ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SEP 8 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR INFRASTRUCTURE STEERING GROUP MEMBERS
CHAIRMEN, JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUPS

SUBJECT: Transformational Options for BRAC 2005

The Secretary of Defense, in his November 15, 2002, memorandum initiating the BRAC process, asked for a broad series of options for stationing and supporting forces and functions to increase efficiency and effectiveness. The memo tasked the Infrastructure Steering Group to provide options to the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) for the Secretary's final approval. Once approved by the Secretary, these options will constitute a minimum analytical framework upon which the Military Departments and Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) will conduct their respective BRAC analyses.

In my June 21, 2004, memorandum, I asked for a review of previously submitted options and/or for your suggested modifications, additions, or deletions. The BRAC Deputy Assistant Secretaries (DASs) participated in refining these submissions to eliminate duplications and to array them as transformational options recommended for approval or deletion based on whether the proposed option could be readily translated into scenarios, was actionable within the BRAC 2005 process, or possessed an identifiable effect on infrastructure.

The attachment provides the list of transformational options categorized with a recommendation for approval or deletion to forward to the IEC. I would appreciate receiving your formal concurrence and comments on these lists by September 17, 2004. Please provide your input to Mr. Peter Potochney, Director, Base Realignment and Closure in Room 3D814.

Michael W. Wynne
Acting USD (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)
Chairman, Infrastructure Steering Group

Attachment
As stated

Transformational Options

Recommend Approval:

1. Consolidate Management at Installations with Shared Boundaries. Create a single manager for installations that share boundaries. Source & Application: H&SA

2. Regionalize Installation Support. Regionalize management of the provision of installation support activities across Military Departments within areas of significant Department of Defense (DoD) concentration, identified as Geographic Clusters. Option will evaluate designating organizations to provide a range of services, regionally, as well as aligning regional efforts to specific functions. For example, a possible outcome might be designation of a single organization with the responsibility to provide installation management services to DoD installations within the statutory National Capital Region (NCR). Source and Application: H&SA

3. Consolidate or collocate Regional Civilian Personnel Offices to create joint civilian personnel centers. Source and Application: H&SA

4. Consolidate active and Reserve Military Personnel Centers of the same service. Source and Application: H&SA

5. Collocate active and/or Reserve Military Personnel Centers across Military Departments. Source and Application: H&SA

6. Consolidate same service active and Reserve local Military Personnel Offices within Geographic Clusters. Source and Application: H&SA

7. Collocate active and/or Reserve local Military Personnel Offices across Military Departments located within Geographic Clusters. Source and Application: H&SA

8. Consolidate Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Central and Field Sites. Consolidate DFAS business line workload and administrative/staff functions and locations. Source and Application: H&SA

9. Consolidate Local DFAS Finance & Accounting (F&A). Merge/consolidate local DFAS F&A within Geographic Clusters. Source and Application: H&SA

10. Consolidate remaining mainframe processing and high capacity data storage operations to existing Defense Mega Centers (Defense Enterprise Computing Centers). Source and Application: H&SA

11. Establish and consolidate mobilization sites at installations able to adequately prepare, train and deploy service members. Source and Application: H&SA

12. Establish joint pre-deployment/re-deployment processing sites. Source and Application: H&SA

13. Rationalize Presence in the DC Area. Assess the need for headquarters, commands and activities to be located within 100 miles of the Pentagon. Evaluation will include analysis of realignment of those organizations found to be eligible to move to DoD-owned space outside of a 100-miles radius. Source and Application: H&SA

14. Minimize leased space across the US and movement of organizations residing in leased space to DoD-owned space. Source and Application: H&SA

15. Consolidate HQs at Single Locations. Consolidate multi-location headquarters at single locations. Source and Application: H&SA

16. Eliminate locations of stand-alone headquarters. Source and Application: H&SA

17. Consolidate correctional facilities into fewer locations across Military Departments. Source and Application: H&SA

18. Collocate Reserve Component (RC) Headquarters. Determine alternative facility alignments to support RC headquarters' administrative missions. Alternatives could consider collocation and/or movement of RC headquarters to operational bases. Source: H&SA; Application: MILDEPS

19. Collocate Recruiting Headquarters. Analyze alternative Recruiting Headquarters alignments. Consider co-location of RC and Active Component (AC) Recruiting headquarters. Source and Application: H&SA

20. Establish a consolidated multi-service supply, storage and distribution system that enhances the strategic deployment and sustainment of expeditionary joint forces worldwide. Focus the analysis on creating joint activities in heavy (US) DoD concentration areas, i.e. locations where more than one Department is based and within close proximity to another. Source: Supply & Storage; Application: Supply and Storage and Industrial

21. Privatize the wholesale storage and distribution processes from DoD activities that perform these functions. Source and Application: Supply & Storage

22. Migrate oversight and management of all service depot level reparables to a single DoD agency/activity. Source and Application: Supply & Storage

23. Decentralize Depot level maintenance by reclassifying work from depot-level to I-level. Source and Application: Industrial

24. Centralize I-level maintenance and decentralize depot-level maintenance to the existing (or remaining) depots.
    - Eliminate over-redundancy in functions.
    - Consolidate Intermediate and Depot-level regional activities

    Source and Application: Industrial

25. Regionalize severable and similar work at the intermediate level. Source and Application: Industrial

26. Partnerships Expansions. Under a partnership, have government personnel work in contractor owned/leased facilities and realign or close facilities where personnel are currently working. Source and Application: Industrial

27. Collocate depots: Two Services use the same facility(s). Separate command structures but shared common operations. Source and Application: Industrial

28. Consolidate similar commodities under Centers of Technical Excellence. Source and Application: Industrial

29. Implement concept of Vertical Integration by putting entire life cycle at same site to increase synergies, e.g. production of raw materials to the manufacture of finished parts, co-locating storage, maintenance and demil. Source and Application: Industrial

30. Implement concept of Horizontal Integration by taking some of the most costly elements of the M&A processes and put them at the same site to increase efficiencies, e.g. put Load, Assemble and Pack (LAP) of all related munitions at same site. Source and Application: Industrial

31. Maintain a multi-service distribution and deployment network consolidating on regional joint service nodes. Source and Application: Industrial

32. Evaluate Joint Centers for classes and types of weapons systems and/or technologies used by more than one Military Department:
    - Within a Defense Technology Area Plan (DTAP) Capability Area
    - Across multiple functions (Research; Development & Acquisition; Test & Evaluation)

- Across multiple DTAP capability areas. Source and Application: Technical

33. Evaluate Service-Centric concentration, i.e. consolidate within each Service:
    - Within a Defense Technology Area Plan (DTAP) capability area
    - Across multiple functions (Research; Development & Acquisition; Test & Evaluation)
    - Across multiple DTAP capability areas. Source and Application: Technical

34. Privatize graduate-level education. Source and Application: Education & Training

35. Integrate military and DoD civilian full-time professional development education programs. Source and Application: Education & Training

