DCN: 11898

July 26, 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0156, CT-0646, What Has Changed to Suggest Basing All B-1s at One Base

Requester: BRAC Commission (Kenneth Small, AF Team Leader)

Issue: During the hearing on August [sic] 18, 2005, the Commission asked General Moseley what had changed to cause the Air Force to propose to base all the B-1s at one location. General Moseley responded that the number of B-1s has been reduced from 100 to 67, and, the Air Force had several examples where all the aircraft of a type were in one location, such as the B-2, F-117, J-Stars and several other aircraft types.

Question: Please respond to the following question: What has changed, other than you have fewer aircraft, that leads you to conclude that you can base all the B-1 aircraft at one base with one runway?

Answer: On July 18, 2005 Commissioner Skinner raised concerns about the uniqueness of the B-1s operating at a single-runway base, especially in the event of a catastrophe to the runway or facilities at that one base. In his testimony, Gen Moseley replied to Commission Skinner that bedding down an entire weapons system at one installation would not be inconsistent with how the Air Force bases and operates other unique, low-density weapons systems:

> "Sir, addressing the single location, we have our Global Hawks and our U-2s now at only one location. We have J-STARS at one location, Rivet Joint at one location, the F-117s at one location, the B-2s at one location. And so, the notion of going to a single location is not inconsistent with some of our other force structure pieces of inventory that we sit with about 60 or 70 airplanes."

What Commissioner Skinner addressed is not uncommon in today's Air Force given the smaller, diversified force structure; multiple unique, high-value platforms; and the Air Force's historical installation inventory. For example, the B-2 fleet resides at a single-runway base at Whiteman; the U-2/Global Hawk fleet at a single-runway base at Beale; the RC-135/NAOC fleet at a single-runway base at Offutt; and the Joint STARS fleet at a single-runway installation at Robins--all former SAC large aircraft locations. These type of bases had a long, single-runway configuration to disperse, generate and launch a strategic alert force--unlike TAC or ATC bases, which had multiple runways to accommodate concurrent airfield or training events, or whose type of aircraft did not have the range to recover elsewhere. Additionally, all F-117s are located at Holloman and the majority of all special operations aircraft at Hurlburt Field (single runway). All these installations have MDS-unique infrastructure that is difficult to replicate, but this is an operational risk the Air Force has traditionally accepted given the high cost in creating redundant infrastructure elsewhere. This is also a result of the installation inventory today's Air Force has evolved from, to include four previous rounds of base closures. The Air Force uses contingency basing plans in the event of scheduled runway maintenance or natural disaster, such as hurricane evacuation, to ensure portions of its fleet can disperse to, and temporarily operate from, other CONUS locations. The Department's BRAC recommendations can accommodate this type of surge requirement within the remaining Air Force installation inventory.

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Bottom Line: The B-1 fleet is now a conventional fleet and force dispersal requirements vis-à-vis its former SIOP mission no longer apply. As Gen Moseley testified, today's B-1 force has 67 aircraft, including combat-coded, training, test, attrition reserve and backup inventory. Having balanced both operational risk and cost, consolidating this conventional fleet of combat-coded and training aircraft at Dyess makes fiscal sense. It will allow the Air Force to maximize effectiveness of its base loading and further leverage common support requirements for its B-1 fleet, not unlike the operational risk it assumes for its other unique weapons systems.

Approved

DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

DCN: 11898

2 Aug 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0171 (CT-0706)

Requester: R. Gary Dinsick, Army Team Leader

Question 1: Lift requirements at Pope-Bragg. Please identify lift requirements at Pope AFB. Please do not limit it only to a "number of chutes required" solution, but include all planned short haul deployments, (within C-130 distances) as well as daily training based on historical data.

Air Force Answer 1: 43 AW does not track the Ft Bragg requirements. See accompanying data provided by 18th Corp.

Question 2: Additional Brigade Combat Team at Bragg. While the Fort Bragg recommendation realigns 7th SFG to Eglin AFB, does OSD believe the lift requirement at Pope-Bragg will increase based on the activation of an additional BCT, and by how much?

Army Answer 2: Based on recent coordination with the Army G3 Force Management Office, we believe that the net increase in population at Fort Bragg from FY03 to FY11 is approximately 1800 authorizations. This increase reflects all known changes in authorizations at Fort Bragg due to BRAC, Army Modular Force Transformation, and the return of forces from overseas. Therefore, we believe that the maximum increase in paid parachute positions is 1800. This would be less than a five percent increase in the lift requirement.

Question 3: 43d Airlift Wing support of the current lift requirements. Over the last two years, how much of the lift requirement at Fort Bragg has been satisfied by the C-130 aircraft of the 43d Wing permanently stationed at Pope AFB? Is there any reason why that number would be currently smaller than the historic average (aircraft maintenance issues, deployments)?

Air Force Answer 3: The 43 AW conducts a significant portion of the JAATT missions that support Ft. Bragg (Primary source of data is the 18 Corps G3 Air. Numbers were crosschecked with 43 AW data). In FY 04 the 43 AW provided approximately 65% of the C-130 JAATT sorties for Ft Bragg. Raw data shows of the 977 C-130 sorties contracted by the 18 ABC, the 43 AW supplied 644. In FY 05 (Oct 04 – Jun 05), the 43 AW supplied 436 of the 608 sorties for a 71% rate. As another FY 05 metric, the 43 AW supported 85 of the scheduled 154 missions. Again, missions can translate to multiple sorties on multiple days. There also have been 229 C-130 aircraft scheduled so far in FY 05 with the 43 AW providing 140. A longer snap shot using an AMC historical database and GDSS reports shows the following: From Jan 99 thru 11 Sep 01 the 43 AW flew 1752 of the actual 3986 sorties flown for a 43% rate. From 11 Sep 01 to Present the 43 AW has flown 1354 of the 3754 sorties flown for a 36% rate. Overall sortie count for entire C-130 fleet is down significantly the last two years from historical data due high deployment rates and maintenance issues.

Question 4: Other support of the current lift requirements. Over the last two years, how much of the lift requirement at Fort Bragg has been satisfied C-130s from Air Guard and Air Force Reserve units?

Air Force Answer 4: Source of data is 18 Corps G-3 Air. In FY 04, approximately 18% (177 of 977) of the JAATT sorties for Ft Bragg "lift" were satisfied by ANG and AFRC units. For FY 05, to date, approximately 12% (74 of 608) of the sorties were satisfied by ANG and AFRC units.

Question 5: Other support of the current lift requirements. Over the last two years, how much of the lift requirement at Fort Bragg has been satisfied by strategic lift capabilities (i.e., C-5 or C-17)?

Air Force Answer 5: See accompanying slides provide by the 18th Corp.

Question 6: No C-130's permanently stationed at Pope AFB. If no C-130's are permanently stationed at Pope AFB, what corresponding support infrastructure will no longer be necessary? What savings will be realized by no longer needing this infrastructure? How will these potential savings be offset by increased support from other Active, Air Reserve or Guard units that must spend TDY funds to satisfy the lift requirements?

Air Force Answer 6: If no C-130 aircraft are stationed at Pope AFB the following facilities would be excess: Buildings 900, 738, 741, 750, 735, 731, 730, 724, 721, 720, 715, 718, 706, 568, 558, 555, 554, and 550. In order for savings to occur, the assumption must be made that facilities will not be occupied. With zero annual utility, maintenance, and custodial costs the savings would equal over $1.3M annually. This assumption would change if USA personnel occupy the facilities and the Ft. Bragg Garrison incurs additional costs to maintain the facilities. A ROM for the cost incurred to use TDY C-130 aircrews vice 43 AW crews is $175 K per year.

Question 7: 7th SFG to Eglin. The DoD justification for relocating the 7th SFG to Eglin AFB included, among other justifications, the fact that it would be "creating needed space for the additional brigade at Fort Bragg." Please define this "space" as maneuver, barracks, or otherwise. During a visit to Fort Bragg, the Commission learned that no barracks space would be made available as the 7th SFG vacates, since other Special Operations units will expand to fill the vacancies? Did DoD consider in its costs the additional funds required to build new barracks for the additional BCT?

Army Answer 7: The Army Basing Study Group (TABS) considered space as facilities, training ranges and maneuver space. We followed a standard process for the analysis of facility requirements and documented the results in the Cost of Base Realignment and Closure Action (COBRA) model in our recommendations. Using the certified Real Property Planning and Analysis System (RPLANS), the 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) was removed from Fort Bragg and an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (BCT) was added. RPLANS uses available or excess space across all facility codes before building a requirement for new construction. In cases where a BRAC-related action creates excess space, we either documented the excess space as facility space shutdown in the COBRA model or RPLANS considered the excess space in

determining new construction requirements. TABS did not include undefined or potential requirements that were not approved by the Army in our analysis. At the time the recommendation was completed, we did not have documented requirements for a potential expansion of Army Special Operations Command units at Fort Bragg. Therefore, it was not included as BRAC-related action. Recent coordination with the Army G3 force management office only shows a future requirement (FY08) for a new civil affairs brigade. However, it only has authorizations for 319 Soldiers. This is far less than the 7th SFG. There is a net savings in facilities at Fort Bragg based on the move of the 7th SFG. We applied that savings or efficiencies to the activation of the Infantry BCT as it is BRAC-related as well. It would not have been appropriate to include the cost of the future Special Operations units, as they are not BRAC-related. Finally, as we stated in the response to question 2 above, we believe that the total gain in authorizations at Fort Bragg is only 1800, when all actions are considered. If there are additional requirements at Fort Bragg, the Army will fund them outside of BRAC.

Question 8: 43D Airlift Wing joint planning and contingency operations support. What does OSD believe is the 43d Wing's contributions to jointness with respect to Army units at Fort Bragg? How will the planned Air Force Reserve/Active Associate Squadron be able to replicate the joint planning and contingency support capabilities that exist within the 43D Airlift Wing? Do the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) requirements of Fort Bragg units require the joint planning and contingency support capabilities of the 43D Airlift Wing?

Air Force (AFRC) Answer 8: In regard to 43rd Wing's contribution to jointness with respect to Army units at Ft Bragg, it would be an understatement to limit this to one squadron. The jointness at Ft Bragg extends beyond the 43rd Wing and includes every AMC stratlifter and tactical airlifter (to include the ARC) to manage the day-to-day training and real world requirements. An operation that continually requires multi-service integration to meet routine training objectives requires a higher level of planning and coordination to compensate for the numerous external factors (weather, logistics, time constraints, etc.). The 43AW does not have a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan requirement. Depending on what the requirement is would drive what the wing is asked to support. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan requirements for Ft Bragg would be vetted from JFCOM to TRANSCOM followed by flowing to AMC and TACC. The designated joint planners generally come out of HQ staffs above the wing level, so as not to impede the wings primary mission of providing crews to support the requirement. For local training exercises the 43rd wing tactics shop generally provides the lead C-130 planners, which could be replicated in the planned capabilities between the Reserve wing and active duty associate personnel.

Approved

DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

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43D AIRLIFT WING

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JOINT BRAGG/POPE BRAC COMMISSION BRIEFING

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1

Introduction

- Commission Questions
- Airborne Requirement
- 43 AW Support
- Garrison Plan
- Summary

2

Commission Questions

- C-130 Lift Requirements
- Strategic Lift Support
- AFRC w/Active Duty Associate Unit Support
- Support With No Permanently Stationed C-130s

3

JA/ATT Program

- Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training
- DOD Regulated, JCS Directed, USAF Funded
- Users Submit Request
  - Date, Time, Location, Service Requested
- Bi-Monthly Meeting Chaired by TACC
  - Units "Bid" On Requests
- Not All Requests Supported
- Majority of Army Support via JA/ATT Program

4

SAAM Program

- Special Assignment Airlift Mission
- User "Buys" The Plane
- Rate Based on Flying Hours Used
  - C-17 = $2,756
  - C-130 = $1,559
  - C-5 = $6,039
  - Commercial Flights by contract negotiation
- Support Based on JCS Priority System

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Airborne Requirement

- Division Ready Brigade (DRB 1) 3140 Jumpers
  - Highest State of Readiness for One of Three Brigades
  - Ready to Deploy from Pope AFB Within 18 Hours
- XVIII Abn Corps Separate Bdes & 82d Abn Div
  - 20,000 Paratroopers (1 Jump every 90 days)
- Large Package Week BN & Below
  - (4 x per year 4 x C17s & 6 x C130s)
- Joint Forcible Entry Exercise Bde and Above
  - (4 x per year 9 x C17s & 6 x C130s)
- 82d Abn Div Current Strength: 15,000 (+/-)
  - Modular Force: 18,000
  - No significant impact of transformation on the DRB

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DCN: 11898

FY04 C-130 Lift Requirement
(Individual Aircraft Flights)

	Total # Contracted	# Contracted by 43AW	# Contractred by other Active units	# Contracted by Air Guard / AF Reserve
XVIII ABC Separates	360	274 (76.1 %)	9 (2.5 %)	77 (21.4 %)
82d ABN Division	617	370 (60 %)	147 (23.8 %)	100 (16.2 %)
TOTAL	977	644 (65.9 %)	156 (16 %)	177 (18.1 %)

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FY05 C-130 Lift Requirement
(Individual Aircraft Flights)

	Total # Contracted	# Contracted by 43AW	# Contractred by other Active units	# Contracted by Air Guard / AF Reserve
XVIII ABC Separates	185	148 (80 %)	7 (3.8 %)	30 (16.2 %)
82d ABN Division	423	288 (68.1 %)	91 (21.5 %)	44 (10.4 %)
TOTAL	608	436 (71.7 %)	98 (16.1 %)	74 (12.2 %)

~~1536~~ per working day.
140 ~~148~~
140) 436 = 3.1/day
420
160

8

C-17 Lift Requirement
(Individual Aircraft Flights)

	FY 04	FY 05
XVIII ABC Separate Brigades	262	228
82d ABN DIV	534	487
TOTAL	796	715

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43 AW Aircraft Availability

	FY03	FYO4	FY05
Assigned	28	28	28
Possessed	22.2	24.6	18.7
Deployed	9.2	9.8	7.4
Grounded	3.9	1.3	13.2

10

AFRC Wing – 16 PAA

Will the planned Air Force Reserve/Active Associate Squadron be able to replicate the joint planning and contingency support capabilities?

IT DEPENDS

- JA/ATT Program Involvement
- Volunteerism
- Associate Unit Helps

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No Base Assigned C-130s

- JA/ATT Program
- SAAM

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Advantage of Assigned C-130s

- Trained In Entire Spectrum Of C-130 Mission Requirements Without TDY Travel
- Assets
  - Mackall AAF – NVG Capability To Blacked-Out Airfield
  - Access To Personnel Drops – Toughest Navigator Training Requirement To Achieve For Non Pope CONUS C-130s
  - Historically Pope C-130 Units Were some of the First called upon for action:
    - Grenada
    - Just Cause
    - Haiti
    - Desert Storm/Shield
    - Enduring/Iraqi Freedom

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Historical Strategic Data
(Individual Aircraft Flights)

	C-17	C-5	Civ Contract
FY 04	30	13	21
FY 05	22	8	74
TOTAL	52	21	95

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

Green Ramp



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Pope AFB Support

- 26% AMC JA/ATTs Scheduled @ Pope
  - Jun 02 – Aug 05
  - JFEX, CAPSTONE, EDRES
- Primary Departure Point:
  - XVIII Abn Corps (14 Separate Bdes)
  - 82nd Airborne Division DRB
  - USASOC
  - 43AW And 23FG
  - Others

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43 AW Direct Support

3rd Aerial Port Squadron
- Personnel - 258
- Advise A/DACG On Airflow ETA/ETD
- Receive/Processes Passenger/Cargo Manifests
- Supervise/Conducts Aircraft Loading
- Operates All MHE/Special Loading Equipment
- Coordinates Aerial port and A/DACG Activities
- Maintains Statistical Data

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Cargo/Passenger

	AIRDROP		AIRLAND	
FY	Pax	Cargo	Pax	Cargo
00	123,101	4,104	40,894	9,728
01	109,258	3,510	46,400	11,949
02	84,803	2,402	53,218	23,250
03	57,463	2,820	68,470	39,192
04	85,379	3,331	75,767	19,763
05	34,398	1,803	27,465	8,503

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43 AW Direct Support

- 43 OG-J (Joint Operations)
  - Personnel – 28
  - Plans Training, Exercise, and Contingency Operations
    - Capable Of Supporting Multiple Airframes/Missions
    - Identify LIMFACs Early In Planning Process
  - Aircraft Maneuverability Is Integral To Success
    - Controls Parking Plan
  - Conducts All Joint Inspections Of Airdrop Loads
  - Executes the plan (Exercise or Crisis)

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43 AW Direct Support

43 COMMAND POST
- Personnel – 24
- C2 Link Between Aircraft Other Agencies
  - GLO, MX, 3 APS, Range Control, etc
- CAT/Joint Operations Center (JOC)

743 AMXS
- Personnel – 111
- AMC's Sole CONUS Enroute Maintenance Squadron
- 24/7, 365 Transient Aircraft Maintenance Support
  - C-5, C-17, C-130, Commercial

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Total 743 AMXS Support
(ALL USERS)

FY	C-130	C-17	Civ/Other	Total
00	1,158	627	684	2,469
01	1,332	947	272	2,551
02	1,450	566	610	2,626
03	1,453	1,370	629	3,452
04	708	1,327	345	2,380
05 (Jun)	566	1,043	921	2,530

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43 AW Indirect Support

- 43 OSS
  - Current Ops
    - Personnel Attend Bi-Monthly JAATT Conferences
    - Identifies Scheduling Conflicts
    - Monitors/Deconflicts R5311 Operations
    - Joint Training Exercises
    - JAATT / SAAM Flights
  - Tactics
    - 8 - JEFX, 4 X JRTX/CAPSTONE, 2 X CADS Annually
    - Planning Begins 45 Days Out
    - Mission Commander - G3 Coordination Begins
- 43 LRS
  - Maintains Special Purpose Vehicles
    - K-Loaders, Forklifts, Refueling/Servicing Trucks
  - POL
    - Operates POL Facilities and Vehicles
  - Aircraft Supply

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Ft Bragg Direct Support

- Strom Thurmond Strategic Deployment Facility
  - Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group
  - High Line Docks/Assembly Lanes
    - Covered Storage For Equipment
    - 40 C-141 Loads Of Palletized Cargo On The High Line Docks
    - 60 C-141 Loads Of Rolling Stock In The Lanes
    - Meets Explosives Safety Zone Requirements
  - Paratroop Assembly Facilities (Pax Sheds)
    - 3 Climate Controlled Facilities For Troop Assembly
    - Shed 1 Can Hold 750 Combat Equipped Troops
    - Shed 2 & 3 Can Hold 1000 Combat Equipped Jumpers Each
    - Distribute Parachutes
    - Rehearse Door Procedures

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Fort Bragg Garrison

Air Force Elements That Will Remain at Pope

- ✓ Aerial Port
- ✓ Enroute Maintenance
- ✓ 18th ASOG
- ✓ 14th ASOS
- ✓ 43d Weather Squadron
- ✓ 43d Medical Squadron
- ✓ Det 1, 373d Training Squadron
- ✓ Combat Control Training School
- ✓ Special Tactics Squadrons

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Fort Bragg Garrison

Function Transfers to Fort Bragg Garrison

FUNCTION/SERVICE	CAPABILITY	
	INTERNAL	EXTERNAL
POL STORAGE & DISTRIBUTION		X
VEHICLE & EQUIPMENT MAINT	X	
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL	X	
SECURITY & ACCESS CONTROL	X	
FIRE & CRASH RESCUE	X	
NAVAIDS		X
AIRFIELD MAINTENANCE	X	
PASSENGER TERMINAL	X	
BILLETING	X	
AVIATION SAFETY	X	
LAW ENFORCEMENT	X	

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Joint Ops Success Hinges Upon

- Key Facilities/Equipment
- Trained Personnel
- Joint Training Opportunities

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Summary

- Combination Of Assets Allow Rapid Deployment
- Units Specifically Tailored For Process
  - DRB1, ADACG, OG-J3, 3 APS ,743 AMXS, 43 LRS
  - GLOs (Army Liaison Personnel)
- Facilities Uniquely Designed To Expedite Departure
- Capability Frequently Rehearsed

Green Ramp Becomes The Center Of Gravity For Rapid Deployment In A National Crisis.

28

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29

C-130 Scenario Group Overview

Start Point. The C-130 force laydown used to develop DoD BRAC 2005 recommendations begins with 390 primary assigned C-130s based on 35 installations at the end of FY 06. Pre-BRAC plans would result in 46% of the C-130 force comprised of effectively sized squadrons at the 35 C-130 bases.

Force Structure. The 2025 Force Structure Plan reduces the C-130 inventory by 15%, down to 327 primary aircraft assigned (PAA). To more effectively operate this reduced force, the Air Force strategy is to organize it into more effectively sized squadrons of 16 aircraft (12 is an acceptable size for the Guard and Reserve (ARC) due to higher average experience levels in the ARC). Effectively sized squadrons better meet the Air Force's expeditionary needs and make a smaller force more effective in meeting both homeland and global defense needs.

Recommended End State. The DoD BRAC 2005 end state is C-130s based at 18 installations at the end of FY 11. DoD BRAC recommendations would result in a C-130 force in 2011 comprised almost entirely of optimally sized squadrons. After the BRAC recommendations, 89% of the C-130 fleet will be based in effectively sized squadrons at 16 C-130 bases.

Role of mission compatibility index (MCI) scores. In the first step we assigned an initial C-130 laydown using the force structure plan and raw MCI scores. The MCI scores accommodate many, but not all, of the characteristics that comprise military value. Among those characteristics not readily modeled are force structure proportionality among the Active, Guard, and AF Reserve components; consolidation of C-130 variants for operational or logistics reasons, sizing of training functions, Air Reserve Component (ARC) demographics and joint interoperability. Where we apply military knowledge and judgment to MCI outcomes, we cite the characteristics below as notes in the tables:

1. Active/Guard/Reserve Proportionality. Proportionality refers to keeping in constant balance the proportion of the fleet operated by the Active Duty, Guard, and AF Reserve.

2. Air Sovereignty. The Air Force worked closely with USNORTHCOM to ensure its ability to execute the air sovereignty mission within the laydown.

3. Change for Operational / Logistical Reasons. Recommendations of the type are made for both operational (e.g., mission type) and logistical (e.g., aircraft commonality) reasons.

4. Test Resources. Edwards and Eglin keep the same number of test aircraft reflected in the FY 06 POM. Overseas bases were not considered and therefore maintain the status quo.

5. Training Bases. The size of the training fleet is appropriate to the size of the entire fleet. For the C-130 fleet, Little Rock, Dobbins, and provisionally Fort Bragg execute the Flying Training Unit (FTU) mission.

6. ARC Demographics. Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve General Officer members of the AF Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) provided expert military

knowledge and judgment with respect to state factors, possible emerging missions, ability to associate with active units, and ability to recruit to larger squadron sizes.

7. Joint Interoperability. These judgments refer to interoperability factors related to nearby installations (e.g., Reserve C-130s at Pope/Ft Bragg, C-130 support to Alaskan NORAD missions).

C-130 Scenario Group Recommendations, by Component

Active Duty. The active duty C-130 force decreases from 126 to 98 PAA. Active duty operational C-130s consolidate from three United States locations to one location, Little Rock AFB. The training location remains the same; the number of training aircraft is reduced at Little Rock AFB commensurate with the planned reduction in the fleet. C-130s assigned to Pope AFB were distributed to Little Rock AFB to enable other DoD recommendations that relocate Army Forces Command to Pope/Fort Bragg. C-130s assigned to Dyess AFB were redistributed to enable Dyess to be solely utilized as a B-1 base (Ellsworth closure).

	MCI	Installation	SQDNs	Start	BRAC	SQDNs	NOTE
AD	6	Pope	2	25	0	0	1
AD	11	Dyess	2	32	0	0	3
AD	17		5	69	98	6	
				126	98		

Air Force Reserve (AFR). The AFR C-130 force decreases from 88 to 84 PAA. The AFR C-130 fleet consolidates from ten to seven United States locations, with Active associate units at Peterson and Fort Bragg.

	MCI	Installation	SQDNs	Start	BRAC	SQDNs	NOTE
AFR	6		0	0	16	1	1
AFR	21		1	8	12	1	
AFR/AD	30		1	12	16	1	
AFR	69	Keesler	1	8	8	1	
AFR	71		1	8	12	1	
AFR	99	Minneapolis AFR	1	8	8	1	
AFR	102	Youngstown	1	12	12	1	
AFR	103	Niagara Falls	1	8	0	0	
AFR	105	Pittsburgh	1	8	0	0	
AFR	123	Willow Grove	1	8	0	0	
AFR	130	Gen Mitchell	1	8	0	0	
				88	84		

Air National Guard (ANG). The ANG C-130 force decreases from 176 to 145 PAA. ANG C-130s consolidate from 23 to 12 squadrons, with Active associate units at Elmendorf and Cheyenne.

Exceptions to MCI ranking are noted below:

Will Rogers - Although Will Rogers ranked relatively high in military value, it was chosen to give up C-130 force structure for the following reasons: 1) proximity to Tinker AFB presents the opportunity to form an associate unit with an AFR KC-135 aircraft unit at Tinker that is growing in PAA; 2) vacating space at Will Rogers enables the Air Force to relocate the Air Force Flight Standards Agency and Air Force Advanced Instrument School there to be in close proximity to offices of the Federal Aviation Administration, and 3) the Guard is able to tap other ARC demographic areas with C-130s.

Boise to Cheyenne - Although in the Airlift MCI, Boise ranks 66, it ranks equally high for A-10s and will have an ANG A-10 unit increasing to an optimum size. Further, the 4PAA unit at Boise is an ineffective size. Both the Boise and Cheyenne units are the sole ANG flying units in their respective states. Recommended BRAC moves associated with these two installations present an opportunity to preserve an ANG flying mission in each state. Due to its very close proximity to F.E. Warren AFB, the ANG C-130 Mobile Aerial Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) unit at Cheyenne was identified as a prime location for an active association even though it ranked 118.

Selfridge - Changing aircraft type to KC-135s.

Reno - Reno was chosen to transfer its aircraft because the installation has a growing intelligence mission and the ANG will gain a new flying mission in Nevada with the creation of a unit association at Nellis AFB.

Nashville - 4 C-130s move from Nashville to Greater Peoria. The recommendation also moves the remaining 4 PAA from Nashville to a higher-ranking installation, Louisville (79), in the Airlift MCI. Peoria was chosen to keep and receive aircraft over Nashville to retain mobility aircraft across multiple geographic regions.

