

Congress of the United States

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Washington, DC 20515

August 17, 2005

BRAC Commission

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi  
Chairman, Base Realignment and Closure Commission  
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600  
Arlington, VA 22202-3920

AUG 19 2005

Received

Dear Chairman Principi:

We want to again express our appreciation for the cautious deliberation of the BRAC Commission, particularly as you evaluate the recommendations regarding the Air National Guard.

One of the difficult decisions you face is the task of sorting out the Air Force and Air National Guard realignment and closure recommendations. With this in mind, we would like to provide additional data on the Air National Guard 179<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing at Mansfield, Ohio.

Attached, please find information that was recently brought to our attention regarding the 179<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing that addresses many of the concerns about this Air National Guard location. We believe this information may provide supporting data for maintaining the Reserve Component facilities in Mansfield, Ohio, and possibly identify errors we have found in the BRAC data.

Additionally, we would like to register our opposition to a proposal that the Air Force and Air National Guard find a compromise solution in only a few weeks time, when the Air Force recommendations were developed over several years without the coordination or consultation of the Adjutant Generals and the Air National Guard. Instead, we strongly recommend that you ask the Air Force to pursue all structural and policy changes as part of their regular programmatic reviews, and not as part of the 2005 BRAC process.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. In the meantime, we look forward to working with you to ensure that the BRAC recommendations are based on accurate data and are within the boundaries of current law. If you have any questions, we would be happy to response or provide additional data in support of the information that we have provided.


Very respectfully yours,



MIKE DeWINE  
United States Senator



GEORGE V. VOINOVICH  
United States Senator



MICHAEL G. OXLEY  
Member of Congress

## Discussion Points – 179<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing Mansfield, Ohio

1. **The aircraft assigned to the 179<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing at Mansfield, OH were specifically purchased by the Congress for use by the 179<sup>th</sup>, and the Air National Guard.**
  - a. The BRAC recommendation deviates from Congressional intent by relocating these aircraft to units within the Air Force Reserve and the active duty Air Force.
  
2. **The 179<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing has exceptional manning rates, among the very highest in the Air National Guard.**
  - a. Current manning at the 179<sup>th</sup> is 104%.
  - b. Aircraft are recommended for relocation to two states, Alabama and Arkansas, both of which have poor manning rates, on average less than 96%.
  - c. This seems counter-intuitive, considering the high current PERSTEMP level, and in light of comments made to the Commission itself with regard to manning issues within the C-130 world.


*Deviates from Criteria #1 & #4: Would result in reduced operational readiness and have a negative impact on Air Guard manning.*

3. **Costs / benefit analysis does not support the Air Force's recommendation to close the 179<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing and relocate its aircraft. Without challenging the validity of the Air Force's costs and savings estimates, the following points are vital for the Commission to consider:**
  - a. Total costs estimated by DoD to execute the closure of the 179<sup>th</sup>: \$21.6M
  - b. Total cost to outfit the 179<sup>th</sup>'s facility to provide for 12PAA: \$13.7M
  - c. Unconsidered costs of relocating 4 aircraft from a Guard unit (part-time) to an active duty unit (full-time): \$54.7M
  - d. Unconsidered costs of aircraft conversion and/or training costs (for Maxwell ARB only due to multiple C-130 variants): \$41.2M. This would be increased exponentially for Little Rock Air Force Base.

*Deviates from Criteria #4: Costs to execute recommendation do not justify the negative impact on readiness, particularly in light of lower cost alternatives which would result in a positive impact on readiness.*

### **Summary Points:**

- This recommendation represents a negative return on a taxpayer investment.
- This recommendation will result in limited aircraft resources being redistributed to states with a proven track record of lower recruiting, retention and ability to meet mission manning requirements.
- For a smaller investment than the Department wants to spend on closing the 179<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing, the base could receive minimal military construction and continue to provide top-level manning at a variety of squadron sizes.