36. 36. Establish Centers of Excellence for Joint or Inter-service education and training by combining or co-locating like schools (e.g., form a "DoD University" with satellite training sites provided by Service-lead or civilian institutions). Source and Application: Education & Training

37. Establish "joint" officer and enlisted specialized skill training (initial skill, skill progression & functional training). Source and Application: Education & Training

38. Establish a single "Center of Excellence" to provide Unmanned Aerial Vehicle initial (a.k.a. undergraduate) training. Source and Application: Education & Training

39. Establish regional Cross-Service and Cross-Functional ranges that will support Service collective, interoperability and joint training as well as test and evaluation of weapon systems. Source and Application: Education & Training

40. Integrate selected range capabilities across Services to enhance Service collective, interoperability and joint training, such as Urban Operations, Littoral, training in unique settings (arctic, mountain, desert, and tropical). Source and Application: Education & Training

41. Combine Services' T&E Open Air Range (OAR) management into one joint management office. Although organizational/managerial, this option could engender further transformation. Joint management of OAR resources could encourage a healthy competition among OARs to increase efficiency and maximum utility DoD-wide. Source and Application: Education & Training

42. Consolidate or collocate at a single installation all services' primary phase of pilot training that uses the same aircraft (T-6). Source and Application: Education & Training

43. Locate (division/corps) UEx and (corps/Army) UEy on Joint bases where practical to leverage capabilities of other services (e.g., strategic lift to enhance strategic responsiveness). Source and Application: Army

44. Locate (brigades) Units of Action at installations DoD-wide, capable of training modular formations, both mounted and dismounted, at home station with sufficient land and facilities to test, simulate, or fire all organic weapons. Source and Application: Army

45. Collocate Army War College and Command and General Staff College at a single location. Source: Army; Application: Education & Training

46. Locate Special Operations Forces (SOF) in locations that best support specialized training needs, training with conventional forces and other service SOF units and wartime alignment deployment requirements. Source and Application: Army

47. Collocate or consolidate multiple branch schools and centers on single locations (preferably with MTOE units and RDTE facilities) based on warfighting requirements, training strategy, and doctrine, to gain efficiencies from reducing overhead and sharing of program-of-instruction resources. Source and Application: Army

48. Reshape installations, RC facilities and RC major training centers to support home station mobilization and demobilization and implement the Train/Alert/Deploy model. Source and Application: Army

49. Increase the number of multi-functional training areas able to simultaneously serve multiple purposes and minimize the number of single focus training areas for the Reserve Components where possible. Source and Application: Army

50. Collocate institutional training, MTOE units, RDTE organizations and other TDA units in large numbers on single installations to support force stabilization and enhance training. Army

51. Locate units/activities to enhance home station operations and force protection. Source and Application: Army

52. Consolidate aviation training with sister services for like-type aircraft to gain efficiencies. Source: Army; Application: all services.

53. Collocate functions and headquarters in “Joint Campuses” to enhance interoperability and reduce costs. Source: Army; Application: H&SA

54. Consolidate Army RDT&E organizations to capitalize on technical synergy across DoD, academia and industry. Source: Army; Application: Technical

55. Reduce the number of USAR regional headquarters to reflect Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRRI). Source and Application: Army

56. Consolidate RDT&E functions on fewer installations through inter-service support agreements to enable multidisciplinary efforts to increase efficiencies and reduce redundancy within DoD. Source: Army; Application: Technical, MilDeps.

57. Establish a single inventory control point (ICP) within each Service or consolidating into joint ICPs. Application: Supply and Storage

58. Expand Guard and Reserve force integration with the Active force. Examples:
(1) Blended organizations.
(2) Reserve Associate, Guard Associate, and Active Associate
(3) Sponsored Reserve.
(4) Blending of Guard units across state lines to unify mission areas, reduce infrastructure, and improve readiness.
Application: MilDeps

59. Consolidate National Capital Region (NCR) intelligence community activities now occupying small government facilities and privately owned leased space to fewer, secure DoD-owned locations in the region. Application: Intel

60. Collocate Guard and Reserve units at active bases or consolidate the Guard and Reserve units that are located in close proximity to one another at one location if practical, i.e., joint use facilities. Application: MilDeps

61. Consolidate the Army's five separate Active Component recruit training sites and the Marine Corps' two Active Component recruit training sites into one recruit training installation each. Source: Education and Training; Application: Army & Marine Corps

62. Privatize Household Goods and Personal Property Shipping function. Source: BENS; Application: Supply and Storage, MilDeps

63. Privatize long-haul communications in the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). Source: BENS; Application: H&SA

64. Collocate Joint Strike Fighter graduate flight training and maintenance training.

65. Collocate Joint Strike Fighter graduate flight training.

66. Collocate Joint Strike Fighter maintenance training.

67. Consolidate aviation assets of two or more Military Services on the same base. Application: MilDeps

68. Collocate Service special operations units where they further reduce infrastructure requirements and enable improved training opportunities.

69. Collocate Service Professional Military Education (PME) schools at the intermediate and senior levels. Application: E&T

70. Consolidate/Collocate Service specific test pilot schools. Application: MilDeps

71. Collocate ground and signals intelligence systems. Application: Intel & MilDeps

72. Collocate ground and airborne intelligence systems. Application: Intel & MilDeps

73. Consolidate pilot training and maintenance training for rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft using Executive Agency. Application: Education and Training.

74. Each Military Department and Joint Cross Service Group will look at the effects of either reducing their functions by 20%, 30%, and 40% from the current baseline, or reducing excess capacity by an additional 5% beyond the analyzed excess capacity, whichever is greater. The objective of this analysis is to uncover ways in which additional gains could be achieved, rather reasons why they could not. Source: DON; Application: MilDeps and JCSGs

75. Establish a “space test range” for satellite ground testing, threat assessment, and tactics development. Elements of the “range” should be networked using a minimum number of ground facilities to virtually simulate on-orbit operations. Source and Application: Air Force

76. Establish an Army Joint Network Science Technology and Experimentation Center to fully realize the transformational capabilities of interdependent Joint Network Centric Warfare. Source: Army; Application: Technical

77. Air Force use optimum flying squadron sizing and organizational constructs to disproportionately increase combat capability and transform the capability of its AEFs. Source and Application: Air Force

Transformational Options

Recommend Disapproval:

1. Establish joint basing – make it the rule vs. exception: Education & Training

   - Too broad. More suitable as policy guidance or a consideration.

2. Each JCSG and Military Department will consider, at a minimum, one joint basing solution for each function analyzed without regard to the Service that owns the sites being evaluated (analysis to eliminate any Service bias). Joint basing is defined as a co-location of another Service asset employing the traditional host-tenant relationship. (DON)

   - Too broad. More suitable as policy guidance or a consideration.

3. Air Force use optimum squadron sizes and crew ratios to maximize effectiveness of weapon systems. Rationale: Moving this from an imperative to a TO—required for BRAC in the Air Force. Air Force

   - Too broad. More suitable as policy guidance or a consideration.

