


**RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS AND SUBSTANTIATING  
DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE BRAC PROPOSAL TO  
REALIGN POPE AFB**

**July 14, 2005**

**REFERENCE THE BRAC REGIONAL HEARING  
AT CHARLOTTE, NC  
JUNE 28, 2005**



**ELIZABETH DOLE**  
NORTH CAROLINA

555 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510  
(202) 224-6342  
FAX: (202) 224-1100

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

COMMITTEES:  
ARMED SERVICES  
BANKING, HOUSING, AND  
URBAN AFFAIRS  
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

July 14, 2005

Anthony Principi  
Chairman BRAC Commission  
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600  
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi,

North Carolina fully supports the BRAC process and the role of the BRAC commission in reviewing the proposals from the Department of Defense and determining if they meet the BRAC statute and criteria. We are delighted that DOD has recognized the incredible value of North Carolina's military installations and has proposed moving additional military forces and capabilities to these installations.

I appreciated the opportunity to participate in the regional BRAC hearing in Charlotte on June 28, 2005, and during that hearing, the commissioners asked questions about the proposal to realign Pope AFB. As you know, we are concerned about the proposal to shut down the 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing and transfer the installation and the airfield functions to the Army. With this letter, I am submitting on behalf of the representatives of the Fayetteville community their response to the commission's questions along with additional information which substantiates our concerns.

This BRAC round offers a tremendous opportunity to establish a joint base Bragg/Pope that would meet all OSD BRAC guidance for joint training and basing opportunities. Please closely review these points and consider the potential degradation to our nation's 911 Crisis Response Force if these team is dissolved. Thank you for all the time and effort you are devoting to reviewing the BRAC process and considering our concerns.

With much gratitude,



Elizabeth Dole

**GREENVILLE OFFICE:**  
306 SOUTH EVANS STREET  
GREENVILLE, NC 27858  
(252) 329-1093  
FAX: (252) 329-1097

**HENDERSONVILLE OFFICE:**  
401 NORTH MAIN STREET  
SUITE 200  
HENDERSONVILLE, NC 28792  
(828) 698-3747  
FAX: (828) 698-1267

**RALEIGH OFFICE:**  
310 NEW BERN AVENUE  
SUITE 122  
RALEIGH, NC 27601  
(919) 856-4630  
FAX: (919) 856-4053

**SALISBURY OFFICE:**  
225 NORTH MAIN STREET  
SUITE 304  
SALISBURY, NC 28144  
(704) 633-5011  
FAX: (704) 633-2937

# POPE AFB REALIGNMENT RESPONSE

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## SECTION 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The crisis reaction forces at Fort Bragg constitute a unique military capability that responds quickly to contingency operations worldwide. The Airlift Wing at Pope AFB has been a critical part of this team for more than twenty years and has participated in many successful combat operations including Just Cause in Panama, Urgent Fury in Grenada and Uphold Democracy in Haiti. The joint training, planning and execution opportunities have forged a strong relationship and a proven team to create the premier power projection force that supports the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and is not replicated anywhere else in our military force structure.

Equally important to participating in combat operations, the Wing provides numerous functions to maintain the airfield, execute airfield operations and to support strategic airlift operations from Pope AFB, including operational planning, airlift coordination, maintenance, and logistics and outload support. The 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing provides the expertise and infrastructure that keeps the airfield operational and allows high-density aircraft operations to flow smoothly. The Army does not have the requisite skills or expertise to maintain an airbase to the same standard as the Air Force. It is not an Army mission to maintain or operate an airfield to the standards necessary to conduct Joint Crisis Response operations or sustained strategic airlift. Army airfields typically support Army aviation units consisting of helicopters and light aircraft. This realignment will negatively impact the joint training, operational, and deployment capability of forces on Fort Bragg, and compromise our nation's crisis response capabilities.

It appears that the BRAC cross service coordination process for this proposal failed to be completed in the last few weeks before the DOD BRAC announcements. One month prior to OSD approval of the BRAC recommendations, the Army and Joint Cross Service Group were working toward a proposal to move FORSCOM and US Army Reserve Command headquarters to Pope AFB and establish a joint base Bragg/Pope. This proposal was approved by the HSA Joint Steering Group at the end of March, 2005. The HAS Joint Steering Group then rescinded and superseded that position in April by proposing to realign Pope AFB and transfer the installation to the Army. Until that point, the Army coordination indicated that airfield operations at Pope AFB, or at a joint base Bragg/Pope, would be handled by the Air Force. There was no apparent planning or coordination between the services for the Army to take over airfield operations and support operations. To operate Pope airbase at its current OPTEMPO and mission profile would be unique to the Army and they could not prepare cost or manpower analysis for such an undertaking. It is clear that failure to maintain Pope's operational capabilities will degrade the joint power projection mission of Fort Bragg and Pope AFB, and the warfighting capability of both services; therefore, this disconnect between the services' positions compromised the process and generated this flawed recommendation.

The Military Value analysis used formulas with weighted criteria that resulted in very low values for the crisis response and airlift missions at Pope AFB. The maximum points allowed for Contingency, Mobilization and Future Force was 10 out of 100. Using the sum of the eight mission areas, resulted in low scores for an Air Force base with a mission to support the Army, and provided quantitative justification to close Pope AFB.

## SECTION 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Accurate weighting criteria would have reflected the strategic importance of supporting joint crisis response forces.

The Airlift Wing at Pope AFB and the airborne and special operations forces at Fort Bragg constitute a valuable and unique power projection capability that is not replicated anywhere else in the world. Dissolving this team and transferring Pope AFB to the Army instead of establishing a Joint Base is a flawed recommendation that will compromise joint training and warfighting capabilities and place the Crisis Response mission at risk. The Army cannot maintain the airfield to the standards and capability needed to support the power projection mission. The decision to disestablish the wing and transfer the base to the Army should be reversed and the installation should be established as Joint Base Bragg/Pope.

## SECTION 2: INTRODUCTION

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Questions asked by BRAC commissioners following the presentation at the BRAC hearing on June 28 are summarized:

- Did we analyze the cost of reversing the decision to realign Pope AFB?
- The Air Force plans to support deployment operations from Fort Bragg, why can't aircraft land, load troops and depart without support from the airlift wing?
- Strategic deployments are supported with long-range airlift, how is the deployment mission degraded since C-130s are not used for this purpose?

An additional question asked by Chairman Principi to Secretary Rumsfeld in a letter dated July 1, 2005 is also addressed: "Are the joint operational synergies that exist between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing/23<sup>rd</sup> Fighter Group able to be replicated from other locations?"

This response addresses these questions and clarifies the missions and functions performed by the 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing; assesses airfield facilities and ramp space; identifies a flawed coordination process for this proposal; analyzes inconsistencies in the formulas used by the Air Force to establish MCI; and defines the mission decrement referred to in the proposal to realign Pope AFB.

The proposed actions to move FORSCOM Headquarters and Army Reserve Command Headquarters to Fort Bragg/Pope AFB are absolutely the right move for the Army. Combining these headquarters with 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps, US Army Special Forces Command, and Joint Special Operations Command to provide a secure and combined location for warfighting and training command headquarters provides synergy and efficiencies that cannot be found in other locations. These actions are not dependent on the BRAC actions to disestablish the airlift wing and transfer the installation to the Army. Therefore, we fully support these actions and they are not discussed in this report.

**Pope Air Force Base, NC Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station, and  
Yeager Air Guard Station, WV, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR**

**Recommendation:** Realign Pope Air Force Base (Air Force Base), North Carolina. Distribute the 43d Airlift Wing's C-130E aircraft (25 aircraft) to the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas; realign the 23d Fighter Group's A-10 aircraft (36 aircraft) to Moody Air Force Base, Georgia; transfer real property accountability to the Army; disestablish the 43rd Medical Group and establish a medical squadron. At Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, realign eight C-130E aircraft to backup inventory; retire 27 C-130Es; realign one C-130J aircraft to the 143d Airlift Wing (ANG), Quonset State Airport Air Guard Station, Rhode Island; two C-130Js to the 146th Airlift Wing (ANG), Channel Islands Air Guard Station, California; and transfer four C-130Js from the 314th Airlift Wing (AD) to the 189th Airlift Wing (ANG), Little Rock Air Force Base.

Realign Yeager Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), West Virginia, by realigning eight C-130H aircraft to Pope/Fort Bragg to form a 16 aircraft active duty/Reserve associate unit, and by relocating flying-related expeditionary combat support (ECS) to Eastern West Virginia Regional Airport/Shepherd Field AGS (aerial port and fire fighters). Close Pittsburgh International Airport (IAP) Air Reserve Station (ARS), Pennsylvania and relocate 911th Airlift Wing's (AFRC) eight C-130H aircraft to Pope/Fort Bragg to form a 16 aircraft active/reserve associate unit. Relocate AFRC operations and maintenance manpower to Pope/Ft. Bragg. Relocate flight related ECS (aeromedical squadron) to Youngstown-Warren Regional APT ARS. Relocate all remaining Pittsburgh ECS and headquarters manpower to Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Air National Guard units at Pittsburgh are unaffected.

**Justification:** Downsizing Pope Air Force Base takes advantage of mission-specific consolidation opportunities to reduce operational costs, maintenance costs and the manpower footprint. The smaller manpower footprint facilitates transfer of the installation to the Army. Active duty C-130s and A-10s will move to Little Rock (17-airlift) and Moody (11-SOF/CSAR), respectively, to consolidate force structure at those two bases and enable Army recommendations at Pope. At Little Rock, older aircraft are retired or converted to back-up inventory and J-model C-130s are aligned under the Air National Guard. Little Rock grows to become the single major active duty C-130 unit, streamlining maintenance and operation of this aging weapon system. At Pope, the synergistic, multi-service relationship will continue between Army airborne and Air Force airlift forces with the creation of an active duty/Reserve associate unit. The C-130 unit remains as an Army tenant on an expanded Ft. Bragg. With the disestablishment of the 43<sup>rd</sup> Medical Group, the AF will maintain the required manpower to provide primary care, flight and occupational medicine to support the Air Force active duty military members. The Army will maintain the required manpower necessary to provide primary care, flight and occupational medicine to support the Army active duty military members. The Army will provide ancillary and specialty medical services for all assigned Army and Air Force military members (lab, x-ray, pharmacy, etc).

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The major command's capacity briefing reported Pittsburgh ARS land constraints prevented the installation from hosting more than 10 C-130 aircraft and Yeager AGS cannot support more than eight C-130s. Careful analysis of mission capability indicates that it is more appropriate to robust the proposed airlift mission at Fort Bragg to an optimal 16 aircraft C-130 squadron, which provides greater military value and offers unique opportunities for Jointness.

**Payback:** The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$218 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of \$653 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$197 million, with an immediate payback expected. The net present value of the cost and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$2,515 million.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 7,840 jobs (4,700 direct jobs and 3,140 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Fayetteville, North Carolina Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is 4.01 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 246 jobs (156 direct jobs and 90 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Charleston, West Virginia Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is 0.14 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 581 jobs (322 direct jobs and 259 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Impact on Community Infrastructure:** A review of the community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support forces, missions and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** There are potential impacts to air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; and wetlands that may need to be considered during the implementation of this recommendation. There are no anticipated impacts to dredging; or marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries. Impacts of costs include \$1.29 million in costs for environmental compliance and waste management. These costs were included in the payback calculation. There are no anticipated impacts to the costs of environmental

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restoration. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation have been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to the implementation of this recommendation.

## SECTION 3

### MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES

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This section addresses questions about the missions, capabilities and deployment requirements at Fort Bragg/Pope AFB.

Three specific questions asked were:

- You would suggest that the Commission and our staff should analyze the capabilities that would be required to provide that support mission, and see what is the best and most logical place and most cost effective place to put it at to make sure the warfighter reaches the war in time with the equipment and properly deployed.
- Can these functions be replicated somewhere else?
- (reference Combat Operations) They didn't employ in C-130s...other deployments really occur in aircraft that are not at Pope...and are basically brought in to handle the mission. There's more to it than that, that the Army couldn't do that – the Air Force would have to do that.

Section 3 includes:

3A: Units and Mission Capability

3B: Combat Airlift Operations Flown From Pope AFB

3C: Airlift Wing Support for Exercises, Operations and Deployment

3D: Evolving Missions

3E: Mission Degradation

## **SECTION 3: MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES**

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### **3A: Mission Capability**

Fort Bragg and Pope AFB constitute a unique power projection capability unlike any other military installation in the country. Forces on Fort Bragg must meet requirements to execute on the shortest timeline of any forces in our military as directed by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). With the Pope AFB airfield adjoining Fort Bragg, crisis response forces can stage and deploy faster than at any other installation, and units do not have to leave the installation to stage and board aircraft, allowing force movements to remain undetected. These forces include three 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Brigade Combat Teams, with a fourth projected; Special Forces from the US Army Special Operations Command; and the Joint Special Operations Command. There are combat planning staffs on Fort Bragg/Pope AFB from the 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Joint Special Operations Command, and the 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing. In addition, combat controllers from the 18<sup>th</sup> Air Support Operations Group, and 14<sup>th</sup> Air Support Operations Squadron, and the Combat Controllers School train and deploy with Army units. The capabilities that exist at Fort Bragg and Pope AFB can not be replicated anywhere else due to the wide range and specialized training of crisis response forces at Fort Bragg; the training, planning, execution and airlift support provided by the 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing; the capability to deploy quickly to meet crisis timelines; and the ability to conceal preparations and maintain secrecy.

Forces at Fort Bragg provide a variety of options to the President and Secretary of Defense during crisis planning that no other base can provide. With the addition of the Homeland Defense mission, units at Fort Bragg may be required to respond quickly to an international crisis or to a national emergency or terrorist act in the United States. If this response capability is degraded, our national security could be affected. Some other major Army installations that have runways on the post that can accommodate strategic lift aircraft are: Fort Bliss, Fort Hood, and Fort Campbell. Fort Bliss is home to the Army Air Defense Command, which does not have a rapid response mission. Fort Hood is home to III Corps, the 4<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division and the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, all heavy forces that move the majority of their equipment by rail. Fort Campbell is home to the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division, which is heavily equipped with helicopters, which also deploys primarily by rail. None of the Army's airfields operate at the same level, alert status and tempo of Fort Bragg/Pope AFB.

### **3B: Combat Airlift Operations from Pope AFB**

Over the last four decades, the unique relationship and organizations of Ft Bragg and Pope AFB were created specifically to support the nation's Crisis Response mission as directed in our militaries' classified contingency plans. Airlift Wings at Pope AFB have supported Combat Operations that were planned and executed from the base. They provided the primary airlift and execution planning for Grenada, Panama and Haiti. This required the wing to closely coordinate with the Corps staff and to provide the majority of the Air Force planning for the operation and to orchestrate the preparation, briefings, loading, marshalling and launching of all aircraft, personnel and equipment, and

### SECTION 3: MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES

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deconflict the flights into the battle area. These are just a few examples of the order of magnitude of Pope operations from past Crisis Response missions and only includes operations when aircraft launched from or cycled through Pope AFB:

Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada), 1983: Forces had to be ready to launch 18 hours after alert. Approximately 24 C-141s were positioned at Pope AFB to support the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division's move, but were configured for air land operations and had to be reconfigured for airdrop operations on Pope during the 18-hour preparation window prior to launch. Additionally, three C-5A aircraft cycled through Pope during this same period to pick up and deploy special operations forces.

Operation Just Cause (Panama), 1989: Forces had to be ready to launch 18 hours after alert. 31 C-141s were initially loaded at Pope and sent to Charleston AFB for staging. 20 C-141s were positioned at Pope AFB to support the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division's initial airfield seizure airdrop operations, followed by 43 C-141s and 16 C-5s conducting airland operations. An ice storm in North Carolina the night of the operation could have canceled the mission had the Army and Air Force commanders not had developed confidence in each others abilities through multiple joint training exercises and habitual planning relationships.

Operation Desert Shield/Storm (Kuwait/Iraq), 1990/1: Forces had to be ready to launch 18 hours after alert. The initial aircraft launched at 1:40PM, August 8, 1990 and was followed by approximately 889 C-141, 430 C-5 and 485 commercial charter (CRAF) missions operating around the clock from Pope AFB until all XVIII Airborne Corps and special operations forces had been deployed from Fort Bragg, approximately 40,000 soldiers and their unit equipment. Almost half of this movement was accomplished in the first 30 days.

Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti), 1994: Forces had to be ready to launch 18 hours after alert. The combat airdrop (airfield seizure) was to be executed from 32 C-130 aircraft followed by 54 C-141 aircraft to airdrop additional personnel and equipment. 37 of the C-141 aircraft were pre-loaded with equipment at Pope and then staged at McGuire and Charleston AFBs. The 32 C-130 aircraft and 17 C-141 aircraft launched directly from Pope AFB. An additional 32 C-130 aircraft were supporting special operations forces from other airfields.

In every case, forces had to be prepared to deploy within 18 hours of alert. In every case, the Air Force planning, staging, and execution requirements far exceeded the capabilities of a squadron headquarters or the expertise of an Army garrison staff. In every case, the base operations and support infrastructure was robust enough to handle the Crisis Response mission. This would not have happened without support from the Airlift Wing. The expertise and resources requisite to a Wing organization have the ability to execute initial planning while simultaneously receiving and preparing platforms and personnel from across the Air Force tailored to the mission profile to meet the impending operational requirement. The current BRAC recommendations do not ensure

## **SECTION 3: MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES**

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that this documented joint response requirement can be sustained and therefore does not comply with the DOD BRAC guidance

### **3C: Airlift Wing Support for Exercises, Operations and Deployments**

In the deployment scenario the main wing functions are the marshalling and loading of equipment, preparation of aircraft, and command and control of the launches to meet the established timelines. The issue of support for the Army during deployments is dependent on the size of the operation. Wing assets normally require augmentation to support the deployment of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps Headquarters and support staff. During large-scale deployments or exercises such as Large Package Week, CAPSTONE, and Joint Forced Entry Exercises (JFEX), additional maintenance personnel are needed to meet the added workload. The Wing provides the daily route and drop zone deconfliction for any and all AF aircraft conducting training or Army support at Pope AFB. In some exercises, even though wing aircraft may not be involved with the exercise or training event, the 43<sup>rd</sup> Wing provides support for core functions and planners and schedulers assist with scenario development and events timeline to ensure compatibility with all base activities and to provide the proper level of visibility and success of the missions. The Airlift Wing staff deployed to SWA to provide a battle staff during Desert Storm. The 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing currently provides 10 C-130E aircraft and 15 aircrews to the CENTCOM AOR, and because of this heavy usage, the Wing borrows aircraft from active and ARC bases to keep the mission going both deployed and at home. The planned replacement of the C-130E aircraft with C-130J aircraft at Pope AFB was an important aspect to maintain our airlift capability and support Army operations. The funding cut for the C-130Js by OSD, affected the Air Force proposal to realign Pope AFB, as the military justification for closing the wing was to consolidate an aging aircraft fleet. The C-130J provides longer range, faster deployments and more load capacity than the C-130E, and will be used for strategic and intratheater airlift operations.

### **3D: Evolving Missions**

In addition to the current spectrum of operations that U.S. forces are supporting around the world, there are evolving missions associated with the War on Terrorism and Homeland Defense. Terrorist acts, especially those associated with nuclear or chemical/biological weapons, would conceivably require a rapid military response. Missions could include securing an area or a city, restoring the peace, engaging terrorists, CNB containment and cleanup, and retaliation for an attack. Responding to a potential terrorist act with overwhelming force or engaging forces prior to an attack could prevent the act from taking place. All of these missions would require a rapid response with appropriate force and equipment. With the current relationship between Fort Bragg and Pope AFB, and with the airlift wing in place, crisis response forces are available to respond quickly to these situations. If the wing is disestablished, aircraft would need to deploy to the installation, which adds time to the crisis response. Execution planning would also be delayed.

## **SECTION 3: MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES**

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Other missions that have been supported in the past and may be needed in the future are Humanitarian Relief, and support for the War on Drugs.

### **3E: Mission Degradation**

A brigade from the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division designated the Division Ready Brigade (DRB) is required to be staged for deployment in 18 hours and airborne within 24 hours of notification by the President. Deploying the entire Brigade requires approximately 76 C-130s or 20 C-17s. If an Airlift Control Element or team had to deploy to Fort Bragg to plan, coordinate and control airborne operations, they would not meet the required timelines. In addition, if the orders call for a large-scale deployment requiring surge operations, augmentation of many airfield functions listed above may be required. An associate RC squadron would not have the planning section or trained personnel to plan combat operations similar to operations in Grenada, Haiti and Panama. The relationships between Corps, Special Forces and Wing staffs, built on working together and solving problems during numerous joint training exercises would no longer exist. This is a degradation that our crisis reaction forces cannot afford.

Forces at Fort Bragg and the Airlift Wing at Pope AFB have reacted quickly to contingency crisis for the past twenty years. Breaking up this team and degrading our crisis response capability does not make good military sense while we are engaged in a War on Terrorism and involved in military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other areas around the world. The military justification for closing the wing and consolidating an aging aircraft fleet is far outweighed by the responsibility to our national security for developing an increased crisis response capability at a newly designated joint base Bragg/Pope. Establishing joint base Bragg/Pope and maintaining the Airlift Wing is a tremendous opportunity to increase our power projection capability and adhere to DOD BRAC guidance to achieve efficiencies and effectiveness with joint basing opportunities.

## SECTION 4

### AIRFIELD CONSIDERATIONS

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This section addresses Pope AFB airfield facilities, functions and operations to support mission requirements.

Section 4 includes:

- 4A: Airfield Facilities
- 4B: Airfield Functions and Operations
- 4C: Airlift Wing Support for Airfield Operations
- 4D: Support information and graphics

## SECTION 4: AIRFIELD CONSIDERATIONS

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### 4A: Airfield Facilities

The airfield facilities at Pope AFB are in excellent condition, highly maintained to Air Force and FAA standards and specifically designed to support Army operations at Fort Bragg. The ramp area at Pope AFB achieved the maximum score of 100 for MCI in six of the seven applicable mission areas, with the airlift scoring 75.

The Blue Ramp is the primary ramp for Wing operations and according to Air Mobility Command; it has room for 64 C-130s, Primary Assigned Aircraft (PAA), or room for 36 A-10s and 28 C-130s. The Blue Ramp (shown in dark green on attached map) has 194,000 square yards of parking space and is adjacent to the A-10 ramp, which has an additional 190,000 square yards and is currently used for A-10 operations.

The Green Ramp (colored burgundy) has direct access to Fort Bragg and is the primary staging area for Army operations. It has 260,000 square yards of ramp space, sufficient to stage 20 C-17s at a time, which is adequate to move an entire Division Ready Brigade. As part of the \$118.5 million Outload Enhancement Program, three 40,000 square ft staging facilities were constructed on the Fort Bragg side of the Green Ramp, permitting soldiers to prepare for deployment and for their equipment to remain out of the elements. Information on the Outload Enhancement Program is included in Section 4D.

The Yellow Ramp (colored yellow) is primarily used for JSOC operations. With 48,000 square yards of ramp space, it can hold four C-17s. There are six newly constructed munitions and hazardous cargo loading areas, colored red, on the southwest side of the airfield with new taxiways accessing the runway.

The Silver Ramp is adjacent to base operations, and is used primarily for VIP flights. It is adjacent to the Blue Ramp and has room for three additional C-130s.

Other recent enhancements to the Green Ramp are new POL aircraft fueling facilities, and new munitions load areas. The new load areas compliment the large munitions storage area shown on the map.

### 4B: Airfield Functions and Operations

Airfield Operations are the responsibility of the 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing and the Wing performs functions that are normal for major Air Force bases. However these same functions are not the standard at Army Airfields, and the expertise to meet those standards is not the norm because the Army does not routinely support major aircraft operations such as those required at Pope AFB and most other major AMC bases. A few examples are listed that are Air Force unique functions:

## SECTION 4: AIRFIELD CONSIDERATIONS

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The Air Force has time tested standardization/evaluation functions at the Wing, MAJCOM, and AF levels with regular scheduled inspections and certification of airfield facilities and functions.

Air Traffic Control operates from the Pope tower 24 hours a day, seven days a week and aircraft operate throughout this period. Air Force trained and FAA certified air traffic controllers are also used for radar approaches, departures and controlling traffic in the local area. Trained and certified personnel in base operations work on a daily basis with the FAA, reviewing and filing flight plans and coordinating flights.

Fire fighting personnel are specially trained, and equipment is specially designed to suppress aircraft fires and rescue crewmembers, and specifically at Pope AFB they receive additional training for firefighting support for large aircraft and for dealing with hazardous cargo and munitions. Munitions load crews are trained on all types of AF aircraft, and are certified for various types of equipment and loads. Munitions storage areas on Pope AFB and Fort Bragg are utilized when munitions are loaded and deployed to support combat operations.

Ice and snow removal equipment was purchased by the wing to keep the runway open at all times and under all conditions. Rapid runway repair is a specialty function required by the Air Force to maintain the runway in operational status and rapidly repair damages to operational status. The Wing's Civil Engineer squadron provides airfield and facility support, and sets a high priority on maintaining and upgrading the airfield. The 43<sup>rd</sup> Logistics Group maintains parts and provides logistical support for PAA and visiting aircraft. The 43<sup>rd</sup> Maintenance Group maintains Wing assigned aircraft and supports repair for visiting aircraft. The Airlift Wing annual budget includes a significant investment for airfield maintenance and repair. Long-term upgrades, such as munitions load areas, fire fighting training facilities, and new staging areas receive high priority in the five-year plan and also receive strong congressional support. All these considerations are the 'norm' for the Air Force in sustainment of its base infrastructure and therefore efficiencies are gained through similar requirements at its numerous airfields.

The demands of maintaining Pope to its current standards would be unique to the Army and the Army's priorities and budgeting for airfield support have not been set at the same levels and have not been realized at other Army Airfields. Also, the Army simply does not have the institutional expertise within its service that the Air Force does at maintaining airfield operations and support facilities to a standard necessary to meet short notice surge operations as for a crisis response, or long-term high optempo strategic deployment operations as we saw during Operation Desert Storm. Army airfields traditionally operate to support army aviation assets, consisting primarily of helicopter and light aircraft. The Army does not have a mission to support strategic airlift and army airfields do not have an organic capability to support this mission. The Army should not be required to support the airlift mission and doing so would be a duplication of roles and missions. Failure to support the airlift mission would result in mission degradation.

## **SECTION 4: AIRFIELD CONSIDERATIONS**

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### **4C: Airlift Wing Support for Airfield Operations**

The following list of functions is included to provide a scope of the responsibilities inherent to operating, maintaining and supporting airfield operations. Over 6,000 personnel are assigned to the 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing, and the majority of these functions are managed by flights or squadrons.

Planning Section: Operations, Inspections, Anti-terrorism, Scheduling and Documentation  
Rapid Runway Repair section  
Damage Control Center  
Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
Communications squadron  
Munitions load Flight  
Fire Protection Flight  
Liquid Fuels  
Facilities Manager  
Wing FOD Manager  
Aerospace Ground Equipment  
Avionics  
Engines, Fuels and Pseudraulics  
Structural Maintenance  
Aircraft Schedulers  
Resource Advisors  
Logistics support: Disaster Preparation; Environmental Coordinator; Plans and Mobility  
Maintenance: Repair and Reclamation; Aircraft wheel and tire  
Material support  
Test cell  
Fabrication: Metal technology, NDI, refurbishment, structural maintenance  
Survival equipment  
Sortie generation  
Enroute Operations: mission scheduler, superintendents, loadmasters, QA  
Life support: equipment and oxygen sections  
ATC: flight planning  
Airfield manager: Air Traffic Control, Tower, GCA  
Range scheduling  
Intelligence section  
Weather section  
Combat readiness and resources  
Aerial Delivery: parachute rigging, fabrication and chute shop  
Air Terminal Operations Center

### **4D: Supporting Information and Graphics**

(Supporting information follows.)



