Breakdown By Location (FY03-FY05)

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Sea Range</u>	<u>Land Range</u>	<u>Off Range</u>
NP-3D	76-84%	0-3%	15-24%
DC-130	88-97%	1-2%	5-10%
FA-18 (FY05)	63%	37%	0%
TOTAL (average)	84%	5%	11%


VX-30 Range Support (FY03-05)
(All Aircraft Types)



P-3 Sorties (FY03-05)




C-130 Sorties (FY03-05)



FA-18 Sorties (FY05 only)



FY-04 NP-3D FLIGHT HOUR BREAKDOWN (ALL LOCATIONS)




TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS: 1186.8


TELEMETRY:	267.1
CAST GLANCE:	193
AREA CLEARANCE:	720.6



FY-04 AREA CLEARANCE BREAKDOWN BY CUSTOMERS (ALL LOCATIONS)




FY-04 TELEMETRY BREAKDOWN BY CUSTOMER (ALL LOCATIONS)



TELEMETRY: 267.1 HOURS
23% OF TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS




FY-04 CAST GLANCE BREAKDOWN BY CUSTOMER (ALL LOCATIONS)



CAST GLANCE: 193 HOURS
16% OF TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS



FY04 C-130 PROJECT HOUR BREAKDOWN (ALMOST ALL SEA RANGE)




TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS: 257.8

LOGISTICS:	181.8
TARGETS:	50.0
PROJECTS:	26.0



FY04 C-130 Customer Breakdown (ALMOST ALL SEA RANGE)







Epstein,

**Narrative Description
Of
Electronic Warfare Facilities
At
NAVAIR Point Mugu, CA**

Prepared at the request of
BRAC Commission Staff
Mr. Les Farrington
Mr. David Epstein

08 Jul 2005

Sirs

During your tour of the Electronic Warfare Laboratory Building at Point Mugu, you requested a "layman's description" of the laboratories and facilities you had visited. The following is a simple narrative of the facilities you observed with a description of their use. I will also gather and include with this narrative any currently available brochures, which may help in your analysis.

**Clifton Evans Electronic Warfare Laboratory
Building 3008
Point Mugu, CA**

This building was a MILCON specifically designed to house the Electronic Warfare support efforts at Point Mugu. It was completed in 1988, and cost approximately \$15M to construct in then year dollars. While it doesn't house the entire complement of 369 EW personnel at Point Mugu, it does provide for collocation, or close proximity for most of the key laboratory facilities. These personnel and facilities are connected to the 12 EW personnel at China Lake via SIPRNET and other high-speed data links, as well as other pertinent sensor and integration folks that we work with on a routine basis. The building was designed to not only allow full electronic networking but also to facilitate interchange between members of teams doing separate but related functions in the Electronic Warfare arena. An example is the constant interchange of ideas on effective radar jamming techniques between the jammer experts in the Tactical Aircraft EW suite arena and their counterparts in the Airborne Electronic Attack (EA-6B and EA-18G) arena.

EW is to a large degree a responsive science. It is a cat and mouse game, with each side striving to develop systems, tactics, and techniques to allow their own systems free play within and control of the electromagnetic spectrum. So these laboratories and the skilled personnel that utilize them provide not only continuous product flow via a scheduled release cycle for required updates, but also quick reaction responses to urgent Fleet requirements driven by wartime issues. As an example, you heard earlier about how this integrated functional capability allowed us to respond to over 31,000 Fleet requests in FY-03 alone. The depth of the knowledge in our personnel allows us to do both of these with minimum staffing levels and interruption to the scheduled product releases.

You saw three distinct but connected lab complexes. They support separate portions of EW but share a large number of assets and processes. The labs are the ECSEL laboratory, the AEA complex, and the EWDS/ETIRMS labs.

These labs support the development and delivery of a large number of products to Fleet, Joint, and coalition users.

We were not able to show you one of our unique product areas, the JATO vans, as they are currently deployed to a classified location in support of the classified mission we discussed with you. These mobile assets, and more importantly the extremely expert personnel that man them, provide an invaluable function for the warfighter in support of the development and acquisition of new receiver and jamming systems as well as technique development in support of the rapidly changing EW environment.

ECSEL

This is the primary tool we use in the development and integration of the EW systems used on our tactical aircraft (referred to as TACAIR EW). This lab supports TACAIR EW for over 20 different aircraft types. It is in this laboratory where EW products are built and tested for their ability to warn aircrew and protect the aircraft from radar guided missiles and anti-aircraft artillery.

It consists of a number of radio frequency (RF) shielded rooms within an overall shielded enclosure. These "cans within a can" allow us to test highly classified systems as well as provide support to approved FMS customers without the danger of releasing intelligence data outside its intended audience.

ECSEL provides a laboratory environment that gives engineers complete access to every level of the integrated EW suite while the EW equipment believes it is flying in a realistic operational environment. A worldwide threat environment is available to engineers on a daily basis.

The central features of the lab are the avionics "hot benches", which allow us to operate the various EW systems and suites, and the variety of simulators, stimulators and instrumentation allowing us to stimulate the systems and measure their response to the environment. This allows the engineers to assess the response of the systems to the threat as well as the effectiveness of the techniques proposed to thwart the threats.

The hot benches also allow us to integrate the various separate EW systems, such as the Radar Warning Receiver (utilized to survey the environment for enemy threat) and the On-Board Jammer (utilized to supply RF energy and appropriate jamming techniques to spoof the enemy radars) into the suite configuration normally utilized in the actual aircraft.

This lab is essentially a high fidelity indoor range, which allows us to deliver high quality products directly to the Fleet users. These simulations have been determined to be high enough fidelity that we no longer require expensive and time consuming flight test in order to deliver our User Data Files to the Fleet.

The products supported by the ECSEL are conceived, developed, tested, and delivered here. The tools you saw in the SATS portion of the lab allows the engineering level analysis of techniques we are developing to thwart the guidance of enemy missiles. In

this lab you were shown the effectiveness of a particular enemy radar system in tracking and engaging a friendly aircraft without jamming, and then shown the effect of a real EW system, the Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures System (IDECM) injecting a jamming technique into the threat radar. You were shown a similar display depicting the effect of an EA-6B jamming signal on an EW Acquisition radar.

Airborne Electronic Attack Complex (EA-6B/EA-18G)

We transited to the ICAP-III laboratory. This is the lab that was designed and built by the government team at Point Mugu to be a copy of the ICAP-II Block 89A laboratory (the baseline from which the ICAP-III derived). After completion and acceptance testing, the lab was then "sold off" to the prime contractor for the ICAP-III for modification to the new avionics configuration.

This is the lab that has supported the development of the ICAP-III version of the EA-6B. This is the latest version of the aircraft, and includes many new systems to increase the capabilities of the aircraft over its predecessors such as new displays, a new bus structure, and higher speed computers with increased memory. Probably the main new feature is a channelized receiver which allows high speed and highly accurate viewing of the threat environment. It uses a technology called phase interferometry, which essentially has an array of antennas around the airframe, which allow the system to accurately measure the direction of arrival and range of the incoming signal. What that means to the lab is that we had to develop a highly sophisticated stimulator for this system. It's called the AMES III. This is a very complex and expensive (multi-million dollar) piece of equipment, and any future system with capabilities similar to the ALQ-218 receiver will require this simulator for development and evaluation. In addition, AMES III requires significant expertise to calibrate and program. This asset is being shared between the ICAP-III lab and the EA-18G laboratory next door.

During the development of the ICAP-III avionics suite, our expertise was recognized to the point that the prime contractor, Northrop Grumman, actually found a way to utilize some of our people as contributors to the prime development project, almost in a subcontractor role. (At Air Force request, the Point Mugu EW team is participating in the B-52H AEA system definition and source selection process.)

EA-18G

We then transited to the area of the laboratory complex, which houses the EA-18G avionics suite. This lab is very transformational in nature. When PMA-265 (the F/A-18 program manager) was given the task of developing the follow on platform to the EA-6B, they decided that the best development approach was to take full advantage of the intellectual capital at both NAVAIR WD sites. PMA-265 has historically had a strong relationship with the China Lake site, where the F-18 WSSA has been hosted for many years. The PM decided that it was a lower risk approach to build a distributed laboratory structure, which would take full advantage of the expertise at each site. The China Lake site is responsible for all of the portions of the legacy F-18 that are part of the EA-18G.

The EA-18G's AEA suite is essentially a repackaging of the ICAP-III avionics suite. The expertise for that system is here. The lab has been set up with a high-speed fiber optic line between the labs. Each lab will have a small emulation of the "other lab" so that they may operate and develop portions of their subsystem in a stand-alone mode. You saw the F-18 mission computer and cockpit display emulator. This supplies the inputs required by the AEA subsystems for isolated development. When complex interactions or higher-level integration is required, the labs hook up via the high-speed channels, and essentially operate as a whole aircraft spread across the miles. Technology and transformational thinking allow us to leverage the truly high value assets – the people and their expertise – at each site to make an effective solution set for the Warfighter.

I mentioned that the AMES-III we saw next door was shared between the ICAP-III and the EA-18. This EA-18 lab will also share a number of other pieces of fixed hardware. The EA-18G, ICAP-III lab and ICAP II lab will all share access to the pod station gantry, they also share the same RF threat generators, central computer facilities, and remote terminal room used as a quiet development environment by our s/w programmers. These labs were built to be an integrated complex, and were never designed to be easily or cheaply separated.

We next saw the pod gantry. This gantry allows us to radiate high power transmitter signals into dummy loads to allow us to characterize the transmitters and exciters. To do this, the lab must supply not only power and interconnectivity to the various lab configurations, but we actually have a cooling cart in the corner of the lab. We are currently developing a solution for our troops in Iraq by modifying an engineering model of the latest transmitter to ship to Fleet users as a quick reaction fix for the problem I mentioned earlier.

The next stop was the ICAP-II Blk 89A development and integration facility. It is the only one in the world, and is the sole support tool for our deployed EA-6B's. During the early 80's, Grumman had developed the ICAP-II EA-6B. They turned over long-term support to the government, and focused their energy on the next generation of the aircraft, called the ADVCAP. When that update was cancelled, Point Mugu remained as the only support structure for the EA-6B community. In addition to our more traditional role of EW product development and software support, we had to take on the role of full systems developer and integrator. We have added features well beyond the traditional EW roles such as new navigation systems, the ability to communicate with GPS systems, the ability to employ satellite communications and Link 16 messages, as well as other common avionics upgrades. This is in addition to delivering regular s/w product updates and quick reaction capabilities to the fleet users. Any degradation of this capability will directly impact the deployed fleet users, as there simply is no backup capability. Although the Navy will transition in the 2010-2015 timeframe to the EA-18G, our expeditionary Marine Corps squadrons have decided to stick with the EA-6B airframe until they make a decision regarding their EW requirements after 2015 (possibly a JSF variant).

EWDS

We next went to Intel center of our lab complex to see the Electronic Warfare Database Support system (EWDS). This is where a small group of very talented individuals does essentially three tasks. First, they continuously scour the world's intelligence data sets and attempt to determine the current and future threats in areas of interest in the world. They resolve those threats in concert with their intelligence community spread across the country, and build the routine updates that are shipped regularly to all fleet users of their product. Second, they are the front end for all fleet requests for information and updates on a quick reaction basis. The goal of this group is to respond to all fleet requests within 24 hrs. The much more typical time is less than four hours, and we have instances with local response time of 1 hr. This small (6-8 people) dedicated group provides this service on a 24/7/365 basis via a network of pagers and cell phones. Interconnectivity to the fleet is via all methods from secure phone to SIPERNET to naval messages. They are able to accomplish the full task by working in concert with the specialists from other areas of the complex, including the jammer technique group and the s/w programmers. Being collocated with these experts and facilities is vital to rapid turn around time. As an example, on 9/11/2001, we kept one analyst, a jammer expert, and two s/w programmers here while everyone else went home. They were able to produce a whole new HARM file as well as jammer techniques reports and new intelligence files in less than 8 hours. These files readied the fleet to retaliate in areas of interest in the world the same day as the attack had the President ordered that action.

The third product set they produce is a sophisticated set of tools comprising the Electronic Warfare Tactical Information Report Management System (ETIRMS), which are used by multiple communities. The complex architecture they developed has impressed a great many communities outside of their traditional EA-6B customer base. They now produce intelligence-based products for not only the EA-6B but also the E-2C, the MH-60R, and the SH-60S. They are also the producer of the Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) for the Joint Mission Planning system (JMPS) system used by all tactical aircraft and the specific planning module for the EA-18G segment on JMPS. The JSF program has become very interested in their architecture and tools, and is leaning heavily towards adopting it for the EW reprogramming required for that platform.

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NAVBASE_VENTURA_CTY_PT_MUGU_CA, CA

Demographics

The following tables provide a short description of the area near the installation/activity. NAVBASE_VENTURA_CTY_PT_MUGU_CA is within Oxnard, CA, the nearest city with a population of 100,000 or more. The nearest metropolitan statistical area (MSA) is

MSA	Population
Ventura, CA PMSA	753,197

The following entities comprise the military housing area (MHA):

County/City	Population
Santa Barbara	399347
Ventura	753197
Total	1,152,544

Child Care

This attribute captures the number of nationally accredited child-care centers within the local community: 26

Cost of Living

Cost of Living provides a relative measure of cost of living in the local community. General Schedule (GS) Locality pay provides a relative scale to compare local salaries with government salaries and Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) is an indicator of the local rental market. In-state tuition is an indicator of the support provided by the state for active duty family members to participate in higher-level education opportunities. For median household income and house value, the basis of the data (either MSA or number of counties in the MHA or the county of the installation) is indicated.

Median Household Income	(US Avg \$41,994)	\$59,666	Basis: MSA
Median House Value	(US Avg \$119,600)	\$248,700	
GS Locality Pay	("Rest of US" 10.9%)	20.1%	
O-3 with Dependents BAH Rate		\$2,010	
In-state Tuition for Family Member		Yes	
In-state Tuition Continues if Member PCSs Out of State		No	

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Education

This attribute defines the population in local school districts and identifies capacity. The pupil/teacher ratio, graduation rate, and composite SAT I/ACT scores provide a relative quality indicator of education. This attribute also attempts to give communities credit for the potential intellectual capital they provide.

NOTE: "MFR"--means a Memorandum For Record is on file at the installation/activity/agency to document problems in obtaining the required information. Reasons for not being able to obtain information may be that the school district refused to provide the information or the school district does not use or track the information. For each entry, the number of school districts for which data are available of the total number of school districts reported, and the number of MFRs is indicated.

		Basis
School District(s) Capacity	47,318	5 of 5 districts
Students Enrolled	50,665	5 of 5 districts
Average Pupil/Teacher Ratio	21.9:1	5 of 5 districts
High School Students Enrolled	15,370	1 of 1 district
Average High School Graduation Rate (US Avg 67.3%)	95.7%	1 of 1 district
Average Composite SAT I Score (US Avg 1026)	1011	1 of 1 district
Average ACT Score (US Avg 20.8)	22	1 of 1 district
Available Graduate/PhD Programs	2	
Available Colleges and/or Universities	5	
Available Vocational and/or Technical Schools	5	

Employment

Unemployment and job growth rates provide an indicator of job availability in the local community. National rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics are also provided. For each entry, the basis of the data (either MSA or number of counties in the MHA or the county of the installation) is indicated.