4. Streamline training and test infrastructure and associated overhead (manpower, equipment, facilities, etc.) to achieve efficiencies. Army

   - Too vague to be actionable.

5. Establish environments that support live, virtual, and constructive training areas to support combat readiness of Army forces. Army

   - Too broad. More suitable as policy guidance or a consideration.

6. Develop, implement, and sustain an integrated logistics enterprise capable of managing the global logistics/supply chain. Army

   - Too broad. More suitable as policy guidance or a consideration.

7. Realign and consolidate the Army organic industrial base to provide Joint, responsive, flexible, world-wide logistics support from factory to foxhole. Army

   - Too broad to be actionable.

8. Reshape and integrate critical munitions and armaments capability to sustain peacetime and wartime Joint operational requirements in the most effective and efficient manner. Army

   - Too vague to be actionable.

9. Reshape and integrate Army maintenance and materiel management capabilities to sustain peacetime and wartime Joint operational requirements in the most effective and efficient manner. Army

   - Too vague to be actionable.

10. Collocate multiple functions, activities, or workload at a single installation. Army

    - Too vague to be actionable.

11. Consolidate multi-location headquarters at single locations when feasible to enhance efficiency and effectiveness. Army

    - Captured in another option.

12. Pursue Joint solutions for C4ISR and Battle Command while ensuring that Army retains responsibility for LandWarNet and sensors supporting ground combat. Army

    - More suitable as a consideration.

13. Create multi-functional, multi-component and multi-service installations (to include sister Service, USAR, ARNG and other DoD installations) to provide maximum flexibility for the Future Force and provide same or better level of service at a reduced cost. Army

    - Too broad. H&SA geocluster regionalization is also similar.

14. Reduce infrastructure footprint, including leased space, to enhance force protection and reduce costs. Army

    - Captured in another option.

15. Explore Joint civil-military use of facilities/installations in support of homeland defense missions, response and coordination (e.g. Army National Guard and State Emergency Management/Fire/Police, or other Federal agencies (FEMA/FBI). Army

    - Not in scope of BRAC

16. Propose CONUS installations to site Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) unit moves. Army

    - Associated with other guidance.

17. Integrate Reserve Component elements with respective active and joint components. The value of locating Reserve facilities within the community must also be considered, given the role that Reserve activities play in strengthening the link between the armed forces and American society.

    - Similar to another TO; nonspecific to generate scenario

18. Consolidate/privatize common specialty training. The Army Engineering School at Ft. Leonard Wood, MO may be a good model of multi-service training with contract instructors.

    - Too broad to be actionable.

19. Establish Centers of Excellence with joint or inter-service training, i.e., combining common or similar instructional institutions (e.g., Judge Advocate General Schools) to form a "DoD University" with satellite training sites or provided by Service-lead or civilian institutions.

    - Captured in another option

20. Analyze how we can better combine the efforts of the Services in those areas where the instructional flight training syllabus is essentially the same (e.g., ground school, basic flight training -- helo, prop, and jet). Similarly, aircraft type training for common airframes (e.g., Osprey, H-60, C-130, JSF, etc.) should be consolidated at a minimum number of joint sites -- or single joint site. (Atch 1 2003 List #11)

    - [OSD] Recommend: Delete. Too broadly written. Other E&T options cover the topic adequately.

21. Consolidate Services' common functions: supply, medical, legal, religious programs. (Atch 1 2003 List #12)

- Too broad to be actionable.

22. Evaluate Joint Service Installation Management by Region vice Service. (Atch 1 2003 List #13)

    - Too broad to be actionable.

23. Consolidate Base Installation Maintenance Requirements by geographic area.

    - Too broad to be actionable.

24. Eliminate all leased space occupied by DoD organizations within the United States. Growing concerns for force protection, in addition to lease costs, make this an emerging issue and important issue for review. Several types of agencies, i.e. recruiting offices, could be excluded from the analysis.

    - Captured in another TO.

25. Identify the potential to reduce installation operating costs through inter-service agreements, consolidations, and elimination of duplicate support services where military bases are located close to one another or where similar functions are performed at multiple locations. Examples of these services are MWR, public works, public safety, childcare services, housing services, and buildings/grounds/roads maintenance. (GAO Report High Risk Series - Defense Infrastructure, February 1997.) Assess the potential for the increased sharing of bases on an inter-service or intra-service basis to maximize the use of available training ranges and other facilities.

    The analysis would determine the feasibility of consolidating contracting for services. DoD spending in service contracts approaches $1B annually, but according to GAO, DoD's management of services' procurement is inefficient and ineffective and the dollars are not well spent. GAO recommended that DoD's approach should provide for an agency-wide view of service contract spending and promote collaboration to leverage buying power across multiple organizations. Possible impact would be a reduction in personnel and office space through possible consolidation of function. (GAO Report — Best Practices — Improved Knowledge of DoD Service Contracts Could Reveal Significant Savings - June 2003.)

    - Too broad to be actionable.

26. Centralize the systems management and operations of DoD combat support processing servers into enterprise systems management centers to prepare for the net-centric environment being pursued by the Department and to reduce costs and significantly improve the security and performance of server-based processing.

    - Consideration of managerial organizations for technical assets is not within scope of BRAC

27. Consolidate the Naval Facilities Engineering Command under the Army Corps of Engineers or completely do away with the Naval Facility Engineering Command.

    - Not executable; statutory concerns regarding ACoE civil works.

28. Consolidate acquisition and logistics activities at the headquarters level (e.g., the Air Force Materiel Command model) to achieve support personnel and overhead reductions.

    - Too broad to be actionable.

29. Designate lead services for common equipment and reduce physical plant and workforces to the minimum number required for the force structure.

    - Too broad to be actionable.

30. Transfer the operations of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) back to the respective buying entity.

    - Not in scope of BRAC

31. Establish a joint, central organization for all personnel management activities. Retain in each Service only those activities needed to build the force structure requirements, make assignments, and manage war fighting, and occupational skills development.

    - Captured in another TO.

32. Employ distance learning and available educational resources in local communities to cut down on DoD owned/operated educational facility requirements.

    - Too broad and not within the scope of BRAC

33. Determine alternative facility alignments to execute Reserve Component (RC) headquarters administrative missions and functions. Consider all seven elements of

the RC structure. The focus of the analysis will be on the requirements for and capabilities of facilities and installations supporting Reserve and National Guard administrative and headquarters functions, excluding state owned and/or controlled facilities of the National Guard. Alternatives should include consideration of combining headquarters and/or moving headquarters to operational bases.

- Captured in another option.

34. Identify alternative concepts for realigning mobilization facilities DoD-wide. This analysis should focus on requirements for and capabilities of facilities and installations in the Active, Reserve, and National Guard Components of all Services to mobilize, prepare, train, deploy, and sustain forces committed to combat operations, whether overseas or in the US. Alternatives to consider include:

    (1) Establishment and consolidation of mobilization sites at installations able to adequately prepare, deploy, and train service members.
    (2) Establishment of joint pre-deployment (e.g. personnel processing) centers.