Kulis - Enables an increase to 12 PAA and presents an opportunity to create an active associate unit at Elmendorf.

Schenectady. Schenectady will retain LC-130 aircraft currently assigned and its 4PAA 'slick' C-130 increment will be used to form effectively sized units elsewhere.

Mansfield - Little Rock - Maxwell. Mansfield was chosen to transfer aircraft due to a combination of its MCI ranking and its proximity to several other ARC units in the state and region that are retaining force structure or growing.

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	MCI	Installation	SQDNs	Start	BRAC	SQDNs	NOTE
ANG	17		1	8	18	1	5, 6
ANG	33		1	8	12	1	
ANG/AD	51		0	0	12	1	
ANG	53		1	8	12	1	
ANG	64	Will Rogers	1	8	0	0	6
ANG	66	Boise	1	4	0	0	3
ANG	67	Selfridge	1	8	0	0	3
ANG	77		1	8	12	1	
ANG	79		1	8	12	1	
ANG	96		1	8	12	1	
ANG	99	Minneapolis ANG	1	8	8	1	
ANG	101	Reno	1	8	0	0	1, 3
ANG	104	Nashville	1	8	0	0	6
ANG	110	Kulis	1	8	0	0	3, 6
ANG	114		1	8	12	1	5
ANG	117	Schenectedy	1	4	0	0	3, 6
ANG	118		1	8	12	1	6, 7
ANG	119	Mansfield	1	8	0	0	3, 6
ANG	120	New Castle	1	8	0	0	
ANG	121	Luis Munoz	1	8	0	0	
ANG	125		1	8	11	1	6
ANG	127		1	8	12	1	6
ANG	137	Yeager	1	8	0	0	
ANG	140	Martin State	1	8	0	0	
				176	145		

In summary, the BRAC 2005 C-130 force structure laydown accommodates a C-130 reduction of approximately 15%, while reducing the number of C-130 installations from 35 to 18. The DoD BRAC recommendations create a C-130 force in 2011 comprised almost entirely of optimally sized squadrons.

Note:

Lose Aircraft in BRAC
No Change in BRAC

DCN: 11898

F-16 Scenario Group Overview

Start Point. The F-16 force laydown used to develop DoD BRAC 2005 recommendations begins with F-16s based at 43 total installations at the end of FY 06. Pre-BRAC plans would result in 44% of the F-16 force comprised of effectively sized squadrons at the 43 F-16 bases.

Force Structure. The 2025 Force Structure Plan reduces the F-16 inventory. To more effectively operate this reduced force, the Air Force strategy is to organize it into squadrons of 24 aircraft (18 is an acceptable size for the Guard and Reserve (ARC) due to higher average experience levels in the ARC). Effectively sized squadrons better meet the Air Force's expeditionary needs and make a smaller force more effective in meeting both homeland and global defense needs. Smaller squadrons were kept to a minimum to accommodate F-16 force structure decreases beyond FY 11.

Recommended End State. The DoD BRAC 2005 end state is F-16s based at 27 installations at the end of FY 11. DoD BRAC recommendations would result in 100% of the F-16 force to be comprised of operationally effective squadrons at 27 F-16 bases.

Role of mission compatibility index (MCI) scores. In the first step we assigned an initial F-16 laydown using the force structure plan and raw MCI scores. The MCI scores accommodate many, but not all, of the characteristics that comprise military value. Among those characteristics not readily modeled are force structure proportionality among the Active, Guard and AF Reserve components; USNORTHCOM air sovereignty requirements, consolidation of F-16 variants for operational or logistics reasons, sizing of test and training functions, Air Reserve Component demographics and joint interoperability. Where we apply military knowledge and judgment to MCI outcomes, we cite the characteristics below as notes in the tables:

1. Active/Guard/Reserve Proportionality. Proportionality refers to keeping in constant balance the proportion of the fleet operated by the Active Duty, Air National Guard, and AF Reserve components of the Total Air Force.

2. Air Sovereignty. The Air Force worked closely with USNORTHCOM to ensure its ability to execute the air sovereignty mission within the laydown.

3. Change for Operational / Logistical Reasons. Recommendations of the type are made for both operational (e.g., mission type) and logistical (e.g., aircraft commonality) reasons.

4. Test Resources. Edwards and Eglin keep the same number of test aircraft reflected in the FY 06 POM. Overseas bases were not considered and therefore maintain the status quo.

5. Training Bases. The size of the training fleet is appropriate to the size of the entire fleet. For the F-16 fleet, Luke AFB, Lackland AFB and Tucson execute the Flying Training Unit (FTU) mission.

6. ARC Demographics. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve General Officer members of the AF Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), provided expert military knowledge and judgment with respect to state factors, possible emerging missions, ability to associate with active units, and ability to recruit to larger squadron sizes (e.g., synergy between McEntire ANGB and Shaw AFB in SC).

7. Joint Interoperability. These judgments refer to interoperability factors related to nearby installations

Gain Aircraft in BRAC
Lose Aircraft in BRAC
No Change in BRAC

F-16 Scenario Group Recommendations, by Component

Active Duty. The active duty F-16 force decreases from 455 Primary Authorized Aircraft (PAA) to 312 PAA. Active duty operational F-16s consolidate from five to two United States locations, Hill AFB and Shaw AFB. Test and training locations remain the same; the number of training jets is reduced at Luke AFB commensurate with the planned reduction in the fleet. Consolidating the number of U.S. deployable active wings to Hill and Shaw enables the Air Force to schedule more large-scale exercises at Eielson using freed-up hangar and ramp space to better use the training range and airspace. More exercise participants can take advantage of Eielson's range and airspace and relieve some of the future test and training burden at Nellis AFB. Mountain Home is a multiple MDS base that will be consolidated as an F-15E base. Cannon is the lowest rated active duty fighter base. Some of Cannon's jets were moved to ANG bases to keep proportionality in the force.

	MCI	Installation	SQDNs	Start	BRAC	SQDNs	NOTE
AD	3	Eglin	1	14	14	1	
AD	7	Shaw	3	72	72	3	
AD	8	Edwards	1	9	9	1	
AD	11		1	18	0	0	3
AD	12		8	162	100	4	5
AD	13	Nellis	2	36	45	2	
AD	14	Hill	3	66	72	3	
AD	23		1	18	0	0	3
AD	50		3	60	0	0	1
			23	455	312	14	

Air Force Reserve (AFR). The AFR F-16 force decreases from 60 to 48 PAA. The AFR F-16 fleet consolidates from four to two United States locations; both are air sovereignty sites

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	MCI	Installation	SQDNs	Start	BRAC	SQDNs	NOTE
AFR	13	[redacted]	1	15	0	0	
AFR	14	[redacted]	1	15	0	0	
AFR	31	Homestead	1	15	24	1	2
AFR	58	Carswell/Ft Worth	1	15	24	1	2
			4	60	48	2	

Air National Guard (ANG). The ANG F-16 force decreases from 457 to 355 PAA. ANG F-16s consolidate from 29 to 18 squadrons. Once the ANG force structure was placed by MCI only, the Air Force BCEG studied its ability to execute the air sovereignty mission. To complement homeland defense, we place force structure at the following bases due to their proximity to a USNORTHCOM location of interest: Dane County Regional/Truax (Madison), Fort Wayne, Toledo and Des Moines. Test and training locations remain the same.

Other exceptions to MCI:

Richmond – facilitates an F/A-22 association with Langley AFB (announced prior to BRAC and supported by the BCEG.)

Atlantic City – remains a fighter base. Atlantic City receives a squadron of F-15Cs to support its homeland defense mission and contributes to proportionality in the combat air forces.

Selfridge – remains a fighter base. Selfridge and Kellogg consolidate as an A-10 unit.

Ellington – remains a fighter air sovereignty alert site. Ellington F-16s are removed with the intent to use trained personnel from Ellington at the F-16 ANG FTU operation at Lackland-Kelly, which would increase in size. TDY units can and currently do accomplish Ellington's air sovereignty mission.

Hancock – a unique location identified for an emerging UAV-like mission and supported by the BCEG.

Fort Smith - the intent is to utilize trained personnel from Fort Smith at the ANG C-130 FTU operation at Little Rock, which would increase in size.

Springfield Beckley – though currently an FTU, Lackland and Luke are higher ranking and are sized appropriately to accomplish the training mission.

Madison/Truax, Toledo, Des Moines – each is chosen for proximity to sites of interest for Homeland Defense. Toledo and Fort Wayne chosen due to ANG input.

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	MCI	Installation	SQDNs	Start	BRAC	SQDNs	NOTE
ANG	16	Kirtland	1	15	18	1	
ANG	21	Andrews	1	15	24	1	
ANG	47	Lackland	1	18	24	1	
ANG	48	McEntire	1	15	24	1	
ANG	49	Richmond	1	15	0	0	3, 6
ANG	60	Danelly Field	1	15	18	1	
ANG	61	Atlantic City	1	15	0	0	3
ANG	64	Buckley	1	15	18	1	
ANG	67	Tucson	3	61	61	3	
ANG	70	Selfridge	1	15	0	0	2, 3, 6
ANG	80	Ellington	1	15	0	0	6, 2
ANG	87	Fresno	1	15	24	1	2
ANG	94	Hancock	1	15	0	0	6
ANG	102	Burlington	1	15	18	1	
ANG	110	Fort Smith	1	15	0	0	6
ANG	112	Joe Foss Field	1	15	18	1	
ANG	114	Tulsa	1	15	24	1	
ANG	115	Capital	1	15	0	0	
ANG	117	Great Falls	1	15	0	0	
ANG	119	Hulman	1	15	0	0	6
ANG	122	Madison/Truax Field	1	15	18	1	2
ANG	123	Toledo	1	15	24	1	2
ANG	125	Hector Field	1	15	0	0	
ANG	128	Springfield-Beckley	1	18	0	0	6
ANG	130	Ft Wayne	1	15	24	1	6
ANG	136	Duluth	1	15	0	0	
ANG	137	Des Moines	1	15	18	1	2
			29	457	355	17	

In summary, the BRAC 2005 F-16 force structure laydown accommodates a reduction in F-16s from 1,288 to 1,049; reduces the number of total F-16 installations from 43 to 27 and increases optimal squadron sizing from 44% at the end of FY06 to 100% effective sized squadrons in 2011.

DCN: 11898

A-10 Scenario Group

Start Point. The A-10 force laydown used to develop DoD BRAC 2005 recommendations begins with A-10s based at 15 installations at the end of FY 06. Pre-BRAC plans would result in 33% of the A-10 force comprised of effectively sized squadrons at the 15 A-10 bases.

Force Structure. The 2025 Force Structure Plan reduces the A-10s inventory. To more effectively operate this reduced force, the Air Force strategy is to organize the remaining force into more effectively sized squadrons of 24 aircraft (18 is an acceptable size for the Guard and Reserve (ARC) due to higher average experience levels in the ARC). Effectively sized squadrons better meet the Air Force's expeditionary needs and make a smaller force more effective in meeting both homeland and global defense needs. Smaller squadrons were kept to a minimum to accommodate A-10 force structure decreases beyond FY 11.

Recommended End State. The DoD BRAC 2005 end state is A-10s based at 11 installations at the end of FY 11. DoD BRAC recommendations result in 100% of the A-10 force comprised of operationally effective squadrons at the 11 bases.

Role of mission compatibility index (MCI) scores. In the first step we assigned an initial laydown using the force structure plan and raw MCI scores. The MCI scores accommodated many, but not all, of the characteristics comprising military value. Among those characteristics not readily modeled are force structure proportionality among the Active, Guard, and AF Reserve components, sizing of test and training functions, Air Reserve Component demographics and joint interoperability. Where we apply military knowledge and judgment to MCI outcomes, we cite the characteristics below as notes in the tables:

1. Active/Guard/Reserve Proportionality. Proportionality refers to keeping in constant balance proportions of the fleet operated by the Active Duty, Guard and AF Reserve.

2. Air Sovereignty. The Air Force worked closely with USNORTHCOM to ensure its ability to execute the air sovereignty mission within the laydown.

3. Change for Operational / Logistical Reasons. Recommendations are made for both operational (e.g., mission type) and logistical (e.g., aircraft commonality) reasons.

4. Test Resources. Edwards and Eglin keep the same number of test aircraft reflected in the FY 06 POM. Overseas bases were not considered and therefore maintain the status quo..

5. Training Bases. The size of the training fleet is appropriate to the size of the entire fleet. Davis-Monthan AFB and Barksdale AFB execute the Flying Training Unit (FTU) mission.

6. ARC Demographics. Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve General Officer members of the AF Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), provided expert military knowledge and judgment with respect to state factors, possible emerging missions, ability to associate with active units and ability to recruit the people to man larger squadrons.

7. Joint Interoperability. These judgments refer to interoperability factors related to nearby installations (e.g., synergy between Moody AFB and Army maneuver units and schools at Fort Stewart and Fort Benning).

Gain Aircraft in BRAC
Lose Aircraft in BRAC
No Change in BRAC

A-10 Scenario Group Recommendations, by Component

Active Duty. The active duty A-10 force decrease from 130 to 124 PAA by FY 11 beyond. Active duty operational units consolidate from four to two United States locations, Moody AFB and Davis Monthan AFB. Test and training locations remain the same. Consolidating the number of U.S. deployable active wings to Moody and Davis Monthan enable the Air Force to take advantage of superior joint training opportunities at both bases, maintain the FTU at Davis-Monthan and schedule more large-scale exercises at Eielson (using freed-up hangar and ramp space to better use the training range and airspace). Not only will more exercise participants benefit from Eielson's ranges and airspace, hosting large-scale exercise in Alaska will relieve some of the future training and testing burden at Nellis AFB.

	MCI	Installation	SQDNs	Start	BRAC	SQDNs	NOTE
AD	1	Pope	2	36	0	0	7
AD	11	Moody	0	0	48	2	7
AD	19	Nellis	1	10	10	1	
AD	22	Eielson	1	18	0	0	3
AD	25	Davis-Monthan	3	66	66	3	5
			7	130	124	6	

Air Force Reserve (AFR). The AFR A-10 fleet increases from 45 to 48 PAA. The AFR A-10 force consolidates from three to two United States locations.

AFR	28	Whiteman	1	15	24	1	
AFR	33	Barksdale	1	15	24	1	
AFR	49	NAS New Orleans	1	15	0	0	
			3	45	48	2	

Air National Guard (ANG). The ANG A-10 fleet decreases from 90 to 78 PAA; adjustments to the Air National Guard F-15 force maintain proportionality across the combat air forces. The ANG A-10 squadrons consolidate from six to four United States locations. Selfridge (vice Kellogg) was chosen to receive an A-10 squadron due to higher military value and ARC demographic considerations. The Department of Navy recommended closure of Willow Grove, requires the ANG A-10 squadron to move.

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ANG	62	Selfridge	0	0	18	1	
ANG	66	Boise	1	15	18	1	
ANG	75	Martin State	1	15	18	1	
ANG	87	Willow Grove	1	15	0	0	3, 7
ANG	97	Barnes	1	15	24	1	
ANG	98	Bradley	1	15	0	0	
ANG	122	WK Kellogg	1	15	0	0	
			6	90	78	4	

In summary, the BRAC 2005 A-10 force structure laydown accommodates a slight reduction in A-10s, reduces the number of A-10 installations from 15 to 11 and increases effective squadron sizing from 33% at the end of FY06 to 100% effective sized squadrons in 2011.

DCN: 11898

A-10 Scenario Group

Start Point. The A-10 force laydown used to develop DoD BRAC 2005 recommendations begins with A-10s based at 15 installations at the end of FY 06. Pre-BRAC plans would result in 33% of the A-10 force comprised of effectively sized squadrons at the 15 A-10 bases.

Force Structure. The 2025 Force Structure Plan reduces the A-10s inventory. To more effectively operate this reduced force, the Air Force strategy is to organize the remaining force into more effectively sized squadrons of 24 aircraft (18 is an acceptable size for the Guard and Reserve (ARC) due to higher average experience levels in the ARC). Effectively sized squadrons better meet the Air Force's expeditionary needs and make a smaller force more effective in meeting both homeland and global defense needs. Smaller squadrons were kept to a minimum to accommodate A-10 force structure decreases beyond FY 11.

Recommended End State. The DoD BRAC 2005 end state is A-10s based at 11 installations at the end of FY 11. DoD BRAC recommendations result in 100% of the A-10 force comprised of operationally effective squadrons at the 11 bases.

Role of mission compatibility index (MCI) scores. In the first step we assigned an initial laydown using the force structure plan and raw MCI scores. The MCI scores accommodated many, but not all, of the characteristics comprising military value. Among those characteristics not readily modeled are force structure proportionality among the Active, Guard, and AF Reserve components, sizing of test and training functions, Air Reserve Component demographics and joint interoperability. Where we apply military knowledge and judgment to MCI outcomes, we cite the characteristics below as notes in the tables:

1. Active/Guard/Reserve Proportionality. Proportionality refers to keeping in constant balance proportions of the fleet operated by the Active Duty, Guard and AF Reserve.

2. Air Sovereignty. The Air Force worked closely with USNORTHCOM to ensure its ability to execute the air sovereignty mission within the laydown.

3. Change for Operational / Logistical Reasons. Recommendations are made for both operational (e.g., mission type) and logistical (e.g., aircraft commonality) reasons.

4. Test Resources. Edwards and Eglin keep the same number of test aircraft reflected in the FY 06 POM. Overseas bases were not considered and therefore maintain the status quo..

5. Training Bases. The size of the training fleet is appropriate to the size of the entire fleet. Davis-Monthan AFB and Barksdale AFB execute the Flying Training Unit (FTU) mission.

6. ARC Demographics. Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve General Officer members of the AF Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), provided expert military knowledge and judgment with respect to state factors, possible emerging missions, ability to associate with active units and ability to recruit the people to man larger squadrons.

7. Joint Interoperability. These judgments refer to interoperability factors related to nearby installations (e.g., synergy between Moody AFB and Army maneuver units and schools at Fort Stewart and Fort Benning).

Gain Aircraft in BRAC
Lose Aircraft in BRAC
No Change in BRAC

A-10 Scenario Group Recommendations, by Component

Active Duty. The active duty A-10 force decrease from 130 to 124 PAA by FY 11 beyond. Active duty operational units consolidate from four to two United States locations, Moody AFB and Davis Monthan AFB. Test and training locations remain the same. Consolidating the number of U.S. deployable active wings to Moody and Davis Monthan enable the Air Force to take advantage of superior joint training opportunities at both bases, maintain the FTU at Davis-Monthan and schedule more large-scale exercises at Eielson (using freed-up hangar and ramp space to better use the training range and airspace). Not only will more exercise participants benefit from Eielson's ranges and airspace, hosting large-scale exercise in Alaska will relieve some of the future training and testing burden at Nellis AFB.

	MCI	Installation	SQDNs	Start	BRAC	SQDNs	NOTE
AD	1	Pope	2	36	0	0	7
AD	11	Moody	0	0	48	2	7
AD	19	Nellis	1	10	10	1	
AD	22	Eielson	1	18	0	0	3
AD	25	Davis-Monthan	3	66	66	3	5
			7	130	124	6	

Air Force Reserve (AFR). The AFR A-10 fleet increases from 45 to 48 PAA. The AFR A-10 force consolidates from three to two United States locations.

AFR	28	Whiteman	1	15	24	1	
AFR	33	Barksdale	1	15	24	1	
AFR	49	NAS New Orleans	1	15	0	0	
			3	45	48	2	

Air National Guard (ANG). The ANG A-10 fleet decreases from 90 to 78 PAA; adjustments to the Air National Guard F-15 force maintain proportionality across the combat air forces. The ANG A-10 squadrons consolidate from six to four United States locations. Selfridge (vice Kellogg) was chosen to receive an A-10 squadron due to higher military value and ARC demographic considerations. The Department of Navy recommended closure of Willow Grove, requires the ANG A-10 squadron to move.

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ANG	62	Selfridge	0	0	18	1	
ANG	66	Boise	1	15	18	1	
ANG	75	Martin State	1	15	18	1	
ANG	87	Willow Grove	1	15	0	0	3, 7
ANG	97	Barnes	1	15	24	1	
ANG	98	Bradley	1	15	0	0	
ANG	122	WK Kellogg	1	15	0	0	
			6	90	78	4	

In summary, the BRAC 2005 A-10 force structure laydown accommodates a slight reduction in A-10s, reduces the number of A-10 installations from 15 to 11 and increases effective squadron sizing from 33% at the end of FY06 to 100% effective sized squadrons in 2011.

DCN: 11898

F-15C/D and F/A-22 Scenario Group

Start Point. The F-15 force laydown used to develop DoD BRAC 2005 recommendations begins with F-15s based at 16 total installations at the end of FY 06. Pre-BRAC plans would result in 65% of the F-15 force comprised of effectively sized squadrons at the 16 F-15 bases.

Force Structure. The 2025 Force Structure Plan reduces the number of F-15s in the inventory. To more effectively operate this reduced force, the Air Force strategy is to organize it into squadrons of 24 aircraft (18 is an acceptable size for the Guard and Reserve (ARC) due to higher average experience levels in the ARC). Effectively sized squadrons better meet the Air Force's expeditionary needs and make a smaller force more effective in meeting both homeland and global defense needs.

Recommended End State. The DoD BRAC 2005 end state is F-15s based at 13 total installations at the end of FY11. DoD BRAC recommendations would result in 93% of the F-15 force comprised of operationally effective squadrons.

Role of mission compatibility score (MCI) index. In the first step, we assigned an initial F-15 laydown using the force structure plan and raw MCI scores. The MCI scores accommodate many, but not all, of the characteristics that comprise military value. Among those characteristics not readily modeled are force structure proportionality among the Active, Guard, and AF Reserve components; USNORTHCOM air sovereignty requirements, consolidation of F-15 models for operational or logistics reasons, sizing of test and training functions, Air Reserve Component demographics, and joint interoperability. Where we apply military knowledge and judgment to MCI outcomes, we cite the characteristics as notes in the tables below:

1. Active/Guard/Reserve Proportionality. Proportionality refers to keeping in constant balance the proportion of the fleet operated by the Active Duty, Guard, and AF Reserve.

2. Air Sovereignty. The Air Force worked closely with USNORTHCOM to ensure its ability to execute the air sovereignty mission within the laydown. To complement homeland defense, we placed force structure or left alert sites at the following bases due to their proximity to a USNORTHCOM sites of interest: New Orleans, Bradley (as a replacement for Otis), Atlantic City and Portland.

3. Change for Operational / Logistical Reasons. Recommendations of this type are made for both operational (e.g., mission type) and logistical (e.g., aircraft commonality) reasons.

4. Test Resources. Edwards and Eglin keep the same number of test aircraft reflected in the FY 06 POM. Overseas bases were not considered and therefore maintain the status quo.

5. Training bases. The size of the training fleet is appropriate to the size of the entire fleet. For the F-15 fleet, Tyndall AFB and Klamath Falls will execute the Flying Training Unit (FTU) mission. Tyndall also hosts F-22 FTU. Nellis hosts the Air Force Weapons School.

6. ARC demographics. Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve general officer members of the AF Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), provided expert military knowledge and judgment with respect to state factors, possible emerging missions, ability to associate with active units, and ability to recruit to larger squadron sizes.

7. Joint Interoperability. These judgments refer to interoperability factors related to nearby installations

Gain Aircraft in BRAC
Lose Aircraft in BRAC
No Change in BRAC

F-15C Scenario Group Recommendations, by Component

Active Duty. Active duty F-15C force decreases from 205 Primary Authorized Aircraft (PAA) to 144 PAA. Active duty operational F-15Cs consolidate from four to two United States locations: Langley AFB and Elmendorf AFB. Tyndall AFB, the active duty training base, was reduced in proportion to the entire F-15 fleet reduction. Nellis AFB will increase in size to accommodate an increase in capability for its aggressor function. Mountain Home is a multiple MDS base that will be consolidated as an F-15E base. Elmendorf provided F-15Cs to Langley, thereby creating capacity at Elmendorf to receive F/A-22s.

F-15C	MCI	Installation	SQDNs	Start	BRAC	SQDNs	NOTE
AD	2	Langley	0	0	24	1	
AD	3	Eglin	3	56	8	1	
AD	6	Tyndall	3	61	48	2	5
AD	8	Edwards	1	7	7	1	
AD	13	Nellis	1	21	39	2	
AD	23	Mt Home	1	18	0	0	3
AD	36	Elmendorf	2	42	18	1	
			11	205	144	8	

Air National Guard (ANG). The ANG F-15C force increases from 105 to 111 PAA and consolidates from seven to five squadrons. Once the ANG force structure was placed by MCI only, the Air Force BCEG studied its ability to execute the air sovereignty mission. To complement homeland defense, the BCEG placed force structure at New Orleans. Portland and New Orleans are ranked approximately the same in military value, but New Orleans was more valuable from a homeland defense perspective. However, Portland retains its air sovereignty alert role and its alert facility, and will host deployed detachments of Air Sovereignty Alert fighters as tasked. Hickam did not receive added force structure because of the challenge in recruiting at Hickam for both the F-15 and C-17 missions.

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F-15C	MCI	Installation	SQDNs	Start	BRAC	SQDNs	NOTE
ANG	24	Jacksonville	1	15	24	1	
ANG	52	Hickam	1	15	15	1	
ANG	61	Atlantic City	0	0	24	1	1, 2
ANG	65	Klamath Falls	1	15	24	1	
ANG	77	Portland	1	15	0	0	2
ANG	79	New Orleans	1	15	24	1	2
ANG	88	Otis	1	15	0	0	2
ANG	127	Lambert Field	1	15	0	0	
			7	105	111	5	

DCN: 11898

KC-135 Scenario Group Overview

Start Point. The KC-135 force laydown used to develop DoD BRAC 2005 recommendations begins with KC-135s based at 38 installations (three share runways with other active duty, ANG or Reserve KC-135 units) at the end of FY 06. Pre-BRAC plans would result in 18% of the KC-135 force comprised of effectively sized squadrons at the 38 KC-135 bases.

Force Structure. The 2025 Force Structure Plan reduces the KC-135 inventory. To more effectively operate this reduced force, the Air Force strategy is to organize it into squadrons of 16 aircraft (12 is an acceptable size for the Guard and Reserve (ARC) due to higher average experience levels in the ARC). Effectively sized squadrons better meet the Air Force's expeditionary needs and make a smaller force more effective in meeting both homeland and global defense needs.

Recommended End State. The DoD BRAC 2005 end state is KC-135s based at 28 installations at the end of FY 11. DoD BRAC recommendations would result in 71% of the KC-135 force comprised of operationally effective squadrons at the 28 KC-135 bases.