The unemployment rates for the last five years:

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Local Data	4.8%	4.5%	4.6%	5.4%	5.3%
National	4.2%	4.0%	4.7%	5.8%	6.0%
Basis:	MSA	MSA	MSA	MSA	MSA

The annual job growth rate for the last five-years:

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	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Local Data	3.1%	4.2%	1.3%	1.4%	1.6%
National	1.5%	2.4%	.03%	-.31%	.86%
Basis:	MSA	MSA	MSA	MSA	MSA

Housing

This attribute provides an indication of availability of housing, both sales and rental, in the local community. Note: According to the 2000 Census, Vacant Sale and Vacant Rental Units do not equal total Vacant Housing Units. Vacant housing units may also include units that are vacant but not on the market for sale or rent. For each entry, the basis of the data (either MSA or number of counties in the MHA or the county of the installation) is indicated.

Total Vacant Housing Units	8,478	Basis: 1 of 2 counties
Vacant Sale Units	1,847	
Vacant Rental Units	2,316	

Medical Providers

This attribute provides an indicator of availability of medical care for military and DoD civilians in the local community. The table reflects the raw number of physicians/beds and ratio of physicians/beds to population. The basis of the data (either MSA or number of counties in the MHA or the county of the installation) is indicated.

	# Physicians	# Beds	Population	
Local Community	1,415	1,496	753,197	Basis: MSA
Ratio	1:532	1:503		
National Ratio (2003)	1:421.2	1:373.7		

Safety/Crime

The local community's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) Index for 2002 per 100,000 people and the national UCR based on information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for 2002 is provided. The basis of the data (either MSA or state) is indicated.

Local UCR	2,265.9	Basis: MSA
National UCR	4,118.8	

Transportation

Distance to an airport shows convenience and availability of airline transportation. Public transportation shows potential for members and DoD civilians to use it to commute to/from work under normal circumstances and for leisure.

Distance from NAVBASE_VENTURA_CTY_PT_MUGU_CA to nearest commercial airport: 62.7 miles

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Is NAVBASE_VENTURA_CTY_PT_MUGU_CA served by regularly scheduled public transportation? Yes

Utilities

This attribute identifies a local community's water and sewer systems' ability to receive 1,000 additional people.

Does the local community's water system have the ability to meet an expanded need of an additional 1,000 people moving in the local community? Yes

Does the local community's sewer system have the ability to meet an expanded need of an additional 1,000 people moving in the local community? Yes



Naval Base Ventura County Overview

Presented to BRAC Commission Staff

10 June 2005

6/14 1:00

1 Numbers inconsistent
2B data call
Identify "inextricably linked"
to scenario

David - astic question - 47 + 2B

Need to understand recommendation
"hard to do this"

Savings based on F-18s going away
going away anyway

47 could reduce 2200-900
difference is range + targets

tell Les about search capability

Establish COE for EW RDT&E

- **Description: Establish Joint EW COE at Pt. Mugu, China Lake or Eglin while divesting capabilities at other sites**
- **Naval Aviation Imperatives:**
 - **Maintain Electronic Attack capabilities for Joint warfighters**
- **Concerns:**
 - **Operational reachback to Pt. Mugu**
 - **“Black art” nature of capability difficult to reconstitute**
- **Naval Aviation impact:**
 - **Pt Mugu COE Low**
 - **Eglin COE High (Intellectual Capital)**
 - **China Lake COE High (Intellectual Capital)**
- **Recommended Alternative:**
 - **Support establishment of Joint EW COE at Pt Mugu and preserve unique distributed capabilities at other sites**

Ventura County, California, Community Position

Regarding DoD BRAC 2005 Recommendations for Realignment of Naval Base Ventura County Activities

Reference: TECHNICAL JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (VOLUME XII) 19 May 2005

1. Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 5012 jobs (2250 direct jobs and 2762 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Community Position: We understand the concept of creating a Naval Weapons and Armaments RDT&E Center and agree with the recommendation to establish that Center at the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake.

However, we take great exception to the number of positions and some of the functions to be realigned from Pt. Mugu, as identified in the TJCSG report. The specific details behind our objections follow:

(1) The Technical data calls received by NAWC WD Pt. Mugu directed that personnel, equipment and facilities that were within the Weapons and Armaments category, but were an “inextricable” part of the remaining core mission of the command, would be identified and explained in what was known as “Question 47.” In response to this direction, NAWC WD Pt. Mugu reported 851 positions in the Sea Range, Targets, Logistics and G&A activities that should have been subtracted from the total W&A personnel numbers under consideration.

(2) An identical situation occurred at NSWC PHD Port Hueneme, with approximately 300 positions being identified in Question 47 as being “inextricable.”

(3) In both Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme cases, per direction, the losing activity did not include dynamic or facility costs to relocate the functions identified in Question 47.

(4) Somewhere in the TJCSG processes, however, the above Question 47 numbers identified in the original TECH2B scenario were not carried over to the eventual W&A RDAT&E scenario, called TECH18. The reasons for the broken process are not known, but could be categorized as either: (a) clerical error / inattention to detail, or (b) intentional, in disregard for the established procedures for deducting the number of "inextricable" positions. (At this date, 6/10/05, we are hearing that several other Navy facilities suffered the same error. Internal Navy questions requesting clarification have been forwarded, but resolution is not known.)

We also take exception to the recommendation to realign all VX-30 Test Squadron activities from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. This recommendation does not make operational sense and was at least partially based on an incorrect computation of savings. Specific details of our objections follow:

Two different squadrons?

(1) VX-30 operates P-3, C-130 and F/A-18 aircraft. The P-3's and C-130's directly support Pt. Mugu Sea Range operations by providing surveillance, clearance, telemetry, flight termination, optics, communications, target launch and logistics support. These aircraft very rarely provide support to the Land Range at China Lake. Moving the P-3 and C-130 aircraft to China Lake would relocate them over 150 miles away from their primary operating area, thus increasing their response time to range tasking, reducing their on-range time and increasing their operating costs. Recurring costs of flying P-3's and C-130's from China Lake vice Pt. Mugu are estimated to be over \$2.3 Million per year. Additional flight hours on the aircraft would accelerate the expenditure of their fatigue lives, which would both reduce aircraft availability and increase depot level costs. Additionally, new hangar and parking apron MILCON costs would be required at China Lake, while none would be required at Pt. Mugu. Operationally, this recommendation simply does not make sense.

(2) Apparently, excessive gaining activity savings were claimed by eliminating the costs for operating and maintaining VX-30 F/A-18 aircraft. In fact, the decisions to divest the VX-30 F/A-18's and give the military billets back to the Navy were already made by Test Wing Pacific and the Naval Air Systems Command and were not BRAC decisions. Adding these savings to the BRAC analysis would be improper.

Community Recommendations:

(1) Reduce the number of Range, Targets, Anechoic Chamber, Logistics and G&A positions to be realigned from Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu by the number defined as being inextricable to the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

(2) Reduce the number of Weapons and Armament positions to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to

the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

(3) Reject the recommendation to move the VX-30 test squadron from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. Retain the Test Squadron Range Support Aircraft base of operations at Pt. Mugu.

2. Consolidate Maritime C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Base Ventura County, CA, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA, and Naval Station Newport, RI, by relocating Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, and consolidating with the Space Warfare Center to create the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 286 jobs (127 direct jobs and 159 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Community Position: In a manner identical to that discussed in Weapons and Armaments, above, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, identified a number of C4ISR positions as being inextricable to the core command mission. These positions and the rationale for identifying them were provided in a Question 47 data call response. Similar to W&A, these reduced numbers were apparently omitted from the final TJCSG roll-up in the reference document. Internal Navy questions requesting clarification have been forwarded, but resolution is not known.

Community Recommendation: Reduce the number of C4ISR jobs to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

3. Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1075 jobs (479 direct

request for
C.G. doc n

Coast
Guard
moving
to D.C.
Eagle Eye
WABs
C130s
helos
degraded
patrol

Pt. Mugu
is center
of excellence
479 vs 30

adds nothing to MV probably hurts it
vestiges of obscure plan

people will not move

"Echo Range" Lake @ China Lake no longer relevant

jobs and 596 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area economic area.

Community Position: This recommended realignment of Electronic Warfare from Pt. Mugu to China Lake makes absolutely no sense. Rather than adding military value, such a move would put our Warfighters in harm's way. The specific details behind our objections follow:

(1) Pt. Mugu is the existing, recognized Center of Excellence (COE) for EW. A 2004 Naval Air Systems Command study was conducted to assess the abilities of both Pt. Mugu and China Lake to serve as a Joint EW COE. Due to the "black art" nature of the capability, which would be difficult to reconstitute at China Lake, Pt. Mugu was judged LOW risk and China Lake as HIGH risk. The NAVAIR recommendation was to support establishment of a Joint EW COE at Pt. Mugu.

(2) The Electronic Warfare activities at Point Mugu directly support the combat capability of the Navy and Air Force Warfighters. EW operates on a 24/7/365 basis. Engineers and analysts track the electronic signatures of potential threats gathered from the intelligence community, evaluate those electronic threats, develop solutions and issue hardware designs, data and software updates to operating forces on a response cycle often measured in hours. This capability has supported operational forces since the 1960's. EW personnel and laboratories reside in a state of the art secure facility at Point Mugu. The capability of this enterprise lies more in the expertise developed in the engineering cadre than in the facilities and equipment that are resident there. The EW workforce is very specialized, and while they do work with their aircraft software development counterparts at China Lake, they possess greatly different skills and experience. Quite simply, the majority of the existing Pt. Mugu EW workforce will not relocate to China Lake. Their "intellectual capital" will be lost and the ability of our Warfighters to counter threat systems will be significantly diminished.

(3) In response to the initial EW data call, the Pt. Mugu EW personnel estimated the costs to replicate their facility at China Lake, then dismantle the existing facility at Pt. Mugu. This approach was deemed to be the most practical in order to reduce the risk to operating forces. However, they were subsequently directed by their chain-of-command to reduce their BRAC costs by dismantling their existing facility, then moving it and re-establishing it at China Lake. The risk to the Warfighter is considered to be high in that the assumptions made for this revised submittal: (a) allow for no unforeseen costs nor schedule impacts, (b) disregard all ongoing program work, (c) assume all personnel will be readily available to assist in the move, and (d) assume that all current personnel will move to the new location. None of these assumptions are viewed to be justifiable or supported by historical data. In fact, it is believed that this approach will result in a significant negative impact to the Warfighter's electronic warfare capabilities in that emergency response capacity and time to respond will be degraded by an estimated 80% for a period of time during the transition (12 to 18 months), and at least 50% for the next decade with the loss of the talent base (which takes 8 to 10 years to develop) that would occur as a result of this action. At the very least, this impact would be measured in

hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, and at the worst it will be measured in lost lives of our Warfighters. The community assumes that the rationale for adopting the latter approach centered solely on making the proposed realignment satisfy target cost savings. In reality, it results in significant negative impact to the Warfighter.

(4) The cognizant weapons systems program managers played no significant part in the process. For example, Point Mugu is the primary organization for the in-house development of electronic countermeasures for the Navy and the Air Force. It is currently developing in house jamming technology in support of the Army to defeat improvised explosive devices in Iraq. Yet key DoD program managers in electronic warfare played no real part in the decision to destroy the intellectual capital at Point Mugu and move empty positions to China Lake. Similarly, Point Mugu is developing a countermeasure to hand-held anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADS), which will be disrupted by moving. The program managers, with the best view of EW systems requirements and the responsibility for EW systems development, do not concur with the DoD recommendation to move EW from Pt. Mugu to China Lake.

(5) The justification for this realignment, as stated in the reference document, is not supported by the facts. There is no "redundant infrastructure." The approximately 480 Pt. Mugu EW personnel and approximately 30 China Lake EW personnel work in the same organizational structure with common management. The recommended realignment would not make "more efficient use" of the Electronic Combat Range at China Lake. The EW system development process makes little use of the ECR. In fact, the EW systems in the new EA-6B ICAP III are now so sophisticated, they can tell that the threat emitters on the ECR are not "real." All significant testing is now performed in the laboratory environment.

Community Recommendations:

(1) Reject DoD's recommendation. Retain Electronic Warfare RDATE&E functions at Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Pt. Mugu.

(2) Consider realigning the far lesser number of China Lake positions to Pt. Mugu to enhance the existing Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence at Pt. Mugu.

Naval Base Ventura County



***“A Major Aviation Shore Command
and Naval Construction Force
Mobilization Base”***



NBVC Mission

- Provide:

- Airfield
- Seaport
- Base Support Services



- For:

- Fleet Operating Forces
- RDT&E missions
- Naval Training Centers
- Reserve Activities



NBVC Point Mugu


- Home of the Pacific Fleet Hawkeyes
- Aviation Operations
- Two Runways
 - Carrier Landing Boxes



- Sea Test Range
- Weapons Testing
- RDT&E Facilities

NBVC Port Hueneme

- Home of Pacific Seabees
- Deep Water Port
- Joint Mobilization Site



- CNET Schools
- Multi Service Support
- RDT&E Facilities

Major NBVC Tenants

Four Operational Wings

Fleet Operational Commands

-  Airborne Early Warning Wing Pacific
-  31st Naval Construction Regiment

• Test and Evaluation

-  Naval Air Warfare Center
-  Naval Surface Warfare Center
-  Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center

• Other Missions

-  Naval Construction Battalion Center
-  Naval Satellite Operations Center
-  Navy Education and Training Centers
-  Reserve Squadrons / Centers
-  California Air National Guard


Naval Air Systems Command

Weapons Division

China Lake
Point Mugu

Aircraft Division

Lakehurst
Patuxent River
Orlando



Depots

Cherry Point
Jacksonville
North Island

NAWMC Weapons Division



Combat Systems
R&D

Electronic Warfare

Test & Evaluation

Avionics Hardware


RD&E

Navy's premier test & evaluation center for Weapons

Electronic Warfare

Iraqi Freedom


- EA-6B escorted most strike groups
- Answered more than 100 fleet requests for EW data
- New ELINT files for HARM missiles on the EA-6B and F/A-18





Enduring Freedom

- Provided round-the-clock threat database support
- EWDS laboratory answered over 11,000 email inquiries
- EA-6B team developed ETIRMS and PFPS
- Integrated Mongoose countermeasure pod on AH-1W SuperCobra

NAWCWD Ranges



Threat/Target Systems



Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneheme Division

NAVSEA

PORT HUENEHEME

Surface Warfare Center Division



**AEGIS Combat
Systems**

Ship Missile Systems

Underway Replenishment

In-Service Engineering

Missile Launching Systems

PHD NSW/C Product Areas

■ SHIPS AND SHIP SYSTEMS

- Signature and Silencing Programs
- Vulnerability and Survivability Systems

● Machinery Systems and Components

- Hull Forms and Propulsion
- Structures and Materials
- Environmental Quality Systems

■ SURFACE SHIP COMBAT SYSTEMS

- Air and Surface Surveillance and Detection Systems
- Combat Control Systems
- Engagement Systems
- Electronic Warfare Systems
- Theater Air Defense Systems

■ LITTORAL WARFARE SYSTEMS

- Mine Countermeasures and Clearance Systems
- Amphibious Warfare Systems
- Special Warfare Systems
- Diving Systems


■ NAVY STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS

- Targeting, Navigation, Fire Control, Missile and Launcher Subsystems

■ ORDNANCE


- Mines, Warheads, Rockets, and Ammunition
- Energetic Chemicals, Pyrotechnics, Propellants, and Explosives
- Explosive Safety Standards and Ordnance Environmental Protection00

Combat Systems



Proximity to Sea Range

- Proximity to Navy's Largest, Best Instrumented Sea Test Range Enhances Use of Self Defense Test Ship
- Surface Warfare Engineering Facility (SWEF) in Line-of-Sight with NAWC Electronic Warfare Laboratory



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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0523

FAX COVER SHEET

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- SUBCOMMITTEE: CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
- EUROPE
- JUDICIARY
- SUBCOMMITTEE: IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY, AND CUSTOMS, THE INTERNET, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
- RESOURCES
- SUBCOMMITTEE: NATIONAL PARKS, RECREATION, AND PUBLIC LANDS
- HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
- SUBCOMMITTEES:
 - TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE
 - INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
 - TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY

Date: Aug. 23, 2005 Time: _____

To: Dierdra Walsh

From: Brian Miller

Number of Pages: 19 Pages Numbered: _____
(Including Cover Sheet)

Special Instructions:

One last piece
of correspondence for
each of the Commissioners -
Thank Ya -

Brian Miller

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0524

August 22, 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

I want to thank you for speaking with me briefly this week regarding my concerns with the DoD recommendations at Naval Base Ventura County. I am sorry to be contacting you at this late date, but I believe the Technical Joint Cross Services Group continues to provide you false and misleading information which I feel compelled to counter. The information below is true and accurate to the best of my beliefs.