    - Captured in other options.

35. Evaluate the Defense, Accounting and Finance Service (DFAS) operations. This option seeks to leverage BRAC 2005 to recognize additional workload consolidation, infrastructure reduction, and reduction in the number of DFAS operating locations at which specific functions are performed. While A-76 competitive sourcing is one of the options currently under investigation and implementation is not directly affected by BRAC 2005, implementation of other options such as a High-Performing Organization or a Public-Private Partnership could benefit from the opportunities provided under BRAC 2005. Implementation of a High-Performing Organization, for example, could result in shifting workload and functions to a location that is currently performing significantly better than other locations and closing the poorer performing sites. Centralization of specific functions at a major site and embedding a small number of DFAS personnel at customer locations is another possibility that results in a reduced infrastructure and facility requirements.

    - Captured in other another option.

36. Evaluate security and continuity of operations at Defense Accounting and Finance Service (DFAS) activities. The events of 9/11 highlight security and safety concerns for both DFAS personnel and the financial and accounting data. A number of DFAS' 26 current operating locations are not located on military installations. Safety and security are in most cases provided by public services

(fire, police, etc). Security of each DFAS location should be evaluated and if significant risks are determined to exist and relocation to military installations or DFAS site consolidation considered. With the migration to fewer sites, provisions need to incorporate the requirement to have backup equipment systems, and facility plans that replicate functions in the event of an incident or disaster.

- Captured in other another option.

37. Examine DoD human resources management processes and locations. Potential issues include:
(1) Consolidation of military personnel agencies at one location.
(2) Consolidation of civilian personnel agencies at one or several locations.
(3) Joint regionalization of civilian personnel agencies.
(4) Consolidation of military and civilian personnel within Service.

- Captured in other options.

38. Establish multi-service distribution and deployment network that enhances the strategic responsiveness of the Joint Team. (Army)

- Captured in other options.

39. Evaluate the Military Services' need for multiple Initial Entry Training (IET) sites. The Navy and Air Force, each, conduct this primary training at a single installation. However, the Marine Corps operates two recruit training depots—one on the East Coast, one on the West. The Army operates five separate basic training sites.

- Captured in other option.

40. There are a number of ongoing strategic and transformational initiatives in the Navy and Marine Corps that will contribute to the BRAC 2005 goals of sizing our infrastructure to the defense strategy and increasing its efficiency and effectiveness. These studies, including the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, Sea Power 21, and the Fleet Response Plan, will impact the future force structure and it is imperative that the conclusions be incorporated into BRAC deliberations and transformational analyses. The Navy will continue to work with Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure the twenty-year force structure plan is consistent with our ongoing initiatives.

41. Identify alternative concepts for realigning missions and functions among seven CONUS-based unified commands (USJFCOM, USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM, and

USSOCOM), component or supporting service commands, and Defense Agencies. Analysis opportunities may include:

(1) Location of service component commands with unified commands.
(2) Elimination of "stand alone" headquarters.
(3) Integration of functions of appropriate Defense agencies and selected unified commands.
(4) Elimination of service component commands.
(5) Review and analysis of functions and business processes to identify BRAC implications for headquarters/command facilities.

42. Consider the full range of options for the Department of Defense's Science and Technology (S&T), Test and Evaluation (T&E), and system Development and Acquisition infrastructure and functions. Evaluate integration of individual Service and Defense Agency physical capabilities and functions. Consider consolidation of individual Service and/or Defense Agency physical capabilities and functions, using mechanisms such as: Executive Agency, regionalization, joint management, new entity, etc.

43. Consolidate/merge all Service personnel business functions and rating (MOS/FEC/NEC) structures, including: Service medical records, pay systems, and performance appraisals, etc. Consolidation or merger would allow Services to eliminate separate support functions at various locations.

44. Discussions have suggested that the common business functions are currently being addressed through the Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSG). The opportunities to examine potential synergies associated with the co-location of operational forces; however, seem less defined. Recommend a process be established to provide this cross—service analysis, especially in the area of aviation platform bed down.

45. Incorporate force protection vulnerability assessments into the BRAC evaluation process.

46. Incorporate a strategic business analysis into the BRAC process to align the business functions with Defense Strategy, and focus on aggregate vice isolated efficiencies. This would entail an examination of Department of Defense business functions and address infrastructure needs.

47. Consider "City-Basing". It may be possible some military bases could divest and privatize selected non-military/non-critical facilities and functions to reduce the DoD infrastructure. We should consider whether the Brooks City-Base pilot initiative sponsored by the Air Force and the Business Initiative Council may have potential elsewhere. Military installations for the most part are small cities that could be managed/operated by local governments, or for that matter a best-of-breed

private sector activity, allowing military commanders to concentrate on military operations. However, great care must be taken to ensure that we do not divest functions that are needed for military wartime or contingency requirements, and that the troops retain access to the same or better services at the same or lower costs. Enabling legislation was required to implement Brooks City-Base, but this enabling legislation could he incorporated in the SecDef's BRAC 2005 recommendations to the Defense BRAC Commission.

48. Partner military depots' workload with industry. Opportunities might exist to partner with industry at government facilities, to further reduce infrastructure requirements. In addition, future opportunities may exist to combine certain depot functions across Services. A future partnership arrangement and joint depot function for the Joint Strike Fighter would be a good example.

49. Study the results of the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy as a factor for BRAC considerations.

50. Assess the required infrastructure necessary to bed down forces returning to the United States as a result of potential change to US Defense strategy. For example, a reduced requirement in forces needed to "deter forward" may increase infrastructure requirements within the United States.

51. Examine the realignment of Active/Reserve Component forces and associated infrastructure in order to meet short warning and compressed swiftly defeat the effort (SDTE) timelines required to execute the Defense strategy.

52. Evaluate the minimum force levels necessary to be forward-stationed and immediately available, and preserve the infrastructure needed to bed down the remaining forces within the United States.

53. Review the infrastructure requirements associated with mobilization of Reserve Forces to optimize their ability to meet short warning and compressed SUTE timelines.

54. Look at mobility plans to ensure overlapping en route infrastructures exist to provide more flexible expeditionary capabilities.

55. Establish additional multi-mission, multi-service CONUS-based installations. These multi-service installations could be used by more than one service for a variety of missions including equipment repair (aircraft, crew served and individual weapons, boats/ship repair, etc.), schooling of service members, multi-use joint training facilities, and joint installations where units that will fight together are based together. Cost savings will be created through elimination of redundancy

and reduction of overhead. Throughout this consolidation, we must ensure that we maintain the capability to train and educate our partner nation counterparts in skills that they currently rely on the U.S. Armed Forces training centers to provide.