Role of mission compatibility index (MCI) scores. In the first step, an initial KC-135 laydown was assigned using the force structure plan and raw MCI scores. The MCI scores accommodate many, but not all, of the characteristics that comprise military value. Among those characteristics not readily modeled are force structure proportionality among the Active, Guard, and AF Reserve components; sizing of test and training functions, operational issues such as Northeast Tanker Task Force and Air Reserve Component demographics. Where we apply military knowledge and judgment to MCI outcomes, we cite the characteristics below as notes in the tables:

1. Active/Guard/Reserve Proportionality. Proportionality refers to keeping in constant balance the proportion of the fleet operated by the Active Duty, Guard, and AF Reserve.

2. Air Sovereignty. The Air Force worked closely with USNORTHCOM to ensure its ability to execute the air sovereignty mission within the laydown.

3. Change for Operational / Logistical Reasons. Recommendations of the type are made for both operational (e.g., mission type) and logistical (e.g., aircraft commonality) reasons.

4. Test Resources. Edwards and Eglin keep the same number of test aircraft reflected in the FY 06 POM. Overseas bases were not considered and therefore maintain the status quo.

5. Training Bases. The size of the training fleet is appropriate to the size of the entire fleet. Altus AFB executes the Flying Training Unit (FTU) mission.

6. ARC Demographics. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve General Officer members of the AF Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), provided expert military knowledge and judgment with respect to state factors, possible emerging missions, ability to associate with active units, and ability to recruit to larger squadron sizes.

7. Joint Interoperability. These judgments refer to interoperability factors related to nearby installations.

Lose Aircraft in BRAC
No Change in BRAC

KC-135 Scenario Group Recommendations, by Component

Active Duty. The active duty KC-135 force decreases from 145 Primary Authorized Aircraft (PAA) to 119 PAA. Active duty operational KC-135s consolidate from five to three United States locations--McConnell, Fairchild and MacDill—with a Guard associate unit at Fairchild and Reserve associate units at McConnell and MacDill. This does not include the test and training locations at Altus and Edwards. Consolidating the number of U.S. deployable active wings to McConnell, Fairchild and MacDill enables the Air Force to more effectively manage AEF deployments and worldwide air refueling requirements. Movement of the single squadron from Robins AFB optimizes active duty tanker squadron sizing at McConnell AFB using McConnell's excess capacity. This realignment also makes available the vacated KC-135 ramp and facilities at Robins for the aircraft displaced by the proposed closure of NAS Atlanta.

	MCI	Installation	SQDNs	Start	BRAC	SQDNs	NOTEs
AD	6	Altus	2	24	24	2	
AD	8	Edwards		1	1		
AD	15		2	30	48	3	
AD	17	Fairchild	2	30	30	2	
AD	18	Robins	1	12	0	0	1, 7
AAD	36		1	12	16	1	
AD	40	Grand Forks	3	36	0	0	
			11	145	119	8	

Air Force Reserve (AFR). The AFR KC-135 force decreases from 72 to 64 PAA. The AFR KC-135 fleet consolidates from eight to five locations, with an Active associate unit at Seymour-Johnson. Proportionality in future missions is key to the Air Force recommendations to realign Beale AFB. Although Beale AFB ranked high in the tanker MCI, the BCEG recommended realigning Beale to achieve several things: retain reserve component manpower and experience for the new Global Hawk mission, focus Beale on one primary operational flying mission (manned and unmanned high altitude reconnaissance) and help balance the Reserve and ANG KC-135 force structure.

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	MCI	Installation	SQDNs	Start	BRAC	SQDNs	NOTEs
AFR	4	[redacted]	1	8	12	1	
AFR	10	Beale	1	8	0	0	6, 7
AFR	16	[redacted]	1	8	12	1	
AFR	25	[redacted]	1	8	16	1	
AFR	31	Grissom	2	16	16	2	
AFR	32	Andrews	1	8	8	1	
AFR	57	Selfridge	1	8	0	0	
AFR	71	Portland	1	8	0	0	
			9	72	64	6	

Air National Guard (ANG). The ANG KC-135 force decreases from 199 to 172 PAA. ANG KC-135s consolidate from 22 to 15 installations. The three highest MCI scoring bases, McConnell, March and Fairchild are supporting Active Duty and Air Force Reserve units as describe above. As previously mentioned, the realignment of the Robins' KC-135R aircraft enables the ANG to realign its KC-135R presence from McConnell to Forbes Field. Forbes Field was one of the higher-ranking reserve component tanker bases. March ARB has the highest military value of all reserve component bases for the tanker mission. The realignment of the ANG KC-135s enables streamlining March ARB from two wing organizational structures and two units flying the same aircraft (ANG and AFRC) to one effectively sized reserve component flying mission (AFRC). This will eliminate competing recruiting entities for the same flying and maintenance personnel at March. The association of the Guard and Active Duty at Fairchild postures that base with an Active Guard association and frees capacity for the eventual arrival of KC-X. The remaining ANG force structure was placed at ANG bases in order of MCI precedence except as noted below:

McGuire - even though McGuire ranked somewhat higher in the tanker MCI than other tanker installations that were not closed, the BCEG, in coordination with the Navy, judged making the vacated KC-135E ramp and facilities available for aircraft and personnel from the closure of the Navy's Willow Grove NAS had more value from a joint perspective.

Birmingham - The Air Force's desire to grow the ANG Intelligence mission at Birmingham, and the recommended expansion of the ANG flying mission at Dannelly Field, contributed prominently to the deliberative discussions to remove the tankers from Birmingham. Ultimately, it was determined that any increase in the intelligence mission at Birmingham would not only result in competition for the same recruits, but would prohibit the Air Force from robusting the KC-135 unit from eight to twelve aircraft due to competition for existing ANG facilities and any required buildable acres.

Key Field and Niagara - Bangor and Pease were chosen because both provide substantial support for the Northeast Tanker Task Force and the Atlantic Air Bridge. Even though Bangor was slightly lower than Niagara in MCI score, its location (400 miles closer to the North Atlantic Tracks) as the northeastern-most tanker installation combined with its current missions (staging

base and planning facility for the Northeast Tanker Task Force and the Atlantic Air Bridge) made it a more valuable ANG installation to retain.

	MCI	Installation	SQDNs	Start	BRAC	SQDNs	NOTEs
ANG	15	McConnell	1	9	0	0	1, 6
ANG	16	March	1	9	0	0	1, 6
ANG	17	Fairchild	1	8	0	0	1
ANG	24	Salt Lake City	1	8	8	1	
ANG	35		1	8	12	1	
ANG	37		1	8	10	1	
ANG	38		1	8	12	1	
ANG	47	Lincoln	1	8	8	1	
ANG	48	Rickenbacker	2	18	18	2	
ANG	57		0	0	12	1	
ANG	59	Eielson	1	8	8	1	
ANG	61	McGuire	2	16	0	0	7
ANG	63	Birmingham	1	8	0	0	6
ANG	67	Sioux City	1	8	8	1	
ANG	74		1	8	12	1	
ANG	80	Pittsburgh	2	16	16	2	
ANG	86		1	9	12	1	
ANG	87		1	8	12	1	
ANG	92	Key Field	1	9	0	0	3,6
ANG	105		1	9	12	1	
ANG	119	Niagara	1	8	0	0	3
ANG	123		1	8	12	1	
			24	199	172	17	

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Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Felix, Kevin, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2005 10:38 AM
To: Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Dinsick, Robert, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Flinn, Michael, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Cc: MacGregor, Timothy, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: FW: Dod Response

Gents,

Info from reps from Pope-Bragg.

V/r
Kevin Felix
Army Senior Analyst
BRAC Commission
(703) 699-2950

From: Peck, Terry Contractor [mailto:terry.peck1@us.army.mil]
Sent: Monday, July 18, 2005 7:56 AM
To: kevin.felix@us.army.mil
Subject: FW: Dod Response

Mike/Kevin □ The DOD response to Mr. Principi□s questions on Pope is shown below in blue. Mostly very general comments□without a solid logic trail. Paul and I have provided some quick, direct responses to each bullet that help put them in perspective. Our responses are in red.

Thanks

Terry Peck

7. Pope Air Force Base, NC
7a. Commission issue: What considerations drove the recommendation to realign, rather than close Pope AFB, NC under Fort Bragg, NC?
7a. Response:
KEY POINTS:
□ Supports Army plan for relocation of FORSCOM. FORSCOM can and will be relocated to the Bragg/Pope installation. Current army site locations for FORSCOM and USARC headquarters are primarily on real estate that is part of Fort Bragg, not Pope AFB. This move is independent of actions to turn Pope AFB over to the Army. The installation should be a Joint Base as was initially documented in the HSA JCSG minutes and slides, with the AF retaining the operational capabilities of the Pope and the Army merely assuming the garrison facility support requirements.
□ Maintains airfield capability for Army presence and Air Force force structure. This does not maintain the airfield capability of Pope, since the Army does not have the inherent skilled personnel or institutional

experience to maintain a strategic power projection platform for AF strategic lift aircraft as well as the AF does. This would also be a unique requirement within the Army, whereas, the Air Force has a primary mission of maintaining such bases throughout the world.
□ Allows efficient consolidation of installation management functions. This would best be accomplished with a Joint Base Bragg/Pope vice Pope becoming an Army Airfield.
DISCUSSION:
The Air Force recommendation to realign, rather than close Pope AFB, was made to support the Army recommendation to relocate U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army Reserve Command and allows for closure of Fort McPherson, GA and Atlanta leased space. All Air Force property and facilities will be administratively transferred to the Army. The financial analysis included expected recurring expenses paid by the Air Force to the Army as a result of the Air Force presence that will remain. This coordination on installation management builds upon and subsumes the H&SA candidate recommendation (H&SA-0009) to combine Installation Management of Fort Bragg and Pope AFB, NC.

DISCUSSION: The Joint Base concept for Bragg/Pope best supports the Army move of FORSCOM and USARC headquarters to the installations. If this action subsumes the HSA candidate recommendation, it should not change the manner in which Bragg/Pope are organized as a base, but merely modify the manner in which the AF integrates into that new Joint Base through retention of units at the base and retention of the airspace and operational responsibilities of the Joint Base. The cost analysis done by the Army did not include operating and maintaining the airfield at the same level as it exists today or expected the AF to retain the operational costs while the Army absorbed the fixed facilities support into their Garrison costs.

7b. Commission issue: Are the joint operational synergies that exist between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 43rd Airlift Wing/23rd Fighter Group able to be replicated from other locations?
7b. Response:
KEY POINTS:
□ Existing operational relationships will continue. Not True. Without the representation of at least a Wing headquarters on Pope, the planning and preparation for contingency operations on a routine basis will not continue. An associate reserve C-130 squadron does not provide the capability to conduct these functions in support of contingency and surge operations. Without at least a Wing headquarters on Pope, there will not be the AF representation to maintain proper Joint relationships for training and warfighting with the XVIII Airborne Corps (an Army 3-star headquarters), Army Special Operations Command (an Army 3-star headquarters), the 82nd Airborne Division (an Army 2-star headquarters) or the Joint Special Operations Command (a Joint 2-star headquarters).

□ Additional operational and training synergies will emerge from new relationships. Flawed expectation, given that the senior AF representative will be at best a Colonel without the staff infrastructure to work with any of the major Army headquarters on Fort Bragg.
DISCUSSION:
As a part of the coordination between the Army regarding a tenant Air Force presence on an expanded Fort Bragg, the Army indicated that it would allow a tenant C-130 unit with a maximum size of 16 PAA (911th Airlift Wing, AFRC). Other Air Force functions that currently exist at Pope AFB, will remain at Fort Bragg to continue the present operational relationships, they include: 3rd Aerial Port Squadron; 18th Air Support Operations Group; 14th Air Support Operations Squadron; Det 1 of the 373rd Training Squadron; and 43rd Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron. Additionally, new opportunities for ongoing joint operations at Fort Bragg will continue with planned deployment of air assets to Fort Bragg/Pope for joint training with the Army.

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The Pope recommendation also includes the transfer of A-10s to Moody AFB, GA. Operational and training synergies will occur with new relationships between the A-10 unit at Moody and Army units at Ft. Benning, GA, the recommended location of the Army's Maneuver Training Center (consolidation of Infantry and Armor schools). Locating Air Force A-10s near this consolidated Army training will lead to new opportunities of realistic close air support training for the Army and the Air Force and potential joint training between the Battlefield Airmen at Moody, the Maneuver Center of Excellence and east coast CSAR training capability with CSAR helicopters and A-10s.

DISCUSSION:
The Army/Air Force joint warfighting organizations at Bragg/Pope are responsible to the President to be prepared to respond to any crisis within 18-hours of alert. The AF units shown above as remaining on Pope AFB (or Pope army airfield) are not robust enough to ensure that timeline is met. The movement of A-10s from Pope is not relevant to the operational discussion, since they are not part of the forces needed to execute the 18-hour □alert to wheels up□ requirement. However, the need for a planning headquarters of at least AF Wing level, the logistical infrastructure of at least an AF Wing level, the airbase maintenance and airspace control elements common to an AF strategic airlift airbase, and airlift platforms to move at least the initial forces to meet the Crisis Response timelines must be part of the AF organizations in place at Pope to ensure any Presidential directives can be met by the Secretary of Defense in accordance with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Clearly, Joint warfighting capabilities at Bragg/Pope can not be sustained at current levels when the AF headquarters remaining at Pope is a squadron (commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel with junior officers on his staff) and the Army headquarters on Fort Bragg are currently Two and Three-star level organizations tasked with the shortest execution timelines of any forces in our military and will be joined by an Army Four-star headquarters. Joint Base Bragg/Pope would be the ideal location to establish joint training opportunities that do not currently exist at other bases. Pope AFB was rated the #1 base in the AF for support of SOF and CSAR. It would also be an ideal location for battlefield airmen, enhancing their ability to operate with special forces personnel, the AF controllers school and the 18th air support group.

Terry

Terry Peck
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DCN: 11898

New Mexico Training Range Initiative (NMTRI) Airspace Proposal

1. Area Descriptions

1.1. Pecos North High Military Operations Area (MOA)

1.1.1. ***Proposed Boundaries*** Beginning at lat. 34°37'00"N., long. 104°30'02"W.;
to lat. 34°33'00"N., long. 103°55'02"W.;
to lat. 34°10'00"N., long. 103°55'02"W.;
to lat. 34°10'00"N., long. 105°10'00"W.;
to lat. 34°20'20"N., long. 105°10'00"W.;
to lat. 34°31'00"N., long. 105°05'02"W.;
to the point of beginning.

1.1.2. ***Altitudes*** 11,000 feet MSL up to but not including FL 180.
Note: Overlies Taiban MOA

1.1.3. ***Times of Use*** 0800-2000 Monday through Friday;
other times by NOTAM

1.1.4. ***Controlling Agency*** FAA, Albuquerque ARTCC

1.1.5. ***Using Agency*** U.S. Air Force, Commander, 27th Fighter Wing,
Cannon AFB, NM

1.2. Pecos North Low MOA

1.2.1. ***Proposed Boundaries*** Beginning at lat. 34°37'00"N., long. 104°30'02"W.;
to lat. 34°34'36"N., long. 104°07'00"W.;
to lat. 34°10'00"N., long. 104°07'00"W.;
to lat. 34°10'00"N., long. 105°10'00"W.;
to lat. 34°20'20"N., long. 105°10'00"W.;
to lat. 34°31'00"N., long. 105°05'02"W.;
to the point of beginning. excluding that airspace at and below 1500 feet AGL, within a 3 NM radius of the Fort Sumner Municipal Airport and within 3 NM each side of a 360° bearing from the airport to the northern boundary of the MOA

1.2.2. ***Altitudes*** 500 feet AGL up to but not including 11,000 feet MSL

1.2.3. ***Times of Use*** 0800-2000 Monday through Friday;

other times by NOTAM

1.2.4. *Controlling Agency* FAA, Albuquerque ARTCC

1.2.5. *Using Agency* U.S. Air Force, Commander, 27th Fighter Wing, Cannon AFB, NM

1.3. **Pecos South MOA**

1.3.1. *Proposed Boundaries* Beginning at lat. 34°14'30"N., long. 103°40'02"W.;
to lat. 34°05'00"N., long. 103°40'02"W.;
to lat. 33°45'53"N., long. 104°08'42"W.;
to lat. 33°37'58"N., long. 104°21'36"W.;
thence counterclockwise along the 22NM DME arc of the Chisum VORTAC
to lat. 33°40'00"N., long. 104° 50 00"W.;
to lat. 34°00'00"N., long. 105°10'00"W.;
to lat. 34°10'00"N., long. 105°10'00"W.;
to lat. 34°10'00"N., long. 103°46'02"W.;
to the point of beginning

1.3.2. *Altitudes* 500 feet AGL up to but not including FL 180

1.3.3. *Times of Use* 0800-2000 Monday through Friday;
other times by NOTAM

1.3.4. *Controlling Agency* FAA, Albuquerque ARTCC

1.3.5. *Using Agency* U.S. Air Force, Commander, 27th Fighter Wing, Cannon AFB, NM

2. Airspace Statement of Need and Justification

2.1. Purpose and Need: The 27 FW requires access to training airspace which provides as realistic a combat environment as possible to fulfill its mission and national military objectives. The airspace required would allow aircrews to practice current tactics which make full use of F-16C+, CG, and CJ capabilities. The airspace configuration would include supersonic operations starting at 10,000 feet MSL (approximately 5,000 feet AGL) and lateral expansion of existing Pecos MOA airspace. Lateral expansion of existing airspace offers more aircraft maneuvering room, greatly enhancing combat aircrew training. Additionally, supersonic airspace allows F-16 aircrews to practice profiles for effective use of the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) throughout their employment envelopes. Simulated supersonic JDAM deliveries increase the launch range from the target while simultaneously reducing the surface-to-air missile and target-based anti-aircraft artillery threat. Supersonic airspace also

offers enhancements to air-to-air combat training by significantly increasing the employment envelopes of air-to-air missiles. Existing 27 FW airspace includes some, but not all, of these parameters. The modified airspace would allow 27 FW pilots to train in a more realistic simulated combat environment, greatly enhancing survivability in combat operations. While NMTRI is specifically designed to enhance F-16 training, the modified airspace will be available for joint use.

2.2. ALTERNATIVE AIRSPACE CONSIDERED: The use of existing special use airspace (SUA) was evaluated to meet the current training requirements of the 27 FW. SUAs considered were Mt Dora MOA/ATCAA, Bronco MOA/ATCAA, White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) and Pecos/Sumner MOA/ATCAA. These areas were evaluated to provide the best possible training solutions. The following criteria were used in the research: airspace parameters (volume, attributes, proximity and time) that impact training time, sortie duration, and fuel requirements/tanker requirements, collocation with a bombing and electronic combat training range and potential environmental impacts.

2.2.1. ALTERNATIVE 1: Mt Dora MOA/ATCAA. Mt Dora SUA extends from 1,500 feet AGL to FL 230. The upper limit set at FL 230 means less maneuvering room for aircraft. Mt Dora MOA/ATCAA's closest boundary is 96 miles north of Cannon AFB, nearly three times the distance to the Pecos complex. Aerial refueling would be required on most supersonic sorties in Mt Dora due to the excessive distance from Cannon and the fuel consumption rate of the F-16. This is cost-prohibitive compared to the Pecos complex. Mt Dora SUA does not offer the opportunity to use Melrose Range as part of a normal training sortie because of the excessive distance and lack of connecting SUA. Mt Dora MOA lies below five jet routes and two refueling anchors/tracks. Use would be limited during peak air traffic hours by Albuquerque FAA Air Route Traffic Control Center.

2.2.2. ALTERNATIVE 2: Bronco MOA. Bronco SUA fulfills some of the 27 FW's requirements, specifically the Bronco 3 and 4 MOAs; however, Bronco MOA/ATCAA does not offer a collocated bombing/electronic combat range like the Pecos complex does, nor does it allow supersonic flight below FL 300 or chaff/flare usage. In addition, the closest boundary is 58 miles from Cannon AFB, nearly twice the distance to the Pecos complex.

2.2.3. ALTERNATIVE 3: WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE (WSMR). WSMR offers supersonic airspace starting at 5,000 feet AGL. However, WSMR airspace is over 140 miles from Cannon AFB. The same fuel-related issues apply to WSMR to an even greater degree. WSMR has available bombing ranges, but there is no collocated electronic combat range. WSMR airspace is scheduled on a space available, non-guaranteed basis. It is not uncommon for unscheduled priority events to secure the airspace, resulting in airspace denial and loss of training opportunities for nearly all USAF users.

3. Air Traffic Control Assigned Airspace (ATCAA)

3.1. The NMTRI proposal includes:

- Deletion of the Pecos ATCAA (replace with Sumner North/South ATCAAs)

- Create Sumner North ATCAA to overlie the northern portion of Pecos MOA not covered by Sumner South ATCAA from FL 180 to FL 300 or as assigned (used in conjunction with Pecos/Taiban MOAs). Exception: 27 FW requests Sumner North ATCAA up to FL 500 for LFEs twice per month and twice per week, during low demand traffic periods as defined by Albuquerque Center. The twice per week time periods are requested in two-hour blocks; normally these periods will be prior to/ or after Albuquerque Center high demand traffic periods. For aircrew and ATC planning purposes, request standardized time periods.

- Vertical expansion of Sumner South ATCAA from FL 180 to FL 500. No change in times of use. One change in dimension (northern boundary)—detailed in next bullet.

- Establish Sumner North/South ATCAA boundary 5 NM south and parallel to J-74. Lat 34°18'42"N., long. 105°10'00"W to lat. 34°22'51"N., long.103°40'02"W

- Create Capitan ATCAA (FL 180 to FL 320 or as assigned) to link Beak and Sumner South ATCAAs for use during Large Force Exercises only. Linking Beak and Sumner ATCAAs will result in uninterrupted aircrew training into Pecos MOA and Melrose Bombing Range (4K foot block needed for ingress from Sumner South ATCAA and 14K block needed for 1 hour to flow back into Sumner South ATCAA to Pecos/Melrose).

Note: LFE exercises, averaging approximately 20 fighter aircraft, are scheduled throughout each year. Approximately seven LFEs per year are day training events, with five per year planned for night training events. Additionally, the 27 FW conducts LFE training during quarterly Phase II Operational Readiness Exercises (ORE). These exercises last three days and test the 27 FW's ability to conduct sustained/surge flying operations. The LFEs provide 27 FW pilots the opportunity to practice large force employment and train mission commanders prior to combat operations. Expected use is approximately 24 days per year (seven day training, five night training and twelve ORE) for two hours per day. The airspace is typically scheduled for two hour periods.

3.2. All ATCAA airspace is proposed to allow supersonic operations.

4. Activities

4.1. The NMTRI proposed SUA would be primarily used for F-16 missions. F-16 missions include Advanced Aircraft Handling, Basic Fighter Maneuvers, Air Combat Maneuvering, Tactical Intercepts, Air Combat Tactics, Dissimilar Air Combat Tactics, Surface Attack

Tactics, Basic Weapons Delivery, Tactical Weapons Delivery, Close Air Support, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses, Forward Air Controller – Airborne, Combat Search and Recovery, and Force Protection.

4.2. Other aircraft that will use occasionally NMTRI airspace include B-1B, B-52, F-14, F-15C/E, FA-18, GAF Tornado, AT-38, and F/A-22.

5. Environmental and Land Use Information

5.1. The United States Air Force, through Air Combat Command (ACC), Langley AFB, VA is preparing a NMTRI Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The final EIS is scheduled for completion in Nov 05 with the Record of Decision in Jan 06. ACC EIS point of contact is Mr. Troy Andersen, HQ ACC/CEPP, 129 Andrews St., Suite 102, Langley AFB, Virginia 23665. Phone:757-764-9198. Email: troy.andersen@langley.af.mil.

5.2. NMTRI is an airspace proposal only.

5.3. The 27 FW agrees to provide reasonable and timely aerial access to land underneath the proposed airspace. The MOA floor will continue to be 1,500 feet AGL in the vicinity of Ft Sumner Municipal Airport (FSU).

6. Communications and Radar

6.1. Communications and radar services will be as they are today. Albuquerque Center is the servicing ATC agency.

6.2. Communication will be by discrete UHF frequencies assigned by the FAA controller. The FAA remains the primary ATC agency servicing NMTRI airspace.

7. Safety

7.1. Safety issues are addressed in the EIS.

7.2. Defensive training flare use is proposed down to 2,000 feet AGL in accordance with current Air Force Instructions. Flare use will be addressed in the EIS.

8. Coordination Summary

8.1. Air Traffic Control organizations contacted were the Albuquerque Center (ZAB) Air Traffic Manager, ZAB Support Manager, Airspace and Procedures; ZAB Support Manager, Traffic Management; ZAB Airspace Specialist; ZAB controller union representative;

Roswell FAA Tower Chief; FAA Southwest Region Airspace Manager, and the FAA Southwest Region NMTRI environmental action officer.

8.2. Military units actively engaged with the NMTRI include the New Mexico Air National Guard, 150 FW, Kirtland AFB, NM (F-16). Other flying units previously listed have expressed interest in using the expanded airspace, if approved.

8.3. Other federal governmental agencies such as Bureau of Land Management and Bureau of Indian Affairs, as well as state agencies have been contacted during the EIS process.

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9. Proposed SUA

Proposed Pecos MOA Expansion



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Proposed Capitan and Sumner North/South ATCAAs



10. Environmental Documents: The Draft EIS was published in Jan 05 with public hearings held in Jan 05 also. The final EIS is scheduled to be complete in Nov 05.

11. Summary: The 27 FW requires airspace to support day and night supersonic training events for F-16s 10,000 feet MSL to FL 500 in the proposed NMTRI airspace. State of the art aerial combat and surface attack missions in multi-role fighters require highly-tuned offensive and defensive aircrew skills best practiced at all speed and altitude regimes. The ability to conduct local supersonic training operations will enable the 27 FW to meet all critical training requirements which cannot be accomplished in the current airspace. When approved, NMTRI will result in more realistic combat aircrew training and enhanced aircrew survivability in combat.

DCN: 11898

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

JUL 15 2005

Mr. Barry Holman
Defense Capabilities and Management
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Holman,

This is the Department of Defense response to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) final report, GAO-05-785, "Analysis of DoD's 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments," dated July 1, 2005.