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- The TJCSG recommended realigning Sea Range and Targets functions from Pt. Mugu to China Lake, but failed to include either the costs of the moves or the required Military Construction (MILCON) projects.
- The TJCSG ignored Navy-certified data, which delineated the personnel deemed inextricable to the core functions of the commands at NBVC.
- The TJCSG included an arbitrary 15% personnel savings in their calculations, when in fact, due to the integrated nature of the two Naval Air Systems Command sites at Pt. Mugu and China Lake, the actual savings would approach zero. The General Accountability Office audit of DoD's processes also concluded that the TJCSG estimate of 15% was grossly overstated.
- The TJCSG recommended that the Electronic Warfare (EW) functions at Pt. Mugu be relocated to China Lake, even though Pt. Mugu's Military Value in EW Research and Development is higher than China Lake's.

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JUDICIARY

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• COURTS, THE INTERNET, AND INTELLECTUAL
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RESOURCES

SUBCOMMITTEE:
• NATIONAL PARKS, RECREATION, AND PUBLIC
LANDS

HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE


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• TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY

The Honorable Anthony Principi, Chairman
August 22, 2005
Page two

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- Upon receiving a recent Navy-certified response to a BRAC Commission originated data call, the TJCSG arbitrarily changed the certified data before forwarding the information to the Commission
- TJCSG personnel continue to provide unofficial, uncertified information to the BRAC staff.

The above are the most egregious examples of what I consider to be improper and unprofessional processes conducted by the TJCSG. Based on the serious nature of these flawed processes and their negative effect on NBVC and to our men and women currently serving overseas, I strongly recommend that you and your fellow Commissioners vote to reject DoD's recommendations to realign NBVC functions to China Lake.

Sincerely,



ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

EG:bm

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0524

August 22, 2005

The Honorable James H. Bilbray
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner Bilbray

I want to thank you for speaking with me briefly last week regarding my concerns with the DoD recommendations at Naval Base Ventura County. I am sorry to be contacting you at this late date, but I believe the Technical Joint Cross Services Group continues to provide you false and misleading information which I feel compelled to counter. The information below is true and accurate to the best of my beliefs.

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The Honorable James H. Bilbray, Commissioner
August 22, 2005
Page two

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
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Sincerely,



ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

EG:bm



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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0524

August 22, 2005

The Honorable Phillip Coyle
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner Coyle:

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The Honorable Phillip Coyle, Commissioner
August 22, 2005
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ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

EG:bm



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Congress of the United States
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Washington, DC 20515-0524

August 22, 2005

General James T. Hill, USA (Ret.)
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear General Hill:

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General James T. Hill, USA (Ret.), Commissioner
August 22, 2005
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
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ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

EG:bm



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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0524

August 22, 2005

The Honorable James V. Hansen
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner Hansen:

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The Honorable James V. Hansen, Commissioner
August 22, 2005
Page two


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Sincerely,


ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

EG:bm



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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0524

August 22, 2005

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Admiral Gehman:

First, I would like to thank you and your fellow Commissioners for your unselfish service to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission and to our country. I am sorry to be contacting you at this late date, but the Technical Joint Cross Services Group continues to provide you false and misleading information which I feel compelled to counter. The information below is true and accurate to the best of my beliefs.

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- The TJCSG recommended realigning Sea Range and Targets functions from Pt. Mugu to China Lake, but failed to include either the costs of the moves or the required Military Construction (MILCON) projects.
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- The TJCSG included an arbitrary 15% personnel savings in their calculations, when in fact, due to the integrated nature of the two Naval Air Systems Command sites at Pt. Mugu and China Lake, the actual savings would approach zero. The General Accountability Office audit of DoD's processes also concluded that the TJCSG estimate of 15% was grossly overstated.
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Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. USN (Ret.), Commissioner
August 22, 2005
Page two

- The TJCSG included an arbitrary \$3 Million recurring savings in their EW calculations, even though this savings would not exist.
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- In spite of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Anne Rathmell Davis' submission of additional requirements for base operating support and medical personnel at China Lake as a result of the Pt. Mugu realignments, the TJCSG ignored this input.
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The above are the most egregious examples of what I consider to be improper and unprofessional processes conducted by the TJCSG. Based on the serious nature of these flawed processes and their negative effect on NBVC and to our men and women currently serving overseas, I strongly recommend that you and your fellow Commissioners vote to reject DoD's recommendations to realign NBVC functions to China Lake.

Sincerely,



ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

EG:bm

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0524

August 22, 2005

General Lloyd W. Newton, USAF (Ret.)
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear General Newton:

First, I would like to thank you and your fellow Commissioners for your unselfish service to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission and to our country. I am sorry to be contacting you at this late date, but the Technical Joint Cross Services Group continues to provide you false and misleading information which I feel compelled to counter. The information below is true and accurate to the best of my beliefs.

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August 22, 2005

The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Secretary Skinner:

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The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner, Commissioner
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August 22, 2005

Brigadier General Sue E. Turner, USAF (Ret.)
Commissioner
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Brigadier General Turner:

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Sincerely,



ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

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David Epstein	
Lester Farrington	

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION: China Lake's mission is to provide our Armed Forces with effective and affordable integrated warfare systems and life-cycle support to ensure battlespace dominance. It

- performs research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), logistics, and in-service support for guided missiles, free-fall weapons, targets, support equipment, crew systems, and electronic warfare;
- integrates weapons and avionics on tactical aircraft;
- operates the Navy's western land and sea range test and evaluation complex;
- develops and applies new technology to ensure battlespace dominance.

It is the free world's leader in RDT&E of guided missiles, advanced weapons, and weapon systems.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION:

- **(Fleet Readiness Center – IND-19)** Realign Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division China Lake, CA, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department and relocating its maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft (approximately 3 K DLHs), Aircraft Components (approximately 45 K DLHs), Fabrication & Manufacturing (approximately 6 K DLHs) and Support Equipment (approximately 16 K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center West, Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA.
- **(Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center – TECH-15)** Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane, IN, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except gun/ammo, combat system security, and energetic materials to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head, MD, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except gun/ammo, underwater weapons, and energetic materials, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except the Program Executive Office and Program Management Offices in Naval Air Systems Command, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except underwater weapons and energetic materials, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, VA, by relocating all Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except guns/ammo and weapon systems integration to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

- **(Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition – TECH-19)** Realign Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division China Lake, CA, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.
- **(Establish Centers for Fixed Wing Air Platform Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation – TECH-24)** Realign Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH, by relocating fixed wing related Live Fire Test and Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.
- **(Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation – TECH-28):** Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION:

- **(Fleet Readiness Centers – IND - 19):** This recommendation realigns and merges depot and intermediate maintenance activities. It creates 6 Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs), with 13 affiliated FRC Sites at satellite locations. FRC Mid-Atlantic will be located on NAS Oceana, VA, with affiliated FRC Sites at NAS Patuxent River, MD, NAS Norfolk, VA, and JRB New Orleans, LA. FRC East is located at Cherry Point, NC, with affiliated FRC Sites at MCAS Beaufort, SC, and MCAS New River, NC. The existing intermediate level activity associated with HMX-1 at MCB Quantico, VA, will also be affiliated with FRC East. FRC Southeast will be located on NAS Jacksonville, FL, and will have an affiliated FRC Site at NAS Mayport, FL. FRC West will be located on NAS Lemoore, CA, and will have FRC affiliated sites at NAS JRB Fort Worth, TX, and NAS Fallon, NV. FRC Southwest will be located on Naval Station Coronado, CA, and will have affiliated sites at MCAS Miramar, CA, MCAS Pendleton, CA, MCAS Yuma, AZ, and NAS Point Mugu, CA. FRC Northwest will be located on NAS Whidbey, WA, with no affiliated FRC Sites.

This recommendation supports both DoD and Navy transformation goals by reducing the number of maintenance levels and streamlining the way maintenance is accomplished with associated significant cost reductions. It supports the Naval Aviation Enterprise's (NAE's) goal of transforming to fewer maintenance levels, i.e., from 3 to 2 levels; and it supports the NAE's strategy of positioning maintenance activities closer to fleet concentrations when doing so will result in enhanced effectiveness and efficiency, greater agility, and allows Naval Aviation to achieve the right readiness at the least cost. This transformation to FRCs produces significant reductions in the total cost of maintenance, repair and overhaul plus the associated Supply system PHS&T (Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation) as well as reparable inventory stocking levels as a result of reduced total repair turn-around times, reduced transportation, lower spares inventories, less manpower, and more highly utilized infrastructure. It requires integration and collaboration between Depot level Civil Service personnel and Military Intermediate level Sailors and Marines. At those FRCs involving Marine Corps MALS (Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons), because the MALS remain deployable commands, they will affiliate with their FRC organizations, but will remain operationally distinct and severable in all respects. The FRC D-level functions within the MALS fall under the Commanding Officer of each MALS. The FRC Commander is the provider of embedded depot personnel, as well as D-level technical and logistics support within the MALS. For all FRCs, there is a combined annual facility sustainment savings of \$1.1M; elimination of a total of 529,000 square feet of depot/intermediate maintenance production space and military construction cost avoidances of \$0.2M. This recommendation also includes a military construction cost of \$85.7M.

In addition to the actions described in this recommendation, there are four additional actions involved in the comprehensive merger of depot and intermediate maintenance: Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove,

PA, Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX, Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME, and Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA. The actions at these installations are described in separate installation closure recommendations in the Department of the Navy section of the BRAC Report.

- **(Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center – TECH - 15)** This recommendation realigns and consolidates those facilities working in Weapons & Armaments (W&A) Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation (RDAT&E) into a Naval Integrated RDAT&E center at the Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, CA. Additional synergistic realignments for W&A was achieved at two receiver sites for specific focus. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA, is a receiver specialty site for Naval surface weapons systems integration and receives a west coast site for consolidation. This construct creates an integrated W&A RDAT&E center in China Lake, CA, energetics center at Indian Head, MD, and consolidates Navy surface weapons system integration at Dahlgren, VA. All actions relocate technical facilities with lower overall quantitative Military Value (across Research, Development & Acquisition and Test & Evaluation) into the Integrated RDAT&E center and other receiver sites with greater quantitative Military Value.

Consolidating the Navy's air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface launched missile RD&A, and T&E activities at China Lake, CA, would create an efficient integrated RDAT&E center. China Lake is able to accommodate with minor modification/addition both mission and lifecycle/sustainment functions to create synergies between these traditionally independent communities.

During the other large scale movements of W&A capabilities noted above, Weapon System Integration was specifically addressed to preserve the synergies between large highly integrated control system developments (Weapon Systems Integration) and the weapon system developments themselves. A specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare was identified at Dahlgren, VA, that was unique to the services and a centroid for Navy surface ship developments. A satellite unit from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, San Diego Detachment will be relocated to Dahlgren.

The Integrated RDAT&E Center at China Lake provides a diverse set of open-air range and test environments (desert, mountain, forest) for W&A RDAT&E functions. Synergy will be realized in air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface launched mission areas.

This recommendation enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical and acquisition expertise with weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition that currently

resides at 10 locations into the one Integrated RDA&E site, one specialty site, and an energetics site.

- **Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition (TECH – 19)** This recommendation realigns and consolidates those gun and ammunition facilities working in Weapons and Armaments (W&A) Research (R), Development & Acquisition (D&A). This realignment would result in a more robust joint center for gun and ammunition Research, Development & Acquisition at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. This location is already the greatest concentration of military value in gun and ammunition W&A RD&A.

Picatinny Arsenal is the center-of-mass for DoD's Research, Development & Acquisition of guns and ammunition, with a workload more than an order of magnitude greater than any other DoD facility in this area. It also is home to the DoD's Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition. Movement of all the Services' guns and ammunition work to Picatinny Arsenal will create a joint center of excellence and provide synergy in armament development for the near future and beyond, featuring a Joint Packaging, Handling, Shipping and Transportation (PHS&T) Center, particularly important in this current time of high demand for guns and ammunition by all the services. Technical facilities with lower quantitative military value are relocated to Picatinny Arsenal.

This recommendation includes Research, Development & Acquisition activities in the Army and Navy. It promotes jointness, enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise within the weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition community that currently resides at this DoD specialty location.

- **Establish Centers for Fixed Wing Air Platform Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (TECH – 24)** The consolidation of all Fixed Wing Air Platform Survivability Live Fire T&E at China Lake is driven by the inefficiencies that currently exist between the two sites (Wright Patterson AFB and China Lake), and the potential savings afforded by establishing a single live fire test range for fixed wing air platforms. China Lake has this capability and has been doing similar work related to weapons lethality for many years. This action will increase efficiency by reducing overall manpower requirements while also reducing redundancies that exist across the Live Fire Testing domain.
- **Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (TECH – 28):** Consolidating the Sensors, EW, and Electronics RDA&E functions at China Lake will eliminate redundant infrastructure between Point Mugu and China Lake and provide for the more efficient use of the remaining assets including the Electronic Combat Range and other integration laboratories at China Lake.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED: NAWC Weapons Division HQ building where briefing was conducted, Michelson Laboratory, range testing facility

INSTALLATION CONCERNS RAISED:

- Significant concerns were expressed over both major realignment recommendation and the associated scenarios. In particular many base civilian employees believe that the Navy should conform to the SECDEF recommendations, whereas some of the military personnel suggested that the SECDEF recommendations were not consistent with the SECNAV desires and in fact may not have been reviewed at that level.
- As for the sensors/EW recommendation the predominant feeling among certain military personnel was that the 369 employees identified in the COBRA would remain at Pt. Mugu. NBVC. The other parts of sensors/EW would move to China Lake. Technical personnel at China Lake believe they are well equipped to handle the workload from NBVC and in fact are engaged in many EW projects geared toward future transformation weapons.
- As for the Weapons and Armament recommendation, the major point of confusion was that the scenario in the SECDEF recommendation did not adequately address the numbers and types of personnel that would have to remain at NBVC to support the sea range. There was universal agreement as to the fact that the Sea Range is a national asset, should remain in active use, and could not be safely or efficiently operated by China Lake personnel. In addition, there was total agreement as to the need to retain target launching and development at Pt. Mugu. We asked Navy BRAC and NBVC personnel to develop a revised COBRA and scenario that properly reflects the number and type of personnel that are required at each location.
- There seemed to be a fairly broad consensus that the C-130 and P-3 aircraft and their support should remain at Point Mugu to support the sea range. This would avert the need to build a new hanger at China Lake. There was widespread agreement that the F-18s should be consolidated at China Lake. However, the disposition of the EA-6Bs was quite contentious. Some meeting participants advocated moving the EA-6Bs to China Lake, whereas other said that since the Electronic Warfare (EW) work should remain at Pt. Mugu, the planes should also be kept there until the EA-6Bs are phased out at the end of the decade. It was recognized that the EA-6B expertise resides at Pt. Mugu. China Lake personnel pointed out that they are working on the next generation EW aircraft, the ER-18 Growler and it would be very beneficial to transition EW people at Point Mugu to work on this aircraft.
- We were consistently reminded that in 1992, a combined China Lake/Pt. Mugu command had emerged and that the two facilities were managed under the same leadership, reporting to NAVAIR. They had eliminated instances of dual management and had wrung out all possible duplication. Furthermore, NAVAIR

has already prescribed a goal of a ten percent reduction in operating costs by the beginning of FY 2007.