56. Lease commercially available facilities to eliminate costly permanent military installations. The costs to build, operate, and maintain permanent military installations could be greatly reduced through leasing of commercially available state-of-the-art facilities and, at the same time, create a favorable economic impact for our local community partners. Examples of leaseable services include: gyms, chapels, dining facilities, and child care facilities.

57. There is great value in creating and sustaining a global infrastructure of widely dispersed forward operating locations capable of supporting responsive extended range air, land, naval, and space operations. Priority should extend to bases and well-developed infrastructure in countries and regions that not only provide access to our most likely areas of engagement, but also in which the U.S. seeks to assure allies of a long-term U.S. military commitment in defense of shared interest. Importantly, basing options should anticipate potential host country restrictions that could limit unilateral U.S. force employment options.

58. Consider deliberations to balance the fiscal benefits of consolidation with the increased security provided by physical redundancy. Our current space operations infrastructure provides numerous examples in which funding decisions drove development of infrastructure that now contain potential single points of failure. A key tenet of our overall basing and force development posture should be that no critical infrastructure or capability is reliant upon a single base of operations. A possible strategy to implement this goal while also reducing overall defense infrastructure may be developing Joint Force Bases where geographical proximity and mission scope allow for the sharing of resources among individual services.

59. Use the Service-agreed upon criteria/standards established in the Inter-service Training Review Organization (ITRO) Procedures Manual as the baseline for consolidation of training programs/courses. Secondly, re-evaluate previous ITRO course reviews to determine if “disapproved” courses for joint consolidation meet the new standards outlined by the BRAC Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group (i.e. a focus on jointness, as well as efficiencies).

60. Partner with other than the Federal sector (e.g., State and local) for range and training resources.

61. Integrate distributed/networked virtual and constructive capabilities through the Joint National Training Capability initiative into regional or national centers.

62. Incorporate “space” into the analyses of ranges.

63. Establish a stronger joint basing policy — make it the rule vs. exception.

64. Design Bases around Core Missions — organize to support a capability vs. filling up bases.

65. Eliminate Controlled Humidity Storage of equipment.

66. Restructure the organization of the DoD executive departments at the seat of government (OSD and military department’s headquarters’ staffs) and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to eliminate administrative management overhead; reduce redundant layering in decision-making processes; modernize the operational chain of command; establish single oversight of business functions; and establish an enterprise architecture with a common operating environment. A reevaluation of Title X responsibilities would be required as part of this analysis process. A reexamination of duties would also be required to ensure headquarters focus on core, corporate-level tasks rather than program management and day-to-day management of subordinate activities; strengthened focus on long-term strategic program and financial planning; and elimination of unnecessary overlap, complexity, and redundancy in tasks. (GAO/NSIAD-00-72, Defense Management, July 2002.) Execution of this alternative would result in significant reduction in facilities space requirements.

67. Examine best practices in commercial acquisition to determine if fewer people, organizations, and or facilities could be used in the DoD process. The GAO reported in February 2002 (GAO-02-469T Sourcing and Acquisition 19 March 2003) that it is important for DoD to adopt business practices that will enable it to acquire the systems and services to allow it to operate effectively in a resource constrained environment. One analysis area could be examining the feasibility of streamlining the acquisition process through DoD/Federal enterprise-wide contracting managed at the Centers of Excellence” level and executed at the local level. Execution of a streamlined acquisition process would result in a reduction in infrastructure requirements.

68. Consider BRAC implications for the divestiture of DoD-owned utility and energy systems. Frameworks that could be investigated include:
    (1) Establishment of a single subject matter expert and executive agent for all DoD utilities privatization efforts.
    (2) Establishment of a joint approach toward utilities privatization. Consideration that proposals including adjacent, related systems might prove attractive to industry.

(3) Consideration of taking a regional (and Joint) approach to the provision of energy to installations in the State of Alaska. Implementation of recommendations could result in the closure of one of more central heat and power plants at Army and/or Air Force installations. Effort could capitalize on ongoing study being done by the Department of the Army.

69. Examine DoD's business management operations to include the complex network of finance, logistics, personnel, acquisition, and other management processes and information systems that are used to gather the financial data needed to support day-to-day management and decision-making. The processes and their supporting networks were not designed, but rather evolved into an overly complex operation including little standardization across DoD components; multiple systems performing the same tasks; the same data stored in multiple systems; manual data entry into multiple systems; and a large number of data translations and interfaces which combine to exacerbate problems with data integrity. According to the GAO, the conditions that lead to previous attempts at reform remain largely unchanged today. (GAO-02-497T, DoD Financial Management, 6 March 2002.) A possible outcome would be a reduction in systems, data entry personnel, and facility support infrastructure as a result of establishing enterprise business rules for business processes that use a framework of DoD-wide common data standards.

70. Identify and Determine Alternatives for Providing Non-core Functions. This analysis would accelerate the efforts of the Senior Executive Council and the Business Initiative Council to identify non-core functions that DoD and the Services do not necessarily need to perform in-house. A range of alternatives for provision of functions may include function transfer, cross-servicing, consolidation, regionalization, privatization, or elimination. The recently revised OMB A-76 Circular would need to be evaluated to determine its impact to the effort.

71. Examine DoD Installation Management. Breaking down cultural resistance to change, overcoming service parochialism, and setting forth a clear framework for a reduced defense infrastructure are key to avoiding waste and inefficiency. Infrastructure is defined as those activities that provide support services to mission programs, such as combat forces, and primarily operate from fixed positions. Therefore, this analysis would identify the potential to reduce installation operating costs through interservice agreements, consolidations, and elimination of duplicate support services where military bases are located close to one another or where similar functions are performed at multiple locations. Examples of these services are MWR, public works, public safety, childcare services, housing services, and buildings/grounds/roads maintenance. (GAO Report High Risk Series — Defense Infrastructure, February 1997.) Possible areas of focus follow:

(1) Each Service maintains its own facilities and capabilities for performing many common support functions and, as a result, DoD has overlapping, redundant, and underutilized infrastructure. Significant reductions in excess infrastructure requirements in common support areas could come from consolidating workloads, sharing assets, and restructuring functions on a cross-service basis. An analysis would examine ways to consolidate functions; eliminate duplication of efforts; and recommend organizational reforms, reductions in management overhead, and streamlined business practices. It would be important to resolve the policy issues that have had limited cross-service consolidations in the past.

(2) Determination of how much DoD medical infrastructure is needed to meet war-fighting requirements and what capacity exceeding those requirements will be retained for use by military dependents and retirees.

(3) Determination of what extent OSD and JCS will emphasize joint basing in the future as they increase joint training and operations.

(5) Determination, to the extent practical, whether (1) overseas basing is likely to continue at the current level or be reduced and (2) contingent capacity for basing in the US needs to be retained. (GAO Report — Military Bases — Lessons Learned from Prior Base Closure Rounds, July 1997.)

72. Evaluate a divestiture of mission involving support of active duty military contingencies, a reallocation of assets used in support of such missions to reserve or active duty units, and a reorganization based on mission as determined by the state governor.

