



Reply ZIP Code:
20318-4000

July 8, 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS), CHAIRMAN,
INFRASTRUCTURE STEERING GROUP**

**SUBJECT: Supply and Storage Joint Cross Service Group (S&S JCSG) Review of
Draft Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Imperatives**

Your memorandum of July 2, 2004 directed each Joint Cross Service Group to review draft BRAC 2005 Imperatives focusing on their potential effect on military value analysis. The S&S JCSG has reviewed the imperatives with particular emphasis on those that may affect the analysis of our assigned functions. The attachment provides specific comments on select imperatives. The comments are provided directly beneath the applicable imperative. The following additional overarching comments are provided.

In general, we believe the draft imperatives lack necessary specificity and are written too broadly to constrain potential S&S JCSG recommendations. Most require refinement and additional detail for our Group to determine the possible results that they are seeking. Without a greater level of detail and a better understanding of the infrastructure implications of each S&S-related imperative, we will be unable to shape it into the required mathematical input for optimization analysis.

Every effort should be taken to remove any imperative ambiguity that would require JCSG interpretation. If an imperative cannot be precisely defined, then it should be deleted so it will not unnecessarily restrict transformational alternatives or discourage making constructive recommendations in support of infrastructure reduction.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. S. Holder".

G. S. HOLDER
Vice Admiral, USN
Director for Logistics, J4
Chairman, Supply and Storage, Joint Cross-
Service Group

CC: JCSG Chairmen
Attachments: as stated

Draft Deliberative Document-For Discussion Purposes Only

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Principles and Corresponding Imperatives

Recruit and Train: The Department must attract, develop, and retain active, reserve, civilian, and contractor personnel that are highly skilled and educated and that have access to effective, diverse, and sustainable training space in order to ensure current and future readiness, to support advances in technology, and to respond to anticipated developments in joint and service doctrine and tactics.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to support the Army's Leader Development and Assessment Course and Leader's Training Course.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to meet both peacetime and wartime aviation training requirements, including undergraduate and graduate pilot training.
- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that fails to preserve additional training areas in CONUS where operational units can conduct company or higher-level training when home station training areas are not available due to the training load or environmental concerns.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the only remaining training environments designed to support airborne, air assault, urban operations, cold weather training, Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) training in the United States, combat formations for full spectrum operations to include obscurant training and electro-magnetic operations, MAGTFs, live fire and combined arms training, and chemical live agent training.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to conduct graduate medical/dental education (GME/GDE) and clinical training for uniformed medics.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that locates Navy or Marine Corps Fleet Replacement Squadrons and Operational Squadrons outside operationally efficient proximity (e.g., for the Department of the Navy, farther than one un-refueled sortie) from DoD-controlled airspace, ranges, targets, low-level routes, outlying fields and over-water training airspace with access to aircraft carrier support.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the organic capability for Service specific Strategic Thought and Joint and Coalition Security Policy Innovation.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that locates undergraduate flight training with operational squadrons or within high air traffic areas.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the organizational independence of training units from combat units.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that locates undergraduate Navy or Marine Corps flight training without access to DoD-scheduled airspace over open water and land with access to aircraft carrier support.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that locates major CSG / ESG level exercises, ranges / OPAREAs more than 3 underway days from air, sea and over the shore maneuver space or that locates individual operational ships and aircraft more than 6 underway hours for ships, 12 underway hours for submarines, and 1 un-refueled sortie for aircraft, from unimpeded access to ranges and operating areas.
- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates a Service's ability to provide timely responses to military contingencies or support RC mobilization, institutional training, and collective training because of insufficient infrastructure, maneuver space, and training ranges.
- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that fails to retain access to sufficient training area (air, land, and sea) and facilities across a wide variety of topography and climatic conditions (e.g., cold weather, swamps, mountains, desert, etc.) with operationally efficient access and proximity to meet current and future Service and Joint training requirements for both Active and Reserve Component forces and weapons systems.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates access to educational programs which include specific focus on those areas which are uniquely related to distinctive Service capabilities (e.g., maritime, land warfare).
- Fleet concentration areas will provide Navy skills progression training and functional skills training relevant to homeported platforms whenever possible.
- Navy initial skills training will be located with accessions training to minimize student moves or with skills progression training to allow cross-utilization of instructors, facilities and equipment, and support future training and efficiency improvements.