# POPE OVERVIEW

| As of  | 30 Sep 2005   | 30 Sep 2011     |
|--|---------------|-----------------|
| <b>Assigned Weapon System Type(s) (MDS)</b>    | <b>C-130E</b> | <b>C-130E/J</b> |
| <b>Total PAA</b>                               | <b>28</b>     | <b>28</b>       |
| <b># Flying Squadrons</b>                      | <b>2</b>      | <b>2</b>        |
| <b>Total Available Aircraft Parking Spaces</b> | <b>30</b>     | <b>30</b>       |
| <b>Unused Aircraft Parking Spaces</b>          | <b>7</b>      | <b>7</b>        |
| <b>Template Used</b>                           | <b>C-130J</b> |                 |
| <b>Standard PAA Per Squadron</b>               | <b>16</b>     |                 |



# POPE OVERVIEW (CONT'D)

## TENANT FLYING UNITS

|                     | As of   | 30 Sep 2005 |                       | 30 Sep 2011 |                       |
|---------------------|---------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| Tenant Flying Unit  | Type AC | # Aircraft  | # Parking Spaces Used | # Aircraft  | # Parking Spaces Used |
| ACC Fighter Unit    | A-10    | 36          | 36                    | 36          | 36                    |
| Army Golden Knights | C-31    | 2           | 5                     | 2           | 5                     |
|                     | UV-18   | 2           |                       | 2           |                       |
|                     | UV-20   | 1           |                       | 1           |                       |
| Various Other Units | C-208   | 2           | 6                     | 2           | 6                     |
|                     | PC-6    | 1           |                       | 1           |                       |
|                     | CN-235  | 1           |                       | 1           |                       |
|                     | DHC-6   | 1           |                       | 1           |                       |
|                     | T-34    | 1           |                       | 1           |                       |



# POPE

## ESTIMATED CAPACITY AFTER 2011

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|  |                 |
|--|-----------------|
| <b>Weapon System Type (MDS)</b>                                | <b>C-130</b>    |
| <b>Maximum Operational Capacity<br/>(With A-10s Assigned)</b>  | <b>32 PAA</b>   |
| <b>Maximum Operational Capacity<br/>(With A-10s Relocated)</b> | <b>64 PAA *</b> |

**\*Leaves 80,000 SY of unused ramp space on former A-10 Ramp to support Joint requirements**

**OUTLOAD ENHANCEMENT PLAN  
FORT BRAGG'S ARMY STRATEGIC  
MOBILITY PROGRAM**

| <b>PHASE</b> | <b>DESCRIPTION</b>        | <b>COST</b> | <b>Program<br/>Year</b> | <b>Projected<br/>Completion</b> |
|--------------|---------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1a.          | A/DACG Staging Complex    | \$13.2M     | 1996                    | 2Q99                            |
| 1b.          | A/DACG Staging Complex    | \$29.0M     | 1999                    | 4Q02                            |
| 2.           | Hvy Drop Rigging Facility | \$30.0M     | 2000                    | 4Q02                            |
| 3.           | Ammunition Holding Area   | \$15.0M     | 2001                    | 4Q03                            |
| 4.           | POL Storage Complex       | \$17.5M     | 2003                    | 2Q05                            |
| 5            | Central Marshalling Area  | \$13.5M     | 2008                    | 3Q10                            |

## SECTION 5: BRAC COORDINATION BREAKDOWN

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The BRAC coordination process for this proposal broke down between the Joint Cross Steering Group, the Army and the Air Force. This was especially evident in the last few weeks before the DOD BRAC announcements. There was no apparent planning or coordination on the part of the Army to take over airfield operations and support operations as they are today. The Army did not prepare cost or manpower analysis for maintaining and operating the airfield.

From all documents reviewed, it appears that the Army was planning on Fort Bragg and Pope AFB to become Joint Base Bragg-Pope from the first time it surfaced as an option by the HSA JCSG. Joint Base Bragg-Pope was carried as an approved recommendation by the HSA JCSG up to and including the 29 March 2005 meeting. We have to assume that 'approved' means that the recommendation had been addressed and supported by both services and the Joint Staff.

On those same HSA JCSG slides, it relocates FORSCOM headquarters from Ft. McPherson to 'Pope AFB'. Therefore, it is logical that when the JCSG says 'Joint Base', that it means both services continue to be represented and both services continue to execute their operational responsibilities, and only the administrative and facility support functions (facility maintenance, health care, MWR, PX/BX, commissary, etc.) would be consolidated under a single service for efficiency.

The 26 April 2005 HSA JCSG slides delete Joint Base Bragg-Pope, however the Army continued to represent their BRAC planning in terms of a Joint Base. The Army BRAC 2005 analyses and recommendations released in May 2005 state that:

"Through coordination with and the leadership of the HSA JCSG the Army developed recommendations to collocate headquarters at joint campuses...by relocating the Headquarters, Forces Command (FORSCOM) to Pope AFB, NC."

Additionally, The Army Basing Study (TABS), which provided guidance to the Army installations on preparation to execute the BRAC recommendations and was also released in May, 2005 states the following:

- US Forces Command and US Army Reserve Command to Pope AFB.
- Transfer real property and ownership of Pope AFB to the Army and Fort Bragg, NC. The Air Force will realign various operational units from Pope AFB to other bases. A C-130 unit and approximately 1800 personnel will remain. This will establish a more efficient Joint Base.
- We also anticipate an increase in our garrison staff and some support organizations. The garrison functions and the medical functions of Pope will fall under Fort Bragg. (Note it does not say the operation of the airbase)
- Fort Bragg will become a consolidated, joint installation under Army control.

## SECTION 5: BRAC COORDINATION BREAKDOWN

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We have found no Army generated COBRA data that addresses their expectations of assuming the operational costs of sustaining Pope's infrastructure or OPTEMPO dollars for runway and ramp repairs/sutainment or military construction.

The Army is now assessing the cost of operating Pope AFB as an Army airfield. They do not intend to operate it at the current level of operations, or at a level to support large-scale contingency operations. The Army does not inherently provide these functions and has relied on the Air Force to provide airlift and maintain and operate airfields supporting airlift operations. The Army does not have the personnel, equipment, training or expertise to maintain or operate the airfield to the standards necessary to fully support combat operations, strategic airlift or large-scale crisis reactions. Failure to operate the airfield as it operates today will degrade the capability of the installation to provide strategic airlift, support contingency operations and provide airborne training with C-130s.

## **SECTION 6**

### **Military Value Analysis**

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This section discusses the Military Value analysis and the weighting and formulas used to determine the MCI.

Section 6 includes:

- 6A: AF Process and Criteria Weighting
- 6B: Military Capability Index Scoring
- 6C: MCI Formula Analysis
- 6D: Supporting Information

## SECTION 6: MILITARY VAUE ANALYSIS

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### 6A: AF Analytical Process and Criteria Weighting

According to the Air Force BRAC Report, the Air Force base analysis was shaped by three principles: military value, both quantitative and qualitative, was the primary factor; all installations were treated equally; and installation military value was determined not only on a base's current mission but also on its capacity to support other core missions. Certified data was derived from the individual installations and the BCEG assigned weighing guidance that was used in formulas to establish an MCI. Each installation received a separate MCI for each of the eight mission areas: fighter; bomber; tanker; airlift; special operation/combat search and rescue; command and control/intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (C2ISR); unmanned aerial vehicles; and space control. Active and Reserve Component installations were considered on an equal basis and were rank ordered on their relative ability to support the eight AF mission areas.

This appears to be a fair process, however the scoring criteria is heavily weighted for bases with long runways, room for expansion and capability to support multiple missions. Selection Criteria #1 (Current and Future Mission) accounted for 54.3 percent of the total score; Selection Criteria #2 (Condition of Infrastructure) was 33.2 percent; Selection Criteria #3 (Contingency, Mobilization and Future Force) was 10 percent; and Selection Criteria #4 (Cost of Operations/Manpower) was 2.5 percent. Even if Pope AFB received maximum points in Contingency, Mobilization and Future Force, it only accounted for ten percent of the Military Value of the base. Bases that did not score well in the categories including runway dimensions and distance from low level routes and airspace, which was applied to all eight mission areas, scored lower in total ranking, which provided quantitative justification for closure or realignment.

### 6B: Military Capability Index Scoring

Pope AFB's primary mission is to support airlift operations for the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division and Special Operations Forces at Fort Bragg, which is specifically addressed in Selection Criteria # 3. It is not intended to support Bomber, Space Operations or C2ISR. The Air Force only weighted SC #3 as ten percent of the total MCI for each mission area. So, although Pope AFB's MCI for SOF/CSAR was first out of 154 installations and the MCI for Airlift was third, it did not meet criteria in other mission areas to score well overall. As an example, Pope AFB scored zero points in four mission areas because the runway was 500 feet shorter than the minimum runway criteria for any points in these mission areas. The primary runway at Pope AFB is 7,500 feet long, with 1,000 feet overruns on both ends, and the runway criteria for Fighter, Bomber, SOF and C2ISR mission areas resulted in zero points awarded for the runway. The formula disregarded that the runway is adequate to support Fighter and SOF operations on a regular basis, that A-10s, F-16s and C-130s were stationed at Pope AFB for years, and the base is used regularly by tankers and strategic airlift aircraft. In the Air Force formulas, runways shorter than 8,000 feet received zero points in the MCI assessment.

## **SECTION 6: MILITARY VAUE ANALYSIS**

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### **6C: MCI Formula Analysis**

Pope AFB scored low in other mission areas due to criteria that was not applicable to the mission and due to formulas that were applied across the board to all mission areas. Selection criteria #3 was scored low (less than 50%) in most mission areas for Pope AFB, although it scored 100% in 7 of the 8 mission areas (Space Ops did not have a runway category) for its ability to support large-scale mobility deployment. However, this area was only 1.2 to 2.2 maximum points out of 100. The low scores in SC#3 were due to zero points awarded for "Buildable acres for Industrial Operations and Air Operations growth", which was worth almost double the ability to support large-scale mobility deployment. In Selection Criteria #1, proximity to low level routes was weighted from 13.98 to 39.1 maximum points. The Air Force weighted "proximity to airspace supporting the mission" from ten to twenty times more important than "ability to support large-scale mobility deployment" in all mission areas.

The formulas used in this process did not account for Pope AFB's unique power projection role and did not consider the proposal to establish a Joint Base Bragg/Pope. Considering these factors would have resulted in a much higher MCI score. These inconsistencies indicate that the weighting factors and scoring criteria did not accurately reflect the military value of Pope AFB or for different and unique military installations.

### **6D: Supporting Information**

Supporting information follows.

| Base                               | Airlift MCI       |                                   |                                    |   |                               |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------|
|                                    | Overall MCI Score | Crit 1 Current and Future Mission | Crit 2 Condition of Infrastructure | Crit 3 Contingency Mobilization Future Forces | Crit 4 Cost of Ops / Manpower |
| Maxwell AFB                        | 59.90             | 70.78                             | 55.31                              | 22.48   | 85.68                         |
| McChord AFB                        | 57.95             | 49.64                             | 71.78                              | 38.95   | 57.08                         |
| McConnell AFB                      | 54.65             | 45.85                             | 65.92                              | 43.00   | 75.83                         |
| McEntire AGS                       | 59.35             | 71.70                             | 49.85                              | 35.48   | 85.19                         |
| McGee Tyson APT AGS                | 48.32             | 47.96                             | 51.87                              | 25.79   | 86.02                         |
| McGuire AFB                        | 51.80             | 39.42                             | 62.51                              | 67.95   | 37.26                         |
| Memphis IAP AGS                    | 48.01             | 50.94                             | 45.72                              | 37.17   | 75.57                         |
| Minn/St Paul IAP ARS               | 41.52             | 32.19                             | 52.63                              | 36.80   | 47.69                         |
| Minot AFB                          | 54.34             | 39.70                             | 65.42                              | 70.91   | 73.42                         |
| Moffett Federal Field AGS          | 33.14             | 40.10                             | 31.66                              | 11.59   | 15.79                         |
| Moody AFB                          | 51.72             | 52.29                             | 41.64                              | 81.05   | 91.37                         |
| Mountain Home AFB                  | 59.77             | 46.58                             | 68.64                              | 81.35   | 68.58                         |
| NAS New Orleans ARS                | 41.65             | 46.93                             | 39.81                              | 17.20   | 72.63                         |
| Nashville IAP AGS                  | 39.77             | 48.71                             | 27.61                              | 39.33   | 78.64                         |
| Nellis AFB                         | 63.95             | 59.85                             | 72.31                              | 53.08   | 43.94                         |
| New Castle County Airport AGS      | 36.96             | 48.83                             | 28.33                              | 15.48   | 47.53                         |
| Niagara Falls IAP ARS              | 40.03             | 35.85                             | 43.28                              | 41.92   | 55.66                         |
| Offutt AFB                         | 47.07             | 43.55                             | 49.10                              | 48.25   | 73.20                         |
| Onizuka AFS                        | 3.09              | 0.00                              | 4.00                               | 10.08   | 16.85                         |
| Otis AGB                           | 38.95             | 36.97                             | 36.90                              | 55.82   | 42.04                         |
| Patrick AFB                        | 42.23             | 47.00                             | 32.91                              | 52.75   | 66.83                         |
| Pease International Trade Port AGS | 46.65             | 43.72                             | 52.48                              | 39.09   | 33.80                         |
| Peterson AFB                       | 57.20             | 58.40                             | 59.78                              | 39.75   | 61.91                         |
| Phoenix Sky Harbor IAP AGS         | 48.12             | 53.14                             | 45.21                              | 32.12   | 68.42                         |
| Pittsburgh IAP AGS                 | 44.85             | 36.28                             | 55.13                              | 35.53   | 69.30                         |
| Pittsburgh IAP ARS                 | 39.64             | 36.28                             | 42.44                              | 36.01   | 69.59                         |
| Pope AFB                           | 69.99             | 71.21                             | 73.40                              | 46.19   | 86.08                         |
| Portland IAP AGS                   | 42.32             | 46.23                             | 37.58                              | 39.48   | 60.13                         |
| Quonset State APT AGS              | 35.29             | 40.77                             | 29.32                              | 33.62   | 40.59                         |
| Randolph AFB                       | 49.20             | 43.66                             | 51.76                              | 56.76   | 78.51                         |
| Reno-Tahoe IAP AGS                 | 40.51             | 44.93                             | 39.29                              | 23.44   | 47.47                         |
| Richmond IAP AGS                   | 42.64             | 53.44                             | 35.69                              | 13.67   | 75.18                         |
| Rickenbacker IAP AGS               | 50.04             | 45.27                             | 61.23                              | 20.26   | 71.11                         |
| Robins AFB                         | 63.89             | 52.22                             | 71.87                              | 78.50   | 87.45                         |
| Rome Laboratory                    | 4.92              | 0.00                              | 4.00                               | 16.80   | 63.10                         |
| Rosecrans Memorial APT AGS         | 38.22             | 40.01                             | 32.73                              | 41.97   | 81.65                         |
| Salt Lake City IAP AGS             | 43.99             | 45.47                             | 43.47                              | 32.41   | 71.72                         |
| Savannah IAP AGS                   | 45.10             | 52.68                             | 38.84                              | 26.30   | 84.65                         |
| Schenectady County APT AGS         | 37.72             | 49.21                             | 25.33                              | 30.66   | 60.05                         |
| Schriever AFB                      | 5.78              | 0.00                              | 4.00                               | 27.31   | 55.46                         |
| Scott AFB                          | 44.55             | 39.62                             | 52.04                              | 33.65   | 53.95                         |
| Selfridge ANGB                     | 47.27             | 44.66                             | 52.56                              | 38.56   | 42.51                         |
| Seymour Johnson AFB                | 78.03             | 71.25                             | 83.82                              | 83.34   | 85.03                         |
| Shaw AFB                           | 67.70             | 71.86                             | 59.50                              | 78.12   | 85.64                         |
| Sheppard AFB                       | 55.21             | 60.81                             | 52.33                              | 35.24   | 80.04                         |
| Sioux Gateway APT AGS              | 39.30             | 39.33                             | 37.14                              | 38.03   | 79.98                         |

## 1.4 Airlift

### 1.4.1 Effective Weights (Airlift MCI)

Bold rows indicate OSD military value selection criteria and associated effective weights. Shaded rows indicate Air Force military value attributes and associated effective weights. Rows with no enhancement indicate individual questions with the leading numeric indicating the question number. Question effective weights sum to the attribute above them and attribute effective weights sum to the criterion above them. The criteria (**bold**) sum to 100.

| Name  | Eff. %       |
|---|--------------|
| <b>1 - Current / Future Mission</b>                       | <b>46.00</b> |
| 1 - Operating Environment                                 | 9.20         |
| 1242 - ATC Restrictions to Operations                     | 5.98         |
| 1271 - Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions         | 3.22         |
| <b>2 - Geo-locational Factors</b>                         | <b>36.80</b> |
| 1246 - Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission   | 13.98        |
| 1248 - Proximity to DZ/LZ                                 | 14.72        |
| 1273 - Aerial Port Proximity                              | 8.10         |
| <b>2 - Condition of Infrastructure</b>                    | <b>41.50</b> |
| <b>3 - Key Mission Infrastructure</b>                     | <b>33.20</b> |
| 1 - Fuel Hydrant Systems Support Mission Growth           | 4.32         |
| 8 - Ramp Area and Serviceability                          | 5.98         |
| 9 - Runway Dimension and Serviceability                   | 5.98         |
| 19 - Hangar Capability - Large Aircraft                   | 3.32         |
| 1207 - Level of Mission Encroachment                      | 1.66         |
| 1235 - Installation Pavements Quality                     | 11.95        |
| <b>4 - Operating Areas</b>                                | <b>8.30</b>  |
| 1249 - Airspace Attributes of DZ/LZ                       | 8.30         |
| <b>3 - Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces</b>       | <b>10.00</b> |
| <b>5 - Mobility/Surge</b>                                 | <b>4.40</b>  |
| 1214 - Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge | 2.20         |
| 1241 - Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment | 2.20         |
| <b>6 - Growth Potential</b>                               | <b>5.60</b>  |
| 213 - Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance       | 1.68         |
| 1205.1 - Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth | 1.96         |
| 1205.2 - Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth        | 1.96         |
| <b>4 - Cost of Ops / Manpower</b>                         | <b>2.50</b>  |
| <b>7 - Cost Factors</b>                                   | <b>2.50</b>  |
| 1250 - Area Cost Factor                                   | 1.25         |
| 1269 - Utilities cost rating (U3C)                        | .13          |
| 1402 - BAH Rate   | .88          |
| 1403 - GS Locality Pay Rate                               | .25          |

# USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

## Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB MCI: Airlift

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

### Max Points

This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

### Earned Points

This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

### Lost Points

The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

### Running Score from 100

The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

**Running  
Score  
from  
100**

SC#

|   | Formula  | Max<br>Points | Earned<br>Points | Lost<br>Points | Running<br>Score<br>from<br>100 |
|---|--|---------------|------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|
| 1 | 1246.00 Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission   | 13.98         | 6.51             | 7.47           | 92.53                           |
| 1 | 1273.00 Aerial Port Proximity                              | 8.10          | 4.05             | 4.05           | 88.48                           |
| 2 | 1235.00 Installation Pavements Quality                     | 11.95         | 8.96             | 2.99           | 85.49                           |
| 2 | 9.00 Runway Dimension and Serviceability                   | 5.98          | 3.36             | 2.61           | 82.88                           |
| 2 | 19.00 Hangar Capability - Large Aircraft                   | 3.32          | 0.96             | 2.36           | 80.52                           |
| 3 | 1205.10 Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth   | 1.96          | 0.00             | 1.96           | 78.56                           |
| 3 | 1205.20 Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth          | 1.96          | 0.00             | 1.96           | 76.60                           |
| 1 | 1248.00 Proximity to DZ/LZ                                 | 14.72         | 12.99            | 1.73           | 74.87                           |
| 2 | 8.00 Ramp Area and Serviceability                          | 5.98          | 4.48             | 1.49           | 73.38                           |
| 3 | 1214.00 Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge | 2.20          | 0.74             | 1.46           | 71.92                           |
| 1 | 1249.00 Airspace Attributes of DZ/LZ                       | 8.30          | 7.51             | 0.79           | 71.13                           |
| 2 | 1207.00 Level of Mission Encroachment                      | 1.66          | 0.88             | 0.78           | 70.35                           |
| 4 | 1250.00 Area Cost Factor                                   | 1.25          | 1.05             | 0.20           | 70.15                           |
| 4 | 1402.00 BAH Rate   | 0.88          | 0.78             | 0.10           | 70.05                           |
| 4 | 1269.00 Utilities cost rating (U3C)                        | 0.13          | 0.07             | 0.06           | 69.99                           |
| 2 | 1.00 Fuel Hydrant Systems Support Mission Growth           | 4.32          | 4.32             | 0.00           | 69.99                           |
| 3 | 213.00 Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance       | 1.68          | 1.68             | 0.00           | 69.99                           |
| 3 | 1241.00 Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment | 2.20          | 2.20             | 0.00           | 69.99                           |
| 1 | 1242.00 ATC Restrictions to Operations                     | 5.98          | 5.98             | 0.00           | 69.99                           |
| 1 | 1271.00 Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions         | 3.22          | 3.22             | 0.00           | 69.99                           |
| 4 | 1403.00 GS Locality Pay Rate                               | 0.25          | 0.25             | 0.00           | 69.99                           |

# USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

## Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB MCI: Tanker

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

### Max Points

This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

### Earned Points

This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

### Lost Points

The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

### Running Score from 100

The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

| <u>Formula</u>   | <u>Max Points</u> | <u>Earned Points</u> | <u>Lost Points</u> | <u>Running Score from 100</u> |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1245.00 Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)     | 39.10             | 20.99                | 18.11              | 81.89                         |
| 1235.00 Installation Pavements Quality                     | 14.53             | 9.08                 | 5.45               | 76.44                         |
| 9.00 Runway Dimension and Serviceability                   | 9.55              | 5.25                 | 4.29               | 72.15                         |
| 1214.00 Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge | 3.85              | 1.29                 | 2.56               | 69.59                         |
| 19.00 Hangar Capability - Large Aircraft                   | 3.32              | 0.96                 | 2.36               | 67.23                         |
| 1205.10 Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth   | 1.58              | 0.00                 | 1.58               | 65.65                         |
| 1205.20 Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth          | 1.58              | 0.00                 | 1.58               | 64.07                         |
| 1207.00 Level of Mission Encroachment                      | 2.08              | 1.10                 | 0.98               | 63.09                         |
| 1250.00 Area Cost Factor                                   | 1.25              | 1.05                 | 0.20               | 62.89                         |
| 1402.00 BAH Rate   | 0.88              | 0.78                 | 0.10               | 62.79                         |
| 1269.00 Utilities cost rating (U3C)                        | 0.13              | 0.07                 | 0.06               | 62.73                         |
| 1.00 Fuel Hydrant Systems Support Mission Growth           | 4.15              | 4.15                 | 0.00               | 62.73                         |
| 8.00 Ramp Area and Serviceability                          | 7.89              | 7.89                 | 0.00               | 62.73                         |
| 213.00 Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance       | 1.35              | 1.35                 | 0.00               | 62.73                         |
| 1241.00 Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment | 1.65              | 1.65                 | 0.00               | 62.73                         |
| 1242.00 ATC Restrictions to Operations                     | 6.90              | 6.90                 | 0.00               | 62.73                         |
| 1403.00 GS Locality Pay Rate                               | 0.25              | 0.25                 | 0.00               | 62.73                         |

# USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

## Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB MCI: Bomber

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

### Max Points

This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

### Earned Points

This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

### Lost Points

The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

### Running Score from 100

The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

| <u>Formula</u>   | <u>Max Points</u> | <u>Earned Points</u> | <u>Lost Points</u> | <u>Running Score from 100</u> |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1246.00 Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission   | 16.56             | 8.90                 | 7.66               | 92.34                         |
| 9.00 Runway Dimension and Serviceability                   | 5.52              | 0.00                 | 5.52               | 86.82                         |
| 1235.00 Installation Pavements Quality                     | 4.94              | 1.23                 | 3.70               | 83.12                         |
| 1245.00 Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)     | 20.24             | 16.79                | 3.45               | 79.67                         |
| 19.00 Hangar Capability - Large Aircraft                   | 2.91              | 0.84                 | 2.07               | 77.60                         |
| 1266.00 Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission                | 12.45             | 10.40                | 2.05               | 75.55                         |
| 1231.00 Certified Weapons Storage Area                     | 2.03              | 0.00                 | 2.03               | 73.52                         |
| 1205.10 Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth   | 1.96              | 0.00                 | 1.96               | 71.56                         |
| 1205.20 Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth          | 1.96              | 0.00                 | 1.96               | 69.60                         |
| 1214.00 Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge | 2.64              | 0.89                 | 1.75               | 67.85                         |
| 1207.00 Level of Mission Encroachment                      | 2.03              | 1.07                 | 0.96               | 66.89                         |
| 1250.00 Area Cost Factor                                   | 1.25              | 1.05                 | 0.20               | 66.69                         |
| 1402.00 BAH Rate   | 0.88              | 0.78                 | 0.10               | 66.59                         |
| 1269.00 Utilities cost rating (U3C)                        | 0.13              | 0.07                 | 0.06               | 66.53                         |
| 1.00 Fuel Hydrant Systems Support Mission Growth           | 2.03              | 2.03                 | 0.00               | 66.53                         |
| 8.00 Ramp Area and Serviceability                          | 3.49              | 3.49                 | 0.00               | 66.53                         |
| 213.00 Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance       | 1.68              | 1.68                 | 0.00               | 66.53                         |
| 1232.00 Sufficient Explosives-sited Parking                | 3.20              | 3.20                 | 0.00               | 66.53                         |
| 1233.00 Sufficient Munitions Storage                       | 2.91              | 2.91                 | 0.00               | 66.53                         |
| 1241.00 Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment | 1.76              | 1.76                 | 0.00               | 66.53                         |
| 1242.00 ATC Restrictions to Operations                     | 5.52              | 5.52                 | 0.00               | 66.53                         |
| 1271.00 Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions         | 3.68              | 3.68                 | 0.00               | 66.53                         |
| 1403.00 GS Locality Pay Rate                               | 0.25              | 0.25                 | 0.00               | 66.53                         |

# USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

## Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB MCI: Fighter

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

### Max Points

This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

### Earned Points

This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

### Lost Points

The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

### Running Score from 100

The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

| <u>Formula</u>   | <u>Max Points</u> | <u>Earned Points</u> | <u>Lost Points</u> | <u>Running Score from 100</u> |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1245.00 Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)     | 22.08             | 10.55                | 11.53              | 88.47                         |
| 1246.00 Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission   | 7.25              | 2.47                 | 4.77               | 83.70                         |
| 1203.00 Access to Adequate Supersonic Airspace             | 6.72              | 3.36                 | 3.36               | 80.34                         |
| 1270.00 Suitable Auxiliary Airfields Within 50NM           | 5.18              | 2.59                 | 2.59               | 77.75                         |
| 1266.00 Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission                | 11.95             | 9.43                 | 2.52               | 75.23                         |
| 9.00 Runway Dimension and Serviceability                   | 2.28              | 0.00                 | 2.28               | 72.95                         |
| 1205.10 Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth   | 1.96              | 0.00                 | 1.96               | 70.99                         |
| 1205.20 Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth          | 1.96              | 0.00                 | 1.96               | 69.03                         |
| 1214.00 Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge | 2.64              | 0.89                 | 1.75               | 67.28                         |
| 1207.00 Level of Mission Encroachment                      | 2.28              | 1.21                 | 1.08               | 66.20                         |
| 1250.00 Area Cost Factor                                   | 1.25              | 1.05                 | 0.20               | 66.00                         |
| 1402.00 BAH Rate   | 0.88              | 0.78                 | 0.10               | 65.90                         |
| 1269.00 Utilities cost rating (U3C)                        | 0.13              | 0.07                 | 0.06               | 65.84                         |
| 8.00 Ramp Area and Serviceability                          | 2.97              | 2.97                 | 0.00               | 65.84                         |
| 213.00 Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance       | 1.68              | 1.68                 | 0.00               | 65.84                         |
| 1221.00 Hangar Capability - Small Aircraft                 | 3.88              | 3.88                 | 0.00               | 65.84                         |
| 1232.00 Sufficient Explosives-sited Parking                | 3.65              | 3.65                 | 0.00               | 65.84                         |
| 1233.00 Sufficient Munitions Storage                       | 4.79              | 4.79                 | 0.00               | 65.84                         |
| 1235.00 Installation Pavements Quality                     | 2.97              | 2.97                 | 0.00               | 65.84                         |
| 1241.00 Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment | 1.76              | 1.76                 | 0.00               | 65.84                         |
| 1242.00 ATC Restrictions to Operations                     | 5.98              | 5.98                 | 0.00               | 65.84                         |
| 1271.00 Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions         | 5.52              | 5.52                 | 0.00               | 65.84                         |
| 1403.00 GS Locality Pay Rate                               | 0.25              | 0.25                 | 0.00               | 65.84                         |

# USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

## Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB MCI: SOF / CSAR

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

### Max Points

This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

### Earned Points

This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

### Lost Points

The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

### Running Score from 100

The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

| <u>Formula</u>   | <u>Max<br/>Points</u> | <u>Earned<br/>Points</u> | <u>Lost<br/>Points</u> | <u>Running<br/>Score<br/>from<br/>100</u> |
|--|-----------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---|
| 1245.00 Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)     | 14.72                 | 9.60                     | 5.12                   | 94.88                                     |
| 1266.00 Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission                | 14.84                 | 11.05                    | 3.79                   | 91.09                                     |
| 1246.00 Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission   | 3.68                  | 0.56                     | 3.12                   | 87.97                                     |
| 9.00 Runway Dimension and Serviceability                   | 2.80                  | 0.00                     | 2.80                   | 85.17                                     |
| 1205.10 Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth   | 1.96                  | 0.00                     | 1.96                   | 83.21                                     |
| 1205.20 Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth          | 1.96                  | 0.00                     | 1.96                   | 81.25                                     |
| 1214.00 Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge | 1.76                  | 0.59                     | 1.17                   | 80.08                                     |
| 1207.00 Level of Mission Encroachment                      | 1.49                  | 0.79                     | 0.70                   | 79.38                                     |
| 1243.00 Airfield Elevation                                 | 3.68                  | 3.39                     | 0.29                   | 79.09                                     |
| 1250.00 Area Cost Factor                                   | 1.25                  | 1.05                     | 0.20                   | 78.89                                     |
| 1402.00 BAH Rate   | 0.88                  | 0.78                     | 0.10                   | 78.79                                     |
| 1269.00 Utilities cost rating (U3C)                        | 0.13                  | 0.07                     | 0.06                   | 78.73                                     |
| 8.00 Ramp Area and Serviceability                          | 4.67                  | 4.67                     | 0.00                   | 78.73                                     |
| 213.00 Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance       | 1.68                  | 1.68                     | 0.00                   | 78.73                                     |
| 1232.00 Sufficient Explosives-sited Parking                | 2.24                  | 2.24                     | 0.00                   | 78.73                                     |
| 1233.00 Sufficient Munitions Storage                       | 2.80                  | 2.80                     | 0.00                   | 78.73                                     |
| 1235.00 Installation Pavements Quality                     | 4.67                  | 4.67                     | 0.00                   | 78.73                                     |
| 1241.00 Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment | 2.64                  | 2.64                     | 0.00                   | 78.73                                     |
| 1242.00 ATC Restrictions to Operations                     | 4.14                  | 4.14                     | 0.00                   | 78.73                                     |
| 1248.00 Proximity to DZ/LZ                                 | 14.72                 | 14.72                    | 0.00                   | 78.73                                     |
| 1249.00 Airspace Attributes of DZ/LZ                       | 7.99                  | 7.99                     | 0.00                   | 78.73                                     |
| 1271.00 Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions         | 5.06                  | 5.06                     | 0.00                   | 78.73                                     |
| 1403.00 GS Locality Pay Rate                               | 0.25                  | 0.25                     | 0.00                   | 78.73                                     |

# USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

## Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB

MCI: C2ISR

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

### Max Points

This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

### Earned Points

This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

### Lost Points

The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

### Running Score from 100

The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

| Formula  | Max Points | Earned Points | Lost Points | Running Score from 100 |
|--|------------|---------------|-------------|------------------------|
| 1245.00 Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)     | 29.90      | 16.05         | 13.85       | 86.15                  |
| 9.00 Runway Dimension and Serviceability                   | 9.13       | 0.00          | 9.13        | 77.02                  |
| 19.00 Hangar Capability - Large Aircraft                   | 2.91       | 0.84          | 2.07        | 74.95                  |
| 1235.00 Installation Pavements Quality                     | 16.19      | 14.16         | 2.02        | 72.93                  |
| 1214.00 Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge | 2.80       | 0.94          | 1.86        | 71.07                  |
| 1205.10 Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth   | 1.80       | 0.00          | 1.80        | 69.27                  |
| 1205.20 Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth          | 1.80       | 0.00          | 1.80        | 67.47                  |
| 1207.00 Level of Mission Encroachment                      | 2.08       | 1.10          | 0.98        | 66.49                  |
| 1251.00 Frequency Spectrum Limitations (FSL)               | 8.05       | 7.12          | 0.93        | 65.56                  |
| 1250.00 Area Cost Factor                                   | 1.25       | 1.05          | 0.20        | 65.36                  |
| 1402.00 BAH Rate   | 0.88       | 0.78          | 0.10        | 65.26                  |
| 1269.00 Utilities cost rating (U3C)                        | 0.13       | 0.07          | 0.06        | 65.20                  |
| 1.00 Fuel Hydrant Systems Support Mission Growth           | 2.08       | 2.08          | 0.00        | 65.20                  |
| 8.00 Ramp Area and Serviceability                          | 9.13       | 9.13          | 0.00        | 65.20                  |
| 213.00 Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance       | 2.40       | 2.40          | 0.00        | 65.20                  |
| 1241.00 Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment | 1.20       | 1.20          | 0.00        | 65.20                  |
| 1242.00 ATC Restrictions to Operations                     | 8.05       | 8.05          | 0.00        | 65.20                  |
| 1403.00 GS Locality Pay Rate                               | 0.25       | 0.25          | 0.00        | 65.20                  |

# USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

## Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB MCI: UAV / UCAS

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

### Max Points

This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

### Earned Points

This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

### Lost Points

The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

### Running Score from 100

The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

| <u>Formula</u>   | <u>Max Points</u> | <u>Earned Points</u> | <u>Lost Points</u> | <u>Running Score from 100</u> |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1245.00 Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)     | 20.70             | 15.89                | 4.81               | 95.19                         |
| 1205.10 Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth   | 3.50              | 0.00                 | 3.50               | 91.69                         |
| 1205.20 Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth          | 2.80              | 0.00                 | 2.80               | 88.89                         |
| 1251.00 Frequency Spectrum Limitations (FSL)               | 6.58              | 4.39                 | 2.18               | 86.71                         |
| 1266.00 Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission                | 12.45             | 11.28                | 1.17               | 85.54                         |
| 1207.00 Level of Mission Encroachment                      | 1.45              | 0.77                 | 0.69               | 84.85                         |
| 9.00 Runway Dimension and Serviceability                   | 5.23              | 4.79                 | 0.44               | 84.41                         |
| 1250.00 Area Cost Factor                                   | 1.25              | 1.05                 | 0.20               | 84.21                         |
| 1402.00 BAH Rate   | 0.88              | 0.78                 | 0.10               | 84.11                         |
| 1269.00 Utilities cost rating (U3C)                        | 0.13              | 0.07                 | 0.06               | 84.05                         |
| 8.00 Ramp Area and Serviceability                          | 5.23              | 5.23                 | 0.00               | 84.05                         |
| 213.00 Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance       | 0.70              | 0.70                 | 0.00               | 84.05                         |
| 1232.00 Sufficient Explosives-sited Parking                | 5.81              | 5.81                 | 0.00               | 84.05                         |
| 1233.00 Sufficient Munitions Storage                       | 5.81              | 5.81                 | 0.00               | 84.05                         |
| 1235.00 Installation Pavements Quality                     | 5.52              | 5.52                 | 0.00               | 84.05                         |
| 1241.00 Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment | 3.00              | 3.00                 | 0.00               | 84.05                         |
| 1242.00 ATC Restrictions to Operations                     | 6.33              | 6.33                 | 0.00               | 84.05                         |
| 1271.00 Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions         | 3.29              | 3.29                 | 0.00               | 84.05                         |
| 1272.00 Installation Crosswind Conditions                  | 9.11              | 9.11                 | 0.00               | 84.05                         |
| 1403.00 GS Locality Pay Rate                               | 0.25              | 0.25                 | 0.00               | 84.05                         |

# USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

## Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB MCI: Space Ops

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

### Max Points

This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

### Earned Points

This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

### Lost Points

The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

### Running Score from 100

The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

| <u>Formula</u>   | <u>Max<br/>Points</u> | <u>Earned<br/>Points</u> | <u>Lost<br/>Points</u> | <u>Running<br/>Score<br/>from<br/>100</u> |
|--|-----------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---|
| 30.00 Buildable Acres (Space Mission Bed Down Area)      | 41.50                 | 9.56                     | 31.94                  | 68.06                                     |
| 1210.00 Line-of-Sight Encroachment                       | 23.00                 | 7.59                     | 15.41                  | 52.65                                     |
| 1205.10 Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth | 7.00                  | 0.00                     | 7.00                   | 45.65                                     |
| 1250.00 Area Cost Factor                                 | 1.25                  | 1.05                     | 0.20                   | 45.45                                     |
| 1402.00 BAH Rate   | 0.88                  | 0.78                     | 0.10                   | 45.35                                     |
| 1269.00 Utilities cost rating (U3C)                      | 0.13                  | 0.07                     | 0.06                   | 45.29                                     |
| 213.00 Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance     | 3.00                  | 3.00                     | 0.00                   | 45.29                                     |
| 1226.00 Population Density Impact on USAF Mission        | 23.00                 | 23.00                    | 0.00                   | 45.29                                     |
| 1403.00 GS Locality Pay Rate                             | 0.25                  | 0.25                     | 0.00                   | 45.29                                     |

**Final Selection Criteria**  
**Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment**

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

***Military Value***


1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

***Other Considerations***

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.
7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities.

## Introduction

Part 2 to the Air Force report contains detailed information on military value analysis, criteria 6-8 considerations, and capacity. Chapter 1 contains question-level detail for each of the eight Mission Compatibility Indices the Air Force used in military value analysis. This section includes the question, metrics, and formulas used to derive military value ratings for the bases. Chapters 2 and 3 contain criteria 6-8 and capacity considerations not presented elsewhere in OSD or Air Force submissions.



# Department of the Air Force

## *Summary of Selection Process*

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### **Introduction**

The Secretary of Defense, in initiating the BRAC 2005 effort, established the following goals:

- Transform the current and future force and its support systems to meet new threats,
- Eliminate excess physical capacity,
- Rationalize the base infrastructure with the new defense strategy,
- Maximize both warfighting capability and efficiency, and
- Examine opportunities for joint activities.

Consistent with these goals, the Secretary of the Air Force established the following four goals to support right-sizing the force and enhancing its capabilities through BRAC 2005:

- Transform by maximizing the warfighting capability of each squadron,
- Transform by realigning Air Force infrastructure with the future defense strategy,
- Maximize operational capability by eliminating excess physical capacity, and
- Capitalize on opportunities for joint activity.

### **Strategy**

The Air Force strategy for BRAC 2005 was to consolidate and right-size operational and support units and in the process reduce excess infrastructure and capacity. This strategy was dictated by two primary dynamics. First, over the 20-year period of the force structure plan (FSP), the Service's combat force will become smaller, even as it becomes more capable. Older weapons systems are being replaced by more capable platforms on a less than one-for-one basis. Second, the current force is organized in too many small, less than optimal sized operational units.

BRAC offered the Air Force the opportunity to rebase its current force to increase its combat capability and efficiency, while preparing to integrate new weapons systems into the Service during the 20-year period of the FSP. Concurrently, this rebasing strategy ensured that the restructured force provided capabilities to support the new defense strategy; increased overall efficiency by eliminating excess plant capacity; retained those Air Force bases that, by virtue of location or other difficult to reconstitute attributes, had the highest military value; supported joint basing initiatives where feasible; and generated savings within a reasonable period.

## **Selection Process**

The Air Force BRAC analysis was grounded in the 20-year Force Structure Plan, the Service's facility inventory, and the BRAC selection criteria. In developing its recommendations, the Air Force base analysis was shaped by three underlying rules:

- Military value, both quantitative and qualitative, was the primary factor;
- All installations were treated equally; and
- Installation military value was determined not only on a base's current mission but also on its capacity to support other core missions.

The Secretary of the Air Force chartered the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) to advise and assist him in developing BRAC recommendations. The BCEG comprised 12 senior military and civilian executives.

## **Capacity Analysis**

The Air Force estimated the theoretical capacity of each installation using data collected from its installations, other data available at Headquarters Air Force, and weapons system templates provided by the Air Force Major Commands. These templates detailed operational and support capabilities required to host the major weapons systems.

This capacity information, along with other inputs, was used in the Air Force Cueing Tool (the cueing tool is a Binary Integer Goal Programming tool) identify an optimal set of bases to support a specified force.

## **Military Value Analysis**

The Service assessed the military value of its operational bases using certified data derived from individual installations. Rather than focus on fungible attributes like assigned personnel or relocatable equipment and forces, the military value assessment stressed installation characteristics that were either immutable or outside the control of the Air Force or were difficult to replicate elsewhere due to expense or complexity. Immutable characteristics include geographic location and proximity to other physical features or defense activities, terrain, and prevailing weather. Difficult-to-reconstitute characteristics include the installation's transportation infrastructure, missile silos, or basic airfield infrastructure.

Applying operational capability data collected through a web-based installation data gathering and entry tool to BRAC Selection Criteria 1-4 and the weighing guidance assigned by the BCEG, each of the Air Force's 154 installations was given a Mission Capability Index (MCI). For a given installation, there was a separate MCI for each of the eight mission areas (fighter, bomber, tanker, airlift, special operation / combat search and rescue, intelligence / surveillance / reconnaissance, unmanned aerial vehicles, and space control).

Ultimately, using these data to assess all Active and Reserve Component installations on an equal basis, all installations were rank ordered on their relative ability to support the eight Air

meet contingency needs, and the maximum potential capacity at each location. Once the data call questions were completed, they were forwarded to the field by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. Each group evaluated capacity analysis responses to identify opportunities for efficiency and effectiveness.

### **Military Value Analysis (Criteria 1-4)**

As required by statute, the military value of an installation or activity was the primary consideration in developing the Department's recommendations for base realignments and closures. The Department determined that military value had two components: a quantitative component and a qualitative component. The qualitative component is the exercise of military judgment and experience to ensure rational application of the criteria. This component is discussed further in the context of scenario analysis. The quantitative component, explained in greater detail below, assigns attributes, metrics, and weights to the selection criteria to arrive at a relative scoring of facilities within assigned functions.

To arrive at a quantitative military value score, the proponents began by identifying attributes, or characteristics, for each criterion. The proponents then weighted attributes to reflect their relative importance based upon things such as their military judgment or experience, the Secretary of Defense's transformational guidance, and BRAC principles. A set of metrics was subsequently developed to measure these attributes. These were also weighted to reflect relative importance, again using, for example, military judgment, transformational guidance, and BRAC principles. Once attributes had been identified and weighted, the proponent developed questions for use in military value data calls. If more than one question was required to assess a given metric, these were also weighted. Each analytical proponent prepared a scoring plan, and data call questions were forwarded to the field. These plans established how answers to data call questions were to be evaluated and scored. With the scoring plans in place, the Military Departments and JCSGs completed their military value data calls. These were then forwarded to the field by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. The analytical proponents input the certified data responses into the scoring plans to arrive at a numerical score and a relative quantitative military value ranking of facilities/installations against their peers.

### **Scenario Development**


With capacity and military value analyses complete, the Military Departments and JCSGs then began an iterative process to identify potential closure and realignment scenarios. These scenarios were developed using either a data-driven optimization model or strategy-driven approaches. Each approach relied heavily on the military judgment and experience of analytical proponents.

The optimization models used by proponents incorporated capacity and military value analysis results and force structure capabilities to identify scenarios that maximized military value and minimized the amount of capacity retained. These models were also used to explore options that minimized the number of sites required to accommodate a particular function or maximized potential savings. As data results were analyzed, additional scenario options were evaluated.

- **Intelligence.** The Department needs intelligence capabilities to support the National Military Strategy by delivering predictive analyses, warning of impending crises, providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving horizontal integration of networks and databases.

## Analytical Process

During the BRAC 2005 process, the Military Departments and JCSGs followed a series of related, but separate analyses. These basic steps were capacity analysis, military value analysis, scenario development, and scenario analysis. Using these analytical elements, each proponent tailored its procedures to analyze its assigned installations and activities. The chart below provides a summary of this process.



### Key Aspects of Process

| <u>CAPACITY</u> | <u>MILITARY VALUE</u>    | <u>SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT</u>    | <u>SCENARIO ANALYSIS</u>  |
|-----------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| Inventory       | Selection Criteria 1 - 4 | • 20-year force structure plan | • Selection Criterion 5 – Potential Costs & Savings (COBRA)       |
| • What          | • What's important       | • Capacity Analysis            | • Criteria 6, 7, 8 – Economic, Community, & Environmental Impacts |
| • Where         | • How to measure         | • Military Value Analysis      |   |
| • How Big       | • How to weight          | • Transformational ideas       |   |
| • Usage         | • Rank order             | • Guiding principles           |   |
| • Surge         |                          |                                |   |

## Capacity Analysis

To maximize warfighting capabilities and the efficiency of the current domestic infrastructure, each Military Department and JCSG began its analysis by determining the capacity of the installations and activities within its purview. The intent of this analysis was to develop a comprehensive inventory based upon certified data that included both physical capacity (buildings, runways, maneuver acres, etc.) and operational capacity (workload or throughput). Each proponent prepared a comprehensive capacity data call to meet its requirements. The groups' task was to determine which bases and sites performed each function, how the physical and operational capacity at those installations was being used, whether surge capabilities would

## SECTION 7: COST ANALYSIS

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The OSD BRAC report lists cost assessment for the Pope AFB realignment proposal for one-time costs of (\$218.1 million), with net implementation savings of \$652.5 million, and net annual savings of \$197.0 million. The projected payback is immediate and the 20-year net present value savings is projected as \$2,515.4 million. These figures do not appear to reflect the cost of continuing to operate the installation, although these costs will be transferred to the Army. The BRAC statute requires that BRAC cost assessments reflect any cost that will be transferred to a DOD or non-DOD entity to be reflected in the cost analysis.

*Costs for  
Army not  
considered*

The Army was not expecting to operate the base and did not develop cost figures for this area. The actual costs for the Army to operate the airfield and maintain the facilities and equipment can be expected to be higher than with the Air Force operating the installation. With 154 installations, the Air Force has developed efficiencies and expertise in operating Air Force bases. The Army has a handful of large army airfields located on Army installations, none of which handle the volume or profile of aircraft that fly out of Pope annually nor the crisis response requirements of Pope. The Army does not have the inherent expertise, learned efficiencies or specialized equipment required to operate a major airfield such as Pope. They will need to build this capability, which will take time and additional expense. It will be more expensive for the Army to maintain and operate Pope AFB to the same level of standards and operations that currently exist, than for the Air Force to continue to operate these functions.

activation of forces enhances military value and training capabilities by locating Special Operations Forces (SOF) in locations that best support Joint specialized training needs, and by creating needed space for the additional brigade at Fort Bragg. This recommendation is consistent with, and supports the Army's Force Structure Plan submitted with the FY 06 budget, and provides the necessary capacity and capability (including surge) to support the units affected by this action.

- This recommendation never pays back. However, the benefits of enhancing Joint training opportunities coupled with the positive impact of freeing up needed training space and reducing cost of the new BCT by approximately \$54-\$148M (with family housing) at Fort Bragg for the Army's Modular Force transformation, justify the additional costs to the Department.

### **COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD**

#### **Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina**

- One-Time Costs: \$218.1 million
- Net Savings during Implementation: \$652.5 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$197.0 million
- Return on Investment Year: 2006 (0)
- Net Present Value over 20 Years (Savings): \$2,515.4 million

#### **Fort Bragg, North Carolina**

- One-Time Costs: \$334.8 million
- Net Savings during Implementation: \$446.1 million
- Annual Recurring Costs: \$ 23.8 million
- Return on Investment Year: None
- Net Present Value over 20 Years (Costs): \$639.2 million

#### **Total**

- One-Time Costs: \$552.9 million
- Net Savings during Implementation: \$1,098.6 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$173.2 million
- Return on Investment Year:
- Net Present Value over 20 Years (Savings): \$1,876.2 million

infrastructure by increasing the number of aircraft per fighter squadron but could also save millions of dollars annually.<sup>14</sup>

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## Issues Identified with Approved Recommendations

Time did not permit us to assess the operational impact of each recommendation, particularly where recommendations involve multiple locations. Nonetheless, we offer a number of broad-based observations about the proposed recommendations and selected observations on some individual recommendations. Our analysis of the Air Force recommendations identified some issues that the BRAC Commission may wish to consider, such as the projected savings from military personnel reductions; impact on the Air National Guard, impact on other federal agencies; and other issues related to the realignments of Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina; Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska; and Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota and the closure of Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota.

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## Military Personnel Savings

Our analysis showed that about \$732 million, or about 60 percent, of the projected \$1.2 billion net annual recurring savings are based on savings from eliminating military personnel positions. Initially, the Air Force counted only military personnel savings that resulted in a decrease in end strength. However, at the direction of OSD, the Air Force included savings for all military personnel positions that were made available through realignment or closure recommendations. The Air Force was unable to provide us documentation showing at the present time to what extent each of these positions will be required to support future missions. According to Air Force officials, they envision that most active slots will be needed for formal training, and all the Air Reserve and Air National Guard personnel will be assigned to stressed career fields and emerging missions. Furthermore, Air Force officials said that positions will also be reviewed during the Quadrennial Defense Review, which could decrease end strength. Either way, claiming such personnel as BRAC savings without reducing end strength does not provide dollar savings that can be reapplied outside personnel accounts and could result in the Air Force having to find other sources of funding for up-front investment costs needed to implement its BRAC recommendations.

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<sup>14</sup> GAO, *Air Force Aircraft: Consolidating Fighter Squadrons Could Reduce Costs*, GAO/NSIAD-96-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 1996).

Coast Guard could be affected if the base was closed, their cost and savings analysis did not consider any costs that could be incurred by the Coast Guard. Air Force officials stated they didn't have access to credible cost data during the BRAC process since cost estimates would have been speculative; the Air Force could not assume the final disposition of the facility and how much, if any, of the facility the Coast Guard would opt to retain. The Coast Guard is in the process of developing potential basing alternatives, to include costs impacts, for each affected location. Subsequent to the recommendations being made public, the Coast Guard estimated that they would incur about \$17 million in additional annual operating costs to remain at Otis Air National Guard Base.

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### Realignment of Selected Active Bases

The realignment of Pope Air Force Base<sup>20</sup> involves the transfer of 100 percent of the acres and facilities to the Army to become part of Fort Bragg, with a C-130 active/reserve associate unit remaining to support the Army. Our analysis indicates that there is a significant difference between the savings claimed by the Air Force and the costs projected by the Army regarding base operations support, recapitalization, and sustainment for facilities on Pope Air Force Base. For example, the Air Force claimed total net annual recurring savings of about \$36 million for not providing base operations support and recapitalization and sustainment of facilities on Pope Air Force Base. However, the Army estimated total annual recurring costs for these areas to be about \$19.5 million. This estimated cost comprises over \$13 million from the Army as well as over \$5.5 million from the Air Force to remain as tenant at Fort Bragg. According to Army officials, their estimated costs included taking ownership for all facilities on Pope Air Force Base.

The Air Force is also proposing to realign Eielson Air Force Base by moving all active duty units, leaving the Air National Guard units, and hiring contractors to provide base operating support and maintenance and repair of the facilities. The Air Force projects this action would produce a 20-year net present value savings of \$2.8 billion, the most of any Air Force recommendation. Air Force officials said the decision to realign Eielson was made because of the high cost of operating the base and its value as major training site. The officials noted that the realignment will enable the Air Force to expand an annual training exercise as well as provide

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<sup>20</sup> The Pope Air Force Base recommendation includes the closure of Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station and the realignment of Yeager Air Guard Station and Little Rock Air Force Base.

## SECTION 8: WORKFORCE CONSIDERATIONS

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### COMMUNITY LABOR CAPACITY

At the Base Realignment and Closure hearing in Atlanta, a Georgia representative questioned the ability of the Fayetteville, North Carolina area to fulfill the labor force needs associated with the proposed relocation of U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army Reserve Command to Ft. Bragg/Pope Air Force Base.

This community has a long history of providing the military, government and private sectors with high quality employees at reasonable cost. Several factors have led to this experience.

Fayetteville has a large and growing labor shed from which to draw. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, employers in Cumberland County can draw potential employees from an eleven (11) county area of North Carolina. **The total population within the labor shed is 1,708,144.**

The labor force within commuting distance is 827,377 people. Of that number, approximately 4.7 percent (38,818 people) are currently unemployed.

Significant skills, experience and education exist among the ranks of the unemployed. Some typical office related job titles and the number of people registered for unemployment within those categories in the labor shed area are:

#### MANAGERIAL & ADMINISTRATIVE

|                                      |       |
|--------------------------------------|-------|
| Accountants & auditors               | 5,645 |
| Budget & management systems analysis | 1,137 |
| Purchasing management                | 1,135 |
| Personnel administration             | 1,143 |
| Administrative specializations (NEC) | 3,676 |

#### PROFESSIONAL, PARAPROFESSIONAL & TECHNICAL

|                                    |       |
|------------------------------------|-------|
| Systems analysis & programming     | 1,334 |
| Data communications & networks     | 860   |
| Computer systems technical support | 797   |

#### SECRETARIAL, GENERAL CLERICAL & BOOKKEEPING

|                                       |       |
|---------------------------------------|-------|
| Stenography, typing, filing & related | 5,043 |
| Computing & account recording         | 3,165 |

*Source: North Carolina Employment Security Commission, July 17, 2005*

## **SECTION 8: WORKFORCE COSIDERATIONS**

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The above figures include only those people currently registered with Employment Security. There are no doubt many others who may have given up looking for work or temporarily left the labor force.

Approximately 8,000 people exit the military each year in Cumberland County. Many of these people would like to stay in the area if adequate job opportunities were available. In addition, many of these people may possess skills needed by the headquarters operations.