73. Determine the feasibility of physical consolidation, functional consolidation, regionalization, and/or privatization of staff functions such as the Medical Corps, Judge Advocate General Corps, chaplains, legislative liaisons, public affairs, and safety.

74. Evaluate military barracks policies. The military barracks footprint is large. Barracks are costly to build and maintain. All services continue to invest heavily in barracks. Several Services are considering looking at privatization as a feasible and cost-effective approach to permanent party single service member housing (PPSSMH). A collaborative, rather than independent service, approach could minimize duplication. (GAO Report — Military Housing — Opportunities that Should Be Explored to Improve Housing and Reduce Costs for Unmarried Junior Service Members — June 2003.) Other analyses that might be considered for PPSSMH as part of BRAC 05 include:

(1) Elimination of single service member mandatory assignment to barracks/dormitories for all Services.

(2) Establishment of consistent assignment policy across the four Services, e.g., Army's mandatory assignment policy is E-1 thru E-6, while the Navy's is E-1 thru E-4.

75. Review the efforts of the Business Management Modernization Program and all other information technology studies being conducted by OSD and the military departments with a goal of determining opportunities for transferring, consolidating, or privatizing all or part of information technology services and systems. Possible analytical frameworks include:

(1) Establishment of a ubiquitous DoD enterprise network with regionalized management vice a network of networks owned and operated by the Services and Agencies. This approach could reduce installation footprint, redundancies and duplications of effort, and operational overhead. It would also enhance security and information assurance, as well as increase interoperability as a result of standardization and integration. Guard and Reserve Component would also merge into the larger DoD enterprise enhancing interoperability and reducing redundancy.

(2) Establishment of a DoD or Joint level CIO responsible for providing the Services and Agencies with the strategic IT support required to operate and maintain a worldwide enterprise network for installations and that can be extended to the tactical networks supporting the war fighter. This framework treats information technology services like a utility at the installation level and allows the Services to focus on tactical extension of the DoD enterprise network service required to support war fighter missions.

(3) Consolidation of all DoD, Service and Agency email systems into regional web-based mail services similar to that provided by America On Line (AOL), and or Army Knowledge Online (AKO). The creation of a DoD enterprise portal supports the development of a global enterprise information service and taxonomy for the sharing and delivering of information across one network vice stove piped systems.

(4) Expedition of the merging of all voice, data, and video communications on to an Internet Protocol (IP) network to reduce infrastructure requirements and sustainment costs.

(5) Mandate the hosting of all applications and mainframe operations at centralized DoD processing centers, such as Defense Enterprise Computing Centers (DECO). he use of these facilities will reduce footprint requirements and implement economies of scale cost reduction. This centralized hosting and processing enhances the global enterprise information taxonomy.

76. Evaluate DoD human resources management policies. This analysis and reengineering effort would look at human resources management processes across DoD. Possible analytical frameworks include: Development of automated personnel profiles that capture complete employee history to include pay and benefits history, training, and medical records. This would alleviate fragmented records, multiple records and data entry points, and reduce supporting personnel requirements and facilities infrastructure. This effort might also consider privatization of components of the human resource management function, or of the function in entirety, as it pertains to civilian personnel.

77. Shift BRAC focus. The business strategy of the Department of Defense (DoD) focuses almost exclusively on efficiency in the conduct of business operations. Almost no emphasis is given to devising effective business strategies. This drive to the bottom line assumes DoD already has an effective strategy (i.e., the department is pursuing only the business functions that provide it with an advantage) and it merely needs to fine-tune operations. This is also the inherent assumption behind the traditional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.

Incorporating a strategic business analysis into the BRAC process would provide the opportunity to examine what business functions DoD should be engaged in so that they align with Defense Strategy, rather than examining how to trim capacity on what is currently being done. This would also afford the department the opportunity to focus on aggregate efficiencies instead of isolated efficiencies and avoid potential adverse strategic outcomes that can arise from tactical pursuit of cost reductions at the business unit level.

In contrast to DoD, private firms seek first to gain a competitive advantage. Decisions of what to do internally and what to outsource are made in light of strategic objectives. While DoD emphasizes cost when making these decisions, business management literature emphasizes that lower costs should not be the primary or the only goal of business strategy and outsourcing. Michael Corbett [1995] lists the following goals in descending order of importance.

(1) Improving Business Focus
(2) Gaining Access to Superior Capabilities

(3) Accelerating Re-Engineering Efforts to Reduce Cycle Times and Improve Quality
(4) Sharing Risks
(5) Reducing Operating Costs
(6) Converting Capital Investments in Non-Core Functions into Operating Expense
(7) Gaining Better Control Over Functions That Are Not Meeting Performance Goals or Customer Expectations

While traditionally BRAC has only focused on item five, the process could be revised to take the other six elements into account. This would entail an examination not only of what infrastructure DoD needs to perform current business functions but also what business functions should DoD be doing in the first place.

78. Realign of Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Distribution Activities. DLA is currently realigning their distribution activities to support the Industrial Transformation Strategy of the Military Services; executing the National Inventory Management Strategy (NIMS) to extend DoD Supply Chain of consumable items beyond the wholesale level; and implementing the "Hub and Spoke" distribution concept.

The NIMS promotes extending supply chain management of consumable items beyond the wholesale level in order to provide products and services to the point of consumption. This effort will merge distinct wholesale and retail inventories into a national inventory that can be managed in a more integrated and efficient manner. This will reduce redundant inventory levels and information systems thereby lowering overall DoD inventory costs.

The "hub and spoke" distribution process will use speed and responsiveness to move critical supplies under positive control from the source to the customer. Stock positioning decisions will be made to move critical parts closer to the customer, significantly increasing readiness, reducing order ship time and allowing Service owned retail level inventories to be further reduced.

They are also establishing a single Weapons Systems ICP with regional sites at Columbus, Richmond, and Philadelphia (this may provide a tie-in to the single Service ICP concept discussed above).

79. Establish an Integrated Common Identification System. Regardless of the end result of BRAC process, if the Supply and Storage infrastructure is "right sized' without having an integrated common tracking, marking, burning, interrogating, receipting and distributing process then infrastructure is reduced without gaining any effectiveness in our logistics business. An overarching Radio Frequency (RF)

capability, interfaced with the Global Information Grid, integrated in the distribution pipeline that provides real time visibility from source of supply to the soldier at the end of the last tactical mile should be established. This capability should also be built into the redistribution/retrograde pipeline to ensure materiel flow is as effective moving out of theater as it will be moving forward.

This overarching RF architecture must also be integrated into the financial community. Given that our working capital fund (WCF) structure is dependent on sales, the velocity of which we can move materiel has become faster than the soldiers ability to input receipts, creating not only backlog but the "loss of sales" jeopardizes the WCF. These disconnects across the logistics and financial community, particularly as we look at joint and combined operations, must be closed. To better facilitate this effort recommend that it be coordinated with the Industrial, Technical, and Headquarters and Support JCSGs.