- We were told that the two principal scenarios were never part of the NAVAIR strategic plan. It is unknown what the intent of the TJCSG was in developing these two scenarios. This issue was never raised to “NAVAIR Corporate” to confirm that this scenario should be implemented. It was believed that the TJCSG was “gaming” the system.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

- Program Management personnel should be moved from Naval Air Station at Patuxent River, MD to NAWC China Lake. They said this would greatly reduce travel time between the PM offices and the RDT&E personnel. It would also reduce travel time and cost between the PM offices and the aircraft manufacturer, in Arizona. (However, the BRAC staff observes that there appears to have been a conscious Navy-wide decision to keep program managers near the acquisition community/hardware systems command, rather than at the field activities – a practice followed by both Army and the Air Force. Examples include C4ISR – SPAWAR San Diego, and Eglin AFB, Redstone Arsenal, and Wright Patterson AFB.
- Implement the two key realignment recommendations as detailed in the SECDEF recommendations.
- China Lake was rated as having the highest military value for the Weapons and Armaments RDT&E recommendation for research, acquisition, and T&E. And first in two of the three categories for the Sensors/EW and Electronics recommendation. The community said China Lake is the best site to locate for synergism, efficiency, etc.
- The infrastructure, to include water, sewer, schools, housing, and roads presents no insurmountable obstacles, and in fact the schools and their students perform at a level significantly higher than the State average. They pointed out that NAWC China Lake employment dropped nearly in half in the mid-1990s and the proposed growth at this time represents a relatively small increase from Ridgecrest’s peak population. They are already proactively planning for the growth.
- They did not object to the other recommendations, even those that represented employment reductions at NAWC China Lake (i.e., NAS Lemoore and Picatinny Arsenal.
- They pointed out that F-18 Growler is the Naval aviation system of the future and it makes no sense to divide that workforce, except they recognized the need to retain the Sea Range and supporting infrastructure at Pt. Mugu. They specifically did not advocate having NAWC personnel shuttling several times each week with their equipment to conduct tests.
- Although recruiting is not necessarily easy, they have a high retention rate and over 80% of the NAWC China Lake retirees stay in the community.
- Housing prices average about \$250k, significantly less than at NBVC.

- Shuttle flights between NBVC and NAWC China Lake operate several times per day and only take about 35 minutes. The planes hold about 15 passengers.
- The community observed that the Sensors and Electronic Warfare recommendation RDATE&E Consolidation at China Lake (Tech 0054), DOD used a 5.7% civilian personnel efficiency factor, resulted in a slow payback. They provided us with a revised COBRA that reflected a 15% efficiency factor and a payback in only six years, one-half of the DOD payback period. [However, the BRAC staff noted that GAO had recommended the consistent use of 5.6%.] This recommendation has a one-time cost of \$72.7 M and a NPV savings in 2025 of \$83.8 M.
- The community believes that the sea range is vital and is a critical joint service asset that must be preserved. The issue is how many people should be kept at Point Mugu to efficiently and effectively operate the sea range, including San Nicholas Island; range, target development and launching operations.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT: NA

China Lake

A Workable Alternative

How to use the existing construct of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division to comply with DoD's strategy of establishing centers of technical excellence, while significantly increasing military value, decreasing the cost of realignment and reducing the loss of intellectual capital.

Background

The Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division (NAWCWD) stood up as a command within the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) claimancy on 1 January 1992. Its planning and legal basis stem from the Navy preparation for BRAC 91 and the subsequent BRAC implementation established by law. While initially encompassing several separate and independent NAVAIR field activities and the prior Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, then a field activity of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), it quickly evolved to a two-site technical organization at China Lake and Pt. Mugu. At the time of its formation, two other centers under NAVAIR were created, the NAWC Aircraft Division headquartered at Patuxent River, MD, and the Training Systems Division at Orlando, FL. A headquarters for the three centers was established as the NAWC in Washington, D.C. under NAVAIR. At the same time as the NAWC and its divisions were formed, companion centers were created in the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and in SPAWAR.

The Intent

When planning started for BRAC 91, the leadership in the Navy was intent on consolidating the vast systems commands' RDT&E field activities into a much leaner structure. This was to be accomplished through realignments and closures affecting most of the field activities within the three systems commands organizations. NAVAIR leadership had had much earlier visions of a field activity structure with a flag officer in charge on each coast. The focus on the east coast would be airplanes and on the west coast, weapons, although the complexity of activity across all the supporting field structure was far greater than just those two commodities. Where activities were to continue to exist, the command function would vest in the NAWC division commander (a flag officer) and the supporting base function would be a subordinate command.

One very important aspect of this consolidation was the elimination of independent competing technical commands and functions around the country. Because weapons RDT&E functions were performed both at China Lake (more heavily R&D) and Pt. Mugu (more heavily T&E), a primary NAWCWD consolidation goal was to eliminate areas of overlap between the main sites. The new NAWCWD command structure significantly reduced middle management positions and located technical leadership at the site where it made the most sense. For example, Range, Targets, Test Wing, Logistics, Avionics and T&E Engineering leadership was located at Pt. Mugu, while System Engineering and Weapons leadership was located at China Lake. NAWCWD also adopted common systems for major supporting functions (e.g., financial, personnel,

information technology) depending on which site was judged most efficient. These consolidation efficiencies commenced in 1992 and were favorably noted during BRAC 95 site visits.

What followed in NAWCWD was a single command, headquartered first at Pt. Mugu and later at China Lake, commanding all the technical work at both places as an integrated organization, with subordinate Naval Air Weapons Station commands at each location to run the support functions of the bases themselves. Incredibly, there were really only two reasons for even identifying the two NAWCWD sites as separate entities. One involved the US Postal Service and the need to correctly address mail. The other had to do with detailed personnel management within the Department of the Navy and the need to have separate Unit Identification Codes (UIC) at each site.

NAVSEA used a different construct for their consolidated field activities and allowed each of the remaining activities renamed as Divisions, after closures occurred, to continue to exist as separate technical commands, coordinated in their work by a Washington, D.C. based Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) headquarters staff. NSWC Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD) remains as one of those technical commands. The NSWC recently adopted a form of competency alignment under Product Area Directors and has significantly reduced redundancy and competition between the separately commanded Surface Warfare Center Divisions.

The Management Imperative

First within the NAWC, then quickly followed by all of NAVAIR, a Competency Aligned Organization (CAO) management paradigm was adopted. This structure of management aligns people by technical function or specialty to provide support for programs without regard to physical location. NAVAIR in many ways ceased being a headquarters organization, which it had to do because of very aggressive mandated downsizing, and adopted a process by which leadership at all management levels was placed where the "center of gravity" for specific functions really existed. In the case of Ranges, Target Systems, Weapons, Electronic Warfare and other technical areas, that meant that the NAWCWD was in charge of those areas for all of NAVAIR. Within NAWCWD, the technical leadership for Weapons R&D is clearly at China Lake with T&E work also being accomplished in that competency at Pt. Mugu and Patuxent River. Technical leadership for Open Air Ranges, of which there are four within NAVAIR, Targets (used at all the ranges), and Electronic Warfare reside at Pt. Mugu. Since, in terms of total workload and people employed, China Lake has always been the larger element of NAWCWD, it was decided that the headquarters (flag pole) for NAWCWD would remain at China Lake, instead of alternating between the two sites, as had been the original concept. However, it is extremely important to understand that the residence of the flag officer and his immediate staff does not create an organization centered at China Lake with a detachment at Pt. Mugu. The commander of NAWCWD maintains offices at Pt. Mugu. He and his staff spend a considerable amount of time there, as they are the only technical command function at both locations.

In contribution to the support of programs, both sites work together in a fully integrated manner and are literally an inseparable team. At every level, management has been flattened and the work fully distributed to the people best suited to perform it. In the flat management chain, it is very common to find workers at one site reporting to a manager at the other site. Modern electronic communications technology, including dedicated fiber optic and microwave links and a network of video teleconference nodes, combined with a regularly scheduled aircraft shuttle service, have been employed to tightly link technical work. For example some electronic warfare and weapons laboratories are connected by fiber optics and literally function as one across the two sites. The NAWCWD infrastructure is transformational in that it adopted these methods more than 10 years ago and has since refined them to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness.

In 1998, as part of the Navy's shore establishment regionalization initiative, the Air Station at Pt. Mugu was moved from NAVAIR control to the fleet. Additionally, in 2000, the Naval Air Station at Pt. Mugu was merged with the Construction Battalion Center at Port Hueneme to create Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC). The effect at NBVC was to eliminate duplicate base command and support functions at the two proximate bases. That consolidation effort continues to this day. It is important to note that NAWCWD Pt. Mugu and NSWC PHD exist today as technical tenant activities on NBVC. There are dozens of other tenant activities on NBVC. However, the only ones subject to BRAC 2005 realignment are NAWCWD and NSWC PHD.

The Proposed Technical Mega-Centers at China Lake in BRAC 2005

The proposed Weapons and Armament Center and the Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Center at China Lake will probably never exist in the final management structure, even if all the BRAC realignments are put into law. In keeping with the CAO management paradigm of NAVAIR those positions would be aligned into existing, or perhaps some new competencies within the overall NAVAIR structure. In a world of industrial funding for program work, management can ill afford to add additional management layers to accommodate BRAC realignment rationale. The resulting management structure will continue to employ people at multiple sites that do not close. In the case of the Pt. Mugu realignment, from a management perspective, literally nothing will be changed except the positions will physically relocate to China Lake under a new mailing address and UIC. Unfortunately, most of the technical experts in their specialties from NBVC will not move and fill those positions. The loss of intellectual capital will be devastating for several years. If the positions are not relocated, they will continue to support programs, through the CAO, and under the technical command of the same flag officer, as they are today joined "at the hip" with their counterparts at China Lake

In the case of the realignment of functions from NSWC PHD, there is a case for consolidating a small part of that work under different systems commands. The weapons management functions at PHD, which are not inextricable to their essential shipboard weapons system integration work, probably could be more efficiently managed within NAWCWD. However the people literally do not have to move to make that happen.

They can realign in place and remain at Port Hueneme as part of the NAWCWD on NBVC, or if NAWC management prefers, move over to the Pt. Mugu side of the base. There are a handful of C4ISR functions at NSWC PHD which more properly align under SPAWAR and should realign and relocate to Pt. Loma.

An Alternative Philosophical Rationale

Given the data provided by the Ventura County BRAC Task Force, it is obvious that the proposed NBVC realignment will trigger a large and painful loss of intellectual capital, perhaps in excess of 80%, will incur costs that are not reasonably recoverable, and have a serious impact on the program customers as well as the effectiveness of our war fighters. Yet the concept of establishing consolidated Weapons and Armament and Sensors, EW, and Electronics centers, if in name only, under one systems command has merit. Therefore the BRAC Commission need only honor the simple fact that the two-site NAWCWD exists as a totally integrated single technical command established by BRAC 91 and that those proposed centers really are to be established at NAWCWD, the command, not the singular location of China Lake. By so doing, (1) the realignment of all functions out of Pt. Mugu would be cancelled, (2) only the appropriate weapons functions at NSWC PHD would be realigned, in place, to NAWCWD and (3) a handful of C4ISR positions would actually move to Pt. Loma. The proposals for other bases to realign functions to the consolidated Weapons and Armament center would be judged on their individual merits under the BRAC process. If they were to be realigned, in keeping with this rationale, the gaining organization would be NAWCWD, and the most relevant site for the relocation would be selected based on the nature of the functions to be realigned.

Following this alternative recommendation would comply with DoD's strategy of establishing centers of technical excellence, while significantly increasing military value, decreasing the cost of realignment and reducing the loss of intellectual capital.

NAWCWD Point Mugu Personnel Impacts

NAVAIRWARCEN_PT_MUGU Scenarios

- TECH2B (Folded into TECH18) – Realign Point Mugu Weapons and Armament RDAT&E and relocate to China Lake
→ folded into Tech 18
- TECH54 - Consolidate Sensors, EW, and Electronics RDAT&E functions at Point Mugu with China Lake
- DON-162 – Close NAS Point Mugu

NAWCWD Point Mugu Scenarios

Tech-0018D PT 4 Relocate Weapons & Armaments to China Lake	589	0
Tech-0054 Relocate Sensors, electronics, and EW to China Lake	379	0
Total of 2 recommended actions	968	0
DON-162 Close NAS Point Mugu (DON did not support)	919	0

NAWCWD Point Mugu Scenarios

Tech-0018D PT 4 Relocate Weapons & Armaments to China Lake	589	0	1625	287
Tech-0054 Relocate Sensors, electronics, and EW to China Lake	379	0	379	0
Total of 2 proposed actions	968	0	2004	287
DON-162 Close NAS Point Mugu (DON did not support)	919	0	158	0

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stand

← simply
doesn't
make
sense

**TECH2B (Folded into TECH18) – Realign Point
Mugu Weapons and Armament RDAT&E and
relocate to China Lake**

The Meaning of Inextricable

- Guidance was given to the losing activities to include workload and facilities that was inextricable to the mission remaining but to explain these in the Q47 response
- In TECH18 none of the Q47 responses submitted by losing activities appears to be taken into account. The net result is that the personnel movements (and associated 15% savings) are overstated by a factor of 3 and facilities support reductions are overstated
- At NBVC alone, these errors result in approximately \$30M per year in overstated savings.