Quality of Life: The Department must provide a quality of life, to include quality of work place, that supports recruitment, learning, and training, and enhances retention.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates access to housing, medical, career progression services, child development services, spousal employment services, MWR services, or education.
- Maintain sufficient capacity to provide operational-non-operational (sea-shore) rotation.

Organize: The Department needs force structure sized, composed, and located to match the demands of the National Military Strategy, effectively and efficiently supported by properly aligned headquarters and other DoD organizations, and that take advantage of opportunities for joint basing.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that removes the Headquarters of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy (including the Commandant of the Marine Corps), or the Department of the Air Force from the National Capital Region.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to station existing Continental United States Army (CONUSA) headquarters, Major Army Command (MACOM) headquarters, and United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) headquarters in the United States.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the last remaining Navy presence (excluding recruiters) in a state. The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment that prohibits fulfilling the air sovereignty protection site and response criteria requirements stipulated by COMNORTHCOM and COMPACOM.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates START Treaty land-based strategic deterrent.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to support the Army's modular force initiative, the Navy's Global Concept of Operations force initiative, the USMC's expeditionary maneuver warfare initiatives, and the USAF's 10 fully- and equally-capable AEFs.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to support surge, mobilization, continuity of operations, evacuations for natural disasters, or conduct core roles and missions (e.g., sea-based operations, combined arms, etc.).
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment involving joint basing unless it increases average military value or decreases the cost for the same military value, when compared to the status quo.

Equip: The Department needs research, development, acquisition, test, and evaluation capabilities that efficiently and effectively place superior technology in the hands of the warfighter to meet current and future threats and facilitate knowledge-enabled and net-centric warfare.

- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the Army's single headquarters organizational structure that combines responsibility for developmental and operational test and evaluation.
- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that does not provide RDT&E infrastructure and laboratory capabilities to attract, train, and retain talent in emerging science and engineering fields.
- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the Army, Navy, and Air Force RDT&E capability necessary to support technologies and systems integral to the conduct of Land, Maritime, and Air warfare, respectively.

Supply, Service, and Maintain: The Department needs access to logistical and industrial infrastructure capabilities optimally integrated into a skilled and cost efficient national industrial base that provides agile and responsive global support to operational forces.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates ship maintenance capabilities to:
 - ▶ Dry dock CVNs and submarines on both coasts and in the central Pacific.
 - ▶ Refuel/de-fuel/inactivate nuclear-powered ships.
 - ▶ Dispose of inactivated nuclear-powered ship reactor compartments.
 - S&S Comment. Not directly applicable to S&S JCSG as written.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the Department of the Navy lead for engineering, producing, maintaining, and handling ordnance and energetic materials designed specifically for the maritime environment.
 - S&S Comment. Not directly applicable to S&S JCSG as written.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability of a Service to define its requirements (all classes of supply), integrate its logistics support, and acquire appropriate support for its unique material.
 - S&S Comment. Imperative requires additional detail. Infrastructure ramifications are unclear. We believe there may be joint solutions, with infrastructure impact, that may facilitate a Service defining its requirements and integrating logistics support.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates inherent Service capabilities where concepts of operations differ from other Services (e.g. MALS support to the FRSs, deployable intermediate maintenance support for MPS equipment, Navy IMAs, reach back support for sea-based logistics, etc).
 - S&S Comment. Not directly applicable to S&S JCSG as written.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that creates a single point of failure in logistics operations.
 - S&S Comment. Imperative requires additional detail. Concur with importance of ensuring flexibility in developing logistics support concepts and supporting infrastructure that are responsive and mitigate risk.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the last remaining strategic distribution platforms on the east and west coast.