80. Explore public/private partnership opportunities (i.e., Limited Liability Companies, Venture Capital, Lease to Buy, etc.) to optimize intellectual capital and maximize facility(s) utilization and capabilities.

81. Consider establishment of an S&T workforce educational program similar to the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences (USUHS) to recruit, train, and retain the unique science and engineering human capital required to ensure U.S. technological warfighting and full spectrum dominance throughout the 21st Century.

82. DoD's inventory of facilities, including CONUS and OCONUS, must be viewed as an integrated network - a system of systems. Facilities must be evaluated based on the service they provide to the system. The system being supported is a rapidly deployable, rapidly tailorable, joint, interagency, unilateral and or combined fighting system, with or without coalition support for basing (denied access). OCONUS bases must support initial operations and thru-put and staging of follow-on forces. CONUS bases must facilitate the rapid deployment of forces as well as support reachback operations where/when possible. The basing structure must support realistic, individual, unit collective, joint, and interagency, capabilities based training. Where possible, sustaining bases and facilities must readily/efficiently support the transition from sustaining/training bases to operational bases with minimal time, cost or effort.

83. Recommend that improvements to mission effectiveness (rather than a heavy emphasis on cost savings) become a significant variable in the BRAC equation reiterating that installations and facilities must be assessed by the contribution they make to the system of training, sustaining and deploying rapidly deployable and tailorable joint forces.

84. Use BRAC to support critical business process reforms under the Business Management Modernization Program to ensure that the goal of 25 percent cost reduction is achieved. For details see A Plan to Streamline DoD's Science and Technology, Engineering, and Test and Evaluation Infrastructure, Report of the Section 907 and 912(c) Senior Steering Group for Review of the RDT&E Infrastructure, July 1999.

85. Work with Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Policy) and retain outside experts to undertake a capabilities-based review of RDT&E infrastructure and projected requirements across the public and private sectors and across all Services. See Vision 21: The Plan for 21st Century Laboratories and Test and Evaluation Centers of the Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology), May 1996.

86. Use the joint cross-servicing working group mechanism to vigorously pursue reductions in duplication and non-value added work in the military service and defense laboratories in accord with the study produced in 49.

87. Reinvigorate the T&E executive agent structure and engage those parties in the process of developing the joint plan for consolidation and streamlining.

88. Consult with outside experts in organizational realignment and use the IT tools made available via the Business Management Modernization Program, to restructure the acquisition organizations of OSD and the Services at the headquarters level to take advantage of improved business processes and IT-enabled information flows and increased use of contractor managed life-cycle support.

89. Support the Navy's creation of a "virtual" enterprise for its Systems Commands (NAVAIR, NAVSEA, NAVSUP, SPAWARS) as a means to streamline operations, reduce intra service duplication and cut overhead.

90. Use BRAC to create a consolidated, joint distribution system for DoD: Engage private sector experts to assist in assessing warehouse and distribution center requirements –
    (1) Appropriate performance/delivery standards of operation for DoD
    (2) Numbers, types and locations for large distribution centers (e.g. Susquehanna and San Joaquin in today's system) and regional distribution centers
    (3) Required inventory levels at each site
    (4) Volume of warehouse and distribution center space
    (5) Close all other warehouse and distribution centers

(6) Use BMMP and ongoing IT integration solutions to create joint supply management system
(7) Use BRAC funds to construct or automate/modernize remaining sites

91. Continue to implement current supply chain business process reforms.

92. Make the private sector the preferred provider of services for back office functions.

93. With the Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) as a guide, change the organizational structure of the Department's back office functions to align authority with responsibility.

94. Transfer all commodity management, information, and disposal activities of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), including the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC), to private vendors or 3rd party logistics providers. Retain within DLA :
(1) Planning and combat logistics support for combatant commanders
(2) Oversight of prime vendor agreements
(3) Direct management of DoD-unique and readiness items

95. Identify the residual organizations in the military services that continue to perform similar activities to or exist to monitor or liaise with the aforementioned Defense Agencies and vigorously eliminate, rationalize or consolidate into joint cross-service use employing the Business Management Modernization Program as a guide.

96. Establish a single HR portal for all DoD military and civilian employees to enable each of them to manage their personnel actions electronically. Vigorously rationalize the military services existing physical HR infrastructure.

97. Expand outsourcing of recruiters and recruiting/induction functions for all military services.

98. Make the private sector the preferred provider of military family housing by continuing a compensation-based approach that enables the military member to make a financial decision on how to spend his or her housing allowance.

99. Continue the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI).

100. Convert barracks/transient facilities development, operation and management to a professional, largely civilian-run organization. Take private hotel/motel industry practices as the organizational standard. Compete where the local commercial market provides alternatives.

101. Continue to expand private sector participation in childcare and family support programs by either privatizing or using enhanced use lease authorities to move the infrastructure out of DoD ownership.

102. Compete, where feasible, infrastructure associated with MWR Category A activities. These activities include intramural and unit sports, libraries, physical fitness facilities, recreation centers and activities at unit level primarily oriented to unaccompanied personnel. These activities need to be preserved on military facilities and ships, but their operation does not require DoD personnel in many cases.

103. Evaluate MWR Category B activities against availability of same/similar services available in the local community (where military members could perhaps receive DoD-subsidized access/membership). These include auto hobby shops, arts & crafts centers, bowling centers, child development centers, entertainment, outdoor recreation, and youth services. Where no commercial market exists, preference should be to provide the service on the military facility, but to compete the development, operation and management where possible.

104. Develop and operate MWR Category C activities with private sector partners. These activities include amusement machines, Armed Forces Recreation Centers, entertainment/dinner clubs, and golf courses. Consider allowing local community use as away of leveraging operating costs.

105. Continue planning to consolidate the Service's three separate exchange systems in a way that is transparent to the military shopper.

106. Even though TRICARE's role in military readiness is critical, its infrastructure must be run like a business. Once the Force Health Protection requirement (e.g., personnel and medical capabilities to prevent casualties from occurring in the deployed environment and ability to provide high quality casualty care if it does occur) is adequately provided for, DoD should consolidate its remaining Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) structure.

107. Increasing partnerships with current managed care providers in the private sector sustains a strong medical support system in CONUS to care for retirees and families of active duty deployed personnel. It also creates a pool of civilian providers to backfill MTF's when their medical staffs are deployed.

108. DoD must complete funding and fielding of the Composite Health Care System (CHCS II) to permit automated medical information on all eligible beneficiaries to be available worldwide. Like the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet, CHCS II is a good candidate for outsourced operation and maintenance.

109. While we believe that it is within the charter of the Training and Education JCSG, analysis specifically directed at the viability of a Joint National Training Capability through BRAC should be considered, such as an integrated real, virtual and digital networked training environment that replicates in training in both CONUS and OCONUS the execution of joint, combined and interagency, warfighting in realistic accuracy.