Approximately 100,000 retired military and military related family members live in the ten county region surrounding Ft. Bragg/Pope Air Force Base. Some of these people may have backgrounds of interest and be interested in working with the new headquarters operations.

Underemployment is a problem in North Carolina. In many cases, people are employed in positions for which they are over-educated or qualified. When jobs open in fields where people can better use their education and training, employers are often swamped with qualified applicants. In Cumberland County alone, over 40,000 people are employed in economic sectors where the average wage is below \$9.50 per hour (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003).

## SECTION 9: CONCLUSION

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The Airlift Wing at Pope AFB and the highly trained and diverse forces at Fort Bragg constitute a valuable and unique power projection capability that cannot be replicated anywhere else in the world. Breaking up this team and transferring Pope AFB to the Army would be a mistake that could affect our country's capability to respond quickly and with overwhelming force to a crisis or contingency. The proposal to realign Pope AFB ignores the value of joint training, joint planning and joint war fighting. It was based on Air Force priorities to consolidate an aging C-130 fleet at another base and transfer to the Army the expense of operating and maintaining the airfield. If the airfield is transferred, the Army will still need to maintain the airfield and perform airfield functions normally performed by the Air Force. Due to the late approval of this proposal by DOD, the Army did not understand or estimate the cost, manpower requirements and complexity of maintaining the airfield and installation at a level consistent with deployment and surge operations. Although the BRAC statute requires costs transferred to other DOD and non-DOD organizations are accounted for, these costs were not reflected in the cost analysis for this proposal.

We are concerned that the analytical process used by the Air Force did not accurately reflect the military value of Pope AFB and the role of the Airlift Wing in supporting joint operations. Although Pope AFB was rated the number one base in the Air Force for supporting Special Operations Forces and Combat Search and Rescue, and number three for supporting airlift, the Military Capability Indexes were weighted so low for deployment and surge capability that it received very little credit for these scores, and was rated 49<sup>th</sup> overall. In other Mission Areas, Pope AFB lost more points for its 7500 ft runway and distance from training space than the maximum available for deployment and surge capability. The quantitative process used to establish Military Value was flawed resulting in inaccurate scores and justification that supported the proposal to disestablish the Airlift Wing. These inequalities are discussed in the MCI section of this response. The airfield functions, operational planning expertise and joint relationship between Fort Bragg and Pope AFB that are critical to contingencies, deployment and surge operations, far outweigh the lack of additional growth and operational factors in other mission areas. The capability to support combat operations with C-130Js, with increased range and payload, was also not considered.

Due to these significant deviations from selection criteria, and even more importantly, the significant degradation to our country's crisis reaction capability, we strongly recommend the following:

- That the BRAC Commission reverse the proposal to disestablish the 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing;
- That the Air Force continues to operate the airfield and not transfer Pope AFB to the Army; and
- That the installation be established as Joint Base Bragg/Pope.


Thank you for consideration of this information and of our recommendations.

**SECTION 10: SLIDES FROM BRAC REGIONAL HEARING**

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**Slides from the BRAC Regional Hearing at Charlotte on June 28, 2005 follow.**

**Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base**  
 Supporting Our Nation's Defense




Base Realignment and Closure Commission  
 Charlotte Regional Hearing—June 28, 2005

**Ft. Bragg/Pope AFB**

**AMERICA'S  
 "911"  
 CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE**

2

**BRAGG/POPE AND  
 LOCAL COUNTIES**



BRAGG/POPE  
 INSTALLATION AND  
 TRAINING AREAS

3

**BRAGG/POPE BRAC  
 RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Move FORSCOM and USARC Headquarters to FtBragg/Pope AFB
- Add a Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
- Add additional units from Europe
- Transfer Pope AFB to the Army
- Disestablish 43d Airlift Wing, replace with Associate AFRC C-130H squadron

4

**FORSCOM AND USARC  
MOVE TO BRAGG/POPE**

A map showing the geographical relationship between Pope Air Force Base (POPE AFB) and Fort Bragg. The map is dark with white outlines and labels for 'POPE AFB' and 'FORT BRAGG'.

**XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS**  
*Unique Capability*  
4<sup>th</sup> Brigade Combat Team, 82<sup>nd</sup> ABN DIV

Two side-by-side images. The left image shows a formation of paratroopers in mid-air, silhouetted against a light background. The right image shows a formation of military helicopters in flight, also silhouetted against a light background.

**FORT BRAGG LAND  
ALLOCATION**

A map of Fort Bragg showing land allocation. The map is dark with white outlines and labels for 'FORT BRAGG' and 'POPE AFB'.

- 22,057 acres, Ft Bragg Main Post
- 138,713 acres, Ft Bragg Training Area

**AIR FORCE BRAC PROPOSAL  
TO REALIGN POPE AFB**

- Disestablish the 43d Airlift Wing.
- Replace the Wing with an Associate Reserve C-130 Squadron
- Transfer Pope AFB to the Army



## Ft. Bragg/Pope AFB



- Nation's premiere power projection team
  - Grenada – Operation Urgent Fury
  - Panama – Operation Just Cause
  - Kuwait/Iraq – Operation Desert Shield/Storm
  - Afghanistan – Operation Enduring Freedom
  - Iraq – Operation Iraqi Freedom
  - Numerous other Contingency Operations
- 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing is a critical part of this team

## JOINT TASK FORCE

As the Contingency Response Force, XVIII ABN Corps and the 43d Airlift Wing has a responsibility and frequent role as the basis for a Joint Task





Joint Exercises:  
Purple Dragon  
Unified Endeavor  
Millennium Challenge

REAL WORLD CONTINGENCIES

## OPERATION JUST CAUSE PANAMA

A Joint operation requiring deployment from multiple airfields and sequential employment in the objective area.





## OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM KUWAIT and IRAQ

Short notice response to support Political/Military goals, followed by the largest joint airlift in the history of Fort Bragg and Pope AFB








**Ft. Bragg/Pope AFB**

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**AMERICA'S  
"911"  
CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE**

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**OSD BRAC Guidance**

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- BRAC Statute specifies that the Selection Criteria must make Military Value the primary consideration
- The Overarching Principle for Deployment and Employment emphasizes joint and combined basing, power projection, rapid deployment capability and the capability to mobilize and surge
- Power projection is the first of 6 major capabilities listed in guidance
- SecDef: "A primary objective of BRAC 2005 is to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity."

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**Joint Cross Service Groups**

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- JCSGs were tasked to assess opportunities for joint basing and to propose Joint Service Installations.
- HSA JCSG approved proposal to establish Bragg/Pope as a Joint Base, Mar 05
  - Proposal met all OSD guidance
  - Accommodated Army desire that the AF continue to operate Bragg/Pope Airfield

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



**JCSG and AF Proposals**

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- There was a disconnect between the HSA JCSG and the Air Force proposal to close Pope AFB
- AF proposal #0122v3 realigned Pope AFB, disestablished the 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing and turned the airfield over to the Army.
- HSA JCSG Proposal to establish Bragg/Pope as a Joint Base was rescinded and superseded by AF proposal to realign Pope to the Army, Apr 05

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


**Air Force BRAC Process**

- Air Force Guidance for BRAC 2005:

**“Increase effectiveness and reduce excess infrastructure and capacity by realigning and right sizing operational and support units.”**


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**Air Force BRAC Process**

- AF used an aircraft platform approach, which emphasized fleet consolidation and cost savings
- Process resulted in inconsistencies in assessing the military value of joint warfighting installations, which was identified by OSD Red Team evaluation
- Bases supporting joint training deployments and surges, such as Pope AFB, did not rank well in this process


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**Military Value**

- Pope AFB rated #1 base for SOF/CSAR support (includes A-10s)
  - Selection Criteria #1/#2 rated high (81.5%/82.4%)
  - Selection Criteria #3 rated much lower (49%)
- Also ranked high for Airlift Support
  - Selection Criteria #1/#2 rated high (71.2%/73.4%)
  - Selection Criteria #3 rated much lower (46%)
- Low ranking in SC#3 was unjustified and deviated from BRAC guidance

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**Selection Criteria**

- SC #3: “The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.”

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### Improvements to Deployment and Surge Capabilities



- Outload enhancement and other improvement programs are ongoing with increased deployment and surge capabilities
- Over \$100 million in improvements to ramps, taxiways, munitions load areas and staging areas
- Airfield improvements and new aircraft for C-130J operations should have resulted in high ratings for military value index of SC#3

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### Air Force BRAC Process



- 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing was projected to receive new C-130J aircraft starting in 2007
  - New Military Construction had started
- OSD cut funding for C-130Js in 2004; funding was not restored until after BRAC announcements
- Initial AF proposal to consolidate the fleet was based on "aging" C-130E fleet

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### Evaluation of Air Force Proposal



- AF Proposal deviates significantly from OSD Selection Criteria Guidance
  - Contradicts BRAC statute that the Selection Criteria must make Military Value the primary consideration.
  - Violated OSD Principle: "Ensure joint basing realignment increases military value...to support surge operations"
  - AF assessment under valued the capability of Pope AFB to accommodate contingency and mobilization requirements (SC #3)
- Implementation will negatively impact power projection, deployment and surge capabilities at Ft.Bragg

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### Recommendation



- Reverse the decision to disestablish the 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing and transfer Pope AFB to the Army
- Establish Bragg/Pope as a Joint Base, which was proposed by JCSG

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**Community Support**



26

**Community Support**

- Civilian/Military relationship is exceptional
- Close bonds with military personnel and families
- Growing community
- Full support for BRAC and future missions

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**Community Support**

- Amtrak, taxi and shuttle services
- U.S. Airways/Delta providing air service
- 5,000 Hotel/Motel rooms in Cumberland Co
  - Additional facilities under construction
- Wide range of meeting and conference facilities available, including Crown Center

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**Community Support**

- Significant number of recreational and cultural opportunities
- 75<sup>th</sup> largest school system in the nation
- Cost of living below national average
- One of five hottest housing markets in the nation
- 'Environmentally friendly' collaborative effects

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 **Community Support** 

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
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 **Ft. Bragg/Pope AFB** 

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**AMERICA'S  
"911"  
CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE**

30



Thank you for your work. Again, welcome to the great State of North Carolina. And if you need anything, let me know.

(Applause.)

COMMISSIONER COYLE: General Kernan.

GENERAL KERNAN: Senator Dole, Governor Easley, Lt. Governor Perdue, Distinguished Members of the Commission and Other Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I'm General Buck Kernan, US Army (retired), previous Post Commander at Fort Bragg and a resident of Pinehurst, so I have some personal interest here, as well as some professional interest.

It is truly an honor for me to come before you today to represent Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base, our Nation's 911 primary Crisis Response Force.

Present with me in the audience are representatives from six counties and numerous committees surrounding these installations.

Together, with Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base, these communities form one of the closest civilian/military families anywhere in America.

That relationship has helped make North Carolina one of the largest and most nurturing states in which our military services reside.

At Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base, we assumed the mantle of our Nation's primary Crisis Response Force in the early 1970s.

The communities around these installations embracing points of that mission as readily as the military organizations themselves.

It is with that common bond between our civilian and military communities and this common sense of responsibility to our Nation, that we come to you today to address these most recent base realignment and closure recommendations.

As you are aware, there are numerous acts being recommended by the 2005 BRAC Commission report that affect Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base.

First, is the recommendation to move US Army Forces Command and US Army Reserve Command Headquarters to the newly-designated Fort Bragg installation.

Second, is the creation of a Fourth Brigade Combat Team within the 82nd Airborne Division, the movement of the Seventh Special Air

Force Group to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and the assignment of the yet-to-be-assigned forces from Europe to the Bragg/Pope installation by the Army.

Third, is to transfer Pope Air Force Base to the Army; and last, the disestablishment of the 43rd Air Wing by the Air Force and replacement by an Air Active Reserve Associate C-130 Squadron as attended on the Bragg/Pope installation.

We will endorse each of these recommendations and provide an overall assessment of how we believe these recommendations respond to the overreaching Defense Department guidance to optimize both efficiency and warfighting capability and serve the intent for the national security strategy of the United States.

First, we believe that the recommendation to move US Army Forces Command and US Army Reserve Command to the Bragg/Pope installation fully supports the goal of optimizing efficiency and warfighting capability. It meets all BRAC selection criteria and does so by placing the Army Headquarters responsible for providing trained and ready Army forces to the combatant commander on the same installation with the Headquarters that train and sustain both Army conventional and special

operation units.

Equally important is the synergy achieved by having the Army Reserve Command Headquarters collocated on this installation, since the Reserves contain both conventional and special operations units and are an integral part of our Nation's warfighting capability.

The operational environment of our military forces is constantly evolving, and is being demonstrated each day in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the ongoing threat of large-scale conventional warfare such as we might experience in North Korea and across the spectrum of non-combat mission profiles as well.

Our military forces today are integrated in the fabric of home and defense, providing support to multiple government agencies on our borders, and supporting transnational operations throughout the world.

In addition to conducting combat operations, our forces are executing stability operations, peace-keeping operations, peace-making operations and a full menu of other types of humanitarian and support missions in over 100 countries.

This full spectrum of operation requirements has produced new demands for close interservice and joint capability.

Just a few decades ago, the mission executed by our Army conventional forces, and those missions conducted by our special operations forces were clearly separate and defined.

To be sure, there are certain missions today that only our special operations are organized, trained and qualified to perform.

But, as the spectrum of conflict evolved, the missions executed by our conventional organizations, and those executed by our special operations organizations, have gone from separate and complimentary, to integrated and seamless in support of combatant commanders worldwide.

US Forces Command has direct responsibility to ensure the proper training and equipping of Army conventional forces.

US Army Special Operations Command, which is also assigned to Fort Bragg, has direct responsibility to ensure the proper training and equipping of Special Operations Forces; therefore, it makes eminently good sense to collocate these two commands at the same installation; where, together,

they can best affect the future of training for not just combat operations, but for the full spectrum of missions in which both Army conventional and special operations forces would perform.

The Bragg/Pope installation is just that location. It's a wise recommendation and one that we strongly endorse.

Additionally, a historical and institutional priority of the Army has always been to ensure that the highest level of leadership and decision-making have their roots with the soldiers on the ground.

Assigning FORSCOM to the Bragg/Pope installation insures this kind of activity and maintains the direct contact between the Army's four star Headquarters and the troopers in the trenches.

Additionally, FORSCOM will now be collocated with the Army and Joint Contingency Force Headquarters that execute these precious missions, that being the 18th Airborne Corps, US Army Special Operations Command and Joint Special Operations Command.

This further strengths the linkage from the tactical to the strategic level of command.

These joint linkages are further

enhanced by the proximity of a Marine expeditionary force at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, building on decades of the habitual training between those Marine forces and the Army forces at Fort Bragg, as well as Air Force units at Pope Air Force Base and Seymour Johnson Air Force Base.

Another benefit is that it places FORSCOM in closer proximity to its higher Headquarters, Joint Forces Command, which is located at Norfolk, Virginia.

The recommendation to move Forces Command and Army Reserve Command to the Bragg/Pope installation, in our opinion, achieves economic benefits for the Army to be as well as but more importantly, it best serves our joint warfighting potential and our Nation.

The second recommendation is to increase the size of the 8th Airborne Division by adding a Fourth Brigade Combat Team, to move the 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and to assign future additional forces from Europe as bases are closed overseas.

This recommendation tracks with the joint nature of the 2005 BRAC process, is supported by the selection criteria enhancing military value,

and is consistent with achieving efficiency and sustaining warfighting capabilities.

The Army deployable forces on the Bragg/Pope installation actually increase under this recommendation, adding an additional Brigade Combat Team to the 82nd Airborne Division, compensates in gross numbers for the loss of the deployable personnel as the 7th Special Forces Group moves to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

Each of these decisions track with the Army's current modularity process and the Defense Department's focus on joint training and power projection.

The addition of a fourth Brigade combat team to the 82nd Airborne Division is part of General Shoemaker's ongoing transformation of the Army into a brigade-based modular force, thereby enhancing flexibility and deployability.

The final point of this recommendation was the probable assignment of additional forces coming out of Europe. It is really premature to address these forces at this time, but the addition of any forces from Europe will increase the Army's capabilities at Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base and add to its operational flexibility.

These first two recommendations assigning additional forces to the installation generates some obvious questions about space to build new structures and the adequacy of ranges and training areas.

These are, of course, legitimate concerns, but the Bragg/Pope installation is sufficiently robust to more than accommodate the increased demand.

The garrison staff at Fort Bragg will provide an assessment to Headquarters Department of the Army as to what the garrison will need in military construction, funding, and other resources, to meet those -- these four -- increases in base organizations and personnel.

Range and training area availability will be adequate to meet the future needs of the Bragg/Pope installation. With the greatest enhancements to training coming in the form of better virtual and constructive capabilities that can be tied to the live training environment.

I highly recommend the Commission use this opportunity to address modernization of installation training areas to accommodate the modern weapon systems and state-of-the-art training

and technology; thereby, allowing organizations to truly train-as-they-will-fight at home stations.

The third BRAC recommendation creates the greatest challenge to sustaining joint fighting capability:

As the Air Force proposal to realign Pope Air Force Base disestablish the 43rd Airlift Wing and transfer the Lift to the Army.

Recommendation creates what I believe are the most significant challenges to joint warfighting capabilities and should be carefully rethought.

The strategic value of the joint team at Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base had been one of the Department of Defense's most successful stories, as they have executed the Nation's 911 missions for over several decades.

In 1980, we learned a hard lesson from Operation Desert One, as we failed in a rescue attempt of US hostages in Iran.

That operation was a clear example of how even highly-skilled war fighters from the different services cannot be thrown together to train for a short period of time and expected to conduct a highly-complex mission in a very fluid

environment.

The service has learned that lesson well, vowed not to repeat it and instituted habitual training relationships that were made possible by dealing through collocation.

Since 1983, when forces from Fort Bragg were part of Operation Urgent Fury, and the rescue of United States citizens on the urban-influenced Island of Granada.

The Nation's Strategic Crisis Response Force from the Bragg/Pope power projection platform has executed over a dozen separate combat and humanitarian relief operations; most notably, Operation Just Cause in Panama, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in Iraq, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and the current combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

I might give you a history lesson or walk you through each of these operations. But I do believe it's important to address a couple of very different operations to understand the significance of the habitual relationships and training and mission preparation between the winning Headquarters at Pope Air Force Base, as part of the joint strategic strike force, and the Army and special

operations forces at Fort Bragg.

First, Operation Just Cause into Panama -- this operation was planned and executed as a strategic decisive blow administered with overwhelming force to collapse the government of Manuel Noriega and his military forces.

To accomplish the 18th Airborne Corps portion of that operation, on the tight and demanding timeline required, joint Army and Air Force units had to stage and launch out of Pope Air Force Base, Shaw and Seymour Johnson to meet the execution over Panama.

The corps' fighting, planning, preparation and execution over night was accomplished from Pope Air Force Base and was greatly facilitated by habitual professional relationship and trust established between the Army and Air Force leaders at the Bragg/Pope Air Force Base military community.

An ice storm in North Carolina on the night of execution could have created delays that could have compromised the mission, had the Joint Air Force/Army Command Team not had the confidence in each others' mission capabilities that only comes from the habitual training relationships.

Next was Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm into Iraq.

In August of 1990, 18th Airborne Corps and the 43rd Airlift Wing were alerted to conduct airborne and air/land operations into Saudi Arabia to deter further aggression by Iraqi forces following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.

It was critically important to have the initial forces on the ground in Saudi Arabia on the timeline set by the President, so that he could demonstrate the United States resolve to our allies and coalition partners.

Twenty-four hours after alert, the Air Force aircraft, the lead element of the 82nd Airborne Division, took off from Pope Air Force Base to put troops on the ground in eastern Saudi Arabia.

Without the winning infrastructure in place at Pope Air Force to support the crisis response timeline of 24 hours from notification to wheels up, the Presidential and CJCS directed timeline could not have been achieved.

What followed that initial Crisis Response Force into Saudi Arabia was the largest military airlift from Pope -- from Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base in history.

Over a six-week period, first the Wing, and then Pope Air Force Base operations, orchestrated hundreds of aircraft in and out of Pope on a 24-hour-a-day schedule, pushing forces into theater as fast as airframes could be mustered at Pope -- and from around the world.

That projection of combat power could not have been sustained on a timeline without the requisite infrastructure at Pope Air Force Base to support high Air Force operational tempo and without the trust and relationships that had been established through years of practice, joint training and this mission execution by collocated Air Force crews and Army air response forces.

In each of these operations, in both services, regulatory guidelines had to be waived. Commanders had to stretch the rules in order to accomplish the mission of "on time/on target".

The fact that these units -- that their units had to habitually train together, and they knew each others' levels of skills allowed those combat leaders to accept risk.

It is no exaggeration to say that the United States was able to project visible, capable military power into Saudi Arabia immediately upon

the outbreak of the crisis, because of the long-standing relationship between the Army and Air Force units at the Bragg/Pope joint installation.

I believe with the departure of the 43rd Wing, we will lose a large portion of the jointness of strength and training, planning and execution that has led to over four decades of strategic crisis response success.

The proposed training squadron will not have the organic command and control, maintenance or logistical capabilities to sustain a planning and execution relationship with 10th Airborne Corps, the 82nd or special operation forces.

Now, I'm sure that the Air Force and Army are looking at new and imaginative ways to compensate for loss of these long-standing relationships.

But clearly, success will now be far more difficult to achieve on a mission that can accept nothing less than success.

Failure, or even delay, is unacceptable when a Nation's primary Crisis Response Force is called.

Therefore, we would like to address some special challenges in this proposal and some areas

that require more detailed examination.

We are going to call General Dordal, previous Commander of the 43rd Airlift Wing who will provide those insights. Paul.

GENERAL DORDAL: We appreciate the opportunity to address the BRAC Commission with our concerns about the realignment of Pope Air Force Base.

I think the General Commander made a very compelling case that Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base have been very successful as America's 911 Crisis Response Force.

And they are the first to be called because they formed a very high power projection capability.

Especially training forces at Fort Bragg, and with a large major airfield at Pope Air Force Base adjoining that installation, they are able to react quickly and stage and deploy to hotspots around the world.

And it's this mission, this capability to respond quickly to contingency and large-scale deployment surge operations, that make this base so important.

So when we reviewed the BRAC data and

the BRAC deliberations leading to this proposal, we expected to find significant justification for the proposal.

However, that was not the case. And what we found instead was that there were differences in priorities and inconsistencies between the Air Force BRAC process and the OSD guidance.

Now, OSD guidance is very clear.

Military value must be the primary consideration for the selection criteria.

And I would like to point out that the overarching principle for operations, which is in the second bullet, emphasizes the joint combined basing, power projection, rapid deployment capability, and the capability to mobilize and surge should be weighted high.

Based on this guidance, the joint cross service groups were established to assess the opportunities for joint basing.

And at the end of March of this year, the Headquarters and Support Agency, Joint Cross Service Group, actually approved establishing Bragg/Pope as a joint base, along with eleven other joint basing initiatives.

And if accepted, this Bragg/Pope joint base would have complied with all the OSD guidance, and would have ranked very high in military value.

The Air Force would have continued to operate the airfield.

However, there was a disconnect between this proposal and a separate proposal that the Air Force is working to close Pope Air Force Base and transfer the installation to the Army.

So less than a month later, in April, the Joint Cross Service Group removed Bragg/Pope from the joint base list and superseded it with the current Air Force proposal to realign Pope Air Force Base.

And since this decision occurred so closely to the release of the BRAC report, in all likelihood, cross service coordination was limited, at best.

And if this proposal is enacted, Pope Air Force Base will be operated as an Army airfield, and the Air Force units will end.

And when that occurs, the primary concern is whether, in the event of contingencies, can the Army still meet the crisis reaction timelines?

And is there enough time to deploy an Air Force command team to the installation to conduct planning and execution for deployment and surge operations?

We also need to question whether the Army can conduct airfield operations and maintain the airfield and facilities at the same level that exists today, and to the extent required to support contingency and deployment operations.

We don't know why the decision to establish a joint base was rescinded and superseded by the Air Force proposal; however, we do know that the Air Force set their own priorities for BRAC, and their proposal was based on the Air Force priorities.

Now, the Air Force used this BRAC to consolidate its aircraft fleet, to right size its squadrons and reduce the infrastructure; and that's what is reflected in the Air Force guidelines.

Now, with that BRAC, the Air Force is trying to correct a problem that was created in 1990, when they established a Composite Wing. Composite Wings grouped different types of aircraft together in smaller squadrons and positioned those around the world.

At Pope we had A-10s, F-16s and C-130s as part of that concept. And it's an excellent concept in theory; but, in reality, it's proven very expensive to maintain and support.

So using this approach to BRAC, gave priority to consolidating aircraft at specified bases, and resulted in inconsistencies in assessing military value.

Bases that were selected for fleet consolidation were rated high in military value, and bases that support joint operations, such as Pope, were rated lower in military value.

And this was identified by the BRAC red team as an inconsistency, and it appears to violate OSD guidance and may have compromised the service recommendation as the process moved forward.

The first four selection criteria are the military value, and Pope Air Force Base was rated very high in most of these categories.

In fact, it was rated the number one base in the Air Force for support for special operations and combat search and rescue operations.

And the selection criteria number one and two were rated high for those airlift operations.

However, selection criteria three was rated low in both categories, resulting in an overall low rating for Pope Air Force Base.

We couldn't find an Air Force rationale for the low rating, but we feel it was unjustified and should have been much higher for the following reasons:

Selection criteria number three is based on supporting contingency mobilization and force requirements for operations and training, which is the primary mission at Pope Air Force Base; and the low rating in this category is surprising, given the magnitude of the improvement programs that are ongoing at Pope Air Force Base, such as the outload and improvement and enhancement program to improve those very capabilities.

These improvements, combined with the planned replacement of the C-130Es with the new C-130Js, should have resulted in a much higher rating for selection criteria three and the military value of Pope Air Force Base.

Four, the Air Force deliberations regarding Pope may have been effected by OSD's decision last year to cut the funding for the C-130Js.

The funding was not restored until after the BRAC announcements were made. We don't know how much this affected the Air Force deliberations; however, in the Air Force proposal to first close and then to realign Pope Air Force Base, the justification states that:

"The efficiencies of consolidating 18 weapon systems outweigh the detriment in installation value;" the aging fleet referred to is the C-130Es.

We don't think that the Air Force intentionally violated OSD guidance; however, their proposal to deestablish the wing and transfer Pope Air Force Base to the Army was based on a desire to consolidate C-130 operations at another base and save the cost of operating the installation.

In their assessment, the Air Force undervalued the capability of Pope Air Force Base to support contingency and mobile requirements; and this contradicts the BRAC statute that selection criteria must make military value the primary consideration. And it is counter to the OSD principle to ensure that joint base and realignment increases the military value of that function, which, in this case, is to support surge operations.

We feel that the Bragg/Pope installation cannot afford a degradation in mission capability, and it doesn't track that if the Army is building forces on Fort Bragg, the Air Force is reducing their presence and transferring Pope Air Force Base to the Army.

Based on these significant deviations from selection criteria, our recommendation is that you reverse the proposal to disestablish the 43rd Airlift Wing, and you establish Bragg/Pope as a joint base.

These actions would be most consistent with the Department of Defense guidance to sustain joint warfighting, power projection capabilities and deployment in surge capabilities.

Now, as we address these military concerns, our civilian leaders are already assessing how they can best support these changes for a mutual community.

And regardless of the final BRAC decision and actions, the surrounding communities are committed to supporting these changes.