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1 M \square eliminated

TECH18D Point Mugu Q47 Certified Response

The following areas would require a reduction in the number of personnel, equipment, and facilities to be relocated to the receiving site: (1) F-14 weapons system support has been terminated, a reduction of 132 civilians and 24 contractors; (2) An error of 33 civilians performing EW support; (3) personnel, mission equipment, and facilities performing outdoor air range operations. These are an integrated, fixed base capability that must remain at the Point Mugu site to continue sea range operations, net reduction of 505 civilians, 153 contractors, 2667 tons of mission equipment, and 1022.4 KSFT of facility space; (4) Retaining the 3 anechoic chambers whose primary customer is the targets range complex, a net reduction of 14 civilians, 3 contractors, 90 tons of support equipment, and 44.2 KSF; (5) Keeping logistical support for targets with the targets hardware, a net reduction of 24 civilians,; and (6) Not moving the general and administrative support that currently services both China Lake and Point Mugu, a net reduction of 143 civilians and 22 contractors.

repond *

NAWCWD Certified Inputs

- TECH 0002B Scenario Data Call
(Rolled into TECH 0018DR)

SDC Action #	FY03 Baseline Personnel No.	Rationale
14	246	Weapons Test Squadron (32 Civilian, 214 Military)
14	143	Indirect Personnel Supporting Both Sites
14	543	In-aircable Sea Range work
14	132	Terminated F-14 Support
14	33	EW Support Equipment (currently identified with Weapons)
		(included in TECH 0018DR)

589

anted twice

This does not include P40 numbers

NAWCWD DONBITs Certified Inputs

SDC Action #	FY03 Baseline	Rationale
[Redacted]		

- 343 Missile, Gun, or Energetic Personnel
 - Weapons In service engineering (37)
 - Missile hardware in the loop (HIL) labs (16)
 - Weapons Sustainment Logistics (188)
 - Weapons Support Equipment (39)
 - Installed System Test Engineering (63)
- General First Cut implementation insight
 - Estimated one time unique costs of \$36M to establish Missile HIL.
 - COBRA allowed \$9M



NAWCWD DONBITs Certified Inputs

SDC Action #	FY03 Baseline	Rationale
14	246	Weapons Test Squadron (32 Civilians, 214 Military)
14	143	Indirect Support Personnel Supporting Both Sites

- **Weapons Test Squadron**

- Cost included:

- Hanger and ramp MILCON at China Lake

- Increased recurring operating expenses to transit to Sea Range

- Savings:

- COBRA calculated 15% savings of Wing and Squadron personnel

- **Indirect personnel**

- Duplication and redundancy eliminated since 1992

- Some functions site specific (facilities, security, STILO, IT, HR, etc)

"nearly every day"
\$6.8 M/YR

Yellow – Trying to Understand

Summary of TECH18 Impacts

Capability	Personnel included in TECH18	Facilities included In TECH18	Inextricable part of sea range ops
Range	Most	No	Yes
Targets	All	No	Yes
RCS Chambers	All	No	Yes
Test Squadron	All	Yes	Yes
Flight Test	Some	Yes	Some
Weapons Sustainment	All	Yes	No

TECH 18 Summary

Weapons and Armament RDAT&E

Take Away's:

- **Clearly defined weapons functions included and understood**
- **Weapons Test Squadron - Realignment**
 - **Significant MILCON costs understood**
 - **Recurring operating cost increase understood**
 - **Personnel savings not understood**
- **Indirect support - Realignment**
 - **Duplication and redundancy eliminated since 1992**
- **Range and Targets**
 - **Integrated, fixed base capability that must remain at Point Mugu to continue sea range operations**

NAWCWD Point Mugu Personnel Impacts

NAVAIRWARCEN_PT_MUGU Scenarios

- TECH2B (Folded into TECH18) – Realign Point Mugu Weapons and Armament RDAT&E and relocate to China Lake
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Total of 2 Tech-0018D PT 4 actions	968	0	2004	287
DON-162 Close NAS Point Mugu (DON did not support)	919	0	158	0

**TECH2B (Folded into TECH18) – Realign Point
Mugu Weapons and Armament RDAT&E and
relocate to China Lake**

The Meaning of Inextricable

- Guidance was given to the losing activities to include workload and facilities that was inextricable to the mission remaining but to explain these in the Q47 response
- In TECH18 none of the Q47 responses submitted by losing activities appears to be taken into account. The net result is that the personnel movements (and associated 15% savings) are overstated by a factor of 3 and facilities support reductions are overstated
- At NBVC alone, these errors result in approximately \$30M per year in overstated savings.

TECH18D Point Mugu Q47 Certified Response

The following areas would require a reduction in the number of personnel, equipment, and facilities to be relocated to the receiving site: (1) F-14 weapons system support has been terminated, a reduction of 132 civilians and 24 contractors; (2) An error of 33 civilians performing EW support; (3) personnel, mission equipment, and facilities performing outdoor air range operations. These are an integrated, fixed base capability that must remain at the Point Mugu site to continue sea range operations, net reduction of 505 civilians, 153 contractors, 2667 tons of mission equipment, and 1022.4 KSFT of facility space; (4) Retaining the 3 anechoic chambers whose primary customer is the targets range complex, a net reduction of 14 civilians, 3 contractors, 90 tons of support equipment, and 44.2 KSF; (5) Keeping logistical support for targets with the targets hardware, a net reduction of 24 civilians,; and (6) Not moving the general and administrative support that currently services both China Lake and Point Mugu, a net reduction of 143 civilians and 22 contractors.

NAWCWD Certified Inputs

- **TECH 0002B Scenario Data Call**
(Rolled into TECH 0018DR)

SDC Action #	FY03 Baseline Personnel No.	Rationale
14	246	Weapons Test Squadron (32 Civilian, 214 Military)
14	143	Indirect Personnel Supporting Both Sites
14	543	In-extricable Sea Range work
14	132	Terminated F-14 Support
14	33	EW Support Equipment incorrectly identified with Weapons (Included in TECH54)

NAWCWD DONBITs Certified Inputs

SDC Action #	FY03 Baseline	Rationale
[Redacted]		

- 343 Missile, Gun, or Energetic Personnel
 - Weapons In service engineering (37)
 - Missile hardware in the loop (HIL) labs (16)
 - Weapons Sustainment Logistics (188)
 - Weapons Support Equipment (39)
 - Installed System Test Engineering (63)
- General First Cut implementation insight
 - Estimated one time unique costs of \$36M to establish Missile HIL.
 - COBRA allowed \$9M



NAWCWD DONBITs Certified Inputs

SDC Action #	FY03 Baseline	Rationale
14	246	Weapons Test Squadron (32 Civilians, 214 Military) Indirect Support Personnel Supporting Both Sites
14	143	

- **Weapons Test Squadron**

- Cost included:
 - Hanger and ramp MILCON at China Lake
 - Increased recurring operating expenses to transit to Sea Range
- Savings:
 - COBRA calculated 15% savings of Wing and Squadron personnel

- **Indirect personnel**

- Duplication and redundancy eliminated since 1992
- Some functions site specific (facilities, security, STILO, IT, HR, etc)

Yellow – Trying to Understand

NAWCWD DONBITS Certified Inputs

- **TECH 0002B Scenario Data Call (Rolled into TECH 0018DR)**

SDC Action #	FY03 Baseline	Rationale
14	543	Inextinguishable Sea Range work

- **The following Sea Test Range functions were excluded by Q47 response, and no military construction or dynamic data were input as part of this data call:**
 - 505 personnel in the range and targets competencies
 - 24 personnel performing targets logistics
 - 14 personnel operating the radar reflectivity lab supporting range and targets customers for the majority of their work
- **These personnel are an integrated, fixed base capability that must remain at the Point Mugu site to continue sea range operations**
- **DON-162 (Close NAS Point Mugu) evaluated relocating these functions but were not part of the recommendations**

Summary of TECH18 Impacts

Capability	Personnel included in TECH18	Facilities included In TECH18	Inextricable part of sea range ops
Range	Most	No	Yes
Targets	All	No	Yes
RCS Chambers	All	No	Yes
Test Squadron	All	Yes	Yes
Flight Test	Some	Yes	Some
Weapons Sustainment	All	Yes	No

TECH 18 Summary

Weapons and Armament RDAT&E

Take Away's:

- **Clearly defined weapons functions included and understood**
- **Weapons Test Squadron - Realignment**
 - **Significant MILCON costs understood**
 - **Recurring operating cost increase understood**
 - **Personnel savings not understood**
- **Indirect support - Realignment**
 - **Duplication and redundancy eliminated since 1992**
- **Range and Targets**
 - **Integrated, fixed base capability that must remain at Point Mugu to continue sea range operations**



NAVAL BASE VENTURA COUNTY

NAME	ORGANIZATION/ POSITION	TELEPHONE	EMAIL
FARRINGTON, LESTER C	BRAC/JOINT SERVICE	(703) 699-2914	lester.farrington@wso.whs.mil
EPSTEIN, DAVID	BRAC/JOINT SERVICE	(703) 699-2947	david.Epstein@wso.whs.mil
SWANEY, CAPT MARK	VICE CDR, NAVAIRWD	(805) 989-7113	mark.swaney@navy.mil
GILMER, BRAD	BRAC COORDINATOR, NAVAIRWD	(805) 989-8445	Bradford.gilmer@navy.mil
HUBER, CAPT STEVE	CO, NSWC PHD	(805) 228-8238	Stephen.huber@navy.mil
MENDONCA, STEVE	DIR, T&E, NAVAIRWD	(805) 989-7275	Stephen.mendonca@navy.mil
VAN DYCK, CMDCM RON	NBVC COMMAND MASTER CHIEF	(805) 989-8484	Ronald.vandyck@navy.mil
BRATTIN, RON	NBVC BRAC	(805) 989-1723	Ronald.brattin@navy.mil
COBLE, BOB	NAVAIRWD	(301) 481-1939	bob.coble@navy.mil
KIWUS, CDR CHRIS	CSO, NBVC	(805) 989-7905	Christopher.kiwus@navy.mil
REUNING, CDR BOB	PWO, NBVC	(805) 989-8501	charles.reuning@navy.mil
BENTLEY, DIANE	NBVC	(805) 989-9752	diane.Bentley@navy.mil

**NAVAL BASE VENTURA COUNTY
COMMISSION BASE VISIT
July 13, 2005**

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8. COMMUNITY CONCERNS (provided 6/10/05 @ BRAC office)
9. COMMANDING OFFICER'S BIO (CAPT Paul S. Grossgold)

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

BASE SUMMARY SHEET

NAVAL BASE VENTURA COUNTY

INSTALLATION MISSION

- As home to the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Point Mugu (now part of Naval Base Ventura County) is the Navy's full spectrum research, development, test and evaluation, and in-service engineering center for weapons systems associated with air warfare (except for anti-submarine warfare systems), missile and missile subsystems, aircraft weapons integration and assigned airborne electronic warfare systems. Naval Base Ventura County provides airfield, seaport and base support services for Fleet operating forces, RDT&E missions, Naval training centers and reserve activities.

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- Consolidate Maritime C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation. (TECH-9)
- Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation Center. (TECH-15)
- Realign Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department and transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA. (IND-19)
- Close Naval Support Activity Corona, CA. Relocate Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Corona, CA to Naval Base Ventura County (Naval Air Station Point Mugu), CA. (DON-7)
- Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA. (TECH-28)

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- Realignment and consolidation of facilities working in weapons and armaments research, development & acquisition and test and evaluation, into a Naval Integrated RDT&E center at Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, CA. (Tech-15)
- Consolidating the Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics RDT&E functions at China Lake eliminates redundant infrastructure between Point Mugu and China Lake and provides for the more efficient use of the remaining assets including the Electronic Combat Range and other integration laboratories at China Lake. (Tech-28)
- Relocation of Naval Surface Center Division Corona RDT&E functions to Point Mugu collocates its 3 required missions (independent assessment, metrology and calibration, and tactical aircrew combat training system ranges) with other RDT&E activities and with fleet assets at Naval Air Station Point Mugu. (DON-7)

These are the major recommendations with justifications affecting Point Mugu. The remaining 2 recommendations (Tech-9 and Ind-19) deal with Maritime C4ISR and Fleet Readiness Center realignments are minor and do not affect significant numbers of people or facilities.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

(TECH-15 & 28 only-- major recommendations/relocations out of Point Mugu)

- One-Time Costs: \$ 162,970 million
- Net Savings (Cost) during Implementation: \$ (60,202) million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$ (43,323) million
- Return on Investment Year: 2006 (7-12 years)
- Net Present Value over 20 Years: cannot be readily determined

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Students</u>
Baseline			
Reductions	(244)	(2,149)	
Realignments			
Total	(244)	(2,149)	

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

	Out		In		Net Gain (Loss)	
	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
This Recommendation	(244)	(2,629)		5	(244)	(2,624)
Other Recommendation(s)			5	849		
Total	(244)	(2,629)	5	854	(244)	(1,775)

CREATE A NAVAL INTEGRATED WEAPONS & ARMAMENTS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION, TEST & EVALUATION CENTER

Tech - 15

Recommendation: Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane, IN, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except gun/ammo, combat system security, and energetic materials to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Recommendation: Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head, MD, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except gun/ammo, underwater weapons, and energetic materials, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Recommendation: Realign Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except the Program Executive Office and Program Management Offices in Naval Air Systems Command, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

→ **Recommendation:** Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Recommendation: Realign Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except underwater weapons and energetic materials, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Recommendation: Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center, Yorktown, VA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head, MD.


Recommendation: Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Recommendation: Realign Fleet Combat Training Center, CA (Port Hueneme Detachment, San Diego, CA), by relocating all Weapons and Armaments weapon system integration Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, VA.

Recommendation: Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, VA, by relocating all Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except guns/ammo and weapon systems integration to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

CREATE A NAVAL INTEGRATED WEAPONS & ARMAMENTS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION, TEST & EVALUATION CENTER

TECH-15




NAVY SENSORS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, AND ELECTRONICS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION, TEST & EVALUATION

Tech - 28

NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER, WEAPONS DIVISION, POINT MUGU, CA

REALIGN

Recommendation: Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.





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About NBVC

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NBVC History

First built as a temporary depot in the early days of World War II, the Construction Battalion Center at Port Hueneme is a veteran of that war. The base was originally established to train, stage, and supply the newly created Seabees. In 1941 as the United States entered World War II Point Mugu also became a training area for the Seabees. The Seabees put down a section of Marston Mat runway that would become Point Mugu's first airstrip. The Port Hueneme base was officially established and began operating May 18, 1942 as the Advance Base Depot. In 1945 the Advance Base Depot was renamed the Naval Construction Battalion Center.

As the need for a sea test range became evident, Commander Grayson Merrill, head of the Bureau of Aeronautics Special Projects Branch, drafted a letter explaining the need for a sea test range. A new missile center at Point Mugu was endorsed by the Secretary of the Navy, and was approved by President Truman in May 1946. Capt. Albert N. Perkins, the first commanding officer of the new center, established the Naval Air Missile Test Center at Point Mugu. The Naval Air Station was established on Aug. 1, 1949, to support the U.S. Naval Air Missile Test Center by providing material and service support, including military personnel administration, air traffic control and flight line functions.

When the Korean War came in 1950, Port Hueneme was ready to serve the Navy again. Almost all of the Navy construction equipment and supplies for that war were routed through the base.

For 57 years Point Mugu has had an impact on research, development, test and evaluation of missile weapons systems, and for 59 years Port Hueneme has provided integral supplies, equipment, camps and roads, to support not only the Seabees, but the Army, Air Force and Marines as well.

As the decade of the 1990's came to a close, and with the former Soviet Union ceasing to exist, the Department of the Navy began to look for new ways of streamlining base commands to better serve our Fleet customers.

The regionalization process formally began in Ventura County in 1998, with the transfer of the commands at Naval Air Station (NAS) Point Mugu and Construction Battalion Center (CBC) at Port Hueneme to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, via regional management by Commander, Navy Region Southwest, San Diego. Base Operating Support (BOS) services were first consolidated in 1998 as a part of a Navy-wide program to gain efficiencies and cost savings. CBC was designated as providers of general BOS support for the Navy at Point Mugu and Port Hueneme. NAS Point Mugu was responsible for the aviation mission at Point Mugu. BOS services encompass the common services required to operate a base such as fire, safety, security, public affairs, public works, environment controls, family services, morale, welfare and recreation, and housing services. Marked also in 1998 was the arrival of the E-2C Hawkeye to Point Mugu from

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 ● TRI-CARE

MCAS Miramar, California. Four E-2C squadrons along with the staff of Commander Airborne Early Warning Wing U.S. Pacific Fleet brought 16 E-2C Hawkeye aircraft and more than 1,000 personnel to Ventura County.

Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 55 (VR-55) became a new reserve tenant command at Point Mugu during 1999. VR-55 operates five C-130T Hercules transport aircraft. VR-55 filled the void as VXE-6 was disestablished after 55 years of service to the Navy and the National Science Foundation.