The Department previously provided technical corrections and oral comments on the draft report during the week of June 20, 2005. The Department appreciates GAO's recognition that "DOD's decision-making process for developing its recommendations was generally logical, well documented, and reasoned." The report also notes that Department was "consistent in adhering to the use of military value criteria, including new considerations introduced for this round, such as surge and homeland defense." Additionally, the Department fully agrees with GAO's finding that audits by the DoD Inspector General and the individual Service Audit Agencies "concluded that the extensive amount of data used as a basis for BRAC decisions was sufficiently valid and accurate for the purposes intended."

The Department generally agrees with GAO's observations on the process, but disagrees with GAO's concerns regarding projected savings. While the report acknowledges that savings would be achieved and that projected savings are large, it expresses concern, however, that much of the savings result from military personnel reductions at BRAC sites. The report states "without recognition that these are not dollar savings that can be readily applied elsewhere, this could create a false sense of savings available for other purposes."

The issue regarding the treatment of military personnel savings represents a longstanding difference of opinion between DoD and GAO. The Department considers military personnel reductions as savings that are just as real as monetary savings. While the Department may not reduce overall end-strength, the reductions in military personnel for each recommendation at a specific location are real. As is the case of monetary savings, personnel reductions allow the Department to apply these military personnel to generate new capabilities and to improve operational efficiencies.

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As the Department has indicated in its oral comments, it intends to develop a system for tracking and periodically updating its savings estimates for the BRAC 2005 round as recommended by GAO.

The Department's additional concerns are outlined in the enclosure.

The Department appreciates the work performed by the GAO in this regard and appreciates the opportunity to comment on the final report.

Sincerely,

Michael W. Wynne
Chairman, Infrastructure Steering Group

Enclosure:
As stated

DCN: 11898

Additional Issues
on
GAO Report GAO-05-785, "Analysis of DoD's 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments"

Department of Army

Issue: The GAO is concerned that uncertainties regarding the rebasing of Army Overseas Forces to the United States and force structure changes due to modularity may cause projected BRAC costs and savings to be incorrect (pg. 83).

Response: The GAO listed three specific areas of concern that contribute to their perceived uncertainties. All three are directly related to the Army's force structure and manpower authorizations. While some uncertainties remain with respect to these areas, the Army's BRAC Recommendations were based on decisions and the Twenty-year Force Structure Plan which are unlikely to change significantly. As stated in the Force Structure Plan, the authorized strength of the Army is expected to remain at 482,400 and includes 43 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) through 2011 and beyond. Temporary authorizations have allowed the Army to retain up to approximately 512,000 soldiers in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). BRAC analysis and the subsequent recommendations considered this temporary increase.

The Army took a holistic approach to the operational Army in its BRAC analysis and accounted for all 43 BCTs. In order to expand the operational Army by an additional 10 BCTs before the end of Fiscal Year 2006, the Army had to account for approximately 3,500 Soldier authorizations per BCT. As the GAO noted on page 84, "over half of the Army's forces returning from overseas are expected to be folded into the new modular brigades being formed in the United States." As the units overseas inactivate over the next few years, their authorizations will be applied to the approximately 35,000 Soldier authorizations required for the 10 additional BCTs. Their return is timed to support the Army force generation cycle in order to meet current and projected operational requirements. If operational requirements delay the inactivation of unit scheduled to return from overseas, this would require a continuation of the Army's temporary over strength which would not impact the BRAC recommendations but could delay the closure of installations overseas.

Issue: The GAO is concerned that proposed BRAC actions may overstress already constrained training ranges (pg. 85).

Response: The Army's BRAC analysis considered the increase in the number of BCTs and the BRAC recommendations reflect what the Army believes is the optimal solution.

For example, the Army's capacity analysis indicated that Fort Hood did not have the amount of training land to adequately meet the training requirements for six BCTs. Similarly, when the Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group proposed to move the Armor School and Center to Fort Benning, the capacity analysis indicated that Fort Benning could not adequately support the requirements of a second BCT that the Army had previously announced it would activate at Fort Benning in 2006 and the BRAC recommendation would activate it at Fort Knox instead. We also reviewed planned modernization efforts at each installation to determine additional training range requirements at installations included in the BRAC recommendations. This resulted in the inclusion of $240 million for range construction and upgrades at Fort Bliss and $40 million at Fort Carson.

Issue: GAO reported that most of the Army's reserve component recommendations are contingent upon certain actions that have either yet to take place or be decided (pg. 87).

Response: The participation by the States in the Army RC recommendations is voluntary. However, each State that participated in the development of these recommendations did so with the intent to implement them. Where possible, the Army obtained a certified document signed by a representative from the office of the State Adjutant General that supports implementation of these recommendations.

In land acquisition contingent recommendations, a cost to obtain suitable land was included in the analysis. Commercial property is readily available in those locations identified for the new Armed Forces Reserve Centers that require land acquisition.

Issue: Bundling of various recommendations reduces visibility of costs (pg. 87).

Response: Combining the various recommended actions at a specific installation into one recommendation improves the visibility of the overall cost and savings estimates at that particular installation. This also ensured that excess facilities are considered only once and that the revised requirements for community facilities and installation staff are more accurate. The Cost of Base Realignment and Closure Actions (COBRA) reports for each recommendation break down all costs and savings by location.

Issue: GAO indicated that storage capacity at McAlester Army Ammunition may be insufficient to handle Red River's munitions (pg. 89).

Response: The Industrial JCSG analysis determined that McAlester Army Ammunition Plant will have sufficient storage space for munitions that will be relocated from Red River Munitions. McAlester Army Ammunition Plant will demilitarize 16 percent of the munitions it is currently storing (102,603 short tons) and this will enable McAlester to store the roughly 77,000 short tons of munitions it will receive from Red River Munitions Center, Texas.

Issue: GAO indicated that the Army and the Navy did not include additional force protection costs in their analysis (pg. 44).

Response: The Army considered standoff distances when establishing the footprint of the new facilities. Additionally, with the exception of the majority of the RC recommendations, the new facilities are built on military installations that provide additional force protection. Therefore, force protection costs were indirectly included in the costs of the recommendations and were considered for all the recommendations.

Issue: The report implies that additional funding was not included for increased housing requirements at gaining installations (pg. 51).

Response: Additional housing costs were included in each of the Army's recommendations where the addition of new personnel exceeded the capacity at the installation based on the current on base housing percentage. For example, at Fort Bliss more than $587 million was included as a one time cost for RCI housing investment.

Issue: GAO indicated that the Army moved lower value installations "up on the list" (pp 76-77).

Response: The military value of these installations did not change; the installations were forced into the portfolio based on unique capabilities or upon direction of the SRG which caused some installations to move out of the portfolio. The portfolio was the minimum number of installations required to meet the Army's requirements and provided the starting point for analysis. The report also comments that the Army did not establish a 1 to N list for the RC installations. As discussed earlier, this was due to the unique nature of the mission and organization of the RC; establishing a 1 to N list would have no meaning or practical application.

Department of Navy

Issue: GAO states "the recommendations to close Submarine Base New London, Connecticut, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Maine...are based on projected decreases in the number of submarines in the future force structure" (pg. 104).

Response: This statement is not factually correct for Submarine Base New London, and is repeated in substance in the second sentence of the second paragraph in this section ("...the projected 21 percent reduction in the submarine force led the Navy to analyze various proposals to close submarine bases"). The analysis leading to the recommendation to close Submarine Base New London was based on a calculation of aggregate excess capacity for the entire surface/subsurface function derived from the original Force Structure Plan, without regard to type of platform. As the Chief of Naval Operations indicated in his testimony on May 17, 2005, the subsequent reduction of submarine force structure in the revised Force Structure Plan served to confirm the

viability of this recommendation. However, submarine bases were not analyzed as a separate subset of installations, and the details of Force Structure Plan decreases were not used to develop scenarios for analysis. To the extent the decommissioning of ships was reflected in the Force Structure Plan, this was accounted for in scenario analysis, as in the case of Naval Station Ingleside (decommissioning of mine warfare ships). That was not the case for Submarine Base New London: all reported submarines homeported at Submarine Base New London were relocated in the scenario analysis.

Issue: Regarding the Submarine School at Submarine Base New London, GAO states "The BRAC Commission may want to assure itself that the Navy has developed a transition plan to satisfy the training and certification requirements until the receiving sites are able to perform this training, without unduly interrupting the training pipeline" (pg. 105).

Response: We have already responded to a question from the Commission on this topic and look forward to continuing the discussion.

Issue: Regarding Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, GAO states "The Commission may wish to consider the views of the shipyard employees and the results of the Navy's review in their analysis of this recommendation" (pg. 108).

Response: We have already responded to a question from the Commission on this topic and look forward to continuing the discussion.

Department of Air Force

Issue: GAO states, "Although this [capacity] analysis indicated the ability of bases to bed down additional aircraft, according to Air Force officials, it did not provide a specific excess capacity percentage by installation or major command. Accordingly, an overall capacity analysis report was not made available to us, comparable to that provided by the other military departments" (pg. 114).

Response: The capacity of Air Force installations varied depending on the mission design series (MDS) (type of aircraft) assigned. Variables, such as buildable acres, runway, taxiway and ramp dimensions, hangar size and fuel system type and capacity, affect the capacity of a base to house a particular MDS. The Air Force capacity analysis considered these variables and focused on identifying the potential to add force structure of similar MDS to each installation. The intent of the analysis effort was to provide an estimate of total maximum theoretical capacity at each location and across the Air Force by MDS. Assessments were provided by Air Force Major Commands using certified data provided in Data Call #1 and approved weapons systems templates used in initial Major Command capacity briefings (April 2004). The assessments identified each installation's potential to add units of similar force structure considering existing conditions, facilities, additional construction requirements, and operational and

environmental constraints. This information was available and the process used suited Air Force analysis needs exceptionally well.

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group

Issue: GAO states, "The group did not analyze the extent to which its proposed recommendations would reduce excess capacity across all education and training functions. Nonetheless, the Air Force estimated that the recommendation to consolidate undergraduate pilot training would reduce excess capacity by 2 percent. At the same time, the excess capacity identified will remain in undergraduate rotary wing training because the Navy could not agree on a scenario to consolidate training (pg. 135)."

Response: The E&T JCSG did analyze the extent to which all scenario options for undergraduate fixed wing and rotary wing would reduce excess capacity across the 12 undergraduate flight training bases. The results were presented to the ISG leadership during their review and evaluation of proposed scenarios.

Issue: GAO states "Our analysis indicates that $1.3 billion, or over 95 percent, of the group's projected 20-year savings results from two recommendations that involve only the Army—the combat service support center and the air defense artillery center" (pg. 141).

Response: These are not exclusively Army recommendations. Although predominately Army, the Specialized Skill Training portion of the recommendations include the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

Issue: GAO states, "However, the chairman noted that his group could not get the Navy to agree to the consolidation because of the Navy's concerns over how such actions would affect other training schedules, so it was not pursued" (pg. 142).

Response: The Department of the Navy did not support the consolidation because the scenario had a payback that exceeded 100 years. However, if the consolidation at Fort Rucker included a closure of Naval Air Station Whiting Field, or other airfields in related scenarios, a reasonable payback would have been realized. Other scenarios that included rotary wing training consolidation were not approved because of concerns over impact on student production, increased travel costs, and airfield and airspace capacity saturation.

Issue: GAO states, "The Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group also developed a proposal to privatize graduate education that was conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California, and the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The group estimated that the proposal would produce $14 million in 20-year savings, with payback in 13 years, and enable the closure of the Monterey location." (pg. 143).

Response: The E&T JCSG, along with the Department of Navy, estimated the scenario would produce $1.12 billion in 20-year savings, with payback as immediate, and enable the closure of the Monterey location and the facility supporting graduate education for the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

Issue: GAO states, "The group also developed a recommendation to consolidate all the military services' senior war colleges at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., making them one college of the National Defense University. The group estimated that the proposal would produce $213 million in 20-year savings, with payback in 2 years" (pg. 143)

Response: The candidate recommendation in question actually called for co-locating all the military services' senior war colleges at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., making them part of the National Defense University. The E&T JCSG estimated that the proposal would produce $408 million in 20-year savings, with payback in 1 year.

Headquarters and Support Activity Joint Cross-Service Group

Issue: The GAO report cites concerns the DoD Inspector General's raised about how the Headquarters and Support Activity (HSA) JCSG applied rounding in applying personnel eliminations (pg. 152).

Response: The HSA JCSG implemented a prudent personnel reduction determination process that began with application of a standard, and conservative, elimination rate based on co-location or consolidation, followed with negotiating with the affected entities, and exercising military judgment through deliberations to avoid creating an arbitrary factor. The range of eliminations both reflected and allowed for unique characteristics of each organization involved. While the application of eliminations or rounding may seem nonstandard, that truly reflects the strength of the HSA JCSG approach. Instead of applying a standard and arbitrary factor to every scenario, the HSA JCSG fostered a process to balance (a) obtaining efficiency and shared savings with (b) the operational needs of the entities under consideration. Reflecting this conservative approach, approximately 80 percent of the HSA JCSG recommendations had elimination rates of less than 20 percent.

Issue: The GAO report notes that DoD's recommendations would "reduce total DoD leased space in the National Capital Region from 8.3 million square feet to about 1.7 million square feet, or by 80 percent." The report states "the recommendations related to vacating leased space also raise questions about a limitation in projected savings and impact on local communities," (pg. 158).

Response: It is important to highlight the relative size of DoD leased space within the commercial real estate sector in the region. There are approximately 369 million square feet of commercial leased space within the Washington, DC, metro area and 164 million square feet in Northern Virginia. The reduction represents an insignificant percentage of

the total commercial real estate market. Historical absorption rates also suggest that recovery is achievable, and the impact is likely insignificant for the National Capital Region.

Issue: The GAO discusses the application of one time cost avoidances associated from moving from leased facilities onto government owned and protected facilities. The report notes that HSA applied the cost avoidance factor consistently "but did not collect data that would indicate whether existing leases met" force protection standards (pp. 158-159)."

Response: While deliberating movement from leased space, the HSA JCSG considered current Department policy for meeting Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) a necessity. It is important to note that the removal of the AT/FP premium does not materially affect any of the HSA JCSG recommendations. Removing 100 percent of the AT/FP premium only decreases the aggregate 20-year Net Present Value (NPV) savings 4.6 percent, and the remaining NPV savings still total $5.546 billion. In the specific Stennis example cited in the GAO report, removal of the AT/FP premium reduces NPV savings from $196.669 million to $194.887 million, with no impact on payback years. Although the most accurate way to assess the cost of AT/FP compliance would be to grade each leased and owned building in the DoD inventory, this approach was not feasible given time and resource constraints. Therefore, the HSA JCSG applied a conservative AT/FP premium to all cases in order to ensure a balanced, equitable, and realistic comparison. It was appropriate for the HSA JCSG to apply the premium even in cases where the current leased occupancy represents less than 25 percent of the space in the building (thus currently AT/FP compliant by Uniform Facilities Criteria), as future building occupancy-based compliance could change or the lessee may not remain in place throughout the BRAC horizon.

The future Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA) study mentioned in the GAO report was not available to the HSA JCSG, and is not relevant to the BRAC process. Certainly, threat vulnerability is a dynamic of AT/FP and the PFPA study, when conducted, will be helpful with respect to the threat associated with a specific building. This information may prove useful in the future management of leased space within the Department, but could not be a factor in the HSA JCSG recommendations.

Issue: GAO states, "While the proposal to create joint bases by consolidating common installation management functions is projected to create greater efficiencies, our prior work suggests that implementation of these actions may prove challenging," (pg. 161).

Response: While Joint Basing initiatives may present implementation challenges, these challenges are surmountable and the potential for increased efficiency and effectiveness is significant. The fact is, tenant relationships exist aboard many Bases and Stations today. The period of time preceding implementation allows ample opportunity to

develop and refine common terminology and operating standards. Leveraging this potential leads to efficiencies that benefit operational forces and the taxpayer.

Issue: Under the heading "Bundling Lessens Visibility of Costs," GAO states, "We found that in 7 instances, the more than 10-year payback periods of initially stand-alone proposals tended to be masked after they were combined in such packages," (pg. 162).

Response: Integration of scenarios was a management tool for the large number of recommendations during the latter stages of deliberations, and generally centered on common closure recommendations or groupings of entities with similar functions. The HSA JCSG provided multiple recommendations to the Army that combined to support the closures of Forts Monroe and McPherson. The movement of Headquarters from the Washington, DC, area to Fort Sam Houston, one small element from Rock Island, and the Army Materiel Command (AMC) remained. The HSA JCSG grouped these remaining entities as the "Relocation of Headquarters and Field Operating Agencies from the National Capital Region" recommendation. The relocation of AMC fit cleanly into this "grouping."

Issue: The report indicates that JCSG personnel stated that the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) rejected the U.S. Southern Command recommendation because costs associated with the relocation were too high (pg. 164).

Response: For clarity, the reasons why the ISG removed this recommendation from further consideration are as documented in the ISG minutes for March 25, 2005. The ISG agreed that the options presented at that meeting (moving SOUTHCOM to a state-owned leased facility, Patrick AFB, Lackland AFB or Homestead AFB) were not viable because SOUTHCOM can be accommodated locally without a costly relocation. In addition, SOUTHCOM judged Miami to be the best location for its mission for efficiency reasons.

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group

Issue: The GAO cites the concerns raised by Red River Army Depot officials about the complexities associated with replicating its rubber production capability, which consists of removing and replacing rubber pads for vehicle track and road wheels, at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, and points out Red River is currently the only source for road wheels for the Abrams M1 tank (pg. 90).

Response: The Industrial JCSG (IJCSG) did recommend that Red River's Rubber Products capability be realigned to Anniston Army Depot. Anniston responded by estimating the costs to transition this capability during several scenario data calls. In addition, the IJCSG did consider the impact of maintaining current rubber production capacity and capability during this transition period in making its recommendation to realign Red River's depot maintenance activities. There are many historical examples where a Service has successfully implemented

BRAC decisions to disestablish capability at a losing depot and re-establish capability at a gaining depot during periods of high operational tempo without jeopardizing support to the war fighter. The same approaches and several of the same actions can be applied to maintaining rubber production capacity and inventory levels during the transition process. While the certification of the rubber production capability at Anniston Army Depot must be qualified through rigorous testing and is expected to be a time consuming process, production capability will remain at Red River until the certification is complete and transition can occur without negatively impacting the war fighter.

Issue: The GAO states, "no recommendations were developed regarding the Air Force's three relatively large air logistics centers and only Navy-centric recommendations were developed regarding the Navy's three naval air depots, despite that the industrial group had registered scenarios consolidating similar types of work from a naval air depot into air logistics centers." The report states the IJCSG "decided not to propose these as recommendations because of the Navy's desire to combine its aircraft depot and intermediate work into fleet readiness centers and because this recommendation offered greater financial benefits" (pg. 177).

Response: The IJCSG did analyze the depot maintenance workloads remaining at the Naval Air Depots after development of the fleet readiness center scenario construct. Based on the optimization model analysis, which included all aviation depots (including Air Force depots), a potential candidate was identified for realignment. However, further analysis revealed it was not an economically sound scenario.

Issue: The GAO discusses the commercial leases at Army ammunition plants entered into under the authority of the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Initiative (ARMS). The GAO speculates that early lease terminations could cause the Department to incur increased costs should these leases be terminated early. GAO cites an example of Indiana Army Ammunition Plant and increased costs of $41 million due to early contract termination. They suggest termination costs should be included in the analysis for any contract that extends past the closure date (pp 182-183).

Response: IJCSG officials confirmed through the Joint Munitions Command that all existing ARMS related contracts expire within the BRAC window. Therefore there are no termination costs to include in the analysis. A list of all of the contracts with expiration dates was forwarded to the GAO on June 29, 2005.

Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group

Issue: GAO reports that the savings projected by the Supply and Storage (S&S) JCSG from the use of performance-based logistics and reductions to duplicate inventories are uncertain. GAO notes that it lacked sufficient time to fully evaluate supporting documentation underpinning the S&S JCSG assumptions for savings. GAO correctly noted, however, that savings would be generated through the increased use of

performance based agreements that leverage the buying power that accrues from combining multi-service purchases under one agency (DLA) and concomitant reductions in inventory requirements (pg. 216).

Response: The S&S JCSG based its savings estimates on historically proven and documented results experienced in similar business process improvements such as the Performance Based Agreements currently in use by DLA. The savings projections were incorporated in S&S JCSG recommendations only after military judgment assessment and concurrence by the S&S JCSG Principals representing each Military Service.

Issue: GAO reports that the Supply and Storage (S&S) JCSG assumed that vacated infrastructure projected in S&S JCSG BRAC recommendations would remain unused after implementation and that the Defense Department would incur no sustainment or recapitalization costs. GAO states that this assumption was the basis for the approximately $100M in net annual recurring savings claimed by the S&S JCSG. GAO further notes that the assumption that space vacated as a result of BRAC would remain unused is not necessarily valid and, as a result, savings may be overstated (pg. 217).

Response: The S&S JCSG did not make assumptions with respect to the disposition of vacated infrastructure following implementation of BRAC recommendations. S&S is unaware of any approved model or tool that can predict the future use of a structure or decision by an installation commander that would prevent re-occupation of a vacated structure. The savings associated with vacated infrastructure were generated by the Cost of Base Realignment Activity (COBRA) model. The S&S JCSG agrees with GAO that if vacated facility space continues to be used after implementation of the BRAC recommendations then savings estimates may not be achieved. However, if approved and implemented, this recommendation will vacate infrastructure and it is arguable that savings will still accrue to the Department even if the space is reoccupied. This is because once the S&S entities vacate, any other entity requiring infrastructure would otherwise have to create infrastructure and incur the associated costs. The availability of S&S vacated space would serve to offset or avoid those costs that would be incurred elsewhere.

Issue: GAO reports that the S&S JCSG had alternative recommendations other than the recommendation that was approved by the IEC for depot level reparable procurement management consolidation to DLA. GAO reports that additional savings could have been generated if Service representatives would have been less risk averse and therefore willing to transfer more responsibility from the inventory control points (ICPs) to DLA using the S&S JCSG alternative recommendations (pg. 217).

Response: This recommendation reflects the combined military judgment of the S&S JCSG and Military Services. The S&S JCSG Principals engaged in substantive dialogue on depot level reparable procurement management consolidation in order to ensure that support for the warfighter was in no way compromised by any of the recommendations

that would ultimately be implemented. Maintaining support for the warfighter, especially critical during this period as Military Services are engaged and forward deployed in the global war against terror, was a main tenet of the S&S JCSG throughout this BRAC round. Highly technical functions such as engineering were never envisioned as functionality that should transfer to an agency such as DLA that does not perform weapons systems engineering as a core function. The transfer of other ICP functions as suggested by GAO were also discussed and deliberated. However, the functions that were agreed upon to be transferred, the degree of responsibility that would transfer with them and the associated risk that would accompany implementation of the recommendation were validated as acceptable outcomes by the collective military judgment of the S&S JCSG Principals. As GAO maintains in this GAO report, "GAO believes DLA management of ICPs and DLRs is transformational."