I would like to introduce Mr. Tony Chavonne, who is with Cumberland County Business Council in Fayetteville, who will address some of

to show their support.

It is also reflected in President Bush's decision to visit Fayetteville and Fort Bragg today, to meet with our community members and share his plan for the global war on terrorism.

Like our friends in the military at Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base, we stand ready to respond to our Nation's call.

We have infrastructure in place to support the BRAC recommendation to move US Forces Command and Army Reserve Command Headquarters to Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base.

We offer an award-winning model for a civilian/military community to thrive. And we have a spirit that leads us all to say: All present and accounted for, sir, and ready for our Nation's next call.

I return the floor to General Kernan for closing comments.

GENERAL KERNAN: Ladies and Gentlemen:

I would like to complete our comments by saying, it is never easy to close bases. They obstruct the lives of thousands of civilian and military families, affect the local economies; and in the end, truly extract the expected savings in

the magnitude proposed by these BRAC initiatives.

The Department of Defense, the Services, and all involved in the process, are trying to achieve the best solution for the future without compromising security.

In truth, the actual impact on operational capabilities is always a crucial question, because the field commanders are not part of the assessment. The BRAC process, and all those associated with it, have a daunting challenge.

They must strike the delicate balance between budgetary efficiency and the sustainment of warfighting capabilities.

But in the final analysis, the ultimate goal must be enhanced readiness and operational capability.

That is why we are here today, to endorse those recommendations, to promote national security and identify possible areas requiring additional study.

We thank the members of the Commission for providing us this opportunity to present our comments, and are prepared to answer any questions. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER COYLE: Thank you very

much, General Kernan.

Did you folks look at what the cost savings might be from joint basing, as compared to the cost savings that the DoD projects from their proposed realignment of Pope Air Force Base?

GENERAL KERNAN: The specific data of that?

COMMISSIONER COYLE: Yes.

GENERAL KERNAN: We did not, Mr. Chairman.

COMMISSIONER COYLE: Thank you. And questions anybody wants to ask?

COMMISSIONER GEHMAN: I was doing some research about this 43rd Wing, and I cannot find -- just from the pieces of paper I have here -- the BRAC recommendation -- I mean, the Department of Defense recommendation lists what happens to the airplanes, the A-10s and the C-130s, but I couldn't find what happens to the 43rd Wing Commander and staff.

GENERAL DORDAL: We don't have any information on that. It disestablishes the Wing, and the aircraft primarily --

COMMISSIONER GEHMAN: And your suggestion was, the Wing Commander and staff were

instrumental in these strategic plans. They didn't employ in 130s. They didn't go to Somalia in 130s. But the Commander and staff were instrumental --

GENERAL DORDAL: That is correct.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: I want to follow up with what the Admiral said:

As I understand it, the Wing at Pope -- it's your position that they support the functions at Bragg for deployment, and I assume, as well as training.

Yet, as I understand it, the deployment -- not only the one that we just talked about to Somalia, but other deployments really occur in aircraft that are not at Pope, but are at other facilities, and that are basically brought in to handle the mission.

In fact, Pope Air Force Base became Pope Army Airfield, and was fully supportive and was part of the garrison of Fort Bragg, maybe it would become Bragg Army Base, I don't know. I don't want to get into a debate on what name it should be, but -- that would open a whole other can --

But either way, it would be a facility that, as I understand the recommendation, would be under the garrison command at Bragg, and would be

supported by Bragg, and would have the facility -- and Bragg would maintain the facility that would allow the airplanes to deploy.

What is the real logic, then, of keeping the C-130s and the A-10s for deployment. There might be a logic for keeping them for training, but I'm not so sure what it is for deployment, when those are not the aircraft that would be used for deployment anyway.

Maybe the Wing Commander wants to handle that.

GENERAL DORDAL: Yes, sir. The Associate Reserve C-130 squadron could adequately handle the daily training for an airborne mission. And that's really not the issue. The issue is whether or not the Wing could support -- or the replacement for the Wing could support the contingency operations in a crisis reaction mode.

The Air Force would have to deploy in a command team for execution and planning and control of all the airlift aircrafts coming in to Pope Air Force Base to move the Army forces out.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Your position would be that in addition to what the Army would do to prepare -- the preparation for the loading, that

there's more to that, that the Army couldn't do that the Air Force would have to do that -- rather than just putting an airplane on the ground, dropping the ramp, feeding them in, taking all the equipment that has been provisioned by the Army at Bragg, putting it on and moving it out, that that required -- that that mission had to be performed at Bragg/Pope, or could that not be done somewhere else?

That is what I'm having a little trouble understanding.

GENERAL DORDAL: I think it goes to looking at what is its strategic capabilities that have been imposed on the joint forces that are at Fort Bragg.

Those tasks are going to have to be done, unquestionably; whether they are done from Fort Bragg or somewhere else.

One of the things that is going to have to be accomplished is the strategic task analysis to insure that those critical timelines and the ability to rapidly deploy forces, wherever the Wing Commander would require them, in the condition required to be able to go right into combat -- must be addressed.

So, could Pope Air Force Base become an

Army installation? Sure.

But you are going to have to put the requisite infrastructure there, and then you are going to have to make sure that you have the necessary operational commanders to be able to address the time-sensitive missions that have been imposed on the contingency forces and special operations forces.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: So you would suggest that the Commission and our staff should analyze the capabilities that would be required to provide that support mission, and see what is the best and most -- where the best and most logical place and most cost effective place to put it at, to make sure that the warfighter reaches the war in time with the equipment and properly deployed.

GENERAL KERNAN: Absolutely. And one of the things we have to look at is what is the JSCOT mission; and can we meet that. And then cost is a piece of it, but those habitual relationships are making sure the ability to develop tactical techniques and procedures and standardization allows you to very safely and precisely execute that mission -- have to be factored in also.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: And one last

question: The A-10s, which are basically, as I understand it, a close combat low level, you know, outstanding support aircraft to the Marines, infantry, and anybody that is in the field, those aircraft would mainly be used at Pope, to support the training of the combat brigade at Pope -- at Bragg -- as soon as you go there, that is going to be built there, as well as the others in the training missions.

GENERAL KERNAN: As well as the air troops. Absolutely.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Right.

GENERAL KERNAN: That air/ground mission is very important and it goes to support troops on the battlefield is paramount to our success.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Are there support helicopters at Bragg that the A-10 would support?

GENERAL KERNAN: Absolutely.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: And work closely with.

GENERAL DORDAL: They do work as part of a joint team. The A-10s primarily do train away from Fort Bragg ranges. They have training opportunities. They primarily train at other

ranges, and they deploy overseas regularly.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Thank you.

GENERAL DORDAL: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER COYLE: Thank you very much for your testimony. We appreciate it very much.

And we can have the next panel now, please.

GENERAL OVERHOLT: If it please the panel, we would like to get started.

COMMISSIONER COYLE: We would, too. Thank you.

From what I have in front of me, it looks like Mr. Smith is going to go first.

GENERAL OVERHOLT: I will go first, on behalf of the Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point, now they are a Depot.

I'm joined at the table by Major General (Retired) Tom Brownson, former Commander of the Marine Corps Station Cherry Point, and Marine Corps Air Base Lee, and Troy Smith, a long-time resident of the area, and who has represented Havelock for over 36 years.

I would also, if you give me a matter of leave, recognize all of our folks from our area that took -- got up at 4 AM this morning to come down

J/A/ATT Missions Scheduled Jun 02 - Jun 05

| Location                  | MAJCOM | Unit   | J/A/ATT Missions Scheduled | Missions for 18th Abn Corps | Missions for 18th Abn Corps | Missions for 82nd Abn Div | Aircraft for 82nd Abn Division | Missions Supporting Both | Total Aircraft | Avg A/C per month to |
|---------------------------|--------|--------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------------------|
| Pope                      | AMC    | 43 AW  | 368                        | 97                          | 203                         | 105                       | 145                            | 202                      | 348            | 9.4                  |
| Pittsburgh                | AIRC   | 911 AW | 178                        | 24                          | 66                          | 5                         | 8                              | 29                       | 74             | 2.0                  |
| Dyess <sup>3</sup>        | AMC    | 317 AG | 282                        | 7                           | 7                           | 33                        | 38                             | 40                       | 45             | 1.2                  |
| Charlotte                 | ANG    | 145 AW | 98                         | 2                           | 2                           | 21                        | 22                             | 23                       | 24             | 0.6                  |
| Yeager                    | ANG    | 130 AW | 40                         | 6                           | 19                          | 3                         | 5                              | 9                        | 24             | 0.6                  |
| Millwaukee                | AIRC   | 440 AW | 120                        | 9                           | 13                          | 1                         | 1                              | 10                       | 14             | 0.4                  |
| Little Rock               | AMC    | 314 AW | 19                         | 2                           | 8                           | 3                         | 6                              | 5                        | 14             | 0.4                  |
| Niagara                   | AIRC   | 914 AW | 126                        | 9                           | 9                           | 2                         | 3                              | 11                       | 12             | 0.3                  |
| Quonset <sup>4</sup>      | ANG    | 143 AW | 28                         | 10                          | 12                          | 0                         | 0                              | 10                       | 12             | 0.3                  |
| Youngstown                | AIRC   | 910 AW | 154                        | 4                           | 7                           | 2                         | 4                              | 6                        | 11             | 0.3                  |
| Willow Grove              | AIRC   | 913 AW | 170                        | 5                           | 2                           | 13                        | 8                              | 18                       | 10             | 0.3                  |
| Keesler <sup>4</sup>      | AIRC   | 403 AW | 58                         | 8                           | 7                           | 3                         | 3                              | 11                       | 10             | 0.3                  |
| Dobbs                     | AIRC   | 94 AW  | 108                        | 4                           | 3                           | 2                         | 6                              | 6                        | 9              | 0.2                  |
| Martinsburg               | ANG    | 167 AW | 104                        | 0                           | 0                           | 7                         | 9                              | 7                        | 9              | 0.2                  |
| Nashville                 | ANG    | 118 AW | 43                         | 4                           | 8                           | 0                         | 0                              | 4                        | 8              | 0.2                  |
| Louisville                | ANG    | 123 AW | 77                         | 3                           | 3                           | 5                         | 2                              | 8                        | 5              | 0.1                  |
| Mansfield                 | ANG    | 179 AW | 40                         | 4                           | 4                           | 1                         | 1                              | 5                        | 5              | 0.1                  |
| Selfridge                 | ANG    | 171 AS | 51                         | 0                           | 0                           | 2                         | 3                              | 2                        | 3              | 0.1                  |
| Maxwell                   | AIRC   | 908 AW | 133                        | 1                           | 2                           | 0                         | 0                              | 1                        | 2              | 0.1                  |
| Peoria                    | ANG    | 182 AW | 62                         | 1                           | 1                           | 1                         | 1                              | 2                        | 2              | 0.1                  |
| New Castle                | ANG    | 166 AW | 26                         | 0                           | 0                           | 2                         | 2                              | 2                        | 2              | 0.1                  |
| Savannah                  | ANG    | 165 AW | 65                         | 0                           | 0                           | 0                         | 0                              | 0                        | 0              | 0.0                  |
| Martin State <sup>4</sup> | ANG    | 135 AS | 1                          | 0                           | 0                           | 0                         | 0                              | 0                        | 0              | 0.0                  |

Click in Header Cells with red text to sort by that column.

<sup>1</sup> Statistics extracted from JA/ATT Annex C. Period covered from Jun 2002 through Jun 2005 (37 Months). Scheduled missions does not take into account cancellations due to weather, maintenance, etc. Assumed level playing field for all due to OIF and OEF commitments.

<sup>2</sup> Extracted numbers only include JA/ATT missions providing support to 18th Airborne Corps and 82 Airborne Division at Fort Bragg.

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<sup>4</sup> Conversion to C-130J and associated airdrop restrictions may have affected JA/ATT participation.

J/A/ATT Missions Scheduled Jun 02 - Jun 05

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| Dyess <sup>3</sup>        | AMC    | 317 AG | 282                        | 7                           | 7                           | 33                        | 38                             | 40                       | 45             | 1.2                  |
| Charlotte                 | ANG    | 145 AW | 98                         | 2                           | 2                           | 21                        | 22                             | 23                       | 24             | 0.6                  |
| Yeager                    | ANG    | 130 AW | 40                         | 6                           | 19                          | 3                         | 5                              | 9                        | 24             | 0.6                  |
| Milwaukee                 | AFRC   | 440 AW | 120                        | 9                           | 13                          | 1                         | 1                              | 10                       | 14             | 0.4                  |
| Little Rock               | AMC    | 314 AW | 19                         | 2                           | 8                           | 3                         | 6                              | 5                        | 14             | 0.4                  |
| Niagara                   | AFRC   | 914 AW | 126                        | 9                           | 9                           | 2                         | 3                              | 11                       | 12             | 0.3                  |
| Quonset <sup>4</sup>      | ANG    | 143 AW | 28                         | 10                          | 12                          | 0                         | 0                              | 10                       | 12             | 0.3                  |
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| Quonset <sup>4</sup>      | ANG    | 143 AW | 28                        | 10                          | 12                          | 0                         | 0                              | 10                       | 12             | 0.3                  |
| Youngstown                | AFRC   | 910 AW | 154                       | 4                           | 7                           | 2                         | 4                              | 6                        | 11             | 0.3                  |
| Willow Grove              | AFRC   | 913 AW | 170                       | 5                           | 2                           | 13                        | 8                              | 18                       | 10             | 0.3                  |
| Keesler <sup>4</sup>      | AFRC   | 403 AW | 58                        | 8                           | 7                           | 3                         | 3                              | 11                       | 10             | 0.3                  |
| Dobbins                   | AFRC   | 94 AW  | 108                       | 4                           | 3                           | 2                         | 6                              | 6                        | 9              | 0.2                  |
| Martinsburg               | ANG    | 167 AW | 104                       | 0                           | 0                           | 7                         | 9                              | 7                        | 9              | 0.2                  |
| Nashville                 | ANG    | 118 AW | 43                        | 4                           | 8                           | 0                         | 0                              | 4                        | 8              | 0.2                  |
| Louisville                | ANG    | 123 AW | 77                        | 3                           | 3                           | 5                         | 2                              | 8                        | 5              | 0.1                  |
| Mansfield                 | ANG    | 179 AW | 40                        | 4                           | 4                           | 1                         | 1                              | 5                        | 5              | 0.1                  |
| Selfridge                 | ANG    | 171 AS | 51                        | 0                           | 0                           | 2                         | 3                              | 2                        | 3              | 0.1                  |
| Maxwell                   | AFRC   | 908 AW | 133                       | 1                           | 2                           | 0                         | 0                              | 1                        | 2              | 0.1                  |
| Peoria                    | ANG    | 182 AW | 62                        | 1                           | 1                           | 1                         | 1                              | 2                        | 2              | 0.1                  |
| New Castle                | ANG    | 166 AW | 26                        | 0                           | 0                           | 2                         | 2                              | 2                        | 2              | 0.1                  |
| Savannah                  | ANG    | 165 AW | 65                        | 0                           | 0                           | 0                         | 0                              | 0                        | 0              | 0.0                  |
| Martin State <sup>4</sup> | ANG    | 135 AS | 1                         | 0                           | 0                           | 0                         | 0                              | 0                        | 0              | 0.0                  |

**Click in Header Cells with red text to sort by that column.**

<sup>1</sup> Statistics extracted from JA/ATT Annex C. Period covered from Jun 2002 through Jun 2005 (37 Months). Scheduled missions does not take into account cancellations due to weather, maintenance, etc. Assumed level playing field for all due to OIF and OEF committments.

<sup>2</sup> Extracted numbers only include JA/ATT missions providing support to 18th Airborne Corps and 82 Airborne Division at Fort Bragg.

<sup>3</sup> Aircraft numbers are those assigned to the mission. It does not take into account a single aircraft assigned to a multi-day mission

<sup>4</sup> Conversion to C-130J and associated airdrop restrictions may have affected JA/ATT participation.

.. I am not convinced that Portsmouth should be closed either."

Commissioner James T. Hill urged the Navy yesterday to provide data to determine how much extra shipyard capacity exists.

### **Pope Gets Second Look On Shift To Army**

Fayetteville Observer (Fayetteville, NC)  
Henry Cuningham  
July 20, 2005

WASHINGTON - The Base Closure and Realignment Commission on Tuesday voted to take a closer look at a Pentagon proposal on the future of Pope Air Force Base, setting the stage for more visits and hearings before a final decision in late August.

"I felt that the end result was extremely positive," retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Paul Dordal said after the session concerning Pope.

"They opened it up for additional review, and that allows us to get additional input into them and explain it and clarify a little bit of the issues that exist."

The commission, which has been seeking input from states at regional hearings around the country, is the only body that can change the Pentagon's plan, which involves 222 recommendations.

The commission must report to the president by Sept. 8. The president and Congress can only accept or reject the entire plan as submitted.

"If anything happened today, I think it demonstrated that this commission knows what it's talking about and is not a rubber stamp," Chairman Anthony Principi said after the session on Capitol Hill.

"We are an independent check on the power of the secretary (of defense) to close and realign military bases."

Dordal, a former wing commander at Pope, has been representing Cumberland County with the commission.

Cumberland County officials say Pope should remain an Air Force base and keep its active-duty wing. Dordal said the Army lacks specialties - from handling munitions to fighting aircraft fires - that are needed at an Air Force base. He also said the active-duty wing provides the leadership and expertise needed when making rapid, large-scale deployments by Army forces at Fort Bragg.

The Pentagon on May 13 recommended turning Pope over to Fort Bragg and replacing the active-duty wing of Vietnam-era C-130s with a squadron of more modern C-130s, which now belong to National Guard and Air Force Reserve units in other states.

State governors and adjutants general have protested the possible loss of airplanes, which, they say, are needed for state emergency missions and Homeland Security requirements. BRAC commissioners, who are tasked with making decisions on real estate, have expressed frustration about trying to sort out conflicting claims on the nationwide redistribution of planes between active and reserve forces.

"Should there be any 130s there at all?" retired Navy Adm. Harold Gehman asked during the discussion. "With the great mix of hundreds of C-130s moving all over the country, why did we pick this one to make a big study of?"

Fort Bragg is home to the 82nd Airborne Division, the 18th Airborne Corps and U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Soldiers and cargo are loaded onto Air Force airplanes at Pope's Green Ramp for local airborne training, as well as overseas deployments. The airplanes come from bases throughout the United States.

"We don't know how this is going to play out," said Samuel Skinner, a commissioner and former secretary of transportation. "I understand they need the facility."

Mike Flinn, a senior analyst for the BRAC commission, recommended Tuesday that the reserve airplanes and squadron not be reassigned to Pope and that Pope be entirely turned over to the Army. The move would result in about 1,500 fewer people at the base, they said.

Retired Army Gen. James Hill said he initially supported closing Pope, but after listening to other commissioners he was willing to study the matter further.

"There is a great deal of confusion between the BRAC commissioners as to what the original recommendation proposed, as well as how the BRAC staff recommendation changed that," Dordal said.

The Pentagon also called for U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army Reserve Command to be relocated to the Fort Bragg-Pope complex from Fort McPherson in Atlanta. If all of the Pentagon's recommendations are accepted, thousands of people would move in and out, but Cumberland County would gain about 180 people in the long run.

Georgia officials have protested the proposal, which would result in the closing of Fort McPherson and nearby Fort Gillem. The BRAC commissioners did not bring up that issue for discussion, however.

The proposal also calls for the 7th Special Forces Group to move from Fort Bragg to Eglin Air Force Base in Florida and the 23rd Fighter Group and its A-10 attack jets to move to Moody Air Force Base in Georgia. The commission also did not bring up those proposals for discussion.

"At least two commissioners will visit any installation that we add for further consideration," Principi said during the hearing. Community representatives will have the chance to testify in regional hearings.

In August, the commission will invite Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other officials to comment. Final decisions will be made during the week of Aug. 22.

## The Plan

The Pentagon has recommended turning Pope over to Fort Bragg.

The active-duty wing of Vietnam-era C-130s would be replaced with a squadron of more modern C-130s.

The modern C-130s belong to National Guard and Air Force Reserve units in other states whose governors and adjutants are fighting the move.

## **Navy's Broadway Complex Added To Commission's Base-Closure List Decision sparing MCRD hailed by local officials**

San Diego Union-Tribune (San Diego, CA)  
Rick Rogers  
July 20, 2005

A prime piece of San Diego real estate occupied by the Navy since the 1920s might very well become a waterfront tourist attraction, thanks to yesterday's vote by a federal commission to include the Broadway complex on the national base-closure list.

For two decades, San Diego officials have wanted to turn the 3 million-square-foot site at the North Embarcadero into a district of shops, restaurants, parks and high-rise housing.

"San Diego could finally realize the potential of its waterfront," said Peter Hall, president of the Centre City Development Corp., which is responsible for downtown development. "It's our front porch, and of course it is very critical."

Many of the county's business and legislative leaders, including Hall, also celebrated the commission's decision to spare Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego from closure or downsizing. In recent weeks, commissioners had asked the Pentagon why the Marine Corps needs two bases to train recruits when the other military branches have one each.

## **Former Brass: Protect Pope**

Fayetteville Observer (Fayetteville, NC)

Henry Cuningham

July 24, 2005

Fort Bragg can still get its paratroopers in the air if no C-130s are stationed at Pope Air Force Base, but former Army and Air Force commanders say performance will suffer.

Retired Col. Daniel E. "Stump" Sowada commanded Pope's 317th Tactical Airlift Wing during the Panama invasion in 1989. He is now city administrator of West Lake Hills, Texas.

"Certainly they can operate without a permanent Air Force presence there, but the teamwork that is built up - not just by the permanent presence but by the familiarity with the people you are dealing with - goes a long way," Sowada said.

At a hearing in Washington on Tuesday, Mike Flinn, an analyst for the Base Closure and Realignment Commission, suggested that the commission consider removing all permanent airplanes from Pope.

The original recommendation from the Pentagon was to move the 43rd Wing C-130s from Pope and turn the base over to the Army, but to station 16 C-130s from reserve units at the airstrip.

Flinn said the 16 C-130s would not be enough to meet the Army's needs anyway, requiring that planes be brought in to bolster training.

'Clean slate'

The base closure commission is still considering what to do with Pope. At Tuesday's hearing, it voted to take a closer look at the Pentagon proposal.

"The commission staff told us as far as they are concerned the slate is clean on Pope," retired Brig. Gen. Paul Dordal said.

Dordal, a former wing commander at Pope, is working with the Cumberland County Business Council to persuade the BRAC commissioners

to keep Pope open as an Air Force base and preserve the C-130 wing.

Dordal and a former commander of Fort Bragg's 82nd Airborne Division echo Sowada's contention that keeping planes stationed at Pope makes for better teamwork between the paratroopers and those who transport them. That teamwork is important when the country needs to get paratroopers to trouble spots quickly.

"If you don't work together and train together on a daily basis, then when it comes to combat operations you haven't developed the relationships or the procedures or techniques required to make the operation a success," Dordal said.

Retired Lt. Gen. George A. Crocker commanded the 82nd Airborne Division from 1994 to 1996.

"The more you keep an Army-Air Force team together, the better they get at it," he said. He lives in his native Arkansas and has done military consulting in Iraq.

"I wouldn't see any justification for just turning it over to the Army," Sowada said. "I certainly think that the response time is going to be enhanced by a permanent presence. Part of the response time is the planning. If you have sat down and worked and planned and executed training missions on a day-to-day basis in a joint effort, I think that would certainly be effective when the balloon goes up for real."

Timetable

Retired Adm. Harold Gehman and retired Gen. James T. Hill, two of nine members of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission, will visit Pope on Aug. 2.

Five commissioners will be at a public hearing in Washington on Aug. 10. The full commission will start making final decisions during the week of Aug. 22. The commission, which is the only body that can change the proposal, must report to the president by Sept. 8. The president and Congress can only accept or reject the entire package.

Dordal said the BRAC analysts will assess how many flights are required to get the job done for Fort Bragg, options for providing the service and cost-effectiveness of various options.

Cumberland County officials say it would be most effective and efficient to keep the present arrangement in place. The 43rd Wing has about 25 C-130s.

Dordal says the Army does not have the specially trained personnel to operate an Air Force runway, such as firefighters trained to respond to aircraft fires, munitions handlers to load Air Force aircraft and fuel management specialists.

"It would be all new and have to be built by the Army," Dordal said. "It really doesn't make much sense when you look at the roles and missions of the services for the Army to try to run an Air Force base.

BRAC analysts say the Army operates large strategic airfields - Biggs Field at Fort Bliss, Texas, and Gray Field at Fort Hood, Texas.

Dordal says the Army airfields have long runways but are not manned for the short-notice surge operations associated with Fort Bragg's rapid deployment operations.

## POINT PAPER

### Air Mobility Operations

#### Purpose:

Explore the DoD Joint Doctrine and procedures for Air Mobility Operations.

#### Discussion:

This research was conducted to challenge the point that a Wing Commander located at Pope AFB will facilitate the acquisition of air mobility assets for the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division Commanders. The Wing Commander would, in all actuality, have little to do with the requests for and planning for use of airlift aircraft to support the Army requirements.

Data contained in this paper has been extracted from Joint Publication 3-17, Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations, 14 August 2002. Cross references in JP 3-17 to the following Joint Pubs may make them beneficial for study to fully understand concepts: JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense4 Transportation System, 19 March 2003, JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control, 9 April 2002, and JP 4-05, Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning, 22 June 1995. These Joint Publications are accessible via the web at <https://134.11.61.26/CD9/Publications/Joint/JP/ByPub.htm>. Data is provided to show the established DoD procedures for troop movement and airlift requests.

JP 3-17 is attached to this document.

- JP 3-17 covers the authority and responsibilities of combatant commanders, subordinate commanders, and all agencies involved in the air deployment, employment, redeployment, and sustainment of a joint force. (page i)
  - Further, the publication provides guidance on planning, coordinating, and conducting air mobility operations. (page i)
  - The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. (page i)
  - **All commanders must plan the orderly movement to and from unit areas** and the efficient onload and offload of aircraft. Air mobility planners use the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), an integrated command and control (C2) system, for deliberate and crisis action planning and execution. The combatant commander requests airlift for the **deployment and redeployment** phases of an operation through the JOPES process. (page ix)
  - **The bulk of intertheater air mobility operations** is conducted in response to requests from the combatant commands and Services in accordance with (IAW) guidelines set by the President and Secretary of Defense. (page I-4)

- The AMC TACC is the C2 node for most intertheater operations. As the sole C2 node capable of directing and providing oversight for MAF anywhere around the globe, it provides the essential services required by these forces to operate. Specifically, the TACC is able to receive validated common-user requests from the USTRANSCOM Mobility Control Center (MCC), task the appropriate unit, plan the mission, and provide continuous communications connectivity between intertheater forces, the common-user,... (pages I-4 – I-5)

- **Intertheater Air Mobility Operations.** Intertheater air mobility operations are generally global in nature and service the CONUS-to-theater air mobility needs of the supported commander. **Commander, USTRANSCOM-assigned air mobility assets execute the vast majority of intertheater airlift missions. C2 of these air mobility assets is normally exercised through AMC's TACC.** The TACC plans, coordinates, schedules, tasks, and executes air mobility missions worldwide. The TACC is the single tasking and execution agency for all activities involving AMC-assigned forces operating to fulfill Commander, USTRANSCOM-directed requirements. (page III-2)

- This figure illustrates the routine, day-to-day command relationships for controlling air mobility forces.