Oct. 11, 2000 marked the establishment of Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) during a ceremony held at Point Mugu. The two commands of NAS Point Mugu and CBC Port Hueneme were consolidated into a completely new organization. Naval Base Ventura County provides the Pacific Fleet with a premier mobilization site, complete with a deep water port, rail head, and airfield-all in one package. Two outstanding commands - Construction Battalion Center Port Hueneme and Naval Air Station Point Mugu - have evolved into one full-service organization that is one of the major naval installations on the West Coast.

At Port Hueneme the deep water port is one of the few military ports on the West Coast. Port Hueneme has more than 300 acres of lay-down space and 16 miles of railroad with portside access. Point Mugu operates and maintains two runways, Runway 3-21 is 11,000 feet and Runway 9-27 is 5,500 feet. Runway 3-21 is capable of handling the largest of Air Force aircraft, including the C-5 Galaxy.

NBVC Point Mugu site welcomed Naval Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment Point Mugu (NAMTRAGRU DET) on Oct. 17, 2000. NAMTRAGRU DET was the final piece of the Hawkeye community to relocate from San Diego to Point Mugu. In 2001 the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department functions were transferred from Naval Base Ventura County to Commander Airborne Early Warning Wing U.S. Pacific Fleet.

The more than 70 military commands located at NBVC is ready to support the diverse missions of the Department of Defense. These missions include combat and weapon systems testing on the 36,000 miles Sea Range off the coast of Point Mugu. Four Seabee battalions, Underwater Construction Team TWO of the Third Naval Construction Brigade, and Naval Construction Training Center (Seabee College) are homeported at Port Hueneme. The Navy's combat skilled construction force serves around the world in support of military construction requirements.

Today, from the Aviators to the Seabees, NBVC provides world-class support to our nation's defense

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Please read this Privacy Policy before entering this site.
Send recommendations and comments to the NBVC Webmaster.

California State Closure History

1988

George Air Force Base	CLOSE
Hamilton Army Airfield	CLOSE
Mather Air Force Base	CLOSE
Naval Station San Francisco (Hunters Point)	REALIGN
Norton Air Force Base	CLOSE
Presidio of San Francisco	CLOSE
Salton Sea Test Base, Imperial County	CLOSE

1991

Beale Air Force Base	REALIGN
Castle Air Force Base	CLOSE
Fort Ord	CLOSE
Hunters Point Annex, San Francisco	CLOSE
Integrated Combat Systems Test Facility San Diego	CLOSE
Letterman Army Institute of Research Presidio of San Francisco	DISESTAB
Fleet Combat Direction Systems Support Activity San Diego	REALIGN
March Air Force Base	REALIGN
Mather Air Force Base	REDIRECT
Naval Air Station Moffett Field	CLOSE
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center San Diego	CLOSE
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center Vallejo	CLOSE
Naval Space Systems Activity Los Angeles	CLOSE
Naval Station Long Beach	CLOSE
Naval Weapons Center China Lake	REALIGN
Pacific Missile Test Center Point Mugu	REALIGN
Sacramento Army Depot	CLOSE
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin	CLOSE

1993

Castle Air Force Base (B-52 Combat Crew Training redirected from Fairchild AFB to Barksdale AFB and KC-135 Combat Crew Training from Fairchild AFB to Altus AFB)	REDIRECT
Data Processing Center Marine Corps Air Station El Toro	CLOSE
Data Processing Center Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division China Lake	CLOSE
Data Processing Center Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division Point Mugu	CLOSE
Data Processing Center Naval Command Control & Ocean Surveillance Center San Diego	CLOSE
Data Processing Center Navy Regional Data Automation Center San Francisco	CLOSE
Defense Contract Management District West El Segundo	RELOCATE
Defense Distribution Depot Oakland	DISESTAB

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island (Redirect to dispose of all property in any lawful manner, including outlease)	REDIRECT
March Air Force Base	REALIGN
Mare Island Naval Shipyard	CLOSE
Marine Corps Air Station El Toro	CLOSE
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin (Relocate MCAS Tustin helicopter assets to NAS North Island, NAS Miramar, or MCAS Camp Pendleton)	REDIRECT
Marine Corps Data Processing Center Regional Automated Services Center Camp Pendleton	CLOSE
Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow	REALIGN
Mather Air Force Base (940th Air Refueling Group redirected from McClellan AFB to Beale AFB)	REDIRECT
Naval Air Station Alameda	CLOSE
Naval Aviation Depot Alameda	CLOSE
Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center San Diego (Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center Vallejo into available space in Air Force Plant #19, San Diego, vice new construction)	REDIRECT
Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center Vallejo (Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems Center San Diego into available space in Air Force Plant #19, San Diego, vice new construction)	REDIRECT
Naval Hospital Oakland	CLOSE
Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco	CLOSE
Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach	REALIGN
Navy Data Processing Center Facilities Systems Office, Port Hueneme	CLOSE
Navy Data Processing Center Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, San Diego	CLOSE
Presidio of Monterey Annex	REALIGN
Presidio of San Francisco (6th Army remains at the Presidio of San Francisco, CA instead of moving to Fort Carson, CO)	REDIRECT
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme	CLOSE
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Western Engineering Field Division, San Bruno	CLOSE
Naval Reserve Center Pacific Grove	CLOSE
Naval Training Center San Diego	CLOSE
Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations Center (Surface) Pacific San Francisco	DISESTAB
Naval Public Works Center San Francisco	DISESTAB

1995

Oakland Army Base	CLOSE
Naval Shipyard Long Beach	CLOSE
McClellan Air Force Base	CLOSE
Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station	CLOSE
Defense Distribution Depot McClellan	DISESTAB

Fort Hunter Liggett	REALIGN
Sierra Army Depot	REALIGN
Onizuka Air Station	REALIGN
Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks	CLOSE
East Fort Baker	CLOSE
Rio Vista Army Reserve Center	CLOSE
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Oakland	CLOSE
Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering West Coast Division San Diego	DISESTAB
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair, USN, Long Beach	DISESTAB
Naval Reserve Center Stockton	CLOSE
Naval Reserve Center Santa Ana	CLOSE
Naval Reserve Center Pomona	CLOSE
Marine Corps Air Station El Toro	REDIRECT
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin	REDIRECT
Naval Air Station Alameda	REDIRECT
Naval Recruiting District San Diego	REDIRECT
Naval Training Center San Diego	REDIRECT
Defense Contract Management District West, El Segundo	REDIRECT

NAVAL BASE VENTURA CALIFORNIA

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Base realignment concerns aired at forums

Ventura County Star

Sylvia Moore

June 17, 2005

About 300 people worried about what will happen to jobs at **Naval Base Ventura County** attended two public forums Wednesday night in Camarillo.

The forums were organized by the Ventura County Base **Realignment** and Closure Task Force, a group of retired military and civilian defense employees and elected officials dedicated to fighting proposed job cuts at the base.

The meetings were designed to update the public on the BRAC process, take questions and solicit financial support and volunteers for lobbying efforts.

"This has to be a united front that says, 'Leave our base alone,' " said Ventura County Supervisor Kathy Long, a task force co-chairwoman.

On May 13, the Department of Defense released its long-awaited list of bases it wants to close or

realign. Although Ventura County's base escaped closure, the Pentagon's initial proposal called for **realignments** at the base resulting in a net loss of 3,397 jobs.

That number includes direct military and civilian employment, as well as jobs in the general economy that base employment indirectly supports. Most of the jobs would be transferred to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake.

The local task force members say from 4,500 to 6,300 jobs could actually be lost. Navy officials say the number of recommended job cuts and the kinds of positions affected is not yet final.

The local base is made up of the Naval Air Station at Point Mugu and the Construction Battalion Center at Port Hueneme.

Wednesday night's forum panelists included Long, Camarillo City Councilwoman Charlotte Craven, task force strategic chairman Henry Norton and Roger "Ted" Rains, a Camarillo resident appointed to the state Council on Base Support and Retention set up by Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger.

Also present were representatives from the offices of U.S. Reps. Lois Capps, D-Santa Barbara, and Elton Gallegly, R-Simi Valley, Assemblywoman Fran Pavley, D-Agoura Hills, and U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein.

The panelists said they are disappointed and frustrated with the amount of declassified information provided by the Pentagon that shows how the agency made its decisions. Much of the information is still classified.

The panelists told the audience, made up mostly of base employees and base supporters, that from what they can glean from the data so far, the Pentagon's cost-savings analysis doesn't add up.

"The numbers associated with positions and costs don't quite mesh with what's going on," Norton said. "We feel that some of the numbers don't make sense."

For example, Norton said, the Pentagon estimates that 94 percent of employees at Point Mugu could be transferred to China Lake, a figure that elicited scoffs from the audience. Some base employees in the audience said later that they didn't want to move, and that many of their colleagues feel angry over the possibility. None of the employees interviewed wanted to be identified.

The panelists said the task force has little time to prepare for a scheduled July 14 hearing before the federal BRAC Commission in Los Angeles. The commission has the authority to make changes to the Pentagon's recommendations.

More public forums are being planned around Ventura County, task force spokesman Tom Nielsen said.

Hundreds of base supporters attend forums

Ventura County Star

Sylvia Moore
June 17, 2005

Task force gives an update on its work, seeks aid in fighting for jobs
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"It's disturbing because we have a real uphill fight in front of us if we're going to salvage any of these positions," Rains said.

More public forums are being planned around Ventura County, task force spokesman Tom Nielsen said. Long said later that the size of Wednesday's audience was no surprise.

"We know we are at risk of losing 5,000-plus jobs," she said. "So I'm pleased with the turnout."

Concerns About Base Mount; Community Fears Losing More Than 6,000 Jobs

The Daily News of Los Angeles

Eric Leach

June 16, 2005

Ventura County's coastal communities could lose more than 6,000 high-paying jobs under the Department of Defense restructuring proposed last month - nearly twice as many as initially projected, officials said Wednesday.

The plan would cut employment by more than one-third at **Naval Base Ventura County**, transferring jobs from the base's Naval Air Warfare Center at Point Mugu to the Naval Air Weapons Station at China Lake in the Kern County desert.

"It is the worst of scenarios," said Bill Simmons, manager of the BRAC 2005 Ventura County Task Force, which is reviewing recommendations the Pentagon made last month to the **Base Realignment** and Closure Commission.

"We stand to lose up to 6,300 direct and indirect high-paying jobs, but we won't have the opportunity to redevelop the land if the current recommendations are implemented," he said.

Officials initially estimated that Ventura County would lose 1,550 military and 1,900 civilian jobs.

Ventura County officials said the greater potential job loss became apparent after closer review of documents released by the Department of Defense last month.

In a task force meeting with community leaders at Camarillo City Hall on Wednesday evening, a standing-room-only crowd of several hundred people - most of them military employees - voiced their concerns over possible relocation to the China Lake area.

Simmons said the military recommendations could result in a potential loss of 2,856 military and civil service jobs and 3,517 contractor jobs in Ventura County.

Naval Base Ventura County represents the county's largest employer, with about 17,000 workers on the base and contributing about \$1.2 billion a year to the local economy.

County officials said they will attend the federal BRAC Commission hearing - expected to be held in Southern California on July 14 - to make the case that the Ventura County changes would be detrimental to the military.

"I think it is urgent that the community get engaged and understand the impact. We need help from the community to raise funds and make sure we have a strong position when we come in front of the BRAC Commission in July," Ventura County Supervisor Kathy Long said.

Jack Dodd, former vice commander of the Naval Air Warfare Center at Point Mugu, said there are important military arguments against some of the proposed changes.

"Realigning Point Mugu's sea range, targets, test squadron and electronic warfare personnel and facilities to China Lake would cost millions of dollars, would reduce operational efficiencies, would reduce safety of operations and, most importantly, would negatively impact the ability of our war fighters, our men and women in uniform, to perform their missions," he said.

"We simply cannot let these recommendations stand."

Simmons said another major drawback to employment under the proposed changes is that it prevents new development on the land.

"Normally what happens is that developers can turn (closed) bases into useful projects, business parks, universities, you name it. Now we're talking about losing jobs while the Navy is still holding onto the land," he said. "So the community cannot turn it into revenue-producing land and have opportunity for economic rebound."

Howard Gantman, a spokesman for Sen. Dianne Feinstein, said her office will be reviewing all reports very closely. "We're always very concerned about the impact of base closures on local communities," he said.

Naval base supporters seek community's aid

Ventura County Star

Sylvia Moore

June 13, 2005

Group to hold two meetings for public

Supporters of **Naval Base Ventura** County are gearing up for a fight against proposed job cuts at the base, and they're asking for the public's help.

Wednesday night, the Ventura County Base **Realignment** and Closure (BRAC) Task Force will hold two town hall meetings in Camarillo to update the public on the Department of Defense's

recommendations for the base.

The task force wants to get citizens' input and raise money for travel expenses to and from Washington, D.C.

Task force members and local elected officials will speak at the event.

"The focus for Wednesday night is to really hear from the community," said county Supervisor Kathy Long, co-chairwoman of the task force.

Last month, the Pentagon released its long-awaited list of bases it wants to close or realign.

The federal BRAC Commission will hold a number of hearings around the country before the Pentagon puts together a final list in September.

President Bush will have until Sept. 23 to approve or reject the list. If he approves the list, Congress has 45 days to reject it. Otherwise, it becomes binding.

Naval Base Ventura County will be hit hard if the current recommendations are approved. The number of recommended job cuts has not been finalized, but the Pentagon's initial proposal released May 13 called for **realignments** at the base resulting in a net loss of 3,397 jobs.

That number includes direct military and civilian employment, as well as jobs in the general economy that base employment indirectly supports. Most of the military and civilian jobs would be transferred to the Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake.

The local task force members say 4,500 to 6,300 jobs could actually be lost.

Navy officials say it's not yet known which jobs could be affected. Local task force spokesman Tom Nielsen said the group is especially worried that the areas of electronic warfare, weapons division and reconnaissance systems could be greatly affected.

Task force members are now poring over mounds of Pentagon data to prepare themselves for the commission hearings and two scheduled base visits in July by commission staff.

"We're literally looking at hundreds and hundreds of documents," said Nielsen.

The documents show how the Pentagon arrived at its decisions to shut down bases and eliminate jobs. Still, task force members say Pentagon officials haven't released enough information.

"I believe that for every day they hold back information, they ought to extend the BRAC process," said Long.

Some Congressional leaders aren't happy, either. Sens. Susan Collins, R-Maine, and Joseph Lieberman, D-Conn., issued a subpoena this month demanding that the Pentagon declassify and release more documents.

In the meantime, Nielsen said, the task force is hoping to raise from \$150,000 to \$200,000 for operating expenses, mainly travel. So far, the cities of Oxnard, Port Hueneme and Ventura have agreed to donate a combined total of nearly \$65,000, Nielsen said.

Nielsen said the task force is hoping for a good turnout Wednesday of county residents, local defense contractors, base employees and their families.

"We know there's a pent-up desire for people at the bases to vent," said Nielsen. "They want to speak up."

Solemn day draws crowds to cemeteries

Ventura County Star

Sylvia Moore

May 31, 2005

Memorial services are held in many cities across the county

Thousands of veterans, family members and military supporters solemnly filled venues across Ventura County on Monday to remember the nation's war dead.

Memorial Day observances were held in Fillmore, Camarillo, Ventura, Ojai, Simi Valley, Santa Paula, Moorpark and Westlake Village.