Approved
Rejected Amended

= Received and/or reviewed
= Inserted into Chapter 1 masterfile

Updated as of: 8/24/2005

Community Concerns Narrative Progress Report

Recommend #	Name of Recommendation	Analyst Writing Narrative	Due Date	Status of Recommendation
1	Ft Wainwright, AK	Dean Rhody	25-Aug	~~Edited and approved by PRA~~ Ap
2	Fort Gillem, GA	Don Manuel	25-Aug	~~Edited~~ Ap Amended but closed
3	Ft McPherson, GA	Don Manuel	25-Aug	Ap
4	Ft Bragg, NC	Kevin Felix	25-Aug	Ap
5	Ft Monmouth, NJ	Wes Hood	25-Aug	Ap amend still closed
6	Ft Hood, TX	Kevin Felix	25-Aug	Ap
7	Red River AD, TX	Liz Bieri	25-Aug	Resign
8	Ft Monroe, VA	Don Manuel	25-Aug	Ap
9	Maneuver Training	Mike Avenick	25-Aug	Ap
10	Operational Army	Kevin Felix	25-Aug	Ap
11	RC Transformation, AL	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	Ap
12	RC Transformation, AZ	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	Ap
13	RC Transformation AR	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
14	RC Transformation CA	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
15	RC Transformation CT	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
16	RC Transformation DE	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
17	RC Transformation GA	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
18	RC Transformation HI	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
19	RC Transformation IL	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
20	RC Transformation IN	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
21	RC Transformation IA	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
22	RC Transformation KY	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
23	RC Transformation LA	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
24	RC Transformation MD	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
25	RC Transformation MA	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
26	RC Transformation MI	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
27	RC Transformation MN	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
28	RC Transformation MO	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
29	RC Transformation MT	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
30	RC Transformation NE	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
31	RC Transformation NH	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	

DCN: 11898

Community Concerns Narrative Progress Report

Recommend #	Name of Recommendation	Analyst Writing Narrative	Due Date	Status
32	RC Transformation NJ	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
33	RC Transformation NM	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
34	RC Transformation NY	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
35	RC Transformation NC	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
36	RC Transformation ND	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
37	RC Transformation OH	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
38	RC Transformation OK	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
39	RC Transformation OR	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
40	RC Transformation PA	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
41	RC Transformation PR	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
42	RC Transformation RI	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
43	RC Transformation TN	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
44	RC Transformation TX	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
45	RC Transformation VT	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
46	RC Transformation WA	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
47	RC Transformation WV	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
48	RC Transformation WI	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
49	RC Transformation WY	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	
50	Single Drill Sergeant	Dean Rhody	25-Aug	Ap
51	US Army Garrison, MI	Wes Hood	25-Aug	Ap
52	USAR Command & Control, New England	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	Ap
53	USAR Command & Control, Northeast	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	Ap
54	USAR Command & Control, Northwest	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	Ap
55	USAR Command & Control, Southeast	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	Ap
56	USAR Command & Control, Southwest	Tim Abrell	25-Aug	Ap
57	Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA	Valerie Mills	25-Aug	Ap
58	Naval Support Activity Corona, CA	David Epstein	25-Aug	rej
59	Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment, Concord, CA	David Epstein	25-Aug	Ap
60	Sub Base New London, CT	Hal Tickle	25-Aug	rej
61	Officer Training Command, Pensacola, FL	Joe Barrett	25-Aug	Ap
62	Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA	Bill Fetzer	25-Aug	Ap
63	Navy Supply Corps School Athens, GA	David Epstein	25-Aug	Ap
64	Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA	Joe Barrett	25-Aug	Am

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Community Concerns Narrative Progress Report

Recommend #	Name of Recommendation	Analyst Writing Narrative	Due Date	Status
65	Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME	Hal Tickle	25-Aug	not voted - rej → closed in add
66	Marine Corps Support Activity Kansas City, MO	Joe Barrett	25-Aug	Amend
67	Naval Station Pascagoula, MS	Brian McDaniel	25-Aug	Ap
68	NAS Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, PA	Mike Delaney	25-Aug	Amend
69	Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Kittery, ME	CW Furlow	25-Aug	rej
70	Naval Station Newport, RI	David Epstein	25-Aug	Ap *
71	Naval Station Ingleside, TX and NAS Corpus Christi, TX	Bill Fetzer	25-Aug	Ap
72	Engineering Field Activity	CW Furlow	25-Aug	Ap
73	Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers	Mike Delaney	25-Aug	Ap
74	Navy Recruiting Districts	Joe Barrett	25-Aug	Ap
75	Navy Regions	CW Furlow	25-Aug	Ap
76	Navy Reserve Centers	Colleen Turner	25-Aug	Am *
77	Navy Reserve Readiness Commands	Mike Delaney	25-Aug	Ap
78	Birmingham Intl Airport AGS, AL	Tim MacGregor	26-Aug	Ap.
79	Eielson AFB, AK, Moody AFB, GA, and Shaw AFB, SC	Craig Hall	26-Aug	Am
80	Kulis AGS, AK and Elmendorf AFB, AK	Craig Hall	26-Aug	Am
81	Fort Smith AGS, AR and Luke AFB, AZ	Brad McRee	26-Aug	Am
82	Beale AFB, CA and Selfridge ANGB, MI	Nat Sillin	26-Aug	App
83	March AFB, CA	Justin Breitschopf	26-Aug	Am
84	Onizuka AF Station, CA	Craig Hall	26-Aug	Ap
85	Bradley AGS, CT, Barnes AGS, MA	Brad McRee	26-Aug	Am
86	New Castle AGS, DE	Jim Hanna	26-Aug	Ap
87	Robins AFB, GA	Tim MacGregor	26-Aug	Am
88	Boise Air Terminal AGS, ID	Brad McRee	26-Aug	Ap
89	Mountain Home AFB, ID, Nellis AFB, NV and Elmendorf AFB, AK	Tanya Cruz	26-Aug	Am.
90	Capital AGS, IL and Hulman AGS, IN	Brad McRee	26-Aug	Am
91	New Orleans Air Reserve Station, LA	Tanya Cruz	26-Aug	Am
92	Andrews AFB, MD Will Rogers AGS, OK, Tinker AFB, OK	Art Beauchamp ~~Mike Flinn and Colleen~~	26-Aug	Ap.
93	Martin State AGS, MD	Jim Hanna	26-Aug	Ap

DCN: 11898

Community Concerns Narrative Progress Report

Recommend #	Name of Recommendation	Analyst Writing Narrative	Due Date	Status
94	Otis Air National Guard Base	Brad McRee	26-Aug	Ap Am
95	WK Kellogg AGS, MI	Ken Small	26-Aug	Am
96	Duluth AGS, MN	Brad McRee	26-Aug	Rej.
97	Key Field AGS, MS	Tim MacGregor	26-Aug	Am
98	Great Falls AGS, MT	Brad McRee	26-Aug	Am
99	Reno Tahoe AGS, NV	Brad McRee	26-Aug	Rej
100	Cannon AFB, NM	David Combs	26-Aug	Am.
101	Niagara Falls ARS, NY	Mike Flinn	26-Aug	Am
102	Schenectedy AGS, NY	Mike Flinn	26-Aug	rej
103	Pope AFB, NC, Pittsburgh ARS, PA, and Yeager AGS, WV	Mike Flinn	26-Aug	Am
104	Grand Forks AFB, ND	Tim MacGregor	26-Aug	Am
105	Hector AGS, ND	Tim MacGregor	26-Aug	Am
106	Mansfield-Lahm AGS, OH	Brad McRee	26-Aug	Am
107	Springfield-Beckley AGS, OH	Brad McRee	26-Aug	Am
108	Portland AGS, OR	David Combs	26-Aug	Ap. Am
109	Ellsworth AFB, SD and Dyess AFB, TX	Art Beauchamp	26-Aug	Rej
110	Nashville AGS, TN	Brad McRee	26-Aug	Ap
111	Ellington AGS, TX	Brad McRee	26-Aug	Ap Am
112	Lackland AFB, TX	Art Beauchamp	26-Aug	Ap.
113	Hill AFB, UT, Edwards AFB, CA, Mountain Home AFB, ID	Art Beauchamp	26-Aug	Am.
114	Langley AFB, VA	Art Beauchamp	26-Aug	Ap.
115	Richmond AGS, VA and Des Moines AGS, IA	Brad McRee	26-Aug	Am
116	Fairchild AFB, WA	Tim MacGregor	26-Aug	Am
117	General Mitchell ARS, WI	Tanya Cruz	26-Aug	Am
118	Air Force Logistics Support Centers	Art Beauchamp	26-Aug	Ap.
119	F100 Engine Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities	Art Beauchamp	26-Aug	Ap.
120	Aviation Logistics School	Dean Rhody	28-Aug	rej
121	Combat Service Support Center	Dean Rhody	28-Aug	Ap
122	Joint Center for Consolidated Transportation Management Training	Syd Carroll	28-Aug	Ap

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Community Concerns Narrative Progress Report

Recommend #	Name of Recommendation	Analyst Writing Narrative	Due Date	Status
123	Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training	Syd Carroll	28-Aug	Ap
124	Joint Center of Excellence for Religious Training and Education	Syd Carroll	28-Aug	Ap
125	Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site	Syd Carroll	28-Aug	Ap
126	Net Fires Center	Mike Avenick	28-Aug	Ap
127	Prime Power to Ft Leonard Wood, MO	Dean Rhody	28-Aug	Ap
128	Undergraduate Pilot and Navigator Training	Syd Carroll	28-Aug	Ap
129	Co-Locate Misc Air Force Leased Space	Tim Abrell	28-Aug	Ap
130	Co-Locate Defense Military Department Adjudication	Carol Schmidt	28-Aug	Ap
131	Co-Locate Military Dept Investigation Agencies	Jim Durso	28-Aug	Ap
132	Co-locate Misc Army Leased Space	Tim Abrell	28-Aug	Ap
133	Co-locate Misc OSD, Defense Agency Leased Space	Carol Schmidt	28-Aug	Ap
134	Co-Locate Missle and Space Defense Agencies	Jim Durso	28-Aug	Ap
135	Co-Locate Navy Education and Training Command	Carol Schmidt	28-Aug	rej
136	Co-Locate Army Test and Evaluation Command HQ	Tim Abrell	28-Aug	Ap
137	Conslidate Civilian Personnel Offices within each Military Department	Carol Schmidt	28-Aug	Am
138	Conslidate Correctional Facilities into Joint Regional Correctional Facilities	Carol Schmidt	28-Aug	Ap
139	Consolidate Defense Commissary Agency	Tom Pantelides	28-Aug	Ap
140	Consolidate Defense Information Systems Agency and Establish Joint C4ISR Capability	Ethan Saxon	28-Aug	Ap
141	Consolidate Media Organizations	Mike Delaney	28-Aug	Ap
142	Consolidate Transportation Command Components	Jim Durso	28-Aug	Ap

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Community Concerns Narrative Progress Report

Recommend #	Name of Recommendation	Analyst Writing Narrative	Due Date	Status
143	Consolidate/Co-Locate Active and Reserve Personnel & Recruiting Centers for Army	Colleen Turner	28-Aug	Am
144	Create Joint Mobilization Sites	Colleen Turner	28-Aug	Ap
145	DFAS	Marliyn Wasleski	28-Aug	—
146	Joint Basing	Carol Schmidt	28-Aug	Ap
147	Relocate Air Force Real Property Agency	Carol Schmidt	28-Aug	Ap
148	Relocate Army Headquarters and Field Operating Agencies	Wes Hood	28-Aug	Ap
149	Relocate Misc Dept of Navy Leased Space	Carol Schmidt	28-Aug	Ap
150	Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA	David Epstein	28-Aug	Am
151	Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant, CA	George Delgado	28-Aug	
152	Sierra Army Depot, CA	George Delgado	28-Aug	
153	Rock Island Arsenal, IL	Valerie Mills	28-Aug	Ap
154	Newport Chemical Depot, IN	George Delgado	28-Aug	
155	Kansas Army Ammunition Plant, KS	George Delgado	28-Aug	
156	Lima Tank Plant, OH	George Delgado	28-Aug	rej
157	Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant, MS	George Delgado	28-Aug	
158	Hawthorne Army Depot, NV	George Delgado	28-Aug	rej
159	Watervliet Arsenal, NY	George Delgado	28-Aug	
160	Umatilla Chemical Depot, OR	George Delgado	28-Aug	
161	Lackland AFB, TX	Tom Pantelides	28-Aug	rej
162	Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, TX	George Delgado	28-Aug	
163	Deseret Chemical Depot, UT	George Delgado	28-Aug	
164	Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity Norfolk, VA	CW Furlow	28-Aug	Ap
165	Fleet Readiness Centers	Tom Pantelides	28-Aug	Am
166	Naval Shipyard Detachments	CW Furlow	28-Aug	Ap
167	Defense Intelligence Agency	Mike Delaney	28-Aug	Ap
168	National Geospatial Intelligence Agency	Mike Delaney	28-Aug	Ap
169	Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda MD	Lesia Mandzia	28-Aug	App
170	Brooks City Base, TX	Lesia Mandzia	28-Aug	Ap
171	McChord Air Force Base, WA	Lesia Mandzia	28-Aug	Ap
172	San Antonio Regional Medical Center, TX	Lesia Mandzia	28-Aug	Ap

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Community Concerns Narrative Progress Report

Recommend #	Name of Recommendation	Analyst Writing Narrative	Due Date	Status
173	Convert Inpatient Services to Clinics	Lesia Mandzia	28-Aug	Am
174	Joint Centers of Excellence for Chemical Biological and Medical	Jim Durso	28-Aug	Am
175	Commodity Management Privatization	Jim Durso	28-Aug	Ap
176	Depot Level Reparable Procurement Management Consolidation	Jim Durso	28-Aug	Am
177	Supply, Distribution, and Storage Management Reconfiguration	Jim Durso	28-Aug	Ap
178	Co-Locate Extramural Research Program Managers	Ashley Buzzell	28-Aug	rej
179	Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR RDAT&E	Les Farrington	28-Aug	rej
180	Consolidate Ground Vehicle D&A in a Joint Center	Les Farrington	28-Aug	Ap
181	Consolidate Maritime C4ISR RDAT&E	David Epstein	28-Aug	Ap
182	Consolidate Navy Strategic T&E	Les Farrington	28-Aug	rej
183	Consolidate Sea Vehicle D&A	Les Farrington	28-Aug	Ap
184	Create a Naval Integrated Weap & Armaments RDAT&E	David Epstein	28-Aug	Ap
185	Create an Air Integrated Weap & Armaments RDAT&E	Les Farrington	28-Aug	Ap
186	Create an Integrated Weap & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns & Ammo	David Epstein	28-Aug	Ap
187	Defense Research Service Led Labs	Les Farrington	28-Aug	Am
188	Establish Centers for Fixed Wing Air Platform RDAT&E	Les Farrington	28-Aug	Ap
189	Establish Centers for Rotary Wing Air Platform RDAT&E	Les Farrington	28-Aug	Ap
190	Navy Sensors, EW, and Electronic RDAT&E	Les Farrington	28-Aug	rej
191	NAS Brunswick (closure)	Hal Tickle	28-Aug	Ap
192	Navy Broadway Complex	Brian McDaniel	28-Aug	Ap
193	NAS Oceana (closure or realign)	Bill Fetzer	28-Aug	Am
194	Pope AFB (expanding realignment)	Mike Flinn	28-Aug	Rej
195	Galena FOL (closure)	Craig Hall	28-Aug	Ap
196	DFAS (close three alt sites)	Marliyn Wasleski	28-Aug	Am

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Community Concerns Narrative Progress Report

Recommend #	Name of Recommendation	Analyst Writing Narrative	Due Date	Status
197	Post Graduate Education	Syd Carroll	28-Aug	rej
198	Joint Medical Command HQ	Ethan Saxon	28-Aug	ap

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FRANK

ADM G Notes from St Louis Hearing

GARY

131 WING Panel

Breaking up the most efficient wing in in the ANG

LEMPKE - ~~ADJ~~ ADJ. GEN'S Assoc of US -

UNLIKE Army NG - AFNG WAS NOT INVOLVED IN BRAC DELIBERATIONS

AJ GEN'S ASSOC POINTS:

1. Active Cost Criteria cannot be applied to ANG
2. Efforts to concentrate ANG PAA at fewer larger wings is cost effective
3. A2 will negatively effect Retention
4. Enclave Concept not demonstrated or even publicly debated

~~BG~~ SIDWELL / MG ~~[illegible]~~ TAG

Repeated BRAC / JALBERT CHARLOTTE

USAF Deviated substantially from the statutory provisions for determining Military Value

Essentially they used Active criteria to evaluate ANG facilities/units and since this is inappropriate - they got the wrong ANG ~~ambassador~~ answer

DCN: 11898

HRC ST LOUIS

- MORE COST EFF. TO MOVE/CONSOLIDATE HRC office at HRC ST. LOUIS rather Than FT KNOX
- SCENARIO NEVER RUN TO STUDY CONSOLID @ ST LOUIS
- Doing above should be cheaper Than $119.m cost in DOD recommendation
- GSA rep. supported the feasibility of ~~as~~ consolidating HRC @ ST LOUIS

✓ FT KNOX does not have the infrastructure
- NOT just the building - its all the housing, schools, hospitals education, etc - it should be included

DFAS (ST L & K CITY)

DCN: 11898

ILLINOIS

Sen Durbin laid down a marker that slow release of DOD data undermines the moves - maybe ~~fo~~ seriously

More of 183 wing to Ft Wayne flawed
- Lower Mil Value
- Present wing has x 100% manning

My Comment:

Doesn't reducing the work force at Rock Island require that overhead be spread over a smaller industrial base? Isn't this bad economics?

IOWA

Rock Island is there issue also

- Arithmetic on Tank & Automotive & Armament moves do not make sense. How do we justify moves that cost money in this strained DOD Budget

DCN: 11898

ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL - (CONT'd)

Suggested that the perception that Rock Island Ars was to be closed started a stampede among tenants that did not get turned around in time to be reflected in new report.

Suggested their numbers show no ROI ever.

Suggested TACOM move violates MIL VALUE, + CRIT. 4&5

Regional Personnel Office never examined alternative scenarios - e.g. consolidate AT Rock Island

MAP W/ FIGHTER COVERAGE in MID WEST (CHICAGO in PARTICULAR)

183RD WING/ ANG / Springfield, IL

Moving highly rated unit rather than lower rated

Moving from Hi Value to Lower Value

Move justified on recruiting & retention - which they claim is no problem at Springfield

Check out % manning - They claim 98.5%

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~~Hazel / Springfield~~

✓ Naval Station Great Lakes
3 moves out
4 moves in

Dollar costs / payback / ROI etc were not provided in Commission Books
(& for Med Training move & downgrading of Naval Hospital GL)

Kentucky

✓ - Challenged move of Naval Surface Warfare Center Louisville to Pecatonica IL
(Gun & Ammo Research)

FT Knox -
Should have co-located Army Recruiting Command with parent @ Ft Knox while we are at it.

Medical Hosp downsize -
DID NOT utilize new end-state numbers resulting from BRAC moves -
Hosp. numbers / utilization goes way up (community) & NOT handle BCT

DCN: 11898

NSWC Louisville moves –
Review all 8 NSWC moves
do ~~compliet~~ complement each other and
could possibly have a synergistic effect

INDIANA
Hulman said to be able to support
Ft Wayne in manning – what
is the distance. Is it reasonable
to believe Hulman people will travel
to Ft Wayne

Springfield/Capital ~~AF~~ ANGB gain of
F110 engine CIRF – what is value
in people and $? – Does it particularly
affect ~~also~~ loss of 183rd wing

Crane (NSWC) is big issue

Challenged DOD methodology in that the
highest MIL VALUE depot – Crane –
was a contributor rather than a
Receiver of functions.

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CRANE

They challenged MILVANS evaluations
see their sheet / white paper

If CRANE's rates go up as a result of this - have these increased rates (costs) been included in COBRA run

ANA issue seems to be answered - their slight advantage was due mostly to SLC newer planes - which are moving!

Why / Are we moving Engineering functions from the lowest rates in NAVY to areas of much higher rates

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MICHIGAN They requested we VISIT Battle Creek since it is a close

SELFRIDGE Army garison - should it be a realignment to USAF property management & ownership

KELLOGG Challenged Mil Value because ANG attributes are not correctly evaluated They gave examples of what they called "biased" evaluation. Further, criteria that should have been used where not used. He gave examples

Challenged cost savings at KELLOGG.

Challenged moving costs - too low as stated. An A-10 wing has requirements that are not one-for-one transferable
+ Transition of F-16 pilots to A-10 not considered - $1M / pilot

STATED BRAC is a vehicle to cut Guard & AFR by > 30% to pay for acquisition $ shortfalls.

Compare Selfridge & Battle Creek
FIRE / SNOW clearance / Police / Town ATC

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WISCONSIN

440th C-130 Wing Obscure unit leave NO AFR/ANG unit in an area with a pop of 12m including Milwaukee/Chicago/Green Bay
- much better than ~~Pope AFB NC~~ Pope, NC, and Little Rock/Dobbins

- Proposed move is to areas of severe air traffic congestion - how much did congestion effect military value

- Part of a more move A/C to Active component from R/Guard. Not an appropriate BRAC issue

- Does cost of move include costs of replacing/training all new personnel? Should it

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BOND: COULD HOUSE ENTIRE HRC in ST LOUIS WITH NO MILCON - VS FT KNOX W/MILCON

✓ HOW CAN ANG STILL DO HOMELAND SECURITY DISTRIBUTED AROUND COUNTRY IF POORLY CONSOLIDATED / RELOCATION?

✓ ANG DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN USAF DELIBERATIONS -

✓ MIL VALUE QUESTIONS DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HOMELAND DEFENSE IN SENSE OF VALUABLE TARGETS

TALENT:

✓ HRC does not factor in the total MILCON REQUIRED - MORE LIKE $100m RELOCATION COSTS BADLY UNDERESTIMATED

DCN: 11898

2005 BRAC Commission Actions

for Recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense.

Summary of Commission Actions		
67.89%	129	Accept
16.32%	31	Accept with Amendment
8.42%	16	Reject
7.37%	14	Reject with Amendment
Total:	**190**	

1	Army-5	Fort Wainwright, AK	Accept
2	Army-6	Fort Gillem, GA	Accept with Amendment
3	Army-8	Fort McPherson, GA	Accept
4	Army-10	Fort Bragg, NC	Accept
5	Army-11	Fort Monmouth, NJ	Accept with Amendment
6	Army-15	Fort Hood, TX	Accept
7	Army-16	Red River Army Depot, TX	Reject with Amendment
8	Army-19	Fort Monroe, VA	Accept
9	Army-20	Maneuver Training	Accept
10	Army-22	Operational Army (IGPBS)	Accept
11	Army-25	RC Transformation in Alabama	Accept
12	Army-28	RC Transformation in Arizona	Accept
13	Army-30	RC Transformation in Arkansas	Accept
14	Army-33	RC Transformation in California	Accept
15	Amry-35	RC Transformation in Connecticut	Accept
16	Army-37	RC Transformation in Delaware	Accept
17	Army-39	RC Transformation in Georgia	Accept
18	Army-40	RC Transformation in Hawaii	Accept
19	Army-42	RC Transformation in Illinois	Accept
20	Army-44	RC Transformation in Indiana	Accept
21	Army-46	RC Transformation in Iowa	Accept
22	Army-48	RC Transformation in Kentucky	Accept
23	Army-50	RC Transformation in Louisiana	Accept
24	Army-52	RC Transformation in Maryland	Accept
25	Army-54	RC Transformation in Massachusetts	Accept
26	Army-55	RC Transformation in Michigan	Accept
27	Army-57	RC Transformation in Minnesota	Accept
28	Army-58	RC Transformation in Missouri	Accept
29	Army-60	RC Transformation in Montana	Accept
30	Army-62	RC Transformation in Nebraska	Accept

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31	Army-65	RC Transformation in New Hampshire	Accept
32	Army-66	RC Transformation in New Jersey	Accept
33	Army-68	RC Transformation in New Mexico	Accept
34	Army-69	RC Transformation in New York	Accept
35	Army-72	RC Transformation in North Carolina	Accept
36	Army-73	RC Transformation in North Dakota	Accept
37	Army-75	RC Transformation in Ohio	Accept
38	Army-77	RC Transformation in Oklahoma	Accept
39	Army-80	RC Transformation in Oregon	Accept
40	Army-82	RC Transformation in Pennsylvania	Accept
41	Army-85	RC Transformation in Puerto Rico	Accept
42	Army-87	RC Transformation in Rhode Island	Accept
43	Army-89	RC Transformation in Tennessee	Accept
44	Army-91	RC Transformation in Texas	Accept
45	Army-95	RC Transformation in Vermont	Accept
46	Amry-97	RC Transformation in Washington	Accept
47	Army-99	RC Transformation in West Virginia	Accept
48	Army-102	RC Transformation in Wisconsin	Accept
49	Army-103	RC Transformation in Wyoming	Accept
50	Army-105	Single Drill Sergeant School	Accept
51	Army-106	U.S. Army Garrison Michigan (Selfridge)	Accept
52	Army-107	USAR Command and Control New England	Accept
53	Army-109	USAR Command and Control – Northeast	Accept
54	Army-112	USAR Command and Control – Northwest	Accept
55	Army-115	USAR Command and Control – Southeast	Accept
56	Army-117	USAR Command and Control – Southwest	Accept
57	DoN-6	Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA	Accept
58	DoN-7	Naval Support Activity Corona, CA	**Reject**
59	DoN-9	Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment, Concord, CA	Accept
60	DoN-10	Submarine Base New London, CT	Reject with Amendment
61	DoN-12	Officer Training Command, Pensacola, FL	Accept
62	DoN-13	Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA	Accept
63	DoN-14	Navy Supply Corps School Athens, GA	Accept
64	DoN-15	Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA	Accept with Amendment
65	DoN-18	Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME	Accept with Amendment

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66	DoN-19	Marine Corps Support Activity Kansas City, MO	Accept with Amendment
67	DoN-20	Naval Station Pascagoula, MS	Accept
68	DoN-21	Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, PA, and Cambria Regional Airport, Johnstown, PA	Accept with Amendment
69	DoN-23	Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Kittery, ME	**Reject**
70	DoN-25	Naval Station Newport, RI	Accept
71	DoN-26	Naval Station Ingleside, TX, and Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX	Accept
72	DoN-28	Engineering Field Division/Activity	Accept
73	DoN-29	Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers	Accept
74	DoN-34	Navy Recruiting Districts	Accept
75	DoN-35	Navy Regions	Accept
76	DoN-37	Navy Reserve Centers	Accept with Amendment
77	DoN-44	Navy Reserve Readiness Commands	Accept
78	Air Force-5	Birmingham International Airport Air Guard Station, AL	**Reject**
79	Air Force-6	Eielson Air Force Base, AK, Moody Air Force Base, GA, and Shaw Air Force Base, SC	Reject with Amendment
80	Air Force-7	Kulis Air Guard Station and Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK	Accept with Amendment
81	Air Force-8	Fort Smith Air Guard Station, AR and Luke Air Force Base, AZ	Accept
82	Air Force-10	Beale Air Force Base, CA and Selfridge Air National Guard Base, MI	Accept
83	Air Force-11	March Air Reserve Base, CA	Accept
84	Air Force-12	Onizuka Air Force Station, CA	Accept
85	Air Force-14	Bradley International Airport Air Guard Station, CT, Barnes Air Guard Station, MA, Selfridge Air National Guard Base, MI, Shaw Air Force Base, SC, and Martin State Air Guard Station, MD	Accept
86	Air Force-15	New Castle Airport Air Guard Station, DE	**Reject**
87	Air Force-16	Robins Air Force Base, GA	Accept
88	Air Force-17	Boise Air Terminal Air Guard Station, ID	Accept
89	Air Force-18	Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID, Nellis Air Force Base, NV, and Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK	Accept
90	Air Force-20	Capital Air Guard Station, IL and Hulman Regional Airport Air Guard Station, IN	Accept
91	Air Force-22	New Orleans Air Reserve Station, LA	Accept
92	Air Force-23	Andrews Air Force Base, MD, Will Rogers Air Guard Station, OK, Tinker Air Force Base, OK, and Randolph Air Force Base, TX	Accept
93	Air Force-24	Martin State Air Guard Station, MD	Accept
94	Air Force-25	Otis Air National Guard Base, MA, Lambert St. Louis International Airport, Air Guard Station, MO, and Atlantic City Air Guard Station, NJ	Reject with Amendment
95	Air Force-27	W.K. Kellogg Airport Air Guard Station, MI	Accept with Amendment
96	Air Force-28	Duluth International Airport Air Guard Station, MN	Reject with Amendment

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97	Air Force-28	Key Field Air Guard Station, MS	Accept with Amendment
98	Air Force-30	Great Falls International Airport Air Guard Station, MT	Accept with Amendment
99	Air Force-31	Reno-Tahoe International Airport Air Guard Station, NV	Reject
100	Air Force-32	Cannon Air Force Base, NM	Accept with Amendment
101	Air Force-33	Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station, NY	Reject with Amendment
102	Air Force-34	Schenectady County Airport Air Guard Station, NY	Reject
103	Air Force-35	Pope Air Force Base, NC, Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station, PA, and Yeager Air Guard Station, WV	Reject with Amendment
104	Air Force-37	Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND	Accept with Amendment
105	Air Force-38	Hector International Airport Air Guard Station, ND	Accept with Amendment
106	Air Force-39	Mansfield-Lahm Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, OH	Reject with Amendment
107	Air Force-40	Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, OH,	Accept
108	Air Force-41	Portland International Airport Air Guard Station, OR	Reject with Amendment
109	Air Force-43	Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD, and Dyess Air Force Base, TX	Reject
110	Air Force-44	Nashville International Airport Air Guard Station, TN	Accept
111	Air Force-45	Ellington Air Guard Station, TX	Accept
112	Air Force-46	Lackland Air Force Base, TX	Accept
113	Air Force-47	Hill Air Force Base, UT, Edwards Air Force Base, CA, Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID, Luke Air Force Base, AZ, and Nellis Air Force Base, NV	Accept
114	Air Force-49	Langley Air Force Base, VA	Accept
115	Air Force-50	Richmond Air Guard Station, VA, and Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station, IA	Accept
116	Air Force-51	Fairchild Air Force Base, WA	Accept
117	Air Force-52	General Mitchell Air Reserve Station, WI	Accept
118	Air Force-53	Air Force Logistics Support Centers	Accept
119	Air Force-55	F100 Engine Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities	Accept
120	E&T-5	Aviation Logistics School	Reject
121	E&T-6	Combat Service Support Center	Accept
122	E&T-7	Joint Center for Consolidated Transportation Management Training	Accept
123	E&T-8	Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training	Accept
124	E&T-9	Joint Center of Excellence for Religious Training & Education	Accept
125	E&T-10	Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site	Accept
126	E&T-12	Net Fires Center	Accept
127	E&T-13	Prime Power to Fort Leonard Wood, MO	Accept
128	E&T-14	Undergraduate Pilot and Navigator Training	Accept
129	H&SA-3	Co-locate Miscellaneous Air Force Leased Locations and National Guard Headquarters Leased Locations	Accept