Figure III-1. Routine Command, Control, and Coordination of Air Mobility Operations

## POINT PAPER

### Pope-Bragg Realignment

#### Related DOD Recommendations:

AF-35: Realign Pope AFB  
Army-10: Realign Fort Bragg  
Army-8: Close Fort McPherson

#### Joint Training and Culture

The biggest concern received from the installation pertained to the severing of the working relationship between the Army and the Air Force relative to accomplishing their respective missions. The Army-Air Force integration at Pope/Bragg is one of the best examples of jointness that currently exists in the military. The 36 A-10s on Pope and an airlift wing that supports the Army airlift and forced-entry mission provide the jointness necessary to meet all training and readiness requirements. The value of this relationship cannot be measured in costs or savings. Long standing personal relationships have developed that facilitate tasking and problem solving, as well as the benefits of joint training. Jointness is a function of proximity and culture. The recommendation will break the existing joint synergies. Without these relationships, the missions can still be accomplished, but with greater difficulty.

#### Daily Training Requirements

TDY costs associated with a requirement to increase the flow of lift aircraft into Pope to support daily Army and Air Force training requirements must be established (18<sup>th</sup> ABN Corps G3 is working to establish the "requirement" for lift support at Bragg). The AF ADD to further realign Pope would eliminate permanently stationed aircraft at Pope. This ADD would increase costs resulting from the additional TDY required to send aircraft from another base to Pope to satisfy an already high training OPTEMPO. Requirements will only grow with the addition of the 4<sup>th</sup> BCT of the 82D Airborne Division.

#### Command and Control/Joint-Contingency Operational Planning

The proposed Reserve/Active Air Force unit at Pope AFB cannot support the joint contingency planning requirements unique to the nation's strategic response force, the 82D Airborne Division, and other Army tenants. With the increased importance of the homeland security mission, and other possible Humanitarian Assistance missions, there may be a need to maintain the 43D Wing capabilities in command and control and joint-contingency planning.

## **Joint Basing BOS Functions**

### **AF-35: Realign Pope AFB**

This recommendation establishes Joint Base Bragg-Pope and realigns Pope AFB by relocating the installation functions/responsibilities to Ft. Bragg. The US Army will assume responsibility for running all Base Operating Support functions (with the exception of Health and Military Personnel Support), to include the airfield. Most of these BOS functions support cost savings through efficiencies gained by the bases' proximity to one another. However, military value is not enhanced and efficiencies are not gained with the Army running an airfield that will have the same level of training activity or more (with the addition of the 4th BCT to the 82d Airborne Division) in the future. This action simply shifts the activity to a service which does not have as its corps competency, the task of running air bases. Typical Army airfields have limited fixed wing activities, which are certainly not at the level of activity and complexity as those activities at Pope AFB.

(Background) Part of the rationale to turn Pope over to the Army, according to MG Heckman, USAF, is that the Army needed more acreage to place FORSCOM HQ and USARC, thus enabling the closure of Fort McPherson. During the Pope-Bragg base visit, the installation briefed that five of seven options for relocating FORSCOM are at sites located on Ft Bragg proper. Also, during a visit by retired local military leaders from Fayetteville, the Army is strongly considering the bed-down for FORSCOM to be on Bragg proper, and 1391s have been written to support the change.

### **Base Profile**

The Fort Bragg/Fayetteville profile will grow with the addition of Forces Command and USARC. The number of senior leaders and their transportation requirements will grow accordingly. The overall activity of the base will increase, yet the AF BRAC recommendation is to reduce the base profile in terms of leadership by deactivating the 43d Wing, and possibly eliminating (through the AF ADD – Further Realign Pope AFB) aircraft permanently stationed at Pope AFB.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION**

1. Realign Pope Air Force Base, NC (**original OSD recommendation**). Distribute the 43d Airlift Wing's C-130E aircraft (25 aircraft) to the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR; realign the 23d Fighter Group's A-10 aircraft (36 aircraft) to Moody Air Force Base, GA; transfer real property accountability to the Army; disestablish the 43d Medical Group and establish a medical squadron. At Little Rock Air Force Base, AR, realign eight C-130E aircraft to backup inventory; retire 27 C-130Es; realign one C-130J aircraft to the 143d Airlift Wing (ANG), Quonset State Airport Air Guard Station, RI; two C-130Js to the 146th Airlift Wing (ANG), Channel Islands Air Guard Station, CA; and transfer four C-130Js from the 314th Airlift Wing (AD) to the 189th Airlift Wing (ANG), Little

Rock Air Force Base. Realign Yeager Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), WV, by realigning eight C-130H aircraft to Pope/Fort Bragg to form a 16 aircraft Air Force Reserve/active duty associate unit, and by relocating flying-related expeditionary combat support to Eastern West Virginia Regional Airport/Shepherd Field AGS (aerial port and fire fighters). Close Pittsburgh International Airport (IAP) Air Reserve Station (ARS), PA, and relocate 911th Airlift Wing's (AFRC) eight C-130H aircraft to Pope/Fort Bragg to form a 16 aircraft Air Force Reserve/active duty associate unit. Relocate AFRC operations and maintenance manpower to Pope/Fort Bragg. Relocate flight related ECS (aeromedical squadron) to Youngstown-Warren Regional APT ARS. Relocate all remaining Pittsburgh ECS and headquarters manpower to Offutt Air Force Base, NE. Air National Guard units at Pittsburgh are unaffected.

2. Further realign Pope Air Force Base, NC (**added recommendation**). Distribute the 43d Airlift Wing's C-130E aircraft (25 aircraft) to the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR; realign the 23d Fighter Group's A-10 aircraft (36 aircraft) to Moody Air Force Base, GA; transfer real property accountability to the Army; disestablish the 43d Medical Group and establish a medical squadron. At Little Rock Air Force Base, AR, realign eight C-130E aircraft to backup inventory; retire 27 C-130Es; realign one C-130J aircraft to the 143d Airlift Wing (ANG), Quonset State Airport Air Guard Station, RI; two C-130Js to the 146th Airlift Wing (ANG), Channel Islands Air Guard Station, CA; and transfer four C-130Js from the 314th Airlift Wing (AD) to the 189th Airlift Wing (ANG), Little Rock Air Force Base.

#### **Other Options**

3. Realign Pope AFB by sending C-130s from Dyess, TX to Pope AFB and establish Little Rock AFB as the pilot training center of excellence for the C-130 and Pope AFB as the joint operational training center of excellence for the C-130.
4. Maintain the 43D Wing as it currently exists to provide command and control and joint contingency planning capabilities in support of joint operations, based out of newly formed Joint Bragg-Pope Base.
5. Establish Joint Base Bragg-Pope by relocating the installation management functions/responsibilities to Ft. Bragg, but the Air force will continue to have responsibility to man and maintain all functions related to the airfield and airfield activities.

# ISG BRAC Scenario Tracking Tool

Scenario Proponent:  Scenario #  Date Created:

Scenario Title:  Reason D

Description:  Realign A-  
Scenarios

Title /  
Description  
Example

Principle: Consolidate legacy fleet; ensures force available for AEF construct

USAF-33  
USAF-42  
USAF-49  
USAF-52  
USAF-55

Transformational Option(s)

Principle(s)

Search returned 3 records

5:03 Status: Deleted

Deleted:

-10 Scenario Replaced by USAF

:

Search

Show All

Reports

New Record

Next Record

Previous  
Record

Export

] Inactive

] Candidate Recommendation

Import

Scenario Proponent: Air Force Scenario # USAF-0058 Date Created: 12/17/2004

Scenario Title: Realign Little Rock AFB (S301) Reason D

Description: Realign Little Rock AFB. Assigned C-130E aircraft (5 PAA) and C-130J aircraft (2 PAA) will be redistributed to the 43rd Airlift Wing, Pope AFB, North Carolina.; other assigned C-130E aircraft will be recoded to backup aircraft inventory (14 PAA) and retire (14 PAA). The 23rd Fighter Group's A-10 aircraft (36 PAA) assigned to Pope AFB will be redistributed to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Replaced

Title / Description Example

Transformational Option(s) Add/Edit

Principle(s) Add/Edit

9:22 Status: Deleted  
Deleted:  
by USAF - 122

Search

Show All

Reports

New Record

Next Record

Previous Record

Export

Import

- ] Inactive
- ] Candidate Recommendation

Scenario Proponent: Air Force Scenario # USAF-0096 Date Created: 1/6/2005 1

Scenario Title: Close Pope AFB (S315) Reason D

Description: Close Pope AFB. The 43rd Airlift Wing will be inactivated. Assigned C-130E (11PAA) and C-130J (14 PAA) aircraft will be distributed to the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock AFB, Arkansas. The 23rd Fighter Group's A-10 aircraft (36 PAA) will be reassigned to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Replaced

Title /  
Description  
Example

Transformational Option(s) Add/Edit

Principle(s) Add/Edit

7:11 Status: Deleted  
eleted:  
by USAF-122

Search

Show All

Reports

New Record

Next Record

Previous  
Record

Export

] Inactive

] Candidate Recommendation

Import

Scenario Proponent: Air Force Scenario # USAF-0122 Date Created: 2/4/2005 1

Scenario Title: Realign Pope AFB (S316.2) Reason D

Description: Realign Pope AFB. The 43rd Airlift Wing will be inactivated. Assigned C-130E (25 PAA) aircraft will be distributed to the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock AFB, Arkansas. Little Rock will retire C-130E aircraft (27 PAA); recode C-130E aircraft to BAI (8 PAA); distribute C-130J aircraft to the 143rd Airlift Wing (ANG) Quonset State APT AGS, Rhode Island (1 PAA) and 146th Airlift Wing (ANG) Channel Islands AGS, California (2 PAA). The 23rd Fighter Group at Pope will inactivate and associated A-10 aircraft (36 PAA) will be distributed to Moody AFB, Georgia. The 347th Rescue Wing's HC-130P (11 PAA) and HH-60 (14 PAA) aircraft will be distributed to the 355th Wing, Davis Monthan AFB, Arizona.

Transformational Option(s) Add/Edit

Principle(s) Add/Edit

- 
-

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deleted:

Search

Show All

Reports

New Record

Next Record

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Record


Export

Import

Inactive

Candidate Recommendation

version 2.1



# **Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission**

## **7. Pope Air Force Base, NC**

**Action under Consideration:**  
Close Pope AFB, NC.





## 7. Pope Air Force Base, NC

### Close:

- Pope AFB, NC. Relocate mission and assigned aircraft to other Air Force installations.

### Requirements:


- TBD

### Associated DoD Recommendations:

- USA – 6: Move small Army elements to Pope from various locations.
- USA – 8: Move FORSCOM to Pope.
- USAF – 35: Pope AFB, Pittsburgh IAP ARS, Yeager AGS.
- H&SA – 35: Create Joint Pre-Deployment/Mobilization Site Bragg/Pope.



EXIT



## 7. Pope Air Force Base, NC

### Reasons for Consideration:

- Airlift mission and synergies could be accomplished from other C-130 bases and with tanker/airlift control center scheduling.
- BCEG Minutes- Approved for Closure.



EXIT




# 7. Pope Air Force Base, NC

| UNDER ORIGINAL DOD PROPOSAL<br>INSTALLATION | TABLE OF PERSONNEL CHANGES |       |       |       |                 |     |       |              |
|---|----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-----------------|-----|-------|--------------|
|   | OUT                        |       | IN    |       | NET GAIN/(LOSS) |     | CONT. | TOTAL DIRECT |
|   | MIL                        | CIV   | MIL   | CIV   | MIL             | CIV |       |              |
| Pope AFB, NC                                | (5,969)                    | (345) | 1,148 | 1,153 | (4,821)         | 808 | (132) | (4,145)      |

| ACTION UNDER CONSIDERATION<br>INSTALLATION | TABLE OF PERSONNEL CHANGES |       |     |     |                 |       |       |              |
|--|----------------------------|-------|-----|-----|-----------------|-------|-------|--------------|
|  | OUT                        |       | IN  |     | NET GAIN/(LOSS) |       | CONT. | TOTAL DIRECT |
|  | MIL                        | CIV   | MIL | CIV | MIL             | CIV   |       |              |
| Pope AFB, NC                               | (5,448)                    | (426) | 0   | 0   | (5,448)         | (426) | 0     | (5,874)      |



EXIT




# 7. Pope Air Force Base, NC

## COBRA DATA

|                                   | Realign<br>Pope, NC<br>COBRA data<br>6/2/2005 | Close<br>Pope, NC<br>COBRA data<br>1/17/2005 |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| One Time Cost                     | \$218.1                                       | \$116.9                                      |
| Net Implementation Cost/(Savings) | \$681.3                                       | (\$6.4 M)                                    |
| Annual Recurring (Savings)        | THIS NUMBER IS SUSP.<br>(\$202.7 M)           | (\$130.4 M)                                  |
| Payback Period/Year               | 2009 (Immediate)                              | 2012 (1 Year)                                |
| Net Present Value at 2025         | (\$2,598.1 M)                                 | (\$1,274.3 M)                                |

Navigation icons: Home, Left Arrow, Right Arrow, Double Left Arrow, Double Right Arrow, Undo

EXIT




# Staff Analysis

| ISSUE | DOD POSITION   | COMMUNITY POSITION  | R&A STAFF FINDINGS |
|-------|--|---|--------------------|
|       | Disestablish the 43 <sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing and transfer Pope AFB to the Army | Establish Bragg/Pope as a Joint Base, which was proposed by JCSCG |                    |
|       |  |   |                    |
|       |  |   |                    |
|       |  |   |                    |



EXIT




## 7. Pope Air Force Base, NC

### DOD Response:

- Pending DoD Letter

### GAO Comment:

- None



EXIT

**Flinn, Michael, CIV, WSO-BRAC**

---

**Subject:** Updated: R&A Meeting with Fayetteville/Pope representatives  
**Location:** Conference Room B

**Start:** Thu 7/14/2005 11:00 AM  
**End:** Thu 7/14/2005 12:00 PM

**Recurrence:** (none)

**Meeting Status:** Accepted

**Required Attendees:** Flinn, Michael, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Long, Kathryn, CIV, WSO-BRAC

**PURPOSE:** Further discuss data provided at hearing and provide community perspective on Commissioner's questions to SecDef

*For  
43rd  
air  
command*

**ATTENDEES:** Brigadier General (Ret) Paul Dordal, Tony Chavonne, Tony Peck- General (Ret) William Kernan (Possibly)

**POC:** Ali Thompson (Dole) 202-224-7972

**COMMISSION ATTENDEES:** Mike Flinn

**LA:** C Hill

*Amber  
Court Business  
Council*

*US Army  
Fort Br. Staff  
Council*

End State - Presentation for leaving

7 Jointness Bases

~~Col Mc~~

4/23/05 Page AFB - Col. The Dew

AD Presence - Sequencer of C-130 Program  
@ 500 AF

Staff

15th Airlift Special Operations Group (ASOG)

Privatized Housing - Reloched

MILCON issues

682 rd for Staw

Move C-130 ASAP (within 2 years)

~~Windsch~~ Windscheld Town

Space Limitations

Red Bays overlook ~~Nothing to see~~

No buildings on Page so unique  
that it can't be replicated

More DW quarters / conference center

Opening up more to Bragg will

Move B-10s would allow room for

C-130s. Move C-130s of  
more room for H-10s  
Total of 18 planes would be  
brought on

Guard + Reserve unit don't suggest  
& Brody. "They could if they should"

C-17s

~~at~~

→ Page is not a good base for training  
PAC studs (?)

FORSSOM - Available space to  
put all ~~these~~ those people.  
MILCOV. Greenspace around  
perimeter needs to ~~be~~ remain

"Clear state"

Utilities to be privatized.

Running - needs to be extended 3000'  
on ~~page~~ Page. Fully loaded  
~~plane~~ plane on C-5 or C-17  
on best day can't lift off.

3 self courses at Buzzy

But N.C. sees BRAC 2005  
as a "huge" win.

~~Buildable~~ Buildable acreage. Compare  
sq. footage. But not all square footage  
is equal. Warehouse square footage may  
not be comparable w/ ~~square foot~~  
administrative square footage.

Govs "going to be a fight" - Lt. Governor  
- public

C-1305 is supposed to be 2007-  
2012

Red Rays - Annex Rays

Green Rays - Loading Rays for 82nd  
75,000 sq. feet hospital required.  
Currently a 13,000 sq-foot

C 1305 - Bigger / Faster / short field  
capabilities. Flys further.

1330

\$130, ~~M~~ on temporary facility  
To house 4ABC  
Seminars Army Airfield  
Cook FORCECOM & 4BARC  
HQ.

Several 100 acres at BRAGG ASP  
251 sq. miles

Tea down of one of the golf  
courses (120 acres)

Largest building @ Pope is  
1/10 size of FORCECOM HQ

\$200 M value for Base 4th Brigade  
J SOC - Joint Special Operations Command

150 Building on Ruckfeller Estate  
Only Donald Ross golf course that  
has not been touched

7th Bragg has 52,000 people -  
base as of last year

144,000 cars come through gate each day

7th BRAGG Windshield View

Big question - Operational ~~Plan~~ pace,  
time line.

Simons DAD - will not accommodate  
anything larger than a C-12  
Double perimeter fence

C-130 loss

ABC3

Airborne Command Control  
and Communications

Forces Command vs Third Army Staff  
are there any deal bits

7th Special Forces Group @ 1800 people

\$3B BRAC Wedge

Total Cost of BRAC activities = \$18B

No mention of Simons or 7th Stewart  
in BRAC recommendations

- Bragg / BRAC recommendations  
+ do they include cost of  
building FORCE COM HQ  
+ DCT HQ

Reserve Wing - Will they be able to  
satisfy short notice requirement

Flight qualification of pilots. How will  
that,

All consideration aside?  
Net / Net

Are MILCO costs added  
- Housing availability w/ departure  
of Air Force

Activities at Bagg are ~~not~~ unrelated  
to ~~not~~ activities at Pope.

Fin / Police / Sewage / Telecommunications

5/24/05 Meeting w/ Col. The Dew and  
Admiral Gehman. 2nd step in  
8 step process  
3rd Step = Regional Hearings  
4th Step

~~7.1.05~~ Fayetteville is a Dmg town  
The Dew - Wing Commander since Jan.  
~~See~~ ~~See~~ No real friendships in  
community. Congressman Wags & McIntyre

Admiral Behman has very pointed  
operability questions - J50C & Delta  
No ready crew maintained of ~~AFB~~  
Page B703. Also

Big losses - relationships built over  
time between Page & Brogg. That  
gets lost and McDew doesn't see  
how it will be replaced

Δ between E & 70 - age. H's  
have different engines. Lift / carrying  
capacity are similar. Of 22  
planes, 13 are grounded.

8 - 9 million to get grounded E's  
flyable.

H-1

H-2

H-3

Wing command structure goes away.  
Aeromedical ~~evacuation~~ evacuation squadrons  
will remain.

12:15 Admiral Behman - Introductions  
briefs to B7 staff.

32 C-130 C's - 13 grounded

unique C-130 here?

BWADS - all weather air delivery

43 A/OA-70s

Practices in Republic over ocean  
& over Charleston, Tanker mostly  
come ~~for~~ from McGuire & McDill.

18 A506 stays ~~at~~ at Pope  
4300 authorization of in 43 airlift wing

~~Transient~~ Transient lodging available  
Woodland Heights Housing development  
219 ~~to~~ 2 bedroom units  
Army is building 600 + units. AF  
was going to build 300 more units.  
~~may~~ may not happen now.

C 1305 is going to the 43rd Air Wing.  
Only if it stays at Pope AFB.  
Supposed to be CY 2007

Flight drops. Reserves can be  
trained to NVG qualifications

FA Bross is a big swimmer. Will  
~~the~~ square footage be adequate

25-35 % of single / married staff  
~~top~~ live at base

7500 ft runway @ Page  
More B-10s and more C-130's  
~~Runway~~ Runway resurfaced 2 years  
ago.

No changes to runway functionality  
@ \$100M to extend runway

Page gets utilities from Ft Bragg  
Separate security  
Separate fire trucks / Truck removal  
State fire ~~range~~ range

1400 Briefs to Col. Aycock

Biggest previous impediment to Ft Bragg  
development is the presence of the  
red-cockaded woodpecker.

Input variables

New vehicle - 7 + Budget the -  
At head,

200 Mileage and Budget - 7 + Budget

Environment considerations. Reduced  
savings for on force of Page  
will be a cost to the Army  
of on force volume maintenance  
costs, has also that reference to  
Page 103 assignment because?

Does mean out 7.576 give up  
additional walk space. Yes. The  
Other groups will report to the  
use for ordered 4703.

Read Report Director. Not the  
for along Army Air Force reception  
handled by looking.

"No showings" Ad. Alan

Want committee on gestures.  
Daily interest will be lost. Our  
a program  
+ Day, training have, the relationship



- Go down 1 layer
- Costs of BCT
  - Costs of FORCECOM Move
  - No double counting
- 10% - 15% discrepancies
- we ~~may~~ may not want to dig deeper.

Inquire - are C-17, C-5s & C-141s load restricted.

Trip report - 1 to 2 pages.

Team Leaders - extract key issues & provide issues list.

Adding a base will be toughest issue. Only reason they would add a base would be to delete a base.

- Preliminary notice 45 days from list publication. July 25
- SECRET has to be noticed 15 days before start @ 5 July.

- Deleting a base is easy. No time restrictions.

Meets w/ Commissioner Coyle  
8/15/05

Get copies

3 sections / day @ Pope w/ C-130

No plan section no - group  
ing

No executive planning component

Air Force Operational Test Results

Keep air force @ at Pope

| <u>ROADS AND GROUNDS**</u>        | <u>FY04</u> |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|
| ACREAGE .....                     | 160,770     |
| ACREAGE USED FOR TRAINING* .....  | 138,713     |
| SURFACED HIGHWAYS (MILES) .....   | 330         |
| UNSURFACED HIGHWAYS (MILES) ..... | 194         |
| RAILROADS (MILES) .....           | 19          |
| TANK TRAILS (MILES) .....         | 167         |
| FIRE BREAKS (MILES) .....         | 650         |

| <u>REAL PROPERTY**</u>                           |                 |
|--|-----------------|
| BUILDING SPACE(SQ FT of Bragg and Mackall) ..... | 31,098,197      |
| (7,747,543 SF of Housing managed by PHC)         |                 |
| FAMILY QUARTERS UNITS .....                      | 4,737           |
| FAMILY QUARTERS LEASED OFF-POST .....            | 250             |
| REAL PROPERTY VALUE (LESS LAND) .....            | \$2,157,319,100 |
| MAJOR CONSTRUCTION .....                         | \$149,600,000   |
| MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR CONSTRUCTION .....        | \$33,600,000    |

| <u>TRAINING AREAS**</u> |    |
|-------------------------|----|
| RANGES .....            | 84 |
| IMPACT AREAS .....      | 4  |
| MAJOR DROP ZONES .....  | 7  |

| <u>MILITARY POPULATION***/PAY</u> |                 |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|
| OFFICERS .....                    | 4,424           |
| WARRANT OFFICERS .....            | 1,126           |
| ENLISTED .....                    | 35,908          |
| ACTIVE AR AND NG .....            | 10,822          |
| MILITARY RESIDING ON-POST .....   | 18,765          |
| MILITARY RESIDING OFF-POST .....  | 22,693          |
| NUMBER OF PARACHUTE JUMPS .....   | 75,000          |
| MILITARY PAY .....                | \$1,828,906,752 |

| <u>RESERVE COMPONENTS</u>    |       |
|------------------------------|-------|
| ANNUAL TRAINING HOSTED ..... | 3,345 |
| INACTIVE DUTY TRAINING ..... | 4,659 |
| ROTC .....                   | 1,599 |

| <u>MOBILIZED/DEMORILIZED(AS OF 1 NOV 04)</u> |        |
|--|--------|
| MOBILIZED .....                              | 26,516 |
| DE-MOBILIZED .....                           | 16,734 |

NOTE: FIGURES ARE ACTUAL FY 04 (AS OF 30 SEP 04) UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.