Several hundred people attended Ivy Lawn Memorial Park's 34th annual Veterans Avenue of Flags Memorial Day service in Ventura. Many attendees wore patriotic red, white and blue, while some veterans donned their uniforms. The cemetery was dotted with more than 1,000 American flags.

The event's keynote speaker, U.S. Rep. Lois Capps, D-Santa Barbara, asked the audience to reflect on the sacrifices American military personnel have made to ensure the nation's citizens live in a free country.

"I'm honored to be here today as we remember and pay tribute to the over 1 million Americans who have given their lives for our country," said Capps. "These men and women are not forgotten. They have not given their lives in vain."

Capps also asked the audience to remember the sacrifices of the millions of veterans, as well as those of the families who have lost loved ones. Capps said that although she was critical of the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003, she stands by the troops and will continue to advocate for issues that affect them here at home, such as quality healthcare for veterans.

Capps closed by emphasizing her intent to keep jobs at **Naval Base Ventura County**, which the Department of Defense recommended as a candidate for job cuts earlier this month as part of this year's Base **Realignment** and Closure process.

"I'm continuing to fight for **Naval Base Ventura County**," Capps said to applause. "It's important for our military missions around the world to keep our resources functioning here."

Representatives from more than 60 veterans organizations and auxiliaries laid commemorative wreaths at a shrine before the speaker's podium. The Channel Islands Clippers and Andrew H. Hicks and his band provided music. The ceremony ended with a 21-gun salute, a Navy jet flyby

and a white dove release.

A ceremony at Valley Oaks Memorial Park in Westlake Village drew more than 2,500 people eager to pay their respects to current and former servicemen and servicewomen.

People sat in reverent silence through much of the 90-minute event, at times singing along or tapping their toes to "Battle Hymn of the Republic" and other patriotic tunes. They erupted in applause when a jet flew overhead -- its thunderous engines setting off car alarms -- and jumped to their feet as young Marines re-created the raising of the flag on Iwo Jima.

A heartfelt rendition by Larry Kern of "An American Soldier" -- the anthem of a man who knows the sacrifice of duty and the importance of the fight for freedom -- drew applause throughout and a standing ovation at the song's end as white doves were released as a symbol of peace.

Steven Weber, 53, of Newbury Park offered a simple thumbs up in quiet approval.

"He sang what we felt," the Vietnam veteran said.

Memorial Day is something that needs to be marked every year, just like birthdays, anniversaries and Christmas, said Emma Engle, 49, of Agoura Hills, as she stood in the shade of a small tree with the backdrop of her own 7-by-5-foot flag she'd proudly staked in the ground.

The Conejo Valley ceremony was one she hasn't missed in at least eight years, said Engle, who was decked out in an American-flag-designed cardigan, red USA shorts, a red, white and blue sun visor and ruby-colored stud earrings.

"I love, love the American flag," she said proudly as she gazed out at the large flags placed alongside the winding roads through the cemetery and the smaller ones placed at each veteran's grave site.

Moorpark residents had two opportunities to pay their respects close to home, the first a flag changing ceremony at the city's Veterans Memorial at the corner of Moorpark and Los Angeles avenues, where John Daniel House's name was inscribed on the memorial. House, 28, a Navy corpsman and former Moorpark High School student, was killed in a January helicopter crash in Iraq.

A second ceremony drew more than 100 people to Poindexter Park, where organizers had to clean up graffiti near the Veterans Memorial Grove in the hours before the ceremony, said event organizer Pete Duncan, adjutant of Moorpark Post 502.

"That puts a nasty little spin on the solemnness of the occasion," said Duncan, who nonetheless called the event a success.

A show of patriotism could also be found in Simi Valley, where a program was held at the city's public cemetery.

Bush affirms base closures

Ventura County Star

Jennifer Loven

May 28, 2005

He says unneeded sites waste billions

The Associated Press

ANNAPOLIS, Maryland -- Speaking out for the first time in favor of controversial base closings, President Bush said Friday the nation is wasting billions of dollars on unnecessary military facilities and needs the money for the war on terrorism.

Bush, who faces opposition from many states to shutting down bases, tried to be reassuring. He said the bases would be chosen fairly and the government would do all it could to help affected communities recover.

But he made clear that the process -- however painful -- could not be avoided.

In a speech to graduates of the Naval Academy, he said the closings and **realignments** "will result in a military that is more efficient and better prepared so you can better protect the American people against the dangers of this new century.

"In this war, there is only one option, and that is victory," he said, to cheers from midshipmen, relatives and faculty at the academy on the shores of the Chesapeake Bay.

When Bush last spoke at a Naval Academy commencement, it was four months before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, and his focus was his administration's effort to reshape the military into a faster, lighter and more flexible -- but not larger -- fighting force.

Since the attacks, and amid a global anti-terror campaign and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a top-to-bottom military transformation is even more necessary, Bush said. Keys to the success are new technology, repositioning of global forces, new weapons and realigned bases at home, he said.

Bush said he understands the fears in cities where bases have been marked for changes or closure. The first round of closings in a decade has members of Congress and local officials working hard to protect the 33 major bases slated for closure and the 29 others proposed for downsizing.

"I know firsthand how hard base closings can be on local communities," said the former Texas governor, who saw facilities shut down in his state.

Members of the congressionally chartered Base **Realignment** and Closure Commission will visit bases and hold hearings on the Pentagon proposal. The plan aims to save \$48.8 billion over 20 years by eliminating redundant and inefficient facilities and promoting cooperation among the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

Under the current recommendations, **Naval Base Ventura** County, which employs 6,000 military personnel and 9,000 civilians, would lose 2,393 civilian and military jobs. It would gain 859 jobs when the Naval Surface Warfare Center Corona Division transfers to **Naval Base Ventura**

County as part of the **realignment**.

Channel Islands Air National Guard next to Point Mugu would gain 19 jobs.

The panel will decide on any changes to the Pentagon plan and then give a list to Bush and Congress this fall for approval or rejection.

Commission Chairman Anthony Principi on Friday joined a growing chorus of lawmakers demanding that the Defense Department quickly release the thousands of pages of data backing up each of its recommendations.

"We cannot make informed decisions without the data," Principi said on Capitol Hill. "That's critical to our work."

Though all bases have defenders, Bush suggested most efforts to save them will be futile.

"We have more bases than we need," Bush said. "Supporting these facilities wastes billions of taxpayers' dollars, money that can be better spent on giving you the tools to fight terrorists and confront 21st-century threats."

The graduation ceremonies got under way with 21 cannon blasts and a fast and low flyover by the Blue Angels, the Navy's precision team of F/A-18 Hornets. After speaking, Bush handed out diplomas to those graduating with distinction, and he shook the hands of all 976 graduates.

Base safe, but not unscathed

Ventura County Star

M. Craft

May 14, 2005

County poised to lose 1,500 jobs

The dreaded Pentagon base closure list has been released and, for **Naval Base Ventura County**, the news, for the most part, is good. Naval Air Station Point Mugu and the Construction Battalion Center in Port Hueneme, which comprise NBVC, did escape the list, but are poised to lose about 1,500 jobs under the plan recommended Friday by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In all, the closure list includes 180 military installations from Maine to Hawaii, including 33 major bases, triggering the first round of base closures in a decade.

NAS Point Mugu took the hardest hit at NBVC. It could see some of its weapons units move to China Lake and San Diego. Channel Islands Air Guard station is scheduled to gain four military and 15 civilian jobs under the proposal. Unfortunately, the loss of jobs locally is the second highest recommended in California. Only Naval Medical Center San Diego is losing more jobs -- 1,630.

The state's big winner, China Lake, which is in the district of Rep. Bill Thomas, the Republican chairman of the powerful Ways and Means Committee and lead man in the House pushing Social Security reform, will see a gain of nearly 2,500 jobs.

For several years, county civic and political leaders have been on the offense in a concerted effort to highlight the efficiency and military importance of **Naval Base Ventura County** to the community, and to the Washington, D.C., and military establishment. They have worked hard to stress the critical importance of CBC's deep-water port and the ocean range at Point Mugu for testing and evaluation.

Clearly, the stakes were high. The two bases employ about 17,000 civilians and members of the military; and pump nearly \$2 billion annually into the local economy.

Although it is difficult to say for certain how big a role the unified lobbying efforts played, in the end, **Naval Base Ventura County** has survived, and the county's main employment centers remain in place. Still, the loss of jobs under the **realignment** plan -- 239 military, 1,295 civilian and approximately 1,880 indirect, off-base -- did somewhat dampen the day for local base supporters.

County Supervisor John Flynn said he is worried about the impact on the region's economy. "It will have an effect on everything from the sale of cars to food," he said.

Added Rep. Lois Capps, a Santa Barbara Democrat, who represents the Construction Battalion Center in Port Hueneme: "These changes would mean lost jobs in Ventura County and serious disruptions to the lives of the military and civilian personnel on the base and their families. The BRAC Commission should reject these recommendations. I continue to strongly believe that these missions are a critical element of our national security system and an important asset to our local community."

Secretary Rumsfeld's recommendations will now be reviewed by an independent nine-member commission that will face intense pressure from every congressional representative and senator with a targeted base in his or her district. The commission can make changes and additions before sending its own list to President Bush in September and then to Congress.

It is now time to play defense. The threat to **Naval Base Ventura County**, although much-diminished, is still there. Fortunately, even though the waiting game isn't quite over, the county does have precedent on its side if it can avoid the final list. In all previous rounds of the base **realignment** and closure process, the president has accepted the commission's final list and it has won acceptance in Congress.

With luck and hard work, **Naval Base Ventura County** will clear this final hurdle and continue to be a key player in the defense of the United States.

Recommended California base closures and realignments

The Associated Press

May 13, 2005

The Pentagon has recommended closing several California military installations, shifting jobs from some and adding missions to others. Many of the jobs scheduled for "**realignment**" will be transferred to existing bases in California, bringing the final tally of eliminated positions in the state to 2,018.

The list issued Friday also included 16 jobs being lost from the elimination or **realignment** of so-called leased space.

Bases proposed for closure, with number of jobs to be lost:

- Armed Forces Reserve Center, Bell, 24
- Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Oakland, 50
- Defense Finance and Accounting Service, San Bernardino, 120
- Defense Finance and Accounting Service, San Diego, 240
- Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Seaside, 61
- Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division, 892
- Concord Naval Weapons Station, 71
- Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center, Encino, 33
- Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center, Los Angeles, 48
- Onizuka Air Force Station, Santa Clara County, 278
- Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant, 89

Bases that would lose jobs under proposed **realignments**:

- Beale Air Force Base, 179
- Camp Parks, 43
- Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin , 31
- Human Resources Support Center Southwest, 164
- Los Alamitos, 170
- March Air Reserve Base, 111
- Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, 144
- Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, 419
- Naval Base Coronado, 460

- **Naval Base Ventura** County, 1,534
- Naval Medical Center San Diego, 1,630
- Naval Weapons Station Fallbrook, 118

Bases that would gain jobs under proposed **realignments**:

- AFRC Moffett Field, 253
- Channel Islands Air Guard Station, 19
- Edwards Air Force Base, 51
- Fort Hunter Liggett, 43
- Fresno Air Terminal, 311
- Marine Corps Base Miramar, 72
- Marine Corps Reserve Center Pasadena, 25
- Naval Air Station Lemoore, 40
- Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, 2,469
- Naval Base Point Loma, 309
- Naval Station San Diego, 1,170
- Vandenberg Air Force Base, 145

Editorial/Opinion Articles

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Ventura County, California, Community Position

Regarding DoD BRAC 2005 Recommendations for Realignment of Naval Base Ventura County Activities

Reference: TECHNICAL JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (VOLUME XII) 19 May 2005

1. Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

DoD Recommendation: Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 5012 jobs (2250 direct jobs and 2762 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Community Position: We understand the concept of creating a Naval Weapons and Armaments RDT&E Center and agree with the recommendation to establish that Center at the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake.

However, we take great exception to the number of positions and some of the functions to be realigned from Pt. Mugu, as identified in the TJCSG report. The specific details behind our objections follow:

(1) The Technical data calls received by NAWC WD Pt. Mugu directed that personnel, equipment and facilities that were within the Weapons and Armaments category, but were an "inextricable" part of the remaining core mission of the command, would be identified and explained in what was known as "Question 47." In response to this direction, NAWC WD Pt. Mugu reported 851 positions in the Sea Range, Targets, Logistics and G&A activities that should have been subtracted from the total W&A personnel numbers under consideration.

(2) An identical situation occurred at NSWC PHD Port Hueneme, with approximately 300 positions being identified in Question 47 as being "inextricable."

(3) In both Pt. Mugu and Port Hueneme cases, per direction, the losing activity did not include dynamic or facility costs to relocate the functions identified in Question 47.

(4) Somewhere in the TJCSG processes, however, the above Question 47 numbers identified in the original TECH2B scenario were not carried over to the eventual W&A RDATE&E scenario, called TECH18. The reasons for the broken process are not known, but could be categorized as either: (a) clerical error / inattention to detail, or (b) intentional, in disregard for the established procedures for deducting the number of "inextricable" positions. (At this date, 6/10/05, we are hearing that several other Navy facilities suffered the same error. Internal Navy questions requesting clarification have been forwarded, but resolution is not known.)

We also take exception to the recommendation to realign all VX-30 Test Squadron activities from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. This recommendation does not make operational sense and was at least partially based on an incorrect computation of savings. Specific details of our objections follow:

(1) VX-30 operates P-3, C-130 and F/A-18 aircraft. The P-3's and C-130's directly support Pt. Mugu Sea Range operations by providing surveillance, clearance, telemetry, flight termination, optics, communications, target launch and logistics support. These aircraft very rarely provide support to the Land Range at China Lake. Moving the P-3 and C-130 aircraft to China Lake would relocate them over 150 miles away from their primary operating area, thus increasing their response time to range tasking, reducing their on-range time and increasing their operating costs. Recurring costs of flying P-3's and C-130's from China Lake vice Pt. Mugu are estimated to be over \$2.3 Million per year. Additional flight hours on the aircraft would accelerate the expenditure of their fatigue lives, which would both reduce aircraft availability and increase depot level costs. Additionally, new hangar and parking apron MILCON costs would be required at China Lake, while none would be required at Pt. Mugu. Operationally, this recommendation simply does not make sense.

(2) Apparently, excessive gaining activity savings were claimed by eliminating the costs for operating and maintaining VX-30 F/A-18 aircraft. In fact, the decisions to divest the VX-30 F/A-18's and give the military billets back to the Navy were already made by Test Wing Pacific and the Naval Air Systems Command and were not BRAC decisions. Adding these savings to the BRAC analysis would be improper.

Community Recommendations:

(1) Reduce the number of Range, Targets, Anechoic Chamber, Logistics and G&A positions to be realigned from Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu by the number defined as being inextricable to the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

(2) Reduce the number of Weapons and Armament positions to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to

the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

(3) Reject the recommendation to move the VX-30 test squadron from Pt. Mugu to China Lake. Retain the Test Squadron Range Support Aircraft base of operations at Pt. Mugu.

2. Consolidate Maritime C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

***DoD Recommendation:** Realign Naval Base Ventura County, CA, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA, and Naval Station Newport, RI, by relocating Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, and consolidating with the Space Warfare Center to create the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.*

***Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 286 jobs (127 direct jobs and 159 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area.*

Community Position: In a manner identical to that discussed in Weapons and Armaments, above, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, identified a number of C4ISR positions as being inextricable to the core command mission. These positions and the rationale for identifying them were provided in a Question 47 data call response. Similar to W&A, these reduced numbers were apparently omitted from the final TJCSG roll-up in the reference document. Internal Navy questions requesting clarification have been forwarded, but resolution is not known.