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130	H&SA-5	Co-locate Defense/Military Department Adjudication Activities	Accept with Amendment
131	H&SA-8	Co-locate Military Department Investigation Agencies with DoD Counterintelligence and Security Agency	Accept with Amendment
132	H&SA-10	Co-locate Miscellaneous Army Leased Locations	Accept
133	H&SA-12	Co-locate Miscellaneous OSD, Defense Agency, and Field Activity Leased Locations	Accept
134	H&SA-15	Co-locate Missile and Space Defense Agencies	Accept with Amendment
135	H&SA-17	Co-locate Navy Education and Training Command and Navy Education and Training Professional Development & Technology Center	**Reject**
136	H&SA-18	Consolidate Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) Headquarters	Reject with Amendment
137	H&SA-19	Consolidate Civilian Personnel Offices (CPOs) within each Military Department and the Defense Agencies	Reject with Amendment
138	H&SA-22	Consolidate Correctional Facilities into Joint Regional Correctional Facilities	Accept
139	H&SA-26	Consolidate Defense Commissary Agency Eastern, Midwestern Regional, and Hopewell, VA, Offices	Accept
140	H&SA-27	Consolidate Defense Information Systems Agency and Establish Joint C4ISR D&A Capability	Accept
141	H&SA-30	Consolidate Media Organizations into a New Agency for Media and Publications	Accept
142	H&SA-31	Consolidate Transportation Command Components	Accept
143	H&SA-33	Consolidate/Co-locate Active and Reserve Personnel & Recruiting Centers for Army and Air Force	Reject with Amendment
144	H&SA-35	Create Joint Mobilization Sites	Accept
145	H&SA-37	Defense Finance and Accounting Service	Reject with Amendment
146	H&SA-41	Joint Basing	Accept with Amendment
147	H&SA-44	Relocate Air Force Real Property Agency (AFRPA)	Accept
148	H&SA-46	Relocate Army Headquarters and Field Operating Agencies	Accept
149	H&SA-49	Relocate Miscellaneous Department of Navy Leased Locations	Accept
150	Ind-4	Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA	Reject with Amendment
151	Ind-5	Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant, CA	Accept
152	Ind-6	Sierra Army Depot, CA	Accept
153	Ind-7	Rock Island Arsenal, IL	Accept
154	Ind-8	Newport Chemical Depot, IN	Accept with Amendment
155	Ind-9	Kansas Army Ammunition Plant, KS	Accept
156	Ind-10	Lima Tank Plant, OH	**Reject**
157	Ind-11	Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant, MS	Accept
158	Ind-12	Hawthorne Army Depot, NV	**Reject**
159	Ind-13	Watervliet Arsenal, NY	Accept
160	Ind-14	Umatilla Chemical Depot, OR	Accept with Amendment

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161	Ind-15	Lackland Air Force Base, TX	Reject
162	Ind-16	Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, TX	Accept
163	Ind-17	Deseret Chemical Depot, UT	Accept with Amendment
164	Ind-18	Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity Norfolk, VA	Accept
165	Ind-19	Fleet Readiness Centers	Accept with Amendment
166	Ind-26	Naval Shipyard Detachments	Accept
167	Int-3	Defense Intelligence Agency	Accept
168	Int-4	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Activities	Accept
169	Med-4	Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda, MD	Accept with Amendment
170	Med-6	Brooks City Base, TX	Accept with Amendment
171	Med-9	McChord Air Force Base, WA	Accept with Amendment
172	Med-10	San Antonio Regional Medical Center, TX	Accept
173	Med-12	Convert Inpatient Services to Clinics	Accept with Amendment
174	Med-15	Joint Centers of Excellence For Chemical, Biological, and Medical Research and Development and Acquisition	Accept with Amendment
175	S&S-5	Commodity Management Privatization	Accept
176	S&S-7	Depot Level Reparable Procurement Management Consolidation	Accept with Amendment
177	S&S-13	Supply, Storage, and Distribution Management Reconfiguration	Accept
178	Tech-5	Co-locate Extramural Research Program Managers	Reject
179	Tech-6	Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation	Reject
180	Tech-7	Consolidate Ground Vehicle Development & Acquisition in a Joint Center	Accept
181	Tech-9	Consolidate Maritime C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation	Accept with Amendment
182	Tech-12	Consolidate Navy Strategic Test & Evaluation	Reject
183	Tech-13	Consolidate Sea Vehicle Development & Acquisition	Accept
184	Tech-15	Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation Center	Accept
185	Tech-18	Create an Air Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation Center	Accept
186	Tech-19	Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition	Accept with Amendment
187	Tech-22	Defense Research Service Led Laboratories	Accept with Amendment
188	Tech-24	Establish Centers for Fixed Wing Air Platform Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation	Accept
189	Tech-26	Establish Centers for Rotary Wing Air Platform Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation	Accept
190	Tech-28	Navy Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation	Reject

DCN: 11898

Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC

To: Sarkar, Rumu, CIV, WSO-BRAC
Subject: Filing for Connecticut

Can I have copies of the Summons & Complaint, Plaintiffs' Memorandumof Law, TRO, Affidavit from David Hague (if it has already been supplied to the court and plaintiffs. Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for preliminary Injunction.

If the items above are public filings already, can you put them in your unrestricted S drive folder so I can look at them.

I'd like to look at these to see if I can anticipate any areas of questions.

I am going to put a book together that should contain:

Item	Barnes	Bradley		Otis
1. Hearing briefing slides	X	X	X	
2. MCIs				Compare the three
3. Current Bill words	X	X	X	
4. Report Languag	X	X	X	
5. OSD Recommend	X	X	X	
6. Laydown Charts				Contains all bases

Ken

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment

Service	Name	Position Title	Telephone #	Address	Email	Fax
Air Force	Maureen Koetz	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment,Safety and Occupational Health	(703) 697-9297	SAF/IEE 1665 Air Force Pentagon Washington, DC 20330-1665	Sharon.spradling@af.pentagon.mil	(703) 614-2884
Navy	Donald Schregardus	Deputy Asst. Secretary of the Navy Environment & Safety	(703) 614-5493	1777 N. Kent Street, Suite 9000 Arlington, VA 22209		
Army	Raymond J. Fatz	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Environment, Safety and Occupational Health, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment)	(703) 695-7824	110 Army Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20314	raymond.fatz@hqda.army.mil	(703) 693-8149

http://www.coastalamerica.gov/text/principals.html
http://www.nps.gov/phso/CRDirectory/departs3.htm

DCN: 11898

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Talking Points
For
Discussion with Commissioners

General issues:

- Air Force report
  - Force deployment/beddown imbedded in recommendations
  - BRAC Commission should remain a real estate activity, not a force beddown activity
    - Leave to the Air Force staff flexibility to put airplanes where they desire
- Air Force approach to ranking bases
  - Quantitative and complex
  - Data collection/consistency has variation
  - AF would like to directly discuss with Commissioners their approach
  - Cost savings for personnel do not validate as total force end strength has only small, < 5% decline.
- Air National Guard
  - OSD Recommendations strip many locations of airplanes
    - Expect recruiting to decline
    - Equipment realignment his readiness for two years or more

Potential Adds:

- Moody for Navy MJB – Navy team lead but this would be a joint piece of work AF/Navy
  - Asked for COBRA run for a "clean out Moody"
    - Air Force discretion where to put air forces
  - Asked for COBRA run for a "clean out Seymour-Johnson" for comparison is required
  - Base visit by Tim MacGregor and Syd Carroll indicates that considerable MILCON would be required
    - Navy opinion is the same on the MILCON
- Galena Airport AK
  - FOL for Elmendorf under Cold War scenerios.
  - Last use of the FOL was 2002
  - There are alert barns at Eielson AFB, 15 minutes flying time from Galena
    - Alert based at Eielson AFB would require NORAD to "pull the trigger" about 15 minutes earlier than if alert F-15s were at Galena
  - Alert facilities at Galena are contractor maintained now
  - Airport serves the local small community, owned by state of AK.
  - Save $8 – 9.5 Mil/yr
- Pope
  - Add for a complete closure
    - Kevin Felix expresses Army desire to have C-130s on the base

Ken Small, 7/14/05

        - AF/ILEB (MGen Heckman) said that Army expressed desire after Air Force sent its recommendations to OSD
        - Air Force air/ground control parties would remain at Ft Bragg
    - Air Force centrally manages airlift so scheduling should go through the usual scheduling shops
    - C-130s at Pope provide no strategic lift. Local jump qualification and currency requirements exceed capability of a 16 UE C-130 squadron
    - Currency training and strategic lift via airplanes not based at Pope
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- Grand Forks
    - Add for complete Closure
        - AF was proposing complete closure until April 05
    - New missions started to be announced after OSD Recommendation delivered to Commission on May 13
    - Gen Handy
        - Good base
        - No flight restrictions
        - Good industrial complex
        - Good quality of life and community support
        - In the decision of the future KC-767 was going to Grand Forks.
        - Would like to have Grand Forks stay around.

Other actions

- Eielson AFB warm basing
    - Warm basing concept may not save much money
        - If we can't save money in closing, why the cost and effort
    - The PARC range complex is biggest in AF
        - Full capable live fire, electronic warfare, supersonic, varied terrain and conditions
        - Adjacent to Eielson AFB
    - Army adding to forces in Alaska (BCT and Airborne Brigade)
    - Need Eielson for northern air bridge to Asia (alternative is southern route by Hawaii
- Cannon close
    - If A-10s come out of Moody to make way for Oceania, AF would put them elsewhere
- Ellsworth
    - Initially suggested Dyess as an add to be able to compare the two bases
    - Current OSD recommendation puts all the B-1s at one location, is this smart
        - Risk Assessment to Clearinghouse came back with answer of no concern, AF doing single base for B-2 (Whiteman), F-117 (Holloman)
    - Ellsworth probably can handle all the B-1s

Ken Small, 7/14/05

DCN: 11898

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    - Establish heavy maintenance teams at several Guard/Reserve unts
        - Provide challenging work for mechanics, increase skill set
        - Refurbish A/C while maintaining personnel strength
        - Put a few tails back on line
        - Buy time for units until aircraft buy of tankers, C-130s, and fighters repopulate the force.
-

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-

Ken Small, 7/14/05

Mike

June 2005

June 2005

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July 2005

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Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Sat/Sun
		June 1	2 8:50am AF Team staff meeting (Ken's 10:30am Classified Reading Room Training (Large 10:30am Updated: Classified 11:00am Lunch with John 6:30pm Dinner (Clydes in	3	4 5
6	7	8	9 Robert Earl Keen (Richmond)	10	11 Asleep at the Wheel (Birchmere) 12
13 Do Charlotte Regional Hearing Bo	14	15	16	17	18 19
20 Mike/C- Pittsburgh ARS-20 Jun	21 CM/JCS/AF-Pittsburgh ARS, PA	22	23 Updated: Mike/C/R-Niagara Falls-Buffalo, NY	24 Do Regional Hearing Book for Litt	25 26 Updated: Mike/C/R-Niagara Falls-
27 Updated: Mike/R-Charlotte, NC	28	29	30 Mike/C-Brooks-1 Jul		

DCN: 118

July 2005

July 2005

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4	5 Mike/C-Brooks-1 Jul CM/JCS-Brooks City Base, TX	6	7	8	9 10
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18	19	20	21	22	23 24
25	26	27 Lyle Lovett at Woltrap	28 VMI Baseball Gathering (Orioles v	29	30 31

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Facsimile Cover Sheet

To: Charles Battaglia
Office: BRAC Commission
Phone: (703) 699-2950
Fax: (703) 699-2735

From: Mrs. Connie Wachsmuth
Office: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), The Pentagon
Phone: (703) 695-7800
Fax: (703) 693-9515

Date: 5/25/05
Pages including this cover page: 2

- Log-IN
- To AF Comm

→ See MARCI

Mr. Battaglia -
Here are two of the QFRs 9 & 10 that have been answered. Still missing QR 1-8, 11 & 12. Hope to get them to you soon.
Connie

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION
FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN, GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW, QUADRENNIAL REVIEW
(TESTIMONY FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)
MAY 4, 2005
COMMISSION QFR 9

Question: Given that the Air Force level of Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) remains constant over at least the next six years, does that indicate a great level of success with that number over the last five years.

Answer: Our Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) have been highly successful in providing capabilities to the combatant commands (COCOMs), maintaining a highly ready force to respond at a moment's notice to additional crises, while providing some semblance of predictability and stability to our Airmen. Our AEF operational practices are continuously refined to ensure that we are best postured to supply the daily demands of the COCOMs, while preserving an ability to respond to an emerging crisis. With our Future Total Force (FTF) transformational initiative, while we may reduce the number of aircraft in each AEF in the long term, we will increase its capabilities with modernization and increased crew ratios.

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION
FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN, GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW, QUADRENNIAL REVIEW
(TESTIMONY FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)
MAY 4, 2005
COMMISSION QFR 10

Question: With the development of the AEFs, the Air Force CONUS basing approach has changed measurably since the last round of BRAC. Does this arrangement increase or decrease your basing requirements. Does this arrangement give the Department of Defense more or less Joint Cross Service options?

Answer: The Air & Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) is the USAF methodology for organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining rapidly responsive air and space forces to meet the defense strategy requirements. Through the AEF, the Air Force supports defense strategy requirements using a combination of both permanently assigned and rotational forces. The USAF task organizes Air & Space Expeditionary Task Forces to meet defense strategy requirements using both CONUS-based and forward-stationed units. The AEF itself does not directly increase or decrease Air Force basing requirements as it makes use of the forces available wherever they are.

Any change in Joint Cross Service options would be predicated on agreements between the Services involved in joint basing considerations.

Procedural and Substantive Legal Issues in the BRAC Process and Recommendations

The BRAC recommendation to relocate the 152nd Airlift Wing violates both the specific language, as well as the intent, of the U.S. Constitution, several federal statutes, and the direction of the U.S. Supreme Court. By focusing on federal active duty needs, and ignoring the state role of the National Guard, the Department of Defense failed to acknowledge and recognize the unique, hybrid nature of the National Guard.

The United States Constitution and federal statutes

The National Guard is a hybrid federal and state organization, and has been since the inception of the country. The United States Constitution states, at Article I, Section 8 (known as the "militia clause"), that the federal Congress will provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, but specifically reserves "...to the state's respectively, the appointment of officers, and the authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." In recognition of this constitutional basis that the militia (now National Guard) is a hybrid Federal-State entity, the federal Congress has passed several statutes to ensure that the Guard is treated in a constitutional fashion, and to ensure that the National Guard can carry out its dual roles of serving as a reserve component of the federal military and as the militia of each state.

One statute recognizes the authority of the Governor on the specific issue of the relocation of Guard units. Title 10 USC 18238 states:

> A unit of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may not be relocated or withdrawn under this chapter without the consent of the Governor of the state or, in the case of the District of Columbia, Commanding General of the National Guard of the District of Columbia.

This plainly worded statute clearly requires that a Governor provide his or her prior consent before relocating a unit of the Air National Guard and would prevent, and in this instance, the relocation of the 152nd Airlift Wing from the State of Nevada. The Governor of Nevada, Kenny Guinn, has expressed his concern about this in a letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, a copy of which is located at the beginning of this package.

Another federal statute was violated in the BRAC recommendation process. 10 USC Section 10501(b) requires that the National Guard Bureau serve as a "channel of communication" between the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force and the several states on matters pertaining to the National Guard. This statute recognizes the dual responsibilities of each state's Guard and is designed to ensure that the interests of each state would be adequately considered and protected. NGB failed to fulfill this statutory responsibility, in that no information on the BRAC process was provided to the Governors of the states (or to The Adjutants General of any states) by the Department of Defense during the BRAC recommendation process. This prohibited the states and Governors from being actively involved in the DoD recommendation, contrary to 10 USC 10501(b).

The United State Supreme Court

The U. S. Supreme Court, in the case of *Perpich v. Department of Defense*, 496 U.S. 334, 110 S.Ct. 2418 (1990), also recognized the dual role of the National Guard and the legal right and responsibility of the Governor.

Perpich recognized the Governor's right to veto certain federal training missions if those federal training missions interfered with the state Guard's capacity to respond to local emergencies. Sections (b) and (d) of 10 USC 12301 prohibit the Secretary of Defense from ordering "units and members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States" to active duty "without the consent of the governor of the State...". The Montgomery Amendment {now codified at 10 USC 12301(f)} was passed by Congress to allow state Guard soldiers and airmen to train overseas without obtaining the consent of the Governor. The Montgomery Amendment states:

> The consent of a Governor described in subsections (b) and (d) may not be withheld (in whole or in part) with regard to active duty outside the United States, its territories, and its possessions, because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such active duty.

While the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Montgomery Amendment in the *Perpich* case, the Court recognized that the Amendment only deprived the Governor of certain veto powers, <u>while the Governor retained the rest</u>. The Court upheld this Amendment because of its narrow application, and the fact that depriving the Governor of these specific veto powers would not affect the Governor's ability to respond to local emergencies. The Supreme Court stated that a Governor retains the veto power if federal training missions substantially impact the Governor's ability to respond to local emergencies. The U. S. Supreme Court stated:

> The Minnesota Unit, which includes about 13,000 members, is affected only slightly when a few dozen, or at most a few hundred, soldiers are ordered into active service for brief periods of time. Neither the state's basic training responsibility, nor its ability to rely on its guard and state emergency situations is significantly affected. Indeed, <u>if the federal training mission were to interfere with the state Guard's capacity to respond to local emergencies, the Montgomery Amendment would permit the Governor to veto the proposed mission.</u>
>
> *Perpich* at 351 (emphasis added)

The Supreme Court has clearly stated that a state Guard must be left with the capacity to respond to local emergencies. In this case, the complete removal of any air lift capacity for the State of Nevada has a drastic effect on the Governor's ability to respond to local emergencies (as argued elsewhere in this document). Thus, the BRAC's recommendation to relocate the only Air Guard wing in Nevada violates the *Perpich* case.

Policy Considerations

This particular BRAC recommendation also violates the 1973 Total Force Policy issued during Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's term. That Total Force Policy was designed to involve a large portion of the American public by mobilizing the National Guard from its thousands of locations throughout the United States when needed. The Total Force Policy required that all active and reserve military organizations of the United States be treated as a single integrated

force. The benefit of the Total Force Policy approach is to permit elected officials to have a better sense of public support or opposition to any major military operation. The Total Force Policy follows the intentions of the founding fathers for a small standing army complemented by citizen-soldiers. Again, the recommendation of BRAC that removes the entire airlift capacity of an entire state violates the Total Force Policy, a policy which has never been retracted.

Summary

The DoD recommendation to eliminate all Air National Guard aircraft from the State of Nevada is contrary to the historical role of the National Guard as a hybrid state/federal entity. The DoD failed to involve the State of Nevada in the process of making its recommendation (as is expected by 10 USC 10501), and this failure led to the DoD ignoring the Constitutional and statutory role of the state. The requirement of obtaining the consent of the Governor (as required by 10 USC 18238) was by-passed. By removing all Air Guard airlift capacity from the State of Nevada, the DoD recommendation inhibits the Governor of the State of Nevada from carrying out his responsibility to respond to local emergencies (contrary to the direction of the U.S. Supreme Court as revealed in the *Perpich* case).

Finally, Congress has recognized the importance of maintaining the strength of the National Guard. 32 USC 102 states, in part:

> In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times.

The DoD recommendation to eliminate all Air National Guard aircraft from the State of Nevada clearly affects the strength and ability of the Nevada Air National Guard to be an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States.

Affect of Potential 'Add' Scenarios on Official DoD Recommendations

Due to the complex and integrated nature of DoD's base closure and realignment recommendations, any base that the commission recommends to add to the list of closing or realigning bases may affect existing official recommendations. These affected recommendations would need to be revised in order to account for the impact of the commission's recommendations. This is necessary because the affected recommendations are net-gainers given the official recommendations. Below is a current list of potential commission recommendations and the official recommendations that would be affected. The page numbers for the official recommendations (from Annex A of the DoD Report) are provided in parentheses.

If we recommend closing Naval Station Ventura County, CA, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- None.

If we recommend closing Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- None.

If we recommend closing Naval Air Station Oceana, VA, then the following recommendation needs to be revised:

- Realign Fleet Readiness Centers (IND-19)

If we recommend closing Naval Station Everett, WA, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- Close Naval Shipyard Portsmouth (DON – 23)
- Naval Shipyard Detachments (IND – 26)

If we recommend closing BUMED, DC, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- None.

If we recommend closing Pope AFB, NC, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- Close Fort Gillem, GA (Army – 6)
- Close Fort McPherson, Ga (Army – 8)
- Close General Mitchell ARS, WI (Air Force – 52)

If we recommend closing Dobbins AFB, GA, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- Close Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA (DON – 13)
- Realign Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers (DON – 29)

- Close General Mitchell ARS, WI (Air Force – 52)

If we recommend closing Moody AFB, GA, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- Realign Eielson AFB, AK (Air Force – 6)
- Realign Pope AFB, NC (Air Force – 35)

If we recommend closing Dyess AFB, TX, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- Close Ellsworth AFB, AK (Air Force – 43)

If we recommend closing Elmendorf AFB, AK, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- Close Ellsworth AFB, AK (Air Force – 43)

If we recommend closing Eielson AFB, AK, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- None.

If we recommend closing Grand Forks AFB, ND, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- None.

If we recommend closing Los Angeles AFB, CA, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- None.

If we recommend closing Luke AFB, AZ, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- None.

If we recommend realigning the Air National Guard Sites, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- TBD

If we recommend closing Fort Eustis, VA, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- Fort McPherson, GA (Army – 8)
- Fort Monroe, VA (Army – 19)

If we recommend closing SSC Natick Lab, MA, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- None.

If we recommend closing the Naval Post Graduate School, CA, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- None.

If we recommend consolidating the Undergraduate Pilot Training, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- TBD.

If we recommend closing Naval Air Station Whiting Field, FL, then the following recommendations need to be revised:

- None.

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From the U.S. Code Online via GPO Access
[wais.access.gpo.gov]
[Laws in effect as of January 7, 2003]
[Document not affected by Public Laws enacted between
January 7, 2003 and February 12, 2003]
[CITE: 32USC104]

TITLE 32--NATIONAL GUARD

CHAPTER 1--ORGANIZATION

Sec. 104. Units: location; organization; command

(a) Each State or Territory and Puerto Rico may fix the location of the units and headquarters of its National Guard.

(b) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this title, the organization of the Army National Guard and the composition of its units shall be the same as those prescribed for the Army, subject, in time of peace, to such general exceptions as the Secretary of the Army may authorize; and the organization of the Air National Guard and the composition of its units shall be the same as those prescribed for the Air Force, subject, in time of peace, to such general exceptions as the Secretary of the Air Force may authorize.

(c) To secure a force the units of which when combined will form complete higher tactical units, the President may designate the units of the National Guard, by branch of the Army or organization of the Air Force, to be maintained in each State and Territory, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. However, no change in the branch, organization, or allotment of a unit located entirely within a State may be made without the approval of its governor.

(d) To maintain appropriate organization and to assist in training and instruction, the President may assign the National Guard to divisions, wings, and other tactical units, and may detail commissioned officers of the National Guard or of the Regular Army or the Regular Air Force, as the case may be, to command those units. However, the commanding officer of a unit organized wholly within a State or Territory, Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia may not be displaced under this subsection.

(e) To insure prompt mobilization of the National Guard in time of war or other emergency, the President may, in time of peace, detail a commissioned officer of the Regular Army to perform the duties of chief of staff for each fully organized division of the Army National Guard, and a commissioned officer of the Regular Air Force to perform the duties of the corresponding position for each fully organized wing of the Air National Guard.

(f) Unless the President consents--

(1) an organization of the National Guard whose members have received compensation from the United States as members of the National Guard may not be disbanded; and

(2) the actual strength of such an organization in commissioned officers or enlisted members may not be reduced below the minimum strength prescribed by the President.

(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 598; Pub. L. 100-456, div. A, title XII, Sec. 1234(b)(1), (2), Sept. 29, 1988, 102 Stat. 2059.)

Historical and Revision Notes

Revised section	Source (U.S. Code)	So

DCN: 11898

104(a)		
104(b)	32:6.	June 3,
104(c)	32:5 (1st sentence).	65 (pr
104(d)	32:5 (less 1st sentence).	200.
104(e)	32:8.	June 3,
104(f)	32:10 (proviso).	June 4
	32:16.	Sec.
		ch. 87

In subsection (a), the words ``within their respective borders'' are omitted as surplusage.

In subsection (b), the word ``Army'' is substituted for the words ``Regular Army'', since the Army is the category for which the organization is prescribed, and the Regular Army is a personnel category for which no organization is prescribed. Similarly, the words ``Air Force'' are used instead of the words ``Regular Air Force''.

In subsection (c), the words ``by branch of the Army or organization of the Air Force'' are substituted for the words ``as to branch or arm of service''. The words ``branch, organization, or allotment of a unit'' are substituted for the words ``allotment, branch, or arm of units or organizations''.

In subsections (d) and (e) the word ``commissioned'' is inserted, since 32:8 and 10 historically applied only to commissioned officers (see opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army (JAGA 1953/4078, 6 May 1953)).

In subsection (d), the word ``brigades'' is omitted as surplusage.

In subsection (e), the word ``tactical'' is omitted as surplusage.

In subsection (f), the words ``have received compensation from the United States as members of the National Guard'' are substituted for the words ``shall be entitled to and shall have received compensation under the provisions of this title''. The words ``actual strength * * * in commissioned officers or enlisted members'' are substituted for the words ``commissioned or enlisted strength''.