\* Total includes DZs, Ranges and Maneuver (Impact) Areas  
 \*\*DATA INCLUDES CAMP MACKALL  
 \*\*\*INFO DOES NOT INCLUDE USAF MILITARY/CIVILIANS LOCATED AT POPE AIR FORCE BASE

| <u>FAMILY MEMBER/RETIREE POPULATION</u>              |        |
|--|--------|
| FAMILY MEMBERS OF ACTIVE DUTY RESIDING ON-POST ..... | 11,695 |
| ARMY RETIREES AND FAMILY MEMBERS IN NC .....         | 98,507 |
| OTHER SVCS RETIREES IN ZIPS 27000-28999 .....        | 48,115 |

| <u>FORT BRAGG SCHOOLS</u>                    |              |
|--|--------------|
| NUMBER OF SCHOOLS ON POST .....              | 9            |
| STUDENT ENROLLMENT .....                     | 4,474        |
| ANNUAL BUDGET (03/04 ACADEMIC YEAR) .....    | \$39,821,800 |
| PL874 FEDERAL IMPACT FUNDS AREA SCHOOL ..... | \$6,014,376  |

| <u>CIVILIAN POPULATION/PAY</u>  |               |
|---------------------------------|---------------|
| DA CIVILIANS .....              | 4,431         |
| OTHER EMPLOYEES                 |               |
| (NAF, CONTRACT, PX, ETC.) ..... | 4,326         |
| DA CIVILIAN PAY .....           | \$248,990,299 |
| NAF EMPLOYEE PAY .....          | \$20,087,528  |
| EXCHANGE PERSONNEL PAY .....    | \$15,380,889  |
| ON-POST BUSINESS PAY .....      | \$2,920,617   |

| <u>OPERATING/INCOME FIGURES</u> |               |
|---------------------------------|---------------|
| UTILITY COSTS .....             | \$53,985,128  |
| GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS .....      | \$252,691,934 |
| POST EXCHANGE GROSS SALES ..... | \$194,981,487 |
| COMMISSARY GROSS SALES .....    | \$140,850,744 |

| <u>ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET</u>               |               |
|--|---------------|
| IMA FY 04 EXECUTED .....                     | \$360,321,614 |
| IMA FY 05 PROGRAMMED (AS OF 07 OCT 04) ..... | \$157,578,000 |
| MSN FY 04 EXECUTED .....                     | \$544,029,700 |
| MSN FY 05 PROGRAMMED (AS OF 01 OCT 04) ..... | \$164,815,000 |

| <u>CONTRIBUTIONS</u>                            |             |
|---|-------------|
| COMBINED FEDERAL CAMPAIGN-ALL AGENCIES .....    | \$2,311,702 |
| (CFC-FORT BRAGG PORTION ALONE) .....            | \$1,770,855 |
| ARMY EMERGENCY RELIEF (AER) CONTRIBUTIONS ..... | \$415,464   |
| (AER LOANS AND GRANTS EXTENDED) .....           | \$2,086,472 |

| <u>TOTAL POST WORK FORCE</u>                  |        |
|---|--------|
| TOTAL MILITARY (ACTIVE, RESERVE AND NG) ..... | 52,280 |
| CIVILIAN .....                                | 8,757  |

| <u>TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACT ON LOCAL (10-COUNTY) AREA</u> |                    |
|--|--------------------|
| .....  | \$5,927,006,281.28 |

10 COUNTIES INCLUDE: BLADEN, CUMBERLAND, HARNETT, HOKE, LEE MOORE, RICHMOND, ROBESON, SAMPSON AND SCOTLAND.

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ITINERARY FOR THE VISIT OF  
ADMIRAL HAROLD W. (HAL) GEHMAN, JR. (RET)  
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
TO  
POPE AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH CAROLINA



**VISIT DATE:** 24 May 2005 *Draft: As of 23 May*

**MEMBERS IN PARTY:** LTC Kevin Felix  
Dr. Michael Flinn

**HOST:** Colonel Darren W. McDew, Commander, 43d Airlift Wing

**PROJECT OFFICER:** Lt Col Lisa Markgraf, Inspector General and Director of Staff, 43d Airlift Wing  
Office: (910) 394-1798 Cell: (910) 237-6886

**PROTOCOL:** Ms. Anne Niece, 43 AW/CCP, Office: (910) 394-4739, Cell: (910) 224-6637  
Lt Angela Uribe-Olson, 43 AW/CCP, Cell: (910) 797-5328

**PURPOSE:** Pope Air Force Base Visit

| <u>DATE/TIME</u>            | <u>ACTIVITY</u>  | <u>POC</u>           |
|-----------------------------|--|----------------------|
| <u>Tuesday</u><br>24 May 05 | <i>Weather Forecast: Partly-Mostly Cloudy (30% chance of precipitation)</i><br>73°F/52°F<br><i>Uniform: Blues</i>  |                      |
| 0955                        | Arrive Fayetteville Airport from Washington DC   | CCP<br>797-5336/5328 |
| 0955-1050                   | En route to Pope AFB   |                      |
| 1050-1150                   | Arrive Pope AFB (Manchester Gate)  |                      |
| 1150                        | Arrive 43d Airlift Wing Headquarters Building<br>Met by: Col McDew<br>CMSgt Herb Hanson, 43 AW/CCC   |                      |
| 1150-1220                   | Office Call with Col McDew   |                      |
| 1220-1225                   | Comfort Break  |                      |
| 1225-1255                   | Pope AFB Brief<br>Briefer: Capt Donald Tasker, 43 MSS<br>Attendees: ADM Gehman<br>LTC Felix<br>Dr. Flinn<br>Col McDew<br>Col Steve Burgess, 43 AW/CV<br>Col Darryl Blan, 43 OG/CV<br>Col Eric Wilbur, 43 MSG/CC<br>Col Ron Nelson, 43 MDOG/CC<br>Col William Stewart, 43 AW/CCJ<br>Lt Col Herb Phillips, 43 MXG/CV<br>Lt Col Michael O'Dowd, 23 OSS/CC |                      |

Lt Col **John Masotti**, 18 ASOG/DS  
CMSgt Hanson  
SMSgt **James Wangeline**, 53 APS

- 1255-1300 En route to Pope Club for lunch via DV Surrey  
DV Surrey: (Driver: A1C Shawn Stafford)  
ADM Gehman  
LTC Felix  
Dr. Flinn  
Col McDew  
Col Burgess  
CMSgt Hanson  
Ms. Niece
- 1300-1400 Working lunch in the Daedalian Room at the Pope Club  
Attendees: Same as Pope Brief  
Menu: *Tossed Salad with Cucumbers and Tomatoes*  
*Choice of Ranch or Golden Italian Dressings*  
*Oven Roasted Turkey Breast*  
*On a French Croissant with Shredded Lettuce & Tomato*  
*Luncheon Rolls & Butter*  
*Coffee and Iced Tea Service*
- 1400-1500 Windshield Tour of Pope AFB via DV Surrey  
DV Surrey: (Driver: A1C Shawn Stafford)  
ADM Gehman  
LTC Felix  
Dr. Flinn  
Col McDew  
Col Burgess  
Col Blan  
Col Wilbur  
Col Nelson  
Lt Col Phillips  
Lt Col O'Dowd  
Lt Col Masotti  
CMSgt Hanson  
SMSgt James Wangeline
- 1500 Arrive 43d Airlift Wing Headquarters Building
- 1500-1530 Meeting with Col McDew and Col Aycock, XVIII Airborne Corps, Garrison  
Commander  
Location: Col McDew's office  
*Ft Bragg Protocol will meet party and take to Ft Bragg for tour*
- 1530-1700 Windshield Tour of Ft Bragg
- 1700 Departure from Pope AFB, en route to Fayetteville Airport  
*Ft Bragg Protocol will bring party to 43 AW Headquarters to pick-up vehicle*
- 1900 Take-Off from Fayetteville Airport

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ITINERARY FOR THE VISIT OF  
ADMIRAL HAROLD W. (HAL) GEHMAN, JR. (RET)  
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
TO  
POPE AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH CAROLINA



**VISIT DATE:** 24 May 2005

**MEMBERS IN PARTY:** LTC Kevin Felix  
Dr. Michael Flinn

**HOST:** Colonel Darren W. McDew, 43 AW/CC

**PROJECT OFFICER:** Lt Col Lisa Markgraf, 43 AW/DS & 43 AW/IG  
Office: (910) 394-1798, Cell: (910) 237-6886

**PROTOCOL:** Ms. Anne Niece, 43 AW/CCP, Office: (910) 394-4739, Cell: (910) 224-6637  
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| <u>DATE/TIME</u>            | <u>ACTIVITY</u>   | <u>POC</u>                   |
|-----------------------------|---|------------------------------|
| <u>Tuesday</u><br>24 May 05 | <i>Weather Forecast: Partly-Mostly Cloudy (30% chance of precipitation)<br/>73°F-52°F<br/>Uniform: Blues</i>  |                              |
| 0955                        | Arrive Fayetteville Airport from Washington DC  | CCP<br>797-5328/<br>224-6637 |
| 0955-1050                   | En route to Pope AFB  |                              |
| 1050-1150                   | Arrive Pope AFB<br><i>(Party will go to Pope Club for meeting. CCP will meet party)</i>   | CCP<br>797-5328/<br>224-6637 |
| 1150                        | Arrive 43d Airlift Wing Headquarters Building<br>Met by: Col McDew<br>CMSgt Herb Hanson, 43 AW/CCC  | CCP<br>797-5328/<br>224-6637 |
| 1150-1220                   | Office Call with Col McDew  | CCP<br>797-5328/<br>224-6637 |
| 1220-1225                   | Comfort Break   |                              |
| 1225-1255                   | Pope AFB Brief<br>Briefer: Capt Donald Tasker, 43 MSS<br>Attendees: ADM Gehman<br>LTC Felix<br>Dr. Flinn<br>Col McDew<br>Col Steve Burgess, 43 AW/CV<br>Col Darryl Blan, 43 OG/CD | CCP<br>797-5328/<br>224-6637 |

**ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATION:**

- AF-6: Realign Eielson AFB
  - AF-32: Close Cannon AFB
  - AF-35: Maintenance realignment from Shaw AFB
  - E&T-14: Realignment of Undergraduate Pilot Training.
- 

**6. GALENA AIRPORT FORWARD OPERATING LOCATION (FOL), AK**

**ISSUE:**

- Was any consideration given to merging the missions of Galena FOL, AK, and Eielson AFB, AK? Why does the United States need to maintain two FOLs in Alaska, given the current national security environment and 20-year threat assessment?

**ISSUE BACKGROUND:**

- Galena is one of two FOLs in Alaska that serve as alert bases for air intercept aircraft in support of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) missions. The requirement for maintaining two FOLs in Alaska may no longer be valid. The mission could be accomplished by maintaining one FOL and two Air Force bases in Alaska.

**ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- AF-6: Eielson AFB, AK; Moody AFB, GA; and Shaw AFB, GA
  - AF-7: Kulis Air Guard Station, AK; and Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK
  - AF-18: Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID; Nellis Air Force Base, NV; and Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK
  - AF-43: Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD; and Dyess Air Force Base, TX
- 

**7. POPE AIR FORCE BASE, NC**

**ISSUE:**

- What considerations drove the recommendation to realign, rather close Pope AFB NC, under Fort Bragg, NC? Are the joint operational synergies that exist between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 43<sup>rd</sup> Airlift Wing/23<sup>rd</sup> Fighter Group able to be replicated from other locations?

**ISSUE BACKGROUND:**

- DoD appears to have determined that much of the benefits of the collocation of the joint forces that will operate together (CAS aircraft, operational planning staffs) are outweighed by the ability to schedule support as necessary through third parties.

**ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- USA-8: Fort Gillem, GA
- USA-8: Fort McPherson, GA
- AF-35: Pope Air Force Base, NC, Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station, PA; and Yeager Air Guard Station, WV
- H&SA-35: Create Joint Mobilization Sites

\$0.04M in costs for environmental compliance and waste management. These costs were included in the payback calculation. There are no anticipated impacts to the costs of environmental restoration. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation have been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to the implementation of this recommendation.

**Pope Air Force Base, NC, Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station, PA,  
and Yeager Air Guard Station, WV**

**Recommendation:** Realign Pope Air Force Base (Air Force Base), NC. Distribute the 43d Airlift Wing's C-130E aircraft (25 aircraft) to the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR; realign the 23d Fighter Group's A-10 aircraft (36 aircraft) to Moody Air Force Base, GA; transfer real property accountability to the Army; disestablish the 43rd Medical Group and establish a medical squadron. At Little Rock Air Force Base, AR, realign eight C-130E aircraft to backup inventory; retire 27 C-130Es; realign one C-130J aircraft to the 143d Airlift Wing (ANG), Quonset State Airport Air Guard Station, RI; two C-130Js to the 146th Airlift Wing (ANG), Channel Islands Air Guard Station, CA; and transfer four C-130Js from the 314th Airlift Wing (AD) to the 189th Airlift Wing (ANG), Little Rock Air Force Base.

Realign Yeager Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), WV, by realigning eight C-130H aircraft to Pope/Fort Bragg to form a 16 aircraft Air Force Reserve/active duty associate unit, and by relocating flying-related expeditionary combat support (ECS) to Eastern West Virginia Regional Airport/Shepherd Field AGS (aerial port and fire fighters). Close Pittsburgh International Airport (IAP) Air Reserve Station (ARS), PA, and relocate 911th Airlift Wing's (AFRC) eight C-130H aircraft to Pope/Fort Bragg to form a 16 aircraft Air Force Reserve/active duty associate unit. Relocate AFRC operations and maintenance manpower to Pope/Fort Bragg. Relocate flight related ECS (aeromedical squadron) to Youngstown-Warren Regional APT ARS. Relocate all remaining Pittsburgh ECS and headquarters manpower to Offutt Air Force Base, NE. Air National Guard units at Pittsburgh are unaffected.

**Justification:** Downsizing Pope Air Force Base takes advantage of mission-specific consolidation opportunities to reduce operational costs, maintenance costs and the manpower footprint. The smaller manpower footprint facilitates transfer of the installation to the Army. Active duty C-130s and A-10s will move to Little Rock (17-airlift) and Moody (11-SOF/CSAR), respectively, to consolidate force structure at those two bases and enable Army recommendations at Pope. At Little Rock, older aircraft are retired or converted to back-up inventory and J-model C-130s are aligned under the Air National Guard. Little Rock grows to become the single major active duty C-130 unit, streamlining maintenance and operation of this aging weapon system. At Pope, the synergistic, multi-service relationship will continue between Army airborne and Air Force airlift forces with the creation of an active duty/Reserve associate unit. The C-130 unit remains as an Army tenant on an expanded Fort Bragg. With the disestablishment of the 43rd Medical Group, the AF will maintain the required manpower to provide primary care, flight and occupational medicine to support the Air Force active duty military members. The Army will maintain the required manpower necessary to provide primary care, flight, and occupational medicine to support the Army active duty military members. The Army will provide ancillary

and specialty medical services for all assigned Army and Air Force military members (lab, x-ray, pharmacy, etc).

The major command's capacity briefing reported Pittsburgh ARS land constraints prevented the installation from hosting more than 10 C-130 aircraft and Yeager AGS cannot support more than eight C-130s. Careful analysis of mission capability indicates that it is more appropriate to robust the proposed airlift mission at Fort Bragg to an optimal 16 aircraft C-130 squadron, which provides greater military value and offers unique opportunities for Jointness.

**Payback:** The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$218.1M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of \$652.5M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$197.0M, with an immediate payback expected. The net present value of the cost and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$2,515.4M.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 7,840 jobs (4,700 direct jobs and 3,140 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Fayetteville, NC, Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is 4.0 percent of economic area employment.

*Air Force  
Out*

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 246 jobs (156 direct jobs and 90 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Charleston, WV, Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

*= 476*

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 581 jobs (322 direct jobs and 259 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Pittsburgh, PA, Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure Assessment:** A review of the community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support forces, missions and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** There are potential impacts to air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; and wetlands that may need to be considered during the implementation of this recommendation. There are no anticipated impacts to dredging; or marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries. Impacts of costs include \$1.3M in costs for environmental compliance and waste management. These costs were included in the payback calculation. There are no anticipated impacts to the costs of environmental restoration. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC


# ASMP Master Plan

## OUTLOAD ENHANCEMENT PLAN PROJECT PHASING PHASES PROGRAM COST

- 1a.
- 1b.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.


|         |
|---------|
| \$13M   |
|         |
|         |
|         |
| \$17.5M |

- 1a. INFRASTRUCTURE, IRC AHA,  
PERSONNEL SHELTER
- 1b. CARGO HANDLING FACILITY &  
PERSONNEL SHELTERS
- 2. HEAVY DROP RIGGING FACILITY
- 3. AMMUNITION HOLDING AREA
- 4. FUELS FACILITY





# POPE RAMP LAYOUT



and consultations with tribes regarding cultural resources will be required at Fort Campbell. This recommendation has the potential to impact noise and threatened and endangered species or critical habitat at Fort Campbell. An Air Conformity Analysis will be required at Fort Benning. Construction at Pope AFB may have to occur on acreage already constrained by TES. This recommendation has the potential to impact wetlands at Pope AFB and Shaw AFB. This recommendation has no impact on dredging; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; or waste management. This recommendation will require spending approximately \$1.3M for environmental compliance costs. These costs were included in the payback calculation. Fort Gillem reports \$18M in environmental restoration costs. Because the Department has a legal obligation to perform environmental restoration regardless of whether an installation is closed, realigned, or remains open, these costs were not included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.

#### **Fort McPherson, GA**

**Recommendation:** Close Fort McPherson, GA. Relocate the Headquarters US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), and the Headquarters US Army Reserve Command (USARC) to Pope Air Force Base, NC. Relocate the Headquarters 3rd US Army to Shaw Air Force Base, SC. Relocate the Installation Management Agency Southeastern Region Headquarters and the US Army Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM) Southeastern Region Headquarters to Fort Eustis, VA. Relocate the Army Contracting Agency Southern Region Headquarters to Fort Sam Houston.

**Justification:** This recommendation closes Fort McPherson, an administrative installation, and moves the tenant headquarters organizations to Fort Sam Houston, Fort Eustis, Pope AFB and Shaw AFB. It enhances the Army's military value, is consistent with the Army's Force Structure Plan, and maintains adequate surge capabilities to address future unforeseen requirements. This closure allows the Army to employ excess capacities at installations that can accomplish more than administrative missions. The organization relocations in this recommendation also create multifunctional, multi-component and multi-Service installations that provide a better level of service at a reduced cost.

The recommended relocations also retain or enhance vital linkages between the relocating organizations and other headquarters activities. FORSCOM HQs is relocated to Pope AFB where it will be co-located with a large concentration of operational forces. The USARC HQs has a mission relationship with FORSCOM that is enhanced by leaving the two co-located. 3rd Army is relocated to Shaw AFB where it will be collocated with the Air Force component command of CENTCOM. The IMA and NETCOM HQs are moved to Fort Eustis because of recommendations to consolidate the Northeastern and Southeastern regions of these two commands into one Eastern Region at Fort Eustis. The ACA Southern Region HQs is moved to

**Payback:** The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$6.4M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of \$1.6M. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$1.0M, with a payback expected in seven years. The net present value savings to the Department over 20 years is \$8.3M.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 413 jobs (198 direct jobs and 215 indirect jobs) over 2006-2011 period in the Spokane, WA, Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is 0.2 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure Assessment:** A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** There are potential impacts to cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; and wetlands that may need to be considered during the implementation of this recommendation. There are no anticipated impacts to air quality; dredging; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; waste management; or water resources. No impacts are anticipated for the costs of environmental restoration, environmental compliance, or waste management activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation have been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to the implementation of this recommendation.

#### General Mitchell Air Reserve Station, WI

**Recommendation:** Close General Mitchell Air Reserve Station (ARS). Distribute the eight C-130H aircraft of the 440th Airlift Wing to the 94th Airlift Wing (AFR), Dobbins Air Reserve Base (ARB), GA (four aircraft) and to the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR (four aircraft). Realign the 440th Airlift Wing's operations, maintenance and Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) manpower to Fort Bragg, NC. Air National Guard units at Mitchell are unaffected by this recommendation.

**Justification:** This recommendation distributes C-130 aircraft to two bases of higher military value, Little Rock Air Force Base (17) and Dobbins Air Reserve Base (71). Adding aircraft to Little Rock and Dobbins optimizes squadron size, creating larger, more effective squadrons. Additionally, these transfers move C-130 force structure from the Air Force Reserve to active duty--addressing a documented imbalance in the active/Air National Guard/Air Force manning mix for C-130s.

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**Pope AFB, NC**  
**BRAC 2005 Recommendations**

**Air Force Recommendations**

**Realign Pope AFB, NC.** Move 25 C-130 aircraft to Little Rock AFB, AR. Move 36 A-10 aircraft to Moody AFB, GA. Transfer ownership of Pope AFB to the U.S. Army. Receive C-130 aircraft from Pittsburgh ARS, PA and Yeager AGS, WV, to form an AFRC Wing. Create active duty association on AFRC C-130 aircraft. Numerous Air Force units (3 APS, 18 ASOG, 14 ASOS, 373 TRS DET 1, and others) remain in place continuing to provide support to the Army and become tenants to the Army on an expanded Ft. Bragg.

**Joint Recommendations**

**Close Ft. McPherson, GA.** Move the HQs US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), and the HQs US Army Reserve Command (USARC) to Pope Air Force Base, NC.

**Close Ft. Gillem.** Move the HQs US Forces Command (FORSCOM) VIP Explosive Ordnance Support to Pope AFB, NC.

**Joint Mobilization Site.**

**Establish Joint Mobilization Sites.** Realign Ft Eustis, VA, Ft Jackson, SC, and Ft Lee, VA, by relocating all mobilization processing functions to Ft Bragg, NC, designating it as Joint Pre-Deployment/Mobilization Site Bragg/Pope.

**Incoming Activities**

**Air Force Actions:**

**What:** Receive C-130 aircraft from Pittsburgh ARS and Yeager AGS.

**Why:** This consolidation is part of a larger effort to consolidate the C-130 force structure into larger, more effective units. Placing this AFRC presence at Ft. Bragg will maintain the synergy that has existed between Army maneuver units and Air Force tactical airlift at Pope AFB.

**What:** Create an active duty association on AFRC C-130 aircraft.

**Why:** This is part of a larger effort across the Air Force forming reverse associate units. Active duty manpower and crews will share in the operation and maintenance of reserve component aircraft. This will provide the active duty with greater access to reserve component airframes and creates opportunities for seasoning active duty members through association with the corporate

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experience retained in the reserve component. Creation of an associate unit at Pope/Ft. Bragg allows for support of active duty members assigned to the associate unit.

**Joint Actions:**

**What:** Close Ft. McPherson, GA. Move the HQs US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), and the HQs US Army Reserve Command (USARC) to Pope Air Force Base, NC.

**Why:** Ft McPherson, an administrative installation, moves the tenant headquarters organizations to Pope AFB. It enhances the Army's military value, is consistent with the Army's Force Structure Plan, and maintains adequate surge capabilities to address future unforeseen requirements. This closure allows the Army to employ excess capacities at installations that can accomplish more than administrative missions. The organization relocations in this recommendation also create multifunctional, multi-component and multi-Service installations that provide a better level of service at a reduced cost. The recommended relocations also retain or enhance vital linkages between the relocating organizations and other headquarters activities.

**What:** Close Ft. Gillem. Move the HQs US Forces Command (FORSCOM) VIP Explosive Ordnance Support to Pope AFB, NC.

**Why:** Ft Gillem, an administrative installation and an AAFES distribution center, moves small components of the HQs 3<sup>rd</sup> US Army and US Army Forces Command to Pope AFB. It enhances the Army's military value, is consistent with the Army's Force Structure Plan, and maintains adequate surge capabilities to address future unforeseen requirements. This closure allows the Army to employ excess capacities at installations that can accomplish more than administrative missions. The closure also enables the stationing of its tenant units at locations that will increase their ability to associate with like units and promote coordination of efforts.

**What:** Joint Mobilization Sites realign lower threshold mobilization sites to existing large capacity sites and transforms them into Joint Pre-Deployment/Mobilization Platforms.

**Why:** Joint Mobilization Sites are expected to have the long-term effect of creating pre-deployment/mobilization centers of excellence, leverage economies of scale, reduce costs, and improve service to mobilized service members. This action specifically targets four of the larger capacity mobilization centers located in higher density Reserve Component (RC) personnel areas. These platforms have the added military value of strategic location, Power Projection Platform (PPP) and deployment capabilities. The gaining bases all have an adjoining installation from another service(s), thereby gaining the opportunity to increase partnership and enhance existing joint service facilities and capabilities.

**Departing Activities**

**Air Force Actions:**

**What:** Move 25 C-130 aircraft to Little Rock AFB.

**Why:** Other than locations where active duty personnel are in a reverse associate organizations with reserve component units, Little Rock will become a single location for CONUS active duty C-130 force structure. This consolidation presents opportunities for efficiency in maintaining an aging aircraft fleet. Additionally, this allows similar consolidations within other weapon systems and facilitates high value recommendations of other services.

**What:** Move 36 A-10 aircraft to Moody AFB.

**Why:** This consolidation is part of a larger effort to consolidate the A-10 fleet in fewer locations.

**Joint Actions:** NONE.

**Quantitative Results**

| Manpower     |           |       |
|--------------|-----------|-------|
| Installation | Full Time | Drill |
| Impact       | -4015     | +1164 |

Includes BRAC and Non-BRAC Programmatic Changes through FY2011.

**Preliminary Manpower Move Year\***

|  |         |
|--|---------|
| Realign Pope Moves                         | FY07    |
| Receive Army FORSCOM HQs from Ft McPherson | FY07-08 |
| Receive Army Units from Ft Gillem          | FY08    |
| Joint Mobilization Site                    | FY08    |
| Receive Manpower from Gen Mitchell         | FY09    |

\* Actual time phasing of manpower moves may be altered during BRAC implementation. According to BRAC law, this (or these) action(s) must be initiated within two years and completed within six years from the date the President transmits the report to Congress.

**Internal Communications: (Base Workforce)**

- The purpose of the SECDEF's recommendations is to make the most efficient and effective use of all the Department's resources; to improve operational efficiency; to save taxpayer dollars; to advance transformation and enhance the combat effectiveness of our military force.

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- The BRAC 2005 process will ensure that the United States continues to have the best-trained and equipped military in the world
- The Air Force recommendations were made carefully and impartially.
- The AF understands the impact BRAC can have on military members, retirees, employees and their families. Base commanders will make every effort to provide forums to share releasable BRAC information and answer questions.
- People are the Air Force's most valuable resource, and we will treat all affected individuals equitably during BRAC reductions and strive to mitigate adverse effects resulting from BRAC actions.
- The BRAC 2005 process will ensure that the United States continues to have the best-trained and equipped military in the world
- Many units losing a weapon system due to force structure changes or BRAC will not be left without a relevant, meaningful mission.
- Along with the other services, the AF continues to transform into a joint warfighting force.
- Certain realignments in BRAC will help promote this transformation by supporting Air Force missions and Airmen within another Service's base infrastructure.

**External Communications: (Civilian Community)**

- The purpose of the SECDEF's recommendations is to make the most efficient and effective use of all the Department's resources; to improve operational efficiency; to save taxpayer dollars; to advance transformation and enhance the combat effectiveness of our military force.
- BRAC 2005 allows the Department to maximize both war-fighting capability and efficiency through joint organizational and basing solutions that will facilitate multi-service missions, reduce excess capacity, save money, and redirect resources to modernize equipment and infrastructure and develop the capabilities to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century threats.
- The Air Force recommendations were made carefully and impartially.
- The Air Force provided the SECDEF with fair and impartial base closure and realignment recommendations consistent with the force structure plan and Congressionally approved BRAC selection criteria, with military value as the primary consideration.
- The Air Force took a hard, balanced look at its bases before making any closure or realignment recommendation. The Air Force used certified data collected from the

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installations to conduct detailed analysis for each recommendation. The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group deliberated on each closure and realignment recommendation.

- Many units losing a weapon system due to force structure changes or BRAC will not be left without a relevant, meaningful mission.
- Along with the other services, the AF continues to transform into a joint warfighting force.
- Certain realignments in BRAC will help promote this transformation by supporting Air Force missions and Airmen within another Service's base infrastructure.

#### **Approving BRAC Recommendations - Statutory Steps**

|            |  |
|------------|--|
| 16 May 05  | SECDEF forwards Recommendations to BRAC Commission   |
| 08 Sept 05 | BRAC Commission recommendations due to President   |
| 23 Sept 05 | President approves/disapproves Commission recommendations  |
| 20 Oct 05  | Commission resubmits recommendations (if initially rejected by President)  |
| 07 Nov 05  | President submits final recommendations to Congress. Once submitted, the plan becomes final within 45 legislative days, unless Congress passes a joint resolution to block the entire package. |

## Dunn, Valeria

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**From:** Rice, Carrie  
**Sent:** Monday, May 23, 2005 1:40 PM  
**To:** Dunn, Valeria  
**Subject:** FW: Initial FORSCOM Command and Control Facility Planning Information

**Importance:** High

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Spencer, Thomas - SERO [mailto:Thomas.Spencer@forscom.army.mil]  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 19, 2005 9:31 AM  
**To:** Rice, Carrie  
**Subject:** FW: Initial FORSCOM Command and Control Facility Planning Information  
**Importance:** High

Carrie, here is some information on the FORSCOM HQ building. Continuing to work the USARC numbers.

Tom

Tom Spencer  
Military Personnel Branch  
SE Region, Installation Management Agency DSN 367-0720 404-464-0720  
thomas.spencer@forscom.army.mil

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Byrd, Mark G. - G1  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 19, 2005 9:22 AM  
**To:** Spencer, Thomas - SERO  
**Cc:** Fetter, Clifford C. - G1; Tillotson, Mark J. - G1; Jones, Carole - G1; Long, Jay R. - G1; Nicholson, Tom - G1; Kleinman, Marty A. G1 - Contractor; Stephens, James - G2  
**Subject:** Initial FORSCOM Command and Control Facility Planning Information  
**Importance:** High

Tom:

Some initial information for your planning use:

FORSCOM HQS, Bldg 200, Fort McPherson presently operates in a 335,000 gsf secure, three story w/basement command and control facility (C2F). (Building footprint occupies a 6 acre area) Current assigned strength to the FORSCOM HQS is 1510 employees (includes military, civilians and contractors)

A portion of the new FORSCOM HQS facility on Pope AFB will need to be fully accredited, Secure Compartmentalized Information Facility (SCIF) space. Our G2 will identify the SCIF requirement in terms of number personnel or area (sf). The new HQS facility will need a number of special space areas including secure conference and briefing rooms, General Officer Command Suite, secure VTC capability, FORSCOM Operations Center (FOC), FORSCOM Network Operations Center (NOC), computer repair center, Joint Message Center, map and drawing storage areas, secure communications systems with associated antenna farm/arrays, and select other special space requirements.

The C2F building should have emergency/standby backup generators for electrical power, NIPR/SIPR IT automation systems, equipment and supply storage areas, break rooms, loading dock, café/snack bar, personnel and freight elevators, intelligent building control and energy management control systems, provisions for handicapped access, secure building access control points with manned guard stations and badge/scan entry points, and all AT/FP requirements. Adequate parking for FORSCOM HQS employees and visitors here on Fort McPherson has been a perennial problem that needs to be adequately addressed in the new C2F building.