110. Consolidate Service's management of quarters, housing, and public schools.

111. Consolidate or privatize base exchanges/commissaries.

112. Evaluate the impact of military joint construction projects. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has recommended to DoD that use of joint construction projects will help improve conditions, reduce construction costs and reduce facilities footprint for Guard and Reserve facilities. (GAO-03-51 6, Defense Infrastructure-Changes in Funding Priorities and Management Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and Reserve Facilities, May 2003.) For example, a joint Armed Forces Reserve Center in Tennessee, which combined construction projects of the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and the Marine Corps Reserve into a single project, saved millions of MILCON dollars and lessened the need for additional infrastructure. This principle when used between the Services, as well as between the active force and RC, will give similar savings. This analysis would evaluate ways that BRAC 2005 might facilitate efficient planning, programming, and execution of joint construction projects. Focus may include facilitation of coordination among RC and Service counterparts, and between service components, to program identified military construction projects in the same fiscal year. The assessment should also examine ways to employ the DoD-established budget structure and/or BRAC resources to fund high priority joint construction projects.

113. Examine DoD lodging management. This analysis would look at BRAC implications for DoD lodging management. Lodging management is defined as the management of transient billeting provided for those on temporary duty, as well as arriving and departing personnel and their families. Possible analytical frameworks include:
    - Elimination of transient lodging, which would result in dependence on the private sector.
    - Consolidation of lodging operations between Services.
    - Establishment of a single executive agent for military lodging operations and management.
    - Transfer of ownership of lodging assets to the private sector for operation and management (privatization).

114. Review DoD Infrastructure — Unique Properties such as Prisons, Historic Properties, and Museums. This analysis would identify all DoD unique properties/facilities such as prisons, historic properties, and museums to determine which properties/facilities could be turned over to an appropriate agency, business, or foundation for continued operation.

115. Evaluate military barracks policy. The military barracks footprint is large. Barracks are costly to build and maintain. All services continue to invest heavily in barracks. Several Services are considering looking at privatization as a feasible and cost-effective approach to permanent party single service member housing (PPSSMH). A collaborative, rather than independent service, approach could minimize duplication. (GAO Report — Military Housing — Opportunities that Should Be Explored to Improve Housing and Reduce Costs for Unmarried Junior Service Members — June 2003.) Other analyses that might be considered for PPSSMH as part of BRAC 05 include consolidation of assets and effort; establishment of a single executive agent for PPSSMH.

116. Determine the feasibility of consolidating contracting for services. DoD spending in service contracts approaches $1B annually, but according to GAO, DoD's management of services' procurement is inefficient and ineffective and the dollars are not well spent. GAO recommended that DoD's approach should provide for an agency-wide view of service contract spending and promote collaboration to leverage buying power across multiple organizations. Possible impact would be a reduction in personnel and office space through possible consolidation of function. (GAO Report — Best Practices — Improved Knowledge of DoD Service Contracts Could Reveal Significant Savings - June 2003.)

117. Establish and support of the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC), an integrated real, virtual and digital networked training environment that replicates in training in both CONUS and OCONUS the execution of joint, combined and interagency, warfighting in realistic accuracy.

118. Continue to exploit opportunities for privatization and public-private partnering in the laboratory structure as a mechanism for filling excess capacity, leveraging private sector investment, spreading overhead, and attracting top talent.

119. Use BRAC to create a consolidated, joint distribution system for DoD. Contract for operation of remaining warehouse and distribution centers – Where public sector operations remain, use Performance Agreements with performance levels/delivery standards arrived at by process above.

120. Establish a depot and industrial facility cross-servicing panel that has the goal of rationalizing and consolidating DoD's existing infrastructure into a configuration to support the repair and maintenance requirements of the 2011 force structure.

121. Outsource the services of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).

122. Compete remaining payroll functions (active duty/reserve/civilian) and those parts of the benefits system related to monetary transactions (e.g., insurance, thrift savings plan, etc.).

123. Continue to press for authority to move all background security investigation personnel and infrastructure out of DoD.

124. Move training and education for specialized skills to preferred providers in the private sector or public academic institutions.

125. Privatize the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA), including its overseas operations, employing a business model that stipulates that the current level of benefit be maintained and that the number of stores not be reduced unless the benefit can be otherwise replaced. The plan should encourage a consortium of providers to team to provide the benefit.

126. Evaluate Military Air Traffic Control (ATC) functions. This analysis would identify BRAC implications for military ATC facilities. Consider transfer of these functions to the Federal Aviation Administration.

127. Locate Army forces and materiel to enhance deployment/redeployment of the Joint Team. Army

128. Establish multiple power projection platforms capable of simultaneously deploying multiple units. Army

129. Consolidate, Collocate, and /or disperse training to enhance coordination, doctrine, development, training effectiveness, and improve operational and functional efficiencies. Army

130. Outsource DFAS activities to the maximum extent possible. (Atch 2 2003 List)

131. Outsource Human Resources, such as Personnel Management, Education and Training and Recruiting functions. (Atch 2 2003 List)

132. Privative-in-place the entire DoD maintenance depot system. (Atch 2 2003 List)

133. Explore stationing CONUS mobility units and assets closer to planned air and sea ports-of-embarkation to facilitate rapid mobilization. (Atch 1 2003 List #3)

- Restructure and/or combine Service acquisition organizations. Significant gains in efficiency might be achieved by combining/merging/co-locating selected acquisition activities. Among these, consider transforming service-specific product centers into jointly-managed centers for items such as avionics, aeronautics and other weapons.

134. Collocate federal, joint, and military department facilities to produce efficiencies in force protection and quality of life services. Opportunities for co-location will most likely present themselves in municipal settings where federal installations already exist, and sufficient adjacent infrastructure is available. If no permanent installations exist then collocation could occur entirely through a leasing agreement. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) must remain a key consideration when evaluating alternatives to relocate/collocate various facilities. It is imperative that we balance the benefits and risks associated with any effort to transform DoD infrastructure/bases.

135. Consider outsourcing all graduate education, to include Service War Colleges to private colleges/ universities -- or maximize outsourcing and then consolidate to minimum sites. Leverage distance learning to reduce residential requirements.

136. Evaluate DoD headquarters and support activities in the National Capital Region (NCR). This analysis should focus on the OSD Staff and activities; Joint Staff and activities; service headquarters staffs and their field operating agencies; staff support activities; and direct supporting units, service commands, and Defense agencies and their missions, functions and facilities, owned or leased in the NCR. Analysis opportunities may include:
    (1) Assessment of the need for the presence of these activities in the NCR and options for realignment out of the NCR.
    (2) Elimination of all leased space in the NCR.
    (3) Examination of the potential for consolidation of joint and service activities in the NCR as a base cluster. (Atch 1 2003 List #17)

137. Evaluate Military Air Traffic Control (ATC) activities and locations. This analysis would identify BRAC implications for military ATC facilities. Potential issues include:
    (A) Establishment of a single executive agent for military ATC.
    (B) Regionalization and/or consolidation of ATC.