Community Recommendation: Reduce the number of C4ISR jobs to be realigned from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme by the number defined as being inextricable to the command's core mission. (Honor those positions identified in the command response to Question #47.)

3. Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

***DoD Recommendation:** Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.*

***Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1075 jobs (479 direct*

jobs and 596 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area economic area.

Community Position: This recommended realignment of Electronic Warfare from Pt. Mugu to China Lake makes absolutely no sense. Rather than adding military value, such a move would put our Warfighters in harm's way. The specific details behind our objections follow:

(1) Pt. Mugu is the existing, recognized Center of Excellence (COE) for EW. A 2004 Naval Air Systems Command study was conducted to assess the abilities of both Pt. Mugu and China Lake to serve as a Joint EW COE. Due to the "black art" nature of the capability, which would be difficult to reconstitute at China Lake, Pt. Mugu was judged LOW risk and China Lake as HIGH risk. The NAVAIR recommendation was to support establishment of a Joint EW COE at Pt. Mugu.

(2) The Electronic Warfare activities at Point Mugu directly support the combat capability of the Navy and Air Force Warfighters. EW operates on a 24/7/365 basis. Engineers and analysts track the electronic signatures of potential threats gathered from the intelligence community, evaluate those electronic threats, develop solutions and issue hardware designs, data and software updates to operating forces on a response cycle often measured in hours. This capability has supported operational forces since the 1960's. EW personnel and laboratories reside in a state of the art secure facility at Point Mugu. The capability of this enterprise lies more in the expertise developed in the engineering cadre than in the facilities and equipment that are resident there. The EW workforce is very specialized, and while they do work with their aircraft software development counterparts at China Lake, they possess greatly different skills and experience. Quite simply, the majority of the existing Pt. Mugu EW workforce will not relocate to China Lake. Their "intellectual capital" will be lost and the ability of our Warfighters to counter threat systems will be significantly diminished.

(3) In response to the initial EW data call, the Pt. Mugu EW personnel estimated the costs to replicate their facility at China Lake, then dismantle the existing facility at Pt. Mugu. This approach was deemed to be the most practical in order to reduce the risk to operating forces. However, they were subsequently directed by their chain-of-command to reduce their BRAC costs by dismantling their existing facility, then moving it and re-establishing it at China Lake. The risk to the Warfighter is considered to be high in that the assumptions made for this revised submittal: (a) allow for no unforeseen costs nor schedule impacts, (b) disregard all ongoing program work, (c) assume all personnel will be readily available to assist in the move, and (d) assume that all current personnel will move to the new location. None of these assumptions are viewed to be justifiable or supported by historical data. In fact, it is believed that this approach will result in a significant negative impact to the Warfighter's electronic warfare capabilities in that emergency response capacity and time to respond will be degraded by an estimated 80% for a period of time during the transition (12 to 18 months), and at least 50% for the next decade with the loss of the talent base (which takes 8 to 10 years to develop) that would occur as a result of this action. At the very least, this impact would be measured in

hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, and at the worst it will be measured in lost lives of our Warfighters. The community assumes that the rationale for adopting the latter approach centered solely on making the proposed realignment satisfy target cost savings. In reality, it results in significant negative impact to the Warfighter.

(4) The cognizant weapons systems program managers played no significant part in the process. For example, Point Mugu is the primary organization for the in-house development of electronic countermeasures for the Navy and the Air Force. It is currently developing in house jamming technology in support of the Army to defeat improvised explosive devices in Iraq. Yet key DoD program managers in electronic warfare played no real part in the decision to destroy the intellectual capital at Point Mugu and move empty positions to China Lake. Similarly, Point Mugu is developing a countermeasure to hand-held anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADS), which will be disrupted by moving. The program managers, with the best view of EW systems requirements and the responsibility for EW systems development, do not concur with the DoD recommendation to move EW from Pt. Mugu to China Lake.

(5) The justification for this realignment, as stated in the reference document, is not supported by the facts. There is no "redundant infrastructure." The approximately 480 Pt. Mugu EW personnel and approximately 30 China Lake EW personnel work in the same organizational structure with common management. The recommended realignment would not make "more efficient use" of the Electronic Combat Range at China Lake. The EW system development process makes little use of the ECR. In fact, the EW systems in the new EA-6B ICAP III are now so sophisticated, they can tell that the threat emitters on the ECR are not "real." All significant testing is now performed in the laboratory environment.

Community Recommendations:

(1) Reject DoD's recommendation. Retain Electronic Warfare RDAT&E functions at Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Pt. Mugu.

(2) Consider realigning the far lesser number of China Lake positions to Pt. Mugu to enhance the existing Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence at Pt. Mugu.



HOME
PRIVACY POLICY

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SITE MAP
ACCESSIBILITY

Today's D
Last Upd

Visiting
NBVC?

NBVC Command

NB
COMM
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Welcome
Aboard

COMMANDING
OFFICER

Chief Staff Officer

Command Master Chief

Weekly Items
● Galley Me
● MWR Hig
● Family Hc

Base
Services

Command Chaplain

Judge Advocate

Equal Opportunity
Advisor

Command

Career Counselor

Ombudsman

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COMMANDING OFFICER
CAPTAIN Paul S. Grossgold
United States Navy

Captain Paul Grossgold is a native of Queens, New York, and a graduate of the City University of New York. After completing Aviation Officer Candidate School in Pensacola Florida, he was commissioned an Ensign in November 1979. Upon completion of Naval Flight Officer training in the E-2C Hawkeye, he reported to VAW-123 in April 1981 for his first operational tour, where he deployed twice to the Indian Ocean in USS AMERICA (CV-66).

Assigned next to VAW-120, Captain Grossgold served as an instructor in the E-2C Fleet Replacement Squadron. He returned to the fleet in April 1987, deploying again to the Indian Ocean in USS FORRESTAL (CV-59). During this deployment, he flew missions in support of Operation Ernest Will, providing coverage to re-flagged shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Captain Grossgold then reported to the Naval Military Personnel Command as the E-2C Assignments Officer and Sea Coordinator. His Department Head tour followed in October, 1991, where he deployed to the Mediterranean Sea aboard USS SARATOGA (CV-60) with VAW-125. He then completed Joint Professional Military Education at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, earning a Masters Degree in National Security and Foreign Affairs.

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- Naval Safe
- Navy Know
- Office of Pr (OPM)
- Thrift Savir
- TRI-CARE

In October 1994, Captain Grossgold reported to the Bear Aces of VAW-124 for his CO/XO tour. While deployed to the Adriatic Sea aboard USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN-71), he flew combat missions in support of Operation Deliberate Force. Once in command, he deployed again to the Mediterranean Sea aboard USS JOHN F KENNEDY (CV-67). He then served on the Joint Staff in Washington DC in the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) as Head, Interoperability Branch. Previously he was on the staff of Commander, Carrier Group FOUR as Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Exercises. He is currently the commanding officer of Naval Base Ventura County.

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What we just heard on F-18
differs from what was said
last week.

CAPT HRNASK last week wanted
F-18s to be at China Lake

→ do you know what time
Coyle & Bilbray have their
evening appointment? How
much of a rush are we in?

Largest employer Ventura County
17,000 total employees
PM is one of the country's 16 strategic ports --
only one that is military controlled
5 E-2C squadrons in Navy -- 4 at VCNB; 1 in Japan

DOON 161 B Corona
PM 701 & PM 7020 to be replaced by ~~PM~~
by MILCON

TECH 18 Weapons & Armaments

TECH 54 EW

TECH 18 (2A) Create Naval Integrated WTA ROTANE

IND-101A AIMD Fleet Readiness Centers
from San Diego; not clear

Nat'l Guard from Baltimore & Little Rock

Should Camarillo ^{complex} be closed?

Metrology Building was ~ \$5.8M in 2002 ??

Bldg 5 PHO would be vacated

4000 civ + MIL; 2000 Contractors in WO

2245 are at Pt. Mugu -- 74% of these ROTANE
Contractors are primarily on base - 444 on slide are
all on base

Corona people interested in moving to China Lake
rather than Corona

36k sqmi → can be expanded to 125 k sq mi

P-3 from Pt. Mugu
"would not be upset if Tech 54 were overturned"

**NAVAL AIR WEAPONS STATION
CHINA LAKE**



China Lake Defense Alliance
Ridgecrest, California
July 2005
BRAC Commission

7/8/05

- Phil Arnold
- Bill Porter
- Shelby Hagenauer
- Vince Fong
- William Vetterts
- Jon McQuiston

OUR REQUESTS

- Support Naval Integrated RDAT&E Center at China Lake Per DOD Recommendations
 - But reject decision to exempt Program Managers from move to China Lake
- Support relocating Sensors, Electronic Warfare and Electronics RDAT&E to China Lake
- Accept recommendations on aircraft intermediate maintenance and guns and ammunition

7/8/05 BRAC Commission

**INTEGRATED RDAT&E CENTER
MAKES SENSE**

- Meets criteria and SECDEF goals
- Scattering W&A across 10 bases
 - Wastes resources
 - Degrades focus
- Consolidating saves money
- Weapons are small piece of budget
 - Fragmented effort especially unacceptable

7/8/05 BRAC Commission

Supports SECDEF as written, except PMs should go to China Lake.

**INTEGRATED RDT&E CENTER
MAKES SENSE**

- Placing one center in each service assures competition of ideas
- Consolidation should be as complete as possible
 - Truncation of functions/number of personnel erodes value of integration

7/8/05

BRAC Commission

**CHINA LAKE IS RIGHT SITE FOR
INTEGRATED W&A RDT&E CENTER**

- Highest military value
 - Most complete staff, laboratories and ranges
 - Full spectrum capability to support all aspects of weapons and armament RDT&E
 - Not encroached, room to grow
- Cost Effective
- Community infrastructure can handle
- No environmental problems

7/8/05

BRAC Commission

**MILITARY VALUE RANK
WEAPONS & ARMAMENTS RDT&E**

ACQ	RESEARCH	T&E
China Lake 0.4982	China Lake 0.5062	China Lake 0.6391
Dahlgren 0.4669	Indian Head 0.3336	Point Mugu 0.6238
Patuxent River 0.3660	Dahlgren 0.2834	Dahlgren 0.4055
Port Hueneme 0.3103	Patuxent River 0.1826	Patuxent River 0.1074
Indian Head 0.2782	Point Mugu 0.1770	Crane 0.0930
Point Mugu 0.2252	Crane 0.1754	Indian Head 0.0787
Crane 0.2292	Port Hueneme 0.1156	Port Hueneme 0.0622
Seal Beach 0.1424	Seal Beach 0.0375	Seal Beach 0.0564

7/8/05

BRAC Commission

get factors that comprise M.V.

sea range must remain. They suggest 150 and move squadron. Maybe leave EA-6B at Mugu. Navy provide services

CHINA LAKE IS RIGHT SITE FOR INTEGRATED W&A RDTA&E CENTER

- China Lake selection supports transformation:
- Joint service customers
 - Combat aircraft-weapon integration - Level 5 rating by Software Engineering Institute
 - EA-18G EW aircraft and JSF on horizon
 - System integration capability beyond weapon-platform

7/8/05

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SEA RANGE IS VITAL

- Critical joint service asset that must be preserved
- Issue is how many stay at Mugu-San Nicolas and what moves to China Lake

7/8/05

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SEA RANGE ISSUE

- Everything doesn't need to stay at Point Mugu
 - Range/target operators need to be on site
 - Other functions should go to China Lake as recommended by TJCSG per certified China Lake-Pt Mugu-Navy data
- Value in consolidating functions that aren't needed on the Sea Range premises

7/8/05

BRAC Commission

See contractual
at Pt. Mugu

requirements for EA-6B

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ISSUE

- We disagree with exemption of Program Management Offices from move to China Lake
- We don't challenge exemption of Program Executive Offices
- Decision to exempt PMs not documented by TJCSG

- they think PMs belong w/ IPTs

7/8/05

BRAC Commission

PMs would be closer to Raytheon

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ISSUE

If management is at RDAT&E Center:

- Manager access to technical team for better response and decision making
- Staff and support contractor redundancy eliminated
- Manager travel cost offset by reduced technical travel
- Electronic communications maintains ties to headquarters - don't need 'business as usual'
- Puts managers closer to service customers

7/8/05

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PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ISSUE

- Management at field locations successful at Eglin AFB, Redstone Arsenal, Wright Patterson AFB (Aircraft) and C4IS-SPAWAR San Diego
- Many joint programs managed at Eglin AFB - JSF at WPAFB (not at Patuxent River)

7/8/05

BRAC Commission

ELECTRONIC WARFARE SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED AT CHINA LAKE

- China Lake appropriate location for consolidation
 - Payoff in 6 years vice 12 years (TJCSG used wrong factor in calculations)
 - Split staff inefficient
- China Lake higher overall military value
 - EW competency
- Leverage transition from EA-6B to EA-18G
 - China Lake integration team
- Weapons, EW and platform integration are closely related
 - Co-location promotes synergism

7/8/05

BRAC Commission

they used 5.7%
China Lake says no
use 15%

SENSORS, EW & ELECTRONICS MILITARY VALUE

Dev. & Acq.		Research		Test & Eval.	
Pt. Mugu	0.3495	China Lake	0.3594	China Lake	0.5610
China Lake	0.3267	Pt. Mugu	0.2811	Pt. Mugu	0.3103

7/8/05

BRAC Commission

COMMUNITY

- "Navy town" can handle influx
- BRAC recommendations bring China Lake work force to pre-downsizing level
- Ready for proposed transfers and indirect growth
 - Basic resources in place
 - Water
 - Waste treatment
 - Space for housing, contractors, businesses
 - Plans in place for population upturn
 - Schools
 - Housing
 - Public facilities and support

7/8/05

BRAC Commission

CONCLUSIONS

We respectfully recommend Commission:

- Approve creation of Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E Center at China Lake
 - Include Program Management Offices in Center
 - Resist proposals to truncate/reduce moves
- Approve relocation of Sensors, Electronic Warfare and Electronics RDAT&E to China Lake

7/8/05

BRAC Commission

**THANK YOU
FOR SERVING COUNTRY
ON BRAC COMMISSION**

7/8/05

BRAC Commission

Sunday, July 10, 2005

Les and David,

We had planned to go through our updated briefing for the Commission's Los Angeles Regional Hearing at the end of the community program on Monday at Cerro Coso Community College. As you know Les, we're challenging the decision to not move program managers to the Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDT&E Center. It's not that they object to the community challenging the Navy. They are concerned, that because of their attendance at the presentation might lead to community attendees' interpretation that they are endorsing our challenge. We want to be sensitive to their concerns

We have asked Mayor Holloway not to introduce us to speak at the end of the community briefings as shown on the program. We would like for the program to end at that point and meet with you privately for 15 to 20 minutes at the Heritage Hotel lobby. We found something very interesting in the COBRA report regarding the proposed Electronic Warfare relocation and some other things.

We'll see you at Cerro Coso, but just won't be on the program.

The attached material includes the Powerpoint slides for Los Angeles, a hard copy of the supporting material and a CD. In addition to the regional hearing material, we've enclosed copies of the proposal by our counterparts for Edwards Air Force Base and Naval Base Ventura County for a Joint Aerospace RDT&E Center, which you have seen Les, and three papers written a couple of years ago to support our thinking about BRAC. The CD has digital versions of that material as well for the library.

See you tomorrow,



Phil Arnold
375-6389,
Cell 382-0499

Attached:

Los Angeles Hearing briefing material
Concept paper on Joint Aerospace RDT&E Center
BRAC papers on China Lake