**Flinn, Michael, CIV, WSO-BRAC**

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**From:** Felix, Kevin, CIV, WSO-BRAC  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 14, 2005 4:25 PM  
**To:** Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Dinsick, Robert, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Flinn, Michael, CIV, WSO-BRAC  
**Subject:** FW: Info Request  
**Attachments:** BRAC Data.xls



BRAC Data.xls (67 KB)

FYI. First cut, EXCLUDING classified requirements for time and lift from SOCOM.

V/r

Kevin Felix  
Army Senior Analyst  
BRAC Commission  
(703) 699-2950

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From: Gustin, Nathaniel MAJ [mailto:nathaniel.gustin@us.army.mil]  
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2005 4:21 PM  
To: Felix, Kevin, CIV, WSO-BRAC  
Cc: King, Tomi LTC  
Subject: Info Request

Sir,

Enclosed is a spreadsheet that outlines fixed wing (lift) training support missions for the first three quarters of this FY. The information was derived from the Corps JA/ATT (Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training) Database in our G3 Air Shop. All the data is for training (exclusively here on Fort Bragg). I've included numbers for C-17 sorties as well. Although C-17s are not your primary concern, they are reflexive of potential future fixed wing requirements that could, on a small scale and in certain circumstances, be filled with C-130s (i.e. pax drops).

One caveat; keep in mind that these numbers represent requirements for units who are here or who have been here during the first three quarters of this FY. Obviously several brigades have been deployed and these numbers reflect requirements of units here on Bragg during this time. The reasonable expectation may be however that this OPTEPO will continue for a few years, so the numbers in that regard are pretty close.

Based on the data I've collected, the 43rd Air Wing (at Pope) has accomplished about 50% of all submitted requirements here at Bragg. (This was a question you asked previously).

The C-130 numbers (averages) are listed in the 43rd AW tab in the spreadsheet.

Please let me know if this data is helpful and if you have any other requirements. I will do my best to get you the answers you need.

All information herein is considered FOUO.

V/R

Nate Gustin

MAJ, AV

ACofS G3 AVN

COM: 910.396.4402

DSN: 236.4402

nathaniel.gustin@us.army.mil

## **Flinn, Michael, CIV, WSO-BRAC**

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**From:** Felix, Kevin, CIV, WSO-BRAC  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 19, 2005 10:38 AM  
**To:** Small, Kenneth, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Dinsick, Robert, CIV, WSO-BRAC; Flinn, Michael, CIV, WSO-BRAC  
**Cc:** MacGregor, Timothy, CIV, WSO-BRAC  
**Subject:** FW: Dod Response

Gents,

Info from reps from Pope-Bragg.

V/r  
Kevin Felix  
Army Senior Analyst  
BRAC Commission  
(703) 699-2950

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**From:** Peck, Terry Contractor [mailto:terry.peck1@us.army.mil]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 7:56 AM  
**To:** kevin.felix@us.army.mil  
**Subject:** FW: Dod Response

Mike/Kevin □ The DOD response to Mr. Principi's questions on Pope is shown below in blue. Mostly very general comments□without a solid logic trail. Paul and I have provided some quick, direct responses to each bullet that help put them in perspective. Our responses are in red.

Thanks

Terry Peck

### 7. Pope Air Force Base, NC

7a. Commission issue: What considerations drove the recommendation to realign, rather than close Pope AFB, NC under Fort Bragg, NC?

7a. Response:

#### KEY POINTS:

- Supports Army plan for relocation of FORSCOM. FORSCOM can and will be relocated to the Bragg/Pope installation. Current army site locations for FORSCOM and USARC headquarters are primarily on real estate that is part of Fort Bragg, not Pope AFB. This move is independent of actions to turn Pope AFB over to the Army. The installation should be a Joint Base as was initially documented in the HSA JCSG minutes and slides, with the AF retaining the operational capabilities of the Pope and the Army merely assuming the garrison facility support requirements.
- Maintains airfield capability for Army presence and Air Force force structure. This does not maintain the airfield capability of Pope, since the Army does not have the inherent skilled personnel or institutional experience to maintain a strategic power projection platform for AF strategic lift aircraft as well as the AF does. This would also be a unique requirement within the Army, whereas, the Air Force has a primary mission of maintaining such bases throughout the world.
- Allows efficient consolidation of installation management functions. This would best be accomplished with a Joint Base Bragg/Pope vice Pope becoming an Army Airfield.

#### DISCUSSION:

The Air Force recommendation to realign, rather than close Pope AFB, was made to support the Army recommendation to relocate U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army Reserve Command and allows for closure of Fort McPherson, GA and Atlanta leased space. All Air Force property and facilities will be administratively transferred

to

the Army. The financial analysis included expected recurring expenses paid by the Air Force to the Army as a result of the Air Force presence that will remain. This coordination on installation management builds upon and subsumes the H&SA candidate recommendation (H&SA-0009) to combine Installation Management of Fort Bragg and Pope AFB, NC.

DISCUSSION: The Joint Base concept for Bragg/Pope best supports the Army move of FORSCOM and USARC headquarters to the installations. If this action subsumes the HSA candidate recommendation, it should not change the manner in which Bragg/Pope are organized as a base, but merely modify the manner in which the AF integrates into that new Joint Base through retention of units at the base and retention of the airspace and operational responsibilities of the Joint Base. The cost analysis done by the Army did not include operating and maintaining the airfield at the same level as it exists today or expected the AF to retain the operational costs while the Army absorbed the fixed facilities support into their Garrison costs.

7b. Commission issue: Are the joint operational synergies that exist between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 43rd Airlift Wing/23rd Fighter Group able to be replicated from other locations?

7b. Response:

KEY POINTS:

Existing operational relationships will continue. Not True. Without the representation of at least a Wing headquarters on Pope, the planning and preparation for contingency operations on a routine basis will not continue. An associate reserve C-130 squadron does not provide the capability to conduct these functions in support of contingency and surge operations. Without at least a Wing headquarters on Pope, there will not be the AF representation to maintain proper Joint relationships for training and warfighting with the XVIII Airborne Corps (an Army 3-star headquarters), Army Special Operations Command (an Army 3-star headquarters), the 82nd Airborne Division (an Army 2-star headquarters) or the Joint Special Operations Command (a Joint 2-star headquarters).

Additional operational and training synergies will emerge from new relationships. Flawed expectation, given that the senior AF representative will be at best a Colonel without the staff infrastructure to work with any of the major Army headquarters on Fort Bragg.

DISCUSSION:

As a part of the coordination between the Army regarding a tenant Air Force presence on an expanded Fort Bragg, the Army indicated that it would allow a tenant C-130 unit with a maximum size of 16 PAA (911th Airlift Wing, AFRC). Other Air Force functions that currently exist at Pope AFB, will remain at Fort Bragg to continue the present operational relationships, they include: 3rd Aerial Port Squadron; 18th Air Support Operations Group; 14th Air Support Operations Squadron; Det 1 of the 373rd Training Squadron; and 43rd Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron. Additionally, new opportunities for ongoing joint operations at Fort Bragg will continue with planned deployment of air assets to Fort Bragg/Pope for joint training with the Army.

The Pope recommendation also includes the transfer of A-10s to Moody AFB, GA.

Operational and training synergies will occur with new relationships between the A-10 unit at Moody and Army units at Ft. Benning, GA, the recommended location of the Army's Maneuver Training Center (consolidation of Infantry and Armor schools).

Locating Air Force A-10s near this consolidated Army training will lead to new opportunities of realistic close air support training for the Army and the Air Force and potential joint training between the Battlefield Airmen at Moody, the Maneuver Center of Excellence and east coast CSAR training capability with CSAR helicopters and A-10s.

DISCUSSION:

The Army/Air Force joint warfighting organizations at Bragg/Pope are responsible to the President to be prepared to respond to any crisis within 18-hours of alert. The AF units shown above as remaining on Pope AFB (or Pope army airfield) are not robust enough to ensure that timeline is met. The movement of A-10s from Pope is not relevant to the operational discussion, since they are not part of the forces needed to execute the 18-hour alert to wheels up requirement. However, the need for a planning headquarters of at least AF Wing level, the logistical infrastructure of at least an AF Wing level, the airbase maintenance and airspace control elements common to an AF strategic airlift airbase, and airlift platforms to move at least the initial forces to meet the Crisis Response timelines must be part of the AF organizations in place at Pope to ensure any Presidential directives can be met by the Secretary of Defense in accordance with the

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Clearly, Joint warfighting capabilities at Bragg/Pope can not be sustained at current levels when the AF headquarters remaining at Pope is a squadron (commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel with junior officers on his staff) and the Army headquarters on Fort Bragg are currently Two and Three-star level organizations tasked with the shortest execution timelines of any forces in our military and will be joined by an Army Four-star headquarters. Joint Base Bragg/Pope would be the ideal location to establish joint training opportunities that do not currently exist at other bases. Pope AFB was rated the #1 base in the AF for support of SOF and CSAR. It would also be an ideal location for battlefield airmen, enhancing their ability to operate with special forces personnel, the AF controllers school and the 18th air support group.

Terry

Terry Peck  
Fort Bragg, NC  
910-432-1979 - Office  
910-583-3797 - Cell  
910-396-8215 - FAX

26 July 2005

## Inquiry Response

**Re:** BI-0152,CT-0631,BOS for Pope AFB

**Requester:** Rep. Gwen Moore (4<sup>th</sup> District, WI)

**Question:** I respectfully request that you provide, in writing, the annual base operations support cost for Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina.

**Answer:** The annual Base Operations Support (BOS) cost for Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, is \$21.093M in annual non-payroll BOS costs and \$14.097 in annual payroll BOS costs. This information may be found in input data screen 4 for Pope AFB in the USAF 0122v3. Realign Pope DBCRC1 COBRA report .pdf file on the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC) web site. Also, please note this information is a composite figure, an average of three years and cannot be replicated by reference to a single program element (PE).

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF  
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

24 June 2005

## Inquiry Response

**Re: BI-0089, CT-0376: Pope Air Force Base; Capabilities and Personnel Calculations**

**Requester: BRAC Commission**

**Question:** Can the proposed Reserve/Active Air Force unit at Pope AFB handle the deployment requirements of JSOC and other Special Mission Units?

**Answer:** Airlift support for JSOC and other Special Mission Unit deployments is an Air Force responsibility. Unit deployments from FtBragg/Pope AFB of this nature require validation through appropriate channels within TRANSCOM. Once the deployment is validated TRANSCOM would task the Air Mobility Command (AMC) to support the deployment. The AMC Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) would provide airlift support based on the JCS priority system. Types of aircraft and units assigned would vary depending on the destination, as well as load and time requirements of the deployment. The Reserve/Active Air Force unit proposed for Ft/Bragg/Pope AFB could be tasked to support part, or all of a deployment. But typically, these deployments are supported by units with larger aircraft from locations other than Ft Bragg/Pope.


**Question.** Did OSD count reserve personnel into its personnel input/output calculations?

**Answer:** Yes. The incoming reserve personnel were factored into the COBRA analysis to account for facility requirements and to capture the cost of training personnel (as a one time cost) due to anticipated losses as a result of the move. However, the COBRA manpower documents only show the full time mil and civ employees as a factor in determining the physical costs of a move.

**Question.** Did OSD factor the requirements vs. capacity of transient billets on Pope AFB to support the new Reserve/Active organization?

**Question:** Yes. AMC is planning on leaving a contingent in place to support the number of transients expected.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF  
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

03 June 2005

## Inquiry Response

**Re:** BI-0039 (OSD Clearinghouse #0221)

**Requester:** Ken Small, AF Team Leader, BRAC Commission R&A Staff

**Question:** Would you please confirm which numbers are the correct data and provide the bibliographic cite for the proper data.

The Air Force Team is reviewing the data for Pope AFB.

There are discrepancies in the data for Pope Air Force Base between that of the text of the BRAC report, Vol 1, part 2, (page Air Force - 36) and the spreadsheet on page B-14.

Regarding the "Economic Impact on Communities" the text provide the following information:

Maximum Potential Job Reduction - 7,840 (4,700 direct and 3,140 indirect) or 4% of economic area employment.

*02-36*

However, the spreadsheet on page B-14 provides the following:

Total Job Changes - 6,802 (4,145 direct and 2,657 indirect) or 3.5% change as percent of employment.

**Answer:** The text on page "Air Force - 36" describes the economic impact on the Fayetteville, NC MSA for only the Air Force recommendation titled "Pope Air Force Base, NC, Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station, PA, and Yeager Air Guard Station, WV".

The spreadsheet on "Page B-14" provides the economic impact of all BRAC recommendations affecting the Fayetteville, NC MSA and breaks these down between Pope AFB, NC and Fort Bragg, NC. Note that four BRAC recommendations impact Pope AFB (See page A-33) and two recommendations impact Fort Bragg, NC (See Page A-32).

Because the individual recommendation economic impact reports were generated by MSA rather than installation, and because the BRAC recommendations include combining Fort Bragg and Pope AFB into a single installation which complicates the definition of these two installations in the reports, it was much easier to check these numbers by looking at the Fayetteville, NC MSA as a whole. The following figures were


taken from the individual economic impact reports (Criterion 6) provided in the justification books for each recommendation:

| Recommendation   | Direct Job Change | Indirect Job Change |
|--|-------------------|---------------------|
| USA - Fort Gillem, GA  | 8                 | 5                   |
| USA - Fort McPherson, GA   | 2211              | 1605                |
| USA - Fort Bragg, NC   | 2540              | 1698                |
| USAF - Pope Air Force Base, NC, Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station, PA, and Yeager Air Guard Station, WV | -4700             | -3140               |
| USAF - Gen Mitchell ARS, WI  | 121               | 90                  |
| <b>Total</b>   | <b>180</b>        | <b>258</b>          |

*Handwritten notes:* 4759 (bracketed next to USA - Fort Bragg, NC); -4579 (written next to USAF - Pope Air Force Base...); 180 (written below Total Direct Job Change); 27-36 (written next to Indirect Job Change for USAF - Pope Air Force Base...)

These totals match the figures provided for the Fayetteville, NC MSA on Page B-14.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF  
Executive Officer, Base Realignment and Closure

*Handwritten calculation:*  
4700  
3140  
-----  
7840

*Handwritten calculation:*  
4759 (Gross) This doc  
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Δ 434

*Handwritten calculation:*  
4579  
4145  
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Δ 434  
Page (This doc)  
B-14 (Page)

24 June 2005

## Inquiry Response

**Re: BI-0089, CT-0376: Pope Air Force Base; Capabilities and Personnel Calculations**

**Requester: BRAC Commission**

**Question:** Can the proposed Reserve/Active Air Force unit at Pope AFB handle the deployment requirements of JSOC and other Special Mission Units?

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**Answer:** Yes. The incoming reserve personnel were factored into the COBRA analysis to account for facility requirements and to capture the cost of training personnel (as a one time cost) due to anticipated losses as a result of the move. However, the COBRA manpower documents only show the full time mil and civ employees as a factor in determining the physical costs of a move.

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**Question:** Yes. AMC is planning on leaving a contingent in place to support the number of transients expected.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF  
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

2 Aug 2005

## Inquiry Response

**Re:** BI-0171 (CT-0706)

**Requester:** R. Gary Dinsick, Army Team Leader

**Question 1:** Lift requirements at Pope-Bragg. Please identify lift requirements at Pope AFB. Please do not limit it only to a "number of chutes required" solution, but include all planned short haul deployments, (within C-130 distances) as well as daily training based on historical data.

**Air Force Answer 1:** 43 AW does not track the Ft Bragg requirements. See accompanying data provided by 18<sup>th</sup> Corp.

**Question 2:** Additional Brigade Combat Team at Bragg. While the Fort Bragg recommendation realigns 7<sup>th</sup> SFG to Eglin AFB, does OSD believe the lift requirement at Pope-Bragg will increase based on the activation of an additional BCT, and by how much?

**Army Answer 2:** Based on recent coordination with the Army G3 Force Management Office, we believe that the net increase in population at Fort Bragg from FY03 to FY11 is approximately 1800 authorizations. This increase reflects all known changes in authorizations at Fort Bragg due to BRAC, Army Modular Force Transformation, and the return of forces from overseas. Therefore, we believe that the maximum increase in paid parachute positions is 1800. This would be less than a five percent increase in the lift requirement.

**Question 3:** 43d Airlift Wing support of the current lift requirements. Over the last two years, how much of the lift requirement at Fort Bragg has been satisfied by the C-130 aircraft of the 43d Wing permanently stationed at Pope AFB? Is there any reason why that number would be currently smaller than the historic average (aircraft maintenance issues, deployments)?

**Air Force Answer 3:** The 43 AW conducts a significant portion of the JAATT missions that support Ft. Bragg (Primary source of data is the 18 Corps G3 Air. Numbers were crosschecked with 43 AW data). In FY 04 the 43 AW provided approximately 65% of the C-130 JAATT sorties for Ft Bragg. Raw data shows of the 977 C-130 sorties contracted by the 18 ABC, the 43 AW supplied 644. In FY 05 (Oct 04 – Jun 05), the 43 AW supplied 436 of the 608 sorties for a 71% rate. As another FY 05 metric, the 43 AW supported 85 of the scheduled 154 missions. Again, missions can translate to multiple sorties on multiple days. There also have been 229 C-130 aircraft scheduled so far in FY 05 with the 43 AW providing 140. A longer snap shot using an AMC historical database and GDSS reports shows the following: From Jan 99 thru 11 Sep 01 the 43 AW flew 1752 of the actual 3986 sorties flown for a 43% rate. From 11 Sep 01 to Present the 43 AW has flown 1354 of the 3754 sorties flown for a 36% rate. Overall sortie count for entire C-130 fleet is down significantly the last two years from historical data due high deployment rates and maintenance issues.

**Question 4:** Other support of the current lift requirements. Over the last two years, how much of the lift requirement at Fort Bragg has been satisfied C-130s from Air Guard and Air Force Reserve units?

**Air Force Answer 4:** Source of data is 18 Corps G-3 Air. In FY 04, approximately 18% (177 of 977) of the JAATT sorties for Ft Bragg "lift" were satisfied by ANG and AFRC units. For FY 05, to date, approximately 12% (74 of 608) of the sorties were satisfied by ANG and AFRC units.

**Question 5:** Other support of the current lift requirements. Over the last two years, how much of the lift requirement at Fort Bragg has been satisfied by strategic lift capabilities (i.e., C-5 or C-17)?

**Air Force Answer 5:** See accompanying slides provide by the 18<sup>th</sup> Corp.

**Question 6:** No C-130's permanently stationed at Pope AFB. If no C-130's are permanently stationed at Pope AFB, what corresponding support infrastructure will no longer be necessary? What savings will be realized by no longer needing this infrastructure? How will these potential savings be offset by increased support from other Active, Air Reserve or Guard units that must spend TDY funds to satisfy the lift requirements?

**Air Force Answer 6:** If no C-130 aircraft are stationed at Pope AFB the following facilities would be excess: Buildings 900, 738, 741, 750, 735, 731, 730, 724, 721, 720, 715, 718, 706, 568, 558, 555, 554, and 550. In order for savings to occur, the assumption must be made that facilities will not be occupied. With zero annual utility, maintenance, and custodial costs the savings would equal over \$1.3M annually. This assumption would change if USA personnel occupy the facilities and the Ft. Bragg Garrison incurs additional costs to maintain the facilities. A ROM for the cost incurred to use TDY C-130 aircrews vice 43 AW crews is \$175 K per year.

**Question 7:** 7<sup>th</sup> SFG to Eglin. The DoD justification for relocating the 7<sup>th</sup> SFG to Eglin AFB included, among other justifications, the fact that it would be "creating needed space for the additional brigade at Fort Bragg." Please define this "space" as maneuver, barracks, or otherwise. During a visit to Fort Bragg, the Commission learned that no barracks space would be made available as the 7<sup>th</sup> SFG vacates, since other Special Operations units will expand to fill the vacancies? Did DoD consider in its costs the additional funds required to build new barracks for the additional BCT?

**Army Answer 7:** The Army Basing Study Group (TABS) considered space as facilities, training ranges and maneuver space. We followed a standard process for the analysis of facility requirements and documented the results in the Cost of Base Realignment and Closure Action (COBRA) model in our recommendations. Using the certified Real Property Planning and Analysis System (RPLANS), the 7<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (SFG) was removed from Fort Bragg and an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (BCT) was added. RPLANS uses available or excess space across all facility codes before building a requirement for new construction. In cases where a BRAC-related action creates excess space, we either documented the excess space as facility space shutdown in the COBRA model or RPLANS considered the excess space in

determining new construction requirements. TABS did not include undefined or potential requirements that were not approved by the Army in our analysis. At the time the recommendation was completed, we did not have documented requirements for a potential expansion of Army Special Operations Command units at Fort Bragg. Therefore, it was not included as BRAC-related action. Recent coordination with the Army G3 force management office only shows a future requirement (FY08) for a new civil affairs brigade. However, it only has authorizations for 319 Soldiers. This is far less than the 7<sup>th</sup> SFG. There is a net savings in facilities at Fort Bragg based on the move of the 7<sup>th</sup> SFG. We applied that savings or efficiencies to the activation of the Infantry BCT as it is BRAC-related as well. It would not have been appropriate to include the cost of the future Special Operations units, as they are not BRAC-related. Finally, as we stated in the response to question 2 above, we believe that the total gain in authorizations at Fort Bragg is only 1800, when all actions are considered. If there are additional requirements at Fort Bragg, the Army will fund them outside of BRAC.

**Question 8:** 43D Airlift Wing joint planning and contingency operations support. What does OSD believe is the 43d Wing's contributions to jointness with respect to Army units at Fort Bragg? How will the planned Air Force Reserve/Active Associate Squadron be able to replicate the joint planning and contingency support capabilities that exist within the 43D Airlift Wing? Do the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) requirements of Fort Bragg units require the joint planning and contingency support capabilities of the 43D Airlift Wing?

**Air Force (AFRC) Answer 8:** In regard to 43rd Wing's contribution to jointness with respect to Army units at Ft Bragg, it would be an understatement to limit this to one squadron. The jointness at Ft Bragg extends beyond the 43rd Wing and includes every AMC stratilifter and tactical airlifter (to include the ARC) to manage the day-to-day training and real world requirements. An operation that continually requires multi-service integration to meet routine training objectives requires a higher level of planning and coordination to compensate for the numerous external factors (weather, logistics, time constraints, etc.). The 43AW does not have a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan requirement. Depending on what the requirement is would drive what the wing is asked to support. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan requirements for Ft Bragg would be vetted from JFCOM to TRANSCOM followed by flowing to AMC and TACC. The designated joint planners generally come out of HQ staffs above the wing level, so as not to impede the wings primary mission of providing crews to support the requirement. For local training exercises the 43rd wing tactics shop generally provides the lead C-130 planners, which could be replicated in the planned capabilities between the Reserve wing and active duty associate personnel.

Approved



DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF  
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

## Airborne Requirement

- **Division Ready Brigade (DRB 1) 3140 Paratroopers**
  - Highest State of Readiness for One of Three Brigades
  - Ready to Deploy from Pope AFB Within 18 Hours
  
- **20,000 Paratroopers (1 Jump every 90 days)**  
 (XVIII Abn Corps Separate Bdes & 82d Abn Div)
  - Large Package Week BN & Below  
 (4 x per year 4 x C17s & 6 x C130s)
  - Joint Forcible Entry Exercise Bde and Above  
 (4 x per year 9 x C17s & 6 x C130s)
  
- **82d Abn Div Current Strength:       15,000 (+/-)**  
   **Modular Force:       18,000**
  - No significant impact of transformation on the DRB

**DRB lift requirement (82d ABN Div RSOP, Chapter 6)**

|       |             |                     |
|-------|-------------|---------------------|
| DRF 1 | 29 x C-17s  | (821 pax + HD/CDS)  |
| DRB   | 217 x C-17s | (3140 pax + HD/CDS) |

**Airborne Proficiency (Corps G7 FY 04 Paid Parachutist Report)**

|                         | <u>Auth. Parachutist Psns.</u> |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| XVIII Corps<br>SEP BDEs | 5,555                          |
| 82d ABN DIV             | 13,879 *                       |
| <b>TOTAL</b>            | <b>19,434</b>                  |

## FY04 Fort Bragg C-130 Lift Requirement (Individual Aircraft Flights)

|                     | Total # Contracted | # Contracted by 43AW | # Contracted by other Active units | # Contracted by Air Guard / AF Reserve |
|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| XVIII ABC Separates | 360                | 274 (76.1 %)         | 9 (2.5 %)                          | 77 (21.4 %)                            |
| 82d ABN Division    | 617                | 370 (60 %)           | 147 (23.8 %)                       | 100 (16.2 %)                           |
| <b>TOTAL</b>        | <b>977</b>         | <b>644 (65.9 %)</b>  | <b>156 (16 %)</b>                  | <b>177 (18.1 %)</b>                    |

For Proficiency training only

Numbers represent what aircraft were JA/ATTed, NOT what actually flew.

## FY05 Fort Bragg C-130 Lift Requirement (Individual Aircraft Flights)

|                     | Total # Contracted | # Contracted by 43AW | # Contracted by other Active units | # Contracted by Air Guard / AF Reserve |
|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| XVIII ABC Separates | 185                | 148 (80 %)           | 7 (3.8 %)                          | 30 (16.2 %)                            |
| 82d ABN Division    | 423                | 288 (68.1 %)         | 91 (21.5 %)                        | 44 (10.4 %)                            |
| <b>TOTAL</b>        | <b>608</b>         | <b>436 (71.7 %)</b>  | <b>98 (16.1 %)</b>                 | <b>74 (12.2 %)</b>                     |

For Proficiency training only

Numbers represent what aircraft were JA/ATTed, NOT what actually flew.

## Historical Fort Bragg C-130 Lift Requirement Summary

|       | Total # Contracted | # Contracted by 43AW | # Contracted by other Active units | # Contracted by Air Guard / AF Reserve |
|-------|--------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| FY 04 | 977                | 644 ( 65.9 %)        | 156 (16 %)                         | 177 (18.1 %)                           |
| FY 05 | 608                | 436 (71.7 %)         | 98 (16.1 %)                        | 74 (12.2 %)                            |
| TOTAL | 1585               | 1080 (68.1 %)        | 254 (16 %)                         | 251 (15.9 %)                           |

For Proficiency training only

Numbers represent what aircraft were JA/ATTed, NOT what actually flew.

**FY04 Fort Bragg C-17 Lift Requirement** (Individual Aircraft Flights)

|  | <b>FY 04</b> | <b>FY 05</b> |
|--|--------------|--------------|
| <b>XVIII ABC<br/>Separate<br/>Brigades</b> | <b>262</b>   | <b>228</b>   |
| <b>82d ABN<br/>DIV</b>                     | <b>534</b>   | <b>487</b>   |
|  | <hr/>        | <hr/>        |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                               | <b>796</b>   | <b>715</b>   |

For Proficiency training only

Numbers represent what aircraft were JA/ATTed, NOT what actually flew.

### Historical Strategic Deployment Data (Individual flights)

|              | C-17           | C-5           | Civ Contract   |
|--------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| FY 04        | 30(288)        | 13(46)        | 21(102)        |
| FY 05        | 22(153)        | 8(8)          | 74(42)         |
| <b>TOTAL</b> | <b>52(441)</b> | <b>21(54)</b> | <b>95(144)</b> |

Black = Army Data

Red = Air Mobility Command Data