Amendments

1988--Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 100-456, Sec. 1234(b)(2), substituted ``Each State or Territory and Puerto Rico'' for ``Each State and Territory, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone''.

Subsecs. (c), (d). Pub. L. 100-456, Sec. 1234(b)(1), struck out ``the Canal Zone,'' after ``Puerto Rico,''.

Study of State and Federal Missions of National Guard

Pub. L. 103-160, div. A, title V, Sec. 522, Nov. 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1655, directed Secretary of Defense to provide for a study of State and Federal missions of National Guard to be carried out by a federally funded research and development center, including consideration of both separate and integrated requirements (including requirements pertaining to personnel, weapons, equipment, and facilities) that derive from those missions, required an interim report not later than May 1, 1994, and a final report not later than Nov. 15, 1994, directed Secretary to submit each report to Congress, not later than 15 days after the date on which it is received by the Secretary, and directed Secretary, together with Secretary of the Army and Secretary of the Air Force, to conduct evaluation of assumptions, analysis, findings, and recommendations of the study and, not later than Feb. 1, 1995, to submit to Congress a

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report on the evaluation.

Retention of Ancient Privileges and Organization

Section 32 of act Aug. 10, 1956, provided that:

``(a) Any corps of artillery, cavalry, or infantry existing in any of the States on the passage of the Act of May 8, 1792, which by the laws, customs, or usages of those States has been in continuous existence since the passage of that Act, shall be allowed to retain its ancient privileges, subject, nevertheless to all duties required by law of militia: Provided, That those organizations may be a part of the National Guard and entitled to all the privileges thereof, and shall conform in all respects to the organization, discipline, and training to the National Guard in time of war: Provided further, That for purposes of training and when on active duty in the service of the United States they may be assigned to higher units, as the President may direct, and shall be subject to the orders of officers under whom they shall be serving.

``(b) The First Corps Cadets, antedating, and continuously existing in the State of Massachusetts since, the Act of May 8, 1792, now designated as the 126th Tank Battalion, 26th Infantry Division, hereby declared to be a corps as defined in subsection (a) of this Act for all purposes thereof and now incorporated in the Organized Militia and a part of the National Guard of Massachusetts, shall be allowed to retain its ancient privileges and organization. The First Corps Cadets is hereby declared to be entitled to a lieutenant colonel in command and a major second in command; and those officers, when federally recognized, are entitled to the pay provided by law for their respective grades: Provided, That nothing in this section or other provisions of law shall be considered to be in derogation of any other ancient privileges to which the First Corps Cadets is entitled under the laws, customs, or usages of the State of Massachusetts.''

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phillip Mack - will get TVT way

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

BASE SUMMARY SHEET

Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina

INSTALLATION MISSION

- The 43rd Airlift Wing Maintains a high state of readiness to rapidly deploy, upon short notice, a highly trained airlift force and successfully plans and executes air operations. These operations may be conducted in any theater, region, or contingency area as part of any force, joint and allied, in support of national objectives.

- As the host unit, the 43rd Airlift Wing provides base support services to 15-plus tenant units, making Team Pope a total-force installation. The Pope Air Force Base flight line is home to the C-130 and the A-10.

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- The Department of Defense recommended realigning Pope Air Force, NC as follows:
  - Transfer 25 C-130E's from the 43rd Airlift Wing at Pope AFB, NC to the 314th Airlift Wing at Little Rock AFB, AR
  - Form 16 aircraft Air Force Reserve/active duty associate unit by:
    - Transferring eight C-130H aircraft to Pope AFB from realigned Yeager Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), WV
    - Transferring eight C-130H aircraft to Pope AFB from 911th Airlift Wing of the closed Pittsburgh International Airport (IAP) Air Reserve Station (ARS) PA
  - Transfer 36 A-10's from the 23rd Fighter Group at Pope AFB, NC to Moody AFB, GA
  - Transfer real property accountability to the Army
  - Disestablish the 43rd Medical Group and establish a medical squadron
  - Relocate AFRC operations and maintenance manpower to Pope/Fort Bragg.

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- Downsizing Pope Air Force Base takes advantage of mission-specific consolidation opportunities to reduce operational costs, maintenance costs, and the manpower footprint. The smaller footprint facilitates transfer of the installation to the Army. Active duty C-130s will move to Little Rock AFB, AR (17-airlift) and A-10s will move to Moody AFB, GA (11-SOF/CSAR), to consolidate the force structure at those two bases and enable Army recommendations at Pope. Older aircraft at Little Rock AFB, AR will be retired or converted to back-up inventory and J-model C-130s will be aligned under the Air National Guard. As Little Rock AFB, AR grows to become the single major active duty C-130 unit, maintenance and operation of this aging weapon system will be streamlined. Meanwhile, the synergistic, multi-service relationship will continue between Army airborne and Air Force airlift forces at Pope AFB, NC with the creation of an Active

Duty/Reserve associate unit. The C-130 unit will become an Army tenant on an expanded Fort Bragg. With the disestablishment of the 43rd Medical Group, both the Air Force and the Army will retain the required manpower to provide primary care, flight, and occupational medicine to support their respective active duty military members. However, the Army will provide ancillary and specialty medical services for all assigned Army and Air Force military members (lab, x-ray, pharmacy, etc). The major command's capacity briefing reported that land constraints at Pittsburgh ARS prevented the installation from hosting more than 10 C-130 aircraft while Yeager AGS cannot support more than eight C-130s. Careful analysis of mission capability indicated that it is more appropriate to robust the proposed airlift mission at Fort Bragg to an optimal 16 aircraft C-130H squadron, which provides greater military value and offers unique opportunities for Jointness.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

- One-Time Costs: $218.1 million
- Net Savings (Cost) during Implementation: $652.5 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: $197.0 million
- Return on Investment Year: 2006 (0)
- Net Present Value over 20 Years: $2,515.4 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

	Military	Civilian	Students
Baseline			
Reductions			
Realignments			
Total			

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

	Out		**In**		**Net Gain (Loss)**	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
This Recommendation	(5,969)	(345)	1,148	1,153	(4,821)	808 (676 with contractor losses)
Other Recommendation(s)						
Total						

DCN: 11898

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- There are potential impacts to air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; and wetlands that may need to be considered during the implementation of this recommendation.
- There are no anticipated impacts to dredging; or marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries.
- Impacts of costs include $1.3M in costs for environmental compliance and waste management. These costs were included in the payback calculation.
- There are no anticipated impacts to the costs of environmental restoration.
- The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation have been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to the implementation of this recommendation.

REPRESENTATION

Governor: Michael F. Easley

Senators: Elizabeth Dole
Richard Burr

Representative:

ECONOMIC IMPACT

• Potential Employment Loss:	6,802 jobs (4,145 direct and 2,657 indirect)
• MSA Job Base:	195,370 jobs
• Percentage:	3.5 % percent decrease
• Cumulative Economic Impact (Year-Year):	___ percent decrease

MILITARY ISSUES

- This recommendation will result in a net loss in airlift capacity of nine C-130s. However, the replacement C-130Hs are longer, newer, and more reliable than the original C-130E models they are intended to replace. Less down time and larger capacity could offset the fewer aircraft. According to Col. Al Aycock (Fort Bragg Garrison Commander), also C-17 aircraft fly in from other locations. The move continues the relationship between the Army airborne and Air Force airlift units by forming an Active Duty/Reserve associate unit with the C-130 unit becoming a tenant of an expanded Fort Bragg.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES

- According to the New & Observer, North Carolina has the fourth-largest military presence of any state, directly employing more than 135,000 people at its six major bases and contributing $18 billion annually to the North Carolina economy. This recommendation will cause a shift in military presence with an emphasis on Army personnel over Air Force. According to the "News 14 Carolina" website posting for 14 May 2005:

> The economy in Fayetteville and Spring Lake isn't expected to take a big hit. It is actually expected to get better. Real estate agents are foaming at the mouth because they are going to have a lot of homes for sale.

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

- Taken alone, the realignment of Pope Air Force Base would seem to be a severe blow to the Fayetteville region. However, Fort Bragg is set to see significant gains. The entire restructuring of Fort Bragg and Polk AFB should be a significant benefit to the local area. Although there will be a net loss of 743 military and 132 contractor jobs, these losses will be offset by a net increase of 1055 civilian jobs equating to a net employment gain of 180. An increase of only 180 employees should have a negligible impact on an employment base of 195,370. When the changes associated with Fort Bragg are considered, the economic impact is actually a 0.2% increase in employment.

- Lost jobs are likely to be replaced with higher paying positions. Headquarters of Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) will relocate to Fort Bragg as part of the Fort MacPherson, GA closure process. Fort Bragg will gain an additional eight to ten generals including a four-star from Fort MacPherson.

- Col. Al Aycock (Fort Bragg Garrison Commander) stated on the "FortBraggNC.com" website that:

> The movement of the major command down to this area will cause a lot of other units to come here for various conferences. There will be a lot of movement in and out of Pope Air Force Base for the purposes of training, for visits to the commander. I think that you will see more high-ranking people who will come to this particular area if the BRAC recommendations are approved.

- There will be a shift in personnel to more civilians. Additionally, the military balance will shift more to an Army presence.

BULLET BACKGROUND PAPER

ON

AIR FORCE (AF) LOGISTICS SUPPORT CENTERS (LSC)

PURPOSE

- To provide background on DOD's BRAC Recommendation to establish AF Logistics Support Centers (LSC)

BACKGROUND

- The Logistics Support Center (LSC) is the latest evolution in the AF to centralize supply management
- In 1997, the AF moved core supply functions from unit supply squadrons to Regional Supply Squadrons (RSS) and gave RSS supply responsibility for geographical areas
- The LSC concept takes the RSS concept one step further and centralizes supply support into weapon system specific support
- Under the LSC concept, there will be only two supply centers. One to support the Combat Air Force (fighters, bombers, missiles); the other to support the Mobility Air Force (airlift, tankers)
- The Combat Air Force Logistics Support Center, will be located at Langley AFB, VA and the Mobility Air Force Logistics Support Center will be located at Scott, AFB, IL

DISCUSSION

- The AF position is that the LSC structure provides the most effective support to the warfigher. According to the AF, the RSS structure has a number of weaknesses. To include:
  - Support based on geographical boundaries, requiring warfighter support from two or more centers when units are deployed
  - Inefficiencies as different RSSs compete for the same parts and airlift
  - Minimal fleet support visibility
  - Results in support seams during transition from peacetime to contingency operations
  - Not all MAJCOMs or ARC forces supported by a regional squadron

- Under the LSC construct. The AF projects that is will be able to streamline capability to deploy, employ, and sustain operations, provide total weapon system/fleet visibility, improve spares and airlift allocation and seamless transition from peacetime to contingencies for all AF units and provide "one face" to the warfigher, whether at home or deployed.

DOD BRAC RECOMMENDATION SPECIFICS:

- Establish a CAF LSC at Langley AFB by realigning RSS positions from Hickam AFB, HI Sembach AFB (Germany) (non-BRAC programmatic) as well as base-level Logistics Readiness Squadron positions from Luke AFB

- Establish a MAF LSC at Scott AFB by realigning RSS positions from Hurlburt Field and Sembach AFB (Germany) and Logistics Readiness Squadron positions from Little Rock AFB and Altus Air Force Base

- This Recommendation realigns manpower from ACC/RSS (Langley AFB, VA), AMC/RSS (Scott AFB, IL) and base-level Logistics Readiness Squadron positions into two LSC that support of CAF and MAF.

- It also disestablish AFSOC/RSS (Hurburt Field, FL), PACAF/RSS (Hickam AFB, HI) and USAFE/RSS (Sembach AB, GE)

- Economic Impact (maximum potential reduction of positions):
  - Altus OK: 26 positions (16 direct; 10 indirect)
  - Honolulu, HI: 269 positions (151 direct; 118 indirect)
  - Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin, FL: 98 positions (54 direct; 44 indirect)
  - Little Rock, AR: 26 positions (16 direct; 10 indirect)
  - Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ: 28 positions (16 direct; 12 indirect)
  - **Maximum total positions realigned: 447 (253 direct; 194 indirect)**

ISSUES:

- No input received from impacted communities on this recommendation.

- This BRAC recommendation is essentially an Air Force reorganization of its supply chain management. An analysis of the recommendation did not find any deviation from military value selection criteria

TALKING PAPER

ON

ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE (AFB)

ISSUES:

- ***Military Value Criterion 4: The projected cost savings identified in closing Ellsworth are unrealistic (when military manpower savings are excluded)***

- ***Military Value Criteria 5 the timing to achieve the return on investment in closing Ellsworth exceeds DoD projections significantly (when military manpower savings are excluded)***

- The table below shows costs/saving with and without personnel savings.

Costs/Savings Categories	DOD COBRA With Personnel Savings	BRAC COBRA W/O Personnel Savings	Delta
One Time Costs	$299.1M	$300.1M	$1M diff rounding error
Net Implementation Costs	$316.4M	$224.8M	**$91.6M more saved**
Annual Recurring Savings	$161.3M	$20.1M	**$141.2 less than projected**
Return on Investment (2027)	1 year	19 years	**Takes 18 yrs longer**
Net Present Value in 20 yrs	$1.853.3M Savings	$19.4M (Cost)	

- When personnel savings are excluded from the cost data, it will take **DOD 19 years (in 2027) to recover the cost ($316.4) to close Ellsworth.** After that there is an estimated $20.1M savings per year vice the $161.3M claimed w/manpower savings.

- ***Military Value Criteria 4: Costs to operate and maintain the B-1 fleet after the consolidation are not expected to decrease (they most likely will increase.***

  - The size of the B-1 fleet will not change as a result of this recommendation.

  - *The AF did not factor the cost to operate the B-1 fleet after the consolidation* (see Clearinghouse response dated 12 Aug 05 "The Air Force did not conduct flying hour cost reduction analysis".

  - The primary cost driver on operating aircraft or "cost per B1 flying hour" is not expected to decrease. In fact, if you compare the cost per flying hr between Ellsworth ($23,754) and Dyess ($31,519) it's more expensive to operate the B-1 at Dyess (using AF provided data)

  - Manpower efficiencies are gained by consolidating B-1 support personnel (only 1,918 positions of the total authorized position at Ellsworth are moving to Dyess; but this efficiency (and savings) is offset by the fact the Air Force is not reducing end strength (see above).

- Additionally, it takes more transit time, about 0.7 longer, to get to the principle training range at Dyess (Lancer MOA) than the principle training range at Ellsworth (Powder)--flying hr costs per hour should increase

- ***Logistics efficiency are achieved-- but not significantly***

  - ***Parts/Spares Analysis***

    - In the short term, due to the consolidation of the B-1s parts inventories from Ellsworth and Dyess, there is a 1-2 percent increase in the B-1 mission capable rate (this equals 1 additional aircraft operational)

    - The consolidation of parts the parts inventory also results in a one-time parts buy/repair savings $11.2.

    - This savings however and increase in the MC is only short term. Why? The Air Force buys spares to a targeted 95 percent mission capability rate, after the initial consolidating of inventories the system will adjust back to the target mission capability rate and the parts buy process will adjust to support the consolidated inventory

  - ***Equipment Analysis***

    - The consolidation will improve the availability of B-1 test and support equipment

- **Military Value Criterion 4: Costs concerns about the gaining installation (Little Rock)**

  - The C-130s assigned to Dyess are moving from Dyess ranked 11th for military value supporting airlift missions to Little Rock, which is ranked 17th

  - The Air Force is consolidating all active duty C-130s at Little Rock. Little Rock will have a mixed C-130 fleet of about 118 C-130s. This isn't consisted with the Air Force plan to consolidate aircraft of the same mission design (i.e. Air Force basing principle #2)

  - COBRA MILCON costs to support beddown of C-130s from Dyess (24 aircraft) and other installation to Little Rock is significantly underestimated.

  - The MILCON costs range from $107M to $270M—much higher that projected in COBRA

- ***Military Value Criterion 1: Closing Ellsworth impacts readiness.***
  - Consolidating the B1 Bomber fleet at one location increases the risk to the Nation's long range strike capability. The "putting all the eggs in one basket" argument.
  - The risk is not so much from a terrorist attack, but from current/emerging strategic threats.
  - By consolidating the Nation's bomber capability from 5 bases (Ellsworth, Dyess, Minot, Barksdale, and Whiteman) to 4 we are decreasing our strategic redundancy for a capability. We are also increasing the risk to this capability from a first strike by current and emerging strategic threats (China, North Korea, and Iran).
  - The Director DIA, in 17 March 2005 statement to Senate Armed Services Committee noted:
    - "China…by 2015, the number of warheads capable of targeting the continental United Stated will increase several fold."
    - "…North Korea could deliver a nuclear warhead to parts of the United States…"
    - "…Iran will have the technical capability to develop an ICBM by 2015."
- ***The B1 consolidation is inconsistent with Nation Defense Strategy: "Developing greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not overly concentrating military forces in few locations."***
- ***The B1 consolidation is also inconsistent with Air Force BRAC Basing Principle #7: "Ensure long-range strike bases provide flexible strategic response and strategic force protection."***
- ***Military Value Criteria 2: Military Value Scoring and Airspace***
- A comparison of Dyess and Ellsworth shows that Ellsworth beat out Dyess in 3 out of the 4 military value criteria, but lost to Dyess in the most heavily weighted criteria of proximity to air space (i.e. Dyess has 2.3 times the volume of air space as Ellsworth). Because of this Dyess scored higher than Ellsworth by just 5.9 points.
- The proximity to air space value however isn't as clear cut as indicated in the scoring. There is a protected litigation issue regarding Dyess' primary training range that wasn't factored into the scoring. While transient, the litigation adds uncertainty on the capabilities available for use in the airspace for several years.
- The litigation involves the Lancer training range (Trans-Pecos vs. USAF) and has resulted in restrictions being placed on using the Lancer range (B-1s can't fly below 500 feet). Ellsworth currently doesn't have this range restriction.

- This is also a concern about capabilities and utilization of airspace and ranges available to Dyess. While Dyess has significantly more airspace volume (2.3 times more) and more ranges, neither the airspace nor ranges offer the same capabilities at their principle range (i.e. Lancer).

- This is indicated by the fact that of the many airspaces and ranges available to Dyess they utilize Lancer 58 percent of the time—the usage rates for the rest range from .05 percent to 10 percent

- ***Criterion 6: Economic impact to the community at Ellsworth is significant:***

- *Ellsworth is the second largest employer in South Dakota. DOD estimates closure of Ellsworth will have a negative 8.5 percent impact on the State.* **Economic Impact: $278 million annually ($761,000 per day).**

- Ellsworth community places the impact in the adjacent metropolitan center of Rapid City (pop. 60,000) @ 20 percent and 10% of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).

- Even using the conservative DOD estimate the impact is significant. The economic shock effect of the job loss is about 7 percent greater than what is considered an acceptable economic shock effect level (plus or minus 1.5 percent).

DCN: 11

Mr. Phillip Coyle,
BRAC Commissioner
25 May 2005

Tuesday, 24 May 2005 ***DRESS: UOD***

2007 **Mr. Coyle arrives SeaTac airport**
Met by:
Ms. Carol Schmidt
Coordinate with TSgt Shawn Compton, 62 APS/DET1 to meet at gate 253-606-6968

2045 **Depart SeaTac enroute to Radisson**

Evening at leisure

Wednesday, 25 May 2005 ***DRESS: UOD***

0730 **Depart lodging en route to McChord AFB**
Rental Car:
Mr. Coyle
Mr. James BilBray, BRAC Commissioner
Ms. Schmidt

0835 **Arrive DV Lounge (street side) for Wing Mission Brief**
Escorted by:
Capt Adam **Digger** DiGerolamo, 62 AW/CCP

Met by:
TSgt Donald **Don** Kusky, 62 AW/CCP
TSgt **Mariah** Tiedeman, 62 AW/CCP

Attendees:
Col Frederick **Rick** Martin, 62 AW/CV
Mr. Coyle
Mr. BilBray
Ms. Schmidt

0915 **DV Lounge to DV-1 for static display**
Met By:
Aircrew representative(s)
Maintenance representative(s)
APS representative(s)

DCN: 11898

Mr. Phillip Coyle,
BRAC Commissioner
25 May 2005

0930 **Depart DV-1 for Windshield Tour**
Surrey Bus:
Col Martin
Col Arquiette
Mr. Coyle
Mr. BilBray
Ms. Schmidt
Col **John** Cromwell, WADS/CC
Col Rebecca **Becky** Garcia, 62 MXG/CC
Col Joseph **JC** Crownover, 62 MSG/CC
Col Thomas **Tim** McCauley, 62 MDG/CC
Lt Col **John** Schmedake, 62 AW/XP
Driver:
From Trans

0935 **Tour of flightline**

0940 **HSC (Hangar 1 & 2)**

0945 **Building 100**

0950 **STS**

0955 **CE**
Met by:
Lt Col **Van** Fuller, 62 CES/CC
Briefer:
Lt Col Fuller

1010 **Community Center**

1015 **WADS**

1020 **Medical Group for briefing in Hansen Suite**
Met By:
Col **Lori** Heim, 62 MDG/CD
Briefer:
Col McCauley

1055 **Depart Medical Group en route to Northwest Connection, Fireside Lounge**

DCN: 11898

Mr. Phillip Coyle,
BRAC Commissioner
25 May 2005

1100 **Arrive NWC for Lunch**

Meal Choice – Caesar Salad (choice of salmon, chicken or plain)

Met By:

TSgt Kusky
TSgt Tiedeman

Attendees:

Col Rowayne **Wayne** Schatz, 62 AW/CC
Col **Murry** Peterman, 446 AW/CV
Col Cromwell
Mr. Coyle
Mr. BilBray
Ms. Schmidt
Col Steven **Steve** Arquiette, 62 AW/DS
Col Garcia
Col **Jon** Huguley, 446 MXG/CC
Col Crownover
Col McCauley
Col Louis **Shack** Bochain, 1 ASOG/CC
Lt Col John **Ty** Thomas, 62 OG/CD
Lt Col Schmedake
Maj **Sam** Highley, 62 AW/PA
CMSgt Ronald **Ron** Hernandez, 62 AW/CCC

1330 **Depart McChord AFB en route to SeaTac airport**

1415 **Arrive SeaTac**

POCs

(DSN Prefix 382 instead of 982)

DSN Prefix is 382

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62d Airlift Wing Command Post
DSN 382-2635
Comm (253) 982-2635

Base Ops
DSN 382-5611
Comm (253) 982-2635

DCN: 11898



August 17, 2005

COPY

Mr. David Combs
Air Force Team
Defense Base Closure
& Realignment Commission
2521 S. Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202-3920

Dear David:

The community of Clovis, New Mexico is grateful for the amount of time and effort your team has spent on the Cannon AFB issue. It is clear that the Commission staff is doing their best to rationalize the Air Force's data and military judgment. However, in the case of Cannon AFB, it is imperative that I state for the record, that the Clovis community remains unsatisfied with the Air Force data-collection process and their responses to the community since the release of the BRAC list. I want to share with you, one final time, the results of the community data finding, and give you an insight into this community's experience working with the Air Force to answer our most basic questions.

It is clear to us, based on ongoing communication with the Air Force Clearinghouse and senior members of the Air Force BRAC team, that Cannon's numbers look significantly and conspicuously lower than its peer group base numbers as well as those of many non-fighter bases. Similarly, communication and feedback from the Air Force to our queries never adequately explained the justifications behind their numbers or effectively rebutted our community numbers. Instead, the community has received sporadic and incomplete data, or large volumes of excel spreadsheets that are not in the format requested.

Our community team includes extremely talented analysts and economists that have years of BRAC experience. They understand the process used by the Air Force to convert raw data into weighted scores for comparative and ranking purposes. They remain astonished that the Air Force could utilize scores dramatically lower then Cannon's peer bases in almost all sub-elements.

The attachments will summarize our case that the Air Force data related to Cannon AFB is wrong and should justify Cannon's removal from the closure list. We believe the data was intentionally lowered to reduce one of three CONUS based F-16 bases given the Air Force's plans to retire the F-16. This strategy ignored Cannon's key attributes, including its infrastructure, ramp space, freedom from encroachment, and it's usability for its existing fighter mission or other DoD uses, including options for new

missions such as UCAV, Airborne Laser, initial training base for the JSF, or for joint training options.

David, you advised us to meet with the Air Force Clearinghouse staff to see what data and backup information they may have. Such a meeting was held with Mr. Fred Pease and two of his support staff on July 25th in Washington, D.C. However, they provided no Cannon specific MCI information at that time. Therefore, we formally requested this information in writing through Senator Domenici's office. We are today providing you with the narrative response from the Air Force Clearinghouse to this formal request (Attachment A), and the Clovis Community's analysis of the data released by the Clearinghouse (Attachment B).

With regard to Attachment A, we have repeatedly asked for not only the MCI scores for Cannon, but also the raw data and calculations leading to those scores. The narrative response from the Air Force Clearinghouse to our specific request, which was taken from our MCI Methodology previously submitted to you, only partially explained the Air Force's process for obtaining the data for OSD Questions 1205, 1242, 1270 and 1250; but neither validated the data nor defended the certification process at the base level. Most significantly, no supporting information or raw data was provided for any of these 4 questions. It should be noted in fact that for one question, number 1205 relating to buildable acres reported, the Air Force admitted that the community's additional data could 'qualify for consideration', but did not explain how or when this would occur.

For the remaining questions in our request, the Clearinghouse response referred to an earlier e-mail attachment, which in fact had been mis-addressed and was not received by the community until August 3. When the data was finally received, it was found to contain 1 large spreadsheet with rolled up numerical scores for all 154 Air Force installations in each of the numerous elements comprising OSD Questions 1245, 1246, and 1266. These questions relate to proximity and attributes of airspace and ranges supporting the mission. I have provided you with the PDF file containing this spreadsheet via e-mail separate from this letter. Again, it is important to note that although referred to in the narrative response, data relating to OSD Question 1203 (Access to Adequate Supersonic Airspace) was not included in the response and still has not been provided to us.

The community's analysis of the incomplete data submitted by the Air Force Clearinghouse for OSD Questions 1245, 1246 and 1266 is summarized at Attachment B. This attachment includes a separate spreadsheet for each of the three questions comparing Cannon's rolled up numerical scores to other Air Force installations, and a list of specific reasons why we believe the data does not pass the "straight-face test".