S&S Comment: Needs more detail.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates distribution support services at Component depot maintenance activities.
 - S&S Comment. Imperative reflects a tie to infrastructure, however, requires additional detail/specificity in order to properly capture through optimization analysis.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates logistics information management and oversight capabilities:
 - ▶ Data standardization
 - ▶ Information routing
 - ▶ Supply chain efficiency information capture
 - S&S Comment. Not directly applicable to S&S JCSG functions as written. Unclear in terms of specific tie to infrastructure.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates needed organic industrial capabilities to produce, sustain, surge, and reconstitute if those capabilities are not commercially available or capable of being privatized.
 - S&S Comment. Not directly applicable to S&S JCSG functions as written.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates access to ammunition storage facilities which will not complete planned chemical demilitarization before 2011.
 - S&S Comment. Not directly applicable to S&S JCSG functions.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the Army lead for life cycle materiel management of systems integral to the conduct of Joint expeditionary land warfare.
 - S&S Comment. Imperative requires additional detail. Unclear how this relates to S&S JCSG functions or its specific infrastructure ramifications.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to move hazardous and/or sensitive cargos (e.g., ammunition).
 - S&S Comment. Not directly applicable to S&S JCSG functions.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates critical production capabilities that cannot be readily rebuilt or expanded during mobilization and reconstitution or commercially duplicated, as well as capabilities to replenish stockpiles.
 - S&S Comment. Not directly applicable to S&S JCSG functions as written.
- DON requires a depot maintenance industrial complex that delivers best value cradle-to-grave results in cost-efficiency (total unit cost), responsiveness (schedule compliance and flexibility), and quality (compliance with specifications).
 - S&S Comment. Not directly applicable to S&S JCSG functions as written.

Deploy & Employ (Operational): The Department needs secure installations that are optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense), that support power projection, rapid deployable capabilities, and expeditionary force needs for reach-back capability, that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge, and that ensure strategic redundancy. Potential S&S JCSG applicability on select imperatives – requires additional detail.

- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the Army's ability to simultaneously deploy, support, and rotate forces from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts in support of operational plans due to reduced quantities of, or reduced access to port facilities, local/national transportation assets (highways and railroad), and airfields or lack of information infrastructure reach back capabilities.
 - S&S Comment. Potential S&S JCSG applicability.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to absorb overseas forces within the United States.
 - S&S Comment. Potential S&S JCSG applicability.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to surge in support of mobilization requirements (e.g., National Defense contingency situations, national disasters, and other emergency requirements).
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that prohibits:
 - ▶ Fleet basing that supports the Fleet Response Plan.
 - ▶ CVN capability: 2 East Coast ports, 2 West Coast ports, and 2 forward-based in the Pacific.
 - ▶ SSBN basing: 1 East Coast port, 1 West Coast port.
 - ▶ MPA and rotary wings located within one un-refueled sortie from over water training areas.
 - ▶ OLF capability to permit unrestricted fleet operations, including flight training, if home base does not allow.
 - ▶ CLF capability: 1 East Coast and 1 West Coast base that minimize explosive safety risks and eliminate waiver requirements.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates unimpeded access to space (polar, equatorial, and inclined launch).
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that does not preserve:
 - ▶ two air mobility bases and one wide-body capable base on each coast to ensure mobility flow without adverse weather, capacity, or airfield incapacitation impacts; and

- ▶ sufficient OCONUS mobility bases along the deployment routes to potential crisis areas to afford deployment of mobility aircraft.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to respond to reach back requests from forward deployed forces and forces at overseas main operating bases engaged in or in support of combatant commander contingency operations.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to provide missile warning and defense in the 2025 force.
- Align Naval Medicine's Military Treatment Facilities with Navy and Marine Corps force concentration for maximum efficiency and effectiveness, and to maximize operational medical support to the Fleet and Marine Corps.
- Maintain sufficient medical capacity (manning, logistics, training and facilities) integral to the MAGTF as well as reach back infrastructure to ensure the continuum of care for the operating forces and additional organic capacity for the supporting establishment and Service member families.

Intelligence: The Department needs intelligence capabilities to support the National Military Strategy by delivering predictive analysis, warning of impending crises, providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving horizontal integration of networks and databases.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates sufficient organic ISR/analytic capability to meet warfighting and acquisition requirements while effectively leveraging Joint and National intelligence capabilities.