## BRAC Analyst Visit



### Net Present Value (NPV) Comparison (For Base Closures)

<b>Active Air Force</b>	<b>**NPV</b>
Cannon AFB	\$2.7B
Ellsworth AFB	\$1.9B
Grand Forks AFB	\$2.0B
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$6.6B</b>
 <b>Air National Guard</b>	
5 Bases to Close (Total NPV)	\$0.9B

Mansfield to Close = \$86M NPV  
 = less than 10% of Total ANG NPV  
 = less than 1.5% of Total AF NPV

\*\*NPV = 20 Year Savings

Data IAW COBRA

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
# COBRA



## COST TO CLOSE MANSFIELD

Costs	2005	2025 NPV
<b>Non-Recurring</b>		
- Training Investment	\$202,293,793	\$202,293,793
- Aircraft Conversion and Training Costs (Maxwell Only)	\$41,220,063	\$41,220,063
<b>Recurring</b>		
- Manpower Differential (AD vs. ANG)	\$54,779,872	\$615,637,586
Actual Costs	\$298,293,728	\$859,151,442
NPV Savings Stated in BRAC Proposal		\$86,000,000
<b>AF BRAC MISCALCULATION</b>		<b>\$773,151,442</b>

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# COBRA



## NEGATIVE RETURN ON INVESTMENT

Toledo	\$ 0.3M
Louisville	\$ 0.6M
Little Rock AFB	\$ 4.8M
<u>Maxwell</u>	<u>\$15.9M</u>
Total For Move	\$21.6M
<b>Mansfield @ 12 PAA</b>	<b><u>\$13.7M</u></b>
RETURN	\$ -7.9M

**Extracted From:***August 11th, 1:00PM, Washington, DC*

Department of Defense Closure and Realignment Recommendation Impacts on Homeland Security/Defense and on Units of the Air National Guard

GEN. HECKMAN:

“Thank you, Mr. Dominquez. And a special thanks to you, Chairman Principi, the commissioners, and your staffs for your rigorous and thorough look at our recommendations.

Over the past 15 years, the Air Force has reduced the number of squadrons in its active component to ensure that we have effectively sized squadrons as we reduce the total infrastructure. During the same period, at the request of the Air Guard, the Air Force retained essentially the same number of squadrons in the Reserve component, and instead reduced the number of aircraft in each of these squadrons. During the same period, the ratio of Active-to-Reserve component has decreased.

As a result of these programmatic actions, we are currently faced with squadron sizes in our Reserve component that are marginally sufficient. Necessary force cuts over the next five to ten years will exacerbate the situation. We also have some acute PERSTEMPO issues, particularly in the C-130 force, which I'll discuss in a few minutes. Since these BRAC rounds began in 1988, each has tended to target certain areas within the Air Force, for instance depots in 1995.”

## C-130 Capabilities Lost Under Current BRAC

- 80 C-130's removed from 11 Mission Ready ANG Units
- 3,750 Mission Ready Operations and Maintenance personnel-  
over 15% of the Total AF wide C-130 pool
- 120,000 total man years of military aviation experience
- Currently 13 ANG C-130's deployed CENTCOM providing;
- 21,450 Flying Hrs per year
- 195,000 PAX moved per year
- 37,700 tons of cargo moved per year
- 300 tons of critical airdropped cargo per year
- Responsible for continuous AEF support of Coronet Oak/  
Joint Forge providing 4 Aircraft/6 crew and maintenance  
package
- Responsible for continuous TACC support providing 2  
aircraft/3 crew and maintenance package
- Responsible for thousands of PAX and tons of cargo  
delivered throughout the world
- Responsible for hundreds of Joint training missions  
throughout the world ensuring mission ready capabilities for  
countless Joint agencies

### Assumptions;


- Did not count Kulis or Puerto Rico
- Extrapolated MFD performance, manning and experience  
statistics to estimate aggregate
- ANG only no AFRC numbers



# BRAC Analyst Visit

## ANG Demographics

Military Value = Effective Recruiting and Retention



24 Green: => 96.7%  
 10 With Yellow Border = Losing Strength


30 White: <= 96.6%  
 7 With Red Border = Gaining Strength

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# MILITARY VALUE - PERSONNEL

CURRENT STRENGTH



Land to Expand → Fully Manned + → The Best People