We respectfully submit that the numbers we have seen reinforce the contention that the recommendation to close Cannon was based on a numerical analysis that was flawed because the data used was incorrect, outdated and misleading. It presents a reasonable doubt as to the objectiveness and openness of the scoring process. **In summary, the Air Force still has not released all the data requested; has not shown us any certification verification; and cannot defend the limited amount of data released**. We believe the numbers are neither defensible nor consistent with what you and your colleagues saw on your site visit. In light of this reasonable doubt, and the unrecoverable economic impact to the region should this recommendation stand, we urge you to support a motion to remove Cannon from the recommendation for closure list.

Again, I personally thank you for your receptivity to our case and your responsiveness in reviewing our analyses. We stand ready to respond to any further questions you may have.

Sincerely,

Randy Harris
Chairman,
Clovis Committee of 50

Attachment A: Air Force Clearinghouse Response to Clovis Community Request
Attachment B: Clovis Community Analysis of Air Force Clearinghouse Data

CC:
Mr. Frank Cirillo
Mr. Bob Cook
Mr. Ken Small
Mr. James Aarnio
Mr. Karl Gingrich
Mr. Duke Tran

DCN: 11898

27 Jul 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0172 (CT-0711) Cannon AFB MCI and COBRA Analysis

Requester: Senator Dominici (Andrew Shulman)

Reference: Meeting with Mr. Pease and Senator Dominici's Staff, Monday, July 25, 2005, 10:00AM

Request: As discussed, I've *(Mr. Shulman)* attached a list of issues submitted for review/response from Air Force BRAC personnel. Since window for dialogue with the Commission is rapidly closing, we respectfully request a timely turn around of this request for information.

Background: Mr. Shulman and various constituents and lobbyist from New Mexico met with Mr Pease to discuss scoring of Cannon Air Force Base by the Air Force during the Base Realignment and Closure Process. The issues provided by the New Mexico delegation can be referenced at attachment.

Response: The opportunity to reiterate responses provided to the New Mexico delegation during Monday's meeting is appreciated. The following Air Force positions were also provided on Monday. The DoD submitted its recommendations 13 May 05 and can no longer change its recommendations. With that in mind, the best means to affect Commission closure and realignment recommendations is by dealing directly with the Defense Base Closure And Realignment Commission.

1. Question 1242 - ATC Restrictions to Operations (See attachment for full Inquiry question):

The question as written asked: List total, actual, aircraft departure figures from the installation for CY03. Of the installation's total departures, how many departures were delayed greater than 30 minutes attributable to Air Traffic Control (ATC) factors? The question was answered by the Wing Maintenance Operations center.

Answer 1242 - The Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) chose to use the computerized aircraft maintenance system (CAMS) as the best available measure of air traffic control affects on installations. Entries to the CAMS database due to air traffic control are made with careful Wing deliberation. The length of delay, 30 minutes, was significant enough to further prompt a careful reckoning. Twenty percent of installations asked responded with entries.

2. Questions 1245, 1246, 1203, 1266, 1203 - Range and airspace related data (See attachment for full Inquiry question):

Answer 1245, 1246, 1203, 1266, 1203: The raw data was provided to Mr. Richard Joleen, e-mail richardjoleen@aol.com, on Monday, 25 July 2005 for the community's use. The data provided included all raw scores, for all installations, used to compute range and airspace scores. To compute an accurate score, Cannon's score must be compared against the airspace and range capabilities of the best installation, anchored to the airspace and range capabilities for the least capable installation. It cannot be calculated individually without all other installation scores.

ATTACHMENT A

27 Jul 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0172 (CT-0711) Cannon AFB MCI and COBRA Analysis

3. Question 1205 - Buildable Acres of Air/Industrial Operations (See attachment for full Inquiry question): The question provided all installations and referenced every available, certifiable source of information the installation possessed as of 30 September 2003. The list of sources follows:

> AFI 32-7062, AFI 32-7063, AFI 32-7084, AFI 91-201, UFC 3-260-1, Cultural Resource Management Plans, Natural Resource Management Plans, base comprehensive planning special plans and studies, Composite Constraints and Opportunities Plan, Land Use and Transportation Plan, other component plans as appropriate and comprehensive plan maps. Public Use Airport: Airport planning or Environmental Office; for small airports, the airport manager's office.

Answer 1205: The uncertified 368 buildable acres for air/industrial operations provided by the delegation was not on record as of 30 September 2003. As presented, the uncertified information still does qualify for consideration given guidelines established by the BCEG.

4. Question 1250 - Area Cost Factor (See attachment for full Inquiry question):

Answer 1250: The area cost factor is a DoD approved figure that all services currently use to compare the costs of operations at every installations. The BCEG accepted the area cost factor as the best comparative measure when considering all 154 installations it considered for realignment and closure.

5. Question 1270 - Suitable Auxiliary Airfields Within 50 NM (See attachment for full Inquiry question)

Answer: As discussed at the 25 May meeting, this question referred to the ability of an installation to support training as well as recovery of aircraft. Not having a separate airfield within 50 nautical miles impacts training and recovery opportunities and was therefore considered a discriminator by the BCEG without regard to whether a specific installation had more than a single runway.

6. COBRA Model Community Excursion June 12, 2005 (See attachment for full Inquiry question):

Answer: The manpower savings from closing Cannon Air Force Base were calculated using the same COBRA process as all other Services and agencies. The DoD recommendations reflect the best estimate of savings for both manpower and infrastructure given OSD-directed computer tools and methodology.

It is important to understand, as the Air Force evolves to support the future total force mission, it must reinvest manpower from BRAC in new missions just as it will reinvest the infrastructure savings in future weapon systems. The Cannon Air Force Base recommendation saves manpower by reducing headquarters overhead, base operating support, operational costs associated with retirement (non-BRAC programmatic) and reinvesting those manpower authorizations in new and emerging missions, placing manpower where it is needed most—in the improved mission capability of our future combat Airmen.

DCN: 11898

27 Jul 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0172 (CT-0711) Cannon AFB MCI and COBRA Analysis

Approved.

DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

MCI Scoring Calculations for Cannon Air Force Base

Question 1242: ATC Restrictions to Operations

Maximum Points	5.98
Air Force Score	3.99

Data was taken from the computerized aircraft maintenance system (CAMS).

This measurement metric is inappropriate for tracking objective ATC delays. According to published Air Force documents, CAMS is a maintenance management and logistics command & control system, and therefore it is nearly impossible to determine if delays were in fact caused by ATC restrictions.

Cannon has no ATC restrictions to contend with; therefore Cannon AFB should have received full points in this criterion. Please comment on any objective metric available to measure true ATC restrictions.

Question 1245: Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission

Maximum Points	22.08
Air Force Score	6.04

Request detailed scoring for each of the 12 elements of this question.

Question 1246: Proximity to Low Level Routes

Max Points	7.25
Air Force Score	2.64

Cannon should receive maximum points - it has at least four low level route entries and eight low level route exits less than 50 miles from the base (IR/VR).

Question 1270: Suitable Auxiliary Airfields Within 50 NM

Max Points	5.18
Air Force Score	0

The source for this formula from Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations, BRAC 2005 is: *"FLIP and Falcon View (or any other certified flight planning software)"*.

A query of FAA certified airfield data through FAA's Direct User Access Terminal (certified flight planning software) shows *TWO* runways at Cannon AFB:

Runway **4/22 (10000' x 150')** **AND** Runway **13/31 (8200' x 150').**

Cannon AFB should have received 50 points in this criterion.

MCI Scoring Calculations for Cannon Air Force Base

Question 1203: Access to Adequate Supersonic Airspace

Max Points	6.72
Air Force Score	1.34

Published (FAA) operating hours for supersonic airspace operations around Cannon Air Force Base are in conflict with official USAF force-planning documents. The Air Force is on record as requiring 24-hour operations within Cannon AFB supersonic airspace:

Certified documents published by the Air Force for the New Mexico Training Range Initiative (NMTRI) clearly designate 280 of 5,600 estimated annual night-time sorties (between 10:00 pm and 7:00 am). This effort was launched well before the 2003 cutoff date for submission of BRAC related source data and therefore should have been included in the Air Force's analysis.

Question 1266: Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission

Request detailed scoring for each of the 12 elements of this question.

Question 1205: Buildable Acres of Air/Industrial Operations

Max Points:	1.96/1.96
Air Force Score:	0.07/0.05

The data available to the community indicates that total unconstrained acreages for industrial development and air operations reported were 9 and 10.5 acres respectively.

This is erroneous. In fact, Cannon has 368 buildable acres for air/industrial operations, according to information from Cannon AFB Base comprehensive plan maps. This source is identified as acceptable under this MCI as listed in Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations, BRAC 2005.

Question 1250: Area Cost Factor

Max Points:	1.25
Air Force Score	.74

The community understands that Area Cost Factor is a plug number taken from a DOD document and therefore not necessarily produced by the Air Force.

However, numerous cost elements such as Per Diem, Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) and others for Cannon AFB are lower; in many cases significantly lower, than all other F-16 fighter bases.

MCI Scoring Calculations for Cannon Air Force Base

COBRA Model Community Excursion June 12, 2005

- On June 12, a community COBRA Excursion was completed by modifying the DOD Recommendation COBRA for Cannon's closure recommendation – COBRA USAir Force 0114V3 (125.1c2).CBR. The results are reported below.
- **Excursion Name: COBRA USAir Force 0114V3 (125.1c2) COMM 1 June 12 05.CBR.**
  - Modification to Air Force COBRA assumptions: Retained all eliminated personnel to support force structure moves and relocated them to Nellis AFB as the most likely installation to receive the bulk of personnel.
  - As demonstrated, when personnel incorrectly eliminated by the Air Force are added back in recognition that military personnel can not be separated from force structure savings without consideration of readiness implications, the recommended action's savings evaporate. While it is true some personnel will, rightly, be eliminated by closure actions, assuming all personnel are retained establishes a counterpoint to the Air Force's assumption that nearly all will be eliminated.
  - It is clear that retention of the necessary operational, maintenance and support needed at receiving locations will significantly reduce the financial case for closing Cannon AFB.
  - To test the impact of eliminating installation support personnel, two excursions were completed. The first eliminated 10 officers, 10% of enlisted and 20% of civilian personnel. The second re-phased the action to 2008 so all MILCON could be completed before additional personnel arrived at receiving locations. The results are displayed in the table in rows four and five. While there are still small savings, **the *NPV is reduced by approximately 94%.***

Scenario	Payback Period (Years)	Costs/Savings ($K)				
		20 - Year NPV	1-Time Cost	Personnel (2006 – 2011)	Total (2006 - 2011)	Annual Total Recurring
Recommendation Scenario	**Immediate**	**-2,706,756**	90,101	**-772,995**	-815,558	-200,497
Keep 100%	**Never**	**169,913**	**86,976**	**109,997**	**118,100**	**6,197**
Minus BOS	**5**	**-157,059**	**118,010**	**-654**	**22,269**	**-19,342**
Minus BOS & Rephase Action	**5**	**-151,997**	**118,160**	**530**	**39,293**	**-19,342**

Attachment B
Community Analysis of Air Force Clearinghouse Data

The Clovis Community's Analysis of the data provided by the Air Force Clearinghouse reinforces the contention that the recommendation to close Cannon AFB was driven by a numerical analysis that was flawed because the data reported was incorrect, outdated and misleading. We suggest the numbers as presented in the response to the community's request (see following summaries) do not pass the "straight-face test" when you consider that:

1. The rolled up numbers for the most cost efficient base in ACC, and one with a stellar record of performance by any objective measure, are not just lower but significantly lower than not only other ACC bases but many non-fighter bases as well.
2. The Air Force now states, and the BRAC Commissioners and staff saw for itself during the site visit, that the buildable acres number reported for Cannon was wrong and several other MCI scores were based on outdated (e.g., runway conditions) or misleading (e.g., operating hours) information;
3. Operating hours alone counts for 15% to 50% of the score for three of the key questions relating to airspace and range attributes and, if reported correctly, would make a huge difference in Cannon's numerical score for those questions;
4. Commissioners and staff saw and heard for themselves that Cannon has multiple VR and IR entry and exit points within 50 miles, and yet it inexplicably scored lower in the VR element than most other bases; even lower in VR than for its own IR entry and exit points;
5. The Clearinghouse representatives stated to us in our meeting on July 25 that they accepted the data submitted by the base, and certified by the Wing Commander, and did not seek either to independently validate it, question any of it for reasonableness, or defend it to the BRAC staff;
6. The Air Force has stated that, under last minute directive from DOD, it doubled its calculations for projected cost savings and reduced its calculations of projected economic impact at Cannon by almost 30% within a month prior to releasing its recommendation;
7. The Air Force totally ignored the presence of an on-site cross runway and nearby municipal airport in favor or an arbitrary standard for an auxiliary airfield within 50 miles (clearly favoring bases in densely populated regions despite the obvious encroachment issues these bases encounter);
8. The Air Force continues to assert that CAMS was the best way to measure ATC restriction information even though Cannon controls its own departures and arrivals and has no ATC restrictions whatsoever, as Commissioners and staff again saw during their site visit;
9. The Air Force continues to assert that 'area cost factor' is the best way to objectively measure costs at its bases when the real data shows just the opposite of what the 'area cost factor' implies for Cannon and the Clovis area; and
10. The Air Force has still not released all the data requested (Question 1203); the Cannon data that has been released is not in the format originally submitted by the

base, and has no certification verification; and what data the community does have has been released in piecemeal and incomplete fashion, too late in the process for the community to do an in-depth analysis.

DCN: 11898

OSE Question 1245- Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission

Question 1245 - Proximity To AS (% of Total)	Lowest	Highest	Cannon (% Against Highest)	Shaw	Hill	Seymour Johnson	Luke	Cannon Rank Against Peers (1-5)
Op Hrs (15%)	94.6	5299.6	2038.4 (38.5%)	2945	2045.5	4713.9	2997.4	5
Scoreable Range (10%)	35.2	2049.6	300.4 (14.7%)	333.3	881.2	2049.6	1162.7	5
AGWD (11.25%)	28.9	2416.2	300.4 (12.4%)	547.2	881.2	2222.7	1162.7	5
Low Angle (.75%)	28.9	2172.9	200 (9.2%)	547.2	881.2	2049.6	1162.7	5
Live Ord (3%)	32.6	1486.9	100.4 (6.8%)	292.8	881.2	1486.9	1162.7	5
IMC (5%)	28.9	1486.9	0 (0.0%)	78.9	881.2	1486.9	1162.7	5
EC (5%)	100	1393.4	300.4 (21.6%)	238.1	257.7	1158.2	372.1	3
Volume (15%)	20	2103.7	57 (2.7%)	513.3	611.8	1589.4	584.1	5
Laser (10%)	10.9	3846.3	963.6 (25.1%)	1222.2	1489.6	2541.8	1713.7	5
Lights Out (10%)	11.8	3306.4	1213.2 (36.7%)	1707.7	793.9	2664.3	1703.6	4
Chaff (5%)	11.8	3801.1	785 (20.7%)	1157	1489.6	2844.6	1485.1	5
Flare (5%)	11.8	4002.2	718 (17.9%)	1157.2	1439.1	3361.9	1359.4	5

DCN: 11898

OSD Question 1246 – Proximity of Low Level Routes Supporting Mission

Question 1246- Low Level Routes Supporting Mission	Lowest	Highest	Cannon (% Against Highest)	Shaw	Hill	Seymour Johnson	Luke	Cannon Rank Against Peers (1-5)
IR Entry Proximity Score (25%)	18.1	1307.5	685.8 (52.5%)	605.2	316.5	569	178.6	1
VR Entry Proximity Score (25%)	32.6	2,259	439.1 (19.4%)	743.1	380.2	1097.1	1,307.1	4
IR Exit Proximity Score (25%)	11.8	1,233.6	679.8 (55.1%)	541.8	321	653.6	294.9	1
VR Exit Proximity Score (25%)	30	2,267	475.9 (21%)	821.2	339.7	1,135.1	1,488.6	4

DCN: 11898

OSD Question 1266 –Range Complex Supports Mission

Question 1266- Range Complex Supports Mission	Lowest	Highest	Cannon (% Against Highest)	Shaw	Hill	Seymour Johnson	Luke	Cannon Rank Against Peers (1-5)
Operating Hours (15%)	100	9,909	3,900 (39.4%)	8,000	4,900	9,800	5,200	5
Scoreable Range (10%)	100	3,100	700 (22.6%)	1,400	1,000	3,100	1,700	5
WD Air Ground (11.25)	100	3,800	700 (18.4%)	2,000	1,000	3,400	1,700	5
WD Low Angle Strafe (.75%)	100	3,800	700 (18.4%)	2,00	1,000	3,100	1,700	5
WD-LO (3%)	100	2,700	500 (18.5%)	1,200	1,000	1,900	1,700	5
IMC Wpn. Rel. (5%)	100	1,900	0 (0%)	600	1,000	1,900	1,700	5
Elec. Combat (10%)	100	2,000	700 (35%)	500	300	1,700	400	2
Airspace Volume (15%)	9,324	369,751	93,735 (35.4%)	110,301	75,858	178,748	161,847	4
Laser Use (10%)	100	6,700	1,500 (22.4%)	4,100	1,900	4,100	2,800	5
Lights Out (10%)	100	5,900	1,800 (30.5%)	3,200	1,000	3,900	2,600	4
Chaff (5%)	100	6,100	1,100	2,300	1,900	6,100	2,600	5
Flare (5%)	100	7,200	800 (11.1%)	3,300	1,800	7,200	2,200	5

DCN: 11898

COMMISSIONER SUE E. TURNER

Travel Itinerary from June 20 – June 24, 2005

CONFIRMATION # JFBUSD

San Antonio, TX

June 19, Sunday:

12:40-14:47 **American Flight 2006 from San Antonio, TX to St. Louis**

Hotel: Ritz Carlton (314) 863-6300

June 20, Monday:

All day visit **ST LOUIS Hearing**

Hotel: Ritz Carlton (314) 863-6300

June 21, Tuesday:

06:00-07:40 **American Flight 2015 from St Louis to Dallas**
09:56-11:03 **American eagle Flight 3217 from Dallas to Red River**

PM visit **RED RIVER AD**

MIL AIR flight depart 1600
Arrive 1646 at Ft. Hood

DVQ if possible / Off post lodging – Plaza Hotel

June 22, Wednesday:

PM visit Ft HOOD, TX

15:32-16:21 **from Killen into Dallas**
17:59-19:04 **from Dallas into Lubbock**

Hotel: La Quinta Inn (505) 763-8777

June 23, Thursday:

PM visit **CANNON AFB, NM**

Hotel: La Quinta Inn (505) 763-8777

June 24, Friday:

DCN: 11898

AM visit	**CANNON AFB Hearing**
16:21-17:26	**American Flight 3620 from Lubbock to Dallas**
18:41-19:44	**American Flight 805 from Dallas to San Antonio**

DCN: 11898

For gate information, check Gates, Times & Status or call American Airlines at 800-433-7300.

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BOARDING PASS

PASSENGER NAME
TURNER/SUE

AADVANTAGE NUMBER
W603340

PNR RECORD LOCATOR
JFBUSD

FROM:
St Louis, STL

TO:
Dallas/ Fort Worth, DFW

CARRIER	FLIGHT	CLASS	DATE	DEPARTS
AA	2015	V	21 Jun	6:00 AM

GATE	BOARDING TIME	SEAT
---	5:30 AM	12B

GROUP - 5

ELECTRONIC

Ticket Number 0011145094748

Transportation of Firearms and Inspection of Checked Baggage
FAA regulations require that firearms in checked baggage must be declared and unloaded. Passengers failing to declare firearms or transporting loaded firearms are subject to substantial civil penalties. Passengers must control their baggage to prevent the introduction of dangerous items without their knowledge and must also not accept items from unknown persons. Carry-on items and checked baggage are subject to search.

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DUPLICATE

PASSENGER NAME
TURNER/SUE

AADVANTAGE NUMBER
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FROM:
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CARRIER	FLIGHT	CLASS	DATE	DEPARTS
AA	2015	V	21 Jun	6:00 AM

GATE	BOARDING TIME	SEAT
---	5:30 AM	12B

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DCN: 11898

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BOARDING PASS

PASSENGER NAME
TURNER/SUE

AADVANTAGE NUMBER
W603340

PNR RECORD LOCATOR
JFBUSD

FROM:
Dallas/ Fort Worth, DFW

TO:
Texarkana, TXK

CARRIER	FLIGHT	CLASS	DATE	DEPARTS
AA	3217	V	21 Jun	9:56 AM

GATE	BOARDING TIME	SEAT
---	9:26 AM	7B

GROUP - 3

ELECTRONIC

Ticket Number 0011145094748

Transportation of Firearms and Inspection of Checked Baggage
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DUPLICATE

PASSENGER NAME
TURNER/SUE

AADVANTAGE NUMBER
W603340

PNR RECORD LOCATOR
JFBUSD

FROM:
Dallas/ Fort Worth, DFW

TO:
Texarkana, TXK

CARRIER	FLIGHT	CLASS	DATE	DEPARTS
AA	3217	V	21 Jun	9:56 AM

GATE	BOARDING TIME	SEAT
---	9:26 AM	7B

GROUP - 3

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DCN: 11898

COMMISSIONER JAMES V. HANSEN

Travel Itinerary from June 20 – June 24, 2005

CONFIRMATION # IUSAPH

Farmington, UT (Salt Lake City)

June 19, Sunday:

Flight from Salt Lake City, UT to St. Louis. (Afternoon)

13:10-16:53 Delta Flight 4821 from Salt Lake City to St. Louis

Hotel: Ritz Carlton (314) 863-6300

June 20, Monday:

All day visit St. Louis

Hotel: Ritz Carlton (314) 863-6300

June 21, Tuesday:

07:10-09:18 Delta Flight 4801 St. Louis to Salt Lake City

June 22, Wednesday:

11:55-15:29 American Flight 1980 from Salt Lake City to Dallas
16:54-17:58 American Flight 3753 from Dallas to Lubbock

Mil Air:
Depart: Lubbock 22 Jun 05 - 1930L
Arrive: Cannon 22 Jun 05 - 1855L

Hotel: La Quinta Inn (505) 763-6300

June 23, Thursday:

PM visit CANNON AFB, NM

Hotel: La Quinta Inn (505) 763-6300

June 24, Friday:

AM visit CANNON AFB Hearing

16:21-17:26 American Flight 3620 from Lubbock to Dallas
18:11-19:49 American Flight 1925 from Dallas to Salt Lake City

DCN: 11898

Air Force 32 – Cannon AFB, NM



DCN: 11898

Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Branning Phillip Civ AFRC/XPPP [Phillip.Branning@AFRC.AF.MIL]
Sent: Thursday, May 26, 2005 10:57 AM
To: Kenneth.Small@wso.whs.mil
Cc: Schonau Harry W Contractor AFRC/XPP; Vitalis Gregory Col AFRC/XPP
Subject: RE: BRAC Regional Hearings

Ken,

I know you are working the site visit to Mitchell, do you know if Mitchell will be addressed at the St Louis Regional. My Mitchell guys are pushing us for info. Do you known how the process at the hearings is going? Does each community have a certain amount of time?

Thank you for working with us on this - I know your schedule is very full.

Craig

-----Original Message-----
From: Branning Phillip Civ AFRC/XPPP
Sent: Wednesday, May 25, 2005 3:44 PM
To: 'Kenneth.Small@wso.whs.mil'
Cc: 'Schonau Harry W Contractor AFRC/XPP'; Vogt Carl Col 911 AW/CC; 'Vitalis Gregory Col AFRC/XPP'
Subject: RE: BRAC Regional Hearings

Ken,

I saw on the press release that there is a hearing in Baltimore. My email was just a curiosity more than a request. From the AFRC perspective, whether the local community attends the hearing at Buffalo, Baltimore or DC matters not, I was just curious as to whether Pittsburgh will be addressed at the Buffalo hearing.

Craig

-----Original Message-----
From: Branning Phillip Civ AFRC/XPPP
Sent: Wednesday, May 25, 2005 3:34 PM
To: 'Kenneth.Small@wso.whs.mil'
Cc: Schonau Harry W Contractor AFRC/XPP; Vogt Carl Col 911 AW/CC; Vitalis Gregory Col AFRC/XPP
Subject: BRAC Regional Hearings

Ken,

Is there going to be a hearing in the Baltimore area? I know there is one in DC. According to the attached Visit Matrix, Pittsburgh will be addressed at the Buffalo Regional Hearing. Any chance that they can address Pittsburgh in the DC area vs Buffalo? That would be a better location for the Pittsburgh folks.

VR
Craig Branning
HQ AFRC/XPPP
DSN 497-1967

DCN: 11898

2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Archive Box Contents

Team:_____

Name of Team Member:_____

Item #	Item

DCN: 11898

E-Mail and Record Archiving Procedures
2005 BRAC Commission

E-Mail – The following types of e-mail should be archived:

- E-mail that documents the work of the BRAC Commission as it pertains to base closures and realignments.
- E-mail that demonstrates transacted BRAC Commission business as it pertains to base closures and realignments.

To prepare your e-mail for archiving, please follow the steps below:

1. Delete all e-mail of a personal nature from your inbox, personal folders, and sent mail. If you want to keep any of your personal e-mail, either save them to an external drive or print a hard-copy.

2. Do not move the e-mail you plan to archive by dragging and dropping or by any other method. Just leave it where it is in either your inbox, sent mail or personal folders. Since all your e-mail remaining after step 1 will be archived it doesn't matter whether it's in your personal folders, inbox or sent mail.

3. Nothing should be done to alter any of your e-mail remaining after step 1. This is the e-mail you plan to archive, and you should not edit, change or delete any information in these e-mails.

On or after your last day of employment with the BRAC Commission, the WSO-IT Helpdesk will burn your e-mail to DVD. This archived e-mail will be part of the records submitted to the National Archives. A restricted classification will be placed on the archived e-mail so that a FOIA review will be required for the public to see these files. This will prevent members of the public from having access to private cell phone numbers and other private information that may be contained in the e-mail files.

Working & Other Related Documents – Working Documents such as notes, papers related to research, COBRA runs, should be grouped by subject matter and placed in manila folders or accordion files. On a post-it note, indicate the subject matter of the contents of the folder (I will type a label in the format required for archiving). Place the folders in a white archiving box (available from the library). Please **do not write directly on the box** as the National Archives will only accept it with specific markings, and nothing else. Instead, please write your name on a post-it note and place it on the box. Also, fill in the attached manifest sheet with a brief description of the contents of each folder/item in the box.

Base Input/Community Input Materials – Any base or community materials that are already in the library may be destroyed. However, if you are unsure, please give materials to Marcy Reborchick, room 600-14.

Questions – If you have any questions, please ask Marcy Reborchick, 703-699-2971, room 600-14.

Attachment: Manifest Sheet

Revised: 9/15/2005 1